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
THE
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PREFACE.

THE great European conflict which gives its name to the present volume of *Our History* had a complicated origin, an unprecedented range, and far-reaching consequences. The story of its origin reaches back into a period dealt with in an earlier division of this work—whether the Thirty Years' War be regarded, in the airy phrase uttered on a memorable occasion by Lord Beaconsfield, as a war of succession for a duchy near Schleswig-Holstein, or as the inevitable result of deep-rooted religious differences not to be settled by ambiguous parchment compromises, or as the outburst of the storm brewed by militant Calvinism, or finally as the opportunity cautiously prepared and still more cautiously allowed to mature by the far-sighted statesmanship of France. After the War had broken out, not in the west but in an eastern border-land of the Empire, it gradually absorbed into itself all the local wars of Europe. The quarrels of the Alpine leagues and those about the Mantuan succession, the rivalries of the Scandinavian north and of the Polish north-east, the struggle, only temporarily suspended, of the United Provinces against Spain, the perennial strife between Spain and France for predominance in Italy and elsewhere—all contributed to the sweep of the current. Even the Ottoman Empire was concerned in its progress; for the "Turco-Calvinistic" combination announced by the pamphleteers was by no means a mere hallucination. "All the wars that are on foot in Europe," wrote Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna in 1628, "have been fused together, and have become a single war."

There was one exception which the Swedish King did not live to witness—the great English Civil War, which ran its course side by side with the last years of the Continental conflict, without at any point intersecting it. In the later years of the reign of her first Stewart King, England might have decisively influenced the great issues of

European politics; but James I missed the chance of harmonising the interests of his dynasty with the religious sympathies of the nation; and the opportunity was, however anxiously he desired it, never recovered by the unfortunate Charles I. Thus the history of England, with that of Scotland and Ireland, ran its course apart.

The vicissitudes of the Continental conflict here narrated were so many and so tremendous as constantly to transform the designs of the belligerent Powers, and often to modify materially the purposes of the personages most actively concerned in the course of affairs. It thus frequently becomes difficult to judge the chief actors on the scene with either consistency or equity. Leibniz (in a passage of his celebrated memorandum proposing a French expedition to Egypt) points out how the Habsburg Emperors Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III, at first merely intent on the defence of their own dominions, and then upon the pursuit of their assailants, were afterwards against their own will, as foe joined foe, drawn into "*progressus ultiores*," till their unexpected successes combined with the fact of their Spanish kinship to bring into the field against them not only Protestant Kings and Princes, but well-nigh the whole of Europe. The designs of Gustavus Adolphus, definitely restricted at the outset, were progressively expanded, and, before they were stopped by death, had ceased to be fettered even by his long-standing compact with France. The schemes of Wallenstein, and even those of Bernard of Weimar, were similarly subject to almost continuous change.

The effects of the great European war call for no less attentive a study. The settlement of the Peace of Westphalia remained for more than a century and a half the norm of the international relations of the European States, and governed the *status Imperii* and that of its members; but the consequences of the War itself for Germany remained perceptible long after that settlement had been revised and recast, and even after the new German Empire of our own times had been established. In 1880, when Prince Bismarck was at the height of his power, the German Ambassador in London, Prince Hatzfeldt, as Lord Fitzmaurice relates, told Lord Granville that "Germany had not yet recovered from the effects of the Thirty and the Seven Years' Wars; and that a determination to prevent the recurrence of similar disasters ought still to be the keynote of German policy." The temporary ascendancy of Sweden in northern Europe, gained by her sword and by it to

be maintained or jeopardised; the enduring control over the political life of Western Europe at large, and even over parts of the Empire itself, secured to the French monarchy by the far-sighted policy of Richelieu, and of his disciple Mazarin; the slow but sure decay of Spain; the transfer of colonial power from her and Portugal to the United Provinces and England; the extraordinary prosperity of those Provinces and the consequent jealousy between them and their only Protestant rival; finally the downfall of the political influence of the Papacy, and the beginnings of a new era of religious thought to which the master-mind of Descartes pointed the way—all these historical phenomena are associated with the course and issue of the War, and may, in a wider or in a narrower sense, be reckoned among its consequences.

In bringing out the present volume, the Editors cannot but once more refer to a loss which they have suffered, together with all students of English history. It had been the hope of Lord Acton, and for a time it was ours, that the eminent historian of England under James I and Charles I, under the Commonwealth, and during the earlier part of the Protectorate, would have contributed to this work a complete summary of a period of English history to whose struggles we mainly owe the preservation of our constitutional liberties. But Dr S. R. Gardiner was only able to write for our *History* the first of the chapters undertaken by him, in which he gave proof of his close study of the connexion between English and Continental affairs. This chapter was printed in an earlier volume of this work; those dealing with the reign of Charles I and the ensuing years have been contributed by other writers, friends and fellow-workers of the historian whom we have lost.

A short chapter is added, commemorating a school of English poetry associated with much that was noblest in the ideas of the age that was passing away. Of Milton, solitary even in the midst of the conflict in which he bore a part, something more will be said in the volume of this *History* dealing with the age in which his greatest work saw the light. There also will be treated the great classical age of French literature, of which the beginnings fall within the period covered by our present volume.

In conclusion, we desire to call attention to an exceptional feature—and one which is intended to remain altogether exceptional—in the

Bibliographical portion of the present volume. The contemporary Histories of the Thirty Years' War, and many later works based upon these, are very largely indebted—not always to the advantage of unadulterated historical truth—to its pamphlet literature. Without some knowledge of that literature it is impossible to understand the force of the blasts of fierce hatred and wild fear which swept over a distracted nation; or to form a conception of the mass of misrepresentation, perversion and falsification with which the newsletters and historical narratives of the time had to deal. All the more necessary is an inspection of such genuine historical documents as still exist. To English students few of these, and only a small proportion of the vast pamphlet literature of the age, have hitherto been generally accessible. It seemed a fitting tribute to the memory of Lord Acton, the projector of this *History*, to utilise the noble collection of books brought together by him and now, thanks to the generous action of Mr Carnegie and of Mr John Morley, part of the Cambridge University Library, for the purpose of attempting what has never before been attempted in this country—a full bibliography of the Thirty Years' War, and more especially of its extant original documents and contemporary narrative and controversial literature. The first of the bibliographies in the present volume represents such an attempt. It does not claim to be exhaustive; but it is meant, taken in conjunction with the several bibliographies which follow, to be a step in that direction. The bibliography in question could not have been produced without the skilled aid of Miss A. M. Cooke, who under the general direction of the University Librarian is engaged in classifying and cataloguing Lord Acton's collection, and that of the Assistants working in this department. For this aid our sincere thanks are due. We venture to add that the study of modern history in our University and in this country will in our opinion benefit very greatly from the publication, which we trust is no longer distant, of the classified catalogue of the library of our late Regius Professor.

A. W. W.
G. W. P.
S. L.

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CORRIGENDA.

- p. 59, l. 10. *For March read May.*
 p. 59, l. 11. *For de Fargis read du Fargis.*
 p. 102, l. 18. *For Dithmarschen read Ditmarschen.*
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 p. 433, l. 7. *For December read May.*
 p. 603, l. 2. *For Ferdinand and Charles read Ferdinand Charles.*

CHAPTER I.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

It was not till five months after the death of the unhappy Emperor Rudolf II that, on June 13, 1612, his brother Matthias reached the height of his ambition by being elected to the Imperial throne. His candidature had been approved by all the other Archdukes; but the Spiritual Electors had caused delay by reverting to the idea of securing the succession to the more capable Archduke Albert, notwithstanding his renunciation of his rights and the Spanish Government's dislike of the project. The Temporal Electors, after discarding in turn the equally short-sighted notions of putting forward Maximilian of Bavaria and his namesake, the Austrian Archduke, settled down to a choice which, from the point of view of militant Protestantism, might suit a brief period of transition. Their action had been quickened by Klesl's management, and by the diplomatic exertions of Christian of Anhalt, seconded by those of the Margraves Joachim Ernest of Ansbach and George Frederick of Baden-Durlach.

But, although Matthias had come to be regarded as a necessity in various quarters, he counted few friends in any. The Spaniards hated him for his intervention in the affairs of the Netherlands, futile as it had proved. The Estates in Hungary and in the other lands subject to his House cherished no gratitude for his various concessions; his frequent haggings in the course of his bargains with them were known to have been inspired by his adviser Klesl, at heart a foe to that principle of home rule which Matthias had accepted in order to oust Rudolf from power. Moreover, Matthias, now a worn-out man of fifty-five, was really little better fitted than his predecessor for taking any part in the business of State—except that he was always ready to sign his name. He would have been only too glad to be left in peace and allowed to enjoy all that he had gained, and to saunter among the treasures which his elder brother had accumulated. Klesl was at heart reactionary; and the lack of principle inherent in Matthias' own character, the sense of power inspired in him by his election as Emperor, and the influence of his newly-married consort Anne, a daughter of the late Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol, alike inclined him to resistance against the

Protestant movement in the Habsburg dominions, albeit the main cause of his rise to supreme power. Thus his rule, at once weak and irritating, contributed to the failure of those hopes for the maintenance of peace in the Empire and in Europe which had accompanied his accession to the Imperial throne.

In 1612, while the *Letters of Majesty* accorded to Bohemia and Silesia might there seem to have established the rights of the Protestant Estates on an immovable basis, in Hungary the coronation of Matthias had been immediately followed by the emancipation of the Protestant congregations from episcopal control. The demands of the Moravian Protestants had been satisfied; and to his Austrian subjects Matthias had reluctantly made concessions which, though in part verbal only, seemed sufficient guarantees for the free exercise of their religion. Outside the Habsburg dominions the Union and the League, in which the forces of Protestant advance and Catholic reaction had been gradually finding their respective centres, at the time of the accession of Matthias seemed likely to sink back into inertia. In October, 1610, both bodies had agreed to dismiss their troops without loss of time; at Rothenburg in September, 1611, the Union had found its balance-sheet very unsatisfactory; and the burdens already borne by its members, the Palatinate in particular, caused a very general feeling on their part that the present was not a time for fresh efforts. Furthermore, the death of the Elector Palatine Frederick IV in September, 1610, had deprived the Union of its real head; and, in the following year, the Elector Christian II of Saxony had been succeeded by John George I, to whom the neutral attitude of his elder brother had been chiefly due and who was resolutely opposed to an aggressive Protestant policy, partly by reason of his antipathy against his Ernestine kinsmen, and against the Palatine and Brandenburg Houses (heightened in the latter case by his own Jülich-Cleves claims). Thus he had remained deaf even to the overtures of Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel, who was always prepared with a scheme of his own, and who had suggested the election of a Protestant Emperor in the person of the Saxon Elector himself.

Nor, since the assassination of Henry IV of France, were any hopes of substantial foreign support left to the Union, should it enter on a policy of action. Since the conclusion of their twelve years' truce with Spain in 1609, the States General were necessarily indisposed to any aggression on their own account, besides being distracted by internal differences and troubles. The policy of France was no longer directly antagonistic to that of Spain. The treaty of alliance which the Union after protracted negotiations concluded with England in April, 1612, was defensive only; it could not have been anything more, for James' marriage-negotiations with Philip III of Spain had already begun. Thus there seemed some chance that the policy which Klesl was urging on Matthias might prove successful; and that, while his immediate

subjects were appeased by conciliatory assurances, the Union might dissolve, and the League, from which Bavarian jealousy had excluded the head of the House of Austria, might follow suit. No consummation could better assure the preservation of the peace of the Empire, while at the same time strengthening the authority of its chief.

Yet all these calculations were delusive. In no part of the Habsburg dominions or of the Empire at large was there even an approach to mutual confidence between the parties. Matthias' understanding with the Austrian towns was verbal only. The inviolable compact between Crown and Estates in Bohemia—the *Letter of Majesty* itself—was already known to have a fatal flaw. As for the Union and the League, the advantages in an emergency of a ready-formed alliance had already been made so manifest that there could not be the faintest intention of putting an end to either association; and Maximilian of Bavaria was far too jealous of John, George of Saxony for a combination between the League and the Lutherans to be even conceivable. The Elector Palatine was hard pressed in his finances; but in the long run he must follow his destiny as the leading Calvinist Prince and the directions of the keeper of his political conscience, Anhalt, the activity of whose "chancery" had never been more intense or more concentrated on definite issues. Moreover, in 1614 the party of action made a distinct advance when the new Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg actually adopted Calvinism and his policy became identified with that of the Elector Palatine. As to foreign connexions, the pacific intentions of James I might reduce the significance of his treaty with the Union; but in the same year the negotiations were completed which in the following February (1613) led to the celebration, amidst the rejoicings of Protestant England, of the marriage of his only daughter Elizabeth to the young "Palsgrave"; and on his way home Frederick V induced the States General to conclude another defensive treaty with the Union, which was ratified in the following year. Clearly, the truce between Spain and the United Provinces was little likely to become a peace; the all-important border-question was still unsettled, and was before long to bring Spinola and Maurice of Nassau once more face to face. Though France and Spain seemed settling down into amity and were soon to be bound together by two royal marriages, yet there could never be any real unity of purpose or policy between them; and their intimacy only served to revive in Philip III aspirations which, vain as they were, constituted a real menace to the peace of Europe.

So far as the internal condition of the Empire was concerned, it was rapidly becoming incompatible with the continuance of tranquillity; and the deep-seated disturbances in its religious, political, and social life were alike making for war.

The religious question, which more than half a century ago the two-faced agreement of the Peace of Augsburg had sought to regulate,

was still unsettled; and the aspirations of the Catholic Reaction, together with the ambitions of the militant section of the Protestants, alike ignored in that compact, remained still unsatisfied. Never before had religious differences asserted themselves with so embittered vehemence, as if pen and speech in their innumerable smittings of the adversary were striving to anticipate the decision of the sword. The age was still enamoured of religious controversy; and, while theological learning still dominated the higher education imparted in the Universities to increasing numbers of the upper as well as of the middle classes, its teaching mainly busied itself with the proof (among the Protestants necessarily the Scriptural proof) of dogma. To these tendencies the educational system of the secondary schools, which had been developed with notable vigour, especially in Lutheran Saxony and Württemberg, readily adapted itself. Never, too, had the Church of Rome been so eagerly and persistently intent upon strengthening her influence by means of her educational work; and in this direction the Jesuits laboured with a success far greater than that which attended some of their amateur efforts in diplomacy. In the south-German, Austrian, and Rhenish Provinces of their Order were to be found many of its Colleges, of which since 1573 the *Collegium Germanicum* at Rome was both the ensample and the feeder; in several of the southern Universities most of the theological and the philosophical chairs were filled by Jesuit occupants, and the secondary education of Catholic Germany was largely falling under their control. The lower classes of the population they were content, in the south-west in particular, to leave to the Capuchins, a popular Order by both tradition and habit, with a predilection for camps and soldiery, and an acknowledged claim, which stood them in good stead as diplomatic agents, to be everybody's friend.

Thus, without its being necessary to attribute the agitation of the public mind to the operations of the Rosicrucians or other occult societies, the literature of Catholic and Protestant polemics, and the discussion of the various religious issues in academic disputations, swelled to unexampled dimensions in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War. Among the pamphlets of the period, the Catholic *Turbatus imperii Romani status* (1613) excited extraordinary attention, by tracing the unhappy divisions in the Empire to the irruption of heresy into its system, and latterly to the insatiable determination of the Calvinists to share in the benefits of the Religious Peace; and the Union at its Nürnberg meeting in the following year resolved to issue a quasi-official rejoinder. But the more fundamental differences between Catholics and Protestants were not neglected; and the ceaseless efforts of the Jesuit controversialists in their Bavaria and neighbouring centres, which culminated in Jacob Gretser of Ingolstadt's *Defensiones* of the Popes, of his own Order, and of its great luminary Bellarmine, met with the fullest response from the Lutheran theologians of Württemberg

and Saxony. The conversion to Rome in 1614 of Wolfgang William of Neuburg gave rise to a prolonged outburst of barren invective; and in 1615, having succeeded to the government of the duchy, he caused a religious disputation to be held in the presence of himself as a kind of *corpus delicti*. As is usual in seasons of embittered theological strife, the transition was easy to coarse historic recrimination and malodorous personal scurrility—intellectual degradations which helped to prepare the national mind for the brutalising effects of war.

The religious as well as the political differences that were distracting the Empire had by no means only brought Catholics and Protestants into mutual opposition. The Catholics themselves were not united either in action or in aim; and the trimming policy which Klesl was commending to his master, and which found a willing agent in the Protestant Controller-General (*Reichspfennigmeister*) Zacharias Geitzkofler, was strongly resented by the Jesuits, whose influence was paramount with both Maximilian of Bavaria and Ferdinand of Styria. But more fundamental was the fissure continuously widening between the two divisions of the Protestant body, the Lutherans and the Calvinists. The enduring antagonism between them was not wholly or even mainly due to political motives or dynastic interests—to the rivalry for the Protestant hegemony between Saxony and the Palatinate, the competition of interests involved in the Jülich-Cleves difficulty, the conflicting views and sentiments as to the Imperial authority and the preservation of the integrity of the Empire and of its foreign policy. As has been already noted, Lutheran and Calvinist religious opinion had alike become more rigid, and consequently more combative; with the Lutherans it had been stiffened by the endeavour to enforce binding instruments of uniformity, while among the Calvinists the violent internal struggle had already set in which was to end in a drastic “expurgation” of most of the “Reformed” Churches of Europe. But as between the two religious communities, the opposition was radical; Luther had never made a secret of it, or of the fact that its roots lay in the doctrine of the Eucharist; and since his death it had steadily progressed to its logical results. Over the heads of the few who perceived the consequences to which open discord in the face of the common foe must inevitably lead, the polemical current poured its eddying waves, the Saxon theologians contending against the north-German Calvinists now settling at Berlin, and Heidelberg (quite literally) taking up the cudgels against Tübingen. Among the Lutheran leaders must be mentioned Hoë von Hohenegg, who as chief Court-preacher to the Elector John George held a position which, in accordance with the ideas of the age as to the relations between Church and State, made him the arbiter of the ecclesiastical, and frequently of the political, affairs of the Saxon electorate; and, among the Calvinist leaders, Abraham Scultetus, a Heidelberg divine who had

accompanied the Palsgrave on his wedding journey to England and was to remain his chief ecclesiastical adviser at Prague. How these two "confessors" loved each other may be gathered from Hoë von Hohenegg's counter-blast to the sermon delivered by Sultetus at Heidelberg on the occasion of the centenary jubilee of the Reformation, which by the irony of fate occurred in the year before the outbreak of the last and longest of the Religious Wars.

Neither in the Lutheran nor in the Calvinistic parts of the Empire had that Reformation led, as it should have led, to a widespread growth of the inner religious life. The inquisitorial powers of the Church of Rome, which in the lands where the Counter-reformation had restored or heightened her authority she wielded with increased zeal and force, had in the Protestant lands been transferred to the territorial governments. Throughout the Empire the exercise of these powers, while materially interfering with the ordinary administration of justice, weighed heavily upon almost every relation of private life, thus calling forth a sense of anxiety and unrest which contrasted painfully with the "merrier" and more tranquil conditions of the past. Most conspicuously was this the case with regard to the wide range of beliefs and practices covered by the terms magic and witchcraft. In the earlier half of the sixteenth century the temporal Courts had taken over the task of maintaining and applying the definition of the *crimen magiae* promulgated by papal authority; and literature and art had brought as many faggots to the fire of persecution as they were capable of furnishing. There was no difference in sentiment or in practice on this head between the Protestant and the Catholic parts of the Empire. Yet it was not till the period with whose closing years we are now concerned—a period extending from about 1580 to about 1620—that the growth of superstition and of delusions, often shared by the accused with the accusers, became epidemic in Germany. The fury of persecution which accompanied this revived rage both in the ecclesiastical lands of the Middle Rhine and Franconia and in the temporal territories from Brunswick to the Breisgau, while asserting itself, though with less savage violence, alike in Lutheran Saxony and in Catholic Bavaria. The perturbation created by these proceedings, and the spirit of unreasoning terror and reckless self-defence which they aroused, beyond a doubt sensibly contributed to the widespread feeling of unrest, and to the general desire for remedies as violent as the evil itself. Among the Princes of the age we find every kind of fixed delusion—from the visions of Christian of Denmark to the ravings of John Frederick of Weimar. Nor should the inveterate endurance and rank growth of countless petty superstitions be overlooked, which seemed to place life and death under the control of dealers in astrological certificates and magical charms, and, during the long war now at hand, was to count for much in the recklessness of the soldiery and of the populations at their mercy.

To the pervading spirit of religious discord and moral disquietude there was in this age of decline added the general consciousness of a continuous decrease of material prosperity throughout the Empire. During a long period, in which neither war nor epidemics had prevailed on a large scale (although from 1570 onwards several parts of Germany had, in consequence of a succession of years of dearth, been subject to visitations of the plague), the population seems on the whole to have gradually increased, notwithstanding the fall in longevity to which already Luther bore regretful testimony. The great and often sudden rise of prices was due not only to a lessening of the productive powers of the country and its inhabitants, but also to violent derangements in the monetary system of the Empire, largely brought about by the constant deterioration of the silver currency, due in part to the decrease in the native production of the metal, but mainly to the steady debasement of the smaller silver coins issued by every potentate, large or small. Hence a most active speculation in coins both by the great bank at Nürnberg (the clearing-house of Germany) and by less honest enterprise. In 1603 the Diet allowed the Turkish aid to be paid in foreign coin, and ten years later it sanctioned the acceptance of money at its current value. Clipping of the coin became a common abuse; and the *Kippers and Wippers*, as they were called, grew into one of the pests of the national life. So terrible was the distress caused by the systematic deterioration of the monetary medium, that in the decade preceding the Thirty Years' War a very different war seemed on the eve of breaking out—an insurrection of the lower classes at large in both town and country, not only impoverished but frenzied by their utter uncertainty as to the value of the money with which they had to purchase their hard-earned bread.

Inasmuch as among the middle and higher classes intemperance in both eating and drinking—the national vice so largely accountable for the shortlivedness deplored by Luther—as well as extravagance in dress, were on the increase, indebtedness had spread in every social sphere; and it had become common to depend on loans which usury, and Jewish usury in particular, was ready to supply, though at the usual risk of infuriating the population against its supposed despoilers. Any sudden pressure such as that of a great war was certain to entail a financial crisis; yet, as capital grew in the hands of neither rulers nor ruled, while foreign trade continued to diminish, no restraining influence of commercial or industrial prosperity made for the maintenance of peace. The home trade was sinking at the same time, probably less on account of the detested foreign pedlars than of the rings which bought up wares and artificially raised prices. The native industries, too, were rapidly falling, more especially the great mining industry, for various reasons, including speculation on a large scale, and with results which partly accounted for the lamentable decrease in the production of silver.

Trade with foreign countries shared in this decadence. The great days of the Hanseatic League were at an end. Democratized Lübeck had failed in her final struggle to recover the control of the trade with the Scandinavian Powers; afterwards she had lost her hold over Livonian and Russian commerce. Meanwhile the old competitors, England and the United Provinces, made a series of fresh advances. In 1567 the English Merchant Adventurers set up their staple at Hamburg, and after forced migrations to Elbing and Emden, and a prolonged settlement at Stade, were in 1611 once more allowed by the Hamburgers, who were themselves now doing good business as middlemen, to settle in their city and to trade from it under favourable conditions, while enjoying free exercise of their national religion. In the meantime the Dutch Baltic trade, especially in corn and timber, assumed very large proportions, though these have perhaps been overstated. Even the Spanish trade the Hanse towns had to share with the Dutch after the conclusion of the truce of 1609. Lübeck allied herself with the Dutch against the overbearing maritime policy of Christian IV of Denmark in 1613; and three years later, together with other sympathising Hanseatic cities, ratified a twelve years' alliance with the United Provinces, whose intervention had helped to relieve the sister Hanse town of Brunswick in her struggle against her territorial lord, Duke Frederick Ulric. But neither Lübeck nor the Hanseatic League derived any lasting benefit from these transactions; to Lübeck (though from this period date some of her choicest monumental glories) the *dominium maris Baltici* was lost for ever, and the League at large was rapidly falling asunder. Its foreign factories were one after the other closed, or deprived of their chief privileges; the fines which furnished a large proportion of the League's income were left unpaid; in 1604, when the last official registers were drawn up, 53 nominal but only 14 actual members remained. The inner association of six cities, formed mainly for the relief of Brunswick, had broken up. The League itself was not formally dissolved, and its final meeting was not held till about half a century later (1669) when practically all that remained was an association for particular purposes between Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen.

While the early years of the new century thus witnessed a continual weakening of common interests bound up with the peace and prosperity of the Empire, no resistless motive or common peril survived to impress upon its members the necessity of cohesion. The gradual decline of the Ottoman Power had been manifested by its acceptance of the Peace of Zsitva-Torok (1606), which, although failing to secure to Hungary, and through it to the Empire, a well-protected frontier, signified the first signal success achieved by western Christendom against its arch-foe since Lepanto. Sully's plan of a European *république très chrétienne*, however remote from the domain of practical politics,

at least showed the expulsion of the Turks from Europe to be in the eyes of contemporary European statesmanship a possible hypothesis; and when in 1613 many of the Estates of the Empire treated Matthias' application for aid against the Turks as a mere blind to cover purposes of his own, there was at all events no longer any serious apprehension of immediate danger from the Porte. .

Least of all were those who were prepared for their own ends to plunge the Empire into war likely to be restrained by any pious or respectful feeling towards the authority of the Emperor himself. Not that the feeling of loyalty had wholly died out among either Princes or cities; but it only counted in the game when, as in the case of John George of Saxony, it cooperated with other motives, religious, dynastic, and personal. The awe inspired by the political greatness of Charles V, the respect secured by Ferdinand I's subordination of his own wishes to the interests of the Empire, the goodwill which could hardly be refused to Maximilian II's kindly latitudinarianism—had come to be forgotten in the hopelessness of a rule so impotent and so perverse as that of Rudolf II. How could the elements of conservative fidelity thus dissipated be reunited and vitalised anew by such a prince as Matthias, himself unstable at heart and controlled by no influence save that of an ecclesiastic whom Catholics and Protestants, Archdukes and Estates, could alike find plausible reasons for distrusting?

Yet, as has already been seen, no serious impediment was in May, 1612, placed in the way of the election of Matthias; and, even in the matter of the *Wahlcapitulation* imposed upon him by the Electors, the opportunity was lost of obtaining important concessions from so pliant a candidate at the moment of least resistance. It was intended to secure a reconstitution of the Emperor's supreme ministerial council, the *Reichshofrath*, whose encroachments in the previous reign had been so notorious; and, above all, the Protestants desired the extension of the system of Imperial indulgences (*Indulte*) to the administrators of bishoprics and abbacies, who would have thus gained seats in the Diet and assured a working majority to its Protestant members. But Saxony at the last rallied to the Catholic side; and these concessions were not exacted. The reorganisation of the *Reichshofrath* with the approval of the Electoral body was however accepted in principle; and the assent of the reigning Emperor was declared to be no longer indispensable to the election of his successor. This innovation might prove of moment.

For the present the election of Matthias as Emperor made no change in the existing state of things. Though really in a minority in the Imperial Diet, the Catholics both here and in the great tribunals and councils of the Empire were still artificially enabled to exercise the sway proper to a majority. Neither Matthias nor Klesl could rise to the conception of an Imperial State or national monarchy covering and controlling the aspirations of both Catholics and Protestants; nor can it

be denied that such an ideal, which the conditions of the Empire and of the Habsburg lands were alike unfit to meet, could only have been realised by statesmanship of the rarest power. Yet Matthias and Klesl, or at all events the latter, the sincerity of whose Catholic sympathies it would be futile to question, saw clearly enough into the situation to be ready to make concessions to the Protestant majority, without neglecting the common interests of the Empire.

With intentions such as these Matthias met his first Diet, which was opened at Ratisbon on August 13, 1613. He declared himself prepared for certain reforms in the *Reichskammergericht*, and appealed for a grant in aid against the Turks, who were again encroaching on the Hungarian frontier and manifestly intending to supplant the Prince of Transylvania, Gabriel Báthory, a dependent of the Emperor, by his own former follower, Bethlen Gabor. But, while the Catholic Princes proved recalcitrant, being rendered suspicious (Bavaria and Mainz in particular) by Klesl's overtures to them to allow the Protestant Administrator of Magdeburg to take his seat at the Diet, the conciliatory attitude of the Emperor and his adviser encouraged the Protestants to raise their terms. They would not hear of any Turkish grant until their demands, of which the maintenance of the Religious Peace was merely the first, should have been satisfied. Though the Emperor allowed a conference to take place under the presidency of Archduke Maximilian between his own councillors and ambassadors of the Corresponding Princes, the latter were not even satisfied by the Imperial promise of a "commission of composition," as it was to be called, to be assembled at Speier in the following year, in which both sides were to be equally represented. Thus, when at the beginning of September the news came that a Turkish army of 80,000 men had actually begun military operations, and when a majority consisting of the Catholics, with Electoral Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt, voted a considerable grant in aid, the Opposition recorded its protest; and a practical deadlock was once more established in the business of the Empire.

It so happened that about this very time the adoption by the two "possessing" Princes, Wolfgang William of Neuburg and John Sigismund of Brandenburg, of the Catholic and the Calvinist faith respectively, gave rise to great agitation in the Jülich-Cleves duchies, in the neighbouring parts of the Empire and across the border. As has already been seen, a renewal of hostilities between Spain and the United Provinces was only with difficulty prevented, through the good offices of France and England, by the Treaty of Xanten (November, 1614); but both Spanish and Dutch influence continued to operate, and in 1616 (the year of the treaty between the States General and the Hanse towns) Frederick Henry of Orange occupied Herford in Ravensburg, and a Spanish garrison Soest in Mark. Meanwhile at Aachen, where the Palatine Government, charged with the vicariate in this part of the

Empire during the interregnum, had allowed the Protestants to recover their ascendancy, Matthias had sought to arrest this change by reverting to the prohibitory mandates of his predecessor; and he had adopted a similar policy of repression at Cologne, where the Catholic town council had procured an injunction from the *Reichshofrath* against an obnoxious Protestant settlement at Mülheim on the right bank of the Rhine below the city. Thus the force of events and the inconsistency inherent in the policy of the Emperor and his chief minister kept alive in the north-west the very religious conflict which at Ratisbon they were seeking to allay.

Nor were they more fortunate at home in Austria, where the Protestants both entertained an inveterate suspicion of Klesl and feared the growth of the rigidly Catholic party at Vienna which abominated his present policy of concession. In August, 1614, representatives of all the lands under the rule of the German Habsburgs (the Bohemian Estates refusing to send more than a deputation, so as to safeguard their independence) assembled at Linz—the first *Reichstag*, as it has been called, of the Austrian dominions. Besides the Emperor and Archdukes Maximilian and Ferdinand, Zuñiga and Count de Bucquoy (a pupil of Parma) appeared here as representing Philip of Spain and Archduke Albert. But all this dynastic display was rendered futile by the resentment with which the Austrian Protestants met the manoeuvres of their familiar adversary, Klesl, and the ill-disguised repugnance of the Hungarians to the Habsburg rule. They declined to be moved even by the fact of the establishment of Bethlen Gabor as Prince of Transylvania under Turkish suzerainty; and Matthias had to enter into negotiations. These, after being arrested for a time by the war party, ended with the conclusion of the Peace of Tyrnau (May 6, 1615), in a secret supplement to which Bethlen Gabor promised to yield ultimate allegiance to the Emperor. A treaty with the Turks on the basis of that of Zsitva-Torok speedily followed (July), and was renewed in 1616 and, after a change of Sultan, in 1618. Whether the Austrian Government observed perfect loyalty in the matter of these transactions, or not, their result was to keep Bethlen Gabor more or less quiet during the troubled years which preceded the Bohemian War. The importance of this diplomatic success was increased by the circumstance that about this time (1616-7) Archduke Ferdinand of Styria, and through him the Austrian Government, were hampered by a conflict with Venice, due in part to the inroads on Dalmatia of the Uskoks, a piratical frontier population of fugitives from many Slavonic lands settled in eastern Carniola and Croatia, which only came to an end with the Peace of Madrid (September, 1617, ratified in February, 1618).

Meanwhile, both Union and League shrank from any forward movement. A meeting of the Union was held at Heilbronn in September and October, 1614, with the object of strengthening its financial basis and developing its system of foreign alliances. But nothing came of it

except the ratification of the existing defensive treaty with the States General, and some desultory negotiations with the enterprising Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, whom the ingenious Maurice of Hesse had already contrived to interest in German affairs, but whose attention was as yet mainly directed to Poland. In the following year the towns belonging to the Union agreed upon an annual contribution towards the requirements of the Dutch treaty; but the attempts made at meetings held at Nürnberg and Hanover to extend the Union broke down—in the latter instance because of the repellent attitude of Electoral Saxony. At Nürnberg the Union displayed its willingness to fall in with Klesl's scheme of a meeting of Catholic and Protestant Estates, for a "composition" or free settlement of their differences; but the Catholics would listen to no such proposal, and the *via media* of an ordinary *Kurfürstentag* suggested by Klesl likewise fell through. The Union, in fact, instead of gaining, was losing strength. The actual secession of Neuburg was followed by the virtual defection of Brandenburg, whose demand that the Union should declare itself bound to defend his "possession" of part of the Jülich-Cleves duchies was refused at another Heilbronn meeting (April, 1617). Here, though nearly all the members were represented, the towns (always the restraining element) outnumbered the Princes in the proportion of seventeen to nine, and the constitution of the Union was altered to that of a purely defensive confederation. And, even with its numbers reduced and its purposes restricted, the Union was at Heilbronn prolonged for three years only (to May, 1621). These facts go far to account for the "desertion" of the Elector Palatine by the Union after the Bohemian catastrophe; yet the Palatine clique and its guiding spirit, Christian of Anhalt, were largely responsible for the timorous policy of Heilbronn.

Nor can the League be said to have made better preparation for the conflict whose imminence was no longer to be ignored. In the counsels of this body a struggle had for some time been in progress between Maximilian of Bavaria and the party (headed by Mainz) desirous of admitting at least a portion of the Austrian hereditary lands into the League and placing them under a third Directory, that of Archduke Maximilian. The League, over whose action a certain control was to be given to the Emperor and into which even Protestants were, if they chose, to be admitted, would thus have become an organisation for the defence of the Empire and the maintenance of the Imperial authority; and the part played in it by the Duke of Bavaria could not have been more than subordinate. Consequently, though this reconstitution had been agreed upon at a meeting held at Ratisbon at the close of the Diet (September, 1613), it was repudiated by Maximilian; and at Augsburg (March, 1614) he formed with the Franconian and Swabian prelates a fresh association on the basis of the old Munich alliance. Thus, with the Rhenish and Austrian Directories left ineffective, the old League was

at a standstill; and there only remained its new and narrow substitute as the nucleus of future developments. At the time of the threatened renewal of the conflict on the Lower Rhine which was averted by the Peace of Xanten, this new League, at a meeting held at Ingolstadt in July, 1614, had agreed to send aid to Wolfgang William, while the Union (in accordance with the Heilbronn resolution) held altogether aloof.

Thus the final cause of the outbreak of the War was after all to be found within the Habsburg dominions, where Klesl's policy was openly to suffer shipwreck. This policy had never been whole-heartedly adopted by the Emperor Matthias; to Klesl himself, however, the logic of facts seems at last to have brought home the equity of the Protestant demands. But it was too late. The party which, inspired by the Jesuits, would listen to no abatement of the pretensions of the Church of Rome, and to which in the disputes among the Estates of the Empire "composition" was an abomination, while at home it abhorred concessions to the Protestants, all the more as implying the grant of autonomy in other matters, was resolved on making a clear sweep of Klesl and his policy of conciliation. This party was headed by Archduke Maximilian and by Archduke Ferdinand of Styria, whose succession, as the only member of the House having issue, to the Habsburg dominions and contingently to the Imperial throne, was regarded as a settled affair, since both Maximilian and Albert had renounced their rights in his favour. Ferdinand, who attributed the inadequacy of support which had prolonged his war with Venice to ill-will on the part of Klesl, still more resented the supposed machinations for delaying the steps that must precede his election as Roman King. While his party insisted upon the convocation of a meeting of Electors (*Kurfürstentag*) which should confine itself entirely to the question of the Imperial succession, Archduke Maximilian in February, 1616, submitted to the Emperor a memorandum, which set in a fuller light the aspirations of the Catholic Hotspurs. The Emperor was in this paper advised to levy an army at the cost of Spain, and to place it under the irresponsible command of Ferdinand for the purpose of settling the perennial Jülich-Cleves question out of hand. Here, then, was the spectre of war summoned into the Empire, with the unconcealed object of overawing those who had to choose the successor to the Imperial Crown. In the meantime Archduke Maximilian pointed out the necessity of at once securing the succession of the future Emperor in Bohemia and Hungary.

Thus the question of the succession forced itself to the front, notwithstanding the persistent endeavours of Klesl to pursue his efforts for a compromise or "composition," to which the Spiritual Electors on the one hand and Electoral Saxony on the other might perhaps be induced to assent. An adherence to this policy was irreconcilable with the definite choice of Ferdinand as the successor of Matthias; and a campaign was opened against the Cardinal by Archduke Maximilian

and his party, who shrank neither from calumny, nor, on one occasion, it was said, even from the use of powder and shot. They were not silenced by the publication, in 1616, of the nomination of Klesl as Cardinal. In June, 1617, they contrived the conclusion of a secret compact with Philip III of Spain, who had at first thought of making over his supposed hereditary claims on the Bohemian and Hungarian Crowns to his second son, Don Carlos. He was now bought off by the promised transfer in the event of Matthias' death, in addition to the Imperial fiefs of Piombino and Finale, already in Spanish hands, of certain Alsatian rights and territories. The annals of the House of Habsburg contain few transactions which have more tended to lower its credit with German patriots; for this arrangement signified that the Austrian dynasty was for its own purposes prepared to grant to Spain a definite foothold on German soil, and a most opportune vantage-ground for the coming war.

The process which, rightly or wrongly, Klesl had been charged with postponing, could now take its course. In Bohemia, as we shall see, the Catholic party of action gained a transient success. The Hungarian Diet, which met on March 23, 1618, proved less easy to be managed; and after two months of debate the Government consented to accept the elective principle, on confirming which Ferdinand was proclaimed King (May 16). He was crowned on July 1, after making a series of concessions, including the restoration of the office of Palatine as an effective regency. Before the next Hungarian Diet assembled (May 31, 1619), Ferdinand had succeeded as King of Hungary in Matthias' stead, and the Thirty Years' War had broken out in Bohemia.

The Bohemian troubles, which must be briefly summarised at this point, were in their origin due to the course pursued by the Government after the Protestant majority had secured the *Letter of Majesty* and the agreement supplementary to it. Although it was impossible altogether to exclude Protestants from the high offices of State, the Catholics continued under Matthias, as under Rudolf, to control the administration; and their attacks upon the charter cherished with the utmost warmth by the great body of the nation were not long in beginning. Inasmuch as they could not touch the privileges granted to the royal towns, or prevent the Protestants from speedily erecting a couple of churches in the capital itself, they soon set about tampering with the rights of the ecclesiastical towns, though, as was seen in an earlier volume, Bohemian official and ordinary parlance designated both species under the single name "royal." After an early Protestant encroachment at Braunau (in the north-eastern part of Bohemia) had been properly repressed on the complaint of the Benedictine Abbot from whom the Braunauers held their lands, they began, in reliance on the supplementary agreement, to build a new Protestant church; whereupon the Abbot procured from King Matthias an ordinance prohibiting further building and declaring it unwarranted by the *Letter of Majesty*. A meeting,

consisting of the Protestant councillors and officials, and six deputies from every Circle in the kingdom—about a hundred in all,—was lawfully summoned to Prague by the *Defensores* appointed under the *Letter of Majesty*, and this assembly, while bidding the Braunauers go on building their church, apprised the Regents (who presided over the government in the absence of the King) that the Protestant Estates intended to adhere to the plain sense of their religious charter (November, 1611). After this the Braunauers were left unmolested.

But the partisans of the Catholic Reaction, headed by the new Archbishop of Prague, were not to be thus easily repressed, and after several previous encroachments provided a parallel case to that of Braunau at Klostergrab in the north-west. The Protestant citizens of this little town, which claimed to be free but stood under the lordship of the monastery of Ossegg, whose revenues belonged to the Archbishop, deeply resented his high-handed closing of a church which they had built for their worship, and their being forced by him to attend the Catholic services (December, 1614). This time the *Defensores* protested in vain; and, though the Protestant grievances were brought forward at a General Diet of the Bohemian Estates and those of the incorporated lands held early in the following summer, the Government of Matthias, who had himself come to Prague, peremptorily ordered the closing of the Protestant churches at both Braunau and Klostergrab. A joint representation to Matthias by all the higher Protestant officials of Bohemia was equally ineffectual; and by the end of 1616 the first and governing clause of the great *Letter* had been directly violated by a number of Catholic incumbents, who flatly prohibited their parishioners from attending Protestant worship outside their parishes.

But the movement was not at an end, and in the opinion of the Protestant leaders the future was their own. Already in 1614 Thurn had assured the Elector of Saxony that the old hereditary union (*Erbeinigung*) between the two lands was unforgotten in Bohemia, on whose throne it was desired to place him. Other speculations and combinations as to that throne were rife during the years next ensuing; and about February, 1617, Ludwig Camerarius, now one of the most active Palatine councillors and afterwards the mainstay of his master's cause in its darkest days, put in an appearance at Prague.

Still, no definite plan of action was laid, and no candidate for the Bohemian throne was distinctly selected. Of a sudden, into the midst of an atmosphere overcharged with electricity, came the news that the Bohemian Diet was summoned for June 5, 1617, to appoint a King. The united House of Habsburg had resolved to make sure of the future as well as of the present, and, taking its stand upon the plain principle of hereditary right, to force upon the Bohemian Estates, still unprepared with a plan of resistance, and upon the people, not yet ready for a revolution, Archduke Ferdinand, the pupil of the Jesuits, the religious

expurgator of his Styrian duchy, the destined champion of a systematic policy of Catholic reaction and centralised monarchical rule. In Austria, early in this year, Tschernembl, the leader of the "Horners" as the Protestant Estates were called after their secession from Vienna to Horn in 1608, had informed an enquiring emissary of Christian of Anhalt, that, if the House of Austria should lose its German dominions on the death of Matthias, they would demand as ruler over these a German Prince, capable of leading them against both Pope and Turk. Evidently, then, the settlement of the Bohemian succession involved even more than the political and religious future of Bohemia and the "incorporated" lands.

The Catholic party in Bohemia included, as has been seen, the majority of the great Crown officials—among them the High Chancellor, Zdenko von Lobkowitz, together with Jaroslav von Martinitz, still no less resolute a Catholic partisan than he had been in the days of the *Letter of Majesty*, and Count William Slawata, a convert from the community of the Bohemian Brethren to the Church of Rome, and now one of the most zealous of her champions. They counted a considerable number of adherents among the lords (*Herren*), and were unanimous for Ferdinand. On the other hand, the large majority of the Knights and towns, while in favour of postponing the election of a King till after the death of Matthias, had arrived at no settled agreement as to the course to be pursued afterwards. The government party were therefore well advised in securing the succession of Ferdinand with the least possible loss of time, and in seizing the opportunity of establishing once for all the hereditary character which, by virtue both of a series of treaties and of ordinary practice, attached to the Bohemian Crown, notwithstanding the principle of freedom of election set forth by the Golden Bull and actually or nominally reasserted in the case of Ferdinand I and in that of Matthias himself. At the Diet of 1617 the attempt of the Protestant Opposition under Thurn to resist the assertion of the hereditary principle of succession broke down, largely owing to the determination of Lobkowitz; and Ferdinand was almost unanimously accepted by the Estates as King-designate of Bohemia. As such, custom demanded that he should, not confirm existing rights and privileges, but promise to confirm them when he should have actually assumed the government. But the Protestant majority, after their pusillanimous failure in the matter of the election itself, were determined to extract from Ferdinand an explicit guarantee which should cover the whole scope of the *Letter of Majesty*. The Catholics as a body allowed the required formula to pass, only Martinitz and Slawata protesting; and the latter adding certain ominous words expressing his disregard for the precious religious charter. Klesl's caution, however, frustrated any attempt to carry this disregard into action; and at his coronation on July 19 Ferdinand expressed his satisfaction at having gained the Bohemian Crown without doing violence to his conscience.

The Silesian, Moravian, and Lusatian Diets speedily followed suit in accepting his succession. In Austria, on the other hand, where nothing beyond the act of Homage could be required, he postponed asking for it, in the belief that after the death of Matthias it would be easier to avoid the concessions made by him to the Estates in 1609.

The most important question of all, that of Ferdinand's succession to the Imperial throne, could now be taken in hand; and, immediately after his coronation at Prague, Matthias had accompanied him to Dresden, where they had easily assured themselves of the goodwill of the Elector, John George (August, 1617). A *Kurfürstentag* for the election of a successor to the Imperial throne, and, in pursuance of Klesl's cherished policy of compromise, for the simultaneous discussion of grievances, was soon summoned for February 1, 1618.

The main opposition which the proposal of Ferdinand's Imperial succession had to overcome was that of the Palatine party, of which the young Elector was the necessary figure-head, and which had never ceased to keep in view its main purpose—the entire exclusion of the House of Habsburg from the Imperial throne. Christian of Anhalt's chancery was always at work; and Matthias had no reason for supposing that either the Palatine councillors or the Corresponding Princes, whose action they continued to direct, had been secured by the policy of compromise. Anhalt had been in communication with Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden as early as 1614, and in 1617 Monthoux, an envoy of Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, negotiated a treaty for military aid with the States General and the Union, while Anhalt's eldest son entered into the Savoy service. As for the young Elector Palatine, who in 1614 had assumed the government of his inheritance, though he was something of a soldier and something of a theologian, his excellent education had failed to implant in him independence of judgment; while the rare natural vigour of his English consort as yet chiefly found vent in the eager pursuit of pleasure and in extravagant display. Anhalt had long indulged in the confident expectation that on the death of Matthias the Bohemian Crown would drop into the Elector Palatine's lap; no secret had been made of these hopes when Frederick appeared as a suitor in England; and a few months after the marriage (April, 1613) James I avowed his opinion that in a few years his son-in-law would be King of Bohemia. But Christopher von Dohna had travelled in vain from Heidelberg to Prague and Dresden, and Ferdinand had been accepted as successor to the Bohemian throne. In the matter of the Imperial succession the Palatine Government, with which (especially since the marriage of Frederick's sister, Elizabeth Charlotte, to the Electoral Prince, George William of Brandenburg) the Elector John Sigismund's went hand in hand, had for some time favoured the scheme of bringing forward Maximilian of Bavaria. But though that Prince had reason for carefully watching the policy of the

House of Austria, he had no intention of listening to the voice of the charmer; and Anhalt now began to dangle the great prize before the roving eyes of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy. King James had no better advice to bestow on his son-in-law than that, if he could not gain over the majority of the electors to his side, he should accept the inevitable, and try to get as much as possible for his vote from Ferdinand. This was substantially the "composition" policy of Klesl, which ran counter to the schemes of Anhalt as it did to the resolve of Ferdinand's party. But, before the *Kurfürstentag* could meet to decide these issues, the news arrived that the agitation in Bohemia, instead of being repressed by the election of Ferdinand as successor to the throne, had once more swelled to the proportions of a national insurrection. It was made plain to Ferdinand, and his supporters recognised it, that, before seeking to compass the Imperial, he must make sure of the Bohemian Crown. Never before, nor for more than a century afterwards, did the literature of pamphlets in Germany reach the dimensions to which it attained in 1618, when something like eighteen hundred publications of this kind are stated to have flooded the book-market.

The consequences of the appointment of Ferdinand as successor to the Bohemian throne had not been long in declaring themselves. After some changes unfavourable to the Protestants had been made in the administration, the tone of the Catholic minority had waxed extremely confident. The *Letter of Majesty* and its authors were openly denounced; some peasants, settled on royal domains, who had refused to profess themselves Catholics, were driven into exile; and in the royal towns proper, a stop was put on the admission of Protestants to the civic franchise, and of course to their obtaining responsible administrative posts on the royal domains. In Prague itself, the almost wholly Protestant *Altstadt* was now ruled by a town council more than half Catholic in its composition; and the prevailing uneasiness became a panic, when (November, 1617) this town council declared its assent necessary for the appointment or dismissal of any parish priest, and when the foundation deeds of the numerous churches in Prague, for the most part Utraquist, were subjected to supervision by the royal judges, and payment from Catholic endowments was refused to the Protestant clergy. Similar proceedings took place in other royal towns; and it was clear that, as in the royal domains, their inhabitants were to lose the liberty of religious worship. Soon the Chancellor Lobkowitz took occasion to assume the censorship over all printed matter.

Shortly before the close of the year 1617 the Emperor Matthias, influenced it was said by an astrological warning, quitted Prague for Hungary, accompanied by Lobkowitz, and committed the government to the Regents, chosen from among the chief state officials, so that Slawata and Martinitz, but not Matthias Thurn, were included among them. On his way to Vienna the Emperor had, in reply to a deputation

from Braunau, definitively ordered the citizens to give up their church to the Abbot, and, when they had refused, the ringleaders had, in obedience to royal instructions, been sent to prison by the Regents. But the Braunauers continued recalcitrant, and, when a government commission came down to the town, managed to interpose delays, so that at the outbreak of the insurrection at Prague they were still in possession of their church. On the other hand, at Klostergrab the Abbot had crowned a series of arbitrary acts by pulling down the Protestant church, and thus apprising the whole Protestant population of Bohemia that the *Letter of Majesty* was a dead document.

Now that the iron was red-hot, Thurn and the majority of the *Defensores* came to the conclusion that there could no longer be any question of waiting till the passing-away of Matthias should furnish an opportunity of a radical cure by getting rid of the dynasty simultaneously with the system to which it seemed wedded. They determined to strike, whatever might be the ulterior consequences of their action. Using their legal powers once more, the *Defensores* summoned to Prague an Assembly of Protestant deputies from each Circle of the realm (but including no representative of Prague), together with the remaining chief Protestant officials of the Crown. This assembly met in the capital on March 5, 1618; and such was the ardour of its leading spirit, Thurn, that, after an address to the Regents demanding the immediate release of the Braunau prisoners had remained without response, on March 11 two letters were drawn up: one to the Emperor, asking redress for the wrongs done at Braunau, Klostergrab, and elsewhere, and the other appealing for support to the Estates of the lands incorporated with the Bohemian Crown. Thereupon, after violent harangues, the assembly adjourned for ten days to await the replies. But on the part of the Government there was no sign of faltering. The royal answer consisted of the publication of ordinances, drawn up by Klesl, which declared the assembly rebellious and threatened proceedings against its originators, while upholding the obnoxious transactions at Braunau and Klostergrab.

An outburst of indignation ensued at Prague, where it was asserted that the ordinances had been drawn up by Martinitz and Slawata. The majority of the *Defensores*, headed by Thurn, hereupon took the decisive step of declaring it their duty to summon the Protestant Assembly anew notwithstanding the royal prohibition. Lobkowitz (who had now returned) managed to produce a certain amount of dissension among the towns, whose corporations had been so drastically manipulated; a few Praguers resigned their places among the *Defensores*, and there were some other signs of desertion. But the clergy of the capital stood firm, encouraged by the failure of the attempt to introduce a Catholic priest into the Bethlehem Chapel, where Hus had ministered as the nominee of the University. After a preliminary gathering of leaders had, on May 18, drawn up an appeal to be read from every Protestant pulpit

in Prague on the following Sunday, the Protestant Assembly met on May 21. Royal officers summoned its members to the Castle to hear a royal letter, couched in conciliatory terms, but bidding them disperse. They met again, however, on the 22nd, when they resolved on a reply in which they refused to separate. A deputation was to wait upon the Regents; and this deputation the Assembly asked, and, curiously enough, received, permission to accompany in arms.

The moment had thus arrived for Thurn's second "demonstration"—the term was his own—which he had more or less confidentially discussed beforehand, and which had previously in Bohemia been esteemed an effective method of procedure. On or before the fateful morning of May 23 the Regents, together with a large part of the population of Prague, had certainly become aware of the design that had been formed for getting rid of the most obnoxious members of their body, if not of the way in which this design was to be carried out. About nine in the morning the Protestant deputation, accompanied by a long procession of armed members of the Assembly, and swelled by representatives of the *Neustadt*, more than a hundred persons in all, made their way to the Chancery or board-room of the Regents in the Hradschin, where not more than four of them, including Martinitz and Slawata, were found in attendance. After some discourse an answer to the last royal rescript, drawn up by the *Defensores* and approved by the members of the Assembly on their way to the Chancery, was read to the Regents; and, on their asking for time to consider their reply, Thurn demanded an immediate response to the questions whether the Regents had had any hand in the Emperor's letter, and when this was refused, declared that the room should not be cleared before an answer was received. Violent invectives followed against Slawata and Martinitz; and already the cry had been raised that they must suffer for their crimes, when one of their two colleagues present veraciously pointed out that the Regents had had no concern in the letter. But the doom of the real objects of the "demonstration" had been fixed. They were dragged to the window, and thence, Thurn having hold of Slawata, and one of his companions of Martinitz, the pair were cast forth into the castle-ditch—a fall reckoned to have then been between 50 and 60 feet. Fabricius, the secretary of the Regents, who remonstrated, was thrown out after the others. Martinitz rose to his feet severely hurt, as did the secretary. But Slawata lay grievously injured, and seemingly half-dead; and Martinitz on coming to his rescue was grazed by one of several shots from the window. Some servants, however, found their way to the fosse, and carried off their masters. Martinitz escaped in disguise to Munich; Fabricius likewise made off; Slawata, after being kept in some sort of custody, was allowed to depart to Teplitz, whence he passed into Saxony. There seems to have been little or no wish to aggravate the outrage in cold blood. Thurn's purpose had been to

render impossible any further attempt on the part of Matthias and his advisers to side over the Bohemian difficulty till the question of the Imperial succession should have been settled in favour of the House of Austria and the Catholic interest. He was resolved that the issue between the Reaction and Protestant liberties, which was also that between the Viennese Government and the Estates of the several Habsburg lands, should be determined, not at Frankfort or at Ratisbon, but in Bohemia. Thus Klesl's peace policy was cast forth from the Hofburg when the myrmidons of the Reaction were hurled down from the Hradschin; and though the *Apologia* issued by the Bohemian Estates two days after the outrage insisted that not the Emperor, but only his evil counsellors, were chargeable with the oppression of the Protestants, Thurn and his associates had established a solidarity between the Habsburgs and reactionaries such as Martinitz and Slawata which must force friend and foe alike to make up their minds. The House of Austria, after violating chartered Protestant and national rights in Bohemia, would have to meet the first shock of the conflict which had long been preparing itself in the Empire, and of which Europe at large had been more or less consciously awaiting the outbreak. Yet for this outbreak hardly any Power or party in the Empire or in Europe, not even the Bohemian Assembly which had so audaciously provoked it, was actually prepared.

The Bohemian Protestants, however, lost no time in organising what was now an open insurrection. On the day after the "defenestration" the Prague municipalities sent their representatives into the Protestant Assembly; and the other royal towns (except only Budweis and Pilsen) followed suit. A provisional government of thirty Directors, ten from each Estate, was named to defend the religious liberties of the kingdom, with Wenceslas William von Ruppa, one of the managers of the Hradschin demonstration, at its head, while Thurn as lieutenant-general assumed command of the mercenary army which had been hastily raised, the idea of a national levy having been soon abandoned. No change was introduced into the system of government beyond the dismissal of those held to have abused the royal confidence. The Archbishop of Prague, the Abbot of Braunau, and some other offending ecclesiastics were driven out, and the Jesuits banished the realm *in perpetuum*.

But money flowed in slowly, and, after Thurn had set out in the middle of June with a force of not more than 3000 foot and 1100 horse to expel the Imperialist garrisons from Krummau and Budweis, a Diet had to be summoned to vote fresh supplies, and the Directors began to look anxiously for the support of the other Habsburg lands. But in Hungary, where Ferdinand was awaiting his coronation at Pressburg, the new Catholic Palatine sent the Bohemian agent in custody to Vienna. In Upper Austria the Protestant majority of the Estates, led by Tschernembl, contented itself with menaces to the Emperor, and in Lower Austria it persisted in pressing its own

grievances. Most unexpectedly of all, in Moravia Zierotin influenced the Diet in the direction of a moderate policy; and at another Diet Ferdinand, present in person, obtained the right of transit through Moravia for his troops (August). The Silesian Estates, however, refused a similar demand, and resolved upon despatching to Bohemia, though for defensive purposes only, the first instalment of troops due from them, under the command of Margrave John George of Jägerndorf (October). He had succeeded to this principality by the will of his father, the late Elector Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg; but the Emperor had refused to acknowledge his succession, and treated his lands as escheated. In Upper Lusatia the Diet maintained its allegiance to Ferdinand.

But even if the Bohemian Directors had thought of drawing back, they would have found that the time for this had passed. The commissioner sent to Prague by Matthias on Klesl's advice had reported that only large concessions could heal the breach; and any such Ferdinand, to whom the Emperor appealed, refused to grant. Yet the party of reaction at Vienna, no less than the Protestant leaders in Bohemia, knew that they were about to put their fate to the touch. Maximilian of Bavaria, alienated by the vagaries of his namesake the Archduke, and conscious perhaps of possibilities which the negotiations as to the Imperial succession had brought home to him, returned a cold answer to Ferdinand's appeal. The Spiritual Electors adopted much the same tone. Even John George of Saxony's loyalty seemed to be wavering; in June he had actually applied for admission into the Union. The Spanish ambassador, Oñate, counselled caution. But King Ferdinand and Archduke Maximilian could see no safety except in going forward. On July 20, 1618, Cardinal Klesl was suddenly arrested in the course of a visit paid by him to Archduke Maximilian in the Hofburg, and straightway conveyed to the castle of Ambras in Tyrol. Here and in other places he was detained as a prisoner for a period of five years, till Pope Gregory XV rescued him from further danger by taking him into his own custody at Rome. His political career was at an end, and with it, to all intents and purposes, the rule of the Prince who had so long submitted to his influence, and who, now that it was removed, had no motive power of his own left. Klesl, after passing out of the service of the Church, which owed him so much, into that of the Emperor, who owed him everything, had been wanting neither in intelligence nor in sincerity of purpose, though his conduct was not free from trickery. His name holds no place on the roll of successful ecclesiastical statesmen; but much of the obloquy heaped on him by contemporaries and posterity has been removed by dispassionate enquiry; nor can it be gainsaid that on the eve of the most disastrous of religious wars his efforts were thanklessly thrown into the scale of conciliation and peace. In 1637, after a long exile, he died at home in his Vienna diocese.

In July, 1618, King Ferdinand, already the real head of the House of Austria, returned from Hungary to face a situation full of menace. Except in the lands under his own or Archduke Maximilian's rule (Styria and Tyrol in especial), he could not trust to the fidelity of his future subjects. In the way of extraneous aid, besides some pecuniary support from Rome and Spain, he might count upon the Spanish troops which had served him against Venice, and he could look for a small contingent from Archduke Albert in the Netherlands, a few thousand Polish horse from his brother-in-law and ally Sigismund III, and, if all was well, six thousand light Hungarian troops. From the Estates of the Empire as such he could look for no aid, especially as Bohemia was exempted from their watch and ward; and of the League only the section headed by Maximilian of Bavaria remained effective, though its intentions were as yet uncertain. The 14,000 troops which by August Ferdinand actually had under arms were chiefly raw recruits of his own raising. The Brabant Count de Bucquoy was placed at the head of this army, with the Lorrainer Count de Dampierre under him. Preceded by the latter, Bucquoy in September with his main force entered Bohemia, where he found opposed to him the Bohemian army, consisting of 12,000 foot and 4000 horse, which had been placed in the field chiefly by the exertions of the Count of Hohenlohe, Thurn's right hand. The Bohemians had a better prospect of outside support than their King-designate. Money had been promised by the States General, and more was expected from the Seignior of Venice, to whom about this time Spain and the friends of Spain had become more odious than ever. France would at least remain neutral in the quarrel; and the only way in which Queen Mary de' Medici could attest her Catholic sympathies was to offer the Emperor her mediation. The hopes placed in James I were not yet at an end, though so far he had not entered into any obligation to take action, and in truth troubled himself very little about his alliance with the Union; but he was quite conscious that England, who had not yet renounced her position at the head of the Protestant interest in Europe, was expected to take up the Bohemian cause. Unfortunately he was hampered by the negotiation for a marriage between the Prince of Wales and the Infanta Maria of Spain, into which he had entered shortly before the outbreak of the Bohemian troubles; for, though this project hung fire, he had by no means relinquished it.

Thus the only service which he was at present able to render to the Bohemians was to explain to Philip III the circumstances in which he intended to offer his mediation between the Emperor and the insurgents. Had he been able to carry out this mediation successfully and to prevent the further growth of the movement by inducing the Austrian Government to deal honestly with the *Letter of Majesty* and the Bohemian rights, and thus to destroy the foundations of Thurn's policy, Europe would beyond doubt have found in him the benefactor that he desired to

become. But James' mediation itself lacked any basis of reality; there was no reasonable chance of his persuading Spain to urge upon the House of Austria a rupture with the Catholic Reaction, or of his inducing the Bohemians and their favourers on either side of the Alps to retrace their steps. In January, 1619, Dohna, sent on a special mission, easily obtained James' assent to the prolongation of his alliance with the Union; but, to the suggestion that his son-in-law should follow Matthias on the Bohemian throne, the King only replied that he would support Frederick in the case of an *electio legitima*; with a policy of war he would have nothing to do. In February the new Viscount Doncaster (James Hay, afterwards Earl of Carlisle), a favourite of the sprightly Electress Elizabeth and a diplomatist of remarkable tact, started on his circular mission of peace, taking Brussels on his way to Heidelberg, and passing thence into Austria. But, before his mission had reached its critical point, its prospects had again changed for the worse.

Of more importance therefore than the benevolent neutrality of James I was the tangible sign of goodwill which, in response to Anhalt's well-calculated overtures, Charles Emmanuel of Savoy had given to the Bohemian Directors by allowing a captain whom he had recently taken into his service to transfer himself into theirs with a body of 2000 mercenaries. This was Ernest von Mansfeld—"Count von Mansfeld" as he styled himself, the illegitimate son of Prince Peter Ernest von Mansfeld, formerly Imperial Governor of Luxemburg—who, after serving the Habsburgs in Hungary and in the Jülich-Cleves war, had without changing his confession passed over to the side of their adversaries. No more fitting personage could have been found to take part in the opening passages of the great war than this born mercenary and leader of mercenaries, ambitious without steadiness of aim and persistent without principle, gifted with military abilities of a high order and (as he was to prove at London as well as at Turin) with notable diplomatic skill. Of his dash as a commander he now gave immediate proof by taking and occupying Pilsen (November, 1618). Beyond the frontier there hovered the restless figure of the Transylvanian Bethlen Gabor, ready to resume his attitude of defiance towards the Imperial authority, while further in the background lowered the dark cloud of the Turkish peril, which he might still at any time draw down upon the Austrian frontier.

The immediate hope of the Bohemians was fixed upon the Elector Palatine, to whom in July the mission to Prague of Count Albert von Solms, ostensibly charged with apprising the Directors of the intention of the Elector and the Corresponding Princes to prohibit the transit of Imperial troops through their dominions, had first drawn attention as a suitable successor to Matthias on the Bohemian throne. Solms' return had inspired Anhalt to renewed diplomatic exertions at Turin and elsewhere; but the Union, while avowedly sympathising with the Bohemian insurrection, and conscious that its success must lead to the triumph of

the Protestant cause throughout the Austrian dominions, could not make up its mind to abandon its defensive character. Nor, in truth, consisting as it did of a majority of timorous towns, and of a few petty Princes either intent upon their own purposes or, like Maurice of Hesse, wedded to their own methods, was the Union really fit for any political action on so large a scale. The Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg, though now outside the Union, was ready to cooperate with the Elector Palatine, especially since the marriage of Frederick's sister Elizabeth Charlotte to the Electoral Prince George William (1616); but he was of little account as an active ally, being in difficulties with his actual Lutheran subjects, which he tried to meet in a spirit of tolerance, and apprehensive as to the succession in Lutheran Prussia, which would fall to his House on the death of Duke Albert Frederick.

The conflict in Bohemia would open under conditions far more favourable for the insurrection if the cooperation of the Austrian Estates could be secured at the outset. In September the agitation among them led to a large deputation to the Emperor, whose patience they completely exhausted by a recital of their grievances. Hereupon Thurn, instead of throwing himself with all his strength upon the Imperialists, when under Bucquoy they invaded Bohemia, led his army into Lower Austria (November). He took Zwettel, and his cavalry advanced into the neighbourhood of Vienna. A demand arose for the convocation of a general meeting of all the Diets; and this project, which, if rapidly pushed forward, might have resulted in confederating the Estates of the bulk of the dominions of the House of Austria against the continuance of its rule, was probably only frustrated by the steady refusal of the Moravian Diet to take part in the Bohemian movement. To no man were the German Habsburgs in this crisis of their destinies more deeply indebted than to the Moravian statesman Zierotin.

Though the first year of the war thus ended without any serious blow having been struck on either side, a terrible foretaste of the suffering which during its course that war was to spread far and near was experienced by southern Bohemia, where the Imperialists burnt down hundreds of villages. During the stoppage of warfare in the winter months of 1618-9, there were some attempts at negotiation which might seem not altogether hopeless so long as the Emperor Matthias survived. But, never himself since the downfall of Klesl, he had been further shaken by the death of his Empress in December, and, as the remnants of his authority seemed crumbling away, he sank into hopeless prostration, till on March 20, 1619, he suddenly died in a fit. In his public life he had on the whole proved more manageable than his more gifted elder brother, and had thus enabled the State-machine to work on after a fashion; but he had lived long enough to show that, left to himself, he could only drift before the storm. A few months earlier

(November 2, 1618) the death of Archduke Maximilian had deprived Ferdinand of the unselfish, though not always discreet, support of another elder kinsman, but had more distinctly than ever committed to him the maintenance of the imperilled dynasty. His younger brother Leopold, so prominent in Rudolf II's latter days, who succeeded Maximilian as ruler of Tyrol and the Austrian possessions in Elsass, continued to play a quite secondary part.

Few princes have entered upon a great inheritance and its responsibilities in conditions so nearly desperate as those in which Ferdinand found himself on the death of Matthias. His Bohemian crown seemed to have already fallen from his head; for to a rescript sent by him to the Bohemian Estates, promising to maintain all their rights and privileges, and asking for his recognition as King, no reply was vouchsafed. His Hungarian throne seemed hardly better assured; for the rumour soon came from Transylvania that Bethlen Gabor was hastening to the neighbourhood of Vienna, there to hold conference with Thurn, and then to invade Hungary in due course. Upper Lusatia had now followed the example of Silesia; and, after Thurn had entered Moravia with a force of 8000 men, a change had, in spite of Zierotin's continued counsels of moderation, been here also brought about. Part of the Moravian army and the treasury of the Estates were indeed carried off in safety to Vienna by Albrecht von Waldstein (Wallenstein); but a Directorate was established, and the remainder of the Moravian troops united with the Bohemian. Upper Austria was soon in open revolt, the Protestant Estates refusing to accept Archduke Albert's renunciation of the hereditary authority in favour of Ferdinand and establishing themselves as a government at Linz, in communication with the Bohemian Directors; while the Lower Austrians, though less resolutely, followed suit. Thurn could look round upon seven kingdoms or provinces in revolt or defection, when in the first days of June, 1619, at the head of an army variously estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 men, he crossed the Danube in the immediate vicinity of the capital.

A force of 12,000 men was setting forth from Flanders to Ferdinand's aid; but he had no allies beyond the frontiers of the Empire except Spain and Poland. The advances made to these Powers by Christian IV of Denmark were only dictated by jealousy of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, to whom the Bohemians had applied for help, for Christian was himself burning to come forward as the champion of the Protestant cause.

But Ferdinand stood unshaken, prepared, as he told his confessor, after weighing the dangers that threatened him on all sides, "to perish in the struggle, should that be the will of God." His confidence may have been increased by his habit of not perplexing himself with details, whether military or financial; and, while he remained unterrified by the ruins around him, his expenditure was as liberal as if his affairs and his conscience had been equally well regulated. On

June 5 he received in a spirit of placid firmness a deputation from the Estates of Lower Austria, who, trusting to the effect of Thurn's close approach to Vienna, had on that very day split off from their Catholic colleagues on the refusal of the latter to agree to the scheme of a confederation with the Bohemians. Ferdinand, it must be remembered, had given no promise to the Austrians of respecting their religious liberties such as he had made to the Bohemians and Hungarians. Before the turbulent interview (certain familiar details of which appear to be apocryphal) had ended, five hundred cuirassiers of the regiment afterwards known as Dampierre's rode into the courtyard of the Hofburg, commanded by a French officer, Gilbert de Saint-Hilaire. The deputies, on whom the tables had thus been turned, were allowed to depart unharmed. Probably there had been some understanding between Thurn and the Austrian delegates; but if so, he had lost some precious hours. Troops now began to pour in till some 6000 were gathered in Vienna, where much enthusiasm was manifested, especially by the students under Jesuit influence. Thurn saw that a siege of the capital was now out of the question; and, when the news arrived from Bohemia that Bucquoy had routed Mansfeld at Zablat (the honours of the day belonged to a regiment of Walloons and Spaniards commanded by Wallenstein), Thurn took his departure from the neighbourhood of Vienna (June 14), and fell back upon Bohemia. But here he proved unable to arrest the progress of the Imperialists; he had, in fact, little or no control of his mercenary soldiery; nor were matters mended by the temporary appointment of Anhalt as Commander-in-Chief in Bohemia and the sister kingdoms. Thus, in the course of the summer and autumn of 1619 the prospects of the Bohemian insurrection had unmistakably darkened, while the wider anti-Habsburg movement which that insurrection was to have called forth had been checked.

Ferdinand lost no time in making use of this respite by taking his departure to Frankfort, his brother Leopold being left as his viceroy in Vienna. On his way, at Salzburg, Ferdinand met Doncaster, to whom he listened politely, but with the consciousness that the ambassador's messages needed no immediate answer. At Frankfort, where he arrived on July 28, he found the *Kurfürstentag* already in session, but only the three Spiritual Electors in personal attendance. The issue of the Imperial election was still not quite assured, though his chances were steadily improving. Brandenburg had entered into an engagement to vote against him, and to take no step without the concurrence of the Palatine Government. But that Government itself was at a loss. Neither the name of the Duke of Lorraine, nor that of the Duke of Savoy, notwithstanding the reopening of negotiations with the latter in the winter months of 1618-9, could be seriously brought forward. But the notion, to which the Palatine politicians clung with strange persistency, of raising Maximilian of Bavaria to the Imperial

throne, had not been altogether dropped; and in the meantime they were seeking to create delays by contending that a settlement of the Bohemian troubles should precede the Imperial election. The Elector of Saxony decided the day by refusing to concur in this proposal, though it perhaps offered the last chance of localising the war, and by announcing his intention to vote with the Spiritual Electors. Hereupon the Elector of Brandenburg, unmindful of his promise, followed suit; and, after Ferdinand had cautiously assented to the "interposition" of the whole electoral body in the Bohemian troubles, his *Wahlcapitulation* was settled without much difficulty, and on August 28 followed his unanimous election as Emperor. The Palatine collapse was complete; for Frederick's ambassador had in the end avowed his instructions to vote in the first instance for Maximilian, but in the event of the remaining electors or the majority of them voting for Ferdinand, to accede to their choice.

Hardly had this result become known at Frankfort than the news arrived there that nine days earlier Ferdinand had been deposed from the Bohemian throne. On July 31 the General Diet, attended by representatives of Bohemia, the incorporated lands, and the two Austrian duchies, had, solely by their own authority, adopted the Act of Confederation which declared the Bohemian Crown elective and assured the predominance of Protestantism throughout these lands. The formal deposition of Ferdinand had followed on August 19. The resolution was approved in Silesia, Lusatia, and Moravia—though in the Diet of the last-named margravate not without strenuous opposition. Had the futility of the Palatine policy at Frankfort been known at Prague, the Protestant leaders might possibly have paused. No doubt the decision of Bethlen Gabor to overrun Hungary, though not actually sent to the Directors till the day before the fatal vote, added to their confidence. But in any case, on the banks of the Moldau as on those of the Main, the die was now cast, and it only remained to decide who should be invited to the vacant throne.

The decision was made, not, as it would seem, in deference to the general desire of the Bohemian Protestants, of whom, partly for political and partly for historic reasons, the majority would probably have preferred John George of Saxony, but in accordance with the determination of the *junta* who had the reins of the government and the command of the troops in their hands. Ruppa, Thurn, and Hohenlohe had made up their minds for the Elector Palatine. In this they were undoubtedly influenced by the personal communications which had taken place and by his position in the Union, which at its meeting at Heilbronn in June, 1619, urged by the arguments of Maurice of Hesse, as well as by the presence of Count Achatius von Dohna, sent by Frederick V, had guaranteed a substantial loan to the Bohemian ambassadors and set on foot a "defensive" force of some 33,000 troops.

Means having been found for ascertaining that Frederick was "in principle" prepared to accept, he was on August 26 all but unanimously elected King by the General Diet, and on the following day proclaimed at Prague. The momentous tidings found him at Amberg, where he was anxiously waiting in the company of his adviser, Christian von Anhalt. No doubt the greatness at which he trembled had been thrust upon him as the inheritor of the policy not less than of the religious faith and princely dignity of his predecessors. But his "I dare not" was as prolonged as his "I would" was manifest through it all. At first he had in vain entreated the Directors to postpone the initial step of the deposition of Ferdinand. Then he had openly wondered what course he would take if he were chosen, and before his election had, as has been seen, sent Christopher von Dohna to England to sound his father-in-law. He could take scant comfort from a meeting of the Union hastily summoned to Rothenburg (September 12), where only Baden and Ansbach were warmly for acceptance. From his councillors at Heidelberg he obtained an opinion in which they only contrived to adduce four reasons for acceptance as against fourteen for refusal. Maximilian of Bavaria openly warned him of the risk which by accepting he would run for both himself and his House. Similar advice, of which it is unnecessary to analyse the motives too nicely, reached him from John George of Saxony and other Electors; on the other hand he was encouraged to proceed by John Sigismund of Brandenburg, who was before long to marry his daughter Maria Eleonora to Gustavus Adolphus (1620), and some years later (1625) another daughter, Catharine, to Bethlen Gabor. Maurice of Orange likewise advised compliance. Frederick's mother Louisa Juliana, the highminded daughter of William the Silent, was overwhelmed with forebodings of disaster when she heard of his acceptance. That he was urged to accept by his wife is a baseless legend, but one which continues to survive; her mind was not at this time occupied with high political issues, though on the news of the election she asked her father's support and promised her own readiness to share whatever the future might have in store for her consort. It was not the persuasions of Elizabeth, born though she was to be a Queen, nor was it any religious admonition on the part of his spiritual adviser, Scultetus, which convinced the hesitating Frederick; it was rather, we may feel assured, the steady pressure of Anhalt's counsel that he had gone too far to retreat, which finally shaped itself in his mind as the belief that his acceptance of the proffered Bohemian Crown was the will of God. In this sense, on September 28, Frederick wrote secretly in the affirmative to the Directors, who had already thrice asked from him an answer. Two days earlier Dohna had taken his departure from the Court of James I, whose final pronouncement, made four days before, had been merely a refusal to decide on his own course of action until he should have convinced himself of the justice of Frederick's

cause. This neutral conclusion, which determined the inaction of the States General and Savoy, was adopted with a knowledge of Frederick's resolution to accept, for which James I is not to be held responsible. Still there can be little doubt that, had James sent Dohna back with a protest, a way might still have been found by Frederick for withholding the final acceptance, which from October 6 onwards was formally made known to several Courts.

The decision thus at last taken was of the utmost importance for the future of the conflict, in which religious and political motives and interests were from the first so inextricably intermixed. The troubles of the Austrian Habsburgs had at once become a matter of direct Imperial, and unavoidably also of international, concern. It remains unknown to what extent Anhalt, whose diplomacy was immediately responsible for the crisis, had engaged the support of the Bohemians and their confederates for the defence of the Palatinate, should this prove to be the next scene of action; nor do we know whether even now he trusted for this to the Union, the product of his earlier handiwork; but could the Bohemian records be revived from their ashes it would matter little, for the issue of the struggle dealt swiftly and fatally with the whole of his political edifice.

At first things seemed to go well. Towards the end of October "the Palatinate," as Louisa Juliana exclaimed, "was on its way into Bohemia." On the last day of the month Frederick held his entry at Prague; on November 4 he was crowned. Queen Elizabeth's regal presence and personal charm suited the glamour of the young pair's sudden elevation, and their popularity sufficed to counterbalance the Calvinistic aggressiveness of their Court-preacher Scultetus and the occasional offence given by their own light-heartedness. The expenditure of the Court, however, though not prodigal, added to the general financial pressure, which at times had to be met by extortions in the convents and elsewhere. While the new *régime* was weak at home and, as was but to be expected, quite powerless to control an aristocracy which had always been high-tempered and of late self-governing, this weakness was not in the eyes of the nation compensated by any manifest accession of extraneous support, the hope of which had been the real motive of the election of Frederick. He was recognised as King of Bohemia by the United Provinces and Venice, as well as by Sweden and his fellow-members of the Union. But Gustavus Adolphus had his hands full with Poland; and the States General, while prepared to fulfil their promise of a monthly subsidy of 50,000 ducats from May, 1619, shrank from an armed intervention. On the other hand, Bethlen Gabor had now begun to move. This remarkable personage, half barbarian in his ways of life, while in religion an eager and disputatious Calvinist, was, like other Transylvanian potentates before him, obliged to depend alternately upon the goodwill of the Sultan and the favour of the Emperor, unless, as now, he took his fortunes into his own hands.

In August, 1619, his design of conducting an expedition in aid of the Bohemians was announced to the Directors; and in the course of September the greater part of Upper Hungary fell easily into his hands. He obliged Forgacz, the Catholic Palatine of Hungary, to summon a Diet for November 11; and it was obvious that Hungary would speedily be added to the confederation whose hostility confronted the Emperor. On October 12 Bethlen Gabor entered Pressburg, and its castle immediately surrendered to him. Archduke Leopold had no choice but to summon Bucquoy from Bohemia to defend the Austrian duchies; and on September 19 he began his retreat, laden with the spoils of his master's kingdom and followed by the Bohemian leaders, with a force superior to his own in numbers, but unequal to preventing either his junction with Dampierre or his safe transit over the Danube (October 25). Once more Vienna seemed to be on the eve of a siege; the Bohemians under Thurn and Hohenlohe cooperating with Bethlen Gabor's victorious army and with an Austrian insurrectionary force which guarded the river against any possible succour from Bavaria, while maintaining communications with the Protestant malcontents in the capital itself. But the combination was broken up by the news that Bethlen Gabor's old adversary, Drugeth de Homonnay, had entered Upper Hungary with the aid of a force of Polish Cossacks; and by the end of November the Transylvanian army had begun its homeward march. Bethlen had been unable to recover his expenses from his Bohemian allies; and it may be doubted whether Frederick's Palatine advisers looked on their Oriental auxiliary with perfect satisfaction. However, without his aid Vienna could not be taken or held; and the Bohemian army was itself, as usual, without its pay. It therefore likewise turned homewards.

Ferdinand had thus gained a respite, and though Bethlen, who had now been formally elected "Prince" of Hungary, on January 15, 1620, entered into a formal alliance with the Bohemian Crown which precluded either side from accepting peace without the concurrence of the other, he found it in his interest immediately to concede to the Emperor a nine months' truce on the *uti possidetis* basis. Bethlen immediately proclaimed throughout Hungary an ample system of religious toleration approved by the Diet, and set about regulating his relations with the Porte.

Ferdinand could thus for the moment concentrate his efforts on the Bohemian struggle, the significance of which for the religious future of Europe was becoming more and more widely manifest. Early in 1620, Pope Paul V doubled his subsidy to the Emperor; the Grand Duke Cosimo of Tuscany and the Republic of Genoa transmitted contributions; and Philip III of Spain, besides sending more gold than his coffers could spare, levied troops on a large scale in both Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. By November, 1619, some 7000 of these troops

had gathered at Innsbruck ; and it was hoped that in the course of 1620 not far short of 30,000 of the soldiery, whose reputation was still unequalled, might, under their famous commander Spinola, overwhelm the hereditary lands of the usurper at Prague. At last, too, the machinery of the reduced Catholic League had been put into operation. On his way home from Frankfort the Emperor Ferdinand II had paid a visit to Duke Maximilian at Munich, where they had come to an understanding of moment not only for the conduct of the war then imminent, but also for the religious future of the Empire, as well as for the whole troubled history of the territorial relations between the two dynasties (October 8, 1619). All the expenses incurred by Maximilian, over and above the contributions due from him as a member of the League or the costs of the defence of his own lands, were to be repaid to him by the House of Austria, which till their repayment was to leave in pledge to him an equivalent territory, more especially such lands as he might himself have recovered from the enemy. At the same time the Emperor and he arrived at a verbal understanding, in which the former promised, in the event of the Elector Palatine being placed under the ban of the Empire, to confer the electoral dignity upon the Duke of Bavaria, whose line had consistently regarded its exclusion from alternate participation in that dignity as an arbitrary provision of the Golden Bull. Nor was the contingent transfer to be confined to the electoral hat ; for Maximilian was to remain in possession of any of the lands in the Empire which he had occupied while executing its ban. With these securities, and the additional proviso that no intervention of any kind in the affairs of the League should be allowed to the Emperor or any other member of his House, Maximilian had no difficulty in inducing the League at a meeting held at Würzburg on December 5 to resolve on the levy of a force of 21,000 foot and 4000 horse, and to commit to his discretion the use to which these troops might be put as the occasion demanded.

As things then stood, it seemed of almost equal importance that, after long and complicated negotiations, Ferdinand was successful in securing the support of John George of Saxony. The Elector's ultimate decision was due in part to loyal sentiment, in part to his hereditary jealousy of his Ernestine kinsmen of Weimar, whom Palatine diplomacy had not omitted to tempt with the bait of his Electorate, and partly by the Imperial promise of territorial gain in the shape of a lien upon both the Lusatias, and of security for the sees and other ecclesiastical foundations in Protestant hands in the two Saxon Circles. This last promise, which was to acquire a great importance at no remote date, was confirmed at a meeting of Catholic Princes, including Bavaria, held at Mühlhausen (March, 1620), so far as an undertaking to abstain from all armed intervention in the matter of these possessions extended. At the same meeting a resolution condemning the Bohemian

insurrection and promising armed aid to the Emperor for its repression was passed. The method of repressing it, was left to be settled by the joint decision of the Emperor, the Elector of Saxony, and the Duke of Bavaria. Saxony had promised to do its best to gain the support of other Estates of the Saxon Circles; but in this quarter an ominous admonition from Christian IV of Denmark suggested caution (April 1). On the other hand the Elector was assured of the concurrence of Landgrave Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt. It may be added that an effort had been made to secure further Polish aid by the pledging of certain forfeited lands in Silesia, but the Turks prevented its despatch. Of troops actually under arms or promised, the Emperor and his allies, Spain, the League, and the loyal Princes, are calculated to have now been able to reckon upon a force of from 110,000 to 120,000 men, about sufficient to overthrow the revolutionary *régime* in Bohemia and the incorporated lands, to secure the submission of the Austrian duchies, to occupy the Palatinate, and perhaps to keep off the Eastern danger.

While the Catholic side was thus prepared, the body which claimed to represent the Protestant interest in the Empire—that interest to which the majority of its population had adhered through long years of hope deferred or development arrested—continued to hesitate, and finally collapsed. But the ignominy summarised in a song of the day—

“ A Union they did form at first,
But when the war came they dispersed ”

—is not wholly to be visited on the most unfortunate of all the leagues of the Wars of Religion epoch. In order to satisfy the purposes of a policy compounded of dynastic ambition and of antagonism to the House of Habsburg, Anhalt had hurried the Elector Palatine into a path into which he had not prepared the Union for following him, nor could expect it to follow him in contravention of its avowed purpose, and without the allies whom his diplomacy had so long been wooing in almost every part of Europe. The members of the Union met at Nürnberg in November, 1619, together with the representatives of seven other Protestant Princes, including the Elector of Brandenburg, and discussed their general position with an amplitude rarely surpassed even in that argumentative age. But while they peremptorily called upon the Duke of Bavaria to satisfy them within two months as to the views of the Catholic Estates concerning the expediency of a joint conference on all their grievances, they resolved for the present to adhere strictly to a defensive attitude. Maximilian of course refused, and during the ensuing transactions, already noted, the Union was left out in the cold. Its ambassador, Buwinkhausen, obtained from the States General the promise of a monthly subsidy to the Union, equal in amount to that paid by them to the Bohemians; while James I, who had finally decided to limit his assistance to Frederick to the event of an attack upon

the Palatinate, pointed out to the ambassador that this occasion had not yet arisen (February, 1620). He permitted, however, as he had already done in the case of Bohemia, the collection of voluntary subscriptions and even the levy by means of the sums thus collected of 2000 volunteers, who before the summer was out crossed the sea under Sir Horace Vere (July). This delay was partly due to the King's unwillingness to summon Parliament, partly to the return to England of the Spanish ambassador, Count Gondomar, whom James received with open arms, and who flattered the King's scheme of an alliance with Spain. Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, who had no intention of devoting his resources in men and money to the maintenance of Frederick's precarious grandeur at Prague, and who found that the Venice Seignior had come to the same conclusion, was beginning to veer round to the Catholic coalition, and allowed the passage of Spanish troops through his dominions. Bethlen Gabor judged that his moment had not yet arrived.

On April 30, 1620, the mandate—practically the Imperial declaration of war—went forth, which ordered the Elector Palatine to quit the Emperor's dominions by June 1, and threatened him, in case of non-compliance, with the ban of the Empire. About the same time the commission was issued which empowered the Elector of Saxony to occupy the Lusatias and Silesia; and shortly afterwards a similar commission against Upper Austria reached Maximilian. The net was closing round the insurrection and round its creature, the unfortunate Twelfth-night King.

As so often happens at the eleventh hour, a last effort had been made in the spring of 1620 by the Government of Mary de' Medici to mediate between the Emperor and his adversaries, so as still, if possible, while serving the interests of the Catholic Church, to avoid a war which might increase the prestige and power of Spain. These negotiations, carried on by an embassy headed by the Duke of Angoulême, came to nothing; but the French intervention had been at first welcomed at Ulm, where the members of the Union were holding a meeting (June, 1620), and whither Maximilian had sent envoys. The army of the Union, some 13,000 strong, was encamped hard by; while the troops of the League, numbering about 24,000 men, were gathered some twenty miles lower down the Danube. In July the two associations entered into an undertaking of abstention from all offensive operations against each other. But Bohemia was expressly excluded from the compact, the League in return promising not to attack Frederick's hereditary dominions. In other words, while Spinola might swoop down on the Palatinate, Maximilian might invade Bohemia, with his rear secure. On July 24, 1620, Tilly entered Upper Austria, and the first stage in the great conflict in arms had begun.

CHAPTER II.

THE VALTELLINE.

(1603-39.)

THE Valtelline is, strictly speaking, that portion of the upper valley of the Adda, about sixty miles in length, which lies between Sondalo, at the southern end of the Serra di Bormio and an imaginary line drawn between the villages of Piantedo and Dubino, a few miles from the point where the Adda falls into the Lake of Como. The Valtelline proper is divided into four districts, the *terzero di Sopra*, with Tirano for its capital; the *terzero di Sotto*, with Sondrio for its capital; the so-called *Squadre*, with Morbegno as its capital; and the independent district of Teglio. But intimately associated with the Valtelline, sharing its vicissitudes, and for historical purposes to be considered a part of it, we have the county of Bormio, commanding the Wörmserjoch and the uppermost reaches of the Adda, and the county of Chiavenna, the key to those two important passes the Splügen and the Maloggia. The Valtelline proper runs nearly due east and west; above Tirano it takes a more northern trend towards Bormio. Debouching as it does on the head of Como, it forms one of the "gates of Italy," and is a connecting link of great value between the Lombard plain and Tyrol, leading over the Wörmserjoch by Santa Maria and the Vintschgau to Meran. At the period with which we are dealing, a private report to Venice placed the population at 30,000, and Padavino, secretary to the Council of Ten and the ablest Venetian envoy to the Grisons, gives the fighting forces of the whole district thus: the Grey League, 10,200 men; the Gotteshaus, 10,600; the Zehngerichten, 5000; Valtelline and Bormio, 15,000; and Chiavenna, 2000; thus indicating that the Valtelline with the counties of Bormio and Chiavenna was the most populous part of the whole Graubünden. The people of the Valtelline were strictly, even bigotedly Catholic, while their masters, the Graubündners, were partly Protestant, partly Catholic, and in both cases of a very deep dye.

The Valtelline, with Bormio and Chiavenna, came into the possession of the Grisons in the following manner. When Gian Galeazzo Visconti, after murdering his uncle Bernabò, seized the whole of the Milanese duchy, Bernabò's son Giammastino fled to Chur; and in January, 1386, out of gratitude for the protection granted to him by Bishop Hartmann,

he ceded to the Bishop all his rights in the Valtelline, Chiavenna, Bormio, and Poschiavo. The donation was recognised by later Lords of Milan, and also by the Emperor Maximilian I on October⁷ 16, 1516; but as a matter of fact it remained a dead letter till 1486, when Bishop Ortlieb endeavoured to establish an effective right over the districts. He was not completely successful, but he came to an understanding with Duke Gian Galeazzo Sforza. The consequences were important to the Grisons and the See of Chur, for the trade route between northern Italy and Germany, which had hitherto been chiefly up the Valtelline, *viâ* Tirano and Bormio, was now diverted to Chiavenna and the Splügen. In 1512, when Lodovico "il Moro" was taken prisoner, Bishop Paul again advanced the episcopal claim on the Valtelline, and this time made it good. Maximilian Sforza ceded in perpetuity the Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna to the Bishops of Chur and the Grisons, and this cession was ratified by Francis I. But in 1530 the three Leagues of the Grisons declared that the Bishop had forfeited his rights by failing to take his share in the war with Giovanni de' Medici, "il Medeghino," when he threatened Chiavenna from the Lake of Como. A compromise was reached, and the Bishop surrendered his share of the sovereignty for a yearly revenue charged on the customs of Chiavenna. Thus the Grisons became sole masters of the Valtelline and of the Passes; and the importance of the three Leagues in the subsequent history of the district is so great that a word must be said about their constitution and government.

The Grisons or Graubünden, the Grey Leagues, was a federation of three Leagues: the Upper or Grey League proper seated in the valley of the Vorderrhein and its confluent, with Ilanz for its capital, the *Gotteshaus* or Cadè with its capital at Chur, and the *Zehngerichten* or Ten Jurisdictions, with its principal seat at Davos. All had risen during the years 1424-34 on the ruins of the feudal aristocracy, the families of Vaz, Werdenberg, Toggenburg, Sax, and Belmont, and had been united in one common *Bund* or League, sworn at Vazerol in 1471. The Reformation affected them diversely. The Gotteshaus, centred at Chur under the eye of the Bishop, remained for the most part Catholic; inspired by Zwingli and the direct action of Ulrich Campell, Philipp Saluz, and Jakob Biveroni, the Zehngerichten with the Lower Engadine became deeply Protestant; while the Grey League was divided, the people of Disentis and Lugnetz abiding by the old faith, the Oberaxenens and Waltensburgers embracing reform. The various communes of each of the Leagues enjoyed their own municipal laws and customs, and were independent in all that did not affect the commonweal of the whole Bund. Affairs of general concern to the federation were dealt with in an annual Diet, which met alternately at Ilanz, Chur, or Davos. The Diet consisted of sixty-three deputies and three chiefs. The Grey League sent twenty-seven, the Cadè twenty-two, and the Ten Jurisdictions fourteen. The deputies

were elected in the communes by universal manhood suffrage. The Diet usually met in September, and the chief of the League in which it was sitting acted as President. Though the Diet dealt with all affairs of importance to the State, it was not absolutely supreme; there always lay an appeal to the communes as the sole fountain of authority; and the deputies, when voting on any definite point, such as war or peace or alliances, were required to produce instructions *ad hoc* from the communes they represented, or to refer to those communes for such definite instructions. Besides the Diet there was also the Congress, composed of the three chiefs and three deputies from each League. Congress met in February at Chur; and its duty was to receive and register the votes of the communes on matters referred to them in the preceding Diet, and to inform the communes of the issue of the votes. Further, the three chiefs met thrice a year at Chur for executive and administrative purposes, and to inform the communes of the agenda of the next general Diet. Outside the fixed lines of this ordinary constitution we find an extraordinary assembly, the *Strafgericht*, which plays a large part in the history of the Valtelline. At times of national crises—usually concerned with foreign politics or religion—a party among the communes, on the cry of “the State in danger,” would raise their banners—*lupfen die Fähnlein*, each company or *Fähnlein* numbering about 300 men—and marching down from their valleys on some important town, Thusis, Chur, Davos, would there establish an extra-legal and “tumultuary” jurisdiction—a kind of committee of public safety, which, under the plea of guarding the State, would proceed to extreme measures against the adherents of the opposite party. The *Strafgericht* had no legal status beyond the claim that it expressed the will of the communes; its authority rested on the force at its back, the *Fähnleins* it could muster. The acts of a *Strafgericht* were liable to be quashed by the next Diet or overridden by a hostile and more powerful *Strafgericht*. It is obvious that here lay the elements of civil war, and it frequently happened that civil war was avoided only by the intervention of some neighbouring Power like the Swiss Confederation.

Such was the political constitution of the Grey Leagues which held the Valtelline as a vassal State. Without a clear understanding of what was taking place in the Grisons it is impossible to grasp the real purport of events in the Valtelline. For purposes of government the Grisons divided the valley into five districts—the Upper and Middle *Terzeri*, Teglio, Morbegno or the *Squadre*, and Trahona. To each of these it sent a *podestà*. The *podestà* of the middle district residing at Sondrio was known as the Governor of the Valtelline; he possessed a superior authority, and was also Captain-General of the militia. Each of these officers was appointed by the Grisons for a term of two years. Besides the *podestà* each district had, for purposes of civil and criminal jurisdiction, a Vicar, who must be a native of the Grisons;—three

candidates for this post were presented to the inhabitants of each district, who selected one—and an Assessor who was always a native of the Valtelline; he was chosen by the Vicar from three candidates presented by the district. The *podestà* received a small annual stipend paid by the district, but his chief income was derived from fines and confiscations, two-thirds of which went into his pocket. The three Leagues took it in turn to nominate the officials in the Valtelline; the places were openly sold to the highest bidder, who recouped himself during his tenure of office. The Grisons were poor, the Valtelline comparatively rich; the officials were armed with supreme power; they were accuser and judge in one, with power of life and death and torture. The abuses and injustice soon became flagrant and bred in the unfortunate Valtelliners an extinguishable hatred of their masters. This animosity was heightened by religious differences; the Protestant majority in the Grisons persistently endeavoured to impose upon their Catholic subjects the doctrines of the Reformed faith. Protestant churches and Protestant schools were founded, and Catholic Church property was diverted to the support of the Protestant preachers and teachers. The better heads in the Grey Leagues were aware of the danger, and reform was attempted in 1603, but in vain; the Valtelline was too rich a prey for the needy and greedy Bündners to renounce of their own accord; and during the period with which we have to deal Valtelline hatred of the Grisons is one of the most important elements in the situation.

The political development of Europe at the opening of the seventeenth century was about to raise the Valtelline to a point of the highest importance, for three reasons. First, the possession of the valley, or at least the dominant influence in it, was desired as it offered a recruiting ground for the States of northern Italy, especially for Venice. The Grisons encouraged recruiting; Padavino reporting home describes the whole country as a *deposito di gente*; Spain had raised 6000 men, France 10,000 men, the Pope 4000 men. In case of war in Italy any Italian State would have found it difficult to levy troops in any of its neighbour States. It was therefore of highest importance to have access to this *deposito di gente*. Secondly, there was the question of religion. It was always possible for the Pope, for the French, for Spain, to plead that it ran counter to their conscience to subject the Catholic Valtelliners to the Protestant tendencies of the Bündners. In the Valtelline and in the Bund the religious question was genuine enough; the Valtelliners were sincerely Catholic, and Catholicism was bound up with their political hatred of their sovereign, the Grey Leagues. In the Bund the Protestant party was sincere in its faith and ready to sacrifice life, as in the case of the preacher, Blasius Alexander, or to risk the loss of the Valtelline rather than trifle with its conscience. But any study of the various treaties between the greater Powers, the Treaty of Madrid or the Treaty of Monzon, will lead us to the conclusion that the religious question was

subservient to the question of the Passes—the third and principal reason for the importance of the Valtelline.

It is essential to a proper understanding of the events which took place in the Valtelline that we should grasp the geography of the valley and of the Passes which lead into or out of it. Starting from Bormio we have, first of all, the Wörmserjoch leading down the valley of the Muranza to Santa Maria in the Münsterthal; the Fraele Pass leading to Fuorn on the Ofenberg; a more difficult route leads by the Val Pedenos to Livigno, and thence over Casana to Scanfs in the Engadine; these three Passes lead north, and connect the Valtelline with the territories of the Grisons. To the south, leading into Venetian territory, a pass runs up the Val Furva and under Monte Gavia to Ponte di Legno and the Val Camonica. Coming further down the valley to Grossotto, we reach the Mortirolo Pass, leading to Edolo at the head of the Val Camonica. But the point of highest strategical importance in the valley was Tirano, for there the great main roads intersect; the road running east and west connecting Como with Tyrol, and the road running north and south connecting Venetian territory with the Grisons by Edolo, Aprica, Tirano, Poschiavo, Bernina, and Samaden. At Sondrio again we have a northern Pass, the Muretto, leading by Chiesa in Val Malenco over the col to Maloggia in the Engadine or to Casaccia in Val Bregaglia, the last of the northern Passes; while at Morbegno, the last of the southern Passes, the Passo di San Marco, leads by the Val Brembana to Bergamo.

As far as the question of vicinity went Venice was conterminous with the Valtelline for about sixty or seventy miles of its southern boundary, and could approach the valley by at least four Passes—Monte Gavia, Mortirolo, Aprica, and San Marco. But the Republic was past her prime; her policy was to maintain peace in northern Italy and to safeguard her frontier. She lived in dread of an attack from the Spaniards in Milan, and did not aspire to possession but merely to influence in the valley. The Spaniards could reach the valley by its open mouth at the head of Como; the Austrians could penetrate by the Wörmserjoch, while the Grisons had access by Casana and Livigno, by the Bernina and the Muretto Passes. Vicinity counts for much in the history of the Valtelline, and the fiercest struggle for possession lay between the Grisons, supported by France and representing French interests, and the Spaniards in the province of Milan.

As to the political situation in Europe, the growth of Spanish-Austrian power in Italy was a standing menace to all the smaller Princes of the northern plain. The duchy of Milan, ruled by vigorous, ambitious and able governors, who paid little heed to instructions from Madrid, constituted a threat to Venice on the east and to Savoy on the west. The Spanish policy was to join hands with the Austrian possessions in Tyrol, and thus to surround Venice on the north, affecting

the outlet of her commerce; while on the east the Republic was threatened by Archduke Ferdinand, the "Gratzer," under cloak of the marauding Uskoks, the refugee settlers on the Dalmatian coast; and Fuentes, governor of Milan, stood as menace to the west. Such a combination would inevitably have been used by the Pope and Spain—Sarpi's hated "*Diacatholicon*"—against the Republic which had dared to withstand and break the power of excommunication and interdict. But to carry out this policy the possession of the Valtelline was essential. It was therefore a matter of life and death for Venice that the Valtelline should remain in the hands of the Grisons. Savoy was hardly less interested than Venice, and for the same reason. Charles Emmanuel remarked to the Venetian ambassador, Renier Zeno, "Four thousand Spanish hold us all in chains; what is wanted is courage and money. The one I have: if the others had it too, in four months we would drive out Spain." That was the dream of independent north Italian Princes, to get rid of Spain; but if the Valtelline came into the hands of the Spanish governor in Milan such a design would be frustrated.

Outside Italy the struggle between the Reformed and the Catholic Church was dividing Europe into two great groups, France, England, the Dutch, and the Protestant Princes of the Union, against Spain, Austria, the Jesuits, and the Church. France and the Reform party welcomed the support they readily found in Italy from Venice and Savoy, and Henry IV calculated on the politico-religious situation in this quarter as a chief factor towards the success of his designs for the abasement of the House of Austria. In this connexion the possession of the Valtelline was of high significance, for as Plessen, the Elector Palatine's councillor, explained to Antonio Foscarni, Venetian ambassador in England, the Valtelline formed a connecting link between Francophil Venice, the anti-Spanish Grisons, the Protestant Princes of Germany, the Dutch, and the English. The question of its possession, therefore, was in a way similar in importance to the question of the possession of Jülich and Cleves, which in the hands of the Catholics would have driven in a wedge between the several parts of the anti-Austrian federates.

The question of the Valtelline, accordingly, engaged the attention of Spain, Savoy, Milan, Venice, Austria, France, and is one of the dominating features of the early part of the Thirty Years' War. The smaller Powers were anxious to see the Valtelline preserved in the hands of the Grisons; they did not aspire to possession themselves, but they were determined to do all they could to prevent the valley from falling into the hands of Spain or Austria. The three greater Powers, France, Spain, and Austria, though professing to desire the *status quo*, showed by their conduct that they were prepared to take possession if they could. Each, however, thwarted the other by the help of the Grisons and the Valtelliners themselves. These people and their country are the

essential factors in the situation. Neither Feria, nor de Coeuvres, nor Baldiron, nor Rohan, nor Merode, succeeded in making good their hold upon the Valtelline against the will of the inhabitants. The whole of this important question, therefore, is best studied in the Valtelline and Graubünden. There we shall see the attitudes, the aspirations, the actions, the instructions of Spain, Rome, Turin, Venice, Paris, and Innsbruck faithfully reflected in the doings at Thusis, Chur, Bergün, Davos, Bormio, Tirano, Morbegno, Sondrio.

The question of the Valtelline can hardly be said to have assumed European importance till the year 1620; down to that date it was rather a matter of private concern between the Grisons and their subject land the Valtelline; but Venice, France, and Milan had, so early as 1602, alike begun to take an interest in the valley; therefore the circumstances which led up to the crisis of 1620 and the massacre of the Protestants call for attention.

In 1601, Méry de Vic, French ambassador to the Grisons, was negotiating for a renewal of the treaty of 1586 with the Bund. Henry IV, writing to him on December 16, 1601, said, "Above all I desire that you should obtain passage through their country for the troops I may wish to send into Italy, for that is the chief advantage I expect from the alliance." The King's agent met with vigorous opposition from Casati, the Spanish ambassador, and Giulio della Torre, Spanish agent, who freely lavished Spanish gold, while French money was scarce. He reports (December 18) that he has not only to bribe the eventy members of the Diet, but that "six hundred peasants, having nothing to do at home, have descended on Chur, where they live in the hostleries at the charges of the King of France. I find it impossible to buy them all." All the same, within eight days of writing this de Vic achieved his aim. The Grisons resolved to renew the alliance, "following the old treaty." De Vic had proposed a modification of the terms of that treaty as regards the Passes; he suggested that they should be open to the King of France "and his friends," meaning the Venetians; this was rejected, and France preserved freedom of passage, "*pour elle seule*," and not "*pour elle et ses amis*." This, no doubt, is one of the reasons why Venice was forced to seek a separate treaty in the following year. A tide of anti-Spanish feeling swept over the Grisons; and Giulio della Torre escaped defenestration solely by the interposition of de Vic. The French treaty was solemnly sworn in Notre Dame in October, 1602. By that treaty the French secured the passage of the Bernardino, the Splügen, the Bernina, and the Wörmserjoch. It was certain that the Spaniards in Milan under such a governor as Don Pedro Enriquez de Azevedo, Count of Fuentes, would not sit down quietly under a menace of that nature. The treaty of 1602 merely inaugurated the struggle for the Alps which preluded the Thirty Years' War. Venice, finding herself excluded by the clause "*pour elle seule*," was

driven to negotiate a separate treaty. The Republic entrusted the mission to Giovanni Battista Padavino, secretary to the Council of Ten. The difficulties were not insuperable. The French treaty had paved the way for a treaty with the ally of France. The Franco-Venetian party in the Grisons were in the ascendant, under the influence of the Protestant preachers, the *Prädikanten*, who were working against the Catholicism of Spain, and the Republic had already secured the support of the powerful family of Salis. But Padavino, like de Vic, had to face the rapacity of the Bündners, though he admits that it was due largely to "the necessities of their poor estate." The Diet was sitting at Chur when Padavino arrived in June, 1603. He had 4000 crowns at his disposal, but he was obliged to spend 9000 before he secured the treaty; 3000 went in gratuities to officials, 3500 in cash to all the voters, and 2500 in feasts and drinks. It was thus he achieved his end. On August 15 the Venetian alliance for ten years was voted by twenty Grey League votes against seven, by eighteen Gotteshaus votes against four, and by all fourteen votes of the Zehngerichten. Padavino returned to Venice with a large embassy from the Grisons, and the treaty was ratified and sworn in the Sala del Maggior Consiglio in September, 1603.

But Fuentes, who had also been seeking an alliance with the Grisons, was exasperated by this fresh rebuff. He instantly closed all traffic between Milan and the Grisons, and began to build Fort Fuentes on a rocky hillock, called Monticchio, which rises in the middle of the swamps at the mouth of the Adda. "*Munitissimam arcem scopulis felici conatu imposuit*"—as he boasts in an inscription which he dictated and dedicated to himself. And as a fact Fort Fuentes was a most serious menace to the Valtelline and the whole of the Grey Leagues. In it the governor of Milan could mass troops for an invasion, and, even more important still, by means of it he could completely cut off all trade with his neighbours, damaging not only private individuals by the loss of transport fees over the Passes, but the State as well by the cessation of customs dues, while the entire population was exposed to privation from the want of grain and salt, both of which they were accustomed to draw from the Milanese. Henry IV was not wrong when he exclaimed, "*Fuentes veut du même nœud ferrer la gorge de l'Italie et les pieds aux Grisons.*"

It is true that Fuentes' instructions were to avoid a war in Italy, and an attack on the Valtelline would have compelled Venice to take the field; but the governor trusted that, with the help of Fort Fuentes, he could raise the spirits of the Spanish party and starve the Grisons into a more compliant attitude. The alarm in Graubünden was great. The people of the Valtelline were with difficulty restrained by the Grisons from attacking the workmen at the fort; and embassies were sent both to France and to Venice in search of aid. But no active support was

promised by either; Venice was resolved not to precipitate a war if she could avoid it, and Henry was too far off to lend immediate help. A Spanish reaction inside the Grisons began to make itself felt, slowly at first, but gathering volume till it culminated in 1607, the "*annus rusticae dementiae*."

The Grisons, finding themselves unsupported by either of their allies and alarmed at the attitude of Fuentes, appointed a Secret Council to "deal with all that might be for the service of the Fatherland," and sent an important mission to Milan. Fuentes declared that he had no hostile intentions, that the fort was merely a defence for the Milanese against French or Venetian troops, those to whom the Bund had permitted free passage. He offered to remove the commercial embargo on condition that French troops were not allowed free transit without informing the governor of Milan and obtaining his leave. As to razing Fort Fuentes he would not hear of it. Though the envoys agreed to these terms the communes refused ratification when they were laid before them. Inside the Bund the struggle between the French party under the envoy Paschal and the Spanish party became sharper and sharper. Fuentes receiving no definite reply to his request that the Passes should be closed to troops hostile to Milan continued to build and strengthen Fort Fuentes. On the other hand the Franco-Venetian Protestant party, in view of Spanish threats, secured the reswearing of the oath of Federation, garrisoned the Valtelline with troops paid by France, and set aside every Friday as a day of prayer and humiliation. Matters came to a crisis in 1607. Most disquieting news had been received from Milan as to Fuentes' military preparations, and the Grisons had appointed a Secret Council of fifteen members to take steps for the "safety of the State." Venice was at that moment in dread of being forced into war with the Pope over the affair of Paolo Sarpi, and was anxious to raise troops. She had levied 6000 soldiers in Lorraine and sent Padavino to ask for free transit down the Valtelline in terms of the treaty of 1603. The Spanish party instantly objected. They pictured the Lorrainers as a horde of barbarians who would pillage and burn all along their line of march. They raised the question as to the exact terms of the treaty; was transit granted "armed" or "unarmed," in "detail" or in "mass"? They declared that the treaty had never been submitted to the whole body of communes, and had been voted by a majority bought with Venetian gold. The fire was quickly lighted and fanned to a blaze. In March the Catholic districts of Belfort, Churwalden, and Schanfig "raised their standards," and marched on Chur. They called for the production of the original document, and appointed a committee to report whether the copy and the original were identical, and whether the treaty had been voted by a legal majority. On April 3 they assembled, in the open air, on the Rossboden at Chur, to hear the report, and, on learning that both copy

and original were identical and that the voting had been legitimate, they then and there voted the abrogation of both French and Venetian treaties.

This high-handed act of the Spanish faction, carried out by the Spanish-Catholic communes of Belfort and Churwalden, in the Spanish-Catholic city of Chur, marks the strength of the Spanish reaction against the Franco-Venetian party. On April 10 the victorious faction in a *Strafgericht* of purely Spanish leanings published an *Artikelbrief* or decree by which the Passes were closed; pensions and presents were declared to be the property of the Bund; the clergy (*Prädikanten*) were forbidden to meddle with politics; and the levies raised by Venice were debarred from entering her service. The three Chiefs of the Leagues refused to attach the seals to this illegal decree; whereupon the seals were taken from them by force.

This violence provoked an inevitable counteraction on the part of the Franco-Venetian Protestants. The leading spirits on the Spanish side had been George Beeli of Belfort and Gaspar Baselga.⁴ News was now sent through from Chiavenna that both were deeply implicated in treasonable correspondence with Fuentes. In the actual tension of parties and the universal suspicion, the charge was readily believed. Meanwhile Paschal, the French envoy, had been raising the Protestants of the Engadine and Prätigau. With nine *Fähnleins*, that is about 2700 men, they marched on Chur, stormed the Bishop's palace in which Beeli and Baselga were confined, and carried them off to the Rathhaus. Then they locked up the judge and proceeded to try the prisoners themselves in a *Strafgericht* of purely Franco-Venetian complexion. A mission from the Swiss Confederation urging moderation and the liberation of Beeli and Baselga was dismissed without an answer. The prisoners were tortured, and the Court found that both had had dealings with Fuentes, and had been bribed to vote for the closing of the Passes against Venice and France. Both were condemned to death. Baselga was beheaded on July 4. He had begged leave to be executed in the courtyard of the Bishop's palace; but the Engadiners would not hear of any concession and carried their victim off by force to the common execution place in the town. Beeli suffered on July 6. In a speech of much dignity he defended himself from the charge of treason to his country, and declared that only by a good understanding with Milan could the Grisons find peace and quiet. He died with the word "fatherland" on his lips. The victorious Franco-Venetian *Strafgericht* proceeded to tear up the Spanish *Artikelbrief* of April 10 and substituted the following declaration: The French and Venetian treaties shall hold good; private persons shall not receive pensions nor presents, nor may they take service with foreign sovereigns without leave; the Secret Council is abolished; an impartial *Strafgericht* is erected at Ilanz to revise the operations of both the Spanish and the French *Strafgericht* in Chur

and to try "those who had acted against the fatherland"; and this it did in a very gentle manner.

The Court at Ilanz was a compromise between the two parties. It laid, for a while, the storm of popular passion; the waves of "*rustica dementia*" calmed down. But the events of the year 1607 laid bare the real situation. France, Venice, and Spain were all struggling for possession of the Passes and were prepared to go any lengths in compelling or inducing the Grisons to grant it. Among the Bündners themselves the chief cause of the "*dementia*," of internal discord, was the discovery that they had a property to sell to eager bidders. Each party was fighting for the sole power to sell the goods. The conflict was inflamed by two genuine passions, religion and freedom, but both were intimately connected with and virtually subsidiary to the question of the Passes. It would at the same time be difficult to prove that any of the leaders were traitors to their country, though this charge was urged against them by their opponents.

The Assembly at Ilanz brought peace for a while. In 1613 the Venetian alliance reached its term of ten years and in spite of every effort on the part of the Republic the Grisons refused to renew it. The memory of the "madness" of 1607 was too vividly impressed upon their minds. But the Republic was in straits for troops to face the Uskoks, secretly supported by the Archduke Ferdinand. In 1616 Padavino was despatched on a mission to renew the alliance if possible on the promise of large sums to each of the three Leagues, or at least to raise levies. His efforts, however, were thwarted by Gueffier, the French agent who had succeeded Paschal. He like his predecessor Paschal, when thwarting Venice and favouring Spain, was acting in obedience to the change of policy which followed on the death of Henry, whose anti-Spanish schemes were succeeded by the philo-Spanish policy of Villeroy and the Queen-Mother. This rebuff to the Venetians encouraged Casati, the Spanish agent, to apply for a treaty. He proposed that neither of the contracting parties should grant passage to troops hostile to either; promised that Fort Fuentes should be demolished; and asked that the Passes should be absolutely closed to Venice and be absolutely free for the passage of Milanese troops at the rate of 200 a day; the French treaty was to hold good. These were Casati's main offers, and they were favourable, especially on the point of money, which he promised in abundance. But they instantly brought to the front the latent schism inside the Bund. The Venetian Protestant party, headed by the Preachers, opposed any dealings with Spain on the ground of religion. They pointed out that Spain might at any moment declare the Grisons heretical and announce that faith need not be kept with them. Moreover both Bern and Zurich earnestly dissuaded the Bund from accepting the Spanish alliance. On the other hand the Spanish party was strongly supported by Rudolf and Pompeius

von Planta, two of the most powerful personages in the Grisons. The situation was becoming strained once more. The failure of Padavino and the proposals of Casati ranged the two factions in hostile camps; and soon we catch the first mutterings of the coming storm.

Though Padavino had failed to secure an alliance, Venetian gold tempted many Bündners to the service of the Republic, in spite of the prohibitions published by the *Strafgericht* in Chur. The Plantas now raised a cry against the disobedient levies. The Preachers retaliated by declaring that the Plantas were intriguing with Austria and Spain against the Bund and the Reformed faith. They alleged as proof Rudolf von Planta's secret interview with Maximilian Mohr, Casati's secretary, at Zernez, the presence of Jesuits in Planta's fortress of Wildenberg, and the fact that the governor of Milan had again closed trade communications on the rejection of Casati's proposals. In April, 1618, the Preachers summoned a Synod at Bergün; it was entirely of their colour, Protestant and anti-Spanish. There "Hispanismus" was declared to be treason. Planta was summoned to appear before the Synod, and on his refusal the Preachers under George Jenatsch, the soldier preacher who now assumed the leadership of his party, marched over the Albula down to Zernez to seize him in his castle of Wildenberg. They found the castle, however, garrisoned and fortified with 400 men under Planta's command, and it was not till they had called up the Engadiners, 1300 strong, that Planta fled over the Ofen Pass to his possessions in Tyrol. The Preachers, in pursuit of their campaign against "Hispanismus," now divided their forces. One body marched over the Maloggia into Val Bregaglia and seized Johann Baptist Prevost, called Zambra, in Vicosoprano; the other marched over the Muretto Pass into the Valtelline to secure the person of Nicholas Rusca, the Archpriest of Sondrio, head of the Catholic-Spanish party in the valley. The whole Valtelline, strongly Catholic in sentiment, was devoted to the Archpriest. It was he who had withstood the efforts to impose the Reformed teaching on the valley and had rendered inoperative the Protestant school founded in Sondrio. He was, therefore, especially odious to the Preachers. On the night of July 18, 1618, the Bündners swept down on Sondrio, seized Rusca in his bed, and hurried him round by Chiavenna to join the division which had captured Zambra in the Bregaglia. In Sondrio the bells were rung and the Catholics rose to attempt a rescue, but they were told that Rusca's life depended on their remaining quiet. With their prisoners the Preachers arrived at Chur, but found the town closed against them. They passed on to Thusis and there erected a *Strafgericht* of the most violently Protestant complexion, entirely dominated by nine of the hottest pulpiters. They proceeded to work and issued a decree, forbidding pensions and decorations, and any dealing with foreign sovereigns, disabling anyone who had taken an oath to a foreign

sovereign from handling Bund affairs, prohibiting foreign enlistment, and expelling foreign ambassadors. It is clear that the intention of the Thusis *Strafgericht* was patriotic. It was an effort to shake the Grisons free of the foreigner. There is no mention of the Passes nor of religion. The expulsion of ambassadors deeply offended France, and so enraged Gueffier, her envoy, that he became one of the most active agents in the massacre of 1620. The Thusis *Strafgericht*, having published its decree, turned to deal in the fiercest spirit with its prisoners and its enemies. Zambra was beheaded; Rusca, though an old and feeble man, was subjected to repeated torture by the cord; as he was being hauled up for the fifth time he fainted and died. His tongue was found bitten through in his agony. The Plantas had fled; but, on the strength of correspondence discovered in their castles of Wildenberg and Riedberg, Pompeius and his brother Rudolf were declared *vogelfrei* or outlawed, and banished from the Grisons under pain of being quartered if caught; their goods were confiscated, their houses were to be razed and a price was put on their heads. Banishment and confiscation were pronounced against twelve other persons, several of them inhabitants of the Valtelline. This and the murder of Rusca were among the principal causes which led up to the massacre of 1620.

The ruthless and high-handed proceedings of the Thusis *Strafgericht* brought the inevitable reaction. The Catholic communes of Bregaglia, Lugnetz, Disentis, Oberhalbstein, marched on Chur to demand revision; while the Protestants of the Upper Engadine, Davos, and Prätigau, ranged themselves in support of the Preachers. The outlaws also had appealed to the Swiss Confederation to secure them safe conduct and a fair hearing. It seemed as if civil war were on the point of breaking out under the walls of Chur. But a compromise was effected by which, in October, 1619, a new *Strafgericht* was erected at Davos, and all the outlaws of the Thusis assembly, with the exception of the eight most important personages, were granted safe conduct and a fresh hearing. This was, however, only a partial reparation. It left out of account the powerful outlaws, the Plantas, who were resolved to recover their property and their status, and it ignored the growing hostility in the Valtelline, caused by the murder of their Archpriest. It is to the Valtelline that our attention must now be turned.

Since the triumph of the Protestant party at Bergün, Thusis, and Davos, the Valtelline had been even more harshly governed in Protestant interests than heretofore. The blood of Rusca was unavenged, and religious sentiment and patriotic aspirations combined to tempt the Valtelliners to throw off the yoke of the Grisons. The situation seemed favourable. The Bund was torn in two by the violence of the Thusis *Strafgericht*; the exiles, the Plantas and their followers, were ready with 500 men at Landeck, only waiting an opportunity to regain their possessions and their status. In Milan was a Spanish governor, the Duke of

Feria, eager to assist in crushing the Franco-Venetian party. France was still incensed at the expulsion of her envoy, Gueffier, and would not move; Venice, threatened by Austria on the one side and Milan on the other, dared not move. It seemed that the moment had come. The nobles of the Valtelline, the Schenardi, Venosta, Guicciardi, Paravicini—all of whom except the Guicciardi had suffered under the Thusis and Davos Courts—headed by Robustelli of Grossotto, who, though not a noble, was rich, vigorous, and related by marriage to the Plantas—entered into a conspiracy against their Grisons lords. Guicciardi, accompanied by priests, undertook a mission to gain the support of Feria. The priests easily persuaded the Cardinal Archbishop of Milan, Federigo Borromeo, to second their efforts; while Guicciardi found an ally in Gueffier, the French envoy, who, by letter, urged Feria to embrace the enterprise. Feria's instructions were to keep the peace in Italy, and an armed intervention in the Valtelline would hardly achieve that. He hoped, however, to support the Valtelliners without being obliged to draw the sword. The Bund was divided, France engaged with the Huguenots, Venice isolated. Guicciardi's mission succeeded, and he returned to the Valtelline with money and promises of support. With this encouragement the plot ripened quickly. It embraced not merely the murder of all Protestants in the valley but also a concerted attack on the Grisons. Planta, with Austrian troops under Baldiron, was to invade the Münsterthal, establish connexion with the Valtelline by the Wörmsersjoch, and to threaten the Lower Engadine by the Ofen Pass. Simultaneously an attack was to be delivered on the Rheinwald by troops raised in Milan and Lugano, under Giöri, with a view to effecting a junction with the Catholic communes of the Upper or Grey League, thus threatening Chur, which was to be menaced by Austrian soldiers massed at Feldkirch. Giovanni Maria Paravicini was charged with the closing of the valley against help from the Grisons garrison of Chiavenna, thus allowing the massacre to take place undisturbed. The plans were skilfully laid and the promoter was Gueffier, acting in concert with Casati and Rudolf von Planta against the Venetians, who alone stood with the Protestant party in the Grisons. He lived to regret his conduct when he found that he had placed the Valtelline entirely in the hands of Spain.

The conspiracy advanced rapidly; though not without arousing the suspicion of the Protestants in the Valtelline, who sent warnings to the *Strafgericht* at Davos and asked for a garrison. They were assured that there was no danger, the Valtelliners were unarmed, the keys of the arsenals were in the hands of the Grisons *podestàs*; nevertheless, as a precaution and to allay the alarm, a thousand men of the Valtelline militia would be called out to man the trenches at Mantello, as the only conceivable danger was an attack from Milan in favour of the Thusis exiles. A more disastrous step could not have been taken, for it

placed under arms the Catholic Valtelliners, the very men who were on the point of rising against their superiors. The massacre and rising were fixed for July 28, but two events occurred which precipitated the movement. Giöri delivered his attack on the castle of Misox and the Rheinwald on July 12, and was driven back by Guler over the Bernardino. In these circumstances Robustelli, who was the acknowledged leader of the rising in the Valtelline, wished to carry out the design at once. A messenger was sent to Paravicini telling him to move his troops up quickly so as to close the approaches from Chiavenna. The messenger was stopped at the bridge by Mantello, but found time to fling the letter into the Adda. The conspirators heard only that their messenger had been arrested; they did not know that the letter was in the river, and so concluded that all was discovered. Venosta counselled flight, but was overridden by the vigour of Robustelli, who decided to strike without delay. On the morning of Sunday, July 19, he and his band of assassins stole into Tirano. A detachment was sent to hold the gorge by the Madonna di Tirano and to prevent any help from Poschiavo. Four shots in the clear morning air gave the signal for the attack: The houses of the Protestants were surrounded. The *podestà*, Enderlin, was killed in the hostelry where he lodged. The preacher Basso was slain and his head placed on his own pulpit for the derision of the Catholic children. The Chancellor Lazzerone fled naked into the Adda for safety, but was discovered and murdered; the Vicar von Salis, in fact all the Grisons officials, met the same fate. About sixty persons perished in Tirano. The massacre spread down the valley. In Teglio seventeen persons fell. At Sondrio the Protestants received timely warning and many fled up the Malenco Valley and over Muretto to Maloggia; but the minister and one hundred and forty of his flock were slain in the square. At the sight of their blood the people cried, "This is our revenge for Rusca." The slaughter lasted fourteen days. About six hundred victims perished, many of them caught in the woods and on the hill-sides where they had sought shelter. Robustelli was declared *Landeshauptmann*, and turned at once to face the Grisons troops which were marching from Chiavenna to put down the revolt. Their lack of discipline, their greed for plunder, and a divided leadership rendered their efforts abortive; and the Valtelliners, with the help of Spanish troops, closed the approaches from Graubünden.

Feria now declared the Valtelline under Spanish protection. There was no doubt as to his main intention; under the plea of protecting the Catholic faith he meant to seize one of the gates of Italy and to secure the Passes for the Spanish-Austrian combination. The whole aspect of the Valtelline question was hereby changed. What had hitherto been to a large extent a private affair of the Grey Leagues now assumed European importance, when one of the competitors for free transit was no longer a suppliant, along with other Powers, to the Bund for favours, but was

actually in possession. The Thirty Years' War had already broken out, and the importance of that possession was presently to be proved when thirty thousand Catholic troops marched through the Valtelline in a single year and turned the balance at the decisive battle of Nördlingen.

When the news of the massacre reached the Grisons the Davos *Strafgericht* was dissolved as incapable of managing so difficult a situation, which had now assumed a European character. The Bund appealed at once to Bern and Zurich for help to crush the "rebel" Valtelliners and to recover the valley. Venice was seriously alarmed at the Spanish threat to its northern frontier, and when the Grisons' appeal for help arrived the Republic was inclined to send overt armed support. But Faria declared that he would consider any advance of Venetian troops as a *casus belli*. Venice was compelled to limit her assistance to money and ammunition, and artillery was pushed forward towards the Mortirolo Pass so as to be ready to support the Grisons in an attack on Bormio and the head of the valley; Girolamo Priuli was also despatched on a special mission to France. But France was in no position to move. She was occupied with the internal question of the Huguenots, and, though deeply interested in the fate of the Valtelline, was unable to take any military measures for the enforcement of her treaty rights. Moreover the trend of her policy was still philo-Spanish. Richelieu had not yet assumed the reins, nor renewed the anti-Austrian policy of Henry IV. Diplomacy was her only available weapon, and, as we shall presently see, she was meditating Bassompierre's embassy to Madrid.

The sole support, therefore, which the Grisons found in their projected attempt to recover the Valtelline was the 3200 men furnished by Bern and Zurich, and the money and munitions which Venice promised. With these forces and 1200 men of their own they resolved to deliver the attack. But instead of choosing the Bernina as their route and as their objective Tirano, where they would have been within easier reach of Venetian supports, and would have cut the valley in two at its most important strategical point, they resolved to make for Bormio, over the more difficult route of Casana and Livigno and down the Val Pedenos. The Spaniards expected the attack from Poschiavo, and their strongest divisions were holding Tirano, but they had left 1600 men well entrenched at the mouth of Pedenos to protect Bormio. The Grisons under Guler and their allies under Mülinen delivered a vigorous attack on the trenches; the mountain-bred soldiers scaled the overhanging rocks on either side and soon turned the position. The Spaniards retired with considerable loss, and the Bündners entered Bormio; whence Hercules von Salis was despatched to Venice to implore instant help towards the common object, the expulsion of the Spaniards from the Valtelline. But before his mission could produce any effect came the news of the unhappy end of the whole expedition, and Salis, who was ill, died of grief. Against Guler's advice the attacking army wasted eight days

in Bormio, days which were of the greatest value to the Spaniards for strengthening Tiranq. When Guler and Mülinen arrived outside the town they found trenches thrown up before the walls, the vineyards and gardens converted into shelters for musketry, the whole position too strong. The attack was repulsed, and the Grisons army retired to Bormio in discouragement. The Berners refused to continue the campaign, and the Bündners clamoured to return to meet a danger which was threatening their homes and their farms. The whole army streamed back again over Casana, and the first attempt to recover the Valtelline closed in disaster.

A grave peril overhung the three Leagues. The Catholics of the Grey or Upper League, the communes of Disentis and Lugnetz, Spanish in sentiment and encouraged by the success of their fellow-believers in the Valtelline, supported by Giöri from Misox and the Catholics of the five cantons (Uri, Unterwalden, Schwyz, Zug, and Luzern), and urged on by Gueffier and Casati, determined to take advantage of the absence of the Protestant army in the Valtelline, to crush if possible the Preachers' party in the Grisons. These Catholic Bündners had refused to share in the Bormio expedition and were pursuing a selfish policy of their own, by which, on the strength of their religion, they hoped to induce Feria to restore the Valtelline to them alone. With that object in view they had already approached the governor of Milan. On February 6, 1621, Feria and the envoys of the Upper or Grey League signed a convention as to the Valtelline on the following conditions. There was to be free transit for all royal troops; a Spanish garrison was to be placed in the valley for eight years; the demolition of Fort Fuentes was to be considered; the Valtelline and Bormio to be restored to the Grey League, but only the Catholic cult permitted; a general pardon was to be granted, the King of Spain guaranteeing security; a Spanish agent was to reside in the Valtelline.

This treaty was considered as an act of treachery against the Bund by all but the Catholic-Spanish party of the Upper League. The Protestant communes of that League refused to ratify it except under pressure. The Protestant-Venetian party was exasperated. Even the Valtelliners resented an arrangement which placed them once more under a part of the hated Grisons. They indulged in hopes and visions of a quasi-independence under the tutelage of Spain. The spirit of freedom was stirring in their veins. Their historians began to use the word "*Patria*"; they themselves despatched to the Courts of Milan, Rome, Madrid missions which were recognised and dealt with as independent. It looked as though civil war were inevitable. The Oberlanders, supported by the men of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, and Luzern, in whose presence we see the hand of Gueffier and Casati, marched down to Reichenau, at the junction of the "Vorder" and "Hinter" Rhine, and occupied Rätzüns, Cäzis, and Thusis opposite to Domleschg, the smiling,

sunny district where lay the Planta castles of Fürstenau and Riedberg. On the other hand, the Protestant party, returning from the disastrous expedition to Bormio, induced their Bern and Zurich allies to halt and entrench themselves at Zizers, Igis, and Mayenfeld. Chur lay between the opposing forces. No collision actually took place. The Protestant-Venetian party concentrated at Grüşch, in the Prätigau, on the line of their return march from Bormio and in touch with their Bern and Zurich allies at Mayenfeld. They were joined by the leaders among the *Prädikanten*, George Jenatsch, Blasius Alexander, Bonaventura Toutsch and others. These men formed themselves into a league, to which they gave the name of the *Gutherzigen*. Their object was to attack and crush the Catholics of the Upper League, and their animosity was directed chiefly against the Planta family, the leaders of the Spanish-Austrian party, on whom the Catholics relied. Pompeius von Planta, on the strength of the Milan convention and relying on the presence of the Catholic forces at Thusis, Cäzis, and Räzüns, had returned to his castle of Riedberg in Domleschg. The *Gutherzigen* resolved to murder him. They engaged some hardy spirits, Galius Riederer, Christopher Rosenroll, and Domenic Stupan, to carry out the deed. These men, together with some seventeen other youths of the Prätigau, left Grüşch on the night of February 14, 1622, and by hard riding came to Riedberg at six o'clock on the following morning. In the courtyard they found Planta's groom currying his horse, for he was to ride that day to Ilanz. The youth was forced to point out his master's bedroom. The door was broken open and there stood Planta in his shirt, a sword in his hand. But on the sight of the armed gang he flung the weapon away and cried, "What have I done that this should befall me?" To which came the answer, "You have betrayed the fatherland, and here is your pay." With that a blow from an axe struck him to the ground, and another followed with such violence that the weapon stuck in the floor.

This deed accomplished, the *Gutherzigen*, under Jenatsch, not venturing to march past Catholic Chur to attack the Catholic Oberlanders at Reichenau, passed up the Prätigau, over the Flüela into the Engadine, and thence over the Albula down upon Domleschg by the Schyn. They attacked and routed the Catholics at Thusis, drove them down to Räzüns, plundered that Austrian fortress, and chased the enemy by Valendas, where they made a fruitless stand, passed Ilanz up the Vorderreinthal and over the Oberalp, thus clearing the Grisons of the Catholic-Swiss invasion and establishing the supremacy of the Protestant-Venetian party.

But while these events were taking place inside the Grisons, the question of the Valtelline and the Passes was receiving more decisive attention in the wider field of European politics. The failure of the Grisons to recover the Valtelline, the convention between Fera and the

Upper League, and the obvious anarchy of the whole country, convinced both France and Venice that steps must be taken unless they intended to leave the Valtelline in the hands of Spain and Austria. Had the Grisons recovered the Valtelline, the treaty of 1602 would have remained in force and France need have taken no steps to keep the Passes open. But such was not the case. Marshal Bassompierre was accordingly sent to Madrid to negotiate a treaty which should settle the question of the Valtelline by an agreement between the two great Powers. Philip III was ill and dying,—his last injunctions to his son, who succeeded him while Bassompierre was still in Madrid, were to lend an ear to papal advice. At first Spain suggested that if France would guarantee the protection of religion in the Valtelline and exclude Venice, Spain would withdraw on receiving compensation for outlay. Bassompierre declined. Free transit for Spanish troops was then proposed as an equivalent for compensation. But this offer too clearly revealed the true intentions of Spain, and again Bassompierre declined. Venice meantime was endeavouring to influence the conference at Madrid through the Court of Rome. Its envoy terrified Gregory XV by visions of Spanish supremacy throughout Italy, and the Pope threw his great influence into the French scale throughout the negotiations at Madrid. A further scheme was submitted by Baldassare de Zuñiga, by which the Grisons were to receive 50,000 crowns and the Valtelline was to be ceded to the Pope. Bassompierre replied that his mission was to recover, not to sell, the Valtelline. Other plans were laid before the conference. It was proposed to erect the Valtelline into a fourth Bund; but that would have implied an abdication of rights on the part of the Three Leagues as well as the creation of a new Ultra-Catholic League, which would have entirely upset the existing balance. It was even suggested that the Valtelline might be constituted a fourteenth canton of the Swiss Confederation. But none of these proposals really met the intention of the Powers. Bassompierre remained firm by his instructions; Spain gave way, and the Treaty of Madrid was signed on April 26, 1621. Its terms, so far as the Valtelline was concerned, included restoration to the Bund; amnesty; the status of 1617 as regards religion, that is to say, permission for the exercise of the Reformed faith; the King of France and the Swiss Confederation to act as guarantors. The pliant spirit which Bassompierre found in the Spanish ministers has been explained by a deep design on the part of Spain to free Louis from foreign embarrassments, so that he might commit himself fully to an internal struggle with the Huguenots which would keep France weak.

But neither the Grisons nor the Valtelline had been consulted in the Treaty of Madrid. It remained to be seen how they would take it. The Grisons, naturally, were satisfied. They had recovered their sovereignty and secured toleration for the Reformed faith. Two of their leading aspirations, patriotism and religion, received fulfilment by the treaty.

Throughout their subsequent history they take their stand on the terms of Madrid. Only three communes objected to the amnesty clause which allowed Robustelli and his assassins to go free; while the Catholics of the Upper League had hankerings after their treaty with Feria, which restored the Valtelline to them alone. The Valtelliners, on the other hand, were violently opposed. They had tasted the sweets of independence and refused to be placed once again under the tyranny of the Grisons, especially with a clause which exposed them to all the difficulties of a religious conflict. They protested, by envoys, at Milan, Madrid, Rome, and Paris. Feria, again, was opposed, as he desired to maintain his treaty with the Upper League, and the policy which had made Spain master of the Valtelline and the Passes. There was a party at Madrid which supported Feria. The Catholic cantons of the Swiss Confederation disliked the religious clause, and it was round them that the opposition to the Treaty of Madrid was concentrated; for by that treaty the Swiss Confederation was to act as guarantor in conjunction with France. A Diet was summoned at Luzern to accept the obligation. The Catholic cantons, being the majority, declined in spite of the efforts of Gueffier, Montholon, and Miron, aided by the ambassador of Venice and the envoys from the Grisons.

The Bündners soon found that they were not to reap the fruits of the Treaty of Madrid. Under the influence of the Preachers, headed, as always, by George Jenatsch, they determined to recover the Valtelline by themselves, and the second expedition to Bormio was planned. Jenatsch, aware that the Upper League would not willingly join him, and mindful of their treacherous action during the first expedition, went up to Flims, and on the first signs of recalcitrancy shot Josef von Capaul. Passing on to Ilanz, he threatened a like fate for any who opposed the determination of the Bund. Cowed by his violence, the Oberlanders reluctantly joined the forces in the Engadine. They were 600 men strong, but without commissariat and without a siege train. On October 11, 1621, they marched over Casana to Livigno, and down the Val Pedenos. The inhabitants had fled to the mountains, taking with them all provisions, and the Spaniards had burned the town so as to deprive the enemy of shelter. Bormio was garrisoned by 800 men who were driven in from their outworks and retired to the fort. But the want of guns rendered any attack hopeless. The troops were absolutely without food. Moreover, news was received that Feria was marching up the valley, while Baldiron, with Austrian troops in the Münsterthal, was threatening the Engadine. To crown all came a letter from Montholon declaring that unless the forces retired at once he would not guarantee the fulfilment of the Madrid Convention. On October 14 the Grisons abandoned the enterprise.

The second Bormio expedition proved even more disastrous than the first, for it brought into active hostility the Austrian power in the Tyrol.

Both Feria and Archduke Leopold declared that the expedition was an act of war on them, not a legitimate attempt to subdue a rebellious province. The Archduke had been exasperated by the sack of his castle at Rätziuns, in March of this year. He now determined to revive and make good his claim on the Lower Engadine and eight of the *Zehngerichte*, his title to which was based on purchase from the House of Toggenburg. In conjunction with Feria he prepared a triple attack on the Grisons. The three Leagues torn by internal dissensions, unsupported by France, which was still engaged in the Huguenot war, or by Venice which dared not move under threat of attack from Milan and from Austria, were powerless to resist invasion. Feria marched on Chiavenna and subdued the Val Bregaglia. The Archduke's troops under Baldiron seized the Lower Engadine, and at the same time made a raid upon the Prätigau from Montafon over the Schlapina Pass, which debouches at Klosters. Baldiron swept over the Flüela, disarmed Davos, compelled the people of the Prätigau to beg for pardon on their knees and to deposit their arms in Castels, to renounce all treaties with other members of the Grisons and with France, and to acknowledge Austrian sovereignty. He then marched down on Mayenfeld, garrisoned it, and proceeded to Chur, thus establishing a junction with the Austrian forces at Feldkirch, and with him was the Thuisis outlaw, Rudolf von Planta. This meant the complete defeat of the Preachers and their allies, the Venetian party. More than one thousand five hundred Bündners fled. Jenatsch, Toutsch, Alexander, and Vulpius endeavoured to escape over the Panixer Pass into Glarus. It was November, and a furious snowstorm was raging. The Oberlanders, embittered against them by the murder of Capaul in Flims, were on their track. Toutsch was killed, Alexander captured and sent to Innsbruck, where he was beheaded a year later. Vulpius and Jenatsch escaped.

The three Leagues were at the lowest ebb. They had lost the Valtelline, Chiavenna, Val Bregaglia, Bormio, Münsterthal, Lower Engadine, and eight of the Ten Jurisdictions. One of the three Leagues, the *Zehngerichten*, indeed, existed no more. The structure of the Grisons as a State lay in ruins. The chief causes of this disaster were the violent religious and political schism inside their own body, the vicinity of Austria and Milan, the weakness of Venice, the distance of France. By the close of 1621 the entire Grisons were in the hands of Austria and Spain. That situation was made quite clear by the terms of the *Milan Artikel*, a double agreement with Feria and Leopold, signed at Milan in January, 1622. The Valtelline and Bormio were renounced by the Grisons for an annual payment of 25,000 gulden (175,000 francs) guaranteed by Spain. Chiavenna was restored, but the Reformed faith was excluded. All Protestants in the Valtelline were obliged to sell their property within six years. By the terms settled with Leopold, the eight Jurisdictions, the Lower Engadine, and the Münsterthal were

declared to be subject to Austria, and an Austrian garrison was to be maintained for twelve years in Chur and Mayenfeld.

But the spirit of the Bündners was not quite broken yet. The intolerable persecutions of the Austrian garrison and the presence, under its protection, of a body of Capuchins drove the Prättigau into a revolt which, for a time, forced Baldiron into flight. The Bündners had been disarmed; but secretly, by night, in the upper forests of their valley, they furnished themselves with formidable clubs, ten feet long, shod with iron and studded with nails. On April 24, 1622, they swept down upon Luzern, killed or drove out the Austrians; pressed them through the gorge at Felzenbach; attacked Baldiron's trenches and drove him into Chur, exclaiming, "*Die Püntner sind nit Menschen, sonder Taifel.*" Chur was besieged, and Baldiron was compelled to ask for terms, and to retire. But by July, Baldiron and Alvig von Sulz were in the Engadine with 10,000 men. Salis, the general of the Leagues, had only 2000 men at his command. The Prättigau was soon reduced, and in September, 1622, the Treaty of Lindau seemed to rivet the Austrian yoke upon the Grisons and the Valtelline. Its terms were an amplification of the Milan *Artikel*. Austria dealt only with the Grey League and the Gotteshaus, the eight Jurisdictions and the Lower Engadine were treated as already Austrian subjects. The two remaining Leagues pledged themselves to make no treaties without the consent of Austria; to grant free transit and free recruiting for Austria and Spain; to receive an Austrian garrison in Chur and Mayenfeld; and to do justice to the Plantas and those who had suffered in the past commotions.

This meant the complete success of the Austrian-Spanish party; and as far as the Grisons and the Valtelline were concerned it seemed that the question of the Passes, the question of religion and the question of patriotism were at an end. For, under the impulse of the Thirty Years' War, armaments were increasing rapidly; Feria was able to place 8000 men in the county of Chiavenna, and Baldiron to lead 10,000 men over the Passes of the Engadine. It was out of the question for the Bund to dream of opposing such forces. The Grisons, moreover, were exhausted by five years of internal dissension and conflict, and a year and a half of Austrian tyranny and commandeering.

But within a month and a half of the conclusions at Lindau the Peace of Montpellier was signed in France (October 19, 1622). The Huguenot difficulty was dispelled for a time. France acquired a free hand, and the whole situation assumed another aspect.

Richelieu was rising rapidly to power; though he did not assume the reins till a year later, he had the ear of the Queen-Mother and spoke through her. The general lines of his foreign policy were those laid down by Henry IV and Sully, the abasement of the Austrian-Spanish power. But in order to carry out his policy it was absolutely essential

that the Huguenot question, which held France divided and weak, should first be settled. This was Richelieu's real difficulty, and the true cause of the vacillation of France in the support of her agents in Switzerland and of French precipitancy as in the case of the hurried Treaty of Monzon. Until the Huguenot question was finally settled by the fall of La Rochelle Richelieu never had a free hand, and was liable to be thwarted at any time in the prosecution of a policy which never for an instant was out of his view. But his struggle with the House of Habsburg was, in its early phases, a secret struggle, a struggle of diplomacy of continual countering of Austro-Spanish successes; he never allowed it to become overt warfare.

As with Henry IV, so with Richelieu the question of the Valtelline and the Passes played a large part in the general design against Spain and Austria, and the keynote of his policy was restitution of the Valtellin in the terms of the Treaty of Madrid. Accordingly, when Venice and Savoy, in alarm at the decisive success of Leopold and Feria, and the absolute subjection of the Grisons and the Valtelline by the Treaty of Lindau, implored the French Court to break up a situation so menacing to the whole of northern Italy, they found a ready hearing, and in February 1623, the Treaty of Paris was concluded. France, Venice, and Savoy pledged themselves to the restitution of the Valtelline.

The policy of the Court of Madrid was peace in Italy. The Pope too felt the gravest alarm at the prospect of a conflagration; and so, to avoid a war over the Valtelline, he proposed the sequestration—the "*depositum*," as it was called—of that valley into his own hands. Some of the Cardinals, notably Maffeo Barberini, afterwards Urban VIII, were opposed to a policy which would probably entangle the Papacy in the mesh of temporal politics; but he was overruled by the Cardinal nephew, Ludovisi, who cherished chimerical designs for erecting the Valtelline into a papal State. France agreed to the *depositum* on the conditions that the forts should be razed and that the sequestration should last four months only. France never intended to abandon her policy of restitution in the terms of the Treaty of Madrid.

The papal troops, under the Marchese di Bagno, entered the Valtelline and took possession of the strong places. But in July, 1623, Pope Gregory XV died and was succeeded by Maffeo Barberini, the Cardinal who had opposed the *depositum*. The new Pope was anti-Spanish in sentiment. Pasquino touched the situation in the epigram "*E forse Cattolico il Papa?*" to which comes the answer "*Taci, taci, è Christianissimo.*" He disliked the cost of the Valtelline to the papal treasury, and gave di Bagno hardly more than 1000 men. But the Spanish party dissuaded him from fulfilling his obligation to end the *depositum* in four months. The presence of the papal troops in the Valtelline seemed to them a guarantee that France would not venture to attack the valley while, in the Pope's hands, the valley afforded them all the benefits of

transit. But Richelieu, freed for a while by the Peace of Montpellier from anxiety about the Huguenots, did not mean to be trifled with, and declared that assistance to allies against rebels was no cause for complaint. He instructed the French ambassador to demand the evacuation of the Valtelline, and, on encountering delays, he said, "The King will not be played with; tell the Pope he will see an army in the Valtelline." Still, Urban could not believe that a Cardinal would venture to levy war on the Pope. But Richelieu was in earnest.

By November, 1624, the Marquis de Coeuvres was at Grüşch, in the Prätigau, the late head-quarters of the Venetian-Protestant party. He had 4000 Swiss and 3000 French infantry, and 500 horse. The people of the Prätigau and Davos welcomed him rapturously. They took an oath of loyalty to France; the Federation oath was resworn in all three Leagues; and the Milan *Artikel* and the Treaty of Lindau were cancelled. Leaving 2000 men to hold the St Luziussteig, the pass between Vaduz and Mayenfeld, de Coeuvres marched into the Engadine, detached a regiment to hold the pass by Martinsbruck and Zernez against a possible Austrian attack on his rear or his flank, and marched over the Bernina to Tirano, there to join the Venetian supports, which in the terms of the Treaty of February, 1623, were being pushed forward to the Valtelline. De Coeuvres met with a purely formal resistance from the papal troops under di Bagno, the Pope was quite unprepared for the suddenness of the attack. De Coeuvres had no orders to deal severely with the papal forces and had no desire to rouse the strong Catholic sentiment of the Valtelline against his expedition. Di Bagno was allowed to march out of Tirano with the honours of war, and with him went the famous Robustelli, leader in the Protestant massacre, a fact which roused the first suspicions in de Coeuvres' Grisons allies. This leniency, however, secured him Bormio and Sondrio without a blow. By the close of the year the whole valley was in the hands of the French. The mouth of the valley, however, and the strong post of Riva on the uppermost reaches of Como, barring the road to Chiavenna, were strongly held by Serbelloni with Spanish troops, and cost de Coeuvres a year's indecisive campaigning. But the French being now masters in the Valtelline the Grisons demanded restitution in the terms of Madrid. Their suspicions first aroused by the treatment of Robustelli now received confirmation. Instead of restoring Bormio, the Valtelline, and Chiavenna, which he did not yet hold, de Coeuvres invited deputies from the three Leagues to meet him at Sondrio, and there laid before them terms on which he would consent to carry out the Treaty of Madrid. The Valtelliners were to enjoy civil and criminal jurisdiction by judges elected by themselves; for this privilege they would pay 25,000 crowns yearly; only the Catholic faith would be permitted in the valley. No doubt de Coeuvres was acting on instructions from Richelieu, who was anxious,—now that he and not Spain held the Valtelline and the Passes—to pacify the Pope for the

outrage of the attack. But these proposals came as a disillusionment for the three Leagues, and roused that deep-rooted suspicion of France which bore fruit later on in the campaign of the Duke of Rohan.

Events, however, were taking place in France which cut across Richelieu's designs and ended by rendering the whole of de Coeuvres' government abortive. The French had failed to destroy Fort Louis, near La Rochelle, as they had promised to do at Montpellier. The consequence was a Huguenot rising supported by Spanish money, which compelled Richelieu hastily to come to terms with Spain on the question of the Valtelline. Ignoring his allies, Venice and Savoy, on March 5, 1626, his envoy, de Fargis, signed the Treaty of Monzon between France and Spain. By the terms of that treaty only the Catholic faith was permitted in the Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna; all three had a right to elect their own officials, who were to be approved, but could not be rejected, by the Bündners; no appeal was to lie from the Valtelline Courts; an amnesty was granted for all past acts; an annual tribute of 25,000 florins was to be paid to the Leagues; the Grisons were not to employ arms against the Valtelline; if they did they were to lose all rights; the forts were to be placed in the hands of the Pope, who was to be arbiter in all religious matters; Spain and France undertook to guarantee the treaty.

The result of this treaty was virtually to erect the Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna into an independent State under the protection of France and Spain. Nothing was said about transit or the Passes, but the Valtelline was not solely Spanish, and in his present straits this was the most Richelieu could look for. His allies, Savoy and Venice, were of course indignant at the "treachery" which led him to conclude a treaty behind their backs, and in truth Venice has little more to do with the Valtelline from this time onward. But Richelieu was justified. The prosecution of this great anti-Austrian scheme, which was of high importance for both his allies, imperatively demanded that the Huguenot question should be settled. If he had informed Savoy and Venice of his intention they would have protested and perhaps thwarted him; on the other hand, they were too weak to be of material assistance in holding Spain and Austria in check while the Cardinal crushed the Huguenots.

The Valtelliners of course accepted the treaty with delight. Under the wing of Milan they were freed from the dreaded restitution threatened by the Treaty of Madrid; their liberties were secured in their Courts of justice; their religion was purged of the Protestant contagion; to secure that point their *Landeshauptmann* Robustelli had spared no efforts. But the indignation in the Grisons was intense: their privileges had been bartered away without consultation, and that by their most powerful ally. Instead of restitution, they were asked to accept a purely formal and illusory sovereignty indicated by an annual tribute

and a right of confirmation to office which was rendered nugatory by the inability to reject. They sent envoys to Paris to demand the fulfilment of the Madrid not of the Monzon settlement, but were met by assurances that the terms of Monzon were the better of the two.

Meantime, in February, 1627, the surrender of the forts into the Pope's hands took place, and de Coeuvres quitted the Valtelline, leaving behind him Mesmin with instructions to carry out the hopeless task of inducing the Grisons to accept the Treaty of Monzon. For the present Richelieu's policy in the Valtelline was virtually broken; in respect both of religion and of politics the valley was under Spanish influence. It was Spain that had saved it from the hated restitution; it was Spain that guaranteed its independence under the Treaty of Monzon. The Passes were at the disposal of Spain and Austria. Their importance was demonstrated during the War of the Mantuan Succession in 1629, when Colalto descended through the Grisons upon the Italian plain; in the summer of that year it is calculated that not less than 30,000 troops crossed the Passes, bringing with them terror, rapine, plague for the unfortunate inhabitants of the Valtelline—plague, which in 1631, swept off at least a quarter of the whole population of Graubünden. Richelieu had not got what he wanted by the Treaty of Monzon. His enemy the Austrian was being constantly fed with troops by way of the Valtelline, to keep alive the Imperial party in the Thirty Years' War. In 1633, Feria passed through with 9000 men, and in the next year the Infante Ferdinand with 12,000 men helped to win the decisive battle of Nördlingen. Richelieu resolved to put a stop to this, and made his last effort to secure French ascendancy in the Valtelline in pursuit of his north-Italian policy which had led him to seize Pinerolo as a menace to the Spanish position in Milan. If he held the passes of the Grisons and the Valtelline as well as Pinerolo, which virtually commanded the mouth of the Cenis, he secured a dominant position in northern Italy.

For the execution of his designs Richelieu chose with great insight Henry de Rohan, the soul of the Huguenot party, the man whom he had learned to appreciate during his long struggle with the Reformed faith. Rohan was not only a brilliant soldier, he had the further recommendation of his creed, which would certainly assist him in dealing with the Protestant element in the three Leagues. His campaign of 1635 in the Valtelline, as it was the last, so it was the most brilliant of all the military operations in that district. Rohan seems to have understood the people and to have revelled in the geographical difficulties of the country. The rapidity of his marches over dangerous passes delighted his allies and confounded his foes. There is almost a touch of pathos in the failure of his mission for reasons which were beyond his control.

Ever since the Peace of Cherasco in 1631, under whose terms the Imperial troops evacuated the Grisons, Richelieu had been preparing the

ground. Lande, the French envoy, was instructed to urge the Bund to secure the passes. In March, 1635, Rohan was at Chur with 4000 men and 400 horse. The troops of the Leagues were inspected on the meadows at Igis, the French battalions at Reichenau. Jenatsch, who since the Treaty of Monzon had found nothing in his own land to engage his activity, now returned and took service under Rohan, who despatched him to Bormio to hold and fortify the Baths and bar an attack from Austria. As a support to the Bormio garrison, he quartered a French regiment at Livigno. Ten companies of men were detached to guard the St Luziussteig, and Lande with 3000 men marched down to Chiavenna. It will be noticed that Rohan's dispositions resembled those of his predecessor de Coeuvres, geographical necessity governing both. Rohan himself, on April 12, followed Lande to Chiavenna with the remainder of his forces.

Neither Austria nor Spain, however, intended to let the Valtelline, which was of such supreme importance to them, slip from their hands as long as the Thirty Years' War lasted. Ten thousand men were massed in Tyrol, and on July 13 attacked the Grisons garrison at Bormio. Fernamond was in command of the Imperial troops and was acting in concert with Serbelloni who was to deliver an attack on the Lower Valtelline from the Milanese. Fernamond drove the Bündner troops out of Bormio; but, instead of pursuing them down the valley, he turned aside up the Val Pedenos, to crush the French regiment at Livigno. He was afraid to leave his rear exposed if he pushed on at once to join hands with Serbelloni. The French retired over Casana into the Engadine, leaving open to Fernamond that pass by which he was enabled to threaten Rohan from Val Bregaglia. There was a danger that Rohan might be caught between Fernamond's troops in the rear and Serbelloni's on his front. He grasped the situation at once and resolved to strike before Fernamond could cross Casana. He left Chiavenna, picked up his Livigno regiment in the Engadine, and on the night of June 27 pushed over Casana without a halt. Fernamond's troops, under Colonel Brisighello, never dreaming that Rohan was upon them, lay scattered about among the cottages of the village. In the grey of the morning Rohan swooped down and seized the central point, the churchyard, under shelter of whose walls his troops could open fire. The churchyard commanded the bridge, and the Imperial troops were picked off one by one as they hurriedly formed up on the opposite meadows. The action was over in a short time, and the Austrians in full retreat on Bormio. Though it lasted so short a time the engagement at Livigno was decisive for the campaign. Rohan did not pursue the enemy, but leaving a force to hold Livigno he pushed right up that valley and over the pass at its head on to the Bernina route at La Rosa, and thence down on Tirano, the chief strategical point in the Valtelline, to prevent the junction of Fernamond and Serbelloni. From Tirano he advanced

some troops to occupy the bridge at Mazzo, and to give battle to Fernamond, who was moving down the valley sacking and burning. At Mazzo the French advance-guard was driven back, and the German troops taking this for a decisive victory gave themselves up to the heady wine of the valley which they found there in the cellars. Fernamond issued orders, "To-morrow we march to pluck the cock." But Rohan, who was aware of the condition of the foe, starting on the night of Monday, July 2, 1635, delivered a surprise attack in the early morning of the 3rd. Fernamond was completely routed and fled to Tyrol, leaving a garrison in Bormio. Rohan turned down the valley to deal with Serbelloni, who was in position at Morbegno. But the Spanish troops did not await the attack. They retired. On October 13, Rohan with the valuable aid of Jenatsch defeated Fernamond at Bormio, to which he had returned, and on November 10 he delivered the final blow to Serbelloni, who had advanced once more to Morbegno. The Spaniards lost 800 men, their munitions, and their military chest.

The Valtelline was now entirely in the hands of the French, and both Valtelliners and Bündners began to ask what Rohan meant to do with it. Both suspected that the French intended to keep it. Rohan summoned the Valtelline nobles to meet him at Morbegno. He endeavoured to compel them to renounce their allegiance to the Spaniards; they refused to abandon the position secured to them by the Treaty of Monzon; while the Grisons were demanding the terms obtained at Madrid, and the complete restitution of the valley. After long pressure and negotiations Rohan succeeded in wringing from both a statement that they placed themselves in the hands of His Most Christian Majesty. With this declaration in his possession, Rohan promulgated his settlement; the terms of which were a return to the *status quo ante* 1617, except as regards religion and justice; with these exceptions all "sovereignty" belonged to the three Leagues. Disputes between the Leagues and their subjects were to be settled by a Court of four, presided over by the French ambassador. This settlement completed the disillusionment of the Graubündners. This was not the Treaty of Madrid, but that of Monzon in a modified form. The reservation of religion and justice rendered their "sovereignty" an empty phrase. From this moment the Bund resolved to break with Rohan and the French. Jenatsch put himself at the head of the movement. There were other causes of complaint against the French. Rohan was left in pressing need of money by Richelieu, and the Bündner troops ceased to receive their pay. Moreover at this juncture Spain let it be known that if the Grisons would join with her to expel the French she would guarantee the unconditional restitution of the Valtelline.

On September 24, 1636, the leaders of the three Leagues met at Silvaplana and took an oath to abandon the French service. Jenatsch, Schorch, and Buol were sent to Innsbruck to come to an understanding

with Austria, and to lay the foundations for a treaty to be signed at Milan. Austria promised religious freedom in the eight Jurisdictions and the Lower Engadine. This clinched the business; for the Grisons had thus achieved their two main objects, the preservation of their sovereignty in the Valtelline, and liberty of conscience inside the Bund. Rohan had warning of what Jenatsch and his friends were plotting; but he was lying ill at Sondrio. The French Court was deaf to his appeals for money, and to his declarations that unless they modified their attitude they would lose the Valtelline. He had himself carried to Chur in a litter and tried to win back the Bündners to the French service. He personally guaranteed their pay. But in vain; the Grisons had lost all confidence in the word of France. In March, 1637, a concerted rising against the French took place. Rohan was in no position of men or of health to face it by force. When too late, he received from Paris despatches authorising him to grant unconditional restitution, except on the point of faith, and a large sum of money to pay the arrears. But the moment had passed. Rohan left the Grisons on May 5. They presented him with a fine address of thanks; "his memory would be perennial among them," they said; "though they raised a monument to him on every peak in the whole canton they could never do him adequate honour for the services he had rendered them." They called him "the good Duke," and accompanied him with all ceremony to the frontiers of their land. There Jenatsch offered his hand to Rohan's captain, Lecques, who refused it, flinging over his shoulder the taunt, "I cannot trust the hand of a traitor." But Jenatsch was not a traitor, he simply embodied the aspirations of his country and achieved them. On May 25 an embassy was sent to Milan and concluded a treaty on the lines of the understanding at Innsbruck. The terms were—free transit for Spain, absolute sovereignty of the Grisons in the Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna, except on the point of religion; free trade between the two States. After some negotiation at Madrid over the point of religion, an "everlasting peace" was signed at Milan on September 23, 1639; and to commemorate the event a gold medal was struck bearing the legend *Tandem*. At length, after thirty-six years of intrigue, of massacre, of war, the Valtelline returned to its former lords, who, schooled by the past, treated their subjects with mildness, and retained possession until 1815, when the Valtelline was ceded to Austria. By the Treaty of Zurich in 1859 it was incorporated with Italy, to which it geographically, racially, and linguistically belongs.

CHAPTER III.

THE PROTESTANT COLLAPSE.

(1620-30.)

I. THE BOHEMIAN AND THE PALATINATE WAR.

(1620-3.)

THE Bohemian War, as the military conflict of the year 1620 is usually called, was as brief in its course as its results were decisive; for, strictly speaking, it extended over but four months. Its story is on the Protestant side from first to last one of helplessness, incompetence, and ill-faith. While Frederick's enemies were preparing to crush him, he was impotently allowing the confusion in his government to become chaos. The Bohemian army had returned from its futile march on Vienna, demoralised by failure and with ranks thinned by disease; its pay was in arrear, and the soldiery ready to break out into open mutiny; yet the Bohemian nobles were jealous of Anhalt holding the chief command over it. The condition of things had, however, improved by May, when Anhalt had effected a junction with Mansfeld, and had been further reinforced by a Silesian contingent. Bethlen Gabor too had now openly promised aid; and, a few weeks after Maximilian had crossed the frontier, a joint Bohemian and Hungarian embassy had started for Constantinople, and an informal Diet had elected Bethlen King at Pressburg.

After entering Upper Austria on July 24, 1620, with the army of the League (about two-thirds of the entire force), Maximilian reached Linz on August 4 without any serious impediment, and at once, in accordance with his commission from the Emperor, exacted provisional homage from the Estates. Their 2000-3000 mercenaries were quickly drafted into the army of the League; and a large body of armed peasantry that sought to obstruct its passage was cut to pieces. Maximilian then put forth his second Imperial commission, empowering him to bring back Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia to their allegiance, and crossed the Bohemian frontier, turning aside again, however, into Lower Austria to effect his junction with Bucquoy. With the Lower Austrian

Estates Ferdinand himself dealt, proclaiming as rebels the Protestant seceders who had formally placed themselves under the protection of Frederick. In the meantime Anhalt with the main Bohemian army fell back into Moravia; while Mansfeld, after operating against a force of Spanish auxiliaries under Don Balthasar Maradas, threw himself into Pilsen. As early as April, having already tired of a service which brought him little plunder or pay, and not even the desired title of Field-Marshal, he had asked for his dismissal; and in August, although he had for a year and a half been under the ban of the Empire, he made overtures to the Emperor through Maximilian.

The way to Prague thus lay open; and, towards the end of October, Maximilian induced Bucquoy to adopt a less cautious strategy. The combined main army of the League and the Imperialists, probably amounting to rather less than 22,000 men, now set forth in its march upon the Bohemian capital. Anhalt, whose forces, including 3000 Hungarians, seem to have outnumbered the enemy by about 2000 men, moved from Moravia and, with King Frederick, who had joined him, took up a position in a fortified camp at Rakonitz, athwart the hostile line of advance. In these preliminary operations Anhalt gained a momentary advantage over Tilly, who had taken Bucquoy's place during his disablement by a slight wound. Count John Tzerklaes von Tilly was a Walloon, who under Parma and in the Hungarian wars had learnt to combine prudence with decisiveness of action at the right moment. In the Thirty Years' War the continuity of Tilly's military successes was unbroken till Gustavus Adolphus appeared on the scene. He was neither unwilling to resort to diplomatic contrivance, nor blind to his own interests; but his devotion to the cause which he served, inspired by an unswerving religious zeal and political loyalty, secured him the confidence of his master, while his rigorous abstention from self-indulgence won him the goodwill of his soldiery, to whose habits and desires he was accustomed to allow the licence approved by the military usage of the times. Unable to dislodge Anhalt at Rakonitz, Tilly endeavored to reach Prague by a more circuitous northern route before the arrival of the Bohemian army; but Anhalt and Hohenlohe contrived to be first on the spot, and encamped to the west of the city on the White Hill, where they hastily threw up entrenchments.

Before these had been completed, Tilly brought up his host in face of them, and, amidst the morning fogs of November 8, in opposition to the advice of the still disabled Bucquoy, marshalled his troops in order of battle. The Catholic forces (which included combatants from every nation of western and central Europe) advanced to the cry of *Sancta Maria*, given out from his tent by Duke Maximilian. A spirited charge of the Imperialist horse was promptly met by Thurn's regiment; and for a brief space of time it seemed as if the defence, in which Anhalt and his eldest son distinguished themselves, would prevail. But

before long it gave way; young Christian of Anhalt was taken prisoner by a gallant Imperialist adversary, Count Verdugo; and a general assault of the Leaguers, whom Tilly had quickly rallied after the first shock of the cannonade directed against them, gradually broke the Bohemian line. Only a small section of the troops, more especially the Moravian foot, refused to yield. In the flight which followed, a much larger number of men and horses went down than in the battle itself. The entire affair occupied not much more than an hour; and the fighting was half over before information that it had begun reached Frederick, who, unluckily for his fame, was sitting at table with the English ambassadors. A council of war was speedily held, at which the Austrian Tschernembl and one or two others were for continuing the defence, since the fortifications were strong, and 8000 men sent by Bethlen Gabor might speedily arrive—in point of fact, they were already within twenty miles of Prague. But Anhalt and Thurn had lost confidence in their troops, and were probably afraid of being unable to control so large a host (for hardly more than a thousand had fallen in the battle) within the panic-struck capital; moreover, they were naturally anxious to secure the safety of Frederick and his family. He seems to have made one attempt to parley with Maximilian, and, when his overture remained unanswered, to have resolved on flight. On the evening of the fateful day a long stream of vehicles, containing the King and Queen and their family, his chief ministers and generals, Anhalt, Ruppa, Thurn, and the rest, passed out of Prague on its way towards the Silesian frontier. Only Thurn's son returned to Prague, whither he was afterwards followed by the English ambassadors. On the following day the victorious armies began their entry into Prague; and on November 13 Maximilian received on behalf of the Emperor the provisional homage of such of the Estates as were assembled there.

Meanwhile, the Palatinate War had broken out, some months before the Bohemian had reached its crisis. In the course of August, 1620, Spinola, in his march from the Netherlands, advanced as far as Mainz and took Kreuznach, while the forces of the Union slowly drew back on the other side of the Rhine. Offering to spare the Hesse-Cassel and Baden-Durlach dominions if their Princes would promise neutrality, he invaded the Upper Palatinate in September, and, though stoutly opposed by a remnant of the Elector's soldiery, seized place upon place, and gradually began to take the government of the country into his hands. In October, Frederick Henry of Orange, with 2000 men, joined the forces of the Union at Worms; but neither he nor Maurice of Hesse was able to infuse resolution into the Court and Council at Heidelberg, whence the Electress Dowager and the heads of the Government incontinently took flight. Early in December the Dutch auxiliaries withdrew. Without attempting to lay siege to the chief towns of the Rhenish

Palatinate, Spinola was content for the present to remain in the comfortable winter-quarters which he had secured, and to await the progress of events.

After the catastrophe of the White Hill it had seemed quite safe on the Imperial side to neglect the overtures of Mansfeld; and he consequently offered his services to Frederick, who named him commander-in-chief in Bohemia and the incorporated lands (February, 1621). Mansfeld hereupon made a series of raids from Pilsen; but, having repaired to Heilbronn, in order to try his diplomatic powers on the members of the Union there, he found himself debarred from returning to Pilsen, which had, in the meantime been occupied by the troops of the League. The fortress of Glatz on the Silesian frontier, the last place in Bohemia which held out against Ferdinand's authority, was not surrendered by the younger Thurn till October, 1622.

The manifesto issued from Breslau in November, 1620, by the unfortunate Frederick, calling on the Union to take up his cause as its own and predicting the lengths to which the Catholic Reaction, if unchecked, would proceed, fell on deaf ears. After holding repeated meetings in the last months of the year, the Union in December at Worms still proclaimed its determination not to abandon the defence of the Palatinate. But the representatives attending these meetings had dwindled in numbers, and at Worms no longer included a single deputy from any of the towns. Several of the Princes, too, were evidently bent upon making their peace with the Emperor—among them Duke John Frederick of Württemberg (who had special reasons for dreading the application to his own case of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*), together with the Anhalt Princes, Christian's nephew and brothers, and his late diplomatic helpmate, Joachim Ernest of Ansbach. All the members of the Union had lost heart, with the exception of George Frederick of Baden-Durlach and the high-minded but somewhat stubborn Maurice of Hesse-Cassel. Nor was there any reliance to be placed on foreign support; the States General were disinclined to repeat a demonstration which the incompetence of the Union had rendered futile; while James I, though the invasion of the Palatinate had furnished him with the requisite opportunity for allowing funds to be collected and volunteers shipped, and part of a loan obtained by him from Denmark had been transferred by him to his daughter Elizabeth, would go no further till his Parliament should meet in January. Inasmuch as his marriage negotiations with Spain were still in progress there was no saying what course he might then pursue.

On February 7, 1621, the Union was to meet at Heilbronn, to determine whether it should prolong its existence beyond May 14 following (up to which date its act of association had been renewed in 1617) and at the same time to settle what common action should

be taken for the protection of the Palatinate. England, Denmark, and the United Provinces had been invited to send their ambassadors to the meeting; but before it took place the former chief of the moribund Union had been placed under the ban of the Empire. °

After quitting Prague, Frederick had with his wife and children made his way into Silesia, whence he speedily sent them on into the dominions of his brother-in-law, the young Elector of Brandenburg. George William had in the previous year succeeded both in Brandenburg and in Prussia, which in 1618 had at last been united with the electorate. Just as during his administration of Cleves and Mark George William had sought to assure these western possessions to his House by keeping in touch with the States General, so he might now be expected, in opposition to Austria and Poland, to enter into close relations with Sweden. Such had indeed been the calculation of King Gustavus Adolphus, who in May, 1620, paid an incognito visit to Berlin, and there, with the aid of the Lutheran Electress Dowager Anna, obtained the promise of the hand of the absent Elector's sister Maria Eleonora. In September the Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna negotiated the formal engagement, and in November the marriage was celebrated at Stockholm. But, though Gustavus Adolphus kept alive the relations thus begun, he was from the summer of 1621 onwards again much occupied by the renewal of the Polish War; while George William, though he had reluctantly consented to the match, was unwilling to provoke either Poland or the Emperor, and delayed choosing his side. In January, 1621, Frederick, whose hope that the Silesian Diet might rally to his support and thus enable him to hold on till the arrival in full force of Bethlen Gabor had been frustrated, joined his wife at Küstrin. Behind his back Silesia submitted without delay to the Saxon occupation, purchasing by a large money-payment easy terms, including the liberty of exercising the Augsburg Confession. Under the pressure of Bucquoy's troops the Moravian Estates had already on December 18, 1620, declared their secession from the Bohemian confederation. The Lusatians obtained conditions similar to the Silesians; but here, in accordance with his compact with the Emperor, the Elector of Saxony was to remain in possession till he had been repaid his costs.

On January 29, 1621, the final blow fell, and the ban of the Empire was solemnly pronounced upon Anhalt, Hohenlohe, and John George of Jägerndorf. This sentence, although delayed at the last in deference to the wish of the Elector of Saxony, must be concluded to have been an afterthought, and due to considerations of policy. For why should it not have been issued when Frederick dared to defy the Emperor by accepting the Bohemian crown and then by resisting him in arms? This view of the situation put forward, with his usual caution, by Baron (afterwards Prince) Ulrich von Eggenberg, since 1615 Ferdinand's most trusted counsellor, was quite understood by Maximilian of Bavaria, who

two months later was charged with the execution of the decree. That careful accountant reckoned the total of the Emperor's indebtedness to him at more than three millions of florins; and the amount was of course continuously increasing. The Emperor would have offended against a traditional principle of his House by entertaining the thought of a permanent cession of Upper Austria to Maximilian, who now held it in pledge; hence it was proposed to compensate him by transferring to him the Upper Palatinate (which his troops were with this intent to occupy) together with the electoral dignity. At the same time Ferdinand had another bargain in view, proposed by the Spanish ambassador Oñate. In return for her assistance Spain was to be placed in possession of the other half of the Palatinate—the Rhenish or Lower—together with Elsass, so as to form a "secundogeniture" for Philip III's second son, Don Carlos. This latter scheme was afterwards repudiated at Madrid; but the arrangement with Bavaria seemed practicable, and an indispensable preliminary to it was the solemn act of outlawry which dispossessed the present Elector Palatine.

However late the blow, it fell in time to extinguish the last pretence of resistance at Heilbronn, where the meeting of the Union opened on February 7, nine days after the issue of the ban of the Empire. No foreign Power was represented there, though even now the English Parliament was ready to grant subsidies for the rescue of the Palatinate. When the representatives of the Union at Heilbronn showed some disposition towards collecting their resources for the same purpose, Landgrave Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt acquainted them with the Emperor's view as to any action of the kind. Not only, he pointed out, would those who supported the outlawed Elector be in their turn subjected to the ban, but the disclosures of *The Anhalt Chancery* (a pamphlet recently put forth by Maximilian of Bavaria, purporting to contain the substance of Christian of Anhalt's diplomatic negotiations) had so clearly proved the Union itself to be an association for unlawful purposes that its members had no choice but to abandon it. Immediately a *sauve qui peut* set in; and a series of treaties were negotiated by the busy Landgrave Lewis, even Maurice of Hesse-Cassel, hitherto the very soul of the Union, seeking protection for his landgravate in a special compact. On April 12 the Duke of Württemberg and the Margrave of Ansbach agreed in the name of the Union to abandon Frederick and the defence of the Palatinate, and to dissolve the association; and on May 14 a few of its members met at Heilbronn to formulate its dissolution. They stated that its purpose still remained unfulfilled; nor could they have better described the result of the thirteen years for which it had lasted. The dissolution of the Union, besides depriving Frederick and the Palatinate of the last chance of aid from that body, seriously damped the ardour of their supporters both in England and in the Scandinavian North.

When the breakdown of the Union had followed on the rout of the White Hill, the first act of the changeful drama of the Great War was really played out. The lackland "King and Queen of Bohemia," as they continued to call themselves, had passed on from Küstrin to Berlin, and thence, by way of Wolfenbüttel and Segeberg (in the royal portion of Holstein), into the Free Netherlands. To Segeberg Christian IV of Denmark in March summoned a few Princes of the Lower Saxon Circle, who passed some strong resolutions as to the defence of Frederick's inheritance. In Holland he and his consort were received by the population as the martyrs of its own cherished Calvinism; and a cordial welcome was extended to them at the Hague by Frederick's kinsman, Maurice of Orange (April, 1621). The Dutch truce with Spain was at this very time running out, and the arrogant Spanish demands rendered the renewal of war inevitable; so that already in December, 1620, the States General had pressed the defence of the Palatinate both upon the Union and upon Denmark.

Frederick's and Elizabeth's life of exile, which in the case of the heroic Queen lasted full forty years, cannot be described here. Notwithstanding his placidity of temper, Frederick was tenacious of his rights throughout; while in the earlier years of her exile Elizabeth Stewart's royal personality inspired a passionate loyalty in both the military champions and the diplomatic agents and helpers of the Palatine cause. With the aid of indefatigable servants such as Ludwig Camerarius and Johann von Rusdorf the Palatine family constituted the chief, and at one time almost the sole, nucleus of resistance to the victorious Catholic Reaction.

Frederick, whom the "pasquils" of the day treated with scant generosity, believed himself to be following his destiny, while in truth, he was yielding to stronger wills than his own. There was some grandeur of purpose in their designs, and some genius in the devices which were to give effect to them. All the more humiliating was their utter collapse so soon as they were put to the touch. Their pivot was the establishment of a national Protestant monarchy in Bohemia. But not only had Thurn and Anhalt—the national leader and the political counsellor—failed to secure a definite assurance of support from external allies. There was also wanting a sufficient and trustworthy military force, organised by the Bohemian insurrectionary government and assured of the support of the large majority of the nation. Thus the government of Frederick had really no chance of maintaining the offensive against Ferdinand, or afterwards of withstanding the combined attack of Emperor, League, and Spain. The rout of the White Hill and the abandonment of the Palatinate at once exposed the hollowness of the vast designs, and the futility of the elaborate apparatus, of the Palatine statesmanship, and put an end to the prominence which it had for a time occupied in the affairs of Europe.

Christian of Anhalt's own political importance ended with this collapse. The publication of his papers seized at Prague had acted like the explosion of the master alchemist's alembic; while the great artificer himself made a noiseless escape into the protection of the King of Sweden. Within three years an elaborate negotiation secured him an Imperial pardon; and before his death in April, 1630, he not only placed himself under obligations to Wallenstein in order to serve the interests of his hardly-used principality, but actually received favours from the Emperor. Of his companions under the ban, Hohenlohe likewise made his peace with Vienna; while John George of Jägerndorf ultimately made his way to Transylvania, and till his death (March, 1624) did his best to stimulate Bethlen Gabor to enter into the war.

The effects of the catastrophe upon Bohemia and the adjoining lands, and upon the unoffending population of the Palatinate, were appalling. In Bohemia, though the authority of Ferdinand could not be at once restored throughout the kingdom and the "incorporated" States, more especially as a rough winter and a severe pestilence delayed the completion of the campaign, the Catholics were resolved to gather in at once the fruits of their victory. The Bohemian leaders were not prepared to rouse the kingdom to a popular resistance which even now might have proved irrepressible. As yet the excesses committed by the troops holding Prague had been relatively slight, and had mainly consisted (to the great loss of future students of Bohemian history) of the burning of books actually or presumably heretical found in the houses of the citizens. The Bohemian Diet had of course ceased to meet; and the politic Prince Charles of Liechtenstein (the founder of the fortunes of his House) was named regent, and afterwards governor, of the kingdom. The Archbishop of Prague (Lohelius) had returned early, together with other prelates and a large number of Jesuits, upon whose immediate recall Ferdinand had insisted. Though the Polish Cossacks had been sent home, carrying rapine and terror through the land on their way, and though Bucquoy had departed to Hungary with the body of Imperial troops, Tilly remained behind for a time to hold watch over Prague. Thus the punitive process could safely begin. During the night of February 10, 1621, the leaders of the recent insurrection were arrested and cast into various prisons; and on the following day an extraordinary tribunal was established for dealing with the delinquencies connected with the rising. Out of a list of sixty-one proscribed, forty-seven had been actually arrested, including eighteen former Directors; old Count Schlick was soon afterwards seized in the castle of Friedland. Thurn, Ruppa, and twenty-nine other defaulters were summoned to appear within six months. On March 29 a "rapid procedure" was instituted against the prisoners, and twenty-seven of them were condemned to death, while they were all declared to have forfeited their estates. The sentences were quickly confirmed at Vienna,

the penalty of death being, however, remitted in five instances, and some barbarous stipulations as to the mode of execution struck out. On April 5 sentence of death *in absentia* was pronounced on twenty-nine further delinquents, while the property of ten who had died in the interval was declared forfeited. On June 21 twenty-seven of the prisoners suffered death, and certain minor punishments were inflicted or sentences pronounced on the following day. Order was kept in the city by seven squadrons of Saxon horse, brought in for the purpose. No further executions took place; and from the spring of 1622 onwards the punitive measures of the Government were practically confined to confiscation.

But this proceeded on an enormous scale. To the proclamation bidding all landowners who had taken any part in the insurrection avow their guilt and throw themselves on the Emperor's mercy, more than 700 nobles and knights had responded. Their lives and honour were left untouched; but, in direct violation of a privilege of Rudolf II providing that forfeited estates should pass to innocent persons in the line of inheritance, one-third, one-half, or the whole of their respective lands were, in accordance with a scale elaborated by Slawata, declared to have escheated to the Crown. The confiscations continued till 1623, when a popular outbreak led to the closing of the proscription list; though payments continued to be enforced for many years, chiefly on petty offenders. It may be safely stated that by the end of 1623 nearly half of the landed property in Bohemia had passed into the hands of the Emperor, and that the confiscations arising out of the insurrection amounted in value to something between four and five millions of our money.

How was the Emperor to deal with so vast an amount of landed property? So early as September, 1622, he announced his intention to sell large quantities of it for cash (of which he certainly stood in need) and to entrust both the conduct of the sale and the application of the proceeds to the Bohemian Government under Liechtenstein. Unfortunately they executed their task with reckless speed, disposing of the main mass of the estates within something like a twelvemonth. As a matter of course, enormous fortunes were made by the wary, and especially by persons claiming to be entitled to easy terms or even to free gifts—officials such as Slawata and Martinitz or military commanders such as Bucquoy, Maradas, and Aldringer. The most extensive operations, however, were carried on by Liechtenstein, Eggenberg, and above all by Albrecht von Wallenstein.

A member of a noble but not wealthy Bohemian family, Wallenstein had exchanged the creed of the Bohemian Brethren for that of Rome, and by his first marriage had attained to large possessions and a prominent position in Moravia. He had made himself useful to the Emperor Ferdinand by levying troops for his service, first, on a small scale, for

his campaign against Venice (1617), then, in larger numbers, during the Bohemian War. In 1622 he was appointed to the command of the troops at Prague, and continued to oblige the Emperor with a series of loans which in the following year already exceeded a million of florins. A large share of the confiscated Bohemian lands was now directly or indirectly acquired by him—among them the domains of Friedland and Reichenberg on the Silesian frontier, and, a little more to the south, the town of Gitschin. By 1624 his acquisitions were valued at not far short of five millions of florins; and it was manifest that he designed sooner or later to make the lands in his possession the basis of an independent principality. The eminence which he had already reached was due to his services, to his wealth, and to his connexion with the great financiers of the day—above all, with de Vite, to whom about this time a patent had been granted for the purchase and recoinage of all the silver in Bohemia. Wallenstein's interests had always been bound up with the affairs of his native land. But, with the twofold object of obtaining a certain amount of money and rewarding many military commanders and others who had served him in the recent crisis, Ferdinand now introduced into the Bohemian landed nobility a number of new-comers of German, Italian, French, and Spanish origin, with the result of both denationalising the once powerful order into which they were admitted and rendering it subservient to the Crown.

But Ferdinand took but a slight personal interest in the land-settlement of his reconquered Bohemian kingdom; what he had at heart was the fulfilment of his vow to extirpate the heresy which had estranged the country from Rome. Notwithstanding the warnings of Bishop Carlo Caraffa (who had looked into the condition of things at Prague before proceeding to Vienna as Nuncio), the cautious counsels of Liechtenstein, of the Elector of Mainz, and of even Maximilian of Bavaria, and the danger of giving offence to John George of Saxony and his influential Court-preacher, Ferdinand, as early as March 1621, ordered all clergy, University teachers and schoolmasters professing the doctrines of Calvin, the Picards, or the Bohemian Brethren, to quit the realm within three days. Next, a general attack was opened upon the adherents of the Confession of 1576. Before the spring was over no Protestant worship was any longer permitted in Prague, except in the German churches, or on any of the royal domains. Other measures ensued, and early in 1622 a series of tests was proposed to the Protestant clergy remaining in Prague which by October led to their expatriation, followed by that of their colleagues in other towns of the kingdom. In the same year the *Carolinum* at Prague was similarly purged; and its revenues and rights were made over to the Jesuit *Clementinum*, with which it was combined into a new University. After Ernest Albert von Harrach (a son of the Emperor's favourite councillor Baron Charles von Harrach, and a brother of Wallenstein's second wife) had succeeded

as Archbishop of Prague, the religious reaction passed all previous bounds. In 1623 the whole body of the Protestant clergy of all shades of creed were expelled from Bohemia; and in 1624 an Imperial edict, obtained through the influence of the Jesuit Lamormain, now the Emperor's confessor, prohibited any religious service except the Catholic, and excluded Protestants from all rights and privileges, whether civil or religious. The conversion of Protestants was systematically enforced by billeting soldiery upon the recalcitrant; and emigration was only permitted on condition of forfeiture of a considerable portion of the emigrant's property. Liechtenstein's proclamation of 1626, summing up the disabilities imposed on Protestants in Bohemia, is a document which it would not be easy to match in the entire history of religious intolerance.

The grotesque inquisitorial process for carrying out this cruel policy at Prague and then throughout the kingdom met with much violent opposition; but the instances of a persistent refusal to conform or emigrate were quite isolated. In 1627 Ferdinand II, when at Prague to secure the coronation of his heir, instituted a tribunal of "reformation," which fixed six months as the final term within which Protestant recusants must quit the realm after the sale of their property. It is reckoned that on this last occasion more than 30,000 domiciled families of all classes abandoned Bohemia. The country lost incalculably by this drain of warlike nobles, skilled professional men, accomplished scholars and artists, and for a long time to come fell back hopelessly in learning and culture; some of its neighbours, Saxony in particular, profiting in proportion by the immigration of Bohemian exiles. The royal towns were deprived both of their corporate property, which had formerly amounted to something like one-third of the lands of the kingdom, and of their self-government; and their utter decline entirely changed the face of the country and dried up the sources of the activity of the people. Such of the Bohemian-born nobles as remained in the land sooner or later became converts; while the peasantry, unable as a class to emigrate, sank into stagnation. The hand of Ferdinand, which cut into shreds the *Letter of Majesty*, seemed at the same time to have severed the sinews of the nation's vitality. The new Constitution (*Landesordnung*), carefully drafted by two reactionary Commissions, and signed by Ferdinand on May 23, 1627, besides establishing the hereditary right of the ruling dynasty, while it reserved to the King the right of summoning the Diet and the legislative initiative, also included provisions for putting an end to the ascendancy of the Bohemian tongue and thus preparing the extinction of the Bohemian nationality.

In Moravia the adoption by the Estates of Žierotin's advice to renounce further resistance on being assured of the preservation of their religious liberties had proved of little avail, for in an interview with the Moravian leader Ferdinand fell back on the authority of the Pope

in matters of conscience. Heavy contributions were imposed upon the towns, and large numbers of industrious sœtaries had to take refuge in Hungary. Ultimately, the Moravian Constitution was revised on the same lines as the Bohemian. After some show of resistance, John George of Jägerndorf, who commanded a force levied in Lusatia, Silesia, and northern Bohemia, declined to risk a battle; and in the end both Upper and Lower Lusatia were granted fair terms, including the confirmation of their religious liberties, by the Saxon Elector. His account against the Emperor had already mounted to a height which put out of question the redemption of the Lusatias, and they were regularly pledged to him in 1623. Silesia, which had at first shown a bold front, but now consented to dismiss its levies, obtained a confirmation of its *Letter of Majesty* with an amnesty, from which, however, John George of Jägerndorf was excepted.

The rout of the White Hill had also determined Bethlen Gabor to stay his advance, and after a time to enter into negotiations with the Emperor (January, 1621). But Ferdinand now felt strong enough to reject the Transylvanian's offers of compromise; and hostile operations were resumed. Bucquoy's delays, and then his death (July), enabled Bethlen, who had been reinforced by some troops under the outlawed Jägerndorf, to overrun the greater part of Hungary, to penetrate into eastern Moravia, and even to harry Lower Austria. But without aid from either Venice or the Turk he felt unable to keep up the struggle; and on the last day of the year a peace was patched up at Nikolsburg in Moravia. Bethlen was secured the possession (with certain reservations) of seven Hungarian counties, with the reversion to his son of the Silesian duchies of Oppeln and Ratibor; in return, he renounced so much of Hungary as he had hitherto occupied, and all claims to the title of King. But all the rights and privileges of the Hungarian Estates were confirmed; and the progress subsequently made in Hungary by the Catholic Reaction—which ultimately secured a working majority among the magnates—though throughout favoured by the Crown, was due to ecclesiastical initiative, in particular to that of Archbishop (afterwards Cardinal) Pázmány. For the present the pacification with Bethlen Gabor and his Hungarian adherents enabled Ferdinand to carry on unhindered the work of reaction in Bohemia and Moravia, and to attempt a similar settlement in the Austrian duchies.

Although, in pledging Upper Austria to Maximilian, Ferdinand had expressly reserved his own rights of territorial sovereignty, several arrests had to take place before the Estates would either sue for his pardon for their participation in the Bohemian rising, or make any contribution towards the redemption of his pledge. In February, 1625, their pardon was at last purchased by the payment of a million of florins, while the religious settlement was left in the Emperor's hands. The Commission of Reformation appointed by him in the previous October having proved

a failure, Easter, 1626, was now fixed as a final term for the adoption of Catholicism by the population, with the alternative of emigration on condition of certain payments to the Government and, in the case of peasantry, to their landlords in addition. The ruthless execution of this edict aroused the fiercest indignation among the peasants, a large proportion of whom were possessed of arms and accustomed to their use. Baron Adam von Herbersdorf, the governor appointed jointly by Ferdinand and Maximilian, had shown himself fair and conciliatory; but the pressure of the Bavarian occupation had now been intolerably aggravated by the religious persecution set on foot by the Emperor. In January, 1626, the insurrection in Upper Austria began. Brutally repressed at first, it broke out afresh on May 17, the plot having rapidly spread among the peasantry of the north-western angles of the duchy, between the Inn and the Danube, and to the north of the latter river. The cry was for the restoration of the Habsburg rule, of the Constitution, and of religious liberty. North of the Danube the peasants were led by Stephen Fadinger, a tradesman who had turned peasant proprietor; south of it by Christopher Zeller, a taverner. The number of peasants under arms (where they found arms to seize) rose to 40,000; and within the month the entire duchy was in revolt, with the exception of a few towns. At Linz, the capital of the duchy, the brave Herbersdorf, whom Zeller had previously defeated, held out, first against Fadinger, and on his death against his successor in the command, Achatius Willinger, a knight by birth. At last, however, troops poured in from Lower Austria and Bohemia; and, though their excesses provoked a desperate resistance, on September 23, 1626, representatives of the peasantry in all the four "quarters" of the duchy submitted on their knees. They were promised the redress of all their grievances except those relating to religion. A few days earlier, however, 8000 Bavarian troops had entered the duchy, and these were followed in November by 5000 more. Though at first successfully resisted, they soon defeated the peasants in a series of engagements in which Herbersdorf's step-son, the Bavarian general Count zu Pappenheim, bore a prominent part. By 1627 the rebellion was extinguished. It only remained for the hangman to wreak vengeance on quick and dead, and for the Government to carry through the religious reaction. Yet even now, though all nobles and burghers refusing an immediate profession of Catholicism were obliged to emigrate, it was deemed expedient not to enforce upon the peasants more than actual attendance upon Catholic worship. When in 1628 Maximilian renounced his hold upon Upper Austria, the Estates of the duchy recovered their constitutional rights.

In Lower Austria, the centre of Ferdinand's territorial power, he contented himself in the case of the towns with prohibiting Protestant worship and the further placing of Protestants on the roll of citizens; besides ordering some expulsions, notably in the capital. The University

of Vienna, and more especially its theological and philosophical faculties, were made over to the Jesuits, who for more than a century to come retained a practical control of Austrian education in all its grades. To the nobility of the home duchy, in so far as they had done homage to him in 1620, Ferdinand had promised the free exercise of their religion; and in 1627, after much searching of heart, he concluded to leave their personal liberty of worship untouched, though rendering it futile by the expulsion of all Protestant clergy and teachers from the duchy. His pious hope seems on the whole to have been justified, that among the Lower Austrian nobility Protestantism would die a natural death; but it died hard.

Thanks to the natural fertility of the Palatinate and to the buoyancy of spirit which still characterised its inhabitants—thanks also to the fact that here the war had not, as in Bohemia, been essentially a religious struggle—its consequences, though heartbreaking, were far less enduringly stamped upon land and people. After the dissolution of the Union, the defence of the still unconquered portions of the Palatinate seemed likely to be left to the few electoral troops still garrisoning Heidelberg and one or two other towns with Sir Horace Vere and his English volunteers, together with a few companies of Dutchmen. Mansfeld, whose occupation in Bohemia was gone, and whose army had all but dissolved, was in the spring and summer of 1621 enabled by Dutch subsidies and Palatine contributions to collect a force of not less than 10,000 men, which would certainly have to be reckoned with. Hence the Palatinate question, as involving the ultimate disposition of Frederick's inheritance, could not at present be regarded as settled. At a meeting of the League held at Augsburg in February, 1621, Maximilian was accordingly well-advised in resisting the wish of the Spiritual Electors to put an end to the association, as having done its work; and he succeeded in prevailing upon its members to keep it alive, and to retain under arms a force of 15,000, instead of, as hitherto, 21,000 men. What was at issue was the question of the renewal of the religious conflict in parts of the Empire very directly affected by the contested provisions of the Religious Peace, and it is significant that the attention of the Augsburg Assembly was directed to these by both Maximilian and the Emperor. As for his own policy, Ferdinand, who had been obliged to send the main portion of his army under Bucquoy to Hungary (April), sought to gain time, while putting himself in the right with the Powers interested in the claims of the unfortunate Frederick. Digby's counsels of moderation at Vienna chimed in with those of Spain, on whose goodwill James I was still calculating. Archduke Albert too, the most politic of the earlier generation of Archdukes, likewise tried to mediate; and after his death (July 13, 1621) Digby was actually referred by Maximilian to

the widowed Isabella Clara Eugenia at Brussels, though without any result. The Spanish Government clearly recognised that its energies needed to be concentrated against the States General, instead of being taken up by the increasing complications of the conflict in Germany. Hence in the spring Spinola was recalled to the Low Countries; the command in the Palatinate, though still under his supreme control, being assumed by Gonzalez de Cordoba. That, however, the Spanish Government would actually intervene on behalf of Frederick's claims, was a calculation on which only James and Digby could rely; and its primary condition was taken away when the English Parliament, after, in November, 1621, petitioning for war against the Spanish invader of the Palatinate, and voting a subsidy for that purpose, engaged in a quarrel with the Crown, and was before long dissolved (January, 1622).

Meanwhile the Palatinate War had resumed its course. In June, 1621, Mansfeld established himself in a fortified camp at Waidhaus in the Upper Palatinate, close to the Bohemian frontier; and here he was, in July, attacked by Tilly, at the head of a superior force. The Leaguers were unable to dislodge Mansfeld from his position; and, the ban of the Empire having been renewed against him, in September Maximilian himself appeared on the scene, announcing his commission to carry out the Imperial sentence and secretly authorised to occupy the Upper Palatinate and hold it in pledge for his outlay. A provisional settlement was concluded between him and Mansfeld, who in return for a large money-payment was to evacuate the Upper Palatinate and either dissolve his army or transfer it to the Emperor. Pending the conclusion of the agreement, however, Mansfeld, quitting his position at Waidhaus, passed on to the Rhenish Palatinate, making war pay for war as he proceeded, and treating the country that he had come to defend hardly better than it had been treated by its invaders.

The news of his approach at the head of some 20,000 troops after effecting a junction with Vere near Mannheim, caused Gonzalez de Cordoba to raise the siege of Frankenthal on the left bank of the Rhine (Queen Elizabeth's dowry town) with serious loss, and the Spanish arms thus suffered a first check (October). Maximilian, now master of the Upper Palatinate, detached Tilly with 11,000 men to keep watch over Mansfeld on the Neckar and the Rhine. But so little was that incalculable *condottiere* mindful of his agreement, that he had already marched into Austrian Elsass and taken Hagenau, apparently intending to make it the seat of a permanent principality of his own (December).

Thus the campaign of 1621 had narrowed the limits of the conflict to the Rhenish Palatinate, whose fate was still undecided, and to its near vicinity. Already the scourge of war had inflicted terrible suffering upon the populations of some of the fairest portions of the Empire; and the cause of Frederick and his inheritance still appealed to some of the Protestant Princes of the Empire. In these ardent spirits

a genuine religious enthusiasm, combined in varying proportions with the old sense of princely "liberty" and with the dominant military aspirations of the age, as well as at times with a shrewd insight into the business advantages of the new system of levying troops on the responsibility of the commander, without the tedious process of extracting grants from a territorial Diet. Thus Margrave George Frederick of Baden-Durlach, a prince of cultivated mind and high resolve, had not given way even at the time of the collapse of the Union, and was now fighting for his own margravate, of which it was sought to deprive him in favour of the sons of the Catholic Margrave Edward Fortunatus of Baden-Baden. By the spring of 1622 George Frederick had collected an armed force reckoned at not less than 15,000 men, of which he took the command after prudently transferring the government of his margravate to his son Frederick. Probably his paymasters were the Dutch, who about the same time equipped an even more notable supporter of the Palatine cause.

This was Duke Christian of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, brother to the reigning Duke Frederick Ulric, and like his father, Duke Henry Julius (Rudolf II's steadfast adherent), occupant of the see of Halberstadt, which he did not resign till 1623. This "temporal bishop," as a contemporary English letter correctly calls him, was, to adopt Gardiner's euphemistic phrase, "a born cavalry-officer" of the most irregular type, and had served the Dutch as a captain of dragoons before he was chosen, in 1616, by the Halberstadt Chapter. There is no evidence of his having met his kinswoman, the Queen of Bohemia, before; in the autumn of 1621 he levied on his own account a force of 10,000 men; but he may have made her acquaintance during her visit to the Court of his brother, when the latter, anxious to preserve his neutrality, discreetly stayed away. His declared devotion to her service casts a gleam of chivalrous romance over his career; but he was at the same time one of the most brutal of the *condottieri* of the war, and a foul-mouthed censor of would-be peacemakers, such as Elizabeth's father. His earliest operations were, in connivance with Maurice of Hesse-Cassel, who had some 20,000 soldiery under arms, directed against Hesse-Darmstadt, but were frustrated, together with the junction of forces that might have ensued, by Tilly's lieutenant, Count von Anholt. Christian then went into winter quarters in the dioceses of Paderborn and Münster; and the intolerable oppressions which he here practised in the character of "God's friend and the priest's foe" (the superscription of the dollars coined by him out of the silver statue of St Liborius at Paderborn) were continued during his subsequent advance through the lands of Fulda and the Wetterau to Frankfort, which he reached in June, 1622.

While the levies of Christian of Halberstadt were discountenanced both by his brother at Wolfenbüttel and by Christian, the head of the

House of Brunswick-Lüneburg at Celle, the House of Saxe-Weimar from the beginning of the Bohemian War onwards identified itself with the Protestant cause. Of the seven surviving sons of Duke John of Saxe-Weimar, six bore arms against the Emperor; of these the senior three had fought on Frederick's side in Bohemia; and the eldest of them, John Ernest, a prince who inherited with the military spirit something of the intellectual tastes characteristic of his line, had followed him to the Netherlands. Two others, Frederick and William—the founder of a military confraternity called the Order of Constancy—found their way to Mansfeld; and, finally, the youngest, Bernard, the day of whose greatness was still distant, after fighting under Mansfeld at Wiesloch, took service in the Margrave of Baden's army. The government at Weimar was in the meantime carried on, and the patrimony of the family preserved by the next youngest brother, Duke Ernest the Pious.

Duke John Frederick of Württemberg and Margrave Joachim Ernest of Ansbach were likewise in touch with Frederick and his supporters; but though Duke Magnus of Württemberg took service with the Margrave of Baden, the large amount of formerly ecclesiastical property held by his reigning brother made caution indispensable.

In the spring of 1622 the ex-Elector Palatine Frederick, encouraged by these adhesions to his cause, concluded that the time had come for him to join the army of 20,000 men assembled under Mansfeld at Germersheim (on the left bank of the Rhine above Speier). He may have been moved by fresh reports of tergiversations intended by Mansfeld to approve the great captain's suggestion that parts of the see of Speier should form part of his proposed principality. With a view to a combined movement of his own and the Margrave of Baden's forces, which might have put an end to Tilly's investment of Heidelberg, Mansfeld now crossed the Rhine by a bridge from Germersheim; but at Wiesloch on the opposite side Tilly threw himself between them (April 27). A battle ensued, at the close of which Tilly was forced to fall back towards the Neckar, and a day or two later the junction which brought up the Protestant forces to some 70,000 men was accomplished. They, however, separated again almost immediately, George Frederick being left alone to confront Tilly. On May 6 the general of the League inflicted upon him a sanguinary defeat at Wimpfen on the Neckar, close to the Württemberg frontier. After this battle, which, though decisive, had not annihilated the Margrave's army, Mansfeld, who had in the meantime relieved Hagenau, on which he always kept a vigilant eye and to which Archduke Leopold had been laying siege, recrossed the Rhine, and with the intention of joining hands with Christian of Halberstadt, executed a raid upon Darmstadt, where he took prisoners the loyal Landgrave Lewis and his son.

Tilly, however, who had united his own forces with the Spanish under Cordoba, prevented the junction contemplated by Mansfeld, and followed

up the victory of Wimpfen by a second, and more overwhelming success. Before Christian had begun any movement for meeting Mansfeld, the Elector of Mainz, terrified, had hastened the advance of Tilly and Cordoba. They found Christian awaiting their attack at Höchst, on the left bank of the Main, a few miles south of Frankfort. A hard-fought battle (June 20) ended in the complete rout of Christian's troops, large numbers of whom were drowned in the river. As, however, Christian contrived after all to join Mansfeld with not less than 13,000 men, the struggle for the Palatinate need not as yet have been considered at an end. James I, however, urged his son-in-law to yield to the Imperial demand that he should renounce any further assertion in arms of his claim, if the negotiations on the Palatinate question which were being opened at Brussels were to proceed. With a heavy heart, and foreseeing that his father-in-law's diplomacy would lose him the Lower Palatinate as it had lost him the Upper, Frederick dismissed his army and betook himself to Sedan (July).

But though Frederick might dismiss his troops, he could not pay them; and Mansfeld once more began to consider in what quarter he could turn his soldiery to the best account. To understand either this passage of the Thirty Years' War, or that which preceded the catastrophe of Wallenstein, it must be borne in mind that the mercenary armies were reckoned as main, and at times as paramount, factors in the general political situation—not as mere adventitious elements in it. At this particular season the Infanta's Government at Brussels was, with the approval of Maximilian, seriously meditating the purchase of Mansfeld, of course at a very high price; while he balanced his former plan of taking service with the Emperor against that of engaging himself to the French Government against the Huguenots. In the end both he and Christian of Halberstadt struck a bargain with the States General, who since the determination of their truce with Spain in 1621 were in immediate need of troops, and whose great general, Maurice of Orange, was for want of them unable to force Spinola to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom.

This end was achieved in October, after Mansfeld and Christian, boldly marching without leave asked or granted through the Spanish Netherlands, had defeated a much inferior force hastily brought up from the Palatinate by Cordoba, first at Ligny, and then, more decisively, at Fleurus (August 29). The victory of Fleurus was largely due to the valour of Christian, who in this battle lost an arm. But his fighting days were not yet quite over; and during the remainder of the year 1622 he and Mansfeld, together with Duke William of Weimar, began afresh to enlist troops in the Lower Saxon Circle.

Meanwhile in the Palatinate itself the struggle had been brought to an end by the capture of Heidelberg and the other fortified towns of the Lower Palatinate. Tilly and his master were above all anxious

to teach Europe the lesson that war and peace depended upon the cooperation of Bavaria and the League with the Emperor, rather than upon the action of the new King of Spain, Philip IV, and his cautious minister Olivares. The Spanish Government would probably have been glad to oblige James I by a considerate treatment of the claims of his son-in-law, while evading his marriage proposal for his heir. At Brussels, in July, the King was amused with divers suggestions for dealing with the Lower Palatinate, and for settling the whole question by the novel expedient of a meeting of loyal Electors and Princes to be shortly held at Ratisbon. In August Digby obtained further promises at Madrid. In the same month, notwithstanding the indignant protests of James against an attack upon a place held by a partly English garrison, Maximilian ordered Tilly to press on the siege of Heidelberg, which he had actually opened on July 1.

The citadel of German Calvinism was defended by a force of a few thousand Germans, Dutchmen, and Englishmen, commanded by Henry van der Merven. By September town and castle were at the mercy of the artillery that poured down destruction upon them from the neighbouring hills; and after the town had been easily carried by assault (July 17), the remnants of the garrison, which had in vain hoped to be relieved by Vere from Mannheim, were two days later allowed to depart with the honours of war, Tilly in person enforcing respect for the terms of the capitulation. But, in accordance with custom, no mercy was shown to the town during a period of three days allowed to the soldiery for plunder; excesses of all kinds were committed, and a hospital and some dwelling-houses were burnt to the ground. Then Tilly marched upon Mannheim, and, after taking the town (October 19), forced the garrison to surrender the citadel of the Friedrichsburg, Vere finding his way to Maurice of Hesse. With the exception of Frankenthal, the entire Palatinate was now in the hands of the Emperor and his allies.

At once the reaction closed in upon its prey, as it had in the Upper Palatinate, where the Bavarian administration and the Jesuit propaganda were gradually extinguishing Lutheranism. In the Lower Palatinate the Calvinist ministers were straightway expelled from the churches of the capital (beginning with the *Heiligengeistkirche*, of which the Jesuits took possession) and then from those of the country at large; the Lutheran minority looked on complacently till its turn came, and within seven years both the divisions of the Palatinate had outwardly been all but entirely re-catholicised. The University of Heidelberg, long the intellectual seminary of Calvinism under the protection of the Palatine dynasty, was treated with special rigour. The deportation of the famous Palatine library is an outrage unforgotten in the history of civilisation¹.

¹ On February 15, 1623, the papal Commissary, Leone Allaci, took his departure from Heidelberg to Rome, carrying with him, packed into fifty waggons, the

Early in January, 1623, the meeting of Princes convened by the Emperor for settling the future of the Palatinate and the electoral dignity attached to it, was opened at Ratisbon, where Ferdinand attended in person. The Bavarian demand was for the transfer of the Electorate with the electoral dignity; and, after much hesitation, the Emperor, who so early as September, 1621, had secretly invested Maximilian with the territory, was induced, partly by his own desire for the recovery of Upper Austria, to consent to granting him the title also. He was, however, confronted by the objections of Spain as well as of England, and by the all but universal alarm of the Protestant Princes of the Empire. While the Ratisbon meeting was in progress James I actually arrived at an agreement with the Infanta at Brussels, by which Frankenthal, the only place in the Palatinate still holding out for Frederick, was placed in Spanish hands, to return under English occupation if within eighteen months he had not made his peace with the Emperor. Frederick, however, manfully refused to agree to a treaty of suspension of arms which his father-in-law sought to force upon him. Among the Protestant Princes even John George of Saxony held back, shaken by the condition of things in Bohemia, uneasy about his Saxon sees, and recently (February, 1622) alarmed by the publication of a compromising correspondence between the Emperor and the Nuncio. Brandenburg followed suit. Even among the Catholics the Bavarian scheme found no whole-hearted support except from Maximilian's brother, the Elector Ferdinand of Cologne; while among the Protestant Princes the pronouncement of the ban of the Empire had produced a quite unmistakable shock. In the end, with the aid of the Elector of Mainz, a compromise was effected. The Emperor undertook that on Maximilian's death the electoral dignity should pass from him to any of Frederick's descendants, brothers, or agnates, whose claims had been in the interval legally or by arrangement recognised; and the Duke of Bavaria was on February 25 without further delay invested with the electorship *sine mentione haeredum*. The formal concession secured on behalf of the Palatine line was however deprived of all practical value through another secret promise made to Maximilian by the Emperor, that in no case would he pay attention to any attempt to interfere with the established Bavarian claim. Thus Maximilian prevailed against Spanish doubts, Protestant fears, and the cavils of Palatine kinsmen. Inasmuch as his revenues from the Upper Palatinate amounted to not more than a quarter of the interest of the capital

Bibliotheca Palatina—hitherto officially known as the *Landesbibliothek*—as a gift from Maximilian to Pope Gregory XV. The remaining Heidelberg libraries—those of the Faculty of Arts, of the other University Faculties, and of the University Church, the *Heiltigengeistkirche*—shared the same fate. The accumulated treasures transferred to Rome long remained useless. About one-third of the Palatine manuscripts (some of which had temporarily migrated to Paris) were returned by the Papal Government in 1816; but the rest are still at Rome, as part-payment of the subsidies granted by the Curia to the Catholic League and its chief.

expended by him in the two wars, he was for the present also to retain Upper Austria, while both he and Spain kept their hold on the portions of the Lower Palatinate respectively occupied by them. Negotiations intended to secure some portion of territory to Frederick's eldest son accordingly continued in London and elsewhere, till a stop was put upon them by the final breakdown, in the spring of 1624, of James I's Spanish marriage scheme.

Though in the Electoral College a working majority was now assured to the Catholic side, the meeting at Ratisbon had signally failed to establish a satisfactory understanding between the Catholics and the loyal Lutherans. The solitary Protestant Prince who had faithfully adhered to the Imperial policy, the Lutheran Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt, was rewarded by the grant of the Marburg inheritance, long disputed by him with his relation of Hesse-Cassel, and was tempted to claim that landgravate itself in payment of the arrears which he held to be his due. About the same time the margravate of Baden-Baden was detached from that of Baden-Durlach in favour of the Catholic claimant.

At a meeting of the League held at Ratisbon immediately after the close of the conference of Princes, Maximilian induced the assembly to agree to the continuance of the existing rate of contributions. Thus, with the aid of support from Emperor and Pope, the military force of the League was again raised to 18,000 men. Maximilian well understood the precarious nature of his gains both actual and prospective. A portion of the so-called Bergstrasse (on the right bank of the Rhine, opposite Worms), had been on more or less plausible grounds adjudged to the Elector of Mainz by the Emperor. The administration of Gernersheim had been made over to Archduke Leopold, for whose avidity nothing was either too great or too small, and to whom in 1623 his brother granted the Tyrol and the rule of the Austrian possessions in Elsass. Most significant of all, Bishop Philip Christopher of Speier, president of the *Reichskammergericht*, had begun a retaliatory process of "reformation" in the convents of his diocese recovered by him from the Palatine Government. Such examples were not likely to be overlooked; and many claims for restitution of conventual and other religious foundations reached the *Reichshofrath* in the course of the years 1623 and 1624. The anxiety aroused by these demands was by no means confined to the most recent scene of the War; and nowhere had it for some time been stronger than in the regions to which, now that the stillness of death had fallen upon the Palatinate, the main conflict of the war was to be shifted.

II. THE LOWER SAXON AND DANISH WAR.

(1623-9.)

Even before the Ratisbon gathering of Princes had separated it was becoming evident that in the next stage of the Great War the chief theatre of military operations would be found in the north-west of the Empire. Mansfeld and his more impulsive associate Christian of Halberstadt had, on their dismissal by Frederick, transferred themselves to the Low Countries, whither they had drawn after them Cordoba and, in the first instance for the protection of the dioceses of the Middle and Lower Rhine and their neighbourhood, Tilly's able lieutenant Anholt. Mansfeld's commission under the States General, to whom he had rendered valuable service, expired in October, 1622; but the States of Holland knew it to be worth their while to take him provisionally into their pay. Thereupon, showing as little care for the inviolability of the frontier of the Empire as was exhibited by the Spaniards themselves, he took up comfortable quarters in East Frisia and the neighbouring Westphalian districts. His intentions were unknown; so late as June, 1623, he was still negotiating with the French Government.

In January, 1623, Mansfeld had been joined by Christian of the iron arm, and both captains manifestly looked forward to a renewal of the German War in the approaching summer. Already in September, 1622, Bethlen Gabor had once more begun to prepare for a forward movement, though it was not actually set on foot till a year later. Its end might be the restoration of Frederick to the Bohemian throne; and the Palatine agents in Copenhagen and at the north-German Courts, and at Paris, were straining every nerve. Unfortunately English money was not forthcoming to sustain this great offensive operation; for James I was making his final effort for peace, and in May even contrived to inveigle his son-in-law into a promise of abstaining from hostile efforts. But Christian IV of Denmark, greedy alike of fame and of territory, took a very different view of the situation; and in Germany itself Brandenburg and Hesse-Cassel, now the two chief remaining representatives of Calvinism, might be expected to take part in a new effort of resistance.

What between Denmark and the United Provinces, and the troops of Mansfeld and his fellow-captain, the territories most likely to be much affected by the next campaign were those of the Lower Saxon Circle—the north-western region of the Empire, washed by both the North Sea and Baltic, and made up of some four-and-twenty Protestant principalities and free cities, and of a series of more or less important Protestantised episcopal sees. In February, 1623, a meeting of the Circle at Brunswick agreed to put in the field a force of 18,000

men, under the command of Duke George of Brunswick-Lüneburg. True, the force was to be 'defensive only; and by the end of April nothing like a quarter of it had been brought together. On the other hand, apart from the fact that Christian IV of Denmark, by virtue of his "royal" portion of Holstein, was a member of the Circle, it had other willing supporters at hand. Christian of Halberstadt entered the service of his brother Frederick Ulric of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, nominally for the defence of the ducal territories; and in March William of Weimar had placed himself and his troops under Christian's command.

While, however, these proceedings were in preparation, Tilly, who had advanced his quarters as far as the Wetterau, was in February directly commissioned by the Emperor to march against Mansfeld and his adherents—a commission supposed to carry with it the right of transit through the territories of any Estate of the Empire. At the head of some 17,000 men he in the first instance entered the Hesse-Cassel dominions, occupying the abbey of Hersfeld, the important ecclesiastical principality appropriated a century before by Landgrave Philip; and then advanced towards the boundary of the Lower Saxon Circle, with the intention of breaking up the army of Christian of Halberstadt. Christian, who had not yet received the news of Bethlen Gabor's start, could not risk marching into Sillesia to meet him; and, when the Estates at Lüneburg declared themselves ready to stand by the Emperor, who in return guaranteed them through Tilly their temporal as well as ecclesiastical possessions (July 23), Christian, baffled but not disheartened, decided on a rapid return into the hospitable United Provinces. It was at this time that he resigned his tenure of the see of Halberstadt. But Tilly, resolved to prevent his escape and still more to render impossible his junction with Mansfeld, followed Christian with a force superior to his both in quality and numbers, and, coming up with him at Stadtlohn in the diocese of Münster, inflicted on him a crushing defeat (August 6, 1623). Christian escaped, but two of the Weimar dukes (William and Frederick) were taken prisoners in the encounter. Tilly, after giving Lower Saxony a partial foretaste of the sufferings which it was to endure, then transferred his quarters to the still vexed districts of Hesse-Cassel. Before this Mansfeld had drawn back from the Münster country into East Frisia; whence, after handing over the strong places of the country to the States General for a money consideration, he withdrew to England, in order to study the opportunities of the situation created by the return of the Prince of Wales from Madrid and the revival of the national desire for the recovery of the Palatinate.

Not long afterwards another menace subsided. Though the news of the Protestant defeat at Stadtlohn had arrested the progress of Bethlen Gabor, who had begun his march in August, 1623, Ferdinand was unable to muster a force equal in number to half of those of the invader, with whom a Turkish host, set free by the conclusion of

the Turco-Polish War, was prepared to cooperate. Thus the Imperialists under the Marquis di Montenegro, with Wallenstein second in command, declined to offer battle even after Bethlen had reached Moravia (October), whence he made diversions into Lower Austria. Fortunately, however, the Hungarian supplies soon fell short, and the truce urged by Wallenstein was offered by Bethlen himself (November 18). Soon afterwards he began his retreat; but it was not till May 8, 1624, that protracted negotiations resulted in a settlement which in all essentials renewed the conditions of the Peace of Nikolsburg.

Hitherto the Emperor had either stood on the defensive or carried on war in self-defence or as it were in the wake of the League. So late as 1624 he cannot be shown to have desired to extend the war in Germany or to take part in the renewed struggle of Spain against the Dutch; while Spain was sufficiently occupied by this struggle, and was soon to find herself involved in new complications. But Ferdinand had chosen his part from religious, even more than from political, motives; the influences around him interpreted his success as the beginning of a religious reaction on which the blessing of Heaven would rest; and Europe was thus once more confronted by an aggressive Habsburg policy.

No direct interference with the advance of this policy was, so far as Germany was concerned, to be looked for from England, even after James I had given up both the Spanish marriage treaty and the control of his own policy. Mansfeld, it is true, without much difficulty obtained ample promises of men and money in England; and in July, 1624, notwithstanding the untoward news of the Amboyna "massacre," a treaty of defensive alliance was signed with the States General, by which the English Government undertook to maintain 6000 volunteers in the Dutch service. But before the end of the first year of the reign of Charles I England was engaged in war with Spain; and, though Charles anxiously kept in view the recovery of the Palatinate for his sister's family, this war, which after all was what the nation had mainly at heart, would have to be actually fought out at sea; nor were supplies now obtainable from Parliament for any other warlike purpose.

England being now on good terms with France (with whom a defensive alliance was concluded in June, 1624, followed by the marriage treaty of November, 1624), the two Powers might be expected to go hand in hand in opposition to the Austrian as well as the Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg. During the early years of the Great War, owing to the still dominant influence of Mary de' Medici, and to her and Louis XIII's strong repugnance to the privileges secured to the Huguenots by the Edict of Nantes, the French Government had not been unfriendly to the Emperor's interests. But the successful issue of his Bohemian War, and the continued Spanish occupation of part of the Palatinate—with perhaps some suspicion of the transitory

scheme of a Spanish frontier-state between France and Germany—rendered it inevitable that French policy should once more return to the lines which it had followed before the death of Henry IV. Already in 1623 the Government of Louis XIII furnished a slight measure of aid to Mansfeld. After Richelieu had become first Minister, French policy was more and more affected, though not yet continuously determined, by the growing jealousy of the advance of the House of Austria. In 1624 diplomatic communications took place with the Elector of Mainz and the other Spiritual Electors, of which Maximilian of Bavaria certainly had cognisance. Of more importance was the mission of de Marescol, who succeeded in impressing George William of Brandenburg with the necessity of combined action among those who still upheld the Protestant cause. Moreover, the French Government concluded a liberal subsidy treaty with the Dutch, and granted freedom of transit through France to the soldiery recruited in England by Mansfeld for service in the Palatinate (1624). It is true that in the end this permission was withdrawn; and Mansfeld had to ship his levies, said to have amounted to 18,000 men, to the Low Countries, where, though supplemented by 2000 horse levied by Christian of Halberstadt in France, they soon dwindled away and proved unable to prevent the capture of Breda by Spinola (June, 1625). The Anglo-Dutch treaty against Spain of October, 1625, exercised little or no influence upon the progress of the German War; and in 1626 Richelieu consented to conclude peace with Spain at Monzon, leaving in the lurch Savoy and Venice, upon whom beyond the Alps an anti-Habsburg combination must essentially depend. Absorbed at home first by the struggle against himself and then by the conflict with the Huguenots, who were supported by England, he could till 1629 take no direct part in the affairs of the Empire. But his diplomacy continued active; and Pope Urban VIII, with whom the French Government were now on good terms, maintained his antagonism to the House of Habsburg.

Thus Buckingham's great scheme of an effective Western alliance against Spain and Austria practically fell through; nor indeed would it from the outset have suited Richelieu to throw the German Catholics into the arms of Spain, and to close the prospect of Louis XIII appearing, when the time arrived, as arbiter between the contending interests. On the other hand, France was quite ready to cooperate towards the recovery of the Palatinate and the restoration of a better balance between the parties in the Empire. But it was obvious that the mere goodwill of England and the guarded diplomatic support of France could not suffice to ensure success to a renewal of the struggle against the House of Austria and the League; while without the guarantee of such a success Bethlen Gabor would clearly not be induced to move again. It was therefore indispensable to secure the support of a strong arm and of substantial resources.

For some time since, the attention of the German Protestants and their friends had inevitably been directed to Christian IV, who as has been seen was himself a member of the Lower Saxon Circle. As monarch of Denmark and Norway, he laid claim to a preponderance of power in the Scandinavian North—a claim which the issue of the “Kalmar War” could not be said to have upset. His multifarious and eager activity (for he had a true despot’s love of detail) in the maritime, industrial, educational, and military affairs of his government gave proof of an aspiring ambition; and his arrogance brooked no check upon his personal will. Thus he was tolerably sure to be ready to listen to an invitation to assume a leading part in the affairs of the Empire in the Protestant interest. He was connected by the marriages of three of his sisters with princely dynasties of the Empire—Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Holstein-Gottorp, and Electoral Saxony (another sister of his was Queen Anne of England, who had become estranged from the Protestant faith). Of his brothers, one, Ulric, had recently died as Bishop of Schwerin. The second of Christian’s sons, Frederick, was Bishop of Verden (June, 1623), and had with some difficulty been forced by the King as coadjutor upon the Archbishop of Bremen, John Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp (1621). An attempt to secure in addition the coadjutorship of Osnabrück had been frustrated by the firmness of the Catholic Chapter there. These proceedings, besides alienating the Gottorp line, had added to the apprehensions aroused by Christian’s imperious dealings with Hamburg, whose independence he openly threatened, and by his hostility to the commercial privileges and policy of Lübeck, and the Hanse Towns in general. His declared intention of making himself master of the mouths of the Elbe and Weser could not but alarm some of the Estates of the Lower Saxon Circle; and for a time he seemed to take up an attitude of reserve towards the overtures made to him by the supporters of a new Protestant coalition.

It was thus that he bore himself to Sir Robert Anstruther, who in the summer of 1624 proposed an alliance to him in the name of King James, and to Christian von Bellin, who shortly afterwards came to Copenhagen with a mission from George William of Brandenburg, and doubtless also from the ex-Elector Palatine. From Copenhagen Bellin went on to Stockholm, whither he had been preceded by Sir James Spens, another diplomatic agent of James I. Pending further information as to the intentions of the north-German Courts, it seemed expedient to sound Gustavus Adolphus.

Of the three wars bequeathed to him by his father Charles IX, Gustavus Adolphus had, as will be narrated elsewhere, by this time brought the Danish and the Russian to a more or less successful conclusion; the Polish he was about to renew (in 1625) on a wider scale and with a view to more decisive results. After his marriage in 1620 with George William of Brandenburg’s sister Maria Eleonora, of which

he had secured the promise by a private visit to Berlin, no doubt could remain as to his intention to intervene, sooner or later, in German affairs. Already in 1623 he had made certain proposals to the ex-Elector Frederick and the States General; and now, in 1624, he expounded to Spens and Bellin an elaborate project hinging on a proposed Russian marriage for his sister-in-law Catharine, and a consequent declaration of war by Russia against Poland, which would enable him at the head of a great Protestant league to carry the war into the heart of the Austrian dominions. This scheme, Napoleonic both in its dimensions and in its precision, was elaborated at the German Chancery in London (a kind of Intelligence Department outside the control of the Secretary of State); and a Protestant Grand Alliance was set forth as its basis in a memorial by the indefatigable Rusdorf. The English Government at first showed no unwillingness to defray, as was proposed, the cost of one-third of the land forces of 50,000 men, and to furnish 17 ships of war; but Richelieu, on the other hand, while promising a large subvention, suggested that the Kings of Sweden and Denmark should act independently of each other at different points in the Empire.

Meanwhile a French diplomatic agent, Louis des Hayes (Baron de Courmenin) had twice visited the Northern Courts and suggested a separate set of proposals of a more moderate cast to Christian IV. The latter, stimulated, it can hardly be doubted, by an irresistible feeling of jealousy, now likewise formulated his offers. Towards the cost of an armament commanded by himself, which, with German aid, he hoped to raise to a total of 30,000, and that of his own contingent, amounting to 5000 men, England was to furnish a subvention reckoned at £30,000 a month. On March 2, 1625, King James, then near his end, decided on accepting the smaller Danish instead of the wider Suedo-Brandenburg scheme, while characteristically informing Christian IV that both schemes had been accepted, subject to an arrangement between him and the King of Sweden as to the supreme command. The great design of a general Protestant alliance was, as will be seen, left an open question; but Gustavus Adolphus rightly interpreted the meaning of the English decision. It signified, what from the English point of view was intelligible enough, that the prestige of Christian IV still seemed to surpass that of his Swedish rival. The news that the Danish King had definitively placed himself at the head of the proposed undertaking finally determined the withdrawal of the Swedish monarch (March 21), whose energies were for the next five years and a half absorbed by his conflict with Poland, though he continued to pay a close attention to the course of the German War.

The final refusal of Gustavus Adolphus to take part in the proposed enterprise implied the renunciation of any prominent share in it by George William of Brandenburg, though he concluded a treaty with Christian IV. In March, 1626, George William further improved the

prospects of a Protestant coalition, by marrying his unlucky sister Catharine to Bethlen Gabor, who at one time had not scrupled to aspire to the hand of one of the Emperor's daughters. The Transylvanian, though he had agreed to the coronation of the Emperor's son Ferdinand as King of Hungary (December, 1625), was once more meditating an assertion of his own claim by a fresh invasion of the Austrian lands.

Throughout the ensuing war Christian IV consistently contended that, though as a sovereign Prince he had been invited by England and other Powers to intervene for the recovery of the Palatinate, the struggle which the Lower Saxon Circle actually carried on under his leadership was provoked by the invasion of that Circle, and directed to the restoration of the peace of the Empire. The members of the Circle were even at first far from unanimous in the wish to take up arms. The Bishop of Hildesheim (the Elector of Cologne) was a pronounced Catholic; the towns, as those of the Union had been, were anxious for non-committal; and Lübeck and Hamburg detested the policy of the Danish King. Duke Christian of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the actual Director of the Circle (*Kreisoberster*), was, notwithstanding his Lutheran sympathies and interests, unwilling to carry on war against the Emperor. But since the summer of 1623 the majority of the Estates had begun to incline to invite the cooperation, or in other words to follow the lead, of King Christian. In this they were chiefly moved by their fears; more especially of an endeavour to bring about the restitution of ecclesiastical lands, which, though repudiated by Tilly in the name of the Emperor would hardly fail to ensue in the event of a successful invasion of the Circle. A gradual change in the whole character of the northern episcopates might follow. When in July, before the battle of Stadtlohn, the martial Christian had resigned the see of Halberstadt, he had done so on condition that the Danish King's second son Frederick should be his successor. It was no secret that the Emperor would have liked to see his younger son Leopold William elected Bishop of Halberstadt. But, though the Chapter, into which a Catholic element had been introduced, rejected the Danish Prince, the Archduke's time had not yet come; and eventually the Administrator of Magdeburg, Christian William of Brandenburg, was elected Bishop of Halberstadt, and Prince Frederick associated with him as coadjutor and prospective successor.

At the beginning of the year 1625 the resignation by Christian of Brunswick-Lüneburg of the Directorship of the Circle brought the question of its relations with the King of Denmark to an issue. Following the precedent set by the Emperor at Ratisbon, Christian IV in April summoned to Lauenburg a meeting of the Estates of the Circle favourable to himself; while about the same time the regular Diet of the Circle (*Kreistag*), sitting at Lüneburg, was going through the form of electing Frederick Ulric of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel to the vacant Directorship. When the news came from Lauenburg that it had been resolved to

muster an army and place it under the King's command, he was duly elected in the place of Frederick Ulric, who had himself been present at Lüneburg. Hereupon, after further resultless negotiations on the part of Christian IV with Gustavus Adolphus and Richelieu, a second *Kreistag* was held at Brunswick (May), where with some difficulty a majority was obtained for warlike action. The die was now cast, and Christian entered upon his new office.

The significance of the new Protestant combination was recognised by both friend and foe. While Gustavus Adolphus shrewdly if not generously credited his rival with the design of making himself Bishop General of northern Germany, every effort was used at Vienna to prevent even a local concentration of Protestant sympathies. The Imperial diplomacy succeeded not only in restraining the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel from joining Christian IV's following, but also, by means of an assurance that no ecclesiastical lands should be seized except for military purposes, in obtaining from the Hanse Towns at their meeting at Bergedorf (April), notwithstanding the efforts of Richelieu's agent, an open refusal to adhere to the detested Danish King. John George of Saxony's hesitancy was prolonged by the proposal of another *Deputationstag*; and George William of Brandenburg, to whom the Emperor sent Hannibal von Dohna on a special mission, and who was no doubt also influenced by his secret understanding with Gustavus Adolphus, for some months refrained from any dealings with Christian IV. On the other hand, Maximilian, probably influenced in his turn by Richelieu, showed no desire to hasten the military action of the League. When, on May 23, Christian arrived in the Lower Saxon Circle with his armament, although he had imposed heavy sacrifices on his Danish subjects for his own share of it, the numbers fell far short of the total contemplated by him. Not only was the Brandenburg contingent wanting, but Mansfeld's English levies, as has been seen, were rapidly rotting away. Christian's army had thus not reached a total of 20,000 when at last, on July 15, Tilly (who held a double commission) was with the Emperor's approval authorised by Maximilian to advance "in the name of God and His Holy Mother." On the 28th he crossed the Weser near Hörter.

The Lower Saxon villages began to empty at the approach of a commander whose name was already envired by half-legendary terrors; the peasantry taking refuge behind the walls of the towns, while the Weser was full of boats laden with fugitives. Devastation and plundering, accompanied by sacrilege, murder, violation, and the firing of villages, marked the progress of detachment after detachment; and reprisals on the part of the peasantry led to excesses which seem to have gone beyond those previously or afterwards committed in these regions by the soldiery of Mansfeld and Christian of Halberstadt, and of Wallenstein. In mere self-defence Frederick Ulric had to admit some Danish garrisons into his

towns; and great energy in the protection of the population was shown by his mother, the Dowager Duchess Elizabeth, herself a Danish Princess. But neither the Duke nor his Estates were capable of taking any resolute measures of defence; and, although at the *Kreistag* held at Brunswick in August and September it was resolved that the departure of Tilly, now master of both Hameln and Minden, must precede the withdrawal of Christian IV from his militant Directorship, the duchy of Brunswick seemed even in October likely to fall into Catholic hands.

As the summer wore on the offensive strength of both sides in the struggle had increased; and about August Mansfeld's force, which now only amounted to about 4000 foot and a few hundred horse, joined the Danish army. But the importance of this accession was not measurable by its numbers; and a crisis was felt to be at hand. Soon Mansfeld was summoned to confer with Richelieu at Paris; and the eastern enemy might be speedily expected to be stirring again. For some time Maximilian of Bavaria had urged upon the Emperor the necessity of calling a new army into the field, but without foreseeing the way in which his demand was to be fulfilled. Wallenstein's great opportunity had now arrived. He had been created Prince of Friedland in 1623, the importance of the position which his powers of administration, organisation, and statesmanship secured to him being hereby formally recognised. Thus the agreement into which he now entered with the Emperor already in some measure resembled a treaty between sovereign Powers. In April, 1625, he received a patent from the Emperor creating him commander-in-chief (*capo*) over all the Imperial troops employed in the Empire or in the Netherlands. Their total was reckoned at 24,000 men, of whom he undertook himself to raise 20,000. The method of levy, the grant of commissions (which he freely offered to Protestants as well as Catholics), and the choice of places of muster, were left entirely to his decision. He fixed the contributions to be paid by towns desirous of escaping the imposition of quarters; thus Nürnberg paid 100,000 florins. From the first, it was evident that the Imperial authority, rather than the interests of the Catholic faith, would be advanced by the compact between the Emperor and his new *generalissimo*. With a strong army Ferdinand would no longer be dependent on the League; and this was a calculation not likely to escape Maximilian. There is no reason for supposing that Wallenstein at present carried his speculations further; but it is clear that the fidelity of such an army as his to the Emperor depended on its chief. Unfortunately, the actual instructions under which Wallenstein took up the supreme command are unknown.

At the end of July, Wallenstein, who had recently been raised to the dignity of Duke of Friedland, proceeded from Prague to Eger, whence at the beginning of September he was able to direct the march of his army, which seems to have exceeded 20,000 men, through Franconia

(where he joined it at Schweinfurt) and Thuringia. In this campaign, his first as Imperial commander-in-chief, it was already noticeable how he remained entirely uncontrolled by orders from the Emperor, and how he resented and punished any reference to the Imperial authority by any of his officers. No general who disputed his judgment was allowed to retain a superior command; and no advice was treated with respect by the commander-in-chief, except that of his chief supporter at Vienna, Ulric von Eggenberg. Surrounded by a kind of Court of his own, and magnificently hospitable, he was at the same time difficult of access, and rarely to be found in the midst of his troops, whom, even when on the march, he preferred to precede or to follow. For the rest, he always maintained the bearing of a good Catholic, though tolerant in practice, and making no secret of being so in principle. Of his soldiery, probably only a minority were Germans, while they included many Hungarians, Cechs, and even Illyrians, and were largely officered by Spaniards, Italians, and Frenchmen. They inflicted much of the suffering inseparable from the accepted practices of war upon the inhabitants of the lands through which they passed, without, however, committing such excesses as had accompanied Tilly's entrance into Lower Saxony. Indeed, Wallenstein himself, as well as some of his generals, paid personal attention to the maintenance of discipline.

In October Wallenstein entered Lower Saxony, but there is no indication that either he or Tilly, who hitherto had held the supreme command there, was anxious for a junction of their forces. Requisitioning ample supplies for his troops and threatening to burn down villages where the life of a single soldier was lost, but leaving unmoled those towns which paid in hard cash for this immunity, Wallenstein slowly advanced through the Göttingen district, without meeting with any very serious resistance. He then passed into the bishopric of Halberstadt and the archbishopric of Magdeburg, both of which were under the administration of Prince Christian William of Brandenburg. At Magdeburg the Saxon prince Augustus was about this time elected coadjutor; but Halberstadt was regarded at Vienna as a vacant see, and its occupant as a rebel, since after much hesitation (for it might in either event fare ill with his tenure of his pluralities) he had thrown in his lot with the Danish King. It was therefore in accordance with a perfect understanding between the party of restitution and reaction at the Imperial Court and Wallenstein, that both dioceses were now flooded by his troops, who treated them as conquered territory, and imposed intolerable contributions upon them. The army itself suffered much from disease and desertion; and Wallenstein on his own authority filled its ranks, and even increased its numbers, by fresh levies. The capture of Halle (the archiepiscopal residence) sent a thrill of apprehension through the neighbouring Saxon electorate.

Christian IV's head-quarters in the autumn of 1625 were at Nienburg

in Lüneburg-Celle, where the dispossessed Christian William of Magdeburg, as well as Mansfeld and the ex-Bishop Christian of Halberstadt, put in an appearance, the last-named bringing reinforcements. But the King was still unable to move; his affairs were in disorder, and though, early in November, Tilly's plan of piercing his lines at Pattensen near Hanover was unsuccessful, the Danish army was weakened by sickness. The Mansfelders were pushed forward beyond the Elbe into Lauenburg, where they increased the ill-will of the Lübeckers to the Danish cause. On the other side of the Leine Tilly was master; while Wallenstein, separated from him by the Harz mountains, occupied a wide arc to the south touching the Elbe at Roslau, where in December he occupied and fortified the so-called Dessau bridge across the river.

The military operations of the new Protestant combination had thus in 1625 proved far from prosperous; nor was the failure in the field redeemed by the diplomatic efforts of the autumn and winter. More specious results attended the conference that in November assembled at the Hague to settle the conditions of the great offensive and defensive Protestant alliance which had been so long hatching, and to the conclusion of which Christian IV had more or less trusted when he had taken up arms. Notwithstanding the rupture between his sovereign and the Parliament, Buckingham arrived with powers to treat with the United Provinces, Denmark, France, Sweden, Brandenburg, and other German States; but, as a matter of fact, the only plenipotentiaries besides himself authorised to come to terms were the Danish and those of the United Provinces who, as has been seen, already concluded an offensive alliance with England. Christian was clearly unable to bring the Lower Saxon War to a satisfactory conclusion by his own resources and with such German assistance as he could obtain. The problem at the Hague therefore reduced itself to this: were the United Provinces, whose whole strength was needed for the struggle against Spain, and England, bound to assist them in this effort and hampered by her domestic troubles, capable of engaging in a further effort; and, secondly, could the Danish King be induced to include the recovery of the Palatinate in the scope of his design? The latter question, which lay at the root of Buckingham's purpose, was finally settled by a secret article providing for the restoration of the Palatinate to Frederick or his family; and the triple alliance actually concluded imposed upon Christian IV the obligation of continuing the war with an army of near 30,000 foot and 8000 horse, on condition that the English Government continued to pay its monthly contribution of 300,000 florins, to which 50,000 were to be added by the States General. Under these conditions the contracting Powers undertook not to withdraw from the treaty till the German War had been brought to a successful issue. The obligations of the Anglo-Dutch offensive treaty were at the same time recognised; while the other Protestant Powers, with France, Savoy, and Venice, were to be invited to accede. But from

this elaborate agreement—the *chef d'œuvre* of Buckingham's inflated diplomacy—Sweden, though it had been represented at the conferences, in the end drew back; France was occupied with the Huguenot revolt; and when in March, 1626, the Hague allies met to exchange the ratifications of their paper treaty, there was no accession to report, nor even the hope of any save that of Bethlen Gabor.

Simultaneous negotiations with a more limited scope had been carried on at Brunswick, where in October, 1625, Danish representatives met those of several other Lower Saxon Estates, as well as of Holstein-Gottorp, Hesse-Cassel, and Brandenburg, and of John George of Saxony, who appeared as mediator. Later, both Tilly and Wallenstein sent agents to the assembly. But John George, though he prevailed upon both sides to agree to a short suspension of hostilities (from November 17), had nothing to propose beyond the withdrawal of the armies on both sides; and Tilly and Wallenstein at once attached conditions to their consent which would have deprived the Circle of all powers of defence. The sufferings of the population and the fear of restitutions decided the Estates to reject such a solution; and by March, 1626, the fate of the Circle was once more committed to the arbitrament of war.

Thus, amidst all this haze of negotiations, the position of Christian IV early in 1626 was a very serious one; and the great energy which at this crisis he displayed showed that he recognised it as such. On the renewal of hostilities the war at once extended its range in various directions. Before the Brunswick negotiations were at an end, Christian IV shifted his head-quarters to Wolfenbüttel, and early in March boldly despatched John Ernest of Weimar with a body of troops into the diocese of Osnabrück. To this bishopric, long an object of the Danish King's desire for territorial aggrandisement, the Catholic majority of the Chapter had in September, 1625, postulated a relative of Maximilian of Bavaria, Count Francis William von Wartenberg, who was still hesitating about acceptance; now, on the appearance of the Danish troops, they lost no time in electing Prince Frederick coadjutor. About the beginning of April, Christian, formerly of Halberstadt, who had been recently charged with the government of his brother's duchy, entered the Hesse-Cassel dominions, in order, as it would seem, to encourage the Landgrave Maurice definitively to join the Lower Saxon combination. But whether this sagacious Prince, who had to take account of imperialist sympathies among the knights of his landgravate, could not or would not fall in with the design of Christian, the latter had to retire upon Göttingen, and, after breaking forth afresh, was by an advance of Tilly's forces driven further back on Wolfenbüttel. Here, in the castle of his ancestors, the restless cavalier a fortnight later (June 6) succumbed to a low fever, at the hour of death believing himself under a magic charm. His character and career are full of flaws; but his chivalrous personal devotion and even his at times savage fanaticism redeem from the

charge of vile selfishness this particular example of the military adventurers of the Thirty Years' War.

A certain obscurity still surrounds the last effort of the Brunswick Christian; but no doubt can exist as to the purpose of Mansfeld's notable expedition to Silesia. While King Christian was occupied in crushing Tilly, Mansfeld was to divert Wallenstein towards the east, whence support from Bethlen Gabor had continued to be expected. Mansfeld had necessarily to begin by an assault on the defences of the bridge across the Elbe at Dessau erected by Wallenstein. Mansfeld, to whom, unhappily for them, George William had allowed a transit through part of his territories, attacked the bridge on April 25, 1626, but notwithstanding his admirable strategy was repulsed, with the loss of 4000 men, by Wallenstein in person. Of Wallenstein's few victories in the field this is perhaps the most conspicuous. But he failed to turn his success to full account, allowing Mansfeld to make good some of his losses, and to push on into Silesia with a force not far short of 10,000 men (June—July). Christian IV, desirous above all of diverting Wallenstein from an attack upon Holstein, had despatched John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar to augment the forces of Mansfeld, who was encouraged by secret information that Bethlen Gabor was preparing to march, and by the news that Upper Austria, as has been seen, was in revolt. In the meantime Wallenstein met Tilly, who had just taken Münden and was preparing to lay siege to Göttingen, at Duderstadt; but, though they discussed the remoter issues of the war, with the assistance of an envoy from Spain, whose interest in the German War was reviving, Wallenstein for the present had no choice but to follow Mansfeld. The daring eastward movement of the latter had thus at all events succeeded in separating the two hostile armies; though Wallenstein left behind 8000 of his troops to support Tilly.

The forward movement begun by Christian IV in July had been too late to prevent the capture of Göttingen (August 5) by Tilly, whose junction with the Wallenstein contingent induced the King to turn back towards Wolfenbüttel (August 14). Hotly pursued by Tilly, he at last halted at Lutter by the Barenberg, a spur of the Harz mountains some ten miles north of Goslar. Neither of the contending armies probably exceeded, or even reached, a total of 20,000. None the less was this battle (August 27) an event of very great moment. For a brief space of time the result was well contested by the Danish infantry; but the end was a complete rout of Christian's forces and the loss of the whole of his artillery, besides that of several of his commanders. The first cause of his calamity, as Christian himself seems afterwards to have pleaded, was the demoralisation of his troops by the want of pay; for the promised English subsidies had failed.

The immediate consequence of the battle of Lutter was the abandonment by Christian IV of the Brunswick territory, which after the

unconditional submission of Duke Frederick Ulric was occupied by Tilly and the contingent of Wallensteiners. The Danish King, having crossed the Elbe, and then recrossed it lower down, took up his position behind the fortifications of Stade, facing his own portion of the duchy of Holstein on the other side of the river. Both Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp and his uncle John Frederick, Archbishop of Bremen and Bishop of Lübeck, would gladly have shaken off their alliance with Christian; but he was still master of Holstein, while to the south his soldiery spread out in the direction of Lüneburg, Lübeck, and Mecklenburg, whose Dukes still adhered to the Protestant cause. He even attempted to extend again on the west towards the Weser; but, though this effort failed, Tilly, who exercised no authority over the Wallenstein contingent, refrained from any fresh attack on the King's forces beyond the Elbe; and both armies went into winter-quarters.

Meanwhile Wallenstein's pursuit of Mansfeld, begun in leisurely fashion, was carried on more slowly than was approved at Vienna, whence two successive missives reached the commander-in-chief, urging him to hasten his advance. Having stood still for a fortnight at Neisse in Silesia, he slowly moved forward into the Austrian hereditary dominions and into Hungary, where he declared himself hampered by a want of supplies. Meanwhile, towards the end of August the Transylvanian had at last thrown off the mask which concealed his preparations for a renewal of offensive war; so that the news of the defeat of Lutter came too late for him to postpone action. Reinforced by a Turkish contingent he had, towards the end of September, found himself in face of the Imperial army. But Wallenstein, who rarely refused to treat even at the last moment, contrived by the end of October to induce Bethlen Gabor, even after his junction with Mansfeld, to accept a truce, and to continue negotiations in which a Danish commissary, Joachim von Mitzlaff, took part. Thus, on December 28, the Peace of Pressburg was concluded, in which the Emperor renewed all the concessions made by him at Nikolsburg to the Transylvanian, with the exception of the annual payment of 50,000 florins and the prospective transfer of Oppeln and Ratibor to which he had then consented. Provision was made in the treaty for the dissolution of Mansfeld's army, or of the fraction which remained of it. Already, in November, weakened by illness and no longer proof against the wiles of Bethlen Gabor, Mansfeld had transferred his command to John Ernest of Weimar, taking his departure with a few companions, as it would seem in order to seek for supplies and succour, first in Venice and then in England. But on his way he was overtaken by death, as it is concluded from his will, on November 29, at Ratona near Saroy on the Bosnian frontier. A few days later (December 4) John Ernest of Weimar also died. The double-faced Bethlen Gabor permitted the departure of the remnant of the Mansfelders to

Silesia, where their numbers seem again to have largely increased and where the command of them was taken by Mitzlaff.

By the death of Mansfeld, Wallenstein was freed of his chief exemplar and rival in the twofold process of enlisting large bodies of troops and inspiring them with a sense of confidence in their commander, and of an adversary who, even in the final struggle in which he had succumbed, had given proof of high capacity. A great and incalculable force had at the same time been removed from the conduct and progress of the war as a whole; and the so-called Danish War had really come to an end on the plains of Hungary rather than in the mountains of the Harz.

Christian's efforts to carry on the war after the rout of Lutter and his retreat to Stade were doomed to failure; and gradually he recognised the wisdom of the pacific advice given by the Infanta Isabel so early as June, 1626. High-sounding promises of men and money from England resulted only in the junction with the Danish army, in April, 1627, of less than 3000 English troops, under the command of Sir Charles Morgan; but these were merely the remnant of the four regiments which had completed their time of service in the Netherlands. Though doling out some assistance to Christian, Richelieu was beginning to calculate on Bavaria and the League as the readiest counterpoise to the augmented power of the House of Austria. In the course of 1627, even the States General put a stop to their payments. Though the far-sighted Wallenstein was still apprehensive of Swedish intervention, Gustavus Adolphus paid no serious attention to the Danish request that he should detach part of his army from its Polish campaign. Bethlen Gabor was once more immovable. Even in the northern regions of the Empire, to which he had retreated, the ground was giving way round Christian and his army. Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp, whose interests were opposed to the King's, had already declared his adherence to the Emperor. Both Hamburg and Lübeck with the other Hanse Towns of the Baltic, upon whom pressure was being put to join Christian's adversaries, were only anxious to remain neutral; and though the Mecklenburg Dukes, whose territories were flooded by Danish troops, could not renounce their alliance with Christian, they desired nothing but peace, being no doubt aware of Wallenstein's designs upon their duchies. Finally, the Danish Rigsraad itself urged upon the King the conclusion of peace, provided things could be restored to the condition in which they had stood before the war.

Thus Christian's prospects for the campaign of 1627 were extremely unsatisfactory, while on the Catholic side, though hitherto Tilly's achievements had far surpassed those of Wallenstein, the understanding between the Emperor and his commander-in-chief remained unbroken. Not even the complaints of officers and nobility in the Austrian lands themselves, where his army was quartered for the winter, prevailed against his ascendancy. On November 25, 1626, Wallenstein had an

interview with Eggenberg, in whom as has been seen he reposed a quite exceptional confidence; and from this meeting, though unfortunately no authentic record of it exists, may be dated the expansion of the original compact between Wallenstein and the Emperor, and the development of the design with which it had been originally concluded. While the numbers of Wallenstein's army were henceforth to be increased to a practically indefinite extent, and he was to be allowed to quarter his army in any part of the Empire, the scheme of a Catholic reaction based on the restitution of ecclesiastical lands was taken up with increased self-confidence by the Imperial Government. The autocratic action of its general was more immediately apparent than its Catholic purpose. Already at the meeting of the League held at Würzburg late in February, 1627, Bavaria and Mainz were commissioned to urge at Vienna by means of a special embassy the numerous complaints preferred against the levies made by Wallenstein, the exactions of quarters for his troops, and the contributions imposed and other kinds of oppression practised by them. The Emperor's answer, delayed till May, promised the prevention of excesses, but refused to listen to any grievances or to stop the levies, and pointed out the necessity that the Rhenish Electors should maintain several of Wallenstein's regiments as a safeguard against France. Soon afterwards Wallenstein despatched a regiment to support the Poles against Gustavus. Evidently the range of the Imperial designs was rapidly widening.

During the spring of 1627 Tilly continued, without completing, the subjugation of the Brunswick lands, where, in opposition to their Government, the population in town and country adhered to the Protestant cause. Some three-hundred villages here lay in ashes, while a desperate resistance was offered to the invaders by the so-called *Harzschützen*, a species of *franc-tireurs*. After the capture of Nordheim (June 25) Tilly advanced upon the Elbe. The Mark Brandenburg, wedged in between the two divisions of the war, had for some time suffered from the inroads of both belligerents; and a collision near Havelberg between the Danes and a division of Tilly's army, April, 1627, led to his occupying in May the line of the Lower Havel. Wallenstein's troops were likewise pressing into the land; and George William was now obliged to declare openly for the Emperor. The neutral attitude which he had hitherto striven to maintain had no doubt been partly caused by his Swedish connexion; but it seems hard to blame him for not throwing himself at the eleventh hour into the arms of the Danes. In any case, the counsellor sent by him into Transylvania, to attend the nuptials of his sister Catharine with Bethlen Gabor, Count Adam zu Schwarzenberg, who had long advocated cooperation with Saxony and recognition of Maximilian as Elector, on his return into the Mark demonstrated to both Elector and Estates that a consistent adherence to the Emperor had become indispensable. Jülich-Cleves, as well as the Prussian duchy, which might

lie at Poland's mercy, was at stake; nor could the Danes protect the Mark against Tilly and Wallenstein. But, though no other course can be said to have been open to Brandenburg, George William's decision brought scant relief to his unfortunate electorate, which for something like a quarter of a century to come was destined, except during a brief interval, to remain at the mercy of friend and foe, with but little to choose between them.

To the east the Danish commander Mitzlaff had begun the Silesian campaign by spreading his troops—the remains of Mansfeld's army—into the south-eastern part of the country, advancing even into Moravia. Wallenstein, deliberate in his movements as usual, did not quit Prague till the end of May, but then by a series of well-devised operations completely cleared Upper Silesia and Moravia of Mitzlaff's soldiery. While according to the usage of the times not a few of the garrisons under Danish colours took service with Wallenstein, Mitzlaff was, on his return home, sentenced to imprisonment by a court-martial; whereupon he entered the Swedish service. Wallenstein's complete success in this difficult campaign left his hands free; and he could now join in carrying the war into Christian IV's own dominions, and there bringing it to an end.

At Rendsburg, where Christian was holding a Diet of his Holstein Estates, the news was brought to him that Tilly had crossed the Elbe, and that Wallenstein was on his march northwards from Silesia. On May 31 Tilly entered Lauenburg; and soon afterwards Hans Georg von Arnim—a Brandenburger by birth and one of the most versatile soldier-diplomatists of the war—approached with his detachment of Wallensteiners. The two Mecklenburg Dukes—Adolphus Frederick of Schwerin and John Albert of Güstrow—before long announced to Tilly their submission to the Emperor (August 1-3). There were occasions on which Wallenstein showed himself aware of the importance of speed, and three weeks later he had himself entered Mecklenburg. Hence he pushed on into Lauenburg, where he soon met Tilly; and by the end of the month their joint invasion of Holstein had begun.

While Christian's troops had been fighting in Brandenburg and Silesia, the incoherency of his dominions had prevented him from uniting their resources for the purpose of common defence. Both Holstein, and Schleswig in its rear, were wholly unprepared for the assault of his adversaries; and the defensive measures adopted by the Estates were in a quite inchoate stage. The Danish Rigsraad, summoned to Kolding by the King, had indeed passed a decree for the levy of 12,000 men from the kingdom itself; but not a soldier was as yet forthcoming. The Duke of Gottorp, who disapproved the continuance of the war, had indeed made a last attempt to ascertain the conditions on which peace was obtainable; but at their Lauenburg meeting Tilly and Wallenstein had formulated conditions which the pride of Christian had unhesitatingly rejected.

The negotiations—according^d to Wallenstein's almost invariable custom—were not broken off; but the attack continued.

Pinneberg was taken (September 2); and though a wound received on the occasion obliged Tilly to return to Lauenburg, the advance proceeded under the undivided command of Wallenstein. On September 14 four regiments of foot and horse, the nucleus of Christian's forces, were obliged to capitulate at Grossenbrode on the Femer Sound, in the extreme north-east of Holstein; but their commanders, the Margrave of Baden, Bernard of Weimar, and the redoubtable Robert Munro (who belonged to a family of Scots distinguished in the German wars) made their escape to Fünen. Some resistance was still offered by Count Thurn, who had recently entered into the Danish service. He was now a sexagenarian; but his activity had by no means come to an end with the failure of the Bohemian War, of which he was a principal author, and he remained for some years to come one of the most eager and resolute supporters of the Protestant cause. The King himself, who had taken ship from Glückstadt, and had been received with great coldness by the Dithmarschen peasantry, found his way, first to Flensburg, and then to Kolding. Utterly disheartened, though Danish troops were approaching on the Fünen side of the Little Belt, he now threw up the game and crossed into safety. The exact date of his flight is unknown; but it must have been early in October. Behind his back Rendsburg fell; and a few days earlier (October 3) Schlick, sent on in pursuit by Wallenstein, captured 3000 Danish horse near Aalborg in Jutland, and the whole of the Danish mainland was now flooded by the Imperial soldiery.

During the winter of 1627–8 the army of Jutland and Schleswig appears to have amounted to quite 30,000 men, and that in Holstein to a similar total. It is difficult to see how Jutland at all events could have supported the heavy exactions demanded; but the discipline maintained under Wallenstein contrasted favourably with the lack of it in Christian's own forces. Of these none were now left in the entire peninsula; while to the west the defensive position on the Weser above Bremen was likewise evacuated on the approach of Tilly's able lieutenant Anholt, and nearly the whole of the Bremen diocese was occupied by the troops of the League without any show of resistance. Before the close of the year 1627, the reduction of the Lower Saxon Circle had been completed, almost the last place to fall being Wolfenbüttel, which held out till December 14, when it capitulated to another of Tilly's lieutenants who was rising to distinction, Count zu Pappenheim.

The Lower Saxon and Danish Wars—for it is hardly admissible to call this curiously composite conflict by any single title—had had a most inglorious ending. As to the Protestant sympathies of the populations there could be no question, whatever; but such support as Christian IV had secured in the German duchies, and even in Denmark

itself, had been unwilling and belated; everywhere resentment of the oppressive conduct of the royal soldiery had prevailed, and in Denmark there was a general unwillingness to levy further troops, which could no longer be quartered "in Germany." Soldiers being difficult to obtain, the captains were anxious to sever their connexion with an undertaking at once so hopeless and unprofitable; and the Margrave of Baden and Bernard of Weimar took their departure to the Netherlands, where alone war still seemed to be carried on in earnest. In these circumstances Christian, through this and the greater part of the following year (1628), mainly confined his endeavours to a continued attempt to obtain support from France and England, characteristically offering his mediation between these Powers, now at war with each other.

On the other hand, the failure of Christian IV could not but suggest the transfer of the task, in the execution of which he had broken down, to the rival Scandinavian Power. Gustavus Adolphus had left Denmark to take care of itself, and had afterwards declined to furnish an army for the reconquest of Jutland. But he was—though hardly, in Ranke's phrase, "awakened," since his vigilance had throughout been unremitting—at last moved to action when the Emperor's arms approached the Baltic, and the question of the control of its waters as it were suddenly sprang into prominence. The interests of the two Scandinavian monarchies in the Baltic were by no means identical, but up to a certain point they necessitated an understanding between them. In January, 1628, a treaty was concluded between Sweden and Denmark by which the former, in return for the opening of the Sound to Swedish vessels, bound herself to keep eight men-of-war in the Baltic during the summer and autumn of the year. At the same time family arrangements were made intended to draw the dynasties more closely together.

Gustavus Adolphus had stirred neither without reason nor too soon. Wallenstein, whose diplomatic skill had laid the eastern peril, whose military operations had subdued Silesia, who by a mixture of force and conciliation had brought Brandenburg over to the Emperor, and placed him in a position of ascendancy in Germany such as his predecessors had not held since the days of Charles V, was now nearing the height of his power. As yet the rise of that power had at almost every step seemed to imply the extension and confirmation of the Imperial authority; and now the opportunity seemed at hand for an unprecedented development of both.

Wallenstein's exceptional services called for a signal reward. In September, 1627, he had obtained, as a notable addition to the vast domains over which he held sway as Duke of Friedland, the Silesian principality of Sagan and the lordship of Priebus. But his services in the north were to receive an acknowledgment which at the same time marked a great advance of the Imperial power and its aims. It is

certain that the idea of placing Wallenstein on the Danish throne was at least temporarily entertained—though not by himself, for he had in hand what sufficed for his purpose. This was the territory of the Dukes of Mecklenburg whom the Danish occupation had obliged to hold out by the cause of Christian. The two duchies had now in turn been occupied by the Imperial forces, and towards the end of the year they were promised to Wallenstein by the Emperor. In February, 1628, they were actually granted to him in pledge as a compensation for the costs incurred by him in the war, and in the following year conferred upon him as Imperial fiefs. The Dukes were driven into exile, and, after they had attempted to levy troops for recovering their patrimony, were from 1629 onwards treated as *de facto* under the ban of the Empire. Mecklenburg had suffered heavily from the exactions to which it had been forced to submit; but the rule of Wallenstein, which endured till 1631, affords striking evidence of his genius for administration.

Late in October, 1627, Arnim was instructed by Wallenstein to occupy all the Pomeranian seaports, and more especially the island of Rügen, which Duke Philip Julius of Pomerania-Wolgast had not long since proposed to sell to Denmark, and on the necessity of securing which Wallenstein specially insisted. In November the country at large was occupied by the Imperial troops. Two years before this date the entire heritage of the Pomeranian Dukes had, in consequence of several deaths (some of which were occasioned by the vice that was the bane of so many of the German dynasties, excess in drinking), come into the hands of Duke Bogislav XIV, the last of his ancient line. Without being wholly wanting in patriotic spirit, he was weak and ill-advised, unable really to unite the several divisions of his land or to adopt any policy in the war except that of a neutrality which the antiquated military organisation of his duchy was incapable of guarding. On the extinction of the native line, the Pomeranian succession was by the Treaty of Grimnitz (1529) secured to Brandenburg. But, though Wallenstein did not encourage any interference with this settlement in his own favour, it was understood to depend on the loyalty of George William whether Pomerania, like Jülich-Cleves and Prussia before it, would be allowed to pass to the House of Brandenburg.

A question of great importance for the whole of northern Germany, and of northern Europe, had now arisen. This was the design of the House of Habsburg to acquire an ascendancy in the Northern and Baltic seas which might develop into the control of them and their trade. Now that among the adversaries of that House of Habsburg in the Great War the United Provinces and the Scandinavian North alone continued to withstand its advance, the situation seemed to suggest the resumption of common action against these enemies by the Emperor and Spain; and Philip IV was ready for action. From the point of view of

the joint interests of the two Habsburg Powers, what could be more expedient than to acquire the control of the German ports on the North Sea, and more especially of those on the Baltic, and thus at the same time effectually break the resistance of both the United Provinces and the Scandinavian kingdoms? With the Sound closed against them, the Dutch—apart from the question of obtaining food supplies for their own population—could certainly no longer build ships; while, if the Baltic were in the hands of Powers adverse to Denmark and Sweden, the chief bulwark of their strength, whether for aggression or for self-preservation, would be taken away. But no supremacy over the Baltic, or control over the mouths of Elbe and Weser, was conceivable without the possession of ships and ports, of seamen, and the material for ship-building. All these could be supplied by the Hanseatic towns along the northern coasts of the Empire. The maritime ascendancy of the Hansa was, no doubt, a thing of the past, and the towns in question had ceased to attempt more than the preservation of their privileges by means of a cautious neutrality. But the high-handed policy of Christian IV of Denmark had driven ten among the most important Hanseatic towns into an alliance with the Dutch, which was really directed against himself; the Hansa had refused him its support in the Lower Saxon War; and when at an earlier date (1620) Gustavus Adolphus had sought to secure a closer alliance with these towns, none of them except Stralsund, which though not a free Imperial city was practically independent of the Pomeranian Dukes, had shown itself favourable to the project. Thus the time seemed now to have arrived for inducing—or if necessary, forcing—the Hanse Towns to join in the struggle on the side of the Emperor and Spain, in the first instance against the Free Netherlands. They would find their account in the restriction of the Spanish trade to the subjects of the Emperor and the King of Spain, together with further privileges. As a matter of fact, the only Hanse Towns largely interested in the Spanish trade were Hamburg, Lübeck, and Danzig.

With this end in view, negotiations were opened with Lübeck and other towns as early as the autumn of 1627; but they referred the question to the meeting of the Hansa summoned to Lübeck for the following February. The definiteness of the designs of the Imperial politicians—of Eggenberg in particular—and of Wallenstein is shown by a letter (November, 1627), in which the latter detailed to Spinola the plan of campaign for the ensuing spring—an attack upon the Danish islands in which the Hansa and Spain should each take part with 24 vessels. Not later than February Wallenstein had assumed the title of General of the Oceanic and the Baltic Sea—a premature assumption, but not intended as an empty vaunt. But when, in the same month, the Hanseatic deputies met at Lübeck, they showed no disposition whatever to enter into the Imperial proposals, and adjourned to

July, and then again to September. Religious motives had an unmistakable share in this unwillingness, even if they were not its primary cause. At their meeting the Hanse Towns had brought forward many grievances both old and new, turning in the main respectively on violation of their mercantile and maritime privileges by the Spanish Government, and on the exactions of the Imperial troops, especially those enforced upon Wismar, and the large sum extorted from Rostock for the avoidance of similar treatment. But of all the complaints the loudest were those provoked by the attempt made in Wallenstein's and the Emperor's names to force an Imperial garrison upon Stralsund.

This attempt, which formed part of the general scheme for securing the cooperation of the Baltic towns, was to result not only in completely frustrating the whole design, but in checking at their full height the advance of the Imperial power and of Wallenstein's personal authority. About this time no achievement seemed impossible to him—even that which, like other conquerors before and after him, he seems to have contemplated, the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. The dream of an Imperial *dominium maris* was dissipated, and Wallenstein's planet for the first time arrested in its course, before the walls of Stralsund.

After Duke Bogislav XIV had signed (November 10, 1627) the capitulation of Franzburg, regulating, and providing for exceptions in, the admission of Imperialist troops into the towns and country districts of Pomerania, Arnim had proposed to the Stralsunders that, like the Rostockers before them, they should pay a sum freeing them from the obligation of providing military quarters—and had named the exorbitant figure of 150,000 dollars. The Stralsunders at once demurred to the demand, though declaring their willingness to discuss such a contribution with Duke Bogislav, their nominal Prince. But they had from the first made up their minds to resist "the shameful servitude of the billeting upon them of Wallenstein's troops." The burgomaster of the city, Steinwich, was a man of spirit; the reformed constitution of the town provided for an appeal to the whole civic body; and in the last resort Stralsund might trust to its position, separated as it was on the one side by more than two miles of water from the island of Rügen (occupied by the Imperialists), and protected on the other by a series of ponds and morasses. The Stralsunders had about a thousand mercenaries in their service; and their ships gave them the command of the sea. Some negotiations ensued at Greifswald with Arnim, who to gain time expressed his willingness to accept a payment of 30,000 dollars on account; and when on February 4, 1628, by a *coup de main*, he occupied the islet of Dänholm, in immediate proximity to the south-eastern end of the city, the money was paid. But, when it was found that the preparations against Stralsund continued, the timidity of the Council was overruled by the spirit of the burghers, which rose higher still after the

surrender, on April 5, of the Imperialists on Dänholm. Embassies, however, were about this time sent by the Stralsunders in various directions: to the Emperor, who gave a tardy and insincere promise of relief; to Wallenstein, who threatened the Stralsunders with the annihilation of their town should they refuse to admit his garrison within its walls; to the Hanseatic delegates at Lübeck, who voted a scanty pecuniary aid (15,000 dollars), which did not arrive till all serious danger was over; and to Christian IV and Gustavus Adolphus, both of whom sent materials of war and promise of further help.

On May 13, 1628, the siege proper was begun by Arnim; and, after two attempted assaults had failed, the Scandinavian reinforcements arrived. It is clear that without their aid Stralsund could not have held out against her besiegers. First came an auxiliary force despatched by Christian IV, under the command of Colonel Henry Holk, and consisting of Major Munro's regiment of 900 Scots and 400 Danes and Germans; then followed eight Swedish ships, with 600 soldiers and a diplomatic agent, who on June 23 concluded on behalf of his King a treaty of alliance for twenty years, the basis, as it proved, of Gustavus Adolphus' subsequent expedition. The city was sufficiently garrisoned, and Arnim in vain essayed both assault and bombardment. By June 23 Wallenstein himself assumed the conduct of the siege, and massed round Stralsund an army amounting to 25,000 men, in addition to the 6000 (or thereabouts) on Rügen. In a preliminary interview with Arnim at Greifswald he had declared his determination, negotiations or no negotiations, to make short work of the *canaglia* in Stralsund; and to the time of his actual appearance before Stralsund seems to belong his famous vaunt, to which Munro's narrative bears testimony, that the city "must down, were it bound with chains to the heavens."

The negotiations into which, notwithstanding this vaunt, Wallenstein entered with the Stralsund Council, can scarcely have been only intended as a blind to the siege operations which he continued to carry on. The Council would even now have accepted his terms, which he had reduced to the admission of a Pomeranian garrison of 2000 men and the payment of an additional 50,000 dollars. But the citizens at large would not hear of the acceptance of these conditions without reference to the Kings of Sweden and Denmark. The negotiations broke down; the bombardment and a succession of assaults (June 26-8) once more failed; two days of rain followed; and on July 5, after 400 more Danes had found their way into the city, Wallenstein offered a brief cessation of arms. It was accepted, and proved the beginning of the end. On July 9 another body of 1100 Scots in Danish pay (Lord Spynie's regiment) arrived with supplies at Stralsund. Three days later Christian IV himself appeared with a fleet off Rügen, and on the 16th 1200 Swedes arrived under Sir Alexander Leslie. The town had now nearly 5000 defenders—amounting to a

superabundance, as Council and citizens were not slow to feel—and on July 19 they ventured on a sortie, which however proved unsuccessful.

Wallenstein's opportunity had passed away; his attempts to circumvent Stralsund by negotiation and to crush her by force had simultaneously broken down. It was impossible any longer to keep the Imperial forces massed round the place; on July 21 the withdrawal of the army began, and by the 24th the siege had to all intents and purposes been raised, though Arnim remained with the army no further off than Brandshagen. Christian IV had the satisfaction of bidding the unfortunate Bogislav clear his duchy of the Imperialists, and of taking Wolgast by a *coup de main* (August 3). But Wallenstein rapidly swooped down upon the King with a force of 12,000 men, and, defeating the troops which he had landed, drove him back to his ships (August 12). Before the end of the autumn Wallenstein himself quitted Pomerania.

Wallenstein's success gained over the Danish King could not compensate him for so striking a failure as the raising of the siege of Stralsund—an event whose significance in the eyes of Europe was enhanced by the fall, in November, of Huguenot Rochelle. Those who were jealous of the growth of the Emperor's power, or who resented Wallenstein's own pre-eminence, could now decry him as a baffled general, and charge him with having been the chief promoter, if not the actual originator, of a great political blunder. The Hanse Towns, at their September meeting in Lübeck, took courage to reject altogether the Imperial proposals intended to involve them in the new mercantile and maritime ambitions of the House of Habsburg. But more than this. The Swedish troops remained in Stralsund; the town concluded a treaty with their King; and Wallenstein's assertion was on the point of being falsified, that "the Roman Empire could settle its war without Gustavus Adolphus."

The failure before Stralsund inevitably hastened the negotiations for peace with Denmark, in which Wallenstein throughout played the most prominent part. Early in February, 1628, the Danish Rigsraad had addressed to the Emperor a direct request for the opening of such negotiations; and, the advice of Wallenstein having prevailed at Vienna over that of the party desirous of making the most of the existing situation, he and Tilly were authorised to discuss preliminaries. The Catholic Electors were anxious that the Emperor should seize the opportunity for demanding a restitution of all ecclesiastical property Protestantised since the Peace of Passau; but he declined to admit even Maximilian of Bavaria to more than a confidential share in the settlement of terms. For the peace conferences opened at Lübeck late in January, 1629, Wallenstein and Tilly were named Imperial plenipotentiaries, and were represented there by subdelegates. But the

real management was in the hands of Wallenstein, who conducted a negotiation on his own account *in secreto secretissimo*, and ultimately secured the success of the moderate policy advocated by him. On the Emperor he seems to have impressed the view that peace was a necessity for him, if he was to carry out his ulterior purposes, whereas Denmark had promises of aid from a whole group of Powers. Tilly's final assent Wallenstein seems to have secured by working upon his private interests—this was the occasion on which it was proposed to make over Calenberg (Hanover) as a principality to the general of the League. Having assured himself that Christian IV was willing to give up the German sees held by his family or claimed on its behalf, as well as the Directorship of the Lower Saxon Circle, Wallenstein agreed to restore to him Jutland, Schleswig, and the royal portion of Holstein, and even to refrain from insisting on an indemnity. Wallenstein's own thoughts were already turning in a different direction. In March, 1629, he decided to send a large auxiliary force under Arnim to support the Poles in Prussia against Sweden, now the chief object of his apprehension. He was therefore resolved on making peace with Denmark, and would not even listen to Tilly's demand that Christian IV should bind himself not to support the claims of the ex-Elector Palatine. On the above terms, therefore, peace was concluded at Lübeck on May 22, 1629; and, though King Christian at the very last indulged himself by a sudden irruption into Schleswig, Wallenstein's self-restraint ignored the affront, and on June 7 the Peace, which included nearly all the European Powers, was solemnly proclaimed.

III. THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION AND THE DISMISSAL OF WALLENSTEIN.

(1628-30.)

Among the conditions of the Peace of Lübeck, by determining which Wallenstein had achieved another great political success, had been the appropriation of the northern sees in accordance with the wishes of the League. The religious conflict had now reached a point when a settlement of one of its fundamental problems was no longer to be avoided; and the Emperor himself at last decided to take that settlement in hand.

Ever since the conclusion of the Religious Peace of Augsburg the Protestant Estates in the Empire had in the main refused to acknowledge the stipulation which under the name of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* provided for the deposition of prelates who had become Protestants. The Protestant Princes—herein acting precisely like the Austrian and

Bavarian dynasties—had provided for their younger sons by means of the sees on which they had laid hands for the purpose, while continuing at the same time to appropriate convents and other ecclesiastical foundations within their territories. The Calvinists, ignored by the Religious Peace, had been foremost in infringing it. After the *Reichskammergericht* had at last begun to give judgments in favour of Catholic complaints, the Calvinists and some other Protestant Estates had paid no further heed to this tribunal, while at the same time refusing to acknowledge the competency in such questions of the *Reichshofrath*. The principle of self-help which this line of action suggested had been carried further by the formation of the Union.

The outbreak of the war and the danger of the falling asunder of the whole Empire had, however, made some sort of understanding indispensable. At the Mühlhausen meeting in March, 1620, the Catholic Electors had agreed that the Lutheran occupants—the Calvinists remained unmentioned—of bishoprics and other ecclesiastical foundations should not be removed by force, if they held Imperial letters of protection. The Elector of Saxony, upon whom as usual the issue largely depended, was content with this meagre assurance; and the Bohemian War ran its course without the intervention of the Union. When, after his victory at the White Hill, the Emperor, in February, 1621, sued for the aid of the League to enable him to continue the war, he expressly indicated as its purpose the relief of those who had suffered wrong in contravention of the Religious Peace. When the Lower Saxon Circle grew restive, he refused to appease it by confirming the tenure of ecclesiastical foundations by its (Protestant) members (May, 1621). When the victory of Lutter had encouraged the forward action of the League, and the Imperial forces overwhelmed the retreating King of Denmark and his allies, there seemed no necessity for further delay. While the party of advance was stimulated by such publications as the *Dillingen Book*, the Imperial tribunals expeditiously granted the prayer of every Catholic complainant. Already the old enemy of the Protestants of the south-west, the Bishop of Augsburg (Heinrich von Knorringen), was to the front, and recovering the convents in Swabia and Franconia appropriated by Württemberg and Ansbach.

The Spiritual Electors, whose interests were most largely concerned, had already, at a *Kurfürstentag* held at Ratisbon in 1627, in conjunction with Maximilian of Bavaria advocated an Imperial declaration as to the true meaning of the Religious Peace. Now, they resolved to insist upon the announcement by Imperial authority of a general Restitution, and upon this announcement being made at once, before the Danish War was at an end and the armies were disbanded. The Emperor's legal right to issue such a proclamation could only be demonstrated by a quibble; but there was no disputing the fact that the Empire was at

present overawed by the Catholic forces. The suggestion that Richelieu lured the Emperor to his ruin by proposing the Edict is absurd; but the French Minister was certainly cognisant of the scheme.

Yet, even after the Danish War was practically over, Ferdinand still hesitated. The Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg urged him to qualify any such Edict as that proposed by a clause safeguarding the rights of the Estates to be consulted in the matter. The Emperor could not conceal from himself that the chief advantages of a restitution would rest with the members of the League; and he was fain to extract from them in return a promise to support the election of his son as Roman King, and to keep under arms the military forces now in the Empire. Bavaria and Mainz would hear of no such concessions. Maximilian, who, in February, 1628, had obtained from the Emperor a formal guarantee for thirty years of the Upper and part of the Lower Palatinate in exchange for Upper Austria, as well as a recognition of the hereditary right of his line to the Electoral succession, had never been more self-confident.

There was, however, another way of inducing the Emperor to act. The great north-German bishoprics, Bremen, Verden, and Minden, might, together with Halberstadt and Magdeburg, be secured to the Emperor's son, Archduke Leopold William, who would thus acquire a domain larger than any of the spiritual electorates. This was a scheme that commended itself not only to Ferdinand, but also to Wallenstein, who had hitherto looked askance at the principle of restitution, but who had nothing to say against it if so applied as to benefit the Imperial House and to advance its military power. And now the religious zeal of another group of the Emperor's advisers—the Nuncio Caraffa, and the confessor Lamormain—and Ferdinand's own religious enthusiasm, rarely appealed to in vain, were fired by the project of a great Counter-reformation, to go hand in hand with the restitution. On September 13, 1628, the order was given to draft the Edict; and after having been submitted to Mainz and Bavaria it was promulgated on March 6, 1629.

The Edict "concerning certain Imperial grievances calling for settlement," in its preamble charged the Protestants with having unlawfully appropriated both immediate and mediate ecclesiastical domains, and resorted to the sword rather than consent to their restitution; and it then proceeded to declare the Catholics justified in demanding the restoration of all mediate conventual or other ecclesiastical property misappropriated since 1552, and the reinstatement of Catholic archbishops, bishops, and abbots in the immediate sees. It approved the expulsion of Protestants from the territories of Catholic rulers, and prohibited all Protestant sects not adhering to the unchanged Augsburg Confession. The execution of the Edict was to be entrusted to Imperial commissioners from whose judgment there was to be no appeal, and who

were in each case to confine themselves to the one question: whether the particular see or convent or other foundation had come into Protestant hands before or after 1552. The commissioners chosen were exclusively Catholic, and for the most part archbishops and bishops, some of whom had a direct interest in the restitutions.

This Edict, which was communicated without note or comment even to the loyal Elector of Saxony, spread the utmost alarm throughout the Protestant portions of the Empire, and especially those occupied by the Catholic armies. It was heightened by the circumstance that the terminus chosen was the year 1552, when the Catholics were in possession of many foundations just recovered by them, which by 1555 had reverted to Protestant tenure. Further apprehensions were rife, and a vague fear prevailed of the Edict being stretched so as to meet every demand of the supporters of the Counter-reformation, and of their leaders the Jesuits. In the case of the small Imperial towns, Archduke Leopold had some months since set a precedent in Elsass, both by the restitution of ecclesiastical property, and by forcing the profession of Catholicism upon all the inhabitants under his rule.

The process of restitution and reformation which now ensued was continued more or less during the next three years. In many cases it remained incomplete; in others it was successfully resisted, as in Magdeburg, to which Wallenstein actually laid siege, though he was ultimately induced to raise it (September, 1629). The great events of the year 1631 prevented the final transfer of the archbishoprics of Bremen and Magdeburg into Catholic hands. But up to that time five bishoprics (Halberstadt, which together with the Hessian abbey of Hersfeld had been secured by the pluralist Archduke Leopold William; Minden and Verden, which fell to the Bishop of Osnabrück, a kinsman of Maximilian; and Ratzburg and Schwerin) had been recovered to the Church of Rome, and a sixth (held by the pluralist of Cologne) had received back two-thirds of its lands, long since alienated from it. In addition, the restitution had been carried out more or less fully in about thirty Imperial or Hanse Towns, and in fifteen more it had been announced, planned, or partially executed. In different parts of Germany nearly a hundred convents had been restored, and some eighty or ninety ordered to be brought back—out of the total more than threescore in the duchy of Brunswick alone, many in Lüneburg, Hesse, and Nassau, and some twenty in Württemberg. The number of parish and other churches in which Catholic worship was once more set up can hardly be estimated. In general, the localities where the Counter-reformation was most effectively carried out were, besides the diocese of Osnabrück and the territories of Lippe, Waldeck, and Saxe-Weimar, the duchy of Württemberg, and most especially the Brandenburg margravates of Ansbach and Baireuth.

Thus, to speak profanely, the spoils were great; but the quarrels

concerning them much marred the satisfaction of the Catholic world. In the first place there was the hierarchical objection taken by Pope Urban VIII and really due to his animosity against the House of Austria (more fully discussed elsewhere), which led him to demand the recall of the Imperial commissioners and the substitution of others appointed by himself. Further to be reckoned with were the jealousy of the Religious Orders, the eagerness of the Jesuits, and the financial claims of the Imperial Court. The commissioners had been directed to deliver up the confiscated convents to the Orders of their several foundations; when, however, any such Order was incapable of administering a convent, it was to be sequestered. On the restoration of a convent to its Order, the latter was to make a payment to the *Reichshofrath* for costs incurred, as well as a proportion of the revenues received. Wallenstein sought to work the Edict in this business-like spirit; nor were Archduke Leopold, and to a certain extent even Father Lamormain, out of sympathy with it. The Jesuits (whose zeal was remembered against them in the days of the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia) were desirous of securing for themselves the convents which the Premonstratensians, Benedictines, and Cistercians were without the means of administering. A violent contention followed, which was envenomed by the attacks upon the Order by Scioppius (Caspar Schoppe), perhaps the most foul-mouthed of the literary gladiators of the century. Finally, the political jealousy between the League on the one hand, and the Emperor and Wallenstein on the other, was intensified by the working of the Edict. The members of the League were willing that Archduke Leopold William should succeed in Halberstadt and also in Magdeburg, Wallenstein keeping the military control over both; but they desired that Hildesheim should fall to the Archbishop of Cologne, and Bremen, round which still lay the army of the League, to another Bavarian prince. To this latter design in particular a strong opposition was offered by the Emperor on behalf of his son Leopold William; and Wallenstein was held responsible by the League and its head for his master's dynastic policy. Their wrath against him had already declared itself at the meeting held by the League at Heidelberg, which, just when the Edict was about to be launched (February, 1629), had declared itself resolved not to give up any lands, either temporal or spiritual, in its occupation.

As the execution of the Edict proceeded, John George of Saxony became more and more anxious to obtain a definite assurance that it was not to be held applicable to his electorate. Maximilian of Bavaria, desirous of securing the support of John George in the coming conflict against the ascendancy of Wallenstein, was ready to assent to such a declaration; but the Emperor, after entering into negotiations, came to the conclusion that there was nothing to be feared from John George.

The Saxon Elector in consequence at last became more amenable to Protestant influence, and, though still opposed to common action, sent a protest of his own against the Edict to Vienna. The Emperor's answer was to refer him to the *Kurfürstentag* which was assembling at Ratisbon at this time (July, 1630).

At Ratisbon a chance was still offered to the Emperor and the League of reconsidering the policy which, while striving to force religious unity upon the Empire, was cleaving it hopelessly asunder. In August, a compromise, fair in some respects if not in all—its most essential point being the restriction of restitution to sees and foundations that had remained Catholic up to 1555—was offered on behalf of the young Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt, son-in-law of the Elector of Saxony. But the proposal was rejected by the Catholic Electors, who absolutely adhered to the Edict and insisted upon its rigorous execution, more especially in Württemberg. They consented, however, in November, to attend a "composition" meeting to be held at Frankfort in the February following on the subject of the restitutions. It was known that John George hoped to assemble the Protestant Princes before that date at Leipzig; for already Gustavus Adolphus had landed on the Pomeranian coast (July 4), and, though this event had not made so profound an impression as might have been expected, common action of some kind could hardly any longer be avoided by the Protestant Princes. But the proceedings which followed on their part will be more conveniently narrated in a later chapter.

When the discussions on the Restitutions opened at Frankfort, George of Hesse-Darmstadt, true to the tendencies of his line, advocated submission to the Catholic demands; but Electoral Saxony now insisted on the revocation of the Edict, and the restoration of spiritual lands and foundations to the condition in which they had been before 1620. On these demands John George insisted, though willing to limit their adoption to a period of fifty years; and on the Catholic side a moderate party, headed by Maximilian of Bavaria, was now willing to postpone for forty years any further proceedings under the Edict. But before any settlement could be reached—and if reached, it could have had little practical value—the news came that Tilly had advanced into Saxony, and that the Saxon ambassadors had taken their departure from Frankfort. The Edict of Restitution remained uncanceled by the Emperor. Its provisions and its policy had deepened the animosity of the Protestant Princes and done something towards driving into armed resistance the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg. The difficulties and jealousies to which its execution had given rise had also augmented the bitter resentment nourished by Maximilian of Bavaria and the League against the Imperial policy and its all-powerful representative and agent, and had helped to bring about the dismissal of Wallenstein.

It has been seen within what narrow limits the Imperial Commander-in-chief had approved of the Restitution policy adopted by the Emperor. He was likewise so dissatisfied with the responsibility incurred by Ferdinand in taking part in the Mantuan War, that at one time (October, 1629) he seems to have thought of a division of the supreme command into two departments, of which he would reserve only the northern to himself. The Mantuan War is described in another chapter. Here it will suffice to state that in regard to the disputed succession in Mantua and Montferrat Pope Urban VIII, involved in a variety of quarrels with Ferdinand—as to the Hungarian sees, as to the Imperial fiefs in Parma, as to the surrender of Prague University to the detested Jesuits—had espoused the cause of the French claimant, the Duke of Nevers, while Ferdinand asserted his right to dispose of Mantua as an Imperial fief. Richelieu, now master of the Huguenots after the fall of La Rochelle and the suppression of Henry de Rohan's rising, had resolved upon intervention. The successful French campaign of 1629 had led to the rapid muster of an Imperial army at Lindau, for which Wallenstein was obliged to detach 20,000 of his troops; and, though in 1630 Richelieu himself took the field and conquered Savoy, the Imperialists under Gallas and Aldringer, after repulsing a Venetian attempt at relief, took Mantua (July 18, 1630). They were, however, unable to take Casale; and the peace with the Emperor and Savoy, signed at Cherasco (April 16, 1631), which put France in possession of Pinerolo, entirely justified Wallenstein's doubts as to the expediency of entering into this war, even though it for the time made it difficult for France to cooperate actively with Gustavus Adolphus.

When, on July 3, 1630, Ferdinand at last reached Ratisbon, his first concern was the election of his eldest son and namesake as Roman King. But he was also troubled by the external dangers threatening the Empire, and by the doubtful attitude of France. The United Provinces had become more dangerous by their capture of Hertogenbosch (September, 1629). About the same time Gustavus Adolphus had concluded with his Polish adversary the truce of Altmark, equivalent to a peace on his own conditions. His landing in Pomerania was now imminent; and an "honest conjunction" between the Emperor and the Electors seemed indispensable for the preservation of the Empire. Unhappily, however, the rift between Ferdinand and Maximilian was still deep. Not in vain had the Papal suggestion of his own election as Roman King sounded in the ear of the prudent but ambitious Bavarian (January, 1629); not in vain had the draft of a French alliance actually been submitted for his consideration (October). A French ambassador, Brulart, appeared at Ratisbon, accompanied by the most confidential of all the confidential agents of the Cardinal, the Capuchin Father Joseph.

The assembled Electors lost no time in replying to the Emperor's

opening statements. Without ignoring the state of foreign affairs—suggesting, indeed, that Sweden might be conciliated by the restoration of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and the United Provinces by the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from the Empire—they laid most stress upon the sufferings caused by the oppressions of the Imperial armies. Among other remedies for this evil, they demanded the appointment of a “considerable member of the Empire,” approved by the Electors, to the supreme command of its forces. No demonstration could have made it more clear that neither Catholic nor Protestant Electors would support the Emperor against foreign adversaries, unless he assented to the one measure to which all these representations pointed. Though taken by surprise, the Emperor—possibly in some measure tempted by the nascent design of putting his son Ferdinand in the Commander-in-chief’s place—prepared with magnificent callousness to sacrifice Wallenstein. The army might thus be preserved though its chief was dismissed, and the wiles of France be defeated all the same.

Wallenstein, with his usual sensitiveness to changes in the political atmosphere, had of late shown himself conciliatory in some matters of foreign policy; but he had steadily gone on increasing the Imperial army, till in April, 1630, he had been explicitly ordered to stop further levies and to take steps towards the reduction of the existing bodies of troops. In June he moved his head-quarters as near as Memmingen in Swabia. On August 11 certain of the Imperial councillors entered into *pourparlers* with the French ambassador at Ratisbon as to the renewal of peace; and two days later the Emperor announced to the Catholic Electors his intention of making a change in the command of his army. While the Protestant Electors, opposed to the existence of any Imperial army at all, stood apart, the Catholic promptly took up the question of the command; and, having secured the “hard assent” of Maximilian, the Spiritual Electors proposed him as the new commander-in-chief, a demand which if successful would have placed both the Catholic armies in the Empire under the control of a sagacious politician wholly devoid of military qualities. The Spanish ambassador vehemently protested; but the Emperor was ready to discuss the proposal, though desirous of modifying it in various ways, more especially by blending the two armies into one.

Though an understanding on this head was really remote, and the suggestion of Archduke Ferdinand’s succession as Imperial Commander-in-chief had been quietly dropped, both Emperor and Electors adhered to the conclusion that Wallenstein was to be dismissed. Early in September two councillors were sent to break the decision to him, when it appeared that he was prepared to accept it without any demur. Making no conditions, not even providing for the safety of his Mecklenburg duchy, he withdrew to his Bohemian domains; and on September 13 the Emperor informed all the heads of the regiments

of his army that its Commander-in-chief had been dismissed. Wallenstein was a man of violent passions, and was rarely at pains to place any restraint upon his expression of them. Who can say whether, with all his insight—actual or fancied—into the future, he knew that his day of retaliation would come?

For the moment, Tilly, who never shrank from a duty imposed upon him, assumed the temporary command over both armies, which it was intended to reduce to a total of 39,000 men. But the difficulty as to how the Imperialist forces were to be maintained was of course hard to meet, and a rapid diminution of them was inevitable. In these circumstances there was but faint hope of a successful negotiation with France. Notwithstanding the tidings of the fall of Mantua (July), French diplomacy pressed the withdrawal of the Spanish and Imperial troops from Italy, while Richelieu was secretly urging Gustavus Adolphus through Hercule de Charnacé, the French ambassador, to make war upon the Emperor. The Catholic Electors were so intent upon a pacification with France that on this head too Ferdinand was ready to give way. But Richelieu had no present wish for a general peace, and, after the *Kurfürstentag* had broken up, contented himself with concluding the Treaty of Cherasco and a subsequent agreement (April and June, 1631), limited to Italian affairs. Thus the Spanish and Imperialist forces, at all events, were once more free.

The Emperor was unable at Ratisbon to carry the election of his eldest son as Roman King. The question of the Edict of Restitution was urged by Saxony and Brandenburg, who went so far as to announce a separate meeting of Protestant Estates which might have proceeded to discuss the question of war contributions; but, as has been seen, it was relegated to a "composition" meeting, to be held at Frankfort early in the following year. When, in November, 1630, the Ratisbon assembly came to an end, unanimity had been reached by the Emperor, the Catholic, and the Protestant Electors, on one point only. They had all agreed on a missive to King Gustavus Adolphus, in which they pointed out the unlawfulness of his recent irruption into the Empire, and requested him to return home.

CHAPTER IV.

RICHELIEU.

ON the death of Henry IV his far-reaching designs were laid aside, and the energy of the Government of France was expended for some years in shifts, expedients, and temporary measures of self-preservation. The proposed invasion of Navarre was ignored by the tacit consent of both the States concerned. The attack upon Milan was abandoned, and the ambitions of the Duke of Savoy were frustrated. The French Government contented itself with affording him so much support as preserved him from the vengeance of Spain. The War of the Jülich Succession, which has been narrated in a previous volume, was dexterously confined to the narrowest limits. The great army which Henry IV had assembled for purposes of which he alone had been fully cognisant was in part disbanded; and a small force of 8000 foot and 1200 horse joined the Dutch and German contingents in the siege of Jülich. When the town had surrendered (September 1, 1610) this force was withdrawn; and the disputed territories were left to Brandenburg and Neuburg, "the Princes in possession." In stipulating for the maintenance of the Catholic religion in the pacified duchies the French Government followed perhaps the course which the late King would have approved, and certainly that which was most likely to preserve the peace.

Meanwhile measures had been taken to carry on the affairs of France. Immediately on the death of the King, his Ministers, too cautious to take a definite decision on their own responsibility, appealed to the *Parlement* of Paris; and that body, nothing loth to exercise a political function, at once declared the Queen-Mother, Mary de' Medici, to be the lawful Regent. This decree was confirmed on the following day in a *lit de justice*, at which the little King, Louis XIII, appeared (May 15, 1610). The new Regent retained her husband's Ministers in their appointments. The routine business of State was transacted by Sillery (the Chancellor), Villeroy, and Jeannin. Sully, on his master's death, bethought him of the many enemies whom he had made, and retired for safety to the Bastille. Reassured as to his personal security, he afterwards joined the Government and retained his posts; his unpopularity, however, told against him; his overweening temper alienated

his colleagues; and early in 1611 he was forced to resign his financial control, though retaining his offices of Grand Master of the Artillery and of Commissioner for Ways and Communications, with his government of Poitou. The finances were then put in commission under a board of which Jeannin was the head.

But the old Ministry, competent and even excellent under the direction of a strong King, was incapable of governing, or of inspiring a weak ruler with method, resolution, and wisdom. The Princes of the Blood and other magnates caballed against the Regent, against each other, and against the Ministry. The Ministers in their turn could devise only transitory palliatives. Discontented interests were appeased by gifts of money, of places, and of pensions. Such appetites grow by what they devour, and the hoards of Henry IV began to melt away. A chronic deficit appeared in place of an annual surplus. The Ministers endeavoured to please everyone, and no one was satisfied.

In these conditions a vigorous foreign policy was out of the question. Opposition to the Habsburg Powers, Spain and Austria, could only lead to undesirable complications. The Queen's Ministers aimed at an understanding with Spain. Early in 1612 plans for a double marriage between the royal Houses of France and Spain began to be seriously discussed. In August of that year it was settled that Louis XIII should marry Anne, the elder Spanish Princess. This indication that old hostilities were abandoned smoothed for the time the path of the French Ministry. The Governments, acting together, maintained a precarious peace in the north of Italy in spite of the restless ruler of Savoy. But the Protestant and independent allies of Henry IV, the United Provinces, the German Princes, Venice, and the minor Italian Powers were alarmed and alienated; the Huguenots feared and resented the reactionary influence of Spain; and their Assemblies at Saumur (1611), and La Rochelle (1612-3) pressed for an extension of safeguards and privileges. The weakness of the Government invited contempt; its policy of doles excited cupidity; real grievances were not wanting; and early in 1614 some of the most important Princes, the Prince of Condé, the Duke of Nevers, the Duke of Mayenne (son of the famous leader of the League), the Duke of Longueville, the Duke of Vendôme, and the Duke of Bouillon, withdrew from the Court, and issued a manifesto against the Government, charging it with incompetence, maladministration, and unconstitutional conduct, calling in question the policy of the Spanish marriages, and demanding a meeting of the three Estates.

The league of Princes was a formidable combination. The Prince of Condé, though dissolute, inexperienced, and worthless, was yet the first Prince of the Blood and Governor of Guienne. The Duke of Nevers was Governor of Champagne. The Duke of Longueville, descendant of the royal bastard Dunois, was Governor of Picardy. Vendôme, the illegitimate son of Henry IV, was Governor of Brittany.

The Duke of Bouillon was the most experienced soldier of the kingdom; he was still a power among the Huguenots; and his sovereign principality of Sedan was conveniently in touch with his German friends. The Government determined to treat. Terms were arranged at Sainte Menehould (May 15, 1614). Money compensations were freely distributed, and a meeting of the Estates was to be summoned, which assembled at Paris in October. In the interval an armed expedition to Brittany against the Duke of Vendôme had shown that the Government still held the master cards if they dared to use them. In September the King reached the age of thirteen and his legal majority: but the Queen continued to exercise the royal power.

The Assembly of Estates, of which such high expectations had been professed, led to little or no result. The Third Estate, still mindful of the murder of Henry IV, and of the doctrines set forth by Mariana and Bellarmine in books condemned by the *Parlement*, put in the forefront of their *cahier* a declaration of fundamental law: "The King holding his crown of God alone, there is no power on earth, spiritual or temporal, which has any right over his kingdom to deprive thereof the consecrated persons of the Kings, or to absolve their subjects from the fealty or obedience which they owe, on any ground or pretext whatsoever." The clergy resented this encroachment upon their sphere, and some perhaps the direct attack on papal authority; a violent quarrel ensued, in which the *Parlement* also took part; and the Government was compelled to close the discussion without deciding the question. The nobles and the clergy demanded the abolition of the *Paulette*, thereby striking at the hereditary rights of the official members of the Third Estate, who constituted the great majority of its representatives. In retaliation, the Third Estate demanded the suppression of pensions and the correction of abuses in the Church. The clergy demanded the publication of the Decrees of the Council of Trent, which the Third Estate opposed. Confronted with the urgent need of financial reform—for it appeared that the normal expenditure was thirty-five millions against thirty-two millions of receipts, and that the pension fund had increased from three millions to five and a half since the death of Henry, and the general expenses by four millions—the Estates proposed to suppress the *Paulette*, which involved a loss of a million and a half per annum, to reduce the *Taille*, and abolish the sale of offices; but no means were suggested to meet the existing or the resulting deficit, except the institution of a Chamber of Justice to deal with the malversations of financiers. The Spanish marriages were generally approved. After waiting until March, 1615, for an answer to their representations, the Estates were dismissed with a promise of consideration, and a pledge that pensions should be diminished, a Chamber of Justice set up, and the venality of offices abolished. But none of these promises was put into effect. The *Paulette* was suspended for a time, but was soon restored. The last

assembly of the Estates summoned before 1789 had been intended by some to embarrass the Government, by others, perhaps, to relieve the real disorders of France. The embarrassment was less than had been hoped; relief there was none.

Disappointed in the results of the meeting of the Estates, the Opposition continued their intrigues. Immediately after the dispersal of the delegates the *Parlement* of Paris issued a decree, inviting Princes, Dukes, peers, and officers of the Crown to attend a meeting of the *Parlement* and discuss measures to be taken for the service of the King, the relief of his subjects, and the good of the State. This bold intrusion into the sphere of government was promptly resented by the Ministers; and a prolonged dispute followed in which the *Parlement* was not altogether worsted. In the course of the discussion (May 22), the *Parlement* called for the exclusion of foreigners from the government of provinces, and from military offices. This demand gave the note of the ensuing struggle. The attack was now unmasked. It became an open assault on the position of the Queen-Mother's principal confidants, Concino Concini, and his wife, Leonora Galigai, through whom his power and influence had been obtained. Leonora had come to France in the suite of Mary de' Medici at the time of her marriage. As her lady-in-waiting she had won and successfully retained an unrivalled power over her mistress. The Italian adventurer whom she married in 1602 had shared her ascendancy and had used his power during the first years of the reign chiefly for the advancement of his private fortune and that of his friends. It was reckoned later that the pair had accumulated in seven years nine millions of *livres*. One of the first acts of the Regent was to purchase for her favourite the marquise of Ancre, the governments of Peronne, Roye, and Montdidier, and the office of First Gentleman of the Chamber. Later, he had received the government of Amiens, and the post of Marshal (1613). This accumulation of offices and dignities and patronage had aroused jealousy; and the Marshal was gradually forced, in order to protect his private interests, to take a part in politics. His position in Picardy had brought him into collision with the Duke of Longueville, whom he wished entirely to supplant in that province, with an eye, perhaps, to communications with the Spanish Netherlands, and he was personally odious to most of the discontented Princes.

Thus, when the Princes in August once more openly raised the standard of rebellion, they designated Concini openly as the principal object of their enmity. The Court, in spite of the gathering storm, had decided to start for the south to solemnise the Spanish marriages and to exchange the Princesses. While the royal cortege and its protecting army slowly moved on its way, Condé and Bouillon marched through France, watched but hardly impeded by the Marshal de Boisdauphin, to Poitou. Meanwhile a Protestant assembly, authorised for Grenoble,

had without warrant removed to Nîmes, whence it was later transferred to La Rochelle. The jealousies of Sully and Bouillon had destroyed the influence of both with their party; and a new leader had come to the front in Henry, Duke of Rohan, who had married Sully's daughter and shared his influence in Poitou. Upright, generous, eloquent, and capable, Rohan is perhaps the most sympathetic figure in Huguenot history. He now for once, as he confessed later, took up arms in an unworthy cause—the cause of the Prince of Condé; but, although he succeeded in rousing rebellion in Guienne, the Cevennes, and Languedoc, he was not strong enough to oppose the passage of the royal escort. The marriages were solemnised by proxy in October at Bordeaux and Burgos; and on November 9 the Princesses were exchanged. When the Court at length turned northwards again, they had to face an armed, a successful, but not a resolute rebellion. Poitou was in the hands of Condé and of Rohan, who had now joined him. The Ministry once more chose the path of negotiation. A conference was called to meet at Loudun. After deliberations which lasted from February until May, 1616, a peace was at length arranged on the usual basis of a general amnesty, a distribution of public money, and concessions to the principal leaders. In the settlement Protestant interests were almost completely ignored. Concini left Picardy to Longueville and received Normandy instead. It was secretly agreed that Sillery, the Chancellor, and one or two less conspicuous Ministers should be sacrificed.

Concini's escape had been a narrow one, and he felt that vigorous measures were needed. He determined to set up a strong Ministry on which he could depend. Not only Sillery, but Jeannin and Villeroy were to be superseded. The head of the new Government was Barbin, a man of obscure origin, closely attached to the Concini, capable and courageous. Condé was persuaded to return to Paris, that either his moderation might assist the Government or his arrogance give them a pretext. The pretext was not lacking; the Prince's insolence suggested that he was aiming at the throne; he ostentatiously withdrew his protection from Concini, who retired to Normandy. But the counter-stroke followed quickly; on September 1 the Prince was arrested at the Louvre, and shortly afterwards he was imprisoned in the Bastille. The new Ministry had shown its courage; its capacity was still to be proved.

Concini returned to Paris, where the mob had sacked his house. The arrest of Condé was followed by a general exodus of Princes. This time the Duke of Nevers in Champagne, abandoning his favourite project of a crusade against the Turks, with Bouillon and Longueville formed the centre of resistance. Barbin was the man to meet such emergencies, but he needed stronger backing. The Ministry was recast; and on November 30, 1616, Richelieu became Minister of State, charged with the departments of Foreign Affairs and War.

Jean Armand Duplessis de Richelieu was now in his thirty-second year. On his father's side he was noble, of a Poitevin family; his mother was the daughter of an advocate in the *Parlement* of Paris. His father had done good service under Henry III, and became Grand Provost of the royal household, and Knight of the Holy Ghost. After his death in 1590, Armand, his youngest son, was at first educated as a layman; but in 1602 he was called upon to leave the "Academy," where he was receiving the usual soldierly training of his class, and fit himself for the family bishopric of Luçon. In 1606 he was formally nominated to this bishopric; in 1607 he went to Rome and was dispensed by the Pope from the canonical rule of age; and in 1608 he took up his duties in the see. Here, with a vigilant eye fixed on the Court and on politics, he performed his pastoral duties, studied, wrote, and reflected, and formed some of his few friendships. Here he met the Capuchin, François du Tremblay, better known as Père Joseph, with whom he was to be so closely associated in later years, Duvergier de Hauranne, later Abbé of Saint Cyran, whom he afterwards found it necessary to imprison, and the family of Bouthillier, his faithful servants. His friends procured his election in 1614 as delegate for the clergy of Poitou; and he was already so far distinguished as to be chosen to make the final address on behalf of the clergy when their *cahier* was presented. His first Court office was that of Grand Almoner to the young Queen Anne, which he took up on her entry into Paris in 1616. He was employed in the summer of 1616 to induce the Prince of Condé to return to Paris. In six months he must have won the confidence of the Queen-Mother and of Concini, as whose creature he makes his entry on the great stage. But in the acts of his five months' Ministry his own individuality is strongly marked.

Abroad the situation was more menacing than it had been since the death of Henry IV. Venice was at war with Archduke Ferdinand of Styria. Milan was threatening Savoy. Before the end of December Lesdiguières, Governor of Dauphiné, acting on his own initiative, crossed the Alps with an army to aid Savoy against the Spaniards. A breach with Spain seemed imminent; and, on the other hand, the old allies of France had been alienated by the Spanish marriages. Into these complications Richelieu had not time to introduce order; but his first acts are significant. He sent envoys to Germany, Holland, England, and Switzerland, to explain away the Spanish marriages. He asserted with more vigour than judgment French interests in the Valtelline. He tolerated the action of Lesdiguières. Subservience to Spain was at an end.

At home, equal energy and determination were shown. Three armies were quickly mustered and directed against the confederates in the east. A stinging manifesto set their action before the public in its true light. It was pointed out that in six years Condé had received three millions

and a half, Nevers a million and a half, Longueville one million two hundred thousand, Mayenne two millions, Bouillon one million, Vendôme six hundred thousand *livres* from the royal treasury. The policy of the Regency was vindicated; and Richelieu, as in duty bound, formulated a defence of Concini, a more difficult task. The presence of the Duke of Rohan with the royal troops showed that nothing was at present to be feared from the Huguenots. The real weakness of the confederates was soon seen. Pushed back and with their principal strongholds beleaguered, they would soon have been compelled to surrender at discretion, when the Barbin Ministry fell with a crash. The King, under the influence of his favourite, Luynes, asserted his royal will. Concini was murdered, Barbin imprisoned, and the Queen-Mother ordered to retire to Blois (April, 1617). Richelieu had been sufficiently adroit to win some favour or indulgence from Luynes; but there was no place for him in the new *régime*. He decided to follow the fortunes of the Queen-Mother, and became for a time the accredited head of her Council at Blois.

The sudden stroke which overthrew the favourite, drove the Queen-Mother from power, and brought the King to the exercise of the royal authority, was the work of a poor gentleman, Charles d'Albert, afterwards Duke of Luynes. Born in 1578, he was introduced to the service of the King by Concini, who thought that his humble position would make him powerless for harm, while the difference of age rendered any dangerous intimacy between him and the young King improbable. But his skill in all the arts of falconry won him the King's affection, which was strengthened by his engaging manners, his handsome person, and his supple tact. He soon obtained that absolute ascendancy over the young King which a man can sometimes obtain over a boy. Louis was now old enough to resent the humiliating control of his mother, and the still more humiliating rule of Concini. He made Luynes the confidant of his grievances, and learnt from him the way to power and revenge; the plot was secretly contrived between them and successfully carried into effect. The young King showed considerable resolution and reticence in this, the first responsible act of his public life. Vengeance did not cease when Concini was dead; from his wife also the utmost penalty was pitilessly exacted.

On receipt of the news of Concini's death the rebellious Princes laid down their arms and were admitted to pardon, or, rather, their meritorious conduct was duly recognised. But it was soon seen that, though the principal personages were changed, little else was altered. The old Ministers were recalled to the Council. The policy of shifts and expedients was revived. The quarrels of Savoy and Milan were once more allayed by an unstable peace (Treaty of Pavia, October 9, 1617). An assembly of Notables was called to give some official recognition to the results of the revolution and to the new order. The old

reforms were recommended, and the old promises were renewed; but nothing was done. Condé was kept in prison. However, the time was at hand when expedients would no longer meet the situation. In 1619 the Bohemian revolt gave France the opportunity which Henry IV or Richelieu would have seized, if not to strike a telling blow against Austria, at least to interpose an effective mediation. But the influence of France was so used that, by the Treaty of Ulm (July, 1620) between the League and the Union, Austria and Spain were left free to throw their whole force and that of their Catholic allies on Bohemia and the Palatinate. The initial advantage thus surrendered was not recovered by France until after many years of war and negotiation.

At home the family of Luynes alone benefited. The favourite became a Duke and Peer; he succeeded to the dignities and to the spoils of Concini, even to his plans of aggrandisement in Picardy; in 1621 he became Constable of France. He married a beautiful lady of the House of Rohan, afterwards famed as the Duchess of Chevreuse. His brothers shared his prosperity and rose in their turn to ducal rank. The old jealousies and discontents were thus awakened, and rebellion was always in the air. Private animosities and disappointed interests were reinforced by religious passions. For one of the first acts of the new rule was to issue an edict restoring to the Church the ecclesiastical possessions in Béarn which had been for half a century in the hands of the Protestants. This was a measure that could only be executed by force, and the King had to acquiesce for a time in the open disobedience of the provincial authorities.

All discontents found a focus in the little Court of Blois. The contemptible intrigues of a discredited woman and her worthless adherents would deserve little notice had they not served as Richelieu's opportunity. The only hold which the Bishop of Luçon still retained on power was through the influence he had established over the mind of Mary de' Medici. He hoped by dexterously using his ascendancy to win the confidence of the King and of Luynes. But he soon saw that this double game was dangerous. He left the Court at Blois to its own devices and retired to his bishopric. He still continued to correspond with the Queen-Mother, but with caution and reserve. When a correspondence became known which she had imprudently carried on with Barbin in prison, Richelieu, though not directly implicated, fell under suspicion; and in April, 1618, he was ordered into exile at Avignon. Hence he was suddenly recalled in March, 1619, to deal with a new situation.

Under the influence of the adventurers who swayed her mind in Richelieu's absence, the Queen-Mother had taken a step which inconvenienced the Government. She had appealed to Épernon to release her from the species of captivity which she endured at Blois. While the old courtier was hastening secretly and by forced marches from his

stronghold of Metz to meet the Queen-Mother in his government of Angoumois, the plans were laid : and on February 22 Mary descended by night from a window of her castle, and on the same day was with the Duke at Loches. It would have been easy to crush the revolt by arms, but the King and the favourite preferred 'a less invidious course. Richelieu was summoned to bring the Queen to reason. His share in the long negotiations that followed at Angoulême proved how indispensable he was. Everything was arranged to the satisfaction of the Government. The Queen gave up her nominal government of Normandy, received Angers for her residence, with Ponts de Cé and Chinon ; and Richelieu was established as her principal adviser. The councillors who had prompted the escapade were removed. In September the King and his mother met, and a formal reconciliation followed. Luynes and Richelieu continued on terms of veiled hostility—Luynes on the defensive, Richelieu on the watch for an opportunity. Condé was released to serve as a makeweight against the Queen-Mother. The shadowy hopes of a Cardinal's hat which had been held out to Richelieu remained, and seemed likely to remain, unfulfilled. But no opposition was offered to his predominance at Angers, where all the chief posts were filled by his relatives and friends.

Thus in May, 1620, when the periodical rising of Princes recurred, Richelieu found himself dragged into rebellion. The malcontents appeared at the Queen's Court. They controlled Normandy through Longueville, and Brittany through Vendôme, while Angers commanded the Loire. South of the Loire, Rohan in Poitou and Épernon in Angoulême joined hands with Mayenne in Guienne. There were hopes of Montmorency's accession carrying Languedoc ; and the Protestants were expected to be sympathetic. It was a promising rebellion—on paper ; and Richelieu did not or could not prevent it. But the King had the troops and the power, and he was not afraid to use them. He marched straight on Angers ; the forces of the confederates were crushed and scattered in a single battle near Ponts de Cé (August 7), and the whole house of cards fell to pieces. But Richelieu knew how insecure the position of the favourite was, and snatched victory from defeat. In the conference at which he represented his mistress he procured for her and for all concerned a complete amnesty with restitution of captured places, merely promising on her part friendly relations for the future with Luynes. Richelieu had not been far from the scaffold ; he emerged from his disasters with increased prestige, and the definite promise of nomination as Cardinal, which Luynes so long as he lived was careful to render nugatory. But the marriage between the niece of Richelieu and the nephew of the favourite indicated at least a desire for better relations between the pair.

The settlement of the dispute between the King and his mother set Louis free to intervene in Béarn. His ardour for military enterprise

had been stimulated by the rapid success of his recent expedition. He now marched into Béarn, where he met with no armed opposition. The fortress of Navarreias was surrendered without a blow. The edicts for the restitution of Church property were enforced. Béarn was united with Navarre, and both with the territories of the King of France. The Protestants were angry and alarmed, but no open resistance was attempted for the moment. However, in December, 1620, an unauthorised assembly of the Protestants met at La Rochelle to consider their grievances and propose measures for their redress. The Assembly determined to sit in permanence until their demands had been met. Their demands were presented, turning chiefly on the fulfilment of stipulations of the Edict of Nantes, but also requiring the restoration of former conditions in Béarn; they were, however, rejected by the King on the ground that the Assembly had no permission to meet. The delegates then proceeded to divide France into eight military districts, to each of which a leader was to be assigned. Their weakness then became apparent. Lesdiguières supported the Court. Bouillon would take no active part. The other leaders suggested were without credit or talent. Among all those named the Duke of Rohan alone had capacity, resolution, and zeal.

The Court was eager for war. In April the King took the field. Moving westwards he seized the Huguenot fortresses north and south of the Loire. St Jean d'Angely, Rohan's own command, resisted under the Duke of Soubise, his brother, for three weeks, and then surrendered. Meanwhile other armies under Condé in the centre, Mayenne in Guienne, and Épernon in Béarn, were operating; and everywhere the Huguenot strongholds were rapidly reduced. The first serious check which the royal arms received was at Montauban, where a regular siege was begun in August, 1621. Rohan had made all the preparations necessary to enable the town to withstand a siege, while he himself collected men and supplies for its relief in Languedoc and the Cevennes. His efforts were successful, and in November the siege was raised. This was a great blow to the credit of the Constable, who endeavoured to repair it by attacking the little place of Monheurt. The place was taken and burned; but two days later (December 14) Luynes died from a fever which he had contracted during the siege. An obstacle had been removed out of Richelieu's way; but he was still far from the attainment of that high power on which his ambitions were immovably fixed.

During the period which followed the death of Luynes, the King relied principally on the old Minister Sillery and his son Puisieux, who had won the support of Condé. But Richelieu took a definite step forwards when the Queen-Mother was admitted to the Council, where, acting under his advice, she observed an attitude of dignified reserve, taking advantage, however, of suitable opportunities to put forward propositions of policy, carefully framed and supported by argument,

in which the hand of Richelieu might be easily discerned. Yet another stage was marked in Richelieu's progress when the long-standing promise was fulfilled, and he became a Cardinal (September, 1622).

Meanwhile the war with the Protestants was renewed. Soubise was decisively beaten at the Isle of Riez in Poitou (April, 1622); the danger threatened by the advance of an army under Mansfeld into French territory was successfully avoided; and after a number of minor successes the siege of Montpellier was begun. Here royalist prosperity ceased; but both parties were ready for peace, and on October 9 a formal treaty between the King and the Protestants was concluded. Montpellier surrendered and its fortifications were demolished. Protestant assemblies were forbidden for the future. The exercise of both religions where it had been previously permitted was restored. Of the two hundred strongholds conceded to the Huguenots by the Edict of Nantes only two, Montauban and La Rochelle, were allowed to remain in their hands. The old Huguenot Lesdiguières saw that the game was up; and in July he had purchased the Constable's sword by reconciliation with the Church.

An inglorious war was now followed by a period of still more inglorious inaction. Sillery and Puisieux were the most incompetent of the old cabal. Burning questions were pending abroad, and the Ministers were men of protocols and not of action. At length the King grew weary of them, and tried a change. In January, 1624, La Vieuville, who had been introduced to the finance department by Sillery's influence, succeeded in ousting and replacing his patrons, and became Chief Minister. But his period of supreme power did not last long; he soon found himself forced to make advances to Richelieu, who was able to dictate his own terms. In April, 1624, the Cardinal entered the Council, and as Cardinal immediately claimed precedence over the other Ministers. In August La Vieuville was dismissed and imprisoned, and Richelieu became Chief Minister.

Many years later Richelieu, reviewing the course of his policy, declared that, when entering on his office, he promised his master to employ all his industry and all the authority bestowed upon him in destroying the Huguenot party, abasing the pride of the magnates, and raising the King's name to its proper place among the foreign Powers—a triple task, each part of which would tax the wasted resources of the kingdom. Nor could the several elements be isolated and separately handled. Discontented magnates would not sit idly by while the Government was at grips with the Huguenots. Those whom religion or ambition had made rebels could rely on help from the foreign enemies of France. External dangers pressed; and measures to meet them could not be postponed until France had restored order and authority at home. Fourteen years had passed since the death of Henry IV; and the policy of shifts and expedients had allowed trivial questions to become serious, and

serious questions to become dangerous. The House of Habsburg was united in its policy; its enemies were isolated, enfeebled, discouraged. Spanish troops held the line of the Rhine from Strassburg to Rees. The Rhenish Palatinate was in the hands of their Bavarian allies. The Dutch truce had expired in 1621, and the United Provinces were hard pressed from the Spanish Netherlands. The old allies of Henry IV looked with suspicion upon France, regarding her as the confederate of Spain. In Germany there was no military force to face the Habsburg coalition, except the levies of Mansfeld and his associates. The efforts of the opportunist Ministers of Louis had been devoted to curbing the ambitions of the Duke of Savoy, and had forced him to conclude the Peace of Asti in 1615 and that of Pavia in 1617. The marriage of Louis XIII's sister Christina to the Prince of Piedmont in 1619 had shown a desire to preserve this valuable friendship for France; but, in default of more material benefits, Charles Emmanuel was discontented with his French allies, and ready, if occasion offered, to make common cause with Spain. Most urgent of all was the question of the Grisons and the Valtelline, where all the currents of European policy met.

The valley of the Valtelline, as shown in a previous chapter, was under the control of the three Grison Leagues, whose alliance with France exposed them to the constant and watchful hostility of Spain. In 1620 a revolt of the Catholic inhabitants of the Valtelline gave Spain her opportunity; the valley was seized, the Grisons were invaded and the convention of Lindau was signed (1620-2). France again met force by negotiation, with the result that when Richelieu came to power the Valtelline fortresses had been entrusted to the custody of the Pope pending a settlement. But no peaceful settlement was likely to result which did not leave to Spain the right of passage through the Valtelline.

Richelieu at once began to strengthen the French position. Even before the fall of La Vieuville, aid in money and men had been promised to the Dutch. Mansfeld was subsidised; and an annual grant was promised to Christian IV of Denmark, on his taking up arms in Germany. All this was part of a deliberate policy of thwarting the Habsburgs without committing France to open intervention. It was part of the same scheme to detach Maximilian of Bavaria from the Habsburg coalition, and to win him for the French cause. Negotiations were at once set on foot to procure this result, which in spite of repeated failures Richelieu never seems to have despaired of attaining. A marriage was arranged between Henrietta Maria of France and the Prince of Wales, who, when the marriage was solemnised (May, 1625), had become King Charles I of England by the death of his father. In the Valtelline diplomatic methods were not by themselves sufficient. The Marquis de Coeuvres was accordingly sent to collect Swiss troops, and with their aid in the last months of 1624 he seized the fortresses of the Valtelline and drove out the papal garrisons. Richelieu could

now negotiate from the vantage-ground of possession. Savoy, Venice, and England were leagued with France. Desultory operations took place in Savoy and in the direction of Genoa. But the real campaign was waged on paper; and in May, 1626, under the influence of Pope Urban VIII, a treaty, the Treaty of Monzon, was concluded between France and Spain. The forts constructed by the Spaniards in the Valtelline were to be handed over to the Pope for destruction. The old treaties were revived whereby France recovered her sole right of passage through the valley. The treaty was favourable to French pretensions, but her allies were not even consulted before its signature; and Richelieu's first important act of policy left Venice, the Grisons, and especially Savoy, profoundly mistrustful and justly discontented.

Whatever other considerations may have hastened Richelieu's action in this matter, he had in fact obeyed the law of necessity. Troubles crowded upon him at home. The finances were in complete disorder. Temporary relief had been obtained by means of an enquiry into the conduct of the financiers, who were forced for fear of worse things to disgorge ten millions. But in June, 1626, when the Marquis d'Effiat took over the *Surintendance*, the revenue of the current year had already been spent, the revenue of the succeeding year had been largely anticipated, and a floating debt of twenty-seven millions demanded liquidation. In January, 1625, the Huguenots renewed the civil war by seizing the port of Blavet in Brittany with the royal ships that lay there. Soubise, with the fleet thus acquired and the navy of La Rochelle, ranged the western coast and intercepted commerce. Rohan at Castres was raising troops. Montauban was in revolt. La Rochelle loudly demanded the destruction of Fort Louis, a fortress intended to hold its harbour in check, whose demolition, as the citizens alleged, had been informally promised at the time of the Peace of Montpellier. Against the navy of Soubise Richelieu collected English and Dutch vessels, which he manned with French seamen. By their help Montmorency was enabled to scatter the forces of Soubise (September, 1625), and to seize the islands of Ré and Oleron, which commanded the harbour of La Rochelle. Soubise was forced to seek a refuge in England. The districts about Montauban and other rebellious places were ruthlessly devastated. But English and Dutch opinion resented the use against Protestants of the vessels lent to France; the ships were recalled; and Richelieu was fain to use the good offices of the English ambassadors to conclude a treaty with the Huguenots (February, 1626). Little was conceded, but the English were thereby in some sort constituted protectors of the Protestants in France.

This danger past, Richelieu thought it opportune to vindicate his own authority by a vigorous demonstration. The conspiracy which he chose to discover centred about the Duke of Anjou, the King's brother. The Government intended to marry this Prince to Mademoiselle de Montpensier; the Prince himself was disinclined to the match; and he

found friends and supporters among the discontented magnates. This attempt at opposition to the Cardinal's will was represented as a dangerous, even as a murderous, enterprise. The Prince's governor, the Marshal d'Ornano, was thrown into prison, where he died. The Duke of Vendôme and his brother, natural sons of Henry IV, were seized and imprisoned. A young noble, Chalais, who under the influence of Madame de Chevreuse had taken part in the cabal, was brought to trial and executed. Madame de Chevreuse was driven into exile in Lorraine. The Duke of Anjou was forced into the marriage originally proposed, and received the title and appanage of Orleans. It was proved that opposition was a crime, and intrigue a game dangerous even for the greatest. Gaston of Orleans made his peace in characteristic fashion by betraying his friends, but the Count of Soissons had to retire to Turin for safety. The Assembly of Notables, summoned in December, 1626, was inspired to propose new measures against rebellion. No communication was to be allowed between French subjects and foreign ambassadors; even the Nuncio was not excepted from this ruling. The mere fact of taking up arms was to be sufficient cause for forfeiture of all offices. Seditious libel, a form of literature which the Cardinal himself had patronised when in opposition, was now to be severely punished. No one was to be permitted to collect arms or munitions or to levy funds from the King's subjects without authority. These proposals were gladly received and speedily registered as edicts. The Cardinal's position was further strengthened by the suppression of the office of Admiral of France, compensation being paid to the Duke of Montmorency, and by the creation in Richelieu's favour of a new office of Superintendent of Navigation and Commerce. With this charge the functions of the Duke of Vendôme as Admiral for Brittany were united. On the death of Lesdiguières in September, 1626, the office of Constable was also suppressed, and thus the supreme direction of military forces devolved also upon the Minister. Even favourites were not tolerated; and Barradas, a young gentleman on whom the King's too conspicuous favour had rested, was driven from the Court.

Richelieu had composed his difficulties with Spain; and in April, 1627, a treaty of alliance was concluded with this Power, in view of the strained relations between England and France. The secret conditions of the English marriage had proved impracticable. Charles and Buckingham were not strong enough to protect the Roman Catholics in England. Trouble arose between the royal pair, which resulted, in August, 1626, in the ignominious expulsion of the Queen's French household. The Parliamentary situation in England made some action on behalf of the French Protestants a desirable political move; and Buckingham's own wounded pride prompted a similar policy. As an envoy to the Court of Paris at the time of Charles' marriage, the

existence of his party, was not strong enough to take a vigorous offensive. Such forces as remained to the Protestants were concentrated in the district between Toulouse and the Rhone. Partly by persuasion, partly by conviction, partly by compulsion, Montauban, Nîmes, Uzé, Castres, Milhau, Privas, besides a number of lesser towns, still held for the Huguenots; and the strong defensive position of the Cevennes afforded a place of muster and equipment, an arsenal, and a final retreat. But Rohan's authority was precarious, and he failed in an attempt to surprise Montpellier. On the other hand, Condé, who had become a firm adherent of the Cardinal, had received the promise of Rohan's confiscated estates, and commanded the King's troops in this district, could not or would not force the Protestants to a serious engagement; and operations were confined to petty sieges and systematic devastation of Protestant districts, with occasional reprisals on the part of the Huguenots. When La Rochelle had surrendered, the suppression of the remnants of Protestant liberty was no longer the most urgent task that demanded the Cardinal's attention.

On December 26, 1627, Duke Vincent II of Mantua had died, leaving no nearer male heir than Charles di Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers, a Frenchman by education and sympathy. Vincent before his death, acting under French influence, left his duchy by will to Charles, and married the daughter of his brother Francis, who had died in 1613, to Charles' son, the Duke of Rethel. Charles at once took possession of his duchy. But Spain was not willing to acquiesce in the establishment of a French prince in Italy. Other claimants were encouraged to put forward their claims; the Duke of Savoy was glad to have the chance of reviving his pretensions to Montferrat; the Emperor refused his investiture and formally sequestered the duchy; and Savoy and Spain, acting in concert, occupied Montferrat, with the exception of the important fortress of Casale, to which Gonzalez de Cordoba, the Governor of Milan, laid siege. So long as La Rochelle held out, France was unable to act, except by diplomacy; and force was needed. But Casale outlasted the Protestant capital; and, so soon as La Rochelle had fallen, Louis and Richelieu determined if possible to save Casale. The Duke of Savoy was requested to allow passage for the French troops; he bargained, but did not conclude; and on March 6, 1629, the French army crossed the frontier in his despite and seized the town of Susa. The Duke of Savoy then came to terms and made an agreement which allowed the French to relieve Casale. The Spaniards retired, and the immediate object of the expedition was achieved. But much still remained to be settled, and the French retained Susa as a guarantee. A league was formed between France, Venice, Mantua, and Savoy for the defence of Italy; the hands of France were freed by the conclusion of peace with England (April 24, 1629); Louis returned to France; and the Cardinal remained for a while at Susa with a considerable force

to watch over the Duke of Savoy, whose intentions were highly dubious, and to guard the interests of the Duke of Mantua.

The King was now at liberty to deal with the Huguenots. In his despair, Rohan had been forced to appeal to the enemies of France; English promises had proved delusive; and, about the time when England made peace with France, the King of Spain consented to accept Rohan's offer of service and promised him an annual subsidy. But the promise came too late. Operations began by the siege of Privas, at which the Cardinal joined the King, having left the Marshal de Créquy in command at Susa; and the conclusion of peace with England was announced (May). Deprived of this last hope, the Huguenots might yet have sold their liberty dear. But discord was rife in their party, and resistance was irresolute. Privas surrendered, and was pillaged and burnt contrary to the capitulation. The fortresses of the Cevennes were soon in the King's hands. Rohan was forced to treat. On June 28 peace was made; the Huguenots submitted; the fortifications of their remaining strongholds were razed; and the last remnants of independent military power given up. There could never again be a militant Protestant party in France. Rohan was treated with indulgence; the property of his family was restored; but he himself was sent into exile at Venice. On August 20 the Cardinal made his triumphal entry into Montauban, and the wars of religion in France were formally concluded. Toleration for Protestant worship was maintained; the *chambres mi-parties* of the Edict of Nantes continued to sit; but the conversion of the Huguenots, which had already begun, proceeded hereafter more rapidly, and was the object of the efforts of numerous Capuchin missions, in which Father Joseph took great interest.

At no time in his career did Richelieu manifest greater qualities of resolution, promptness, and resource than during the years which immediately preceded the landing of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany (June, 1630). While La Rochelle still held out, the Cardinal was preparing for an extension of the field of his activity and meditating plans of attack, direct and insidious, on the Habsburg power, then at its height. When La Rochelle had fallen, though armed rebellion was still on foot in Languedoc, Casale was hastily relieved. This accomplished, the Huguenots were taken in hand without delay. Meanwhile Christian IV of Denmark had been reduced to negotiating for the peace which he concluded in May, 1629. It was impossible for Richelieu to prevent this defection; but he felt that its consequences must be by some means counteracted. Charnacé, who was sent as an envoy to influence the peace negotiations, was also charged to visit Bavaria and endeavour to detach Maximilian from the Habsburg coalition, and finally to mediate if possible a truce between Sweden and Poland. This last part of his mission was successful (September, 1629); and the way was thus cleared for a new and more dangerous enemy

of the Habsburgs in Germany. While this move was maturing, and while the final operations against the Huguenots were proceeding, the temporary settlement of the Mantuan affair had broken down. The Duke of Savoy did not fulfil his engagements, seeing better prospects of gain in the Habsburg alliance; the Imperial troops, freed by the favourable turn of events in Germany, entered the Valtelline in May, 1629. In October Spinola was in Milan, and shortly afterwards he led the Spanish troops into Montferrat, while Imperial forces invaded the Mantuan territory. Casale was besieged by Spinola, Mantua by Wallenstein's lieutenant Colalto; and the Duke of Savoy occupied his allotted share of Montferrat. The resistance of Casale and Mantua gave Richelieu a scanty respite, and enabled him to deal with urgent troubles at home.

No factor in Richelieu's career is more difficult to estimate than the exact influence of Louis' character on the Minister's policy. Louis was not a nonentity; he had a large share of obstinacy, his determination once formed had to be respected, his moods were variable and dangerous. Possessed of good average ability, some industry, and a sense of kingly duty, he could be convinced and influenced, but he could never be neglected. He appears to have long resisted the introduction of Richelieu into the ministry for fear of his commanding personality. To the end of his days he chafed under Richelieu's predominance. But he loved military glory and success; he hated to feel the burden of his functions pressing on his capacity. So long as Richelieu provided the King with success, so long as he made the burden seem light, so long as he showed him the way and found for him the means to meet every difficulty, so long in fact as Richelieu was indispensable—so long he was safe. But, had events ever proved too strong for the Cardinal, had he ever failed to find the solution of the enigma, the magic for dispersing danger, the way to a conspicuous and intelligible end, then his day was over, his life was forfeited. For such a man could not be allowed to return to private life; he was too dangerous. Meanwhile Louis regarded him as a schoolboy regards his schoolmaster, with a certain awe, with a certain dislike—above all, it may be guessed, with a certain humiliation as one who was greater than the King.

The longer the Cardinal's ascendancy lasted, the safer he became by proved success, by indispensable competence, by use and wont. But the King's moods were always to be feared. The Cardinal had seen him with his favourites, exacting as a woman, inconstant, petulant, intolerable. He was careful not to become a favourite, but to preserve a certain distance and austerity, to avoid the friction of intimate relations. But yet he could never feel secure against a sudden act of temper, a momentary betrayal. His rivals helped him here. Their incompetence was conspicuous, their exactions harassing, their claims humiliating.

had climbed to power by her aid; he intended to wield it alone. Moreover, there were differences of policy. The Queen-Mother represented the Catholic party, with whom the interests of religion came first. Richelieu followed the tradition of Henry IV, and with him the interests of the State were at all times paramount. This difference began to be marked from the first. The English marriage, the temporising treatment of the Protestants, the Dutch alliance—these showed the spirit of the Cardinal. The Queen-Mother, after one knows not what scenes and recriminations with her former favourite, broke definitely with him, and threw herself into the arms of the Cardinal de Bérulle, the founder of the Oratory, the leader of the Catholic faction. From the time of the siege of La Rochelle, her enmity could never be ignored. Fortunately for Richelieu, Mary de' Medici was neither practical nor tactful. She could not show an alternative to his policy, or find a substitute for his guidance. She wearied the King with her complaints, her assertion of maternal authority, her tempers, and her reproaches. But she was a danger.

Gaston of Orleans was another danger, to the King no less than to the Minister. Louis was childless as yet; his wife's hopes of offspring had been twice frustrated. His own excellent health had been ruined by harassing medical treatment. Gaston, as his heir, looked forward to the succession, and meanwhile made opposition after the fashion of heirs-apparent. In himself he was not a dangerous opponent, and the preference shown to him by the Queen-Mother weakened their joint influence. Dissolute, inconstant, faithless, he had a name and a position, and could hazard rebellion without risking his life; nor had his followers yet realised that he could not and did not care to confer similar immunity upon them. In 1627 he had lost his first wife in child-bed. He turned his eyes on a Mantuan Princess, resident at the French Court. This match did not please the Queen-Mother, who disliked the Mantuan House; and, while the King and Cardinal were in Piedmont (1629), she thought it necessary to imprison Mary di Gonzaga. Foiled in his whim, Gaston thought to take revenge upon the Cardinal. He intrigued and gathered adherents; and in September, 1629, he left the Court and retired to Lorraine, whose Duke had already shown some willingness to take advantage of the difficulties of France, and to join her enemies. Time which should have been given to preparations for intervention in Italy had to be spent in quieting this malcontent. He was at length persuaded to accept the government of Orleans, and an increase of pension. In December the Cardinal was able to turn his mind to the Italian war, though Gaston was not formally reconciled to his brother until April, 1630.

The Cardinal's personal supervision was needed to forward the lagging military preparations. The army was ready in March, 1630; after negotiations had failed the Cardinal led it into Piedmont; on March 25,

by an unexpected stroke, Pinerolo was seized, and the approaches to this important fortress were then occupied in force. In May the King invaded Savoy. Chambéry was taken, and the whole of Savoy was occupied by the end of June. In July his forces passed Mont Cenis, and joined the army of Piedmont. On July 26 Charles Emmanuel died; his son and successor had married a French Princess, and might be expected to be more favourable to French projects. But on July 18 Mantua was occupied by the Imperial forces, while Spinola had occupied the town of Casale and was pressing the citadel hard. Complicated negotiations followed, during the course of which Spinola died. Father Joseph had been sent to the Diet of Ratisbon (June, 1630) to influence the Electors against the proposed election of Ferdinand's son as King of the Romans. In this he was successful; but as a proof of good faith he agreed to a treaty dealing with the Mantuan question (October 13). This treaty stipulated that France should give no aid, direct or indirect, to the enemies of the Emperor, and Richelieu rejected it as made in excess of powers; eventually, by the intervention of Giulio Mazarini, the papal envoy, an arrangement was made by which Casale was to be evacuated by the Spaniards, while the French troops were withdrawn from the citadel. The last provision was secretly evaded, and four hundred Frenchmen were retained as garrison in the pay of the Duke of Mantua. The French troops in Savoy and Piedmont remained to secure the restitution of Mantua, and the formal investiture of Duke Charles.

During this lull the relations between Richelieu and the Queen-Mother reached their crisis. In September Louis had fallen seriously ill, and it appears that during his illness his wife and mother had persuaded him to hold out hopes of the Cardinal's dismissal. On November 10, 1630, the Queen-Mother and Richelieu met in the King's presence. A violent scene followed with no decisive result; but when on the following day the King retired to Versailles the Cardinal's enemies were convinced that his fall was certain. However, whether spontaneously or by arrangement, the Cardinal followed him, and, before the “Day of Dupes” was ended, was completely restored to favour. On this day the Cardinal's ultimate victory became certain, but a final blow was still needed. Meanwhile the *Garde des Sceaux*, Michel de Marillac, who had lent himself to the cabal, was dismissed and exiled. His brother, Marshal Louis de Marillac, was arrested in the midst of the army of Piedmont, in which he held a command, brought to trial for malversation, condemned, and executed. No plot against the Cardinal was allowed to pass without a victim.

In the course of 1631, by treaties concluded at Cherasco, the affairs of Mantua were brought to a satisfactory settlement. The Duke of Mantua received his investiture and recovered his duchy. The Duke of Savoy received a small territorial compensation. Montferrat was

evacuated, and the French troops were withdrawn from Savoy and Piedmont. France, however, retained Pinerolo and its approaches—the gateway of Italy²—by arrangement with the Duke of Savoy, who became her ally. This favourable settlement of a question, in which the honour and credit even more than the material interests of France were involved, was an indirect result of Gustavus' successes in Germany; for events at home would have prevented Richelieu from acting vigorously beyond the Alps, had his opponents in northern Italy been in a position to raise serious difficulties.

In January, 1631, Gaston took up his mother's quarrel, and acting in concert with her left the Court for Orleans. Richelieu determined to proceed to extremities. The King left Paris for Compiègne, and ordered his mother to follow him thither. On arriving at Compiègne, she was asked to sign a written engagement to give no countenance to opponents of the established authorities. On her refusal, the King sent orders for her to retire to Moulins. This she declined to do; and, after remaining for some months under supervision at Compiègne, she escaped (July) to the Spanish Netherlands. Here she received honourable entertainment, and remained for eight years. She then removed to Holland, and afterwards to England, and died in 1641 at Cologne, to the last a bitter though impotent enemy of the man whom she had raised to power. Meanwhile the King had moved towards Orleans (March, 1631); and on his approach Gaston once more fled to Lorraine, where he remained for some months courting the Duke's sister, Margaret. A warfare of manifestos and pamphlets followed; and the *Parlement* of Paris, which protested against the summary condemnation of Gaston's adherents without form of trial, was made to feel that no constitutional or legal safeguards could prevail against the King's will. But other measures were also needed; and in December the King was at Metz with an army; while Gustavus, having in his victorious progress reached Mainz, was said to have thought of invading Lorraine, whose Duke had raised men for the Emperor's service and had allowed Imperial troops to occupy and fortify Moyenvic in the bishopric of Metz. But France reserved to herself the right of coercing her neighbour, and invading Lorraine drove the garrison from Moyenvic. The Duke hastened to make peace (January 6, 1632), ceding Marsal to France; but on January 3 Gaston had been secretly married to Margaret of Lorraine. He was not, however, safe in the proximity of a French army, and was thus obliged to leave his bride and join his mother in the Netherlands.

In June, 1632, he was again in Lorraine, whence he entered France with a scanty force, and marched through Burgundy, Bourbonnais, Auvergne, Rouergue, to Languedoc, where at length he found an important supporter in the Duke of Montmorency (August). The arrival of Gaston coincided with an injudicious attempt of the Cardinal

of all local contributions out of the hands of the Estates by the establishment in the province of the royal officers known as *élus*. The Estates had already refused to accept his arbitrary measures; and Montmorency, who was previously pledged to Gaston, must have hoped to carry his province with him. A few notables joined the rebellion, and among them five Bishops; but on the whole, in spite of provocation, the province remained quiet; and Montmorency brought to Gaston practically no more than his own paid military following.

The enterprise of Gaston had been precipitated by the knowledge that the King was once more advancing upon Lorraine. In June, Louis had put his army in motion. The places which he passed on his route opened their gates; the forces which he met were dispersed; and on June 23 he was before Nancy. The Duke once more hastened to make peace, surrendered Stenay and Jametz, and his disputed claim to the County of Clermont. The King did not need to take the field himself against his brother. Schomberg and La Force were detached from the army of Lorraine to keep the rebels in check; and, while the King was preparing more substantial forces, Gaston's little army came into collision with that of Schomberg near Castelnaudary. Montmorency, charging rashly and almost alone, was wounded and captured; and Gaston's forces at once began to disperse. He was admitted to terms, renounced all his foreign alliances and the cause of his mother, abandoned all his followers to the King's mercy, and on these conditions received a contemptuous pardon. Montmorency and the unfortunate gentlemen taken in arms were left to pay the price. The trial, condemnation, and execution of the generous Duke, the head of one of the most illustrious Houses of France, was a merciless act of policy, well calculated to strike terror into all rebels, and to expose the character of Gaston in its true light.

On the news of Montmorency's death, which he had not attempted to prevent, Gaston took fright for himself. The Lorraine marriage, which he had denied, was a dangerous matter. If a Montmorency's head could fall on the scaffold, even the King's brother might not be safe; he fled once more to Flanders (November, 1632), where he remained for nearly two years. His despicable intrigues fill a larger place in history than his character or capacity deserves; for it was not until his power to harm had been completely destroyed that Richelieu felt free to develop a vigorous course of action abroad; and his relations with Lorraine determined in great measure the line which that action took.

The death of Montmorency and the third flight of Gaston were quickly followed by the news of Gustavus' death, November 16, 1632. His brief career in Germany is treated elsewhere in this volume; so long as it lasted, European events remained almost entirely out of the Cardinal's control. Richelieu had facilitated Gustavus' expedition by

promoting the Polish truce; partly with a view to furthering it, he had rejected the treaty negotiated by Father Joseph at Ratisbon; and above all, he had, in the Treaty of Bärwalde (January, 1631) by a promise of financial support, endeavoured to control the progress of the conqueror. He had his own scheme, which he pressed upon Gustavus: to detach the great Catholic States of Germany, and especially Bavaria, from the Habsburg alliance; to procure for them, by his influence with Sweden, recognition and respect for their neutrality; and thus to discharge the whole weight of Gustavus' attack upon the power of Austria. By extracting from Gustavus the promise that the Catholic religion should be maintained (where previously established) in the places he might conquer, the Cardinal hoped to secure that the war should not become a war of religion. But in all this he achieved but a limited success. Of the Catholic Princes only the Elector of Trier, already intimately attached to France, accepted the French protection; parties ranged themselves almost entirely on religious lines; the heaviest blows fell, not on the Emperor but on the Elector of Bavaria, whom Richelieu was specially anxious to save; and the new danger brought the incalculable Wallenstein back to authority and to fresh prestige. On the whole the redistribution of power consequent on Gustavus' successes was beneficial to France; and she found profit, especially in Italy, Lorraine, and Trier, from his intervention; while her principal adversaries, Spain and Austria, were correspondingly weakened and hampered. Nevertheless, Richelieu must have been relieved by the death of his great ally, as by the extinction of a mighty force whose action he could neither control nor predict.

Gradually Richelieu had been gaining strength. The Protestants had been crushed in France; his enemies at home had learnt his power, and dreaded his implacable resentment; his action abroad, cautious and reserved at first in the matter of the Valtelline and the Mantuan succession, had become gradually more confident and effective: from the death of Gustavus he became more and more certainly the arbiter of Europe. His will fanned the flames of war from the Oder to the Ebro. Dangling before his deluded allies the prospects of a general peace, in which all interests should be secured, ceaselessly impressing on all concerned that a separate arrangement could be neither profitable nor trustworthy, he gradually wore down the strength of the Habsburgs and recovered the ground lost in twenty years of irresolution or of impotence. His death found his work still uncompleted; but he left a successor to pursue his tradition; and the Peace of Westphalia was really of his making.

On the death of Gustavus it must have been clear to Richelieu that open war with one or both of the Habsburg Powers could not long be postponed. He was anxious, however, to defer it as long as possible. Internal troubles were not yet completely removed. The Queen-Mother

and the Heir-Apparent, though in exile, were in exile at a hostile Court. In 1633 the Cardinal fell seriously ill; and during his illness his creature, the *Garde des Sceaux*, Charles d'Aubespine, Marquis of Châteauneuf, inspired by his mistress, Madame de Chevreuse, and in suspicious intimacy with Anne of Austria, ventured to lay his plans for the Cardinal's succession. The Cardinal recovered, and Châteauneuf expiated his temerity by ten years of imprisonment. The resources of France were considerable; but her military strength was undeveloped. Her armies and her generals were ill-matched with the seasoned warriors and experienced commanders of Spain and Austria, trained in incessant warfare through many years. Indirect attacks must be preferred so long as indirect attacks would serve the purpose. Meanwhile all efforts must be made to strengthen the French frontier towards the Rhine.

In every direction Richelieu sent out his envoys, and his envoys served him well. His old plan of separating the Princes of the Catholic League from the House of Austria, of inducing them to stand neutral in the coming struggle, and the Protestant confederates to recognise their neutrality, was pushed once more, and failed once more owing to the jealousies, animosities, and suspicions of the rival parties. But Feuquières concluded on behalf of France a fresh treaty with Sweden, safeguarding as before the interests of the Catholic religion so far as a treaty could secure them, confining the assistance of France to a pecuniary subsidy, and engaging the Swedish Power to continue the war (April, 1633). At Heilbronn the Protestant Alliance was reorganised, with Oxenstierna, the Swedish Chancellor, at its head, and measures were taken for a vigorous campaign. Charnacé was able to persuade the United Provinces to continue the war with the Spanish Netherlands, without pledging France to direct and immediate intervention, which Richelieu was prepared to offer in the last resort.

Towards the Rhine, Richelieu offered to take over Mainz and the other fortresses on the left bank then in possession of the Swedes. But this was refused. Similar proposals were put forward with regard to Philippsburg and Elsass, and were similarly abandoned. His agents worked among the petty Princes on both banks of the Rhine, endeavouring to create a Rhenish confederacy under French protection. Already at the end of 1631 the Elector of Trier had placed his territories under French protection; in June, 1632, French troops had entered the Electorate; in August they drove the Spaniards from his capital and took over Coblenz from the Swedes. Hopes of similar action on the part of the Elector of Cologne were destined to be disappointed. The attitude of Lorraine was still hostile; the question of Gaston's marriage was still unsettled; and in 1633 France determined to support her allies by action in this direction. The Duke of Lorraine was summoned to do homage for his duchy of Bar, which he held of the crown of France; and when he declined to risk his person at the Court of his enemies, the

Parlement of Paris declared the duchy forfeit; in August, 1633, the French army advanced into Lorraine; and in September the Duke was forced to renounce all hostile alliances, to place Nancy in the King's hands, and to consent to the dissolution of his sister's marriage. The Princess herself escaped to the Netherlands, where she joined her husband. Duke Charles in January, 1634, resigned his duchy to his brother Cardinal Nicolas Francis, and took the field as a soldier of fortune in the service of the Emperor. The new Duke, to secure his rights, granted himself the necessary dispensations, divested himself of his orders, and married his cousin, the Princess Claude. Hereupon both he and his wife were arrested, but in April, 1634, they escaped and made good their flight to Florence. Thus of all the ducal family only the Duchess Nicole, the first discarded wife of Charles, was left in Lorraine, which was occupied and governed by the French.

There remained Gaston's marriage. The Pope did not favour the dissolution; and accordingly the *Parlement* of Paris was called upon to declare the civil contract null and void. This was effected in due course, on the ground that the heir to the throne could not contract a legal marriage without the consent of his natural guardian the King. There was still the sacrament; and it was argued that, sacrament standing to contract as form to matter, the form could not subsist without the matter in which it was inherent. The contract being void, the sacrament was therefore non-existent. On such grounds the decision of the French clergy assembled in Paris, July, 1635, that such marriages were illicit, was held to conclude the question; and no more regular dissolution was obtained. Meanwhile, towards the end of 1634, the Duke of Orleans, fatigued by the impotence and humiliation of his position in Flanders, where he had actually been persuaded to conclude a formal treaty with Spain, took flight and returned to France, and was reconciled to his brother, abandoning his wife with as little compunction as he showed in abandoning his friends to the scaffold or to the Bastille.

The military events of the year 1633 were on the whole favourable to the allies of France. Not so those of the following year. The negotiations which were opened during the summer of 1633 for the defection of Wallenstein and his adhesion to France, were frustrated in February, 1634, by his assassination. The allies suffered a series of reverses and finally a crowning disaster at Nördlingen (September 6). Thereupon Oxenstierna at once agreed to the cession to France of all the positions for which she had long been pressing, and in particular of Philippsburg, Colmar, and Schlettstadt. The French thus held a fairly continuous defensive position far in advance of their actual frontier. In the south the Bishop of Basel had placed his territories under French protection; and to the west of Basel the little principality of Montbéliard (Mümpelgard) had been similarly handed over on behalf of Würtemberg. In Elsass the French held Colmar and

Schlettstadt; in Strassburg they were endeavouring to establish connexions, further north they had occupied a number of positions, of which Hagenau and Zabern were the chief. In the Palatinate and the neighbouring bishopric of Speier they were masters of Kaiserslautern, Speier, Philippsburg, and Mannheim. Further north they garrisoned the Elector of Trier's fortress of Ehrenbreitstein.

Thus by the end of 1634 they had grasped a great block of Imperial territory, from Basel in the south and Coblenz in the north to Lorraine in the west. Yet war had not been declared. But, after keen bargaining at Paris and Worms and the passage of envoys to and fro, among whom was the famous Hugo Grotius, in April, 1635, a treaty was arranged at Compiègne by Oxenstierna in person, binding France to an immediate rupture, and the allies to conclude no separate peace. In February of the same year an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded at Paris between France and the United Provinces, providing for the joint invasion and partition of the Spanish Netherlands. The time for elusions and evasions was past. If the coalition were to be maintained, it could only be maintained by the vigorous intervention of France. Saxony, Brandenburg, the principal Protestant Princes of Germany, and the chief Imperial towns, were preparing to make their peace; and when the Treaty of Prague was published (May 31) and was afterwards adopted by the chief part of Protestant Germany, it only recorded results that had been long foreseen. Imperial troops had surprised Philippsburg (January 23-4); on March 26 the Elector of Trier and his capital fell into the hands of the Spaniards; this last incident supplied the pretext for the decision which had been already made; and on May 19 war was solemnly declared by France against Spain. Open war with the House of Austria was not declared until 1638; but meanwhile hostilities with that Power were hardly less effective because they were indirect and officially ignored.

Thus were the ulterior designs of Henry IV put into effect. The simultaneous attack upon the possessions of the House of Habsburg in all parts of Europe, the wide-spread alliances, the universal conflagration—these Henry had dreamed; they now became a reality. It is said and may be partly true that Richelieu initiated and prolonged the war in order that his master might be saddled with responsibilities which only the Minister could enable him to endure. It is true that, throughout his long career, the maintenance of his own precarious position was for Richelieu a prime care, that it assumed with him the importance rather of an end than of a means. It is the fact that, so long as the war lasted, Richelieu was or seemed indispensable to Louis. Yet little motives never cause, though they may occasion, great results. A spark may fire a powder-mine, but the powder must have been prepared and laid. The great Habsburg war was the inevitable result of Richelieu's policy, of the

policy of those who preceded him. The Spanish alliance of the Regency, the weakness of Luynes, not less than the half-veiled hostilities hitherto conducted by Richelieu himself, all led to this issue. Dynastically the war was a new phase in the blood feud that began on the bridge of Montereau and was fought out at Morat, Nancy, Pavia, and in all the chancelleries of Europe. But still more fundamental as a predisposing cause were those blind and unconscious forces that impel nations to complete their own existence, to achieve their own realisation, to hurl down whatever opposes or threatens to encumber, to sacrifice all else that is most precious to the attainment of self-determined organic unity. National forces were working—not only in France—for the unification of Germany, for the centralisation of the Iberian peninsula, even for the consolidation of Italy. But in the countries swayed by the Habsburg coalition the racial impulses were less clear, the national consciousness less distinct. And the dynastic bond which united them was wholly artificial; it expressed no common national feeling; it could only exploit, it could not satisfy, national aspirations; even in Austria and Castile the Habsburg rule had something of the character of an alien domination. Thus Spain was sacrificed to Milan and Naples, and above all to the Netherlands. Germany was sacrificed to Austria, and Austria to the dream of a Habsburg supremacy in Europe. Louis XIII, Richelieu, and their successors, were fighting in a more legitimate cause, the cause of a national kingdom. To this, more than to any wit of statesman or skill of soldiers, such success as they achieved is due.

This becomes the more clear when we observe the very moderate measure of wisdom which inspired the counsels and the action of France in this momentous period. Of diplomacy, indeed, Richelieu was a supreme master. Even in Italy he contrived to assemble a respectable coalition of Savoy, Mantua, and Parma, to confront the predominant Power. In Germany it was his object, we cannot doubt, to prolong the war. This he could only do by the aid of Sweden. Sweden was invaluable to him; yet he bought her aid at the paltry price of a million *livres* a year, to which was subsequently added a small contingent of troops. Sweden was threatened on the east and the west by the jealous Powers of Poland and Denmark. He persuaded Poland to refuse the tempting offers made to her, and to conclude a twenty-six years' truce with Sweden (1635). He kept Denmark quiet, and amused her King with the futile duties of a self-important mediator. Sweden was anxious for peace, and would have accepted it at any time if the possession of Pomerania, or perhaps a substantial part of it, had been guaranteed to her. He succeeded in persuading her that no terms which Austria could offer would be secure unless they were safeguarded by a general peace, in which the interests of all the enemies of Habsburg domination should receive due recognition.

In order to preserve the illusion that such a settlement was within

view, he maintained, from 1636 onwards, continuous negotiations for peace. In his manœuvres to render these negotiations abortive, he was materially aided by the real unwillingness of Spain and Austria to conclude a general peace, or to negotiate with the hostile or unfriendly Powers as a coalition. But he also used every weapon that the diplomatic armoury contains. Negotiations require preliminaries; preliminaries raise questions which may seem formal although they are really vital. Such was the question of safe-conducts for the plenipotentiaries of the various Powers to be represented at the projected Congresses. Under this head Richelieu contrived to raise the questions of the recognition of Dutch independence, of the rights of the Duchess of Savoy as guardian of her infant son, of the rights in Hesse-Cassel of the Landgrave's widow, of the status of the parties to the Treaty of Prague, and, more important still, of the right of the several Estates of the Empire to negotiate on a footing of independence with the King of Hungary and Bohemia, who happened to be also the Emperor. He also made capital out of such objections as could be urged against the validity of the election of Ferdinand III. The discussion of such matters kept the diplomats of Europe at work till 1641, when at length a compromise on these points was reached, and it was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should assemble and negotiate with those of the Emperor, France and her allies at Münster, Sweden and hers at Osnabrück. In the interval he had persuaded Sweden, in 1636, 1638, and 1641, to renew her agreement against a separate peace. The first of the compacts was so precarious that it never received ratification; the last was not for a term of years, but until the end of the war. He had the less difficulty in persuading Sweden to keep her engagements, since it gradually became clear that France desired at any rate no separate peace. When Sweden demanded as the price of her alliance that France should guarantee the Swedish conquests in Pomerania, Richelieu, or d'Avaux on his behalf, cleverly countered by requesting a similar guarantee of the French conquests in Lorraine. No more was heard of the inconvenient suggestion. When propositions were made for a general truce, France insisted on the condition of *uti possidetis*, and refused to maintain the full war subsidy during any period of truce. By these means the coalition was preserved; Swedish arms kept the Emperor and his German allies fully occupied; and the victories of Banér and Torstensson redounded to the profit of France.

With the United Provinces similar methods were employed; but here the difficulty was less, since Spain would not consent to the recognition of Dutch independence—the indispensable condition of peace in this quarter.

But in the sphere of military operations far less ability was displayed. France was acting on interior lines, from a consolidated territory, against the scattered possessions of Spain. Sea-power was thus a momentous

factor; and France had created, by the efforts of the Cardinal, an imposing navy. Yet for two years (1635—7) France acquiesced in the occupation by Spain of the two islands of Lérins, which blocked the French Mediterranean trade. Her naval achievements were confined to victories off Guetaria (near San Sebastian), August 28, 1638; off Genoa on September 2 of the same year; and at Cadiz in 1640. None of these actions was of capital importance; and the great victories were left to Van Tromp and the Dutch. No substantial use was made of the naval superiority which these engagements seem to show. The victory of Guetaria did not prevent the French defeat at Fuenterrabia. The navy protected the land operations in Roussillon and Catalonia; but little else can be placed to its credit.

On land immense efforts were made; five, six, or seven separate armies were kept up; some 150,000 men were constantly in the field; money was ruthlessly extorted and recklessly spent. But the general conduct of operations reveals no bold offensive, no concentration on a skilfully chosen objective. At the outset, indeed, Richelieu contemplated the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands in cooperation with the Dutch, and with the aid of disaffected subjects of the King of Spain. The Dutch were slow and cautious, and their conception of war was a series of laborious sieges. Had they been left to make war after their own fashion, they would yet have effected valuable diversions; while a more enterprising enemy might have won the lion's share of the spoil. But, after the failure of the first campaign French efforts in this direction, though costly and exhausting, were never pushed with determination. In 1636, indeed, France was hard put to it to defend her northern frontiers. French activity had been transferred to Franche Comté and the Rhinelands. Taking advantage of the opportunity thus offered, united Spanish and Imperial forces in July invaded Picardy, captured La Capelle, Le Catelet, Roye, Corbie, and threatened Paris itself. In due time they retreated, and the fortresses were sooner or later recovered. Thenceforward Picardy was never without a strong covering force; the expense of a vigorous offensive would have been little greater. But the record of warfare on this side carries little to the credit of the French. The siege of St Omer in 1638 was a disastrous failure. The conquests of Cateau Cambrésis and Landrecies in 1637, of Hesdin in 1639, of Arras in 1640, after the Spaniards had been driven from the seas by the Dutch, and of Bapaume in 1641, are all that the French had to show for seven years of laborious campaigning in the north.

The retention of Lorraine was no doubt a point of prime importance in the Cardinal's scheme. Yet the treaty with Duke Charles in 1641 seems to show that Richelieu hardly hoped to retain it at the end of the war. And the places which were necessary to cover it, Philippsburg, Mainz, Coblenz, Trier, were allowed to fall into and remain in the

enemies' hands. In this connexion the possession of Elsass was of vital consequence. But its acquisition was due to luck and diplomacy rather than to the French arms. Bernard of Weimar and his German army were taken into French pay at an annual cost of 4,000,000 *livres*. His victories in the Breisgau (1638) and his capture of Breisach, later in the same year, placed Elsass and the Upper Rhine under his control. His death in the following year gave Richelieu the chance, which he promptly seized, of taking over his army and securing his conquests. Charles Lewis, the ex-Elector Palatine, while journeying through France incognito in hopes that Bernard's army would hoist his flag, was seized and imprisoned until everything had been settled according to Richelieu's desire.

Franche Comté might have seemed an easy prize; the territory was French, and formed a natural addition to French dominions. In the wars of the sixteenth century the protection of the Swiss had secured this province from attack. In this war the Swiss appear to have taken little interest in preserving its neutrality. Desultory inroads were made by French armies, and abortive sieges were undertaken; but nothing of moment was effected.

The warfare in Italy and Piedmont was perhaps the most futile and extravagant. No man in Europe knew better than Richelieu the importance of the Valtelline. Here, at the outset, the brilliant victories of Rohan secured for him the necessary control. But, unsupported and neglected, the gallant leader was forced in 1637 to surrender to the mountaineers whose freedom he was supposed to be protecting. He had perhaps shown too much talent, and no further employment was offered to him; in the following year he died. The loss of the Valtelline controlled the situation in Italy. The death of the Duke of Savoy (October 7, 1637) was a misfortune. The Duchess Christine, sister of the King of France, was with difficulty kept faithful to the French alliance; and her friendship was rather a burden than a profit. Prolonged efforts were necessary to uphold her authority against her brothers-in-law, Thomas and Maurice, who were backed by Spain. The death of the Duke of Mantua (September 24, 1637) left his dominions under the regency of his wife, who was hostile to France; and Mantua was only prevented from open secession by the presence of a French garrison in Casale. Parma left the coalition in the same year. Warfare never ceased in this region during these seven years; but, in spite of the brilliant exploits of the Count d'Harcourt in 1640, achieved with very scanty resources, all that France could boast in Italy was the imperfect maintenance of the *status quo*.

On the side of Spain, the conquest of Roussillon was an obvious preliminary for more serious attack. Yet this was not undertaken until it was practically forced upon France by the revolt of Catalonia in 1640. Even then, Condé was allowed to fail before Richelieu and the King took the task seriously in hand; they completed it in 1642, just before

the Cardinal's death. Indirectly, the revolt of Catalonia and the revolt of Portugal in the same year were results of the war, and by weakening Spain helped the cause of France. But they were still more clearly the result of Spanish internal policy, the policy of concentrating authority without fostering national unity. Thus the imperfectly compacted kingdom yielded and split under the strain of war. On the frontier of Navarre, the siege of Fuenterrabia in 1638 was an ill-conceived and ill-executed enterprise, leading inevitably to disaster.

Thus at the Cardinal's death in 1642 France had won little compensation for seven years of exhausting warfare. Lorraine had been retained, and Elsass had been acquired. French armies had been trained in war, their tactics improved, their *personnel* disciplined, the military organisation developed. An effective instrument had been created for ministers who had a definite objective, a rational scheme of offensive, and above all the courage to use their resources without reserve. But Richelieu was afraid of his generals. He divided their commands, he hampered them with instructions. Any great enterprise required the presence of Richelieu and the King, which meant that no risks would be taken, and overwhelming forces would be used to achieve some ostensible success. Military operations were always controlled by political considerations; and political considerations meant the unchallenged supremacy of the Cardinal. In these circumstances it is not surprising that no great general had appeared before the Cardinal's death. Turenne and the Duke of Enghien (the great Condé) were trained in these wars; but they held no independent commands until after his death. Enghien had already prepared his way to glory by marrying the Cardinal's niece, a disparagement which he would certainly have refused had he foreseen the hour of Richelieu's death. The only sure qualification for high command under Richelieu was unquestioning submission and attachment to his person. Hence we find great armies expended to no purpose under a Condé, a Cardinal de La Valette, a Brézé, a La Meilleraye, or a Guiche. The circle of selection being limited to the Cardinal's relations, connexions, and humble adherents, these were perhaps the best that could be found. But little more could be expected of them than was actually achieved. If equal opportunities had been allowed to Rohan, or Guébriant, or even Harcourt, the issue might have been wholly different.

No detailed examination of campaigns is possible in this place; and indeed they present no features of exceptional military interest. The foregoing summary may suffice to show the policy, the objectives, and the results of the seven years of war for whose conduct the Cardinal was responsible. Half-way through the seven years (December 18, 1638) died that remarkable man, François du Tremblay, better known to history as the Capuchin Father Joseph. The fact that no difference can be observed in Richelieu's policy or action after the death of

Father Joseph is the best refutation of those fantastic legends which represent him as a malign and dominating influence, inspiring Richelieu with unholy schemes, and thwarting his excellent intentions. The fact seems to be that Father Joseph, after a pious, blameless, and enthusiastic youth, which found expression in mystical poetry of a high order, and in romantic schemes for a crusade of all Europe against the infidel Turk, fell in middle life entirely under the influence of Richelieu. After materially assisting his master in his progress to power, he became his confidant, his secretary, his humbler self. He was, among other things, a born politician; his knowledge, especially of German and Italian affairs, acquired partly in the course of his crusading missions, was extensive and valuable; he generally drafted the instructions intended for French agents, which were then revised by the Cardinal, and transmitted through the ordinary official channels; he was employed by the Cardinal for negotiations, for interviews, and on missions; his manner, alternating between unctuous suavity and a delusive frankness, served as a useful mask; his unofficial standing made it easy to disavow him, as for instance after the negotiations at Ratisbon; while his confidential intimacy with the Cardinal gave him weight and credit. Careful research has revealed many minor differences of opinion between master and agent, but none was of permanent importance, and in the end the views of the Cardinal as a rule prevailed. Father Joseph remained to the last a faithful servant of the Church, of the Order to which he belonged, and of the Order of Sisters which he founded; he may have refreshed his zeal with the prospect of the great crusade that was to follow when the Habsburgs had been crushed; but he nevertheless became the slave of a policy in which worldly considerations had undisputed supremacy, and in which religion was always subordinated to statecraft. His own bent, in fact, was entirely overruled by a more commanding personality.

Other personal episodes belonging to this period may be quickly dismissed. We need not pause to consider the subterranean influences which used the King's favourites, Marie de Hautefort and Louise de Lafayette, to undermine the Cardinal's power. From these, as from all other Court intrigues, Richelieu emerged victorious. Spanish attempts to sway the King by secret correspondence with his wife were hardly more dangerous. The unexpected, almost miraculous, birth of an heir in 1638, and the birth of a second son in 1640, relieved the Cardinal of his gravest apprehensions as to consequences which might follow the sudden death of Louis. Orleans continued his desultory machinations, but he was no longer dangerous. The other malcontent Bourbon prince, the Count of Soissons, took refuge in 1637 at the Court of Sedan, where he was permitted to remain. In 1641, Bouillon, Guise, and Soissons, in alliance with the Habsburgs, thought the opportunity had come for a decisive blow. Supported by Lamboy with an

Imperial army they invaded France; the forces of Châtillon which confronted them were driven in rout; but at the moment of victory the Count of Soissons was mysteriously slain by a pistol-shot. The figure-head of the conspiracy thus removed, Bouillon made terms and Lamboy retired. The Cardinal appears to have thought the occasion favourable for testing the fidelity of the Duke of Lorraine, who had recently made terms with Louis, and commissioned him to aid in suppressing the rebellion. As may have been expected, he preferred to support it, and by such action gave ground for the reoccupation of Lorraine, which followed in due course. In the ensuing year a more romantic plot had a tragical ending.

Henry, Marquis of Cinq-Mars, was the second son of the Marquis of Effiat, who had faithfully served the Cardinal in diplomacy, war, and finance. On the father's death in 1632, Richelieu took the boy under his personal protection, and introduced him to the Court in 1638, in the hope that by his attractive personality he would win the King's favour, and counteract other inconvenient influences. Before very long Cinq-Mars had become the King's accredited favourite and constant companion. But the position had its drawbacks. The young man loved pleasure, and had ambitions. He found the King's amusements dull, his temper trying, and his company tedious; he was under the vigilant supervision of his powerful patron, and was expected to reveal to him the King's most intimate confidences. He fell in love with Mary di Gonzaga, who disdained the love of a mere *Grand Écuyer*, but held out to him hopes if he attained a more distinguished rank. Cinq-Mars, misled perhaps by the willingness with which the King listened to and echoed complaints against the Cardinal, formed the hope that by royal favour he might contrive to remove the Minister, and succeed to his authority. He sounded Louis and found that he was not at any rate prepared to take the necessary action himself. He therefore entered into relations with Gaston, and with Bouillon. The three made a treaty with the King of Spain (1642); Sedan was to be the base and refuge of the conspirators; but what further action was to be taken was never certainly agreed. Assassination was no doubt considered, but apparently rejected. The serious illness of Richelieu during the summer of 1642 gave hopes of his removal by natural means; but to the Cardinal on his death-bed was brought through some mysterious channel a copy of the treaty with Spain. Taking advantage of a temporary improvement in his health, he arose, and carried the compromising document to the King. Cinq-Mars and his friend and agent, de Thou, the son of the famous historian and statesman, were seized, brought to trial, condemned, and executed. Cinq-Mars at any rate deserved his fate; sympathy is wasted on a man so worthless and unfit for power. Bouillon was arrested in the midst of the army of Italy, where he was in command, and escaped further penalty by the

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cession of Sedan. Gaston, as usual, betrayed all; he was declared incapable of any office and dignity, and on these conditions pardoned. The effort of this last struggle for power appears to have exhausted the remaining strength of the Minister; and, within three months from the death of Cinq-Mars, Richelieu expired (December 4, 1642). The succession of Mazarin to his authority and the concluding months of Louis' reign will be treated in a later chapter.

For eighteen years the great Minister had ruled the kingdom of France. He had claimed for his master and himself power over all persons and causes within the realm. He had elevated absolutism into a principle. Existing institutions, existing traditions, had been forced to give way before his will. Claiming so much, he must be brought to account for all that he claimed. His great achievements in the field of diplomacy, his personal triumphs over rivals and enemies, the creation of a French army and a French navy, the lasting impression of his overmastering personality—these things give him a great place in history. But he must also be judged by his work as an administrator, and by the effects of his work on the internal prosperity and development of France.

France needed a great administrator. The development of her institutions had not kept pace with her growth. The monarchy had accepted the heritage of a hundred feudal sovereigns; it had undertaken the task of welding a dozen races into a nation; all the men and all the treasures of the kingdom were at its disposal; the fund of loyalty and national enthusiasm on which it could draw was almost inexhaustible; but the machinery for the orderly execution of its purposes was still to be created. We may also think, and consequences were to prove, that safeguards against the abuse of its authority were needed; but we can hardly blame the statesman who saw in *Parlements* and Estates General only so many obstacles to efficiency. The materials for a constitutional monarchy may have been present in France, though they were not very obvious to view; but the materials for an orderly, law-abiding, and beneficent monarchy were certainly present, and Richelieu did little or nothing for their organisation.

The most crying need was that for financial reconstruction. The influence of royal finance was all-pervading, the needs of the royal treasury unceasing and progressive. The income of Henry IV was some 40,000,000 of *livres* towards the end of his reign; his expenditure far less. The annual expenditure of Richelieu in his last years was 160–180,000,000. Yet the financial organisation that had served for Louis XI and Louis XII was still maintained without improvement. There was still a separate machinery for the collection and accounts of the *taille*, the *aides*, the *gabelle*, and the *domaine*. The revenue was still diverted at its sources to meet local expenditure so that hardly more than a half reached the royal exchequer. The system of audit and accounts was still hopelessly defective. A quarter of the revenue appears in the accounts in a lump

sum, *acquits au comptant*, cash expended on items unspecified, the vouchers for which expenditure were burnt every three months. The indirect taxes were still farmed. The expenses of collection were enormous. It is estimated that the cost of levying the *taille* was 25 per cent., of levying the *aides* and *gabelle* not less than 40 per cent. Extraordinary resources were even more wastefully procured. Offices to the value of 500,000,000 *livres* were sold during Richelieu's ministry, of which sum only 350,000,000 reached the Treasury. Not only did such devices mean in effect the borrowing of money at ruinous rates of interest, but the offices thus created hampered the public machine at every turn. It was the rule and not the exception for three officers to do the work of one, officiating in successive years. The interest of the public debt under Richelieu rose from 2,000,000 to 21,000,000 *livres*. In the last years of the reign default was made on the public debt and on salaries to the extent of three-eighths; and the protesting *rentiers* were severely punished. In 1641 the clergy were forced by the most open coercion to contribute 4,000,000 *livres* in three years to the public revenue in addition to their ordinary *don gratuit*. In 1639 the revenues from the communal *octrois* were seized for the King; and the communes were left without resources. At Richelieu's death the revenue for three years had been anticipated. All this, except in the case of the clergy, occurred by the simple fiat of the King. In 1636-7 the population of Limousin, Poitou, Angoumois, Saintonge, Gascony, rose in rebellion and were put down by force. In 1639 the rebellion of the *Nu-pieds* in Normandy was supported by the *Parlement* and the *bourgeoisie* of the principal towns. Meanwhile financiers rapidly amassed enormous fortunes; Crown lands and Church lands were sold; sources of revenue were pledged in security for loans; the revenue raised by way of *taille* rose from 14,000,000 to 69,000,000 *livres*; the oppressive *gabelle* produced 19,000,000, and the retail price of salt amounted to four francs of modern money per pound; commerce languished, agriculture starved, parishes were abandoned, lands went out of cultivation, and the *taille* was collected by armed men. For all this Richelieu devised no single remedial measure.

The burden of taxation was great; the distribution of it rendered its incidence even more galling. The *pays d'états*, Languedoc, Provence, Burgundy, Brittany, paid hardly more than one-third of their proper share. Richelieu endeavoured indeed (1628-32) to assimilate the financial conditions of some of these provinces to the rest of France; but here his authority for once proved insufficient; and he had to compound with the freer provinces for the restoration of their liberties. Dauphiné alone lost its privileges. Not only did the nobles and the clergy escape the more burdensome forms of taxation; but the myriads of officials, whose numbers were constantly growing, also avoided payment. Many professions were exempt. Most of the chief towns paid a light

composition for *taille*. It is estimated that a fourth of the population of France went free of direct taxation on one ground or another. Moreover, one-third of France escaped the chief part of the *gabelle*. The burden of the unprivileged and especially of the peasants was the heavier in consequence.

Richelieu himself, though profuse, was not avaricious. His income from ecclesiastical benefices was about a million and a half *livres*; and he received as much more from property and pensions. At his death his fortune, though large, was not large in proportion to his opportunities. That he himself was no financier, need not be laid to his charge. But that he did not discover and employ able financiers is largely due to the principles which governed his public action. He required his men of finance to be as subservient as his generals. His Bullions and Bouthilliers found him money; he did not understand, he did not care to understand the means. More capable ministers might have been less easy to control. Even their dishonesty was valuable, as placing them more completely in his power, should they at any time give offence.

In general administration Richelieu made little systematic improvement. Local administration, so far as it existed, was in the hands of the heads of the five-and-twenty governments into which France was divided, and of the *Parlements*. The military local authority was in the hands of the Governors, the civil authority in the hands of the *Parlements*. In times of weak government the authority of Governors had frequently been used in the cause of rebellion. Richelieu made it clear how slight that authority really was, and it was proved that the rebellion even of a Montmorency was not dangerous. But the Cardinal was naturally not inclined to increase the importance of the Governors: and their office continued to be one rather of dignity than of power. Only six months' residence was customary; and even this was frequently evaded. With the *Parlements* he was constantly in collision; they approved neither his financial edicts, nor his manner of dealing with political offenders, nor his contemptuous attitude towards the law. They were not suited for the work of administration; and, if they had been, they would not have been suited to the Cardinal. His methods were arbitrary and direct; he carried further the practice introduced by his predecessors of despatching commissioners, *maîtres des requêtes*, to districts where action was necessary; under the name of *intendants de justice, de police, et des finances*, these officers received the widest authority to override every existing functionary or institution, to order all matters at the pleasure of the central Government, to try persons and causes without regard to the formalities of law. Similar officers accompanied the armies, where their simple procedure and extensive competence proved of the highest value in controlling and regulating expenditure and supply. Eventually a system of *intendants* was created; but under Richelieu there was no system; no law prescribed the duties of *intendants* or defined their

powers; the despatch of each *intendant* was an act of arbitrary force; the *intendants* were the direct agents of a lawless autocracy.

In matters relating to justice France was already well provided. The Courts of the *présidiaux* and the *Parlements*, with minor jurisdictions, covered the field well; the complaint was rather of the excessive complexity of the system and procedure, than of injustice or defect. But Richelieu made it a practice in dealing with political offenders to disregard the ordinary Courts of justice, and to proceed by the action of commissions of judges specially chosen to try the particular case. By such tribunals, Cinq-Mars, de Thou, Montmorency, the Marshal de Marillac, and many others were condemned. If a first commission showed any hesitation, it was dissolved, and a second appointed. However clear the offence, the Cardinal would not allow the law to take its normal course. The *Parlements* protested; but their protests were disregarded.

In matters relating to public order little progress was made. The nobility as a class neither required crushing, nor were crushed. Impoverished by the high rate of customary expenditure in the Court and with the army, and by the fall in the purchasing power of the fixed dues which they received from their tenants, their chief ambition was to win the favour of the Government and to secure its patronage, rather than to thwart it. The destruction of royal fortresses except on the frontier was a wise measure of economy. The destruction of the fortified residences of the nobility may or may not have been necessary as a precaution; but such residences, for the most part, were indefensible against modern ordnance, and their destruction without indemnity was in any case an injustice. The practice of the magnates to raise rebellion on any occasion of discontent required severe repression; in the process of repression it became clear how scanty were the actual resources controlled by such rebels. The general security of ordinary citizens under Richelieu's rule was neither greater nor less than it had been in earlier times, and left much to be desired. The armies, whose pay became more and more irregular, lived upon the country where they were quartered. To be treated as a conquered country implied exceptional indulgence and not the reverse. In spite of the striking example made of de Bouteville and des Chapelles, the practice of duelling was hardly less prevalent under Richelieu than it had been under Henry IV. The Cardinal's police was admirable for the discovery of secret intrigues; for the security of common people it was not intended. The almost complete freedom of the press that had existed up to 1630 was in that year destroyed; for the indulgent control of the *Parlements* and the Sorbonne was substituted a rigorous censorship: and a government permit was required for every publication. Of the press as a useful source of instruction to statesmen, he had no notion. The official *Gazette de France* contained all the information about public affairs which he thought desirable for the people.

Richelieu's friendship for letters followed the same principle as his other efforts, the establishment of a central and supreme authority. This was an age when literary and social circles or cliques exercised a considerable influence. The *dix-sept seigneurs* assembled at the house of Bassompierre, *Messieurs du Marais* in that of Madame de Rohan; the Countess of Soissons, the Princess of Condé, held similar gatherings. The Hôtel de Rambouillet was the centre for the *précieux*. One of these clubs met at the house of Valentin Conrart to discuss literary questions. Richelieu heard of their discussions, and offered them his protection and official recognition. Though somewhat embarrassed, they had no choice but to accept, and in 1634 they were constituted as the French Academy. The *Parlement* with considerable reluctance registered their letters-patent in 1637. The number of the members from the first was forty, of whom Balzac, Voiture, Chapelain, Vaugelas were the most distinguished. They accepted their prescribed mission: to purify the French language, and to determine its canons according to the best usage. For this purpose in 1638 they began, at the suggestion of Chapelain, the compilation of their *Dictionary*, in which the influence of Vaugelas was predominant. The later history of the Academy is beyond the scope of this chapter.

The age of Richelieu was an age of a great religious revival in France. The Cardinal de Bérulle founded the Oratory, and multiplied institutions for the instruction of clergy. St Vincent de Paul founded his *Sœurs de la Charité*, and his Congregation of the Mission. The Ursulines and the Visitandines took in hand the education of girls and women. The Jesuit schoolmasters and professors were active everywhere. Richelieu himself did something for the reformation of the religious Orders, and procured his election as head of the three great Orders of Cluny, Cîteaux, and Prémontré, partly with this object. He did good service in composing the disputes between secular and regular clergy, in requiring of the religious license to preach and to confess, and in subjecting them to the authority of the Bishops. It was his ambition to become head of the Church in France, as he was ruler of the State. When the Pope thwarted his desire to be Legate for France, he dreamed of becoming Patriarch of a national Church. Yet flagrant abuses went unremedied in the Church. Non-residence, plurality of benefices, abbeys and priories in lay hands, the charging of lay pensions on ecclesiastical revenues, the employment of Cardinals and Archbishops in military commands—these disorders the Cardinal, himself a soldier and a pluralist, did not attempt to check.

He is seen perhaps at his best in his treatment of the Protestants after their pretensions to political independence had been finally suppressed. The toleration which was accorded to them was real. The greatest consideration was shown for their susceptibilities, and the hostility of the Catholic population was kept in bounds. Their pastors were exempted from *taille*; a subvention of 200,000 *livres* was accorded to

them; they were compensated for the loss of the property of the Church in Béarn. Richelieu was anxious to win over the ministers and prepare the way for a general conversion. In this he was disappointed, but individual conversions were frequent, and the Catholic clergy were taxed to provide pensions for converted Protestant ministers. Of the growing influence of Jansenist opinions he showed himself less tolerant; he inaugurated the long struggle between the monarchy and this sect by the imprisonment of the Abbé of Saint Cyran in 1638; for reasons which are not altogether clear, he saw in these opinions a danger to the State; but the time has not yet come to enlarge upon this theme.

Different estimates may be formed of the military achievements of the Cardinal; as to the general tendencies of his political action there is less room for doubt. Talents, industry, perseverance, resolution, courage, these he possessed in the highest degree. The game of politics, as he understood it and as it was generally understood, he played with consummate ability. Though at a vast expense, he checked the dangerous preponderance of the Habsburg coalition and kept for France her proper place among the Powers. That a large proportion of the sacrifices which he imposed upon his country for this end were unnecessary, that the heritage of bankruptcy which he left to his successors was due to misgovernment, that his habitual contempt of law and justice was impolitic as well as immoral, that he created no system to take the place of that which he destroyed, that the absolutism which he set up was lawless and disorderly, that he seems to have never comprehended the true bases of national prosperity and national power—these are defects which become the more flagrant the more highly we estimate his gifts. The abasement of the magnates, the suppression of the Huguenots, the Habsburg wars, even the maintenance of his personal power—these were legitimate ends. But in his choice of means he was reckless and improvident; in his choice of persons he looked for subservience rather than for independent initiative; of more exalted aims he had no conception; of mercy and justice he took no account; of creative and beneficent statesmanship he had no share. Four-fifths of the field of political endeavour he left untouched, or touched only to encumber and destroy. If the Peace of Westphalia and the Peace of the Pyrenees were of his making, so also was the Revolution of 1789. He had revealed to the French monarchy the weakness of all those traditional and conventional restraints which had limited the power of earlier Kings for good, and more especially for evil; the autocracy was slow to unlearn the lesson he had taught. The bonfires of rejoicing which celebrated his decease were premature; his death was not to ease the bondage which his living will had imposed on France.

CHAPTER V.

THE VASA IN SWEDEN AND POLAND.

(1560-1630.)

GUSTAVUS VASA at his death in 1560 left the future of Sweden only half assured. His forty years of resolute government, indeed, had done much to establish in his dominions a condition of unexampled prosperity. The strength of the nation had grown as the authority of the Crown increased. In 1520 Sweden had been a dependency of Denmark, unable to free herself from the political tyranny of Christian II without submitting to the commercial tyranny of Lübeck. Gustavus had given her independence, political, commercial, and ecclesiastical alike, and with it the strength which was impelling her towards a policy of empire.

The amazing progress which Sweden owed to the founder of the Vasa dynasty was achieved by a policy which was to leave deep marks upon her future. "Necessity," Gustavus held, "breaks law, not merely the law of man, but at times the law of God also." To him necessity always meant the increase of royal power. Avaricious of power, he set himself to seize it at home and to avoid hazarding it abroad; and in both aims he succeeded.

After his death change in the policy of Sweden was inevitable. To maintain a strong monarchy might be possible, but the days of seclusion were numbered. A State which owed everything to the Protestant faith and the Baltic Sea could not remain indifferent while the fortunes of both were in peril. Apart from the Counter-reformation, the decay of the Teutonic Order, the decline of the Hanseatic League, the awakening of Russia, and the expanding ambitions of Denmark were new arguments which must compel Sweden to take action. The methods of Gustavus, moreover, were such as no other King could follow. Himself a promoted noble, he pillaged the Church remorselessly and administered the kingdom like a great domain. Seizing manors by hundreds, he looked to them for a revenue and even for an army, while he laboured with marvellous energy to control the economic life of the whole nation. The policy, both international and internal, by which his sons Erik and John brought Sweden to the verge of dissolution (1560-98), her deliverance by his third son Charles (1599-1611), and the efforts by which, under Charles and

his son Gustavus Adolphus, she gained organisation, empire, and the status of a great Power, form the theme of these pages.

Erik XIV, who succeeded without question to his father's throne and treasure, had grown to manhood as heir to the kingdom. A lover of pomp, he is said to have declared that he must seek to subjugate more realms and lands, or he would not wear his crown. It may be doubted, however, whether the strength of Sweden warranted so complete a breach with the policy of Gustavus. Her resources ill responded to the breadth of her territory. The ancient province of Finland was indeed profitable to the Crown. But Norway still stretched across the mountains, while foreign and often hostile territory intervened between Sweden and the States of western and central Europe. Her single precarious outlet to the North Sea was a narrow strip of territory at the mouth of the river Göta, where Elfsborg was to prove far from impregnable. Between Elfsborg and Kalmar stretched the coast-provinces of Halland, Skåne and Bleking, those fertile plains of the southern peninsula which, like Gotland, the ancient stepping-stone across the Baltic, were fiefs of the Danish Crown. Småland, the border province, was a stronghold of robbers and outlaws from both nations. From Kalmar to the northern limit of civilisation, which adventurous peasants and fishermen were slowly pressing northward from Gefle, the long coast-line with innumerable inlets for invaders justified the dictum of Gustavus Adolphus, "We are nowhere weaker than in Sweden."

The wealth of Sweden was no greater than might be looked for in a land where less than one million people were strewn over a vast area, and in a climate which neither incited nor richly rewarded industry. Foreigners in Sweden remarked that the people were long-lived, adaptable, and cheerful, but that they were unskilled in the arts and disinclined for sobriety and steady work. Communications were poor, and commerce feeble. A great part of the royal revenue was paid in kind. The mines and fisheries, from which Gustavus had hoped so much, were not in themselves sufficient to support a large population or to supply an abundant revenue. Education, at a moment when Sweden had broken with Rome without as yet drawing full nourishment from Wittenberg, was at its lowest. And government, by which alone these manifold defects could be remedied, was still rude and insecure.

For the moment, indeed, the King was supreme. The Hereditary Settlement (*Arfförerving*) of 1544, by which elective gave place to hereditary monarchy, symbolised his triumph over Church, people, and nobles. From each of these classes, however, a sovereign weaker than Gustavus must experience renewed rivalry for power. The Church, crippled and plundered as it was, had begun to develop a force of corporate resistance which baffled each of Erik's four successors upon the throne. The people, in spite of all the sharp lessons of Gustavus, had not completely renounced their practice of armed resistance to measures which displeased

them. Only by fair words or show of force could the Crown secure the obedience of a province. Believing themselves defrauded if any intermediate authority was thrust between their sovereign and themselves, they obstructed the creation of adequate executive, judicial, and legislative organs of the State.

In general, however, the influence of the people lay on the side of the Vasa against the caste which formed the most dangerous rival of monarchy. The nobles, sons of the men who perished in the Blood-bath of 1520, were enriched with the spoils of the Church, and had not forgotten that the Hereditary Settlement of 1544 was a blow to aristocracy. They had acquiesced in the elevation of the Vasa, but they conceived themselves to be entitled both to curtail the powers of the Crown and to share in their exercise. Their ambition was to secure a position with regard to the King similar to that enjoyed by their peers in the Empire. They claimed that their performance of knight-service (*Rusttjänst*)—the maintenance of a prescribed number of mounted soldiers—freed their estates from taxation and made them practically supreme over the districts in which they lived. To what extremes of lawlessness their pretensions might lead was seen when a bold noble annexed the lands and forests of the Crown, punished one of his bailiffs who had fled to Court, and, when another bailiff cut down a wood, proposed to hang him together with every peasant who had shared in the offence. The nobles possessed a monopoly of seats in the Råd, a small council out of which the Swedish Diet (*Riksdag*) grew, and which except in times of stress performed the ordinary functions of a National Assembly. The chief offices thus fell into their hands, and they protested strongly, and in the main successfully, against the employment of any officers of State whatsoever who were not of native and of gentle birth. They thus formed a check on progress when the King was competent, and a menace to the power of the Crown in the hands of a ruler unequal to defending it.

In the reign of Gustavus the danger from the nobles was latent, and the danger from the Church and people was averted by force. Erik was confronted in addition by danger from three great royal duchies, which was in great part created by his father. The testament of Gustavus, of which part received the sanction of the Estates in 1547 and the whole in 1560, provided his sons with appanages, and attempted by admonitions and regulations to secure their future cooperation for the good of the kingdom. The most weighty part of the testament was that by which the King conferred upon the three half-brothers of Erik rights of hereditary sovereignty over great portions of Sweden. John was confirmed in the authority over Åbo, Kumogård, Åland and Raseborg which he had already exercised for several years, and thus remained master of Finland. Charles received the greatest part of Södermanland and Nerike with Vermeland, the whole forming a broad

belt across the kingdom. Magnus, who was older than Charles but weaker in mind, was to rule adjacent territories to the south, including some two-thirds of Östergötland. By whatever motives these dispositions were inspired—whether to save part at least of the realm from the sway of Erik, or to curb the nobles by the creation of a class of royal Dukes, or to indulge an affection for the younger sons which was stronger than statesmanship, or to satisfy their equitable claim to share in the family inheritance—the result was that Sweden was divided and its very independence placed in jeopardy for more than sixty years.

The death of Gustavus caused a crisis in which the decisive factor was the character of his successor. Erik possessed a full share of the ability with which the descendants of Gustavus were endowed. His political insight was not contemptible, while his political imagination was active. A child of the Renaissance, he took delight in composing verse and prose, in painting and music, in languages, in translating the classics and in studying the stars. But this tropical luxuriance, as Geijer finely suggests, was the product of subterranean fires. Erik was too ill-balanced to endure the stress of kingship. The extravagance with which he pressed his suit upon Elizabeth of England is well known. As Crown Prince he had delighted in the wild orgies of his Court at Kalmar, and he was already suspicious almost to the verge of madness.

For three years, however, the young King grappled vigorously with his task. The most momentous problem of policy was the establishment of a single sovereignty within the Swedish State. In April, 1561, Erik secured the concurrence of the Estates in a statute known from the scene of the Diet as the Articles of Arboga. By this enactment his brothers were compelled to renounce the dangerous prerogatives which the testament of Gustavus had conferred upon them. Dwellers in the duchies were to swear fealty to the King instead of to the Dukes, and the royal supremacy was established in matters of war and negotiation, taxation, appeals, the nomination of judges and of bishops, and the conferment of nobility and privilege. This weighty assertion of the power of the Crown was accompanied by the establishment of a royal Court of Appeal,¹ which met one of the most pressing needs of the growing nation. A body of justices (*Konungs Nämnd*) was appointed, part to remain at Stockholm and part to go on circuit when required.

Having bridled the Dukes, Erik next endeavoured to regulate the status of the nobles, to whose support his triumph at Arboga was due. To add splendour and security to the Crown, he conferred upon his intimates the new dignities of Count and Baron, and endowed them with grants of royal revenues, which were moderate in amount but hereditary. He then set himself to correlate the duties and the privileges attendant upon noble birth. The scale of knight-service was fixed in 1562 by the Upsala Constitution at the rate of one well-appointed horseman for every 300 marks of income from hereditary estates or

200 marks from fiefs of the Crown. Manor-house and home-farm were not to be reckoned in; but every nobleman, however poor, must maintain a soldier, or lose caste and submit to ordinary taxation. The burden imposed by the Upsala Constitution was nominally less onerous by one-half than that imposed by Gustavus in 1559; but Erik enforced his claims with such stringency as to annul this benefit and gradually to alienate the nobles.

Meanwhile the future both of the King and of his realm was being determined in Livonia. At this moment the struggle for predominance in the Baltic, a struggle vital to the Power which held both Stockholm and Åbo, entered the phase which within the compass of 160 years (1561-1721) was to bring to Sweden her glory, her empire, and her downfall. The Teutonic Order was moribund, and Erik, as heir to Sweden, and John, as lord of Finland, had united to oppose their father's policy of timid home-keeping and to secure for the Vasa dynasty a share in Esthonia and Livonia. During the summer of 1561 the Protestant town of Reval became Swedish; but at the end of November the Order made complete submission to Sigismund II of Poland. Sweden, it seemed, must either abandon her hopes of aggrandisement or prepare for war. Russia and Denmark however were also candidates for the prize, and Sigismund suggested a third solution which promised immediate peace at the hazard of future struggles. In July, 1561, he proposed an alliance of Sweden and Poland against Russia, to be cemented by the marriage of one of his sisters with Duke John. Erik seemed inclined to acquiesce in an arrangement which would have made his brother all but heir presumptive to the Polish Crown. In February, 1562, however, he forbade the match and proceeded to capture Pernau. John, after long hesitation, defied both the royal command and the Articles of Arboga. In October he married Catharine Jagello and received seven fortresses in Livonia as security for the repayment of money borrowed by Sigismund. Erik, who suspected his brother of treasonable intrigues in Sweden, summoned the Estates to Stockholm and procured from them a sentence of forfeiture and death against him (June 7, 1563). The Duke defended Åbo; but in August he was forced to surrender to an army of 10,000 men. Many of his servants were put to death, and he was imprisoned in the lonely fortress of Gripsholm. There he remained for four years, while the King and his low-born minister Göran Persson subjected Sweden to a reign of terror.

The downfall of John was accompanied by the progress of the Swedish arms in Livonia; but for both disasters Poland was amply avenged by Denmark, her new ally. The relations between Erik and Frederick II had grown steadily worse. The hereditary rivalry between the Scandinavian Kings was symbolised by the Three Crowns of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, which each of them bore on his

escutcheon. It was now inflamed by the quest of empire on the eastern shore of the Baltic. Erik, who hoped to drive the Danes from the Scandinavian peninsula, toiled to win allies by way of marriage and wooed Elizabeth of England, Mary of Scotland, and Christina of Hesse-Cassel. The Danes on the other hand made use of their superiority at sea by intercepting the Swedish embassies and supplies, until in June, 1563, they were severely defeated off Bornholm by Jakob Bagge. The Emperor summoned a congress at Rostock, but strove in vain to preserve peace. In August the war known as the Northern Seven Years' War was formally declared by Denmark (1563-70).

Sweden was in great peril, for her rise had given offence to several Powers. Frederick secured the alliance of the Poles, of the Elector Augustus of Saxony, and of the men of Lübeck, who feared for their trade with Livonia and hoped much from the restoration of a Danish dynasty in Sweden. As against these diplomatic triumphs, Erik could only point to an agreement for seven years' peace with Russia. He failed either to develop the latent conflict of interest between the allies or to secure counter-alliances with their several enemies. He alienated the Emperor by slighting the Congress of Rostock, and lost the Hessian marriage by addressing a love-letter to Queen Elizabeth which was seized and despatched to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel by the Danes. Then, with the consent of his Estates, he sued for the hand of Renée of Lorraine, only to affront all parties by a secret match with his mistress Karin Månsdotter, the offspring of a common soldier.

In the field the King's influence was even more disastrous than in the Cabinet. While the Swedish army was a national force which might soon be made formidable, Frederick was trusting to some 30,000 German mercenaries, a host which could not long be satisfied with the spoils of Småland and Västergötland. Erik and Persson, however, were not strategists but barbarians, and the war became a series of brutalities. Both armies devastated where they could not conquer, and not seldom put their prisoners to death. At home the Swedes gained no signal success and suffered several grave disasters. Chief of these was the loss of Elfsborg, whose fall in September, 1563, cut Sweden off from the North Sea. Such was the isolation of the kingdom that wine could not be procured for the administration of the Eucharist, and the King outraged the feelings of the hierarchy by authorising the consecration of water or water mixed with honey.

In September, 1565, however, a foothold on the western coast was regained by the capture of Varberg, while in Norway, in Livonia, and on the sea, wherever Erik was not, the dreary struggle was waged on equal terms. Klas Kristersson (Horn) proved himself a worthy successor to Jakob Bagge, until he succumbed to the plague in 1566. Gustavus, moreover, by his lifelong invective against "the Jutes," had made the war popular in Sweden. In March, 1566, the Estates protested that

they were ready to sacrifice life, lands, and all that they had rather than submit to an adverse peace.

The year 1567, however, witnessed the collapse of Erik's position both at home and abroad; though he gained the Russian alliance by undertaking to surrender the wife of his brother John to her rejected suitor, Ivan the Terrible. The Tsar afterwards asserted that he had believed her to be a widow and had wished to restore her to Poland in safety. Erik could not advance even such excuses as these. His infamy profited him but little. The Russian alliance did not save the Swedes from disasters in Norway and Livonia, while at home misgovernment was becoming insupportable. Erik's capricious tyranny had not spared the high nobility, and he was conscious of their alienation from himself. Haunted by fears of treason, he suddenly struck at the great family of Sture, the kinsmen of his own half-brothers. In 1566 the young Nils Sture was condemned as a traitor. The King forced him to ride through the streets of Stockholm with a crown of straw upon his head, then pardoned him and entrusted him with a mission to Lorraine. Next, with another change of purpose, he caused Göran Persson to indict the Sture and many other nobles before the Estates at Upsala, and when Nils Sture returned from Lorraine, he flung him into prison. On May 22, 1567, however, the King expressly guaranteed his safety; but two days later he visited him in prison and stabbed him to death. The old Count Svante Sture, his son Erik, and two other lords were next despatched by the soldiery, and the King's tutor, Beurres, paid for his remonstrance with his life.

The royal assassin fled from Upsala and for some days wandered demented through the land. The interregnum attested both the weakness and the strength of the Vasa. No one arose, either to act for the King or to supplant him. John was in prison, Magnus had lost his reason, and Charles was still a boy. At this moment, moreover, the indicted nobles were found guilty of treason by the Estates. Within a month the King had recovered himself sufficiently to set about the work of conciliation, and he allowed Persson to be condemned to death. In the autumn, however, he became possessed by the belief that John had supplanted him in the kingship, and in a grotesque encounter the two brothers in turn did homage to each other.

Meanwhile the Danes were preparing to strike a blow of unusual severity. In a triumphant winter campaign Daniel Rantzau, "the Turenne of Denmark," swept through Småland and Östergötland, burned and pillaged more than 1400 homesteads, and took by surprise the camp of the defenders at Norrby. He crowned the bold enterprise by a masterly retreat, which encouraged Erik to give himself the airs of a conqueror.

During the year 1568 the King steadily undermined his throne. He set John at liberty, restored Persson to favour, made Karin Månsdotter

Queen of Sweden, and extorted the recognition of her son as heir to the throne. At this time, however, John and Charles were organising a revolt. On July 12, one week after the coronation, the strong fortress of Vadstena fell into their hands. Their troops were few, but the rule of Erik had become impossible. He appealed to the Dukes and to the people, fought bravely and allowed his hated minister to be tortured to death, but all in vain. On September 29 Stockholm opened her gates and Erik was compelled to abdicate. In January, 1569, he was deposed by the Diet. He was hurried from prison to prison; but while he lived the Government could not feel secure. Early in 1575 a secret meeting of the Råd together with the Bishops and several priests condemned him to death, and two years later he was poisoned by command of his brother John.

John III, who received the homage of the Estates in January, 1569, owed his position to the endorsement of his claim by Duke Charles and the nobles. He paid his debt to the former by renouncing the Articles of Arboga and to the latter by conceding many privileges. The counts and barons received fresh grants of revenues and judicial rights, and became in all essentials an hereditary feudal aristocracy. The King swore to abstain from promoting low-born ministers, and secured the nobles against imprisonment without trial, and against trial otherwise than by their peers. They were made free to engage in foreign trade, and to sell the produce of their estates without regard to the commercial monopoly of the towns. Above all, knight-service was reduced from the standard of 1562. Henceforth, one horseman had to be maintained for every 400 marks of revenue in time of war, and for every 800 marks in time of peace. Those who were too poor to perform knight-service might sell their lands and yet retain their caste.

Concession to the nobles was thus the keynote of a reign in which the monarchy was menaced by a fresh peril. The Råd was now recruited from nobles of a new generation, led by the houses of Bielke, Brahe, Sparre, Banér and Fleming. Not a few of them were educated and travelled men, and in Erik Sparre they possessed a skilful apologist of oligarchy. Their ambition to control the hereditary monarchy through the Råd was certain to tax the statesmanship of Erik's successor.

John III, though himself ambitious, was no statesman. The obstinacy which he had displayed in Livonia was not weakened by adversity or by time. He loved regal pomp, and, though bankrupt, built more lavishly than any other King of Sweden. He possessed the hot temper of the Vasa, and is said to have once literally trampled under foot a recalcitrant clergyman. His natural bias towards theology had been strengthened by his studies while a prisoner and by the influence of his Papist consort. As King he neglected administration to pursue the chimera of autocratic religious comprehension, and for many years made it his chief object to force his Liturgy upon the people.

Under such a King, in a land which still depended on personal government, the character and conduct of the Duke became of great importance. Charles, who since Magnus had become insane ruled in his own right over about one-twelfth of the nation, set an example which contrasted strongly with the misrule which prevailed beyond the confines of his duchy. He claimed, moreover, to be entitled by birth to a share in the sovereignty of the kingdom; and as the strongest of the sons of Gustavus he exercised great influence on policy. As a rallying-point of opposition to the injurious innovations of the King he rendered invaluable service to the State. The intrigues of John with the Counter-reformation and with Poland were steadily watched by a harsh and unbending colleague of high courage and Calvinistic sympathies, whose ideal was the maintenance of the Vasa dynasty by adhesion to the principles laid down by Gustavus.

The accession of the husband of Catharine Jagello was equivalent to peace with Poland. In foreign affairs, therefore, the first duty of the new Government was to bring to an end the destructive and unprofitable war with Denmark. As early as November, 1568, indeed, the envoys of the rebellious Dukes had signed a treaty at Roeskilde by which Sweden surrendered her conquests, yielded the right to wear the Three Crowns, and paid 200,000 *thalers*. Frederick offered to renounce the indemnity, but John and the Estates preferred to fight on in the hope of driving the Danes from the peninsula. The campaign of 1569–70, however, only increased the need of peace. The Danes recovered Varberg and sent a fleet to Reval, while Ivan, balked of the wife of John, flung his ambassadors into prison. France and Poland offered in vain to mediate, but the Emperor was more successful, and the Seven Years' War closed, as it began, with a congress at Stettin.

After more than five months' negotiation, the Peace of Stettin was concluded (December, 1570) on the basis of the mutual restoration of conquests. The question of the Three Crowns was referred to an Imperial Court of arbitration; and Sweden was compelled to redeem Elfsborg by the payment of 150,000 *thalers*. To raise this sum, nominally rather more than £33,000, it was necessary to subject all movables in Sweden to an inquest more searching than that of Domesday. The peasants contributed one-tenth of their substance, the unburnt towns one-twelfth, and the burnt towns one-eighteenth. Payment was made in no less than seven currencies. The tax-gatherers were compelled to compute the decline in value from the standard money of Gustavus through the best, medium, and ordinary impressions of Erik down to the still baser coins issued by John in 1568, 1569, and 1570.

Further debasement, however, was yet to come, for a thirteen years' war with Russia had begun. In the days of Gustavus, Ivan's hordes had sold captive men and women for a few pence. In 1573, when they took Weissenstein, they bound to stakes the survivors of the little

garrison and roasted them alive. Sweden was too poor to pay for vengeance and in 1577 she had lost all Livonia save Reval. At this point, however, the King of Poland, Stephen Báthory, intervened. Poles and Swedes in alliance overthrew the enemy at Venden (1578), drove him from Livonia, invaded Ingria and took Narva (September, 1581). The Tsar, though shut out from the Baltic, was glad to conclude a truce with both States. The truce of Pliusa with Sweden was to run for three years, reckoned from August, 1583; and in 1585 the term was prolonged till 1590.

In 1583, for the first time for twenty years, Sweden was at peace with all her neighbours. Within her own borders, however, she was torn by strife. The weak and fitful absolutism of the King could not fail to provoke general opposition, and it seemed at times as if civil war were in sight. The King's extravagance imposed unwonted taxation upon a people harried by plague and exhausted by war. Too feeble or too self-satisfied to create any permanent organs of administration, John carried on his slovenly rule with the aid of secretaries, a practice which his subjects deemed unlawful. Shocked by the many abuses, the Råd continually but vainly protested, on one occasion begging the King to refrain from damaging his health by the bursts of choler which their interference provoked. But the brunt of resistance, ecclesiastical and political alike, was borne by Charles. The causes of discord between the brothers were innumerable, and the chief of these was beyond remedy. In Church matters, in taxation, and in the appointment of officials, the Duke asserted an independence which was clearly incompatible with the unity of the kingdom and the sovereignty of the King. On the other hand it was Charles alone who maintained good government, Protestantism, and national freedom so far as his power extended.

For the third time since the death of Gustavus the alliance of the nobles decided a conflict between his sons. In January, 1582, John secured from the Diet at Stockholm both the acceptance of his Liturgy for the whole kingdom and the substantial revival of the Articles of Arboga against the pretensions of the Duke. In 1585, moreover, less than sixteen months after the death of Catharine, John widened the breach by his *mésalliance* with Gunilla Bielke. In 1587, indeed, Charles gave way sufficiently to admit of the promulgation at Vadstena of a constitution drawn up by Erik Sparre to record the victory of the King. The Liturgy, however, he would never tolerate. The clergy of his duchy were denounced by the King as "members of the devil," and the royal bailiffs were instructed to imprison them as outlaws if they set foot in royal Sweden. Henceforward, however, the quest of the Polish Crown and the quarrel with the Råd which arose from it stood foremost in the mind of the King.

The death of King Stephen Báthory in December, 1586, offered John an opportunity of consoling himself for his own rejection in 1573

and 1574 by securing the Polish Crown for his son Sigismund. After long hesitation the Prince resolved to become a candidate. His competitors were the Tsar Feodor, Andreas, brother of the late King, and four Austrian Archdukes. Thanks in great part to the unscrupulous tongue of Sparre, Sigismund was able to outbid them all with a delusive undertaking to cede to Poland the Swedish conquests in Livonia. The Queen Dowager and the Chancellor Zamoyski procured his election by the nobles on August 9, 1587; but three days later the Zborowski faction prevailed upon the Senate to choose Archduke Maximilian as King. In mid-September Sigismund landed at Danzig, only to find himself dependent for throne and safety on Zamoyski's troops; while the impossibility of either repudiating or fulfilling his bargain with regard to Livonia heightened the difficulty of his position.

The repulse of Maximilian from Cracow, where Sigismund held his entry, and the surrender of the Archduke after a decisive battle at Pitschen in Silesia (January, 1588), did not bring the troubles of the former to an end. Some hated Sigismund for his Swedish birth, which made him in their eyes no better than the Germans whose dress and language he affected. Many missed in him the frank, genial, and martial temper of a Polish sovereign. Zamoyski, rather than the King, led the ascendant party in the State. Sigismund's position in many respects resembled that of William III in England, who likewise wearied of the crown. Early in 1589 he entered upon secret negotiations with a view to installing the Archduke Ernest in his stead.

The conspiracy against the Republic was chastised by a public humiliation which left the monarchy even weaker than before. At the so-called Diet of Inquisition in 1592 the Primate of Gnesen solemnly arraigned the conduct and policy of the King. "Sire! think upon your oath," he cried, "take warning by your predecessor, Henry (of Valois), who broke faith and perished miserably." Zamoyski, who remained till his death in 1605 the champion of Polish nationality, added words of defiance and warning and demanded the dismissal of the foreign guards. At length the King capitulated, and promised in writing that he would never abandon the kingdom, or diminish the privileges of the nation, or nominate his successor.

Before Sigismund sailed from Sweden to Poland the prospect of a personal union between States so incompatible had compelled John and the Råd to formulate a plan for their future relations. Both before and after his mission to Warsaw Erik Sparre strove to safeguard the interests of Sweden and of the Råd by means of a document finally signed by John and Sigismund at Kalmar (September, 1587).

The so-called Statute of Kalmar asserted complete equality between Poland and Sweden and provided for arbitration of their differences on equal terms. In spirit, however, it recognised the precedence of the older kingdom. Sigismund, when King of both countries, might live in Poland

on condition of maintaining a Swedish council and chancery at his side and of visiting Sweden at least once in three years. In law and government, in foreign policy and religion, the Statute provided for the independence of Sweden and her provinces in Livonia and Russia with a care which extended even to the possibility of the King's inducing the Pope to absolve him from observing its provisions. The realm however was to be independent only in order that the Råd might govern. The substance of power in Sweden was to pass to a Council of seven great nobles, one of whom alone was to be chosen by the Duke. The design to depress Charles to the rank of a noble was so patent that the Statute was concealed from him for several years; and he therefore never acknowledged its validity.

No sooner had they reached their goal than both father and son wished to retrace their steps. John, soured by opposition and weary of ruling, cared for nothing save to regain the companionship of his heir. He favoured Sigismund's plan of abdication and met his son at Reval in the summer of 1589, resolved to bring him back to Sweden. The Swedes however united with the Poles in protesting against a repetition of the crime of Henry of Valois. Even the staff of John's army raised its voice to condemn so wanton a challenge to war. John, who had consistently defied the Råd, declaring that he would go to Reval "though men should fall as grass in summer before the scythe," answered only with harsh rebukes; but Sigismund, on whom many influences were at work, proved more pliable. At the end of September, after two months of intercourse, father and son parted; John with a thirst for vengeance upon the Råd which the remnant of his days proved too scanty to appease.

In his bitterness against his ancient allies John sought reconciliation with his ancient enemy. In 1590 he surrendered to the Duke all the advantages won at Arboga, Vadstena, and Kalmar, ascribing the several statutes to the machinations of wicked men. On these terms Charles gladly took upon himself a great part of the burden of government and countenanced the King's campaign against the rivals of monarchic power. Erik Sparre, Hogenskild and Ture Bielke, Axel Lejonhufvud and other great nobles were imprisoned and deprived of their fiefs on charges of treason, of which the most tangible was their original advocacy of the acceptance of the Polish Crown. At the same time the hereditary character of the monarchy was strengthened by a provision for an eventual female succession. The discord in Sweden favoured the Russians, who had renewed the war in January, 1590; while the aged King could only prosecute his generals and negotiate with the Tsar. In November, 1592, he died.

At the death of John, Sweden and Poland became associated under the sway of a King incapable either of compromise in politics or of tolerance in religion. Inscrutable, imaginative, chaste, tenacious, and

able, Sigismund was by no means a force to be despised. The elective character of the Polish Crown and the jealousy of the nobles towards the relics of royal power combined with his Swedish birth and Jesuit education to prevent him from becoming a Polish patriot. Unrestrained by ties of nationality, he surrendered himself to the service of Rome, and at her behest continued to bear the burden of Polish kingship. So to augment his power that he might become the northern counterpart of Philip II, a monarch who should purge Poland of heresy and bring Sweden and even Russia into the fold,—this was the dream of his life. The Jesuits were his counsellors, the Habsburgs his allies, and the Pope his master. Clement VIII, whose interest and influence in Poland had survived his mission of conciliation in the early days of Sigismund's rule, was not slow to insist upon the duty of converting Sweden. In the spring of 1593 he sent Bartolomeus Povsinski with a contribution of 20,000 *scudi* to further this aim. Sigismund was admonished to fill the vacant Swedish sees with Roman Catholics, and to provide in Stockholm, or, if that were impossible, in Poland, a Jesuit College for the Swedish youth.

Meanwhile the Swedish Church declared its Lutheranism by the Upsala Resolution, already noticed in a previous volume, which became the national covenant of the Swedish people. The fanatic Abraham Angermannus was appointed to the metropolitan see of Upsala, and all preparations were made for securing ecclesiastical guarantees from the King as a condition of his coronation. Amid the storms of the Counter-reformation, however, Sweden needed a ruler who could give her more than promises to refrain from assailing her Church. The union devised at Kalmar and upheld by the great nobles would at best revive the irresponsible aristocracy with which Gustavus had done away. It was likely to degrade Sweden to the position of a Polish dependency, to imperil her Church, and to sacrifice her empire. The natural centre of resistance to the vassalage of his country was Duke Charles, who had effected a reconciliation with the Råd and arranged, with the sanction of a small meeting of the Estates, that they should govern jointly with himself during his nephew's absence (January, 1593).

The authority of Charles, however, as none felt more keenly than himself, was indispensable to the welfare of Sweden rather than conformable to her laws. The history of the years (1592-9) during which Sigismund remained King of Sweden in name records the successive stages by which an impossible position changed into revolution. First it became clear that a genuine regency of Charles on behalf of Sigismund was impracticable. While great nobles such as Klas Fleming, the ruler of Finland, refused to recognise any authority but that of the King, Charles and the Råd tried in vain to extort from him a guarantee of the Upsala Resolution, and failing this to prevent him from setting foot in Sweden. At the end of September, 1593,

he landed at Stockholm, and Abraham Angermannus unwillingly stood face to face with the papal legate Malaspina. Sigismund found Duke, Råd, and Diet unanimous in their demand for the religious guarantee; and the favour which he could not refrain from showing to Poles and Romanists embittered the long struggle which followed. The King resisted with all his might the constitutional innovation of a guarantee prior to coronation. At last, however, he was forced to give way. He recognised the election of the heretic Archbishop, and received his crown at Upsala from the heretic Bishop of Strängnäs (February, 1594).

The victory had been won by the firmness of Charles. Scouting the King's offer of privileges for himself as the price of privileges for the Romanists, he arrayed an army at Upsala to uphold the policy of "No guarantee, no coronation." Sigismund, however, protested secretly and promised to the Papists what he had sworn to deny them. By the advice of Malaspina he conferred upon six of his dependents the dignity of Lord-Lieutenant (*Ståthållare*), hoping thereby to secure protection for the Romanists and to curtail the authority of Duke and Råd. Early in August, 1594, he returned to Poland. Charles sought to frustrate the disintegrating policy of the King by renewing his alliance with the Råd and by demanding the full powers of an Administrator of the kingdom. The benefits of his rule were patent to all. He earned the honourable nickname of Peasant King (*Bondekonung*). He contrived to pay the army, reduced the face-value of the debased coin, founded towns, and restored Upsala as a seat of learning. In May, 1595, moreover, he concluded the Peace of Teusin with the Tsar.

At Teusin the Swedes agreed to surrender the county of Keksholm in return for the recognition by Russia of their title to Narva and Esthonia, while a boundary commission was appointed to avoid the recurrence of old disputes. The establishment of peace with Russia and perhaps also the birth of his son Gustavus Adolphus (December 9, 1594) encouraged Charles in the inevitable conflict with Sigismund, the Romanists, and the Lords-Lieutenant. In order to set his authority beyond dispute he took up the weapons of his father. First he threatened to resign, and when this no longer sufficed to bend the Råd to his will, he made a direct appeal to the people. In October, 1595, the Estates, including representatives of the army, obeyed his summons to Söderköping and granted him all that he desired. Romanist priests were expelled from the kingdom; Romanist laymen, from office; and Sigismund was to rule only through the agency of Charles and the Råd.

Though some of the nobles dissented from the resolution of Söderköping, the Duke found in it a sufficient warrant to proceed. He pressed his claims with the masterful and lawyer-like assertion which marks the Vasa. Arguing that Sigismund, who had sworn to keep the law of Sweden, had thereby abjured the right to veto what a Diet resolved, he fell upon the Romanists and the Lords-Lieutenant. Klas

Fleming and the army of Finland, however, supported the King, and Charles failed to induce the Råd to levy war against them. He therefore broke with the Råd and the great nobles, but again courted and received a mandate from the nation. In February, 1597, the Estates, disregarding the inhibition of Sigismund and the unprecedented absence of the Råd, met at Arboga and admonished all men to embrace the cause of the Duke. Soon Elfsborg and Kalmar were in his hands, and every province had endorsed the Arboga resolution. Erik Sparre, Sten Banér, and the three Gustafssons fled the country; the commandant at Kalmar swore to resist Sigismund; and the revolution reached the stage of war. Once more a Vasa called the Swedish peasants to arms against a monarchy which, although the nobles for the most part adhered to it, was in fact a foreign tyranny. In 1596-7 Klas Fleming was forced to put down two peasants' risings in East Bothnia; and in the following year the men of Dalarne tortured and murdered James Neave, a royal officer who strove to rouse them against the Duke. At Stockholm (August, 1597), at Upsala (February, 1598), and at Vadstena (June, 1598), national assemblies showed that neither the abstention of a faction nor the commands of the King could shake the alliance between Duke and people. In 1597 Charles descended upon Finland, where Stålarms had succeeded Fleming, and took Åbo. Next year Gustaf Banér and Ture Bielke fled to Denmark.

At last Sigismund resolved to assert his authority by force of arms. In July, 1598, he despatched Stålarms with 3000 men to Gröneborg, north of Stockholm, while he himself sailed from Danzig to Kalmar. The army of Finland, which arrived first, fled at the sight of a few peasants led by two professors from Upsala. The King, however, was admitted to Kalmar and Stockholm, and many nobles embraced his cause. He sailed northward to Stegeborg, where a long negotiation under arms with the Duke developed into a battle. The royal troops gained the upper hand; but Sigismund called a halt at the moment of victory, only to be routed a fortnight later at Stångebro (September, 1598). He surrendered five members of the Råd as the price of an armistice, and it was provided by the Treaty of Linköping that both forces should disband.

Charles kept faith; but Sigismund as usual played false. He fled to Poland, where he was received with enthusiasm, and declared that he would return to Sweden as a conqueror. This conduct only hastened his deposition. In February, 1599, an assembly of nobles and bishops at Jonköping declared that, unless the King would return to Sweden without an army or send his son Wladislav to be brought up in the evangelical faith, they could obey him no longer. In July, after Charles had stormed Kalmar, Sigismund was formally deposed by the Diet assembled at Stockholm. Three months later the conquest of Finland was complete. At the same time Narva joyfully accepted the Protestant

Charles, and in April, 1600, Esthonia sought his protection against the aggressive nationalism of the Poles.

There was much, however, to mitigate and to disguise the revolution which was thus accomplished. The actual government of Sweden underwent little alteration. Sigismund had never ruled, and Charles was not yet King. "The Hereditary Prince of the realm of Sweden and Duke of Södermanland" had defeated an attempt of his nephew and the great nobles to deprive him of the political influence which he had acquired before the death of John, and which the mass of the nation was resolved that he should retain. His ideal of government, which was wholly conservative, remained unchanged. It was the personal rule of the head of the House of Vasa, fettered only by his oath to the nation and by the law of Sweden. Valuing the principles of Gustavus more than primogeniture, he took the crown from the head of a nephew, without any ambition to place it on his own. To him the revolution was a necessary but unwelcome act of policy. The Swedish nation had none the less usurped by force rights which it had granted to the Vasa in 1544, but which in the hands of Sigismund menaced its independence and its religion. This was revolution; and it was glorious because it defied not merely Sigismund and his faction, but also the Catholic Reaction in Europe. By his championship of Protestantism, as in much else, Charles IX connects the work of the first and of the second Gustavus.

In personal character and in domestic government Charles IX was his father's heir. He showed himself, it is true, more devout but less virtuous than Gustavus, while in his dealings with men he was more upright but less adroit. Both Kings were brave, indefatigable, grasping, suspicious, violent, and practical. In husbanding the national estate, in frankly taking the people into their counsel, in swiftly overwhelming opponents, and in pressing to the utmost every royal claim, the founder and the refounder of the Vasa dynasty were alike. Gustavus, however, was compelled by circumstances to confine himself to endeavours at home in Sweden; but Charles, on the other hand, played his part on a stage enlarged by forty years of rivalry with the nations of the north. In an augmented and less secluded Sweden he practised anew the principles of his father and thus rendered possible the achievements of his son.

A severity not less than that which Gustavus had shown to pretenders was dealt out by Charles to the party of Sigismund. The victories at Kalmar and in Finland were followed by executions, among them that of the innocent son of Klas Fleming. These acts of vengeance foreshadowed the tragedy of the Råd. In February, 1600, when the Estates met at Linköping, Charles selected 153 of their number to try thirteen great nobles whom he accused of treason. The judges, though temporarily released from their allegiance to the Duke, gave sentence according to his will; and Erik Sparre, Sten and Gustaf Banér, Ture

Bielke and Bengt Falk were beheaded in the market-place. Five years later, after a similar trial at Stockholm, "the old fox Hogenskild Bielke" shared their fate; and in 1604 the proscription of lesser men was completed at the Diet of Norrköping.

If Charles showed no mercy to traitors, he was himself pedantically careful of the hereditary right to the Crown. The deposition of Sigismund was conditional, and more than once a loophole was left open for the eventual succession of his heir Wladislaw. The Diet of Linköping, however, provided that after five months' grace the succession should pass to Charles IX, then to Gustavus Adolphus and his heirs male, and, failing such, to Duke John of Östergötland, Sigismund's half-brother, at that time aged ten. Yet it was not until four years had elapsed, and John had publicly renounced his birthright, that Charles consented to style himself King. His coronation was deferred until 1607; the *Ericsgait*, his inaugural progress through the realm, until 1609. Finally, by his will Gustavus Adolphus was not to succeed him unless John should waive his claims when grown to manhood and the Estates should choose his cousin King.

As the Blood-bath of Stockholm in 1520 had removed domestic rivals from the path of Gustavus, so the Blood-bath of Linköping cleared the path of Charles IX. Secure against faction in Sweden, he was able to fling himself into the struggle with Poland, which lasted throughout his reign, and the struggle with Denmark, which threatened at the beginning and broke out at the end. In 1600 Sigismund took steps to make a national affair of his dynastic quarrel. He ceded Esthonia to Poland, but failed to win more than the passive acquiescence of the Diet in a war with Sweden at his own risk and cost. Nevertheless the Poles imprisoned the Swedish envoys; and Charles replied by invading Livonia with some 9000 men (August, 1600). By March, 1601, he was master of the lands north of the Düna. The castle of Kokenhausen and the city of Riga barred his progress, but the Livonians showed signs of sympathy with their fellow Protestants in the struggle with a Romanist Power. The peril of their province, however, roused the Poles, and in five campaigns they proved that they were still the foremost warriors of northern Europe. In 1601 they reconquered Livonia as far north as Wolmar, where they captured Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm, the King's natural son, and Jacob de La Gardie, whose mother was the natural daughter of John III. So long as the King lived, Sigismund kept Karl Karlsson in prison, often in chains, thus provoking a fresh animosity within the House of Vasa.

In the campaigns of 1602, 1603, and 1604 Zamoyski and Chodkiewicz made steady progress in recovering and defending the fortresses which dominated the exhausted plain. They penetrated into Esthonia, and the Swedes twice failed to retake Weissenstein. In 1605, therefore, after the unsuccessful general Stålbarm had been condemned for treason,

Charles himself resumed the command which he had laid down after his first successes. He lacked, however, the coolness of a successful strategist. At Kirkholm, a day's march south-east of Riga, he fell upon Chodkiewicz with a greatly superior force; but his rash generalship brought upon his army a terrible defeat (September, 1605). The Poles could boast that the Swedes left upon the field thrice as many dead as Chodkiewicz had men. Barely escaping with his life from a field where some 8000 of his troops perished, Charles returned to Sweden as hastily as he had come. King and nation alike faced with courage both the wreck of the army of Livonia and the prospect that the Russian pretender, known to history as the First False Demetrius, would as Tsar reward Sigismund with his alliance. Next year, though the Swedes in Livonia were still too weak to take the aggressive, the death of Demetrius and Zamoyski paralysed their opponents, while in Sweden the Catholic Petrus Petroska planned in vain to assassinate the King.

It may well be that the greatest dangers which confronted Charles were due to his own stubborn Calvinism. The Swedish Church, no longer subservient to the Crown, scouted the King's proposals for even the smallest modification of its intolerant Lutheran teaching. From 1607-10 Charles made futile efforts to unite the two communions. By threatening to decline the Crown he continued to induce the Estates to accept a clause in the Royal Guarantee of 1604, which provided that the Upsala Resolution and the Augsburg Confession should be the rule of government only so far as they were founded on God's Word in the Scriptures. Now, as in 1593, however, he displayed towards the Lutherans a statesmanlike restraint which contrasts strongly with his violence towards the Råd and foreign Powers.

Although war and religious controversy were raging, the restless energy of Charles found vent in many domestic reforms. In 1600 he took a great step towards the establishment of a provincial standing army. Next year, as he returned from Livonia, he paused to organise the government of Finland and to cut down the liberties of the nobles to the level of those enjoyed by their peers in Sweden. He then journeyed round the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia, making choice of sites for towns. In May, 1602, he met a Diet at Stockholm, and struck the keynote of his domestic policy by restoring the Råd in conformity with the law of the land. This measure, though conservative, was not reactionary, for a decade of persecution had tamed the existing generation of high nobles. Thenceforward the Crown possessed in the Råd a corporation of notables whose services, individual and collective, it could claim on behalf of the realm.

At the same time the King grappled with the questions of the codification of the law and the establishment of a supreme tribunal, both of which projects cost him much toil and brought little immediate advantage. In 1604 a great Succession Act was framed. This arranged

for the hereditary devolution of the Crown upon both male and female Vasa, while it took the right of inheritance from all who departed from the established religion, or married a wife holding any false religion, or married without the knowledge of the Estates, or accepted another throne. With this Bill of Rights which, excepting perhaps Charles himself, every successor of Gustavus had transgressed, was coupled an enactment that no dissidents in matters of religion should be suffered to dwell or to hold property in Sweden. Only the firmness of the King saved the followers of Zwingli and Calvin from express condemnation.

Sweden still lacked anything like an organised administration, and men competent to govern were rare. Impatient at the dearth of qualified assistants, Charles made such impracticable proposals as that every nobleman should forfeit his nobility if he failed to provide his sons with learning sufficient for their serving the State in office. While the number of educated nobles was slowly increasing, the main burden of directing the administration still fell upon the King. Charles promoted manufactures, regulated commerce, worked minerals, controlled the bailiffs of the Crown, planned canals, reformed weights and measures, and raised up such abiding monuments to his memory as Karlstad, Filipstad, Mariestad, and Göteborg.

These manifold contributions to the political and economic structure of Sweden were made under a cloud of war which did not lift as the reign advanced. In Livonia Count von Mansfeld gained fortresses when the Poles were absorbed in domestic strife, and lost them again when Chodkievich and an adequate force confronted him. As the result of four campaigns (1607-10) the Swedish power was restored in Esthonia and overthrown further south. In 1611 an armistice suspended the unprofitable strife. The combatants, however, were still the allies of conflicting parties in Russia, where a second False Demetrius had claimed the throne with Polish support. Early in 1609 Charles had concluded at Viborg an eternal alliance with the Tsar Basil against Sigismund and his successors. Next year, in the hope of gaining the county of Keksholm for Sweden, Jacob de La Gardie led an army of mercenaries to Moscow. Meanwhile Zolkiewski was despatched by Sigismund to make Wladislav Tsar. In June, 1610, he encountered the allies at Klutsjino. The mercenaries deserted, the Russians fled, de La Gardie and his 400 men capitulated, and the throne of Basil collapsed. In 1611, according to a treaty between the Poles and Moscow, Wladislav became Tsar. De La Gardie therefore seized Keksholm in March and Novgorod in July, and concluded with Novgorod a treaty which secured the throne for Gustavus Adolphus or his brother Charles Philip.

At the moment when the duel between the Vasa rivals entered upon this new phase, the ambitious young King of Denmark, Christian IV, at last prevailed on his Estates to sanction a war with Sweden. The claims of the Vasa to wear the Three Crowns and to exercise rights of

sovereignty over the Lapps in the extreme north of Scandinavia played their wonted part among the Danish grievances, while the foundation of Göteborg and the Swedish veto upon trade with Riga and Kurland formed more substantial excuses for war. Thus menaced from two sides, Charles met his Estates at Örebro (November, 1610). He was now worn and aged. Men complained that he was led by low-born counsellors. Twice he had been struck down by apoplexy, and he was forced to leave Gustavus Adolphus to speak on his behalf. His spirit, however, was unbroken, and it was his firmness which induced the reluctant Diet to defy the Danes and to provide for a new army of 25,000 men.

In April, 1611, Christian declared war, and immediately despatched forces to the mouth of the Göta and to Kalmar. Near Kalmar, which gives its name to the war, the two Kings confronted each other throughout the summer months. Gustavus Adolphus, now in the field as well as at home his father's mainstay, surprised Kristianopol; but the great fortress of Kalmar was treacherously surrendered to the Danes. In his rage Charles challenged Christian to single combat, receiving however only coarse taunts in reply. At the close of the campaign he turned towards his capital, but died before he reached it (October, 1611).

After playing for more than forty years a leading part in every crisis of Swedish history, Charles IX left his country surrounded by peril. In the present struggle Denmark, which had never been more formidable, was the half-unconscious ally of the Counter-reformation. The "War of Kalmar" claimed all the energy which Sweden still possessed at a moment when it seemed that Russia might either become hers or pass to her irreconcilable foe, Sigismund. The loyalty of the people, moreover, had been strained by the burden of incessant struggles. The northern provinces were refusing to provide troops for the invasion of Norway, while the mercenaries plundered a country which left them short of pay. The nation, indeed, had gained strength since the Reformation. The Church was now solid, national, and militant, and Sweden was no longer destitute of industry, commerce, and education. Yet never had she stood in greater need of a strong King to save her from foreign foes and to endow her with an organised central administration.

For nearly two months after the death of Charles, however, the throne remained unfilled, while Queen Christina and Duke John carried on the government. Then, in December, 1611, the Estates met at Nyköping. In their presence John once more abjured all claim to the Crown together with the rights of co-regency which the Diet of Norrköping had conferred upon him till Gustavus Adolphus should reach the age of twenty-four years. He was still ruler of Östergötland, while Charles Philip received the duchy of Södermanland by his father's will. In consequence of the late King's affectionate treatment of Duke John, Gustavus Adolphus was secure against immediate rivalry from the only one of the Swedish Vasa who might have been dangerous. The

irregularity of the succession, however, gave the nobles a favourable opportunity for driving a hard bargain with the Crown. They sought, in the main with success, both security against such judicial persecutions as Charles IX. had practised, and also a share in the government proportioned to their social weight. By the Royal Guarantee of 1611 Gustavus bound himself to confer upon them many great titular offices and to secure the consent of the Råd and Estates in matters of legislation, peace, war, and alliance. He undertook to consult the Råd before ordering new levies of men or money, or convoking the Estates. These concessions did much to secure complete harmony between King and nation in confronting the Danish and all other perils.

Much too was due to the personality of Gustavus. Thanks to his father and to the century in which he lived, he was already, at the age of seventeen years, well versed in humane learning, administration, and war. Under the tutorship of John Skytte he had steeped himself in the works of the ancient historians. German was the language of his mother, and Oxenstierna testifies that "he spoke Latin, Dutch, French and Italian just as if born to them, understood Spanish, English and Scotch, and had also a smattering of Polish and Muscovite." As a Protestant he inherited a love of the Bible; as a child of the Renaissance, a taste for music, poesy, and eloquence. He had moreover served a strict apprenticeship in state-craft. When but nine years of age he began to attend the sessions of the Råd. At thirteen he heard complaints and received ambassadors. At fifteen he became Duke of Västmanland, and practically co-regent with his father. The truce of 1609 between Spain and the Dutch sent a host of *condottieri* to the north, and from them he learned the art of Spinola and Maurice of Nassau. Already he showed signs of that versatile talent for war which was to ripen into perfect mastery, so that he became equally expert in inventing appliances and organisation, in selecting conscripts and pointing cannon, in heading a troop of horse and in planning a campaign. What laurels Sweden had gained in 1611 were of his gathering.

In form and feature he was kingly, according to the heroic type which his people revered. He could control his hereditary choler better than the hereditary impulse to be foremost in every fight. Only once is it recorded that he played the tyrant. Then—in 1631—a young courtier, Erik Rålamb, insulted him and fled. Gustavus, inexorable for nine months, cashiered the father on the ground that he should have brought up his son better, and confined him to his house until Erik should return to duty. The connexion with Margaret Cabeliau, who gave birth to Gustaf Gustafsson of Vasaborg in May, 1616, was quite unworthy of the lover of Ebba Brahe. Yet these rare stains, not surprising in a Vasa, enhance the glory of his habitual self-mastery.

Like all the members of his House who wore the crown, Gustavus possessed versatile ability and the ambition to embody it in some great

work. Though as loyal to fact as Gustavus I or Charles IX, he breathed an atmosphere of idealism, and therefore surpassed them in power over the hearts of men. The noble generosity of his temperament made it easy for the sons of the victims of his father's judicial murders to rally round his throne. For a moment, so late as 1622, he dreamed that he might obliterate his disputes with Sigismund in a crusade against the enemies of their common faith. What was of chief importance to Sweden and to Europe was that in Gustavus this unique endowment was accompanied by true statesmanship. Though ardent in pursuing certain lofty aims, the creation of an enduring machine of government, the enlightenment of his people, the ascendancy of Sweden in the north, and the defence of Protestantism, he could discern the right moment for advance, the best path to follow, and the distance which it was safe to travel. Free from jealousy and suspicion, he could moreover avail himself of the sagacity and formulating power of Axel Oxenstierna, the great Chancellor whom he found ready to his hand and in whom he recognised the perfect complement to himself.

The King's first task was to end the "War of Kalmar" on honourable terms. Christian, who was enlisting many thousands of German mercenaries, would not hear of peace, and the winter and summer campaigns of 1612 witnessed the usual ferocious devastation of border provinces by both sides. In January, 1612, he was beaten back from the walls of Gullberg, where women shared in the defence and the wife of the commandant ordered thirty prisoners to be slain. Next month Gustavus, who bore the chief burden of command, was surprised by Rantzau near Vittsjö, and had an extremely narrow escape from death. In the winter campaign, none the less, the balance of success inclined towards the Swedes, but in May it was more than redressed by the loss of Elfsborg and Gullberg.

The Danes now held the keys of Sweden and were lords of the Baltic. They threatened a combined march on Jonköping—Christian from Elfsborg, Rantzau from Kalmar. Gustavus, however, appealed to the people to repel a foe too strong for the royal arms. The peasants obeyed, filled the country-side with irregulars, and forced both invading armies to retreat. Christian next menaced Stockholm by sea, but was repulsed. Unable to bear further the cost of a war which was unpopular in Denmark, and fearful that the Dutch might intervene to get rid of the Sound dues, he accepted the mediation of James I of England. In January, 1613, by the Peace of Knäred, each side gave up its conquests and conceded to the other the right to bear the Three Crowns. Sweden renounced her empty but irritating claims to portions of Christian's dominions. The ancient mutual freedom from customs duties was restored, and the Swedes, receiving the right of free passage through the Sound, promised to refrain from impeding Danish commerce with Livonia and Kurland. Elfsborg, with the other Swedish posts at the

mouth of the Göta, and seven counties in Västergötland, were left in the hands of the Danes as security for the payment of an indemnity of one million *thalers* in specie within six years.

Gustavus thus began his reign by buying off the Swedish nobles with privileges and the Danish armies with money. The ransom of Elfsborg, nominally more than six times as high as in 1570, laid a heavy poll-tax upon the people and forced the King to sacrifice more than 30 per cent. of his revenue and to coin his plate. This was the prelude to a long series of imposts; for the new reign, like that of Charles IX, was a period of almost unceasing war. To the strain which war imposed upon the King and nation was added that of administration, organisation, and social change during the two decades of Sweden's most rapid domestic development. That the country endured so much was primarily due to the frank and cordial cooperation between Crown and people which Gustavus successfully established. Innocent of dynastic self-seeking, he never feared to take his subjects into his counsel. He convoked Diets, or smaller conventions, almost every year, and in 1617 gave the Four Estates (nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants) their first regulations for meeting (*Riksdagsordning*). The people responded when the need arose by waiving all privilege, and placing themselves and their money at the disposal of the Crown.

Gustavus sacrificed much at Knäred that he might be free to devote himself to affairs beyond the Baltic. For the moment his chief problem was the war with Russia. Firm peace with Poland was indeed impossible so long as Sigismund persisted in claiming the allegiance of Sweden. From 1611, however, by a truce which was prolonged until 1617, the two branches of the House of Vasa had agreed to forego their domestic dissensions in the hope of profiting by the anarchy of Russia. Sigismund dreamed of bequeathing the Crowns of Poland, Sweden, and Russia to his sons; while Gustavus, with perhaps a juster appreciation of Muscovite national strength, embraced the opportunity of fortifying Sweden by erecting a firm bulwark at her neighbour's expense. While the King was struggling with the Danes, Jacob de La Gardie made Novgorod a base for the conquest of Ingria. Nöteborg, which was reputed impregnable, was starved into surrender. Narva and other places also capitulated, and the progress of the Swedish arms was arrested only by the walls of Pskoff.

The national revival at Moscow in 1613, however, threatened to destroy the domination of both Swedes and Poles in Russia. "Rather perish than be severed from Moscow" was the answer of Novgorod when Gustavus proposed to convert western Russia into a Swedish Lithuania. Pskoff with some 3000 defenders held out so bravely that the Swedes hemmed it in with a belt of devastation 20 leagues in breadth. Without reinforcements and supplies de La Gardie and his conquests were in peril. Michael Romanoff, the new Tsar, was bent on becoming lord

of Novgorod, and his forces profited by their vast superiority in numbers to regain Tichvin and Gdoff (Augdow).

The conclusion of peace with Denmark enabled Gustavus to despatch a new army to Russia. The unruly Scots and Germans who formed the bulk of it proved, however, so mischievous, that he might well believe his own presence necessary at the seat of war. In January, 1614, he held a momentous Diet at Orebro. After controverting the charge that he made war to satisfy his martial instincts, he secured the co-operation of the Estates against Russia and Poland if an honourable peace was not to be had. One of the gravest defects in the government of Sweden was remedied by the creation of a Supreme Court, while an Economic Ordinance was directed against the scandals of purveyance and compulsory posting. Then, rejecting all counsels and entreaties, the King set out for the East, travelling day and night along the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. In July de La Gardie crushed the invaders from Moscow at Bronitsi, and in September the King recovered Gdoff by storm. He returned in triumph to Sweden, bringing with him de La Gardie, whose ascendancy in the East was not devoid of danger to the Crown.

Gustavus now aimed at securing what the Swedish arms had won, but despite her internal distractions the barbaric pride of Russia long impeded the conclusion of peace. In 1615 Evert Horn, the successor of de La Gardie, fell before Pskoff, and the King returned to undertake the siege in person. After three months, however, he was glad to accept once more the good offices of England, a Power whose interest it was to dissuade her commercial *protégé*, Russia, from self-destruction.

At last, by accepting the mediation of his new allies, the Dutch, and by threatening to make common cause with Sigismund, he extorted the Peace of Stolbova from the Tsar (February, 1617). By surrendering Novgorod and recognising Michael Romanoff, the Swedes gained the fortress and country of Keksholm, north-western Ingria, the renunciation of the Russian pretensions to Esthonia and Livonia, mutual freedom of trade between Russia and Sweden, and an indemnity of 20,000 *roubles*. Finland, whose administration had been reorganised by the King in the winter and spring of 1615-6, now stretched along the shores of the northern half of Lake Ladoga, while the fortress of Nöteborg secured her against invasion. It seemed that the Swedish Empire had acquired a durable natural frontier against a neighbour whose potential greatness her King, like his grandfather, perceived. Without her approval, as Gustavus boasted, Russia could not launch a boat upon the Baltic. He exhorted the Swedish gentry to take up estates in Ingria, and the burghers to profit by the opening of Russia to their wares. Embassy after embassy was despatched to keep the Russian Court in good humour and the Russian grain-market open to the Swedish armies. Gustavus even helped to instruct and recruit the forces of the Tsar. He hoped

that the Power bridled at Stolbova might be a helpful ally in the war with Poland which now broke out anew.

The War of Succession between the two branches of the House of Vasa fills a great space in the history of Sweden and of Poland during sixty years (1600-60). That part of it (1617-29), however, which falls within the reign of Gustavus is specially conspicuous in the general history of Europe. It may be described as that portion of the Thirty Years' War which rendered possible the Swedish intervention in Germany. From its outbreak Gustavus was consciously taking part in the great struggle of Protestantism against the Catholic Reaction. Sigismund, who had become closely associated with the throne of Habsburg by his marriage with the Archduchess Anna in 1592, was determined to purge Livonia of heresy and to restore Sweden to Rome. Dynastic necessity no less than personal conviction therefore made Gustavus the champion of the faith which in three generations had become the symbol of Swedish national freedom. At Örebro, early in 1617, he armed himself with a fiercely intolerant statute which decreed that every Romanist must quit the realm on penalty of forfeiture and death, a doom in which three of the four Estates would gladly have included Calvinists.

The fact that he was menaced by a Jesuit-Habsburg crusade rather than by a single crowned litigant compelled him to look beyond Poland for the disease and beyond Sweden for the remedy. Aggression, he believed, constituted the best defence for Sweden, and he hoped by aggression to gain provinces. But whatever its issue, the struggle was inevitable and the nature of the enemy made the interests of Sweden and of Protestantism identical. Sweden hoped to gain the alliance of Brandenburg, and to cement it by the King's marriage. Skytte discussed with James I the plan of a great evangelical alliance, and laboured to convince the Dutch that his master was fighting their battle against Poland and Spain. Count Palatine John Casimir of Zweibrücken, the brother-in-law and assistant of the King, dwelt on the same theme in the Protestant Courts of Germany. The old Scandinavian discords, however, had left a great hindrance in the way of Protestant union. Denmark was still the jealous rival of Sweden rather than a sister Protestant Power. Until 1619 Elfsborg remained in Danish hands. Then Gustavus met Christian at Halmstad and strove by personal influence to avert the danger to Sweden and to the Protestant cause. It was not until 1628, however, when the Danish forces had been crushed by Tilly and Wallenstein, that Sweden dared to devote the bulk of her strength to war beyond the Baltic. It was in the Polish struggle of 1617-29 moreover that the Swedes first gained great military skill and reputation. Hitherto the armies of their Vasa Kings had gained few victories on land except against the Russians, and for some years they

In 1617 and 1618, while Poland was still at war with Russia, the Swedes devastated parts of Livonia and captured Pernau. Sigismund then made a truce of fourteen years with Russia and of three years with Sweden, but became embroiled in a disastrous struggle with the Turks. Gustavus, having vainly offered to purchase peace by restoring the conquests made by Sweden since 1600, assembled a large army and strove to heighten its discipline, regimental *esprit de corps*, and even piety, by issuing his famous Articles of War. In July, 1621, he left Sweden with 158 ships and besieged Riga with 19,000 men. The great German city, free, populous, and Protestant, held out bravely for five weeks, and then experienced the usual politic clemency of her conqueror. Gustavus, whose exploit made him famous in Europe, is styled *Magnus* on the medal which commemorates his success. He designed to make Riga the corner-stone of a new Swedish province in Livonia and Kurland. Prince Radzivil, however, now stronger by reason of the close of the Turkish war, regained what Gustavus had conquered after the fall of Riga, and the King's army was too ill-found to win it back. In August, 1622, a truce was negotiated which endured for three years.

During this breathing-space, the last which Gustavus was destined to enjoy, Sweden did not put off her armour. The position in Livonia was such as to afford no hope of a settlement without a renewal of strife. The inflexibility of Sigismund was not weakened by the triumphs of his allies in Germany. Pernau and Riga, too, could not well remain politically separate from the province whose janitors they were. In July, 1623, the rumour that a Polish armada was preparing against him brought Gustavus in haste to Danzig with twenty warships. While Sigismund and his Court feasted on shore, the Swedes extorted from the city an undertaking to respect the truce, and even demanded a pledge of permanent neutrality. Next year, in consequence of her violation of the free commercial intercourse provided for by the Treaty of Knäred, Sweden stood for a moment on the verge of war with Denmark. When this danger passed, Gustavus and Christian, as is related elsewhere, became competitors for the leadership of the Protestant expedition into Germany. Thus, when the Truce with Sigismund expired, Gustavus stood at the head of an army which for eight years had been either fighting or awaiting the signal to fight, and in which feudalism had been giving place to a centralised national organisation.

In these years too the hold of Gustavus upon his people had grown even stronger than before. The circle of the Swedish Vasa had contracted until only its centre remained. Duke John died in 1618, Catharine Stenbock, Dowager of Gustavus I, in 1621, and Christina, Dowager of Charles IX, in 1625. Above all, in 1622, the King's younger brother, Charles Philip, fell in the Livonian war. Their appanages escheated to the Crown, and the danger from the duchies was at an end; but the succession was insecure. In 1620 the King

had married Maria Eleonora, sister of the Elector George William of Brandenburg; but they were as yet without an heir. More than ever, the destiny of Sweden hung upon the life of the King.

Throughout his reign Gustavus Adolphus responded to every national need. He possessed neither the necessary authority for autocratic reform, nor was this part of his ambition. The monarchy of Sweden, it is true, was still in great part patriarchal, and her administration rude. While the King made incessant journeys through his dominions, the seat of government moved with him. While he was at the head of his army over-seas, during almost one-half of the years 1621-32, the administration was carried on by a small committee of the Råd, nominated, limited and instructed by himself. The Diet, though gaining power at the expense of the provincial assemblies, had hardly attained to the stage of definition reached by the English Parliament at the accession of Edward I. The Råd, although the centre of events tended to make it the centre of the government, was as yet rather an aggregate of active grandees than a permanent cabinet council. The competence of the several organs of administration was determined in great measure by the personality of their respective chiefs. When the King is found applying in vain to Upsala for a qualified diplomatic clerk, it is not surprising that Axel Oxenstierna could invest the Chancery, the writing-office of the Crown, with something of his own eminence, that Jacob de La Gardie could shape the administration of the army, or Gustavus himself fashion the Supreme Court to his own design.

But the rudimentary organisation of the State did not imply the autocracy of the King. Besides the limitations upon his power imposed by his concessions to the nobles and those inevitably attendant on the rule of law which he was building up, Gustavus had to reckon with the conservatism of the clergy. In 1623 he made the chief of a series of efforts to achieve a reform which lay very near his heart—the establishment of an orderly central authority in the Swedish Church. He proposed to create a General Ecclesiastical Consistory composed of six clerical and six civil officials, and to charge it with the oversight not only of worship, doctrine, and discipline, but also of education, charitable foundations, and the press. Negotiations continued for more than a year, but the King was unable to overcome the stubborn resistance of the clergy to the intrusion of laymen, and he failed to accomplish his design.

In inspiring his lieutenants, however, and in removing the friction and inertia which had hitherto retarded social and constitutional progress, Gustavus rendered priceless services to Sweden. The definition of rights and duties and the centralisation of government, which were of necessity abiding aims of his policy, found notable expression in the foundation of the House of Nobles soon after the Polish Truce had ended. It had long been a grievance of the Vasa that noble status with its freedom from ordinary taxation was often usurped by their subjects without license

from the Crown. In June, 1626, Gustavus authorised the building of the *Riddarhus*, a hall of meeting in the capital for those enrolled as noble, and thereby stereotyped into a hierarchic corporation those Swedes who could vindicate their claims to nobility or who might thereafter be ennobled by the King. The chief of the four Orders of the Diet thus received the definition and organisation which had been repudiated by the Church. Reform could, however, claim only the intervals in strife.

Apart from the peril to the King's own person, to which alone the political vision of Gustavus was always blind, all the interests of Sweden dictated the renewal of the war with Poland in 1625. An attack upon Livonia would paralyse Sigismund and divide the enemies of the Protestant cause, while its conquest would give Sweden a new province and a bastion on the side of Poland. To confuse the enemy a triple attack was devised. Gyllenhielm with a small force was to descend upon Windau, while de La Gardie and Gustaf Horn with the army of the Baltic Provinces laid siege to Dorpat, and the King and John Banér employed the mercenaries in the neighbourhood of Riga. The Swedes were everywhere successful. Within three months almost all Livonia was theirs. While the German burghers of Dorpat were rejoicing at the advent of Protestants, Gustavus was capturing the strong places of Kurland, together with Birze, the border fortress of Lithuania. Too far-seeing to attempt the conquest of a Romanist people, he hoped that the suffering Lithuanians might influence Sigismund to make peace.

At this point, however, the Swedes received a check. A Polish force under Gonsievski drove Horn from the south-east of Livonia. Two armies, with Radzivil and the distinguished statesman Leo Sapieha in command, confronted Gustavus in Kurland. At the end of November the King wrote to Oxenstierna from Berson, "Hunger and cold have driven us hither. I have seen more misery on the way than ever before in my fifteen years of war." All through December he worked incessantly to avert starvation. On January 7, 1626, however, a brilliant feat of arms determined the issue of the war. At Wallhof, fighting against odds of perhaps five to one, Gustavus crushed Sapieha's army almost without loss to his own. He then returned to Sweden, leaving Livonia to await peace and to regain strength under a separate and liberal administration, to which the University of Dorpat, founded in 1630, still bears witness.

The campaigns of 1625 had proved how valuable to the Swedes were the resolute strategy of Gustavus and the reforms introduced by him into their discipline and tactics. In 1626 he sought to reap a still richer harvest in Prussia. East Prussia was a fief of the Polish Crown, ruled by Queen Maria Eleonora's brother, the Elector George William of Brandenburg. West Prussia, in many respects a second Livonia, might afford Gustavus abundant supplies and a theatre of war convenient for observing the struggle in Germany and for compelling

Sigismund to make peace. At the end of June, 1626, the Swedes, some 14,000 strong, descended upon both provinces of Prussia. Gustavus ridiculed the idea that Brandenburg could stand aside while the existence of Protestantism was at stake. Pillau, the port of Königsberg, had 28 feet of water, and he seized it as a naval base. By also blockading Danzig, where a great Protestant community, careless of all interests save its own, grew rich upon the commerce of the Vistula, he was able to lay hands upon the customs dues of all Prussia and to make the war in a great measure self-supporting. Having thus secured access to the mainland, Gustavus next endeavoured to conquer the Polish littoral. His success was swift and far-reaching. Danzig alone proved obstinate. In Catholic Ermeland as well as in West Prussia the towns opened their gates. Both provinces were reorganised as dominions of Sweden, retaining their privileges but paying heavy taxes for the war. Here, as wherever the Swedes triumphed, the Jesuits were expelled and a Lutheran organisation introduced. He then occupied the district to the west of the Vistula and hemmed in Danzig by land and sea. Two months elapsed before Sigismund was able to dispute his progress. A futile attempt to recover Mewe on the Vistula was a fresh demonstration of the inferiority of the Polish troops. Encouraged by the news from Germany, however, Sigismund offered impossible terms of peace. In October, having committed the administration to Oxenstierna and the army to Wrangel, Gustavus returned to Sweden. On December 8 his daughter Christina was born.

Although the Polish War had still more than three years to run, its main results were now achieved. Henceforward the Swedes were hindered by the wounds and sickness of their King and by the stubborn valour of Danzig rather than by Sigismund and his army. On the other hand cold, hunger, and sickness cost them thousands of lives. Prussia was stripped bare, and the vast extent of Poland made it impossible for them to strike the decisive blow.

At the same time, the downfall of Christian IV and of the Protestant power in Germany brought into closer connexion the eastern and the western wars. In 1627 one of Wallenstein's regiments joined the army of Sigismund. The Elector of Brandenburg, after long hesitation, took sides for a moment with his overlord, only to suffer fresh humiliations when half his force deserted to Gustavus and he lost Marienwerder and Memel. Before the campaign of 1628 opened, the King's plan for an offensive war of defence against the Habsburgs had received the assent of a secret committee of the four Estates. Sweden became the ally of Denmark and assisted in the defence of Stralsund.

Gustavus now commanded more than 30,000 men; but until February, 1629, the Poles gained the fruits of victory by avoiding battle. Then, near Gurzno, Wrangel shattered an army of some 6000 men under Potocki. He lost no more than 90 men, but was

compelled to retreat from the walls of Thorn. In the summer the presence of Arnim with 10,000 Imperialist troops recalled Gustavus to the war. The Swedes were surprised at Stuhm, where the King had a hair-breadth escape from death or capture; but they made good their retreat to Marienburg. At last his own ill-health, the exhaustion of his dominions, and the danger from Habsburg designs on Prussia overcame the obstinacy of Sigismund. Charnacé, the envoy of Richelieu, took the lead in mediation, and on September 26, 1629, a six years' truce was signed at Altmark. On condition of surrendering the remainder of her conquests Sweden gained the tranquil possession of Livonia and a great part of the coast of Prussia, including Braunsberg, Elbing, Pillau, and Memel. George William received Marienburg and other compensation in West Prussia. The Swedes secured freedom of worship for the Protestants whom they surrendered to Poland, and—a boon surpassed only by that of relief from the Polish War—they acquired financial support for the war in Germany, since the customs dues, which in 1629 exceeded half a million *riksdaler*, were left in their hands.

The reign of Gustavus after the Truce of Altmark forms an integral part of the Thirty Years' War. His embarkation in 1630 with an army entirely equipped at home commemorates, however, the industrial and commercial progress which had formed a constant ideal of his rule. "The King's Majesty," said Oxenstierna, "controls and steers mines, commerce, manufactures, and customs just as a steersman steers his ship." Gustavus indeed spared no effort to further mining and metal-working under the strict control of the Crown. In order to concentrate commerce and manufactures within the towns, he increased their number, conferred privileges upon them, and protected them by law against the competition of the country districts. In 1614 trade with foreigners was confined to thirteen staple towns, while the market towns (*Uppstäder*) received a monopoly of trade between Swedish subjects.

The principle that industry and commerce should be controlled by the Crown permeated the economic policy of Sweden. The King embraced with enthusiasm the plan of a South Sea trading Company. Industries were committed to the rule of guilds. The monopoly of trade with foreign lands, first in copper, then in iron, corn, and salt, was granted to chartered companies. All these experiments were made when Sweden was perpetually at war and when the financial burden of war could not be thrown upon the future. Although much of the economic policy of Gustavus was unsuccessful, Sweden became eminent in the industries necessary to war, her internal communications were improved, and fifteen new towns were established by the King. Four great free schools, in Västerås, Strängnäs, Linköping, and Åbo, were of his creation, and in 1624 he endowed the University of Upsala with more than three hundred manors, comprising almost the whole of his private estates. The twenty years of his reign were a time of constitutional

advance, of profitable conquest, of military organisation, and of the growth of a richer, more harmonious, and nobler national life.

The glory of Gustavus is enhanced by contrast with the reaction and decadence which characterise the first five-and-forty years of Vasa sovereignty in Poland. For a century after Sigismund's accession, indeed, the Polish magnates continued to be famous for magnificence, valour, and freedom. They believed that their constitution secured the Polish nation in the enjoyment of the fairest fruits of the three great principles of government: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Yet the reign of Sigismund is but the beginning of the long chastisement brought upon the Poles by the arrogant individualism which had dictated the establishment of a weak elective monarchy in 1573, and which was destined in two centuries to dissolve the State. A vassal of the Church, a stranger both to self-interest and patriotism, Sigismund derived in great part his domestic policy from the Jesuits, and his foreign policy from the Habsburgs. In 1589 and 1590, he left to his subjects the defence of the Polish frontiers against the Tartars and the Turks; and a decade later the Poles in their turn refused to concern themselves with the recovery of his Swedish throne. Disunion between King and people is the chief characteristic of Polish history in a reign far from inglorious in war. The Habsburgs gladly embraced the opportunity to make the realm of Sigismund their bulwark against the tumultuous forces of the East. In 1595 Poland declined the invitation of Pope and Emperor to a crusade; but Zamoyski conquered Moldavia at his own expense. At the same time Zolkiewski purged the Ukraine of its Cossack invaders. In 1597 Polish suzerainty over Moldavia was recognised by the Sultan, and two years later the Hospodar of Wallachia menaced the province to no purpose. To these victories of the Republic must be added the overthrow of the Swedes in Livonia. After the crowning triumph of Kirkholm (1605) Zamoyski declared that it was disgraceful to struggle so long with so petty a foe; but again the discrepancy between the interest of Sigismund and that of the nation proved injurious to both. At this crisis of the whole reign, Zamoyski, addressing the Diet for the last time, charged the King to his face with having misappropriated the taxes, left the troops unpaid, neglected the fortifications, retained the foreign guards, planned the coronation of his son, and betrayed the interests of the kingdom by his patronage of the Russian Pretender and by his close alliance with the House of Austria. The death of Zamoyski, however, facilitated the King's marriage (1605) with Constantia, the sister of his former Queen, a union which his subjects regarded both as an act of treason against the Republic and as an insult to Heaven.

Sigismund's second marriage consolidated into a single force the several elements of hostility to the Crown which had sprung up during eighteen years of misrule. With the tacit consent both of the King and of the Senate, which was full of his creatures, the Jesuits and the

mob had reduced religious toleration to a shadow. The Protestants were excluded from office, restricted in education, deprived of their churches, and exposed to outrage at the hands of the Romanist populace. The Greeks in Lithuania suffered most from Latin aggression. The Union of Brzesc in 1595, by which six Orthodox prelates joined the Roman communion, proved only a new source of fanatic violence and civil strife. It thus became possible after the death of the patriot Zamoyski for personal enemies of the King to rally 60,000 men in support of the *Rokosz* (Grand Remonstrance) of Sandomir (1606). Sigismund showed statesmanlike moderation in his efforts to meet this indictment and to avert civil war. Owing, however, to the obstinacy of the Palatine of Cracow, the Chancellor of Lithuania, an interregnum was proclaimed by the rebels in 1607, and it was doubtful how far the royal troops could be trusted to put them down. Many of the insurgents, on the other hand, listened to counsels of moderation, and an accident contributed to save the Crown. At Guzov a sudden panic seized the divided and dwindling army of the *Rokosz*, and the King's clemency finally extinguished the movement. Thenceforward, though the power of the nobles remained unbroken, that of the Protestant party was at an end, and the influence of the Jesuits even greater than before.

The suppression of the *Rokosz* was the last enduring triumph of a reign which had still a quarter of a century to run. Some of the Polish nobles, it is true, had secured the coronation of Demetrius at Moscow in 1605, and five years later Sigismund was to enjoy the brief elevation of his son Wladislav to the throne of the Tsars. In 1619, however, when at Diviline the Republic accepted Smolensk and Sievierz from the Romanoffs as the price of a truce for fourteen years, the dream of a Polish Tsar had vanished.

All that Sigismund hoped from the Habsburgs and from the Polish nobles greedy for office in Livonia and Esthonia likewise vanished, but at a far greater sacrifice, by the truce of 1629. His support of the Imperial cause in the Great War brought him trouble not only from Bethlen Gabor, but also from the Polish Diet of 1624, which compelled him to forbid his subjects to serve in foreign armies. The Turks, too, were able to turn the balance of success in their own favour. In 1612 they recovered Moldavia; and the efforts of the Poles to restore their suzerainty culminated in 1620 with a terrible disaster near Cécora. Zolkiewski was killed and Koniecpolski captured; and next year the heroism of the dying Chodkiewicz in defending Choczim was rewarded only by the concession that the Turkish Governor of Moldavia should be a Christian. All these disasters, together with the burning of the rich town of Jaroslav in 1625, and the annihilation of his fleet during the war with Gustavus, Sigismund bore with the tenacious equanimity which was, perhaps, the most notable feature of his character, and the most disastrous to Poland.

CHAPTER VI.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

(1630-2.)

IN the "proposition" which on May 30, 1629, Gustavus Adolphus addressed from Elbing to the Swedish Estates, and which first distinctly placed before them the plan of the great liberating expedition that has immortalised his name, he declared that to defend Sweden was to defend her faith. He won his last and greenest laurels as the champion of Protestantism, the advancement and maintenance of which had, from Gustavus Vasa onwards, been an unchanging principle of action in the Kings of Sweden. But, as the Elbing "proposition" itself indicates, it was the immediate question of the national safety which determined Gustavus Adolphus to call upon his hard-trying people for an unprecedented warlike effort. The response given by that people was, all things considered, not less heroic than the summons. For Sweden was a poor country, very heavily taxed; and its population, including that of Finland, numbered not more than a million and a half. The King was ready at the last moment to draw back from his enterprise if his conditions were granted; nor would he have embarked in it at all as the mere servant of a Protestant propaganda or as the swordbearer of any interests but those of his own land. He would not have done battle on German soil to suit the schemes of Richelieu, the wishes of England, or the interests of the United Provinces, or to redress the grievances of the German Princes deprived of their territorial acquisitions by the Edict of Restitution. He believed that the maritime designs of the House of Habsburg, which had been already known to his father before him, aiming as they did at the control of the Sound and the mastery of the Baltic, would strangle the national life of the kingdom which by unflinching valour and provident governance he had made doubly his. And so he went forth to carry war into the Empire, not indeed unaware of the possibility that success might carry him beyond the achievement of his immediate end, or insensible, as his great counsellor Oxenstierna afterwards phrased it, of the fundamental importance of

momenta temporum; but nevertheless intent upon a well-defined purpose from which no obstacle would cause him to swerve.

From this point of view it will be worth while to recapitulate in brief the successive steps in the historic process which ended in the landing of Gustavus Adolphus on the island of Usedom, at the mouth of the Peene, on June 26, 1630. Sweden first entered into the complications of Western politics when, a little more than a year after she had made peace with Denmark (January, 1613), she concluded a defensive alliance with the United Provinces,* brought about by the vigilance of Oldenbarneveldt (April, 1614). Although in 1615 and the following year, when a decisive stage of his struggle with Poland seemed near, Gustavus Adolphus was necessarily desirous of an alliance with Brandenburg-Prussia, nor was it until November, 1620, that his marriage with the young Elector George William's sister, Maria Eleonora, was celebrated. Shortly before that date, at the time of the outbreak of the Great War, an intervention in the affairs of the Empire was first suggested to him. But neither the application of the Bohemian leaders for aid, nor the solicitations of King Frederick, brought to Stockholm in March, 1620, by Gustavus' brother-in-law, the Count Palatine John Casimir, came to anything. The Swedish King's preoccupation with Poland would have of itself sufficed to account for his refusal to take part in the abortive Danish attempt of 1620-1 to bring about a European Protestant alliance. But when, in 1623, this attempt revived with the sudden resumption of a policy of aggressive ambition by Spain under Philip IV and Olivares, Gustavus Adolphus was found ready to take part in the project—at first by a "diversion" into the Austrian lands, and then even by an attack upon the Palatinate. But he demanded the double guarantee of a large Dutch and English fleet, and the transfer to his keeping of the ports of Bremen and Wismar. James I, who preferred Danish leadership, juggled the Swede first out of the offer of the supreme command, and then out of a share in it. In return, Gustavus declined to join the Hague Concert, and while leaving Christian IV to fight out his Lower Saxon War, made himself master of Livonia (1625), and Prussia (1626), so that he controlled the whole line of the Baltic east of Pomerania. During this period the notion of a flank attack upon Poland's ally, Austria, was in the King's mind; but the force of events led him to adopt a more direct course.

The plan of maritime domination which in 1627-8 Wallenstein had begun to carry out on behalf of the House of Habsburg, and which aimed at the control of the Baltic from the Sound to the *Haffs* of Pomerania and Prussia, had been primarily directed against both the Scandinavian Powers, and they accordingly became allies (April, 1628), and jointly took part in the defence of Stralsund. But Gustavus, who was aware that his still unbroken power would have to bear the brunt of the struggle, fortified himself at the outset by a solemn engagement

on the part of a committee of his Diet (December, 1627—January, 1628); and, in June, 1629, gave a pledge of the action on which he had resolved by his treaty with Stralsund. By the autumn he had 5000 troops in the city, and a foothold on German soil. The rescue of Stralsund was followed by negotiations with the other Hanse Towns, which contributed to their final rejection of the Habsburg maritime proposals, and the consequent collapse of the great design (September—October, 1628).

Sweden's defensive action—as from her point of view it may still fairly be called—against that design was without loss of time seized upon by the promoters of the Grand Protestant Alliance as a proof that she must speedily proceed to the offensive. It was at this time that Sir Thomas Roe, fresh from his successful efforts at Constantinople to delay the ratification of the Peace of Szön between the Emperor and the Porte, sought to convince both Frederick Henry of Orange and Gustavus himself as to the expediency of a combined war against the House of Habsburg, of which the Swedish King should be the head (1628-9). In December, 1628, Gustavus met his *Riksråd*, and, still insisting upon the *dominium maris* as the essential issue, obtained its assent to an anticipation of the Emperor's attack by carrying the war into the Empire. In March, by way of a preliminary measure, the island of Rügen (which Denmark was proposing to purchase from the Duke of Pomerania) was occupied by a division of the troops in Stralsund under Leslie, and gradually cleared of Imperialists.

While Gustavus Adolphus was thus revealing the design in which he was now fully prepared to engage, and at the same time offering moderate terms of peace to Poland, his proceedings were suddenly thwarted by a masterstroke on the part of his most persistent adversary. Wallenstein had from the first recognised where the chief obstacle to his and the House of Habsburg's designs was to be sought and found. In April, 1629, he despatched Arnim with a force of 15,000 men to the Polish frontier; and Sigismund was now so strong, that, while making an abortive attempt to induce the Emperor and Wallenstein to abandon their northern policy, Gustavus had to take his departure for the seat of war. The intention was to isolate him at the very moment of his proposed interference; and herein also Wallenstein was successful. One of the reasons for the singularly easy terms granted to Christian IV at the Peace of Lübeck (June) was undoubtedly the wish once more to alienate the Danish from the Swedish King. At the same time an intolerable insult was offered to Gustavus Adolphus by excluding his ambassadors from the peace negotiations.

But the device, masterly though it was, proved only temporarily successful. After Sigismund's failure at Stuhm (June 17) to repulse the Swedes, he began to incline to peace; and soon Richelieu's agent Charnacé was on the spot to bring about a solution entirely in accordance with the Cardinal's policy; Roe, who had also found his way

to Prussia, cooperating. A six years' truce was concluded at Altmark (September 26, 1629), on a basis of mutual concession; but Gustavus Adolphus retained the port of Pillau, and not long afterwards (February, 1630) concluded a separate treaty with Danzig. At last his hands were free for the great German enterprise.

During his absence in Prussia, the *Riksdag*, in response to the royal "proposition" already mentioned, had voted the taxes, contributions, and ships demanded; and on the King's return a final consultation was held at Upsala (October 27), at which, after a most elaborate discussion of *pros* and *cons*, all the royal councillors present declared individually for the offensive. War was now solemnly decreed. The Imperial design for the mastery of the Baltic, and implicitly of Sweden itself, was once more put in the forefront; nor can any reasonable doubt be thrown upon the truth of Oxenstierna's statement, made after his master's life had been sacrificed in the venture, that the King had regarded Pomerania and the Baltic coast as the outworks of Sweden, and had gone to war in order to secure them.

Even now he agreed to a conference at Danzig, proposed by Christian IV in his new character of mediator. But the negotiations, after dragging through the spring and summer of 1630, came to nothing; and Christian may have been right in maintaining that Gustavus had now no desire for peace on conditions which his opponents could be expected to grant. Yet, when at last, after final delays caused by the weather, he on June 26, 1630, anchored off the island of Usedom at the mouth of the Peene in Pomerania, and during the next two days disembarked his troops, he still had good cause for avoiding anything like rashness or haste in his movements. On his fleet, in addition to 3000 marines, were 13,000 soldiers, whose numbers were soon after his landing increased by accessions from Sweden, Livonia, and Stralsund to a marching force of some 40,000 men; while at home and in the Baltic lands in his rear he may have left behind over 30,000 more. Rather more than half of the soldiery were Swedish or Finnish by birth; among the foreign levies the Scots were specially notable, but the Baltic lands in general, and even Brandenburg and Poland, had contributed their share. They were all welded together by confidence in their commander, by a firm discipline, and, it cannot be doubted, by the influence of the religious observances with which that discipline was interfused. The infantry was, for the most part, armed with muskets of comparatively light weight and, in part at least, fired by flintlocks in lieu of the old cumbrous matchlocks; mounted foot-soldiers, known as dragoons, formed a complement of the cavalry, which was Gustavus' weakest arm. His strongest was his artillery, for which light iron cannon were largely employed; the so-called "leather" guns fell into disuse early in the German War. Here, and throughout, extreme mobility was a leading principle of Gustavus' method of warfare, and proved a chief cause of its success.

The cost of maintaining this army, which in 1630 led to a deficit of nearly a million of dollars in the Swedish budget, was a matter of anxious forethought; and as a matter of fact the war expenditure of 1630 was diminished by half in the following year, and that of 1631 in 1632. The chief anxiety of Gustavus at the time of his landing, and the main reason for the slowness of his initial advance, was his lack of allies, either outside the Empire or within it. In the negotiations which after the conclusion of the Polish truce Charnacé had carried on in Sweden (where in February, 1630, he had had audience of the King at Västerås), some hitch had occurred, possibly due to Richelieu's sudden action in Italy. Though anxious to keep up the war with Spain, the United Provinces, besides being dissatisfied by the burden of the Swedish tolls at Pillau, now added to that of the Danish at the Sound, were unwilling to take part in a German war except by granting secret subsidies and allowing the levy of troops. England, on the point of concluding peace with Spain, was quite out of the reckoning; while Christian IV was falling back into his old attitude of hostility towards his Swedish rival, and intent upon his own ambitious designs against Hamburg. Bethlen Gabor, whose ultimate cooperation had long been a constant factor in the calculations of Gustavus, and with whom active negotiations had been carried on in 1629, had died in November of that year.

But of more immediate importance was the question of alliances within the Empire, on which the progress of the Swedish arms could not but largely depend. Although already in 1629 Duke George of Lüneburg-Celle had entered into communication with Gustavus, and although early in 1630 Gustavus had sent his able secretary Philip Sattler to several of the Protestant Courts and cities, the question was obviously one of alliances, which would not be settled till the die had been cast. On July 9 the Swedish army crossed the Great Haff, and on the following day Duke Bogislav of Pomerania was obliged to admit a Swedish garrison into his capital, Stettin. His visitor then compelled him to conclude a treaty of alliance, by which his duchy and his troops were placed under Swedish control, and he paid a contribution of 200,000 dollars. Inasmuch as on Bogislav's death his duchy would pass to Brandenburg, it was stipulated that, until his successor should have accepted this treaty, or in the event of a disputed succession, Pomerania should be held in sequestration by Sweden.

In all the negotiations into which the *Restitutor Germaniae* (as Oxenstierna styled his master) now entered with the dispossessed Mecklenburg Dukes, with the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and with his Brandenburg brother-in-law, he showed himself resolved not only on the Pomeranian "satisfaction," but also on an "assecuration" or safeguard. This was to consist of a series of fortresses to be placed under his protection. But George William of Brandenburg, as has been seen, was now

wholly Imperialist. His neighbour, John George of Saxony, might be relied upon to remain quiescent, at all events till after the convention of Protestant Princes summoned by him to Leipzig for January, 1631, should have met. Even Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel, whose grievances had brought him to the brink of an alliance with the King, was taken aback by the Swedish demand of complete military control. Though the Landgrave's aid and that of the Weimar Dukes could hardly fail Gustavus, for a time it seemed as if the only princely support on which he could depend in Germany was that of the Brandenburg Prince Christian William, the deposed Administrator of Magdeburg, who had spent the latter half of 1629 at Stockholm, lodging in the castle there with another fugitive, Count Thurn.

In March, 1629, at the time of the issue of the Edict of Restitution, Wallenstein, incensed by the refusal of Magdeburg to receive and maintain an Imperial regiment or pay an accommodation of 300,000 dollars, had laid siege to the city; but after seven months he had raised the blockade, accepting, for appearance' sake, the modest payment of 30,000 dollars. Elated by this repetition of the fiasco of Stralsund, the Magdeburgers joined in an agreement formed by six Hanseatic towns to arm in common defence (November, 1629), and establish a more democratic town council. This body entered into communication with the exiled Christian William, who in his turn presented himself at a meeting of the Hanse Towns at Lübeck, and obtained from it a contingent promise of support for the Swedish cause. Finally, Gustavus Adolphus undertook to become Christian's surety for a supply of money, and to assist him as opportunity offered to recover the Magdeburg see.

Though even the new town council at Magdeburg as yet hesitated about openly promoting Christian William's return, the citizens became more and more agitated by the continued encroachments of the emissaries of the Catholic Restitution, who even ventured to affix a mandate to the door of the cathedral. Christian now contrived to make his way into Magdeburg incognito, in the company of his confidential agent Stalman, who brought with him a commission from Gustavus, inviting Magdeburg to ally itself with him, in return for a promise of protection. Soon Stalman revealed the presence of the "Administrator," and unfolded their plan (August 1, 1630). Christian William had in readiness a force of some 3500 men, and the Dukes of Weimar were prepared to furnish nearly as many more; if with the aid of this force Magdeburg kept open the passage of the Elbe, and the armies of the Emperor and the League were consequently drawn to this centre of resistance, the King of Sweden must march to meet them, and round him would gather all the upholders of that Protestant cause with which the city was above all others identified. An alliance was hereupon actually concluded between Christian William, the King's agent, and the town council, against the disturbers of the spiritual and temporal peace of the Empire;

and the "Administrator" at the head of an enthusiastic following at once proceeded to his "residential" capital, Halle. But soon he found it prudent to return to Magdeburg; for Pappenheim had been detached by Tilly, now in supreme command of both the League and the Imperial forces, and had approached along the left bank of the Elbe to within a few miles north of the city. Christian William was with some reluctance allowed to quarter his soldiery in the suburbs; but on October 29 a distinguished Swedish officer, Dietrich von Falkenberg, at last arrived to take command of the troops.

The provocation had been given prematurely; but Gustavus Adolphus was desirous of showing that he would if possible support more effective movements that might follow. On his arrival in Pomerania he found a considerable Imperial force still in control of the greater part of the country under the command of General Torquato Conti, who had taken measures for protecting the Oder against a Swedish advance. After securing Stettin, where he established a fortified camp, Gustavus took Stargard (July, 1630), and then, doubtless with a view to drawing nearer to Magdeburg, made a diversion from the line of the Oder into Mecklenburg (September). But no favourable reception was given to the proclamation which from his fortified camp he addressed to the Mecklenburgers, admonishing them in angry terms to throw off the authority usurped by Wallenstein in defiance of the law of God and the Gospel. There was little love in the land for its lawful Dukes; and Wallenstein's administration, orderly, impartial, and expeditious, was unmistakably popular. Into Rostock the Imperialists, regardless of past compacts, had contrived to throw a garrison. The King's reinforcements from Prussia had not yet arrived; and he did not yet feel strong enough for more extensive operations at a distance from his base. The Mecklenburg campaign therefore remained a mere demonstration (October); and, while Gustaf Horn invested Kolberg (which did not capitulate till March, 1631), the King resumed the campaign on the Oder. Here, less than twenty miles above Stettin, the Imperial forces, under the command of Haimbald von Schaumburg, were massed at Garz, which was connected by a bridge with the fortress of Greifenhagen, likewise in their occupation. A series of successful operations, accompanied by some hard fighting on Christmas Eve and Day, put both places into the hands of the Swedes; and Schaumburg's army, disorganised and demoralised, and suffering terribly from the severity of the winter, hastily returned to Küstrin, whose gates were opened to it. Thence it made its way to Frankfort-on-the-Oder, whither—or to Landsberg—such bodies of Imperialists as had remained scattered through Pomerania likewise retreated. Such was the virtual end of Wallenstein's great army of the north. The whole of the duchy, with the exception of Kolberg, Greifswald, and Demmin, was now in Gustavus' hands. The effect of this success was great with both friend and foe, and with the

watchful statesman in the west. Gustavus' own imagination was fired to conceive of a great combination of five armies, amounting together to more than a hundred thousand men, in the face of which all resistance would melt away in Germany. But, for the present, even his advance along the line of the Oder could not continue, so long as the three Brandenburg fortresses which had served as a refuge to the Imperialists shut their gates upon the Swedes.

During the eventful six months which had passed since the landing of Gustavus Adolphus in Usedom, the two Protestant Electors had drawn no nearer to the deliverer. John George of Saxony, though in the past two years he had been plied by Gustavus himself, by Bernard of Weimar, coming from the Hague, by the Mecklenburg Dukes, by the "Administrator," and by the city of Magdeburg, remained unmoved; and to the Magdeburgers he gave the plain advice, to remain in obedience to the Emperor. George William of Brandenburg deeply resented the hard measure which his brother-in-law had dealt out to him in Pillau. After Gustavus' landing he had asked to be allowed to remain neutral, but had been answered by a flat refusal, accompanied, however, by conciliatory assurances. Gustavus would not even bind himself to give up ultimately any places occupied by him in Brandenburg or Pomerania unless George William would become his ally. Left to his own devices by the Elector of Saxony, the Brandenburg Elector was now in the depths of irresolution, and, as to the fortress of Küstrin-on-the-Oder, issued instructions which revealed his utter helplessness.

At Ratisbon, where, as has been seen, the Electors were at this time in conference with the Emperor, the agreement at which they had arrived on the critical question of the chief military command could not bode well for any change in the policy of Restitution favourable to the Protestants. Nevertheless, the two Protestant Electors signed the letter of remonstrance addressed by the Electoral College, simultaneously with one from the Emperor, to the Swedish invader (August, 1630). But the patience of John George was not inexhaustible. When about this time he, on behalf of George William as well as of himself, applied to the Emperor for the revocation of the obnoxious Edict and was met by an arrogantly-worded refusal, coupled with a demand for aid in both men and money, he was at last found prepared with a suitable retort. His announcement of the proposed convention of Protestant Estates at Leipzig was not actual revolt, but it indicated that revolt was possible. He maintained, however, a waiting attitude, and as late as March, 1631, vouchsafed no reply to a renewed appeal from Gustavus Adolphus.

Meanwhile, the neutrality of Brandenburg had proved untenable. The successes of the Swedish arms at the close of 1630 led to a summary demand on the part of Gustavus Adolphus, first, for free transit by water

and by land at Küstrin, and then for the surrender into his hands of the fortress itself. Urged by Tilly to refuse, and advised by John George to enter into no engagements with Sweden, George William entreated Gustavus not to insist upon a "conjunction" between them; right of transit should be granted if Brandenburg as a whole were not to become the seat of war, and if the King would undertake to leave untouched the Elector's capital and fortresses (January, 1631).

While unable to reach an understanding with the two Protestant Electors, Gustavus Adolphus arrived at a definite settlement with France. Charnacé, whose last negotiations with him had been broken off on a trivial point of form, resumed them at Bärwalde; where, though the chief difficulty was the money part of the bargain, some heat was infused into the discussion. On January 13, 1631, however, a treaty of alliance between the Kings of France and Sweden was signed by their commissaries, for the protection, as it purported, of their common friends, and for assuring the security of the Baltic and of the open sea, freedom of commerce, and the restitution of the oppressed Estates of the Empire. The King of Sweden (for the treaty was practically dated as from a year back) was to conduct an army of 30,000 foot and 6000 horse into Germany, and France to pay an annual subsidy of 400,000 dollars, with an additional 120,000 for the year spent in negotiation. The alliance was to continue till March 3, 1636, and to be renewable should peace not have been concluded by that date; but neither of the allies was to make peace without the assent of the other. The adhesion of German and other Princes and Estates was to be permitted, unless they were openly or secretly acting with the enemy—a clause intended as a warning to malevolent neutrals. With Bavaria and the League there was to be friendship and neutrality, should they incline to accept it. In all localities conquered by the King of Sweden he was to observe the laws of the Empire, and not to interfere with the exercise of the Catholic religion. To this last clause, and to that concerning the League, Gustavus had only with difficulty been induced to assent.

It will be remembered that, after Wallenstein's dismissal, the forces of both Emperor and League had been placed under the supreme command of Tilly. The removal of Wallenstein inevitably had an injurious effect upon so much of the Imperial army as had been kept under arms; and Richelieu had taken care to close all present prospect of any reinforcements from Italy. The 12,000 troops, or thereabouts, still left of the Imperial army of the north were demoralised by want of pay as well as of success, and could clearly no longer be relied upon for the defence of Oder and Elbe. The forces of the League, on the other hand, which it was at first intended to employ for covering the lands of the west and south, were reckoned at 27,000 in the field and more than half this number in garrisons. But Tilly, after making his dispositions at Ratisbon, waited patiently in the Weser country till his numbers should be

complete; nor was it till the middle of January, 1631, that, after making a transient appearance before Magdeburg, his army reached Frankfort-on-the-Oder. After his junction with Schaumburg, Tilly was in command of 34,000 troops; but his Imperialist reinforcements were in a sorry plight. The news having now reached Tilly that Gustavus was about to enter Mecklenburg, the General of the League, by a rapid march, crossed the Middle Mark south of Berlin and approached the line of the Havel, so as to place himself in the way of the Swedish advance upon the Elbe and Magdeburg.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Bärwalde, Gustavus, regarding the line of the Oder as temporarily closed, had, though it was mid-winter, started for Mecklenburg with a division of his army amounting to nearly 12,000 men. Before the middle of February he easily took Demmin, on the Mecklenburg frontier, and, after detaching a division to besiege Greifswald, was preparing to advance, when he learnt that Tilly was approaching Neu-Brandenburg (in Mecklenburg-Strelitz, nearly thirty miles south of Demmin), where 3000 Swedes under Kniphausen lay in garrison. Gustavus seems to have hoped to divert Tilly towards Schwedt, where the Swedes would have been nearer to their base at Stettin; but he sent instructions to Kniphausen to conclude an honourable capitulation if it became necessary. The messenger fell into Tilly's hands, and on March 19 he took Neu-Brandenburg by storm, and put the whole garrison to the sword. "Neu-Brandenburg quarter," though it only carried out the accepted principle that no mercy need be shown to a garrison holding out after surrender has become inevitable, in its turn set a precedent soon afterwards followed at Frankfort and at Magdeburg, and thus opened a more savage epoch in the conduct of the war.

After this success Tilly stood still for some days, and then, perhaps feeling incapable of moving Gustavus from his position at Schwedt, where he continued to be in touch with the other Swedish division under Horn, marched south-west, towards the towns of Neu-Ruppin and Brandenburg. On the march he received an explicit order from Maximilian of Bavaria to lose no time in setting about the siege of Magdeburg, before whose walls and trenches Pappenheim was fretting in enforced inactivity.

No sooner was Gustavus sure of Tilly's departure than, once more leaving Horn behind to finish the siege of Greifswald (it did not fall till June), he marched with 14,000 men upon Frankfort-on-the-Oder. To secure this fortress had long been an object of anxiety to him; but we have the explicit statement of his secretary Grubbe that his immediate purpose was to draw Tilly away from Magdeburg. Passing Küstrin without any hindrance and constructing a redoubt in face of its walls, he arrived before Frankfort, where lay a force of 5000 men, more or less, with Field-Marshal von Tiefenbach and other officers of note—the

remnant, in a word, of Wallenstein's army of the north. On April 13 the fortress was rapidly taken by storm; but the brilliancy of the exploit was dimmed by the excesses which followed, and which lasted far into the night, long beyond the three hours allowed by the King for plundering. By his orders the lives of the citizens were left untouched; but of the garrison 2000—according to Munro 3000—were slaughtered “in revenge of their cruelty used at Neu-Brandenburg.” Within a fortnight Landsberg, which Tilly had not turned to relieve, capitulated to Gustavus. A panic spread through Silesia, to which and to Moravia the line of the Oder directly led; and at Prague Gustavus was believed to be about to carry the war to the gates of the city where it had begun. The Emperor himself believed an attack on the Austrian lands to be in serious contemplation. But Gustavus had no such intentions. He still kept the line of the Elbe in view, and, sending a message to Magdeburg, which he had persuaded himself could hold out two months longer, announced his victorious progress to John George of Saxony and the Protestant Estates assembled on his summons at Leipzig.

The Convention was opened early in February, 1631, by a combative blast from the clerical trumpet. But the high-spirited Hoë von Hohenegg was on this occasion unable to carry with him his own master, or any other member of the assembly save the Landgrave of Hesse and the Weimar Dukes William and Bernard. Though, however, John George stolidly asserted that nothing need be done so long as it was not attempted to extirpate the Augsburg Confession, a statement of grievances, including of course a demand for the revocation of the Edict of Restitution, was ultimately despatched to the Emperor, accompanied by an intimation that the Protestant Estates proposed to levy troops in their several Circles, and if necessary to afford due assistance to one another. The Emperor replied by requiring the dissolution of the new association thus outlined, and soon took severe measures against some of the south-western towns that had entered into it. The scheme proceeded no further; and as to the all-important question of the choice of a leader, the King of Sweden's ambassador, though admitted to the meeting, had been put off there with meaningless promises. Thus a possibility of combined resistance had been indicated; but this was all. Perhaps the most interesting incident of the Convention had been a conference between Lutheran and Calvinist theologians, to which long afterwards Leibniz referred as the hopeful precursor of later attempts at religious reunion.

The particular negotiations which followed between Gustavus and the two Protestant Electors cannot here be pursued in detail; yet the protraction of these discussions was the direct cause of the great catastrophe of the fall of Magdeburg. At last Gustavus, by means of a personal interview with George William at Berlin, supplemented by a military demonstration, secured the delivery into his hands (May 13)

of the fortress of Spandau, till the Magdeburg difficulty should be ended. This was one of the two pledges on which he had insisted ; and though the transfer of the other (Küstrin) was still delayed, he now felt sufficiently sure of Brandenburg, and the Elector's Imperialist minister, Schwarzenberg, quitted the Court. Gustavus might now have marched upon Magdeburg up the right bank of the Elbe ; but he decided on taking the longer route towards Wittenberg, with the view of crossing the river there and moving on Magdeburg down the left bank. His chief reason for this preference was his desire to avoid a battle with an enemy superior to himself in numbers ; but it necessitated a promise of cooperation from John George, who remained immovable. These negotiations had just broken down when the news reached Gustavus at Potsdam that on May 20 Magdeburg had fallen.

The suggestion that Gustavus wished to utilise the peril of Magdeburg in order to force John George into his alliance may be dismissed as malicious. But his delay was a grievous miscalculation ; and the principal defence which he set up for it, and which other apologists have repeated, that he was bound to safeguard himself, but was prevented from effecting this by the procrastinations of the two Electors, exaggerated their real weight in the balance, and detracted from his own greatness.

On assuming the command of the troops in the city which, exclusive of the citizens, cannot have much exceeded 3000 men, Falkenberg at once introduced Swedish discipline into their ranks. Magdeburg, which numbered about 36,000 inhabitants, was well fortified except on the river side (north and north-east), where, however, the islets on the bridged marsh offered facilities of defence which were improved by Falkenberg. In the course of November, 1630, the city was invested by Pappenheim ; but during the winter months some negotiation ensued, with an equally futile attempt by Pappenheim to bribe the Swedish commander ; and it was not till the end of March, 1631, after the fall of Neu-Brandenburg, that Tilly at last sat down before Magdeburg, and the siege began in earnest. His and Pappenheim's united forces reached a total of over 22,000 foot and 3000 horse, with 86 heavy guns, besides an additional body of nearly 5000 troops near at hand at Dessau.

After Pappenheim had captured the redoubts on the right bank of the Elbe, and one or two on the left had also fallen, a pause followed, owing to the news of the capture of Frankfort and the Emperor's demand that Tilly should proceed at once to protect the Austrian lands. It was, however, resolved first to finish the siege ; and on April 28 Pappenheim attacked the fortifications on the islands. By the next day all the outworks of the city were in the hands of the besiegers. On May 4 Pappenheim took possession of the razed northern suburb of Neustadt on the left bank and began erecting his batteries. On the same day, Tilly, who would gladly have preserved

the fortifications, summoned the Administrator, the town council, and Falkenberg severally to surrender. The immediate reply on the following day was a brief but successful sortie, followed by two others. On May 10 the town council sent an answer announcing its wish to call in the mediation of the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony and of the Hanse Towns. Tilly's answer, insisting on surrender as a preliminary condition, did not arrive till May 12; in the meantime Falkenberg had sent an urgent appeal to Gustavus Adolphus. On May 17 the bombardment of the city walls from the Neustadt opened, and it continued during the next two days. Meanwhile on the 18th a further summons from Tilly to surrender reached the city, where hope and fear were striving for mastery. On the 19th the whole body of the citizens, as well as the town council, discussed the question, and it was decided to treat, though Falkenberg succeeded in securing that a consultation should be held with him early on the following morning. On the evening of the 19th there had been indications of a lull in Tilly's operations; this was probably the reason why a sortie which Falkenberg had intended to make that night was not undertaken; the charge against him based upon this change of plan can only be described as absurd. At five o'clock in the morning of the 20th a portion of the garrison had as usual withdrawn from the walls. Soon afterwards, while Falkenberg was addressing the town councillors in the *Rathhaus*, the news of a movement of the enemy towards the walls arrived. By seven o'clock the assault had begun on the Neustadt side.

Pappenheim, who led it, had already mounted the walls when Falkenberg threw himself in his way and a check resulted which Pappenheim afterwards resentfully attributed to want of proper support on the part of Tilly. But soon a gate on this side of the wall was forced; the setting on fire, by Pappenheim's orders, of a few houses increased the terror of the defenders; through another gate the Croats poured in; and finally Pappenheim took in the rear the force which was resisting the Duke Adolphus of Holstein-Gottorp's assault on the south side of the city. Falkenberg had fallen, mortally wounded; the "Administrator," Christian William, was taken prisoner. (His career was over, and he ended by becoming a convert to the Church of Rome and an Imperial pensioner.) By 1 p.m. Tilly was in complete possession of the Maiden City, the vaunted bulwark of the Protestant faith.

Then began a massacre of the garrison, and of armed and unarmed citizens, in streets, houses, and churches. The nameless deeds of horror committed are only too well authenticated. In the course of the afternoon fire broke out in several places, and by the following morning virtually the whole of the city, with the exception of the Cathedral, the *Liebfrauenkloster* (where soldiers are said to have helped to extinguish the flames) and a number of houses in a remoter quarter, was reduced to ashes.

There is no evidence that Tilly interfered with the excesses of his soldiery, till on the evening of the 22nd he granted pardon to all survivors. Among these were about a thousand people who had sought refuge in the Cathedral. On the 24th Tilly commanded the stoppage of all further plundering. The charge that the destruction of the city by fire had been ordered by him is contradicted not only by his own statement but by every argument of probability. The counter-charge that it was due to Falkenberg and some who with him desired to make an earlier Moscow of Magdeburg, is more specious, but rests on no satisfactory evidence. Pappenheim's instructions early in the morning had no connexion with the general conflagration. The mystery of its origin—if mystery it be—remains unsolved. Pappenheim, who estimated—and probably greatly underestimated—the loss of life in the sack of Magdeburg at 20,000, expressed his opinion to Maximilian that no such awful visitation of God had been witnessed since the destruction of Jerusalem.

The moral impression made by the sack of Magdeburg on both friend and foe was without precedent or parallel even in the Thirty Years' War; it remains reflected in scurrilous songs of savage triumph, in wrathful outcries, penitential psalms, and wild accusations; it revealed itself in the amazed incredulity of Wallenstein, and in the uneasy eagerness of Gustavus Adolphus to disprove his responsibility for such a catastrophe. But its immediate effect was neither from a military nor from a political point of view overwhelming.

Even now Gustavus' relations with Brandenburg and Saxony remained to be settled. About the middle of June, after protracted negotiations, he marched upon Berlin. The Princesses of the Electoral Court, headed by the venerable Louisa Juliana, Dowager Electress Palatine, went forth into his camp; and on the 19th, with much feasting and firing of guns, his compact with the Elector was at last concluded. Spandau was placed in the King's hands for the rest of the war; Küstrin too was, if necessary, to be given up to him; and the Elector undertook to pay a monthly contribution of 30,000 dollars.

Though Greifswald now fell and the restoration of the Mecklenburg Dukes was in progress, Gustavus, leaving part of his forces on the Oder, advanced with the rest towards the Elbe, and, after the capture of Havelberg, established himself in a fortified camp at Werben, in a very strong position between Elbe and Havel. For a moment he had thought of not passing beyond the compact territory already conquered by him; but he soon elected to follow his star. About this time his Queen arrived at Wolgast with a fresh body of Swedish troops, part of which were united with the 6000 Englishmen and Scots levied and brought to Stettin by the Marquis of Hamilton at his own cost. But this force, like Mansfeld's of old, gradually melted away.

After the sack of Magdeburg, Tilly, uncertain as to the direction

which the movements of his adversary would take, had, to the indignation of Pappenheim, remained in the vicinity of the ruins. When, at the end of May, after both League and Emperor had strengthened their forces—the latter by troops from Italy, where the Mantuan War was now over—he at last set forth with nearly 25,000 men, he marched not north-east, but south-west, upon Hesse-Cassel, to stop the levies of Landgrave William. But he was soon summoned back to the Elbe by Pappenheim, and by the end of July once more stood at Wolmirstedt immediately below Magdeburg. Early in August he approached the camp of Gustavus at Werben; but after some fighting, in which on the Swedish side Bernard of Weimar took a prominent part, Tilly perceived that he could not dislodge the King, and withdrew to the south of Magdeburg. Thus in August Gustavus Adolphus was at leisure to pay a visit to Mecklenburg, and to assist at the entry of the Dukes into Güstrow, now recovered by them, with the whole duchy except Rostock, Wismar, and Dömitz.

The Elector of Brandenburg had, however unwillingly, submitted to the force of events. To the Elector of Saxony the fall of Magdeburg came home even more closely, especially when the Emperor insisted on the dismissal of the Saxon troops, as he had already enforced that of the soldiery levied in the south-west in response to the Leipzig Convention. While William of Hesse-Cassel and Bernard of Weimar, each at the head of some thousands, stood on the Hessian frontier and in Fulda, Tilly was by the end of August massing the forces of both Emperor and League at Eisleben (Luther's birthplace in the county of Mansfeld); and once more the destinies of the House of Wettin seemed likely to be decided, together with the great issues of the religious conflict. The ferment of opinion, which found expression in a copious pamphlet-literature, is explained by the multiplicity of considerations that pressed upon the stolid John George—his tenure of the Lusatias, his relations to the Edict of Restitution, and the conflict between his loyalty to the Emperor and the Protestant sympathies by which he was surrounded. These last found a courageous advocate in his Court-preacher, Hoë von Hohenegg, the most important personage in the Electorate next to the Elector himself. But John George listened rather to the advice of Wallenstein's former lieutenant, Arnim, now in the Saxon service, whose schemes for setting up a middle party between the Swedes and the Emperor bore some resemblance to the designs afterwards cherished by Wallenstein himself. For the present, however, Arnim advised the Swedish alliance, and by inducing Gustavus to promise his good offices for securing the archbishopric of Magdeburg to the Saxon Prince Augustus brought round the Elector. On August 30 John George offered his alliance to Gustavus, then at Brandenburg, and moved his army to Torgau. The Swedes hereupon advanced to Wittenberg; and during September the two armies lay side by side, awaiting the sequel.

After addressing a last warning to the Elector, on September 4, he occupied Merseburg, on the next day. On the 12th John George and Gustavus concluded a close offensive and defensive alliance, which secured the direction of their joint action to the King. A decisive conflict between the Catholic and Protestant armies could now no longer be delayed. On September 15 the Swedish forces, numbering 20,000 foot and 7500 horse, and the Saxon, variously estimated as between 15,000 and 20,000 men, mustered at Düben on the Mulde.

Tilly's army of 23,000 foot and 11,000 horse was inferior in numbers to that of his enemies, and he had less than half their number (60) of guns. He would therefore have preferred, before risking a battle, to wait for Aldringer, who, with a large force from the south-west, had already reached Erfurt. But this time, not only was the usual pressure exercised on him by Pappenheim and others, but he really had no choice. Leipzig, which he entered on September 16, was almost an open town; and when he placed himself to the north of it to await the enemy there was no time for fortifying his position. On the following day was fought the great battle of Breitenfeld, so called from the village, a couple of miles north-east of Leipzig, towards which the Swedish right wing at the crisis of the battle drove their adversaries. The incomparably superior mobility of the Swedish troops, only part of whom were actually engaged in the battle, was the main cause of the victory. Neither the charge of Pappenheim's heavy cavalry, which finally lost touch with Tilly's centre, availed, nor the rout of the Saxons on the left, whom the heavy mass of Tilly's right drove in confusion from the field, the Elector himself being carried away as far as Eilenburg. The loose formation of Gustavus' order of battle enabled him to defy the Pappenheimers, throw himself upon Tilly's left, and finally by a sudden cavalry charge from his own right retake the Saxon guns and capture Tilly's. He had thus gained a complete victory before the September evening had closed in. His losses in the battle and the pursuit amounted to barely 5000 of his own troops, besides 2000 Saxons; of Tilly's army something like half—the numbers were variously stated from 7000 to 12,000—were left on the field or taken prisoners. The remainder rallied at Halberstadt. Tilly himself was wounded; as was his adjutant-general, Duke Adolphus of Holstein-Gottorp, who had taken so conspicuous a part in the siege of Magdeburg. The latter died in captivity at Eilenburg.

The day of Breitenfeld, on which Tilly was widely held to have lost his reputation as a commander, suddenly raised that of Gustavus Adolphus to a height which it henceforth maintained. But it accomplished something more than this. His plans now entered into a phase which, in view of the negotiations previously carried on by him, cannot be described as altogether new, but in which these plans rapidly assumed a breadth such as they had never before reached. His thoughts now went

beyond "satisfaction" and "security"; for a great Protestant victory, which had redeemed a dire Protestant catastrophe, had now marked him out as the champion of a cause adopted by half the Empire. The *momentum temporis* proved decisive; but neither was it his formed intention to carry an armed propaganda of Protestantism through the Empire, nor had he definitely resolved on securing for himself the Imperial Crown, which Bernard of Weimar and others had beyond doubt suggested to him as within his reach.

Of the two alternatives before Gustavus Adolphus the one was to march direct upon Vienna, while leaving Tilly to the Saxons. This course, which John George would have preferred, both as enabling him to enforce the principles of the Leipzig alliance in the west and south-west, and as sparing him a direct conflict with the Emperor, besides bringing Gustavus nearer to Poland, would have been comparatively easy of execution. But, as has been pointed out by Clausewitz in a masterly summary of the situation, Gustavus was by no means one of those generals who achieve great results by sudden blows and rapid incursions; moreover, at Vienna, though he could have done much there for the Protestants, he could not have established for himself any secure basis either for further action or for an ultimate settlement. Such a basis he sought, and practically established, by making himself master of a line that reached from Oder and Elbe through Thuringia and Franconia by way of Frankfort to the Middle Rhine. The isolated positions still occupied by the enemy in the north were of practically little significance; in the west he came into close touch with France. The troops of John George, which had gained no laurels at Breitenfeld, would for the present be suitably employed in the recovery of Silesia, a process which would completely estrange him from the Emperor, and furnish him with a field of operation of his own, without forwarding his design of heading a third party in the Empire.

It has been suggested that Gustavus Adolphus had yet another reason for not directing his own attack upon the Habsburg lands. There can be no doubt—though until after the close of these transactions our knowledge concerning them is drawn from the untrustworthy confession of Sezyma Rasin—that already in the earlier part of 1631 negotiations had been in progress between Gustavus and Wallenstein, and it is at least highly probable that to these dealings Arnim was no stranger. In the summer before the battle of Breitenfeld these communications, managed by Thurn and Rasin, Wallenstein's secret agent, led to a promise on the part of Gustavus that 12,000 Swedish troops should be entrusted to Wallenstein, who should be recognised as "Viceroy" of Bohemia (the title "King" not being used as yet, out of consideration for Frederick); Wallenstein undertaking in return to overthrow the Habsburg dominion in Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia, and to invade the Austrian duchies. But after his great

victory, Gustavus, feeling no longer dependent on such help, suggested that the collection of a force on the Bohemian frontier should be left to Thurn. The King therefore does not appear to have at this time reckoned on any important intervention from this quarter; but Wallenstein was soon to show that he had not forgotten the slight.

Leaving the Saxon Elector to deal with Leipzig, Gustavus Adolphus, after concluding an alliance with the Princes of Anhalt, set forth from Halle (Sept. 27, 1631). Erfurt, where he held his entry on October 2, and where he concluded a final alliance with the Weimar Dukes, placing the command of the Thuringian reserve in the hands of the eldest, William, was to serve as base of operations for the main force (numbering about 25,000 men), with which, a few days later, the King, by way of Gotha, advanced into Franconia. On the Middle and Lower Elbe, Banér and Tott commanded smaller armies, of which the former occupied Magdeburg as a strategical position; whereupon the rebuilding of the town at once commenced (February, 1632). Rostock capitulated to Tott (October, 1631), who then advanced towards the Weser.

The conquest of Franconia was rapidly accomplished by Gustavus Adolphus. After taking the important Würzburg fortress of Königshofen, he on October 12 entered the episcopal city itself. After he had reconstructed the bridge across the Main, a struggle of several days made him master of the castle of Marienburg on the left bank, with its enormous accumulation of military supplies and ecclesiastical and literary treasures (of which latter some found their way to Upsala). The Prince-Bishop had taken refuge in France; and Gustavus, relying on his title by conquest, at once prescribed the form of homage to be taken to himself as Duke of Franconia, and to his heirs. The administration which he set up was composed of natives mixed with Swedish officers; and of the conventual and other landed property which he proceeded to distribute the larger share went to members of the Franconian nobility who had taken his side.

The news of the Swedish progress had scattered to the winds the Frankfort "composition" meeting; and, while the Bishop of Bamberg tried to negotiate with the conqueror, the Protestant Princes and towns near and far solicited his friendship. Nürnberg haggled long over her bargain, but by the end of October concluded, for a year in the first instance, a close alliance, as did the Margraves of Ansbach and Baireuth; all the petty Protestant Estates round about following suit. Duke George of Brunswick-Lüneburg in the north, after protracted negotiations, and the House of Württemberg in the south—which had suffered severely by the Edict of Restitution—sought and obtained the alliance of the King; and with all Franconia, as far west as Hanau, under his control, he could enter upon the next stage of his resistless advance.

Meanwhile Tilly, who on finding that he was not pursued after Breitenfeld had turned into the much-vexed Hesse-Cassel, had been at

last reinforced by Aldringer and was now at the head of 18,000 troops. With these he, early in November, attempted a movement upon Würzburg, and, after being smartly repulsed here by Gustavus himself, essayed to lay siege to Nürnberg. But the alliance with Gustavus and the presence of a Swedish garrison had infused into this city a spirit which determined him to raise the siege, before Gustavus, who had turned aside from his advance, had come near; whereupon the baffled veteran took up his quarters at Nördlingen further south towards the Danube, on the right bank of which Maximilian had collected another army for the defence of Bavaria itself.

On November 19, Gustavus, leaving Horn behind him to guard Franconia, set out on his march towards the Rhine. Aschaffenburg was occupied without a blow; Frankfort opened its gates, and, passing them, the King continued his march to Höchst, in the electorate of Mainz, where he was reinforced by 17,000 men under William of Hesse-Cassel. Thence he passed through the territory of William's Hesse-Darmstadt kinsman, to whom he granted moderate conditions, being at first intent on seizing Heidelberg (December). But he found the line of march much occupied by Spanish troops, and on drawing back had to dislodge them from a fortification on the right bank of the Rhine facing Oppenheim. The garrison of Mainz, upon which he now moved, was commanded by a Spaniard, de Silva. The fortress surrendered (December 20), and the city redeemed itself from being plundered by a payment of 80,000 dollars. Bernard of Weimar brought the campaign to a brilliant close with the capture of Mannheim by a stratagem (January 8, 1632).

At Mainz, the capital of one of the leading Princes of the League, which now became Gustavus' head-quarters, he established a civil administration resembling that set up at Würzburg, and prepared for his next campaign. His intention was, by means of vast armaments, to raise the forces with which he had carried on his campaigns of 1631 to more than twice their present total. But even more notable was the expansion of the general scope of his enterprise. In the course of the last operations of 1631 he had been unexpectedly brought into conflict with the troops of a Power with whom he had hitherto avoided entering into direct hostilities. But, though anxious not to precipitate a quarrel, he was prepared to face this new complication. While, therefore, mindful as ever of Sweden's maritime safety, he sent directions home that attention should be paid to the fortification of Göteborg on the Cattegat, he put the explicit question to his *Riksråd* whether he should treat what had occurred as a rupture of the peace and openly declare war against Spain. The *Riksråd* replied that Spain must be held to have broken the peace, but that a declaration of war had better be adjourned. Yet the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs had unmistakably been added to the list of his *de facto* adversaries.

Meanwhile the war had been once more carried into the lands of the Austrian branch; and, by a strange irony of fate, John George of Saxony had become the assailant of the Emperor. In October, 1631, the Saxon army had marched into Lusatia, where now stood 10,000 Imperialists under Tiefenbach, and had then under Arnim's command crossed into Bohemia, while a division largely composed of the remnant of Hamilton's contingent under Leslie kept Silesia under control. Arnim's movement seems to have been intended as a diversion against the Tiefenbachers rather than as a serious attack upon Prague; but when he had crossed the Bohemian frontier, trustworthy information reached him that the capital would easily drop into his hands. There is no proof, and no probability, that the source of this information was Wallenstein, whose lands Arnim on his march was careful to spare. Early in November the Saxons stood before Prague, and occupied the city without a blow, the handful of soldiery under Maradas which garrisoned the city having taken its departure to Tabor. Under the "protection" of John George, who soon arrived in person, a species of reaction now ensued, which restored many of the Protestant exiles to their lands, and was accompanied by some acts of violence. But the Elector appears to have kept in view the temporary character of his occupation; and though Eger and a few other smaller towns were taken, there was no attempt at conquering the kingdom at large; and in the south Pilsen, Tabor, and Budweis all held out for the Emperor. Arnim's position was full of difficulty, between the pressure of the returned Bohemian exiles headed by Thurn, ardent and indiscreet as ever, the caution of the Elector, who, as Oxenstierna afterwards said, could never make up his mind whether the Emperor was his friend or his foe, and the duplicity of Wallenstein, with whom Arnim was in both direct and indirect communication (December—January). All question of an understanding between Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein had for the present come to an end since Breitenfeld; and Wallenstein, who had by this time consented to levy an army for the Emperor, was really working for a separate peace with Saxony.

During the winter months of 1631-2, then, Gustavus Adolphus was preparing for the resumption of war on an unprecedented scale; but neither were the thoughts of peace now, or ever, absent from his mind. His position at this time indeed seemed that of arbiter of both war and peace. To his Court at Mainz, graced by the presence of his Queen, Maria Eleonora, whom together with the Chancellor Oxenstierna he had summoned from Stockholm, came the representatives of many Princes and of cities (Ulm and Strassburg), desirous of ratifying old alliances or concluding new; thither came too the ex-Elector Palatine, whose claims had so late as the preceding spring been still urged at Vienna by English embassies by his indefatigable agent Rusdorf, and who at Mainz was supported by Sir Henry Vane. Though received with

much cordiality and courtesy, he was made to feel that his restoration had become a question of secondary importance.

Of far greater moment than the wishes of England were the designs of France. Richelieu had never intended that Gustavus should take the ultimate issues of European politics into his own hands, or that after his great victory he should, instead of assailing the Emperor's dominions, invade those of members of the League, to whom an opportunity of neutrality had been expressly preserved at Bärwalde, and over whom Richelieu was most anxious to maintain his influence. Already before the battle of Breitenfeld, he had half forced Maximilian into a defensive alliance for eight years; and after the battle, when Maximilian claimed aid in men or money, had instead sent Charnacé to Munich, to persuade the Elector to abandon the Emperor and neutrality towards Sweden. Maximilian, informed by Tilly and Aldringer of the insufficiency of their forces, and aware of the rumour of the approaching return of Wallenstein to the command of the Imperialists, in the end made up his mind for neutrality, as conducive to a general peace. Of the three Spiritual Electors, Trier at once accepted the proposal; while Cologne and Mainz, with the Bishops of Würzburg, Worms, and Osnabrück, were at least prepared to negotiate. At a meeting of the League at Ingolstadt in January, 1632, it was, notwithstanding the protests of the Imperial ambassador Questenberg, resolved to invite the mediation of France.

Gustavus Adolphus, to whom Richelieu's agents now addressed themselves, although he was desirous of a general peace on his own terms, can only have entered into the present negotiation with the view of detaching the League from the Emperor, and of meeting the wishes of France. To the Munich proposal that the contemplated arrangement should be conditional upon his restoring to the members of the League any of their territories now in his occupation, he first returned a blank *non possumus*. Richelieu himself was very jealous of any encroachment by Sweden on what he regarded as the French sphere of influence—the left bank of the Rhine; and finally Gustavus offered a compromise. His conquests in the dioceses of Trier and Cologne and in the Lower Palatinate (from Bavaria) were to be restored, but all other Swedish acquisitions were to be retained till the conclusion of peace, while the army of the League was to be reduced to 12,000 men and quartered in the lands of its members. These proposals were accepted by Trier, and even by Cologne, who feared invasion, but were refused by Bavaria, who insisted on the restoration of Mainz, Würzburg, and Bamberg, and on a Swedish guarantee of Maximilian's electoral dignity during his life. The League was thus broken up, and Richelieu had in effect suffered a diplomatic rebuff prejudicial to the influence of France in western Germany.

About the same time an effort to bring about a general peace

through the Protestant allies of Sweden was made by the busy Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt, "the peace-maker," in Gustavus' ironical phrase, "of the Holy Roman Empire." Prompted by the landless Elector of Mainz as well as by his fears for his own lands, which, as has been seen, Gustavus had treated with consideration, he proposed a meeting of Catholic and Protestant Estates to lay down the basis of a general pacification; and was ready with a scheme for the reconstitution of the Empire, including the revocation of both the Edict of Restitution and the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*, the "satisfaction" of Sweden being left to the King's own judgment.

John George of Saxony's mind too was working in the direction of peace—but of a separate peace with the Emperor, who as early as October, 1631, had begun to sound him on the subject. The channel chosen by the Emperor was Wallenstein, whose previous communications with Gustavus Adolphus were as yet unknown at Vienna. The question had been discussed (in November) between Wallenstein and Arnim, who had urged that the policy of Reaction must be abandoned by the Emperor, the status of 1618 restored, and the Bohemian question regulated afresh. These negotiations continued; and, though Richelieu sent an ambassador to John George, and the Elector another to Gustavus Adolphus (December, 1631), to discuss the general design and to propose a "composition" meeting at Nürnberg, the King saw through the Elector as he had seen through the Cardinal. At Torgau, in February, 1632, John George made a futile attempt to detach George William of Brandenburg and to bring him over to the policy of a separate peace with the Emperor, after which the King of Sweden, his task done, might be induced to withdraw with an indemnity. Gustavus, after returning a dilatory answer to his untrustworthy ally, early in March took an opportunity of delivering himself in public at Mainz on the selfishness of Saxony, and on the hopelessness of coming to terms with the enemy.

Meanwhile the Emperor, like Gustavus himself, was preparing for a renewal of the struggle in a wider rather than a narrower area. In February, 1632, Ferdinand II concluded a close alliance with the ambitious King Philip IV of Spain; and about the same time he demanded, though in vain, an auxiliary force from Poland. He could obtain no promises in Italy except from Florence and Modena, and none from Switzerland. Even Pope Urban VIII, whose policy will be examined in a subsequent chapter, adhered to his view that the war in Germany was not a religious war, as shown by the King of Sweden's abstention from interference with any man's religion. The Sultan, stimulated by Gustavus, was moving troops to the Hungarian frontier. No ally seemed to remain to the Emperor but his Spanish kinsman, unless the restless jealousy of Christian IV were to range him on their side.

Thus the refusal of Bavaria to listen to the offers which would have detached her from his side, and the manifest inclination of Saxony

to make peace without Sweden and so head a kind of third party in the Empire, afforded much relief to Ferdinand. But he made a provision of his own against the danger which might sooner or later descend upon him, by obtaining, as early as December, 1631, Wallenstein's promise to levy an army for the Imperial service. These transactions had manifestly been hastened by the fear, which at the time had not seemed idle, that, after taking possession of the whole of Bohemia, the Saxon troops might invade the Austrian duchies.

In December, 1631, Wallenstein, at Znaim in Moravia, met Eggenberg, whom he continued to trust. It was agreed that in the course of three months he should levy and equip an army of 70,000 men, but without as yet definitely assuming the command. The sound of his drums had a magical effect; but—for after all there had been many other very rapid levies in the course of the war—still more wonderful was the power of organisation, which quickly welded into an effective army a mass heterogeneous in race, religion, and antecedents of service. The genius of a great poet has with idealising touch depicted the selfishness, the savagery, and the superstition which entered into this abnormal compound, and also the force which gave it unity and discipline. In addition to Wallenstein's own vast expenditure, large sums were contributed to the cost of raising this army by the colonels of the new regiments levied, as well as by Eggenberg and other members of the Austrian nobility, and by the young King of Hungary.

Unfortunately, the written conditions under which in April, 1632, the actual resumption of the chief command by Wallenstein was settled at Göllersdorf in Lower Austria are not extant; and the accounts of the bargain contain much that is fictitious. The power of signing treaties of peace was certainly entrusted to the *generalissimo*, but with limitations which according to his own statement prevented him from treating with Sweden. On the other hand, it may be safely inferred that he exacted from the Emperor the promise of a revocation of the Edict of Restitution. Perfect independence in all matters military was as a matter of course now guaranteed to him; and an explicit promise was made by the Emperor that neither the influence of his confessor, Lamormain, nor that of any other person, should be allowed to interfere with Wallenstein's action. He had exercised the right of nominating his officers already during his earlier tenure of the chief command; but it was now provided that no other independent command should coexist with his own in the Empire; and King Ferdinand, the Emperor's heir, was excluded from active service in the army. Still more notable was the stipulation that in lands conquered by him he should possess not only the right of confiscation, but the prerogative of pardon.

Extraordinary as these provisions are, it should be remembered that both Wallenstein's position as a Prince of the Empire and the actual nature of the political crisis placed him in relations towards the

Emperor which differed essentially from those between sovereign and servant. Moreover, impenetrable as much remains in Wallenstein's political calculations, his new agreement with the Emperor was not inconsistent with the design of re-establishing and raising the Imperial authority—though this involved affronting the pretensions on which the Electors had insisted at Ratisbon, and impeding the progress of the Catholic reaction.

Wallenstein was a man of great thoughts and of aims beyond the common. But, as has been already seen, he was also a man of business. His title as Duke of Mecklenburg was now confirmed by the Emperor; but, as his duchy was in Swedish hands, he was promised a full equivalent, and in the meantime placed in possession of the (mediate) principality of Glogau in Silesia. He was also relieved of a debt of 400,000 dollars, still owing by him to the exchequer of Bohemia from the time of his vast purchase of estates in that country.

Of the conditions of Wallenstein's military dictatorship, which were made public at the time, Richelieu afterwards recorded his opinion that it would be difficult to decide whether they were more extraordinary or necessary. From Znaim, where in April the Commander-in-Chief had mustered his army, he marched into Bohemia, where the demoralised Saxon troops retreated before his approach. As late as May Thurn sought to reopen negotiations with Wallenstein through his brother-in-law Count Treczka; but in vain. The negotiations with the Elector John George for a separate peace were still in progress; and Gustavus Adolphus, who was kept well informed by his special envoy at the Saxon Court, Count Philip Reinhard von Solms, was already preparing to draw near to the Electorate. On May 21 Wallenstein had an interview at Rakonitz with Arnim, to whom, by virtue of his authority to conclude treaties, he offered as the price of a separate peace the revocation of the Edict of Restitution and freedom of religion for the Saxon Electorate. At the same time he held out the prospect of an Imperial alliance to follow upon the peace. Nothing was actually concluded; but on the following day Wallenstein easily took possession of Prague, and the Saxon army of occupation withdrew across the frontier to Pirna. It will be seen how materially these events affected the action of Gustavus Adolphus himself in the midst of his victorious course.

The campaigns of 1632, notable for a multiplicity of operations, of which only a few can be mentioned here, began in February by the capture of Bamberg by Field-Marshal Horn, who was in command at Würzburg. Being in his turn attacked by Tilly, he successfully broke out from the episcopal capital at the head of the garrison. Gustavus, who about the same time had taken Kreuznach in the Rhenish Palatinate, at once marched to Horn's assistance, and after effecting a junction with him at Schweinfurt on the Main, drove Tilly back into Bavaria towards the Danube. Here, or on the Lech, Maximilian had resolved

that a stand should be made to protect his capital. On the last day of March, after some futile negotiations with the Elector, Gustavus entered Nürnberg in great state, but immediately hurried on till within less than a week he stood before Donauwörth, where the Lech flows into the Danube. Tilly was now near at hand; but after his army of 20,000 men, probably much inferior to his adversary's in numbers, had been joined by the garrison of Donauwörth—which had abandoned the place to the Swedes—it retreated down the river towards Ingolstadt. Here Maximilian appeared in person; and it was resolved to march back upon Rain, in the angle between Danube and Lech, and if possible to prevent the Swedes from crossing the latter river. Gustavus, who had now secured the Danube as far up as Ulm, covered the construction of a bridge of boats across the Lech by his artillery, and thus brought his army over to the right bank. In the battle which followed (April 15) Tilly was carried off the field wounded; and by Maximilian's orders the army now withdrew upon Neuburg and Ingolstadt. Gustavus' success had been made possible by the arms in which he excelled; and the road into Bavaria now lay open. A fortnight later (April 30) Tilly died of his wound at Ingolstadt. His last military doings had not added to his fame; and since he had met his superior at Breitenfeld his habitual caution had been intensified by a sense of failure. The methods which he had learnt from his Spanish exemplars had broken down hopelessly before this new master of war. Nor was he a statesman-soldier of the type of either Gustavus or Wallenstein. But he had rendered great services at the most critical earlier stage of the war; and the main share of the infamy attaching to the sack of Magdeburg should fall not on him, but on the practice of the age of warfare in which he held a conspicuous place.

From Rain the Swedes without loss of time advanced upon Augsburg, which was entered upon April 24. A garrison was placed here, and a monthly contribution was promised by the Free Imperial City. Its municipal administration was entirely Protestantised, and the citizens swore an oath of "security" to the King. From a military point of view the triangle of Donauwörth, Ulm, and Augsburg, between Danube and Lech formed a position of incomparable strength. But Gustavus had no thought now of taking up a defensive position. On April 26 the advance continued upon Ingolstadt, which Maximilian had likewise abandoned. His only hope now lay in Wallenstein, whose aid he had urgently solicited; for his attempt at securing a recognition of his neutrality from Gustavus Adolphus through the French resident Étienne, who was well aware how unwelcome the tidings of the "Goth's" progress must be to Richelieu, broke down on the demand of disbandment. But the siege of Ingolstadt proved more difficult than had been foreseen; and on May 1 Gustavus pushed on towards Landshut, which soon fell into his hands.

At this point some uncertainty was introduced into the King's movements by the news from Saxony and Bohemia, which at first induced him to march in the direction of Nürnberg. When, however, an advance of Wallenstein into Bavaria seemed probable, the King turned back once more, and the march on Munich continued. About the middle of May—the precise date is disputed—Gustavus Adolphus entered the Bavarian capital, leaving his troops outside. A heavy requisition (three or four hundred thousand dollars) was imposed upon the town, but only the payment of part exacted; and even Maximilian's palace was spared, the chief spoil being the Elector's celebrated collection of cannon in the arsenal. The stay of Gustavus in Munich was cut short by the news of untoward occurrences in the west. The Elector of Trier had secured "neutrality" by accepting the protection of France and yielding up to her his fortresses, including Coblenz. But his Chapter had called in a Spanish force which seized Speier, and advanced into the Palatinate. Notwithstanding the disturbed state of the south-west, to which the Dukes of Lorraine and Orleans were preparing to contribute, Gustavus had once more to march back upon Nürnberg; for the tidings had reached him of Wallenstein's entry into Prague, and of Arnim's withdrawal across the Saxon frontier (end of May).

The King was necessarily much disturbed by the news of the Rakonitz interview and its consequences; but his ambassador at Dresden was in answer to his complaints told that the Elector himself attached no importance to the negotiations of his field-marshal with Wallenstein, and that he hoped for a junction between Gustavus' army and his own at Leitmeritz. Deception was in the air, and the King, Arnim's policy being also that of his master, was so fully persuaded that the conclusion of a separate peace between Wallenstein and the Saxons was impending that he took measures for eventually buying over Saxon officers to the Swedish side. On the other hand, Wallenstein may not have intended to deceive the Saxons, for at this time he might still hope to oblige the Emperor to accept his policy. On June 23 a special envoy from Gustavus arrived at Dresden in the person of Count Palatine Augustus of Sulzbach, who laid before the Elector a series of proposals on the part of the King. They are largely identical with the famous programme put forward by him about the same time at Nürnberg; and nowhere is a clearer indication to be found of his political intentions when he stood at the very height of his military successes.

A preliminary demand extremely distasteful to John George, who had always shown a strong aversion from his brother Elector, was the restoration of the unfortunate Frederick. The Swedish "satisfaction" was evidently susceptible of reduction, but ultimately Pomerania would clearly be insisted on; while some kind of supremacy was claimed by the King over the Catholic lands conquered by him. But the most startling proposal, at least from the Saxon point of view, was the formation

of a *corpus evangelicorum*, consisting of all the Protestant Estates of the Empire, strong enough to maintain against Austria, Spain, and the League any settlement that might be reached, and placed under the direction of Sweden. When the King consulted the *Riksråd* as to possible terms of peace, the necessity of the establishment of such a *corpus*, together with the retention of Pomerania, was strongly urged upon him.

We are not informed as to the close of the negotiations at Dresden about these proposals; but the mission of Augustus of Sulzbach was so far successful that the Elector promised to have no further dealings with Wallenstein unless with the King's consent, and on June 28 signified to Wallenstein that he had broken off the negotiations. On the other hand, the Elector promised to unite his troops with the Swedes; Arnim betook himself to Silesia; and Wallenstein, having, in the last days of June, effected a junction with the Bavarian troops, headed by Maximilian himself, at Eger, marched with them upon Franconia.

Their advent here had been anticipated by Gustavus Adolphus. When forced to change his plan of action, he had left Banér and Bernard of Weimar behind him to hold Bavaria and Swabia and started on his long march with an army of not more than 18,000 men. On June 18 he reached Fürth on the Regnitz opposite Nürnberg. He now sent the experienced diplomatist Sattler, and Chemnitz, the historian of the Swedish War, to ascertain the views of the Nürnberg authorities on the twofold question of a general and a separate peace. His propositions, though with variants of some importance, were in substance those which he had laid before the Saxon Elector; and in the discussion, of which notes are preserved, his emissaries argued in favour of a *corpus evangelicorum* under a qualified *capo*. In other words, Gustavus Adolphus aimed at becoming the head of a confederation which would have included all Protestant Germany. Although we do not know the limits to which he intended that his control might, permanently or temporarily, extend, this formed design on his part is of the very highest importance—far exceeding even that of Sattler's incidental statements as to what his master was prepared to do, should he in course of time be elected Roman King or Emperor. This was not the present issue, though it was nearer to the domain of practical politics than when, during the winter negotiations at Mainz, Richelieu is said to have dropped a hint in the same direction; and we have Oxenstierna's statement that his sovereign had no such end in view. Of immediate significance at the present moment was his eagerness to secure the towns, more especially the great towns, of the south-west. If they adhered to him—and it will not be forgotten how close already were the bonds which united to him the Hanse Towns of the north—the Princes, so he averred himself, would soon follow. The Nürnbergers,

who remembered better than he the sorry days of the Union, demurred to any line being drawn between the Princes and the towns; but Gustavus was determined and proposed an early meeting of the representatives of the towns at Frankfort. His messages, his words, his genial ways in the midst of the jubilant citizens, all betokened the complete confidence of victory.

But his intention of crushing the Bavarians before their junction with Wallenstein was frustrated; though, moving on from Fürth, he occupied the road leading from Ratisbon to Eger by Amberg and Weiden. The Bavarians had already reached Eger; and, massing his forces, Wallenstein was clearly desirous of waging a decisive conflict (June). That, with forces scattered over so wide an area, Gustavus should exhibit some uncertainty in his movements was inevitable; but after he had resolved in his turn on giving battle at Nürnberg, the energy with which he concentrated his forces is extremely remarkable. Before the actual conflict he more than doubled his numbers, raising them to little short of 48,000 troops, as against more than 60,000 enemies. The latter estimate, however, is very uncertain, because of the extraordinary numbers of non-combatants—15,000 men it is said and as many women—comprised in Wallenstein's army.

After falling back on Nürnberg, and marking out a camp for his forces on the western and southern sides of the city, Gustavus paused to await both the arrival of the enemy and that of his own reinforcements. The fortifications of Nürnberg itself were strengthened, and the citizens cheerfully prepared for the defence, contrasting—if we may attach credit to a song of the day—their own hopefulness, as they beheld their “father” and his “heroes” in their midst, with the desolation of Magdeburg when her fate was upon her. By the middle of the month Wallenstein had taken up his position in a vast fortified camp which extended on the left bank of the Regnitz as far as Fürth immediately opposite Nürnberg, and faced the main Swedish position from heights covered with batteries. The Swedes had failed in all their attempts to prevent the construction of the vast camp which threatened an effective blockade of the city and of the Swedish camp at its gates. Within the walls the signs of famine were already at hand; for the town was crowded with fugitive peasantry; and the ravages of disease were spreading among the Swedish soldiery.

Soon after the middle of August, however, Gustavus had gathered his forces, Wallenstein, strangely as it was thought, hazarding no interference with the arrival of the service contingents. The most important of these was that brought by Oxenstierna from Rhine and Mosel, with which, after effecting a junction with the troops of Banér and those of William of Weimar, he had reached Nürnberg on August 20. All was now ready for a decisive struggle.

On August 31, the Swedish army was drawn up in fighting order

along the Regnitz opposite Wallenstein's camp. But he would not accept battle. A cannonade opened on the following day remained ineffectual; and on the night of September 2^d the Swedes crossed the Regnitz at a lower point, and pitched their camp immediately opposite that of the enemy. On the morning of the 3rd the attack upon the heights on the northern side of the camp began. The chief point of attack and defence was the *alte Veste*, a ruined castle in the middle of a clearance of the wood which had been specially fortified by the Wallensteiners; thrice the Swedes entered it, and thrice they were ejected from its walls. The struggle continued *caldissimamente*, in Wallenstein's phrase, till darkness and the fall of rain rendered its continuance on the part of the Swedes impossible? But they held their ground during the night, and in the morning essayed another attack, but again in vain. Hereupon Gustavus withdrew his troops into the camp at Fürth.

The King frankly confessed to the Nürnbergers the failure of his great effort, but the preparations in which he engaged for constructing another camp showed that he had as yet no design of moving. Hereupon he once more tried negotiations with the adversary whose resistance had at last stayed his victorious course. The intermediary was the Imperialist general Sparre, one of Wallenstein's former agents, who had been taken prisoner by the Swedes. Thurn, too, and the Bohemian agitator Bubna were in the King's camp, and may have contributed to complicate the situation. But the proposals of Gustavus, placed on record by Oxenstierna, were both clear and moderate. Pomerania and the dignity of a Prince of the Empire were to be the King's own "satisfaction"; the Elector Palatine was to be restored, but so likewise was the Elector of Mainz; Saxony and Brandenburg were to be compensated by Magdeburg and Halberstadt; Wallenstein by a duchy of Franconia. The Emperor was to guarantee these arrangements. But Gustavus' offer of a conference on the question of peace, to be held in the sight of both armies, was declined by Wallenstein till he should have referred the proposal to the Emperor. (It was actually referred to him, and an indecisive answer came two months afterwards.) As we know from Oxenstierna, the impression left on Gustavus by the apathetic bearing of Wallenstein was that no settlement remained possible between them but war to the knife.

Meanwhile, though Gustavus had pressed forward the entrenchments, the lack of provisions was becoming serious on his side; and Wallenstein was in his turn being pressed by those around him to assume the offensive. But he was still immovable. At last the King, in order if possible to "draw the fox," resolved on abandoning his position. Placing a garrison of nearly 5000 in Nürnberg, and sending a formal challenge of battle for the morrow to Wallenstein, he broke up his camp on September 18. Three days later, after the Swedes had reached Neustadt (near Coburg),

Wallenstein also broke up his camp, and, burning down the villages round Nürnberg, marched north.

The course now pursued by Gustavus Adolphus is open to much criticism; nor can it be denied that his wonderful versatility and buoyancy at this time began to resemble a hazardous mutability of design. It should, however, be noted that the plan on which he now resolved had the persistent approval of Oxenstierna, who so often, as he told the King, had occasion to pour water upon his fire. Gustavus determined on returning to Swabiä, and thence, moving down the Danube, to invade the Austrian lands, where he reckoned on being supported by a rising among the sturdy peasants of Upper Austria, of whose continued unrest satisfactory assurances had reached him. Wallenstein, the King seems to have calculated, would by such a movement be drawn out of Saxony; and in the meantime he ordered a Swedish force under Duwall from the Brandenburg side to join Arnim, who now had 16,000 men under his command. If, however, it proved necessary to furnish Saxony with further assistance, this task was to fall to Bernard of Weimar, who was placed at the head of the force in Franconia during the illness of his elder brother, William. Yet, when Bernard proposed to move forward on his own account, the King showed much displeasure. He had once more modified or postponed his plan of action; and after crossing the Danube at Donauwörth, and recapturing Rain, halted at Neuburg, with the intention of continuing his march to the Lake of Constance (October). Here at last definite news reached him of Wallenstein's movements, and an interval of high-strung expectation ended in clear and firm resolve.

Notwithstanding the doubts of Gustavus, who remembered the old dealings with Arnim and his master, Wallenstein had never hesitated in his determination to crush the Saxons, after Gustavus had himself failed to come to their aid. Against Arnim, Maradas had led an Imperialist force from Bohemia; and, in the middle of August, Field-Marshal Holk had by Wallenstein's orders broken into the south-west of the Electorate, and finally carried his raids as far as the neighbourhood of Dresden. Holk, a Dane and a Lutheran by birth and breeding, who had formerly served against Wallenstein at Stralsund, by the brutal excesses of his flying column earned for himself in the Erzgebirge and its near neighbourhood a long-enduring infamy. In September Wallenstein detached Gallas with a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 in Holk's wake; and, in the middle of October, the Bavarian troops having marched south to operate nearer home against the Swedes, himself approached by way of Thuringia, and after effecting a junction with both Holk and Gallas, reached Leipzig. Both town and castle (the Pleissenburg) after a show of resistance capitulated. The Commander-in-Chief was here also joined by Aldringer, with a division from Bavaria, and by Pappenheim, who during the greater part of the year had been carrying on successful

operations in the north-west against the Swedish commanders Tott and Baudissin, and against the wary Duke George of Lüneburg. With some reluctance Pappenheim relinquished a kind of warfare in which he excelled, and took up his position, near that of Wallenstein, at Halle. The whole district between the Elbe and Saale was now under the control of the Imperialists, whose head-quarters were at Weissenfels. Their entire force (including the Pappenheimers) may be reckoned at over 25,000 foot and 15,000 horse, with, it is stated, 70 guns. But, as in the case of the Swedish army, there is much uncertainty in this estimate.

Sure at last of Wallenstein's purpose, Gustavus determined upon keeping his promise to the Saxon Elector. The intentions of John George may even now have seemed doubtful to the King; but whether Wallenstein were to crush Saxony, or whether it were to lapse into neutrality, Gustavus, as he seems now to have fully recognised, would be placed in an impossible position. His way home would be blocked, his tenure of Pomerania imperilled by the "Duke of Mecklenburg," and the freedom of the Baltic might once more be threatened by the Imperial Commander-in-Chief. If so, where was he to look for allies? Denmark's jealousy was stronger than ever. The desire of the United Provinces for peace grew with the revived ambition of Spain to take part in the war. He could place no trust in English diplomacy, which in the person of Sir Henry Vane continued to occupy itself with the subsidiary question of the restoration of Charles I's brother-in-law. Even France, while leaving the subsidies promised at Bärwalde unpaid, was alike intent upon her own operations on the Rhine, and undesirous of making Gustavus the arbiter of the German War. His progress had reached a stage of great difficulty, and we know for certain that in these closing weeks of his career of conquest his mind was much occupied with what had been his primary concern when he had opened his German campaigns—the problems of safeguarding the destinies of his own Swedish kingdom.

On October 17 the Swedish army reached Nördlingen; and on the 24th Gustavus rode into the faithful city of Nürnberg, there to confer with Oxenstierna on the situation. The Chancellor was to remain as the King's plenipotentiary in southern Germany, with instructions to summon to Ulm a meeting of the Swabian, Franconian, and two Rhenish Circles, which should there renounce their allegiance to the Emperor, accept the King's "direction and protection," and order a general excise towards the prosecution of the war. The Chancellor received the King's instructions as to the government of his daughter and heiress, Christina, should his death take place during her minority. At Erfurt Gustavus bade farewell to his Queen, and on November 11 he reached Naumburg, about nine miles from Weissenfels. After the Hessians and the Weimarers had joined him, his force is reckoned to have amounted to 19,000 foot, with 6500 horse and 60 guns.

The troops of John George of Saxony and Duke George of Lüneburg were not on the spot. Arnim, who commanded the Saxon forces that were still in Silesia, was busily negotiating according to his wont. But with all his coming and going, Gustavus' urgent entreaties could not induce the Elector to do more than order two regiments of horse to march south with the Lüneburg troops. None of these, or of the Saxons, appeared on the field of battle.

To keep in touch with Pappenheim, Wallenstein moved back his main army on Merseburg and Lützen, and by this movement induced Gustavus to advance. On the evening of November 15 the Swedes stood on the border of the great plain which opens east of the Saale upon Lützen, Markranstädt, and Leipzig—in this war, as in the Napoleonic, the chosen battle-field of the nations. On the morning of the 16th, in a November fog, the battle of Lützen began. The high road to Leipzig had been entrenched by Wallenstein and was defended by artillery. Behind it stood his army, in three lines of battle, with cavalry on either wing; upon it the Swedes advanced in their lighter formation of two lines, the King and his blue and yellow guards on the right; Bernard of Weimar (but as to this the accounts differ) in command on the left. About ten o'clock the fog for a time dispersed, and the attack, led by the King in person, began. Notwithstanding a charge of Ottavio Piccolomini's cavalry, the Swedes had taken the battery on the road, but they were driven out again; and, as the fog thickened, Gustavus, hastening to the assistance of one of his regiments, was momentarily isolated and carried among the enemy's cavalry. His horse received a wound, and then he was wounded himself, whereupon he begged the Duke Francis Albert of Lauenburg to help him from the field; but the Duke fled. A royal page (Leubelfing) remained by the side of his master, when some troopers rode up and put an end to his life. His body was found naked, and covered with wounds. The supposed foul play on the part of the Duke of Lauenburg is an exploded fiction.

This happened about noon. But the battle continued to rage till nightfall. So soon as the King's death became known the command of his army was taken over by Bernard of Weimar. Pappenheim, whose cavalry now intervened in the battle, was in his turn mortally wounded; he died next day at Leipzig. After the Imperialists had recovered their batteries on the high road, they were finally driven out by the valour of the Swedish infantry; but nearly the whole of the Yellow Regiment was destroyed in the process. Late in the evening, after making a last attempt to rally his yielding troops, Wallenstein ordered retreat to be sounded, and Leipzig was reached in the course of the night. He had left 6000 dead on the field, the Swedes 4000. The stern judgment afterwards held by Wallenstein at Prague, when he magisterially distributed capital and other punishments as well as large pecuniary rewards, seems to indicate that he had no choice but to retreat. Yet

though the Swedes held their ground, they ventured on no pursuit. Both sides thought fit to claim the victory, and a *Te Deum* was celebrated at Vienna. The exultation, however, both here and at Madrid, where the *Death of the King of Sweden* was enacted on a stage accustomed to present to its spectators miracles and visitations of divine Providence, was due to a single incident in the battle, rather than to its general result.

The death of Gustavus Adolphus, at the height of his fame and almost at the height of his power—when still in the prime of life (he was not yet thirty-nine years of age) and full of aspirations which, marvellous as his career had been, were still unsatisfied—struck the world with awe, and was fitly moralised by Cardinal Richelieu, the man who best knew how to turn the event to political account. The full significance of the removal of such a personality from the very midst of the scene of military as well as that of political action it would be almost impossible to overestimate. He was great, not only because of what he achieved, but of what he set himself to accomplish. Oxenstierna may have been warranted in asserting that his master intended to be Emperor of Scandinavia, and to rule over an empire comprising all the Baltic lands. He certainly meant Sweden to be made impregnably strong, and left free to hold to the faith which she had chosen. Thus, as the simple triplet on the stone at Breitenfeld avers, he saved religious liberty for the world. He did so consciously, and not as a mere consequence of his political designs. To the fulfilment of his purpose he brought the gifts of a born ruler of men, as well as those of a great general and a great statesman. Cast in heroic mould, of commanding stature and fair-haired (*re d'oro*), he was a Swede every inch of him. Affable, free of speech, full of wrath if discipline were broken or disaster provoked, he was the comrade of his soldiers, by whose side he fought and prayed. He was at the same time a master of military detail; his reforms were grounded on experience, and his tactics inspired by the prescience of victory. He had been carefully trained in the art of government, and besides being able to speak eight languages, and interested in letters and learning, was versed in the administrative business of his own country and capable of understanding the political systems of other lands. He was an adept in negotiation; he was proof against the diplomatic insinuations of Wallenstein, and met as an equal the statecraft of Richelieu. His occasional political miscalculations and his strategic mistakes—not always easily distinguishable from one another—were almost invariably redeemed by his courage and resource; but the foundation of his strength lay in his unfaltering conviction that his cause was that of his country and one of which God had charged him with the defence.

CHAPTER VII.

WALLENSTEIN AND BERNARD OF WEIMAR.

1. WALLENSTEIN'S END.

(1632-4.)

DURING the winter months which followed on the battle of Lützen neither of the hosts which contended for victory there maintained possession of Saxony or engaged in important operations beyond its borders. While Wallenstein, after evacuating the electorate, set up his winter quarters at Prague, and there collected the forces with which in May he joined Gallas in Silesia, the Swedish army broke up again into several divisions. That commanded by Bernard of Weimar, after clearing Saxony of Holk's and other Imperialist soldiery, passed into Thuringia and Franconia. In March Bernard pushed forward as far as the river Altmühl in the Ansbach territory, and, after a brush with the redoubtable Bavarian cavalry general, Johann von Werth, united his forces south of Donauwörth with those of Horn, who had in the last month of 1632 conquered nearly the whole of Elsass.

The expectant character of these movements on the one and the other side is explained by the fact that Lützen had virtually been a drawn battle. But in the summer of 1633 they came more or less to a standstill—Wallenstein's by his own calculated inaction, Bernard of Weimar's because of an agitation (it can hardly be called a mutiny) in the Swedish army, which was only with some difficulty repressed. Broadly speaking, we may regard this standstill as reflecting the doubts and difficulties which, after the death of the great King, pressed upon some of the chief combatants.

The Swedes, though resolved not to break off except on their own terms the struggle of which their King had, first and last, so clearly defined the ends, could no longer exercise over its progress the controlling influence proper to his mighty personality. Gustavus Adolphus was succeeded on the Swedish throne by his daughter Christina, a child of six years of age; and, so long as she remained in tutelage, the government, as will be shown in a later chapter, was practically carried on by a small committee directed by the strong will of the Chancellor, Axel

Oxenstierna. The widow of Gustavus, Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg, was not included among the regents and guardians. Although the system of government during the minority of the "Elected" Queen—a designation partly intended to repress any pretensions on the part of the Polish Vasas—was not approved by the Swedish Diet till January, 1634, Oxenstierna secured a twelvemonth earlier the confirmation of his commission as "Legate" of the Crown, with full powers in the Holy Roman Empire and as regarding all Swedish armies. Thus there was preserved to these armies in Germany that unity of control which had given them so inestimable an advantage over their adversaries, and to which it had been the constant purpose of Gustavus to subject the military affairs of his German allies. To his position of trust, for which it might be difficult to find a parallel, Oxenstierna brought, besides a perfect knowledge of his late master's mind, the insight and judgment of a great statesman. He proved, indeed, unable to solve the perennial problem of a working control of the military executive by the civil authority. Beneath his methodical ways and a phlegmatic temperament that provoked the wit of the young Queen, there burnt a flame of patriotic ambition and incorruptible loyalty, to which a series of eminent commanders proved responsive; but the union of military and political leadership, and the enthusiasm which the great King's personality had communicated to the Swedish armies and nation, had perforce become things of the past.

Though the relaxation of the bond between the Swedes and the chief Protestant Princes was in agreement with the usual policy of John George of Saxony, a warlike impulse had momentarily seized upon him, due, it would seem, to a visionary scheme of securing the Bohemian Crown to his son and namesake. The unlucky Frederick, who had so long worn the empty title of King of Bohemia, had died at Mainz on November 29, 1632, still awaiting—though with drooping hopes—his restoration to his Palatine inheritance, now, with the exception of Heidelberg, reconquered from the foe. But neither Oxenstierna, who had arrived in Dresden on Christmas Day, nor the military chiefs of the Swedish armies, fell in with John George's design. He was all the more unwilling to yield to the Chancellor's demand that the entire body of Protestant Estates should be placed under the direction of Sweden, and adhered to his view that Saxony was their proper head. At Berlin, whither Oxenstierna next repaired, he found George William in a more yielding mood; he was well aware at whose expense Sweden would in any treaty of peace seek to obtain her "satisfaction," and was naturally anxious to conciliate the Chancellor. The project of a marriage between George William's heir (afterwards the Great Elector) and Queen Christina had not yet been laid aside. But soon after this George William showed signs of falling back into line with Saxony, and committed the command of his troops in Silesia, where old Count Thurn

had been made Swedish commissioner, to Arnim, now a Saxon Field-Marshal (February—March). John George hereupon began once more to incline to think of concluding peace without Sweden. Though nothing as yet came of the idea, he was encouraged in it both by Wallenstein's former agent Sparre, and by Christian IV of Denmark, who eagerly proffered a not wholly disinterested mediation.

In January, 1633, Oxenstierna had divided the main Swedish army, giving the command of the larger half to Duke George of Lüneburg, who, with Kniphausen under him, occupied the Weser lands, and that of the smaller to Bernard of Weimar, to the dissatisfaction of his elder brother, Duke William. Oxenstierna was well aware of the difficulty which must beset any attempt to secure the adhesion of the Protestant Estates at large to an alliance directed by Sweden, against the wishes of Saxony, so long as Brandenburg remained lukewarm and most of the Lower Saxon Estates only wished for a safe neutrality. Sweden's one trustworthy friend was Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel; and his troops were needed for the defence of his own territory. Perceiving that in the present instance the half was greater than the whole, Oxenstierna therefore fell back upon those portions of the Empire—the Franconian, the Swabian, and the two Rhenish Circles—which had been placed under his direct control by King Gustavus. United with these Estates by means of a separate alliance under her own direction, Sweden must endeavour to carry on the war side by side with another combination of Estates under Saxon leadership; and perhaps in time the weaker might be absorbed by the stronger body.

The alliance concluded at Heilbronn (Ulm having seemed too remote a place of meeting) on April 23, 1633, was accordingly one of those compromises which deserve to be regarded as great political achievements because they avert paralysis. In order to reach a conclusion, Oxenstierna consented to important sacrifices; and, though Sweden obtained the direction of the alliance, especially in military affairs, a Federal Council was established, of which seven members were to be nominated by the Estates of the four Circles, and only three by Sweden. The functions of this Council were to be consultative rather than executive; but it was likely to find many opportunities for interference. These chances were not ignored by Richelieu, who, desirous as he was of securing the continuance of hostilities between Sweden and the House of Austria, jealously watched Sweden's intervention in what he regarded as the French sphere of influence on the Rhine. While, therefore, the conclusion of the Heilbronn Alliance was furthered by the French ambassador at the Convention, Manasses de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières, who had in 1633 been sent on an extraordinary mission to the Emperor and the Catholic and Protestant Estates of the Empire, his efforts were also directed to the diminution within that alliance of the dominant influence of Sweden. For the rest, the annual war contributions of the four

Circles were fixed at no less a sum than 2,500,000 dollars; and before the Convention separated it resolved on the restoration of the Palatinate to Frederick's heir, Charles Lewis. Frederick's brother, Lewis Philip, undertook the administration of the country, to which, after the easy recapture of Heidelberg (May 24, 1633), prosperity began to return.

Oxenstierna's rapid conclusion of the Heilbronn Alliance, however much it left to be desired from the Swedish point of view, had successfully isolated the Elector of Saxony, especially after the Elector of Brandenburg had come into the new league. But the Chancellor could not shut his eyes to the fact that his achievement was quite as advantageous to France as it was to Sweden. Richelieu, for reasons explained elsewhere, and because he wished to prepare his ground before proceeding to action, continued to defer any direct French intervention in the German War. In 1631, the Peace of Cherasco, which secured an open way into Italy for France, had enabled him to devote a closer attention to her relations with the Empire. Its rights or claims over Lorraine he treated with contempt; but when, in obliging Duke Charles to conclude the disastrous and humiliating Treaty of Liverdun (June, 1632), Richelieu imposed upon him as one of its conditions neutrality during the continuance of the German War, he saw that the course of that war would furnish him with opportunities of mixing up the question of Lorraine with that of Elsass, now almost entirely in Swedish hands; and he was therefore most desirous that the war should continue. His action towards the Spiritual Electors on the left bank of the Rhine has already been noted in a previous chapter. On the approach of Gustavus, and the occupation of Mainz, the Electors of Cologne and Trier had appealed to France for the protection of their neutrality; and, though this appeal had remained unanswered, the quick-witted Philip Christopher of Trier had admitted French garrisons both into the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein opposite his residence of Coblenz, and into Trier itself, previously occupied by Spanish troops. The footing thus gained by France she was unlikely to relinquish to either friend or foe. Thus, after the death of Gustavus, Richelieu's most pressing interest was to keep together the offensive alliance against the House of Austria, now once more in close cooperation with Spain, and to preclude the possibility of the withdrawal of the Swedish army, which had been actually threatened by Oxenstierna. On the other hand, Richelieu was ready to take immediate advantage of the removal of Gustavus himself, before whose commanding personality his own indomitable will had found itself obliged to bend. Hence the twofold activity of Feuquières at Heilbronn in favour of the compact concluded there; while at the same time the hands of Oxenstierna were bound as far as possible by a renewal of the Franco-Swedish alliance, on terms essentially the same as those of the Treaty of Bärwalde, and renewing the promise of a French subsidy (April 19, 1633).

Inasmuch as the Heilbronn Alliance placed all the military forces of the west under Swedish control, it was upon the commanders of those forces that the mantle of the conquering Gustavus may be said to have fallen. After their junction near Donauwörth (April, 1633), Horn and Bernard of Weimar alternately held the chief command, neither of them consenting to regard himself as the subordinate of the other, and Oxenstierna being desirous of offending neither. Though both had high qualities as commanders, the want of unity in their counsels made itself at times disadvantageously felt in the course of the next campaigns. Gustaf Karlsson Horn, Count of Björneborg, who sprang from a family of high distinction in the Swedish service, had, after taking a prominent part in the Polish War, during Gustavus' German campaigns held the position of the King's Field-Marshal (lieutenant-general). He had materially contributed to the victory of Breitenfeld, and had subsequently been named "Director of the Würzburg principality." He was a commander of much circumspection, learned in the theory as well as experienced in the practice of war, and a strict disciplinarian. Within the last months of 1632 he had conquered the whole of Elsass, with the exception of Hagenau. In the personality of Bernard of Weimar there was something which more nearly resembled that of the great King, whose last battle he had fought to a conclusion. From his Ernestine ancestors he had inherited a passionate disposition—which in one of his brothers, the unhappy John Frederick, swerved into madness, but in Bernard was disciplined into a noble ardour. His own statement, that from his youth upwards his thoughts had been bent upon doing service to God and his beloved country, was no mere profession. His intellectual tastes (he was a lover of books) and his modest simplicity invested him with a chivalrous charm; in the field he was all eagerness for battle. Unfortunately for himself, he was, like Duke George of Lüneburg, who commanded in the Lower Saxon Circle and its vicinity, only a younger brother in a princely House—a position which, while it aroused in him a strong dynastic ambition, left him unable to meet on an independent footing the great Powers whose support was indispensable to the cause of Protestantism and of "German liberty."

Once more, then, the Swedish army stood at the gate of Bavaria; and once more Maximilian was soliciting the aid of Wallenstein, who remained immovable in Bohemia. The Swedish forces seem to have numbered about 18,000 men; and if, as Bernard expected, Wallenstein marched to offer them battle, he could not be met without Saxon assistance. But before long a new difficulty arose, the inner history of which remains to some extent obscure.

Since the Swedish army had landed at Usedom, it had changed in its composition, and to some extent in its character. Losses, made good by reinforcements of which only a fraction was derived from

Sweden, while they mainly consisted of soldiery levied near and far, and in all the regions of the Empire through which the troops had passed during their ceaseless marches and counter-marches, had changed the very texture of the army. The disproportion between Swedes and soldiers of other nationalities was much greater than before, more especially in the divisions detached from the force commanded by the King in person. As has been already seen, the principle of making war pay for itself had been more and more fully adopted by Gustavus. But even during his lifetime, notwithstanding the heavy contributions exacted and requisitions made, and (when they had been received) the French subsidies, it had been found impossible to provide the full pay of the soldiery, especially in the detached divisions. The King had thus fallen into debt with his troops, but more especially with the colonels who commanded, and had frequently themselves levied, regiments, advancing sums for their pay in the expectation of being duly repaid with interest. Here and there in the conquered territories, especially in Franconia, some of the officers had been compensated by the grant or promise of landed estates. For many reasons, the death of the King inevitably impaired the cohesion and the general discipline of the army. During the winter of 1632-3, the commanding officers took to levying contributions on their own account, while the soldiers seized the goods and chattels of the inhabitants, and committed all kinds of depredations and other excesses. The general discontent grew apace; and, when it was found that the Convention of Heilbronn, on which great hopes had been placed, was more anxious for the "reformation" of the army than for its "contentment," the accumulated dissatisfaction burst forth. A remonstrance was drawn up by two officers of the Franconian army—one of them the Colonel Mitzlaff who had commanded the remnants of Mansfeld's troops in Silesia and had then passed first into the Danish, and then into the Swedish, service. Quite in the style of the English "agitators" of a rather later date, this document insisted on the payment within four months of the outstanding balances; failing which, instead of continuing to fight the enemy, the officers and troops would establish themselves as a *corpus* in the conquered lands, and hold these in pledge for their pay. The paper was numerously signed by the officers; but there is no trace of an organised mutiny among the common soldiery.

The attitude of Horn and Bernard of Weimar toward this agitation is obscure. While they protested against the menaces of the officers, they were found willing to advocate the claims preferred; and, while Horn insisted on carrying the remonstrance in its crude and unamended form to Heilbronn, Bernard, who was certainly to benefit by the movement, and who may (as Pufendorf hints) have helped to set it on foot, wrote in support of the demands. Oxenstierna in his turn was so much impressed by the gravity of the situation that he persuaded the Estates at Heilbronn, before separating, to agree to the principle of a month's

immediate pay to the troops, and resolved upon bestowing estates in the conquered lands as Swedish Crown fiefs upon the chief commanders—Bernard in particular—in return for their undertaking to satisfy the claims of officers and men.

On these lines the grievances of the army were settled in the course of the summer and autumn of 1633. Bernard, who during Horn's absence had employed the troops in seizing the bishopric of Eichstedt, which they were freely allowed to loot, in May held an interview with Oxenstierna at Frankfort to arrange his share—the lion's share—of the settlement. About the middle of June the document was signed in which the Crown of Sweden, by its own authority and without the concurrence of any of the Estates of the Empire, created Bernard Duke of Franconia in his own right.

Bernard, who had hitherto held no independent position of his own, had long desired a hereditary principality; and some promise of the kind may have been made to him by Gustavus Adolphus. His further wish to become, not only, as he now did, a member of the Heilbronn Alliance, but also the commander-in-chief of its forces, was frustrated by the jealousy of Horn, and perhaps also by the foresight of Oxenstierna. The new duchy of Franconia included, in substance, only those parts of the Franconian Circle which had formed the sees of Würzburg and Bamberg; and even here the Crown of Sweden reserved to itself the fortresses of Würzburg and Königshofen. Bernard was not declared an immediate Prince of the Empire—the comparison between his dukedom and Wallenstein's in Mecklenburg is therefore imperfect; on the contrary, he had to renounce all connexion with the Empire and declare himself explicitly a vassal of the Crown of Sweden, to whom in the event of his dying without male issue the duchy was to escheat.

In this new character Bernard, with Oxenstierna, made his appearance at an assembly of the chief princes of the Heilbronn Alliance, held later in June, 1633, at Heidelberg. The capital of the Palatinate, the last place in it held by the Imperialists, had on May 24 capitulated to Count Palatine Christian of Birkenfeld. The assembly agreed to levy in all the lands included in the alliance a 10 per cent. tax on the produce of all fields and vineyards; and, the means being thus provided, a settlement was arranged here and completed at Frankfort (July), which at last put an end to the critical condition of affairs in the army.

Bernard's absence from the army was prolonged during July, while he was taking possession of his new duchy and establishing his brother Ernest there as regent. In the meantime Horn held the command without making much progress, though in the course of the month he took Pappenheim, and then Neumarkt (near Landshut), having advanced from Donauwörth with his main force. He was beginning to lose all control over his troops; villages were destroyed; the peasantry was maltreated. The officers neglected their soldiery; and the men,

provided with sham passes, roamed over the country in quest of plunder. The old discipline had fallen out of gear; and the Swedish name was beginning to be associated in the mind of the German population with the worst horrors of war. But Bernard's return was still delayed—this time by intrigues between his brother Duke William and John George of Saxony. At last Bernard induced William to allow part of his troops to reinforce the army of the Danube, which he rejoined early in August, and which now seems to have reached a total of 12,000 horse and nearly as many foot. Commissaries of the Swedish Crown had already arrived at Augsburg. While, with some demur, the officers and men accepted a month's pay from the Heilbronn Alliance, the commanders of regiments consented to accept in satisfaction of their claims grants of land which, though guaranteed by the Swedish Crown, purported to be bestowed as hereditary fiefs of the Empire. The grantees had to pay the war contributions already fixed or to be eventually imposed by the Alliance, and bound themselves to "depend" on Oxenstierna as Legate of the Swedish Crown. The value of the lands thus granted in the south-west was estimated at over four millions of dollars.

The army having thus been "contented," and measures taken to prevent further excesses (August—September), it once more became possible to contemplate offensive operations on a larger scale. Although the division of the supreme command boded ill for the maintenance of the requisite unity of design, the general condition of affairs was favourable to the allies of Heilbronn. Elsass had been almost entirely conquered by Horn. In August Christian of Birkenfeld defeated the Duke of Lorraine at Pfaffenhofen when advancing to defend Hagenau in Elsass, over which he had certain rights. The favourable opportunity for reopening hostilities against Lorraine was at once seized by France, under whose protection the Elector of Trier had now openly placed himself. Frederick Henry of Orange had taken Rheinberg; and in Switzerland also French influence was active. The whole line of the Rhine was thus held by the United Provinces, France, and Sweden; and the alliance between the latter two Powers was nearer than ever to becoming an alliance in the field.

While the Austrian possessions in Elsass were thus in hostile hands, Spain too had every reason for breaking the existing control of the line of the Rhine. The peace negotiations opened in 1632 between her and the United Provinces had led to no result; and, as the days of the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia drew to a close, the hopes of a pacific settlement dwindled. Philip IV had some time since resolved on sending his youngest brother Ferdinand, who, though Archbishop of Toledo and a Cardinal, was full of secular ambition, into the Spanish Netherlands, where he was in time to succeed the Archduchess as Governor. As the Dutch were masters of the sea, the Cardinal Infante would, when the time came, have to proceed to the Provinces by land;

and the Spanish Government proposed to clear the way for him by means of a force of 24,000 men to be levied in Italy. They were to be commanded by the Duke of Feria, Governor of Milan, who had already had some experience of the German War. It will be seen how this Spanish expedition, even while still remote, excited the jealousy of Wallenstein, and how his displeasure was intensified by the Emperor's consenting, against the tenour of the agreement between them, to place Aldringer and his force at the disposal of Maximilian of Bavaria, for the defence of his electorate. Bernard had steadily kept in view an attack upon Ratisbon; but, on his return to Donauwörth, he found that Horn had already departed with part of the army to lay siege to Constance.

In the middle of September Feria actually appeared at Innsbruck, though with a force of only 8000 foot and 1200 horse, and not in very good case. But he managed to effect his junction with Aldringer and to relieve Constance and Breisach, before Horn and Bernard had united their forces. In October the two armies lay close to each other, near the Lake of Constance, neither side caring to risk a battle, when, direct hostilities having at last broken out between Wallenstein's troops and Arnim's Saxo-Swedish forces in Silesia, Oxenstierna instructed Bernard to create a diversion in their favour by invading either Bavaria or Bohemia, and leaving Horn to deal with Feria and Aldringer. Bernard could thus at last carry out his long-cherished design against Ratisbon.

Disregarding the successful operations of Johann von Werth and the insecure condition of his own duchy of Franconia, Bernard with characteristic impetuosity now moved direct upon his goal. Starting with ten thousand men from Donauwörth, he executed a rapid march between the Scylla of Ingolstadt and the Charybdis of Eichstedt to the Altmühl, and thence direct upon Ratisbon. In vain at the last moment Maximilian applied for aid to Feria and Aldringer—they were too far away; to Gallas, who had succeeded Holk, and whom Wallenstein would not allow to move from the Bohemian frontier; and to Wallenstein himself, who had no intention of coming to the Elector's aid. Ratisbon was garrisoned by two thousand Bavarian troops under Colonel Troibreze; but notwithstanding a powerful and active Catholic clergy, the sympathies of the majority of the citizens, and of a minority of the town council, were Protestant, and with Maximilian the city had a long-standing quarrel. Ratisbon, which lay on the right bank of the Danube, was completely blocked by Bernard; Johann von Werth's horse were kept at a distance; and the bombardment, begun on November 10, 1633, having after two days' intermission been resumed with great vigour on the 13th, the garrison capitulated on the following day. It was allowed free departure with the honours of war; but the majority of the garrison proposed to come over to Bernard. Hereupon, he held his entry into Ratisbon, amidst the rejoicings of the population; and on November 16, the anniversary of the battle of Lützen, a solemn Protestant service was held in

the Cathedral. No excesses dishonoured Bernard of Weimar's brilliant achievement, which at once made him the hero of the Protestant west. Not only had he succeeded while others—at Constance and at Breisach—had failed, but he had carried out a difficult design with dazzling promptitude; and while "the bulwark of Bavaria" had fallen, the line of the Danube—the road to Vienna itself—lay open before him. In the meantime, the Bishop and the Catholic clergy of Ratisbon were heavily fined; while the latter were for the most part expelled and their domains sequestered. The burghers were organised for defence; and the free and Imperial city, so intimately associated with many notable vicissitudes in the history of the Empire, was enrolled in the Heilbronn Alliance.

Ratisbon, then, had not been relieved by Wallenstein; and no coals of fire had been heaped by him on the head of Maximilian of Bavaria for the action of the Diet held in that city three years before. How is the quiescence of Wallenstein—if quiescence it was—during the twelve-months which had elapsed since the battle of Lützen to be explained?

For him, too, the situation had been changed by that battle and the death of Gustavus Adolphus. Hitherto he had committed no disloyal act, and had in all probability entertained no definitely disloyal intentions. His general scheme of policy had been to aid the Emperor in restoring the Imperial authority and in bringing about a settlement which, while leaving that authority unimpaired, should be acceptable to the Protestant Princes and include conditions favourable to his personal interests. No side, however, trusted him, because he was identified with no party or interest, because he was at any time ready to exchange combination for combination, and because, as his occasional abrupt and passionate utterances indicate, the outlines of his successive schemes were apt to lose themselves in the mists of a vague and boundless ambition. His withdrawal into Bohemia after the battle of Lützen was hardly reconcilable with his official announcement of a complete Imperialist victory, and his prestige as a general suffered in consequence; indeed there was some gossip among the courtiers at Vienna as to his being superseded in the command. Fortunately for him, Bernard of Weimar had declined to follow the Imperialist army, still numerically the stronger, into Bohemia.

Thus Wallenstein had time for augmenting his army at Prague and restoring its efficiency. In the campaigns of 1633 he seems to have intended to play a vigorous part, both by putting an end to the alliance between Saxony and Sweden, and by saving Breisach and if possible recovering the Austrian lands in Elsass—a task which he had no intention of leaving the Spaniards to accomplish. Franconia and Bavaria, as well as the Weser lands, he proposed to leave more or less to themselves. Still, being unable to place in the field an army so preponderant in strength as to ensure success, and habitually preferring diplomatic to military measures in the first instance, he continued to

keep in view the alternative of peace. He was probably quite sincere in telling Count Wartensleben, whom Christian IV of Denmark had sent to push negotiations for peace between Vienna and Dresden, "that he was growing old, was plagued by bad health and in want of rest; that he was quite satisfied with his present position; and that from the continuance of war he could look for no increase of reputation—rather for the contrary." The Emperor was duly informed of Wallenstein's views; and peace negotiations with Saxony and Brandenburg ensued, turning on the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution and the Catholic interpretation of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*, on the rights of the Bohemian Protestants, and on the restoration of the Elector Frederick's son in part at least of the Palatinate. The Emperor would not hear of any concessions in Bohemia; but the negotiations continued with Wallenstein's cognisance and general approval, and it was well understood that in the meantime he would not molest Saxony, if her troops in return left Bohemia untouched. In all this there was nothing either disloyal or illogical; but now there came into the web a strand of intrigue of which the importance cannot be mistaken. The involutions of Wallenstein's course of action, and the motives which determined it, often defy analysis. But there are certain connecting threads which, if the story is to be understood at all, must be throughout kept in view.

Wallenstein, however wide the range of his statesmanship, was at all times sensible of the ties of nationality, family history, the associations of descent and early life. He was born a Bohemian noble and bred a utraquist. The leaders of the Bohemian insurrection, who after the catastrophe of the White Hill had become exiles from their country, had never abandoned the hope of re-establishing the ancient Bohemian constitution in Church and State under an elected King of their own choice. As the star of this or that Protestant leader had been in the ascendant, his possible claims had been considered—Bethlen Gabor was thought of at one time, and even Mansfeld at another. Wallenstein's position differed widely from theirs; but he was a Bohemian magnate, and of Catholic intolerance at least there had never been any trace in his conduct. This had not been overlooked by the Swedes in their negotiations with Wallenstein both before and after the death of Gustavus Adolphus. The Swedish troops in Silesia were in the main officered by Bohemian Protestant exiles, with Count Thurn at their head as royal commissary; and Bohemian agents in plenty were at hand to take part in secret negotiations, from Major-General Bubna to Sezyma Rasin, who in the end turned Crown witness against Wallenstein and contributed more than any man to make the record of his last years a perplexing tangle of truth and fiction. Of a different type was Count William Kinsky, a Bohemian noble who had contrived to preserve his ample estates from confiscation, but was obliged to reside at Dresden, the ordinary place of refuge for his exiled compatriots. He was

brother-in-law to Count Adam Erdmann Treczka, another Bohemian noble, who had himself married a younger sister of Wallenstein's second wife, commanded a regiment under him and enjoyed his confidence. Kinsky kept himself closely informed of all Wallenstein's movements, and was consulted by Feuquières, when, after influencing the deliberations at Heilbronn (April, 1633), he paid a visit to Dresden.

By the middle of May, and probably earlier, the Bohemian malcontents were in communication with Nicolai, the Swedish resident at Dresden, as to the revived project of placing Wallenstein on the Bohemian throne; which, on being reported to Oxenstierna, received his general approval. Hereupon Kinsky furnished Nicolai with a list of the commanders fully trusted by Wallenstein. Whether or not this list, in which both Holk and Gallas figured, had been obtained at first hand, Wallenstein about this time actually had an interview with Bubna at Gitschin. It seems certain that Wallenstein here made no declaration as to his intentions with regard to the Bohemian Crown, and that his present object was to become enabled by a junction between Thurn's army and his own to dictate peace. There was as yet no question of his abandoning the Emperor, but he obviously meant to leave both Saxony and Bavaria out in the cold. Oxenstierna, though he had no intention of binding himself, was prepared to carry on negotiations, like Gustavus Adolphus before him, in furtherance of the Bohemian project.

But in the meantime matters had assumed a different aspect in Silesia. Here, with the opening of the summer of 1633, some military action had become unavoidable; and in May Wallenstein began operations against the combined army of Saxons, Brandenburgers, and Swedes. Their commander, Arnim, had, as has been seen, always advocated an accommodation with the Emperor, and was practically the head of the peace party at the Saxon Court. But Wallenstein had a special reason for desiring not to prolong the campaign which he had just begun. Official news had reached him from Vienna that Feria, instead of merely passing through the western borderlands of the Empire, was to be instructed to operate there against the French, and that Aldringer was to be placed under his supreme command. Thus, not only was Spain to control Elsass, but Wallenstein's own position as *generalissimo* of all Imperialist and Spanish troops in the Empire was to be impaired.

Early in June, when a decisive battle was supposed to be imminent between Wallenstein and Arnim, a fortnight's truce was agreed upon between them, to the bitter disappointment of the Bohemians. Feuquières, who had been intriguing to secure the Saxon army for France, began to fear that Wallenstein intended to attack Bavaria; and Richelieu as well as Oxenstierna came to the conclusion that any agreement with Wallenstein must be conditional upon his open abandonment of the Emperor. But, although in the concessions which he

offered as to the Palatinate Wallenstein went beyond the Emperor's wishes, and although he placed no restraint upon his cavils against the Jesuits and their religious policy, the negotiations which he carried on with Arnim during the truce had the Emperor's distinct sanction. Had they been successful, Wallenstein might possibly have in the end, without either France and Bavaria or Spain, have dictated a peace which would have brought back the Empire to a condition of things resembling that before 1618. But, though Brandenburg was willing, John George of Saxony, who hoped with the aid of Denmark to settle matters in his own way at a "composition" meeting to be summoned to Breslau, was not to be persuaded.

When, after the truce had come to an end, Wallenstein, notwithstanding his superiority in numbers, went on negotiating with Arnim (July), the Court of Vienna no longer heeded protests made by him against Feria's march. If, therefore, Wallenstein still meant to impose a pacific settlement at the head of an overpowering military force he had no time to lose. Holk's renewed raid into the Voigtland (the south-western part of the Saxon Electorate), which was even more savage than the first, and in the course of which he contrived to frighten the Leipzigers out of their wits, seems to have been intended by his chief to prevent a Saxon invasion of Bohemia; and it was only his fear of Bernard of Weimar's marching against him at the Elector of Saxony's request that caused Holk to withdraw his army, which was suffering terribly from the plague. On his way back to Bohemia, Holk, who had not yet completed his fortieth year, fell a victim to the disease at Adorf (September 19); and the most faithful of Wallenstein's lieutenants was inopportunistly lost to the commander-in-chief, to whom in his own phrase he "belonged." His place was ill supplied by Gallas.

On September 19 Arnim, as to the course of whose latest negotiations with Wallenstein nothing is known, reached Gelnhausen (near Hanau), whither Oxenstierna had come from Frankfort to meet him. Arnim's account to the Swedish Chancellor of Wallenstein's view of the situation was that the Emperor had always aimed at a separate peace with Saxony and her German allies, but this Sweden could not allow Saxony to accept. On the other hand Wallenstein himself would not submit to a repetition, with Spanish aid, of the Ratisbon proceedings of 1630. He was not quite sure of all his officers, but had already removed some whom he could not trust. If Sweden would support him he would break with the Emperor, lead his army, after uniting it to the Swedish force, from Silesia into Bohemia, and invade Austria. France (with whose ambassador Arnim avoided contact at Gelnhausen) was to be induced by Sweden to resume the offensive against Spain in Italy.

Although the complement and crown of these vast designs, the accession of Wallenstein to the Bohemian throne, remained as yet unmentioned, they suggest the inspiration of Thurn and his Bohemian

fellow-partisans ; and, indeed, they breathe the spirit of Anhalt and of the early years of the war. They were received with approval by Oxenstierna, though with his usual caution he for the present made no change in his course of action. The Swedish diplomatists at Dresden and Berlin mistrusted Wallenstein ; and Bernard of Weimar shrewdly questioned whether his control over his army was such that he could induce it to abandon the Emperor. But Arnim, though even he had his doubts, persuaded the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg to unite their armies in Silesia with Wallenstein's. The armies under Arnim's command were to meet for a general muster on October 11 ; and he had pointed out to Oxenstierna that a junction of the Saxons and Brandenburgers with Wallenstein's troops would not signify a rupture between Saxony and Sweden. But just before the intended juncture, Duwall, who under Thurn commanded the Swedish force in Silesia, refused to move without direct instructions from the Chancellor or from Stettin. And Arnim found to his dismay and indignation that Wallenstein himself had taken up a new attitude, and one in the circumstances more incomprehensible than ever. He now refused to join the Saxons and Brandenburgers, unless their common action were directed against the Swedes—or, if Duke Francis Albert of Lauenburg's report of a passionate altercation between him and Wallenstein is authentic, against the enemies of the Empire, the Swedes and the Bavarians (October). The reasons for this extraordinary change are unknown. Not long before this (September) Wallenstein must have received a memorandum, written in Kinsky's hand at the dictation of Feuquières, in which he was urged to make common cause with the Emperor's foes, now stronger than ever, thanks to the League of Heilbronn, and with their aid to place the Crown of Bohemia upon his head. As about this time he seems to have positively declined to enter into any dealings with France, so he drew back from alliance with Sweden and immediate rupture with the Emperor. He was, in short, not prepared to sacrifice the strength of his personal position by attaching himself to either of the foreign Powers, and enabling them to pursue their own ambitious policy. Yet how could he, without the alliance of one or both of them, force the Emperor to a peace which would either satisfy the Protestants or meet his personal ends ? By seeking to play a double game he was accomplishing nothing, and at the same time making himself so generally distrusted that, as Irmer well puts it, when at last he determined to break with the Emperor, not one of the Emperor's adversaries would credit his intention.

Arnim having refused Wallenstein's demand that the Saxons should march with him to the Rhine—a movement which in any case would hardly have been executed so late in the year—negotiations between them were entirely broken off. But Wallenstein seems still to have cherished hopes of bringing about a peace with Saxony and Brandenburg

from which the Swedes should be excluded; and to this end resolved on driving them from Silesia. In October, the Swedish camp at Steinau capitulated to him; a large proportion of the 6000 troops, according to the easy fashion of the age, accepting service under his standard. Count Thurn, who had been taken prisoner, was liberated by Wallenstein without ransom; and his long political career was now virtually at an end. Liegnitz and Glogau followed suit; and very soon Silesia was clear of all Swedish soldiery. Wallenstein, instead of taking heed of the sore straits of his old adversary the Elector of Bavaria, hereupon proceeded to put pressure upon Brandenburg and Saxony. His forces invaded Brandenburg, where Frankfort-on-the-Oder and other places speedily surrendered; and he then advanced into Lusatia, as far as Görlitz and Bautzen, while in the rear of Arnim, whose army had withdrawn to the neighbourhood of Dresden, Gallas approached with the force formerly commanded by Holk (November).

The effect of these successes was undoubtedly great; once more it seemed as if Wallenstein were about to become the arbiter of northern Germany, and as if his desire of bringing about an equitable political and religious peace for the Empire at large were after all to be realised. Victory was the best assurance of the fidelity of his army; and, with this assured, his dictatorship must become irresistible. But at this point, when it was too late to save Ratisbon from the approach of Bernard of Weimar, the Emperor joined in solicitations with Maximilian of Bavaria, and Wallenstein gave way. Leaving Gallas with 4000 men at Leitmeritz, he started on November 18 with the bulk of his army to meet Bernard of Weimar, whose advance upon Ratisbon he had insisted upon disbelieving. Undeceived by the news of its fall, he hoped for a moment either to retake it, or, by intercepting Bernard's march along the line of the Danube upon Passau, to prevent him from invading Upper Austria and even menacing Vienna. Ordering Baron de Suys to post himself with a couple of regiments in Upper Austria, Wallenstein directed his own march upon the Upper Palatinate, where he halted at Fürth, in an angle between the Bohemian and Bavarian frontiers, in order to take Cham, about ten miles further south, where lay a small Swedish garrison (end of November).

Bernard of Weimar, delighted to have drawn Wallenstein at last, and believing that Gallas with his whole division had reinforced the garrison of Passau, was retracing his steps in order to relieve Cham, when the astounding news reached him that Wallenstein had given up the investment of Cham and led his army back into Bohemia. The immediate reason for this movement, one of the most perplexing of all the shifts and turns in Wallenstein's career, seems to have been that, with Arnim advancing on the Oder and the Swedish Marshal Kniphausen advancing from the Weser, he feared for his own rear; moreover, the season was certainly far advanced.

Bernard, on learning that Wallenstein had returned to Bohemia, himself fell back upon Ratisbon. When hereupon Feria and Aldringer approached to carry out the protection of Bavaria which Wallenstein had abandoned, Horn, instead of uniting with Bernard against them, manœuvred separately in the rear of Feria's advance. In the end the Spanish-Bavarian forces took up their winter-quarters to the south-west of the great lakes which themselves lie south-west of Munich, and Horn led his own force into southern Swabia. The line of the Danube still remained in Bernard's hands. It was while thus holding their ground, with the western section of their adversaries between their own two armies, that the Swedes received the news of the catastrophe of Wallenstein.

At Vienna the indignation aroused against Wallenstein by his retreat had passed all bounds. The partisans of Bavaria and Spain were up in arms against him and his decision to let his army winter in the Emperor's own lands, instead of in Franconia and Thuringia. Even Eggenberg, hitherto Wallenstein's best friend at Court, declared: "*Amicus Socrates; amicus Plato; amicus autem religio et patria.*" The Emperor himself, complaining that he seemed to have another sovereign by his side, issued an order, bidding Wallenstein return at once into Bavaria, and refused point-blank his request that the defence of the electorate should be committed to Aldringer with part of Feria's troops. At the same time Suys was instructed to move back towards the Inn. Finally, two Imperial councillors, Trautmansdorff and Questenberg, were sent to Wallenstein in his camp at Pilsen, to impress upon him the Emperor's "categorical commands."

Wallenstein could not but recognise that a crisis had been reached in his relations with the Emperor and the Imperial Government. With Count Schlick, the President of the *Hofkriegsrath*, he had for some time been on unfriendly terms; and he had another influential adversary in Baron von Stadion, the Grand Master of the German Order. Together with Eggenberg, Bishop Anton of Vienna was passing into the ranks of his opponents, who continued to be urged on by the Jesuits, and in particular by the Emperor's Walloon confessor, Father Lamormain. Maximilian of Bavaria was well served by his ambassador Richel, whose correspondence with his master supplies much information as to the course of things at Vienna. All these agencies, as Wallenstein knew, were at work to break down his absolute authority as commander-in-chief, on which the whole strength of his position and political influence depended. But most formidable of all was the influence of Spain, represented at Vienna by Castaneda, and from October, 1633, also by Oñate, whose efforts were systematically directed towards bringing about a joint action between the two Habsburg Courts not less intimate, and more effective, than that which he had negotiated at the beginning of the war. The circumstances of the times were propitious; for an heir had recently (September 8) been born to the young King Ferdinand of

Hungary and his Spanish consort Maria Anna, and the dynastic interests of the two lines seemed more closely blended than ever. But Wallenstein had persistently withstood the proposal of levying an army in the Empire to fight on the Rhine under Spanish direction; and he would not even listen to the young King's wish to hold a command in the Imperial forces. The policy of Spain ran directly counter to Wallenstein's; while the latter aimed at an equitable peace in the Empire, the former was wholly directed to uniting Austria with Spain in the war against France. The commander in such a war could not be Wallenstein, who was, among many other things, accused of having entered into treasonable correspondence with Richelieu. The Bavarian ambassador had already suggested to the Emperor that the obnoxious general should be removed from the supreme command. Oñate now threatened that unless this were done the Spanish subsidies would be stopped—and at the same time, no doubt, the private pensions paid under Olivares' reckless system of expenditure, not only to the King of Hungary, who was wholly in the Spanish interest, but also to other personages of note. Before the close of the year the Emperor sent secret communications to Gallas, Aldringer, and some of the commanders in Moravia; but the purport of these remains unknown.

It seems to have been while Trautmansdorff and Questenberg were still awaiting Wallenstein's answer at Pilsen that the young King of Hungary's confessor, Father Quiroga—one of the Capuchin diplomatists—proposed to the Commander-in-Chief, by way of testing his intentions, that he should send a division of 6000 horse to Elsass, to accompany the Cardinal Infante on his march to the Netherlands. In Pilsen rumours were rife that Wallenstein intended to resign his command; indeed he had talked in this vein to Quiroga, though probably only by way of *ruse*. He had, in any case, made up his mind to yield neither to the unwarranted orders of the Emperor nor to Quiroga's insulting suggestion. Acting strictly within his rights, he sent explicit orders to Suys not to move. Then, on January 11, 1634, he, notwithstanding Trautmansdorff's protests, called together a Council of War consisting of his principal commanders. About fifty attended, including Piccolomini (Gallas and Aldringer were not at Pilsen); and Field-Marshal Ilow laid the Imperial demands before the meeting on Wallenstein's behalf, and stated his intention, as matters stood, to resign. The commanders declared the Imperial demands impracticable, and sent two successive deputations to Wallenstein, entreating him to remain. On January 12 he consented, and on the same day, at a banquet given by Ilow, a resolution (*Schluss*) of inviolable fidelity to him was signed by the commanders in the midst of a drunken uproar. According to Oñate, a clause in the copy of this resolution first shown to the officers, which limited their oath of fidelity by the words "so long as he remains in the Emperor's service" was struck out by Wallenstein with his own hand;

clearly, the resolution would have been of little use to him had the clause remained in it. Basing his refusal on this resolution, and on the fact that the safety of the Emperor and his House depended on the preservation of the army, Wallenstein apprised the Imperial Commissioners that the winter-quarters of his troops must be mainly in Bohemia, Silesia, Moravia, and Upper Austria. The resolution of the commanders was circulated for further signatures in Austria and Silesia, and also sent to Dresden; for the idea of a peace with the Protestant Electors, which so late as December had still found favour at Vienna, was still uppermost with Wallenstein. During January he was, through Kinsky (whom the Emperor had now allowed to reside on his Bohemian estates), and then through other agencies and to some extent with the Emperor's cognisance, seeking to reopen direct negotiations with Arnim, who in his turn had persuaded both the Electors to seek a pacific settlement through Wallenstein, if it could not be obtained direct from the Emperor. But Wallenstein was at the same time seeking through his secret agents to ascertain from Oxenstierna and Feuquières what sacrifices would content Sweden and France respectively in the event of a pacification. As yet he had formed no design of treason, or of cooperation with Sweden, and still less with France; but he clearly meant to force the Emperor's hand.

While thus the Protestant Electors and even the cautious Oxenstierna continued to recognise Wallenstein's importance for a possible settlement, and Richelieu's agent had not ceased to hold out to him the prospect of the Bohemian Crown, his own position was being gradually undermined. We cannot say how and to what extent the fidelity of Gallas, Piccolomini, and Aldringer to their chief had already been tampered with before the final step was taken; but it can hardly have been a surprise to Gallas. Before the end of the year 1633 the Emperor had appointed a secret commission to consult about the measures to be taken against Wallenstein. It consisted of Eggenberg, Trautmansdorff, and the Bishop of Vienna. Oñate, who had made up his mind that everything depended upon not allowing Wallenstein to "leap the ditch"—*i.e.*, settle the problem by his own action—was, with the King of Hungary, admitted to the sittings of the commission, and hinted at the most expeditious way out of the difficulty. The news of the Pilsen resolution, by which Wallenstein had hoped to safeguard his position, finally made it untenable.

On January 24 a patent (perhaps post-dated) was drawn up, which deposed Wallenstein and appointed the King of Hungary commander-in-chief of the Imperial armies, while absolving all superior and inferior officers from their obedience to Wallenstein and assigning independent commands to Gallas and Aldringer. The patent also referred to the dismissal and penal prosecution of two of Wallenstein's chief officers (Treczka and Ilow being those intended); and named Piccolomini and Colloredo as Field-Marschals. This patent was not as yet made public;

but on February 3 and 4 it was communicated through Wallmerode to Piccolomini and Aldringer, and doubtless also to Gallas. These men had no doubt been in some measure prepared for what was to follow; but it was not till they were made acquainted with the patent and with the verbal instructions brought by Wallmerode that they began to look the situation in the face, Piccolomini coolly proposing to arrest or kill Arnim and Francis Albert if they should come to negotiate at Pilsen. Still, though the necessary measures seem to have been left by the anxious Emperor to the generals, there was much hesitation on their part, due partly to the belief that the army as a whole would adhere to Wallenstein, partly to a faint hope that Wallenstein might peaceably throw up the command. Aldringer, having paid a visit to Vienna, and been informed there through Oñate that the Imperial instructions were to seize Wallenstein dead or alive, the three generals formed a secret plan to arrest him at Pilsen. But the design broke down, and Aldringer preferred not to re-enter the town. On February 13 Gallas, and on the 17th Piccolomini, took their departure, leaving behind them a general order declaring Wallenstein's command, and those of Trczka and Ilow, vacant and referring the commanding officers of the army to themselves and Aldringer for directions. After their departure this order was transmitted to the commanding officers, a copy having been already on the 15th sent to the garrison at Prague. On February 18 a second patent was issued from Vienna (although, like the first, it did not bear the Imperial signature) denouncing the resolution of the commanders at Pilsen as a plot against the Emperor, confirming the deposition of the "late" commander-in-chief, as guilty of a design to seize and despoil the Emperor and his House of their hereditary kingdoms and crowns, and to extirpate the House of Austria. At the same time a commission was secretly appointed for the confiscation of all the estates of Wallenstein, Ilow, and Trczka.

Two days later a second "resolution" was signed by the commanders at Pilsen, who, this time, however, numbered not more than thirty. One of the generals—Diodati—had already taken his departure without orders. This resolution was in response to Wallenstein's promise to relieve them of their commands should he ("which had never entered into his mind") undertake aught against the Emperor, and to his declaration that he desired to secure himself against the machinations of his adversaries. It promised that the signatories, should he remain with the army, would hold out by him to the last. Wallenstein sent word of this resolution to Vienna, intending himself to march on Prague, there carry through the negotiations with Arnim, and conclude peace with Saxony. He believed himself still strong enough to force the Emperor to do his bidding, but sought to keep open a door of retreat by a series of messages of which one, offering to resign the command if no force were used against him, was actually delivered to Ferdinand by the

Duke's cousin Maximilian von Wallenstein. At the same time he sent Francis Albert of Lauenburg to Bernard of Weimar at Ratisbon, requesting the Swedish general to move a few thousand horse to the Bohemian frontier. But while he was thus seeking to safeguard himself front and rear the ground crumbled away under his feet.

On February 24, 1634, the whole of Wallenstein's army was to have assembled on the White Hill at Prague, there, on conditions which still remained untold, to dictate peace. Before that day arrived—if an insignificant movement in Wallenstein's favour in Silesia be left out of account—the whole of that army had fallen away from him, with the exception of Ilow's and Trczka's regiments. The garrison of Prague, upon which troops had been concentrated even before the issue of the patent, set the example by renouncing its obedience. The commanding officers, returning to their various stations from Pilsen, heard the news; and the defection set in. At Pilsen Wallenstein announced to the officers around him that he proposed to muster all his forces at Laun, near the Saxon frontier, and bade them meet him in person at Eger, whither he was about to proceed. Fresh messages were sent to Bernard of Weimar, who received these overtures very coolly, both suspecting their authenticity and doubting the fidelity of Wallenstein's troops; nor did he advance upon Bohemia till all was over.

On February 24 Wallenstein held his entry into Eger, Trczka's and Ilow's regiments pitching their tents round the place. Baffled and abandoned, Wallenstein deceived himself even as to the fidelity of those upon whom his personal security at Eger depended. The chief officers of the fortress, Gordon and Leslie, were two Protestant Scotchmen, whose sense of military honour seems to have revolted against the arguments pressed on them by Trczka and Ilow. Colonel Walter Butler, whom Wallenstein had half accidentally invited to accompany him, was an Irish Catholic of a similarly conscientious frame of mind. At a banquet given by Gordon to the officers, Kinsky, Trczka, and Ilow were massacred. After a last hesitation whether it would suffice to arrest the traitor-in-chief, it was resolved to kill him; and some of Butler's Irish dragoons, with their captain Devereux in command, accomplished the deed (February 25).

Francis Albert of Lauenburg, returning from his bootless errand to Bernard of Weimar was taken prisoner; so were Colonel von Schlieff, who had been sent to warn Wallenstein's faithful adherent General von Schaffgotsch in Silesia, with Schaffgotsch himself, and Wallenstein's Chancellor Elz. All the threads of the great politician's intrigues were severed; and the whole of his mighty army had fallen away from the famous commander who had created it. He died as an outlawed traitor.

No personality occupies a place in the history of the Thirty Years' War at once so characteristic of that war and so unique in itself as that of Wallenstein. But his greatness—if such it was—lies not in his

achievements either as a creator or as a leader of armies, though this "general without victories" both crushed Mansfeld and foiled Gustavus. Nor does it lie in his consummate insight and capacity as a politician, who could use all circumstances and all conjunctures, and would not permit himself to be used by any of his fellow-players in the game. It lies rather in the innermost purposes of his statesmanship, and above all in his supreme ambition to become the pacificator of the Empire, in the interests of that Empire as a whole, and to liberate it both from the encroachments of the foreigner and from the internal dominion of the Reaction. Herein he showed a farsightedness due to the inspiration of a grand self-reliance rather than to communings with the stars. The Peace of Prague, as will be seen, differed from the settlement which Wallenstein would have concluded on behalf of, or even without, the Emperor; but he was fully justified as against that Emperor and his Spanish and Bavarian allies by the treaties which France and Sweden enforced at Münster and Osnabrück, and of which the bitterness remained with the Empire for many generations. Moreover, the gain for religious freedom secured by the peace which ended the war could not have been achieved, had Wallenstein's sword, when the issues of the conflict so largely depended upon it, been thrown into the scale of an uncompromising intolerance.

2. NÖRDLINGEN AND PRAGUE.

(1634-5.)

After Bernard of Weimar, uncertain whether Ilow's news from Pilsen were true or merely intended to mask some movement of Wallenstein, had quitted Ratisbon to protect his Franconian duchy, the news reached him of the catastrophe at Eger. He then changed his course for Bohemia, proposing to "take advantage for the common weal of the massacre and its consequences"; but, on meeting with no response from Arnim, whom he had summoned to join him with the Saxon army, he fell back on the Upper Palatinate. Arnim, now that Wallenstein and his projects of peace were no more, would gladly have fallen in with Oxenstierna's policy of including Saxony in the Alliance of Heilbronn and thus once more restoring the complete ascendancy of Sweden; but John George once more refused to follow his Field-Marshal's advice, and, while the members of the Heilbronn Alliance assembled at Frankfurt, engaged in separate negotiations with the Emperor's envoys at Leitmeritz (March, 1634). The efforts of Oxenstierna to expand the Heilbronn Alliance, to strengthen its relations with Sweden, and to correct the defects in its military organisation, were very coldly received by its members. The suggestion of the Saxon ambassadors that negotiations

for peace should be actively pursued, and that the two Saxon Circles should carry on the war in alliance with Sweden, but not under her direction, was indeed waved aside. When, however, in a discussion as to the "satisfaction of Sweden in the event of a peace," Oxenstierna, mindful of the safety of the Baltic coast as Sweden's irreducible requirement, made it clear that this satisfaction would have to be sought in Pomerania, Brandenburg went over to the Saxon scheme of a "separate conjunction." Bernard, who had come to Frankfort in the hope of being appointed to the undivided chief command of the Alliance, returned, bitterly disappointed, to his army (May).

The Saxons under Arnim about this time defeated the Imperialists at Liegnitz; and Bernard still hoped for a joint invasion of Bohemia. But he soon learnt that the tables had been turned upon him. By the middle of May, King Ferdinand of Hungary, eager for his first military laurels, with Gallas in command under him, advanced with an army of 25,000 men from Pilsen, while Aldringer stood with nearly 8000 more at Straubing on the Danube, below Ratisbon. Their object was the recovery of that city, whose capture had been Bernard's most glorious achievement. He lost no time in coming to the rescue, crossing the river at Kelheim above Ratisbon; but he ran short of supplies, and was obliged to fall back towards Nürnberg. In the middle of July he at last effected his junction with Horn at Augsburg. It was too late to save Ratisbon, which, on July 22, 1634, capitulated to King Ferdinand. The free city had once more to swear allegiance to the Emperor, but was treated with consideration, while the garrison were allowed to march out with all the honours of war.

The movements of Bernard and Horn, whose only chance of arresting the enemy's progress was now an open battle, were terribly impeded by heavy rains; they were forced to separate once more, and, before they reunited at Günzburg in Upper Swabia (August), Donauwörth had been taken by Ferdinand. The Imperialists hereupon occupied the Swabian lands to the south, and the Franconian to the north, of the river, Johann von Werth's horse and Isolani's Croatians carrying fire and sword through the country, while the main body of the army moved upon Nördlingen (north-west of Donauwörth). Perceiving the strategic value of Nördlingen as a base whence the enemy could distribute his troops through comfortable quarters in Swabia, Bernard induced the inhabitants to fortify their town, and, promising speedy relief, placed in it a Swedish garrison of between four and five hundred men, under a brave commander, Eric Debitz. On August 23 the Swedish army under Bernard and Horn reached the neighbourhood of the town.

The course of the ensuing operations is in many respects obscure. But it is clear that, had the attack been made at once, as Bernard desired, the besieging army of the Imperialists would have been weaker by some 15,000 troops, which the Cardinal Infante brought up on September 3.

On the other hand it is certain that, had the attack been delayed, as Horn wished, till a day or two after it was actually made, the 6000 troops of the Swabian Circle, which were approaching under the Rhinegrave, Otto Lewis, would have been on the spot. As it was, the Imperialist forces outnumbered by nearly one-third the Swedish, whose total is variously stated, but can hardly have reached 25,000. With the King of Hungary were Gallas, the actual commander of the Imperialist forces, Johann von Werth, the dashing Bavarian leader of horse, and Duke Charles of Lorraine, who was at the head of 6000 troops.

After Horn had contrived to throw a small additional number of men into Nördlingen, the Swedes crossed to the right bank of the river Eger, where the Imperialists had occupied the heights south of the town. Bernard had undertaken to relieve Nördlingen by September 6; the concerted signal had appeared on the church tower; and the brave Debitz, hard pressed by the besiegers, had agreed to capitulate, unless relieved by the promised date. On the afternoon of September 5—(when in accordance with the system of alternating command Bernard led the van)—the Swedish army ascended the wooded ridge of the Arnsberg, and issuing forth from it suddenly directed their attack upon the trenches constructed by the Imperialists immediately before Nördlingen. In Horn's judgment, the combat had begun too soon; but it was fiercely carried on till deep into the night. On the following morning (September 6, 1634) Horn was in command on the right wing, and, having been overruled on the previous night, gave battle along the whole line of the Imperialists. The attack lasted six hours, but failed; and Horn was in danger of being cut off from Bernard on the left wing till he came up about noon—too late in Horn's judgment—and covered Horn's retreat. But Bernard's own troops were thrown back in confusion upon Horn's in their rear by a charge of Johann von Werth's cavalry; and the result was a general flight. In the midst of it both Horn and Bernard were taken prisoners, but the latter escaped. Many superior officers, the whole artillery, the standards and the baggage of the Swedish army were captured; 6000 men fell. Nördlingen surrendered, moderate terms being granted to the town by King Ferdinand, while the gallant garrison were allowed to depart, though without their arms.

The remnant of the Swedish troops, temporarily reinforced after the event by the Rhinegrave, rallied at Heilbronn; whence, in the hope of something being done to reorganise the army by the Convention still sitting at Frankfort, they were moved on to the neighbourhood of that city. Meanwhile, as Oxenstierna had foreseen, all Württemberg fell without a blow into the hands of the Imperialists, the young Duke Eberhard taking refuge at Strassburg: and thus one of the chief members of the Heilbronn Alliance came under the heel of the Reaction. Piccolomini and other generals occupied Bernard's Franconian duchy, Würzburg capitulating in October, though the citadel held out three

months longer; and Johann von Werth dashed forward to the west, with the intent of securing Heidelberg for his master Maximilian. The south-west, which had so recently witnessed the victorious progress of Gustavus Adolphus, was virtually once more in Imperial hands; and the Cardinal Infante could signalise the successful *entente* between the Spanish and the Austrian branches of the House of Habsburg by pursuing unhindered his march to the Low Countries. Nor were these merely transitory results. Nördlingen was, in a scarcely less degree than Breitenfeld, one of the decisive battles of the war. It moved the real centre of gravity of the struggle to the west, and transferred the dominant partnership in the undertaking against the House of Habsburg from Sweden to France. It closed the prospect of the conflict being settled by the German Protestants under Swedish leadership; thus making it inevitable that, while Saxony and with her the large majority of the Estates abandoned the alliance with Sweden in order to conclude a separate peace with the Emperor, Bernard of Weimar and his army should pass out of Swedish control and into the service of France. Nördlingen, in a word, broke down the Heilbronn Alliance.

The first step in the tortuous and unedifying process by which the Alliance was actually brought to an end was taken, a few days before the battle of Nördlingen, by the compact concluded at the Frankfort Convention between the representatives of the Heilbronn Alliance and Feuquières. After France had, in 1632, acquired the control of the electorate of Trier and had by the capture of Nancy become mistress of Lorraine, the designs of her Government had begun to extend from the line of the Moselle to that of the Rhine. In the winter of 1633-4 French troops occupied a succession of places in Elsass and thus came face to face with the Spaniards under the command (till his death in January, 1634) of Feria; but Richelieu was still anxious to avoid a "rupture" with the House of Austria, and to confine the French sphere of military action to the left bank of the river. On the other hand, in order to prevent the Imperialists in their turn from operations on that bank, it was necessary to secure as outworks on the right bank, at the two ends of the line of defence, the fortresses of Breisach and Philippsburg. The latter of these, situate above Speier, was, like Ehrenbreitstein opposite Coblenz, a creation of the warlike Bishop Philip Christopher, afterwards Archbishop and Elector of Trier. After many vicissitudes Philippsburg had, in January, 1634, fallen into Swedish hands. Its transfer into French hands had been pressed in the early sittings of the Frankfort Convention, and, after the fall of Ratisbon, was granted on terms which saved the credit of the Alliance, Feuquières promising in return French aid, to consist, if necessary, not only in the 6000 foot demanded, but in the advance to the Rhine of the whole French force of 25,000 men (August 30).

For the immediate necessities of the army of the Alliance the

Convention had done next to nothing; and, already before the catastrophe of Nördlingen, Oxenstierna's soul had been full of bitterness. No sooner had the news arrived, than the Convention prepared to break up with a general declaration in favour of the maintenance of the Alliance, and the provision of a due satisfaction for the Swedish Crown; but time was found by some of the members for secret offers to Feuquières. Informed of these, Oxenstierna resolved to outbid them by a direct offer to Louis XIII of Elsass, so far as it was in Swedish hands. With this offer, the Chancellor's agent, the experienced Württemberg official Löffler, was sent to Paris, to find that most of what he was offering to France was already in her grasp (September—October).

Bernard's beaten army could not be reorganised without money, which the Frankfort Convention had been unwilling and which Oxenstierna was unable to provide; nor could it be once more made an effective force unless by accessions from one or more of the armies which in different parts of the Empire held out for the Protestant cause. Field-Marshal Banér, who, after the battle of Liegnitz and the death of Duwall, had succeeded to the command of the Swedish division in Silesia, had, after separating from Arnim and threatening Prague, advanced into Thuringia, where he and Duke William of Weimar had enough to do to hold their own against the Imperialists. Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel's general Melander (Count von Holzapfel) had considerable difficulty in maintaining his position in Westphalia. A handful of troops was furnished by Duke George of Lüneburg, the general of the Lower Saxon Circle, which he had nearly cleared of Imperialist troops; but this wary prince had even before Nördlingen been impatient of Swedish control, and curtly refused to make any further exertion on Bernard's behalf. In these circumstances, Oxenstierna with some acerbity opposed any movement and insisted on Bernard's army, which in September had reached Frankfort, remaining within reach of the expected French support.

Frankfort seeming no longer safe, the army, early in October, moved on to Mainz, whither Oxenstierna and the Council of the Heilbronn Alliance also hurriedly transferred their quarters. But the troops, still left without pay, were soon allowed by Bernard to cross to the left bank of the Rhine, where in the Lower Palatinate and its vicinity they hoped for better quarters—an object which, in the Thirty Years' War, determined many "strategic" movements. Disregarding Oxenstierna's disciplinary ordinance, and enraged at the scant welcome offered them by the population, the troops ravaged the unhappy Palatinate, as Rusdorf complained to Elizabeth, more savagely than had any of its enemies. The administrator, Count Palatine Lewis Philip, with whom Feuquières had placed himself in communication, saw no way of protecting the country but by admitting French garrisons into the fortress of Mannheim and one or two smaller places (October).

About the same time, a more important step forward was taken by France, when the Rhinegrave Otto Lewis, who had detached himself again from Bernard's army in order to secure Kehl opposite Strassburg, and was threatened by a strong Imperialist force moving upon Colmar and Schlettstadt, concluded with the French Marshal de La Force an agreement placing practically the whole of Upper Elsass under French protection. The Rhinegrave died soon afterwards; but the treaty had been approved both by Louis XIII and by Oxenstierna. Hereupon, while Bernard's army was still left without the promised 6000 French troops, Feuquières was ordered to raise a force of more than twice that number to guard the course of the river from Mainz upwards. Clearly, when the intervention of France actually took place, it would not confine itself to a mere support of the Swedish army.

When, early in November, Johann von Werth, after surprising the town of Heidelberg, began to lay siege to its castle, of which Bernard declined to attempt the relief as beyond his strength, the aid of the French Marshals de La Force and de Brézé from Landau and Speier was invited. But, after they had actually started for the deliverance of the Palatinate, they were detained by Feuquières, who was anxious to avoid precipitating a rupture; and a joint demonstration across the Rhine on the part of the French and Bernard induced the Bavarian general to let go the prize so persistently coveted by his master.

Thus, while Bernard's army, now again amounting to about 18,000 troops, was in its position between Main and Rhine threatened by the advance from Franconia and Swabia of his old victorious Nördlingen adversaries, Gallas and Charles of Lorraine, with a superior force of 14,000 horse and 16,000 foot, France remained in possession of Upper Elsass. In any bargain to be struck by Oxenstierna's agent with Richelieu in Paris, the French Minister could accordingly impose his own terms. This explains the treaty signed by Löffler at Paris on November 1, whereby France entered into an alliance with Sweden and her Heilbronn confederates for securing a good and enduring peace in the Empire, on condition that the Catholic religion should be restored in all lands conquered by the Swedes or their allies, and that the neutrality of any Prince or city that should accept the protection of France should be assured. She would maintain an army of her own on the left bank of the Rhine and pay 1,000,000 *livres* as an annual subsidy to the combatants on the right. If she declared war against the House of Austria, she would, so long as the war lasted, maintain 12,000 troops, natives of Germany or any other country but France, under the command of one of the Princes of the Heilbronn Alliance, but with a French Marshal in his Council of War, entitled, in the case of a combination of armies, to a share in the supreme command. In this event the subsidy of a million would be stopped. But France entered into no obligation to declare war; and it was left to her discretion, whether she

would take part as a combatant in the conflict now in progress, or continue to pay subsidies.

Meanwhile Oxenstierna had summoned the Heilbronn Allies to meet at Worms (November 30). He was so incensed by the Paris Treaty that he dismissed Löffler from the Swedish service, and turned his back upon the German members of the Alliance, who, though uneasy about the clause as to the Catholic religion, were willing to proceed. Nearly the whole of December passed in discussion and altercation; but Oxenstierna could not be persuaded to ratify the treaty until he should be convinced that France actually intended the rupture. At the same time the breach was widening between him and Bernard, who openly sought to obtain from the Worms Convention a definite commission as general of the forces of the Alliance, which would have transferred to him its direction, hitherto in the hands of the Swedish Chancellor. The French Government had for some time been seeking to attach Bernard more closely to itself; but neither Richelieu nor Feuquières had as yet resolved upon accepting him as commander of a combined army; indeed Feuquières would have preferred William of Hesse-Cassel, who was already in receipt of a French pension.

After Johann von Werth's enforced departure, the castle of Heidelberg was once more besieged, this time by an Imperialist force of 6000 troops; and, while Bernard was slowly coming to a conclusion with Feuquières as to the terms on which he would relieve the place, the whole French army, nearly 30,000 strong, crossed the Rhine at Mannheim, and a division of it numbering 12,000 relieved Heidelberg Castle, allowing the besiegers to depart. Bernard with his army arrived a day too late; but the French success, incomplete as it was, seemed at last to have made a rupture with the Emperor inevitable. Those of the Princes who remained at Worms—for the Imperial Towns characteristically held back—ratified the Paris Treaty. But Oxenstierna persistently refused to sign the new compact, maintaining that it put an end to the old Suedo-French subsidy treaty, concluded at Bärwalde and renewed at Heilbronn.

As for the Heilbronn Alliance proper, it seemed to have been superseded by the Paris Treaty and by the actual interference of France in arms, which must assuredly be soon followed by a declaration of war on her part against the Emperor. The Worms Convention, which had adjourned to January, was not actually reopened by Oxenstierna till February 17, 1635, under the depressing influence of the extensive Spanish preparations for the coming campaign and of the progress of the Saxon endeavours (to be described immediately) for a separate peace with the Emperor. He could only exhort his allies in their turn to sign no separate treaties with France, and to be careful in any common negotiations to accept no proposition from the Emperor that was not confirmed by Spain. Bernard's reiterated arguments in favour of an unfettered chief military command he could only meet by a compromise

which, while leaving the Duke the choice of his officers, reserved the decision of the most important movements to the Directory and Council, and excepted Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel from the Commander-in-chief's authority (March 12). As a matter of fact, both the control of Sweden and the cohesion of the Alliance were fast giving way; on the right bank of the Rhine few of its members retained possession of their lands, while the left was flooded by an ill-equipped soldiery. No prospect of aid remained from within or without, except from France.

This was so clearly perceived by Oxenstierna that, so early as December, 1634, he sent to Paris a resident of special ability and distinction, who had been highly valued by King Gustavus Adolphus. After his vicissitudes in his native country, Hugo Grotius had found a refuge in France, and had there written the great work *On the Law of War and Peace* which was to immortalise his name. Unfortunately for the course of the present negotiations, he was not a *persona grata* with Richelieu. But the Cardinal knew that a solution must be found for the difficulties which had arisen in the relations between France and Sweden. He was intent on war with Spain, and there must be no gap in the great coalition which he contemplated against her and her ally the Emperor. The reconciliation between the King and Orleans had secured the French monarchy at home; but its defence against the combined efforts of the two Habsburg dynasties on the Rhine could no longer be left to the Suedo-German arms without open and continuous French support. In the early part of 1635 two important successes were gained by the Imperialists. Philippsburg, the recent acquisition of France, was captured with all the supplies of money and material accumulated there (January 24); and Johann von Werth took Speier (February 2). Shortly afterwards Duke Charles of Lorraine crossed the Rhine to lay siege to Colmar. The French forces consequently, so soon as the weather permitted, withdrew to the left bank (February 22); and before long Bernard, upon whose position near Darmstadt Gallas and Count Philip von Mansfeld were closing in, likewise crossed the river, and induced the French Marshals to aid him in bringing about the capitulation of Speier (March 21). Clearly, unless the Spaniards from Luxemburg were to join hands with the Imperialists from the Upper and Middle Rhine, France, besides concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with the States General (February) must see to carrying out the treaty of November, 1634, and overcome Oxenstierna's repugnance to that agreement.

Thus in the new negotiations Father Joseph and his fellow diplomats exerted all their ingenuity to combat the objections of Grotius to the acceptance of the Paris Treaty; till in the end the Swedish Chancellor journeyed in person to Compiègne, which he reached on April 20. He had the satisfaction of finding that the progress of the Spaniards, who had just by a raid from Luxemburg taken Trier

(March 26) and carried off the Elector Philip Christopher, the *protégé* of France, had materially altered the tone of the French Court and of the great Minister. The Act of Alliance rapidly concluded at Compiègne on April 28 renewed the obligations of the two Powers not to make peace with the House of Austria, "with which they were at present at war," unless by mutual consent, while each Power was to support the German Protestants according to its individual obligations. It assured to Sweden the restoration of her conquests on the Rhine, in case they should be recovered by French arms; and it conceded to France the principle that the Catholic religion should be exercised wherever it had been before 1618. But, while the Treaty of Compiègne amounted generally to a renewal of the obligations of the compacts of Bärwalde and Heilbronn, its advantages remained with Oxenstierna. The obnoxious Paris Treaty was now a dead letter, and the future relations between France and Sweden were left open to further arrangement. Further, Oxenstierna safeguarded himself by the stipulation that the treaty was to require ratification by his Queen; which it was of course in his power to reserve till France should have broken with the House of Austria. Thus in this struggle between the two great statesmen the hand of France had been more distinctly forced than that of Sweden.

The settlement with Sweden completed Richelieu's dispositions for the war which France actually declared against Spain on May 19, 1635. Preparations on a great scale had long been in progress, and were substantially complete in April. While two armies were to take the offensive in the Low Countries and in Italy, and a third was to occupy the passes of the Valtelline, a fourth, under Marshal de La Force, was to cooperate with Bernard of Weimar in covering the Palatinate, Elsass, and Lorraine. About Langres was placed a reserve force, commanded first by the Marquis de Sourdis, and afterwards by Cardinal La Valette. Much remained unsettled in the relations between France and the allies with whom she was united by the mutual tie of necessity, more especially as to the position of their leading general, Bernard of Weimar; and she was still free to choose her own time for declaring her rupture with the Emperor. But in the spring of 1635 she definitely entered into the great German War.

Not without reason had Oxenstierna admonished the Heilbronn Alliance at Worms against the seductions of separate pacifications. While the interests of Sweden and of her German associates had begun to diverge, and the Heilbronn Alliance under the guidance of the half-discredited Löffler was on the brink of final dissolution, the Elector John George had brought to a successful issue his long-cherished plan of a separate peace with the Emperor. Though the settlement achieved by him was far more restricted in its scope than that which had been in the mind of Wallenstein, it was readily accepted by nearly the whole of Protestant Germany.

It has been seen how in March, 1634, the Saxon Government had entered into peace negotiations with the Emperor at Leitmeritz. Oxenstierna, who detested these negotiations, had sought to interrupt them by ordering Banér to invade Bohemia, and John George had actually joined with the Swedes in a futile march upon Prague. Leitmeritz being in Swedish hands, the negotiations were at the end of July transferred to Pirna near Dresden, and here they continued after the battle of Nördlingen. From the first they addressed themselves to two sets of questions—the one turning, without any actual mention of the Edict of Restitution, on the religious settlement in the Empire at large; the other affecting specifically Saxon interests, the possession of Lusatia and the see of Magdeburg. At Pirna Arnim still took part in the transactions, but they were in the main conducted by the official commissioners on both sides, the Emperor's chief representative being Trautmansdorff; for Eggenberg, his most trusted councillor, died in October, 1634. Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt, John George's son-in-law, was, according to his wont, largely instrumental in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. On November 24 an armistice was formally agreed upon between the Imperialist and Saxon forces at Laun, which lasted till the actual conclusion of peace.

After the settlement of the conditions of peace at Pirna, proceedings had been adjourned to the middle of January; but it was not till April 2, 1635, that they were actually resumed at Prague. In the meantime the Emperor had asked the approval of the Catholic Electors, but had met with difficulties on the part of Maximilian of Bavaria, who was desirous of further advantages for himself, and of his brother of Cologne, who had religious scruples; the Elector of Mainz soon waived his objections. He had further consulted twenty Viennese theologians, among whom four Jesuits gave their opinion, in which Father Lamormain concurred, against the peace and the implied suspension of the Edict of Restitution. Finally, a Committee of Imperial Councillors had approved of the adoption, with certain modifications, of the proposed settlement.

The final discussions were not brought to a conclusion till May 30, when the Peace was actually signed, the ratification following on June 15. The Peace of Prague purported, in so far as its conditions were not of a specific nature, to include any Estate of the Empire by whom it was accepted. The following are the most important of the terms of the treaty itself, and of the supplementary pronouncements (*Nebenrecesse*) by which it was accompanied.

As to the fundamental question of the ownership of ecclesiastical lands, it was settled that any such lands held on November 12, 1627 (the date of the Mühlhausen meeting noted above), whether acquired before or after the Religious Peace of Augsburg, should continue so to be held for forty years, or restored for such a period if they had been taken away. Within that period an amicable arrangement was to be

made, or the question of ownership was to be decided by the Emperor on a suit at law. While it was laid down that the Catholic Church was henceforth to suffer no loss of property, and the principle of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* was once more asserted, it was honoured in the breach rather than the observance by the virtual suspension of the Edict of Restitution for a period of forty years. This was the point on which the conscience of Ferdinand had specially desired theological satisfaction. A standing Protestant grievance in the matter of the supreme tribunals, which would now once more finally decide questions as to the ownership of ecclesiastical lands, was to be remedied in the case of the *Reichskammergericht* by its being composed half of Catholic, half of Protestant judges; the composition of the *Reichshofrath* was to be settled by the Emperor.

The main demand of Saxony—the cession of Lusatia in compensation for the aid afforded to the Emperor during the Bohemian troubles—was granted under certain conditions of reversion which long remained without practical significance. The see of Magdeburg (whose territory was still in Swedish hands) was to be held by its Protestant Archbishop, the Saxon Prince Augustus, certain districts being detached from it as hereditary possessions of the Saxon Elector. The former Administrator, Christian William of Brandenburg, was assigned an annual pension of 12,000 dollars. The rights of the Emperor's son Leopold William as Bishop of Halberstadt were confirmed.

The Emperor had declined to tolerate the exercise of their religion by the adherents of the Augsburg Confession in his own dominions, except in parts of Silesia. In his other lands he reserved for himself the right of regulating their religious condition.

Any territories taken from the Emperor or his allies (among whom the Duke of Lorraine was included) since the Swedish landing were to be restored to him. The same provision was to apply to adherents of the Augsburg Confession, among whom special mention was made of the Dukes of Mecklenburg. Saxony, and implicitly all other Estates who adhered to the Peace, bound themselves to assist the Emperor in arms to recover such conquered territories. Thus the Peace constituted a direct challenge to Sweden, and also to France.

As to the Palatinate, Saxony, after at first making, sincerely or otherwise, some efforts on behalf of the expelled dynasty, accepted the Imperial view that both the Electoral dignity and the lands were forfeited by Frederick V's descendants; the Emperor however undertook, should they conduct themselves loyally, to provide for them as princes. For the present they were excluded from the general amnesty announced in the Peace, and with them those who had incurred punishment by taking part in the Bohemian and Upper Austrian insurrections at the outset of the war. Landgrave George had not succeeded in bringing about the exclusion of his kinsman of Hesse-Cassel, whose military force

made him worth conciliating. A similar consideration was shown to the Weimar Dukes, to whom pardon was assured if they would transfer their forces to the Imperial side. The Duke of Württemberg and the Margrave of Baden-Durlach were excluded, subject to an act of grace on the Emperor's part.

All leagues, alliances, and associations in arms were dissolved. The army that was henceforth to withstand the common enemy was to be the army of the Emperor and the Empire, and to be placed under an Imperial commander-in-chief. A division estimated at a quarter of the entire force (or 20,000 men) was, however, to be under the special command of the Elector of Saxony.

Such were the provisions of a Peace which, with all its shortcomings and blemishes, corresponded on the whole, not only to the interests of the contracting parties, but to those of a large majority of the Protestant Princes and Free Cities of the Empire and to the yearnings of all its suffering populations. Inasmuch as this agreement was of a nature to call forth the determined opposition of both Sweden and France, whose expulsion from the Empire it was intended to bring about, the efforts of these Powers were naturally exerted to prevent its acceptance by the more important Princes of the Empire. French diplomacy, though very active at Dresden, was too late in seeking to divert John George, by the illusive prospect of an elective Bohemian Crown, from a policy to which in his heart he had always been inclined. Maximilian of Bavaria, whom the terms of the compact could not altogether suit, and to whose authority as head of the Catholic League it put an end, refused to accept the Peace until he had been placed in the same position as the Elector of Saxony by being assured the command of a quarter of the Imperial army. Oxenstierna attempted to prevent the adhesion of George William of Brandenburg by holding out the bait of Silesia, and by the more practical suggestion of a curtailment of the Swedish claim on Pomerania. But the feeling of the Brandenburg Estates was unanimously in favour of following the Saxon lead; and, being a Calvinist himself, George William may have felt well advised in securing the benefits of the treaty. For there were ominous doubts, which orthodox Lutherans showed no disposition to conceal, whether the Peace covered the Calvinists. In the end George William accepted the treaty, though, as will be seen, not unconditionally. Thus by the end of August, 1635, nearly all the more important Princes and larger Free Towns had accepted the Peace of Prague. Among them were, besides the Elector of Brandenburg, the Dukes of Holstein-Gottorp, Pomerania, Württemberg, and Brunswick, together with several of the Ernestine Dukes. The Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt might himself be called one of the authors of the Peace; it was also accepted by Margrave William of Baden-Baden, by the Princes of Anhalt, including Christian, as well as by the Free Cities of Hamburg,

Lübeck, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Ulm, and—remarkably enough—by Strassburg and other Rhenish cities. The Archbishop of Bremen, Prince Frederick of Denmark, was not restrained from following their example by gratitude to Sweden for leaving him in the enjoyment of his see. Thus no reigning Princes remained outside the pale, except the still unpardoned Landgrave William of Cassel, and Duke William of Weimar. But these were prepared to accept the Peace if it were made more acceptable to France and Sweden. So was Duke George of Lüneburg, who, instead of following the example of Bernard of Weimar, and placing his sword at the service of France, skilfully contrived to maintain for some time a profitable neutrality.

If John George could have followed up the Peace of Prague by a settlement with Sweden, he would have issued forth from the conflict as master of the political situation; for during the Prague negotiations he had maintained an understanding with Spain, and France could not have intervened alone against the combination which would have confronted her. But in this additional attempt the Saxon policy of peace which had achieved so notable a first success, broke down. Oxenstierna, who had failed in detaching Brandenburg from Saxony, was not to be brought to a distinct renunciation of Sweden's Pomeranian claim. At a conference held at Magdeburg, early in August, 1635, between the Chancellor, Marshal Banér, who commanded the Swedish force in this quarter, and Saxon ambassadors, Oxenstierna's refusal was found to have the warm support of the Swedish army. Attracted by a suggestion from John George that Sweden should temporarily hold Stralsund in pledge, Oxenstierna sought to reopen negotiations on the basis of the immediate transfer of the see of Magdeburg into Saxon hands. But, prompted by the Brandenburg Elector, who made the refusal of any part of Pomerania to Sweden the *sine quâ non* of his acceptance of the Peace of Prague, John George refused to budge. Hereupon Oxenstierna, fearing that Sweden and her army might be left in the lurch, offered a moderate ultimatum, demanding for Sweden only a money compensation and the payment in full of the demands of her army, together with the tenure of some towns in pledge. The dispute had all but narrowed itself to the question as to what should be the amount of the money payment, and whether it should cover the claims of the Swedish as well as the German officers of the Swedish army, when John George, by the Emperor's advice, broke off the negotiation, and in the middle of October, 1635, ordered his troops to recommence hostilities against Banér.

Thus, in this eventful year, after the war had under new conditions reopened on the Rhine, it once more broke out on the Elbe; and the advent of peace, for which the whole nation longed, and on whose conditions Emperor and Empire had agreed among themselves, seemed as distant as ever.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE IN ENGLAND.

(1625-40.)

WHEN, on March 27, 1625, James I died, and the accession of his eldest surviving son as Charles I opened one of the most momentous reigns in English history, the condition of the country was by no means happy. A fundamental divergence of view as to the limits of the royal prerogative, the rights of Parliament, and the independence of the Law-Courts, had led, in the late reign, to those serious disputes between the King and his subjects which have been recounted in a previous volume. The revenue which had not sufficed even for a thrifty Queen was still less adequate to the requirements of her wasteful successor, enhanced as these were by causes, such as the change in the value of money, which were beyond his control. Though the country was at peace, lavish expenditure and the lack of supervision involved the Crown in heavy liabilities, from which even the skill of Robert Cecil had failed to extricate it. Unable to agree with Parliament, James had substituted the influence of favourites for that of the national representatives; and ten years of absolute government had set a precedent which his son was to follow with baleful results. This system had broken down under the pressure of the Thirty Years' War, and the demands made by an active foreign policy on an impoverished exchequer. But fresh recourse to Parliaments had not produced the desired agreement between Crown and nation; on the contrary, to the old causes of difference and distrust—questions of financial control, questions of ecclesiastical policy—was now added disagreement in regard to foreign affairs. The coalition between the two branches of the Habsburg House seemed to revive, for Englishmen scarce past middle age, the Spanish terror of their youth, and to threaten equally the political and the religious independence of Great Britain and of Europe. To allay the fears which his diplomacy had aroused, James had publicly pledged himself to conditions which it was impossible for Spain to accept; but the nation, which had hailed with an outburst of joy the rupture of the Spanish treaty, found its anxieties revive when the matrimonial overtures which had failed at Madrid were

addressed to another Catholic State. Nor were these anxieties unfounded, for, in order to win a French bride, Prince Charles had made promises not less contrary to his own and his father's pledges than those he had been ready to make for the sake of an Infanta. The terms of the French treaty were, however, unknown to the nation, which was well content to find itself again at war with Spain. Buckingham, the prime mover in this rupture, as he had been in the negotiations which preceded it, was now at the height of his power; but the favour which he had won by enabling Parliament to overbear the resistance of the old King, was destined to be short-lived.

At the moment of Charles' accession, the state of affairs abroad—which deeply interested the young King for dynastic, and his subjects for religious and political, reasons—was threatening. The sixth year of the Great War was drawing to a close. The Protestant cause was at a low ebb, the Palatinate overrun by the Elector's foes, and himself an exile; the Imperialists were in possession of all central Germany. But the struggle was beginning to take a wider range. Spain, which had come to the Emperor's aid, and whose truce with Holland had ended in 1621, was now at war with France and England; and Richelieu, chief Minister of Louis XIII since the previous May, had, with the aid of Venice and Savoy, laid hands on the Valtelline, and cut the connexion between Spain and Austria. Mansfeld's ill-conceived and misdirected expedition had left the English shores in the preceding January; how dismally it was faring in the swamps of Flanders was as yet unknown. In northern Germany, the Protestant Princes were arming against the Emperor; and, though Gustavus Adolphus, more interested in Poland than in the affairs of the Empire, for the present stood aloof, Christian of Denmark was preparing to aid his German co-religionists. Unfortunately for the Protestant cause, Richelieu's efforts were thwarted by an inopportune revolt of the Huguenots (January, 1625) under Soubise; and La Rochelle was in arms against the Crown. In this crisis, foreign policy naturally engaged the first attention of the new Government.

A committee of the Privy Council for foreign affairs was set up—a plan which conferred additional authority on Buckingham, while it placed no restrictions on his policy. A powerful fleet was got ready; and 10,000 men were pressed for service as soldiers. Their destination for the present was uncertain, and depended on arrangements with friendly Powers. Early in April, Maurice, Prince of Orange, died; his brother Frederick Henry succeeded him as Stadholder. The Dutch agreed to join in an attack on Spain; it was supposed that the armada would seize some Flemish ports—a scheme likely to combine Dutch and English interests. Buckingham was to command the expedition in person. But, for the execution of this and other plans, the aid of France was desirable, if not necessary; and the active aid of France, which after all

was a Catholic Power, was not easy to obtain. The King's marriage, which had been arranged with a view to this end, was now celebrated by proxy in Paris (May 1). The English Government sought to prove its good intentions to Richelieu and Louis XIII. Lord Keeper Williams was ordered to stay the prosecutions of recusants; the ships which James had promised to lend to France were despatched. But, with that fatal half-heartedness and duplicity which had already marked Charles' proceedings in the marriage treaties, the concessions to the recusants were, in view of the impending Parliament, indefinitely deferred; and secret orders were sent to Pennington, who commanded the English ships, not to join in any hostilities against the Huguenots. As the French Government still hung back, Buckingham resolved to see what his personal presence might avail. In the middle of May he was in Paris; but all his arts of persuasion could only induce Richelieu and his master to open negotiations with the Huguenots, and to promise some assistance in men and money to Mansfeld, with a contribution towards the expenses of the King of Denmark.

Buckingham returned to England with the French Princess, whose fate in the land of her adoption was to be only one degree less tragic than that of the Stewart Queen who had come back from France to her own country some sixty years before. For the moment all smiled upon the beautiful girl of fifteen, who, if a Catholic, was after all the daughter of Henry of Navarre. She herself was anxious to remind her new subjects of the fact. When asked if she could abide a Huguenot, she wittily replied, "Why not? was not my father one?" On June 16 she entered London with the King. Two days later, Charles' first Parliament met at Westminster. It was not a promising tale that Buckingham had to tell. The French marriage was made; but where was the French treaty? Breda had fallen to the Spaniards three weeks before; the miserable remnants of Mansfeld's expedition dared not cross the Rhine to carry out their task. A diplomatic and a military failure had to be confessed. Still, the conditions were by no means hopeless; frankness, insight, and decision might still establish the King's authority at home and redeem the Protestant cause abroad. Unfortunately it was just these qualities which were wanting to the Government of Charles I; and to such defects Buckingham added his own special failings of rashness and pride.

On June 18, 1625, Charles' first Parliament met at Westminster. The chief object which the King had at heart was to obtain supplies for his heavy foreign engagements; but the citizens and country gentlemen who held the strings, though well-disposed towards the young monarch, were in no hurry to open the national purse until they should have obtained satisfactory assurances as to the objects on which the money was to be spent, and, above all, as to the security of the Protestant faith. Religion, taxation, and foreign affairs were the prominent considerations in their minds, and were to remain such during the next four stormy years;

and these were inextricably mingled together. On each of these points the sovereign's will clashed with that of the majority of his people; and thus, at the very outset of the reign, the constitutional questions were raised which were to end in civil war and revolution.

The session was opened by a speech from the King, urging his hearers speedily to supply his needs, and pledging himself to maintain the true religion. The Commons went into Committee of Religion and Supply, in which "religion was to have the first place." A petition was then drawn up, in which the King was begged to execute the penal laws, to take other measures against Romanism, and to amend various abuses and defects which hindered the efficiency of the national Church. Having in this way relieved their minds, or, in other words, stated their conditions, they proceeded to the consideration of supply. In vain the courtiers urged the need of an unusually large grant. Phelps declared that, as for war, "we know yet of no war, nor of any enemy"; and he pressed for an explanation as to what had become of the money voted in the late reign. In the end, two subsidies, or about £140,000, were voted—a sum utterly inadequate to meet the engagements, amounting to nearly a million, into which the Government had rashly entered. Nor was this all. Ever since the early part of the fifteenth century the House of Commons had been accustomed to vote the customs-duties known as tonnage and poundage, as a matter of course, at the commencement of each reign. On this occasion, however, the question was raised; and, after considerable discussion, a Bill granting tonnage and poundage for one year only was carried. The Bill went to the Upper House, where, whether owing to its insufficiency or to the pressure of other matters, it was allowed to drop. In strict law, the Commons were within their rights; if they could grant, they could also refuse; nevertheless the precedent was new and grave. Tonnage and poundage had for some two centuries been regarded as part of the regular revenue of the Crown. To refuse or to limit the right to its collection was a serious innovation, and set up a claim which might be used by Parliament to control general policy in a manner and to an extent hitherto unknown.

There can be little doubt that the decision of the House was in some degree influenced by fresh anxiety on the score of religion. The case of Richard Montague was attracting general attention. In the last year of James' reign, this clergyman had issued a pamphlet entitled, *A new Gag for an old Goose*, which, while purporting to refute Roman Catholic arguments against Calvinism, took up a position with respect to predestination and other religious questions midway between that of extreme Protestants and that of the adherents of Rome. His views, generally speaking, appear to have been those held by the chief English divines of the seventeenth century, which have obtained the name of "Anglican," and were again brought into prominence by the leaders

of the Tractarian Movement seventy years ago. The Commons, intolerantly Protestant, and regarding these doctrines as insidious approaches to Rome, had, in James' last Parliament, appealed to Archbishop Abbot to put them down. Montague was, however, recalcitrant, and, having won the old King's ear, published another book, called *Appello Caesarem*, which was published shortly after James' death. The title is noteworthy, for by it the author, while reiterating his former doctrine, sought to enlist the support of the Crown. The Commons referred the book to their Committee on Religion, which reported on it early in July. The report, while refraining from theological argument, charged the author with disturbing Church and State, and setting Parliament at defiance; and Montague, on account of the supposed breach of privilege, was committed to custody.

It was in a scanty House, heated by this conflict and by the debate about tonnage and poundage, that the Court party again brought up the question of supply. There was little speaking; but the House was in no humour to listen to the demand; and nothing was done. Shortly afterwards, a deputation which carried the petition on religion to Hampton Court was civilly received, but was informed that Montague had been appointed to a royal chaplaincy—an unwise act, for it brought the Crown into the controversy, and raised the question of the responsibility of the King's servants. It was no long step from this to the question whether Ministers of State were to be responsible to Parliament or to the Crown. On July 11 the Houses were adjourned.

Between his pledges to France and his promises to Parliament Charles was in a grievous dilemma. At the adjournment, Lord Keeper Williams had repeated the King's promise to execute the penal laws; but, on the very next day, a number of priests were liberated, with a view to their leaving the country. Such a measure was not unusual; but it was, to say the least, an unfortunate coincidence. On the other hand, within his own house, Charles met with opposition of a different kind. The Queen considered that she had been tricked into marriage by promises which it was never intended to fulfil, and, stimulated by her Catholic attendants, demanded greater freedom of worship than she was allowed. The dispute grew so hot that the newly-married pair could no longer live under the same roof.

Meanwhile there seemed to be a good prospect of a solution of one at least of the foreign difficulties. Richelieu had opened negotiations with the Huguenots; Pennington was therefore ordered to hand over his ships to the French Government; and, early in June, he sailed for Dieppe. But his instructions were contradictory; he was secretly ordered to do nothing against the Protestants; and, after a fortnight's stay in the French port, he returned to England. Richelieu naturally remonstrated; and Pennington requested to be relieved of a task which was either unintelligible or odious. At length, about the middle of July, news

(premature, as it proved) arrived that peace had been made; and Pennington was again sent to Dieppe, with the ostensible purpose of handing over his ships to the French. But, with characteristic double-dealing, he was secretly ordered to allow his crews to prevent the surrender; and an envoy was despatched to hold the French in play while encouraging a mutiny with this end in view. The manœuvre was temporarily successful. The crew of the flagship, the *Vanguard*, took command, and stood out to sea; the merchantmen remained at Dieppe, but their captains retained control. Eventually, as peace appeared certain, peremptory orders were sent; and on August 6 the *Vanguard* and six other ships were surrendered to the French.

On August 1, Parliament had met again at Oxford. The attitude of the Commons was unchanged; and what had happened during the adjournment was not likely to render them more amenable. They at once took up again the matter of religion. Montague was summoned to the bar, but was too ill to attend. The question of responsibility was thus evaded for a time; but Laud and other Bishops raised it afresh by declaring, in a letter to Buckingham, that it was not for Parliament, but for the King and the Episcopate, to judge in questions of religion. The House was no doubt intolerant; the heads of the Church stood for toleration; but creeds and politics were too inextricably mingled to allow the prevalence of a principle which had to wait two centuries for full recognition.

It was not, however, on this question, but on that of foreign policy, that the rupture took place. The House was again urged to grant the supply vainly demanded a month before. The parliamentary leaders asked, but in vain, for an explanation of the cause. Seymour complained that they were kept in ignorance. Phelips blamed the advisers of the Crown, and upheld the right of Parliament to "reform the Commonwealth." These were ominous words. Finally, Rich laid down certain propositions, the chief of which were that the King should give an answer to the petition on religion, declare plainly against whom the country was to fight, and promise not to enter upon a war without taking advice of his Council. There could be no doubt what this meant; Buckingham was no longer to be the sole adviser of the Crown. But the favourite was not the man to yield to such demands; a lack of courage was not one of his defects. Facing the assembled Commons in the hall of Christ Church, he promised execution of the laws, defended his foreign policy, and informed the House that, if they wished to know their enemy, they might name him themselves.

Buckingham was probably sincere in his self-confidence, but he could not inspire similar feelings in his audience. In the debates which followed, it came out that Mansell, a member of the Council of War, had never been consulted; and at length Seymour said the fateful word, "Let us lay the fault where it is": the Duke of Buckingham or his agents were

to blame. The safety of the kingdom, urged Phelips, was not to be entrusted to incompetent persons. After this, an agreement was impossible; and on August 12, 1625, Parliament was dissolved.

Charles and Buckingham reckoned that, before Parliament should meet again, they would be able to confront it from the vantage-ground of diplomatic and military success. They expected, on the one hand, that peace would be made in France, and that Louis would then join actively in the league against the Habsburgs; on the other, that the navy would deal a heavy blow at Spain by destroying a Spanish port, and relieve the national exchequer by capturing the Plate fleet. The following autumn and winter were to see all these hopes disappointed.

So empty was the royal purse that privy seals for a loan had to be issued, and the pawning of the crown jewels was contemplated. The pressed troops at Plymouth were in wretched plight; in neither fleet nor army was order kept; and the people protested loudly against the billeting upon them of starving and undisciplined men. At length, in a stormy season, the great armada set sail (October 8). Badly found as it was, Cadiz might have fallen, had the plans been carefully laid and the attack conducted with insight and decision. But Sir Edward Cecil, the commander, was no sailor; there were no plans and no leadership; cooperation between the land and sea forces was imperfect; and some sections showed little stomach for the fight. A fort was taken; an aimless march inland was made; delays and blunders gave the Spaniards time to remove their ships out of danger and to garrison the town; and, after a week spent in futile operations, the armada stood out again to sea. There too ill-fortune awaited the English; for the Plate fleet, forewarned of danger, adopted an unusual route, and slipped into Cadiz when their backs were turned. In the middle of November, Cecil gave orders to sail for home. Singly and with difficulty, the ships straggled back to England; and their demoralised crews spread throughout the country the news that the great expedition had disastrously failed.

Meanwhile, Buckingham's project of a great Protestant league had made little progress. A few days before the dissolution, it was known that war had been actively renewed in France. A month later, a close alliance was formed with the States General in the Treaty of Southampton (September 8). In order to carry through his project, Buckingham went in person to the Hague, where, at the end of November, a triple alliance between England, Denmark, and the United Netherlands was made. But without the active adhesion of France such a league could be of little effect. The negotiations with that country were carried on during the next two months, but were hindered by Charles' attitude towards the rebellious Huguenots, by the demand for the return of the English ships, and by the seizure of French vessels engaged in a trade with Flanders which the English Government declared to be contraband. Richelieu took a long step towards an understanding

when, in spite of French annoyance at English intervention, he received Charles' ambassadors, Carleton and Holland, in Paris, and allowed them to bring about an apparent reconciliation with the Huguenots. Not content with this, Charles insisted on a formal recognition of his mediation, pressed Louis to enter the Protestant league, and demanded the recall of the French ambassador, Blainville. Such tactless diplomacy could hardly fail to alienate a proud and Catholic nation; and the consequent irritation was intensified by disagreement between Charles and his wife as to the exercise of her religion and the retention of her French attendants. In this critical condition of affairs, the second Parliament of the reign met at Westminster on February 6, 1626.

Efforts had been made to deprive the Commons of their leaders by pricking for sheriffs such men as Edward Coke and Wentworth, Seymour and Phelps; but the manœuvre was more likely to irritate than to deter the Opposition. Sir John Eliot at once stepped into the vacant place and took the lead. In an eloquent speech he exposed the wounds of the State, recounted the disasters by sea and land, and demanded full enquiry into the cause. "Our honour is ruined, our ships are sunk, our men perished, not by the enemy, not by chance, but...by those we trust." The Parliament which now began its deliberations was almost entirely occupied in the effort to bring home the guilt of these misfortunes to the Minister who had advised the King.

A Committee of Grievances at once fell to work, enquiring into recent administration and policy, and, in short, collecting the evidence which was subsequently to be the basis of the charges against Buckingham. In this task, the Commons were no doubt to some extent led astray by prejudice against the chief culprit; but their difficulties arose mainly from the impossibility of obtaining adequate information about matters of State. In vain they tried to force the members of the Council of War to open their mouths. Nevertheless the enquiry brought much to light, and resulted, at least, in determining the Commons to proceed. Their persistence drew down upon them an angry rebuke from the King. Too much time, he told the Speaker, was spent on grievances. "I would not have the House to question my servants, much less one that is so near me." Nevertheless the House went on; and Eliot brought ominous precedents to bear in support of the right of Parliament to make the removal of a favourite the condition of supply. Again the King intervened, this time with a clear threat. "Remember (he said) that Parliaments are altogether in my power for their calling, sitting, and dissolution; therefore, as I find the fruits of them good or evil, they are to continue or not to be." A personal attempt by Buckingham to stop proceedings, by making a clean breast of his doings in the matter of the surrendered ships, served only to disclose a policy of double-dealing which increased the general distrust.

The short Easter recess was hardly over when an event occurred

abroad which only too clearly displayed the futility of Buckingham's diplomacy. Richelieu had long borne with statesmanlike patience the vacillations and conflicting demands of English policy. He had made repeated efforts to arrive at an understanding; and fresh seizures of French ships and insults to the French ambassador in London had not turned him from his purpose. So late as the end of February, 1626, there seemed to be a good prospect that the French proposals for joint action abroad would lead to an arrangement; but fresh difficulties were constantly raised by Charles; mutual suspicion prevailed; and eventually the Spanish party at the French Court got the upper hand. Unable to carry on war at the same time against Spain, and the Huguenots, and fearful lest La Rochelle should become another Calais, Richelieu came to terms with Spain (April 30). The failure of the vaunted French alliance increased the irritation against Buckingham; and at the same time Charles had contrived to alienate the Upper House, which, in case of a formal trial, might have protected the favourite.

A quarrel between Buckingham and the Earl of Bristol, which had arisen from the Spanish match, had been taken up by Charles. Bristol had been confined to his house in Dorset, and was not summoned to the first Parliament of the reign. On the meeting of the second, he petitioned for a writ, and demanded a fair trial. The Peers, already annoyed by the confinement of another of their number, the Earl of Arundel, on utterly inadequate grounds, espoused his cause. Bristol was allowed to come to London, and laid his case before the Lords, charging Buckingham as the instigator of his injurious treatment. The King replied by a charge of high treason; and on May 1 Bristol appeared at the bar. The charges against him were frivolous; on the other hand, his retaliation upon Buckingham was damaging; he knew too much of what had passed in Spain. The trial, in which the King vainly sought, by various means, to damage his opponent, was in progress, when, on May 8, the leaders of the Commons formally impeached Buckingham at the bar of the House of Lords.

The attack laboured under two great disadvantages: first, that many of the charges were based on inaccurate information, and were consequently exaggerated or even mistaken; secondly, that, had they been proved, it would have been difficult—at least as difficult as it afterwards was in the case of Strafford—to bring them within any legal conception of treason. But what weakened the parliamentary case most of all was that the real gravamen—the charge of misconducting the affairs and endangering the safety of the nation—could not be pressed without inculcating the King. The maxim that the King can do no wrong was still far from being supplemented by its constitutional corollary—the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Charles I was not the man to say, in his son's witty phrase, that his words were his own but his acts were his Ministers'. Had the Commons been able to prove Buckingham a criminal, or even

venal or corrupt, it would have been easy for Charles to put him aside. To demand his dismissal on the charge of excessive power and unfitness for government, was to usurp what had been, for at least a century and a half, regarded as the sole function of the Crown.

Unfortunately, too, it was not the fact that the King had been deceived or his confidence abused, by the Minister; the verdict of history upholds that of Charles' own conscience, in refusing to allow an exoneration of the master at the expense of the servant. Eliot's famous parallel between Buckingham and Sejanus went further than he intended; and Charles not unnaturally took the implication of Tiberius to himself. His reply was the imprisonment of Eliot and Digges. But the breach of privilege was too flagrant: the Commons declined to do business till this was redressed. Digges was speedily released; and, after a futile attempt to trump up a case against Eliot, he too was set at liberty. As if this rebuff were not sufficient, the Peers, by dint of repeated protests, obliged the King to release Arundel; while with equal firmness they frustrated his endeavour to deprive Bristol of counsel. Though such an attitude displayed the independence of the Peers, it is probable that, had the King allowed the trial to proceed, Buckingham would have gained his cause. But this was not to be. A peremptory demand for supply, intended apparently to put the Commons in the wrong, was met by a formal Remonstrance, in which, after declaring the illegality of levying tonnage and poundage without their consent, the House attacked Buckingham as an enemy of Church and State, and gave the King to understand that, until he were removed, they would grant no supply. Earlier in the session Charles had told the Commons, in Elizabethan fashion, that they had liberty of counsel, not of control. A plainer demand for control could hardly have been made. The King's reply (June 15) was to dissolve Parliament. His displeasure against his opponents was shown by the renewed confinement of Arundel and Bristol; and, when the parliamentary leaders refused to carry on the attack upon Buckingham by process in the Star Chamber, Eliot, Wentworth, and others were struck off the Commission of the Peace.

Having failed to obtain assistance in a parliamentary way, the Government was compelled to fall back on other methods, which were sure to be difficult and might turn out to be illegal. Hitherto the judges had been, for the most part, what Bacon had said they should be—lions under the throne; but there was a point at which even the lions might betray possession of a legal conscience. Various methods of collecting money were proposed. A suggestion to obtain a subsidy direct from the freeholders was dismissed. The experiment of debasing the coinage was actually begun, but stopped before it had gone far. A large quantity of royal plate was sold. The City was asked to lend £100,000, but refused. A free gift, or "benevolence," was requested from the country at large, but brought little into the exchequer.

Stronger measures were now tried. Tonnage and poundage had been levied, throughout, without parliamentary grant; and London and the maritime counties had already been ordered to supply ships. The City, after some resistance, gave in, and a fleet was collected at Portsmouth. But there was no pay for the soldiers, the men were mutinous, the ships badly found. The privy seals of 1625 had brought in but a small amount; it was now resolved (September) to raise five subsidies by means of a forced loan. There was much resistance; but the loan was being collected from the home counties, when the Judges jointly refused to recognise its legality. Sir Randal Crew, Chief Justice, was promptly dismissed, and Nicholas Hyde took his place; but the judicial objection had great effect. Several Peers refused to lend; and the gentry followed suit. The Earl of Lincoln was sent to the Tower (March, 1627); John Hampden, Eliot, Wentworth, and other gentlemen were imprisoned. But the resistance only increased; and the action of the Government set the whole country aflame.

As if Charles and Buckingham had not already enough on their hands, they had meanwhile definitely broken with France, and that too when the Protestant cause seemed almost desperate abroad. It was in the middle of August, 1626, that the battle of Lutter placed northern Germany at the mercy of the League. A few days earlier, Charles had earned the resentment of Louis by finally dismissing the French attendants on the Queen. The quarrel was patched up through the tact of the French ambassador, Bassompierre; but it broke out afresh through the sequestration of English goods at Rouen, the seizure of English ships at La Rochelle, and the stoppage of the wine-fleet at Bordeaux. These reprisals, due to the high-handed manner in which the English Government carried out its views as to neutral trade, were answered by a general order to seize French goods (Dec. 3). The final French demands, for full execution of the marriage contract and mutual liberation of prizes, were rejected; and early in 1627 England drifted into war with France.

In allowing so deplorable a result to take place, Charles made three grave miscalculations—the first, that Richelieu's power would not bear the strain imposed upon it by an English war; the second, that it would be possible to detach Spain from France; the third and most fatal, that his own resources were sufficient to deal a crushing blow. The overtures made to Spain not only failed, but resulted in a compact with France for joint action against England; while Richelieu's power remained unshaken. Nevertheless, undeterred by the danger of a conflict with the two greatest European Powers, Buckingham started, towards the end of June, at the head of a considerable force, for La Rochelle. His instructions were to make war upon the hostile fleets, to offer active assistance to the Rochellese, and then, if the offer were declined, to prey upon French and Spanish commerce wherever found. The French ships kept to their harbours; and the armada reached the Isle of Ré without

adventure or mishap. A landing was effected with some difficulty and no little loss, the French troops on the island retiring to the fortified town of St Martin. Communications were entered into with the Rochellese, who showed little eagerness to accept the proffered aid.

According to the letter of his instructions, Buckingham should now have withdrawn, sent back his troops to England, and continued the war at sea. But the second part of the English programme now appeared. Whether the Rochellese required help or not, the occupation of an island on the French coast would, so long as the English fleet could hold the sea—and of its superiority there seemed no doubt—be of great advantage in any subsequent dealings with France. It was accordingly resolved to besiege St Martin. But the fort held out; the English army began to dwindle; and reinforcements were urgently demanded. Where were they to be found? The forced loan had produced a sum of over £200,000 in July; but debts swallowed up the proceeds as they came in. Charles did his best, but he could neither make money nor collect men; and only a few recruits were sent out. On September 28, by a night attack, the French succeeded in throwing men and provisions into St Martin. Three weeks later French troops landed in the island; the besiegers would soon become the besieged. An attempt to storm St Martin failed; and orders were at last given to embark. In November the miserable remnants of the expedition returned to England. The failure, due rather to the utter disorganisation of the Government at home than to any mistakes on the part of Buckingham as commander, was even more flagrant and more disastrous than that at Cadiz two years before.

The natural result was to heighten the displeasure felt in the country against the Government, and to strengthen resistance to the loan. The question of its justification came indirectly before the Courts in the case of the Five Knights (otherwise known as Darnel's case), who had been imprisoned for refusing to lend. The prisoners—five out of some seventy or eighty who had been similarly confined or banished from their homes—bearing the honoured names of Darnel, Erle, Corbet, Heveningham, and Edmund Hampden, appealed in November, 1627, to the Court of King's Bench for a writ of *Habeas Corpus*, demanding that the cause of their imprisonment should be shown. The trial that followed is notable, not only as the second of the great cases in which the limits of the prerogative in matters of taxation came before the judgment of a Court of law, but also as indicating the lines on which the constitutional struggle was to be fought out.

As in the cases of Bate, Chambers, and Hampden, momentous political issues were concealed beneath legal technicalities, and lawyers were called on to decide the highest affairs of State. The case of Darnel and his friends was argued by Selden and other distinguished counsel on strictly legal grounds, by reference to statutes and precedents from Magna Carta

onwards, tending to show that imprisonment without speedy trial, or without bail being given, was against the law of the land. If, it was maintained, the ordinary rule were to be of no effect in the case of a prisoner committed *per speciale mandatum regis*, then such prisoner had no remedy. On the other hand, Attorney-General Heath, basing his position on "that *absoluta potestas* that a sovereign hath," argued that cases (e.g. of treason) were readily conceivable in which to show cause would be impossible or dangerous to the State; and that, consequently, if, for reasons into which no subject had a right to enquire, the King declined to show cause, it was against the interest of the State to insist. The Judges, with the fear of creating a dangerous precedent before their eyes, adopted a negative attitude. On the ground that the cause of commitment must be presumed to be "matter of State," they declined to give bail; they declined also to say anything in favour of an indefinite right of imprisonment. Technically, and on the point at issue, victory lay with the Crown; but, as every one knew what, in this case, the "matter of State" was, it was clear that the real question was evaded, and would have to be settled by other methods and in another place.

That such a settlement would soon be necessary was becoming daily more clear. The country was at war with two great Powers; but ships and men, ammunition and stores, were wanting. The soldiers and sailors were unpaid and mutinous; the former, billeted on poor folk up and down the country, maltreated their unwilling hosts. The release of all the prisoners for the loan (January 2, 1628) was meant to conciliate opposition; but the unparliamentary sources had evidently run dry. Fresh privy seals were issued, to little or no effect. Early in February, writs for the collection of ship-money from all the shires were sent out; but, at the first sign of opposition on the part of certain Lord-Lieutenants, the Government withdrew the demand. To press it on the eve of a Parliament would have been suicidal; and already (January 30) the summons for another Parliament had gone forth. The circumstances of the time were highly unpropitious for the Government; and popular indignation was intensified by unwise utterances on the part of the High Church clergy. During the late Parliament, Laud, Andrewes, and two other Bishops, had reported in favour of Montague's book, and had advised the King to stop controversy on religious topics. The Commons, however, had drawn up charges against Montague, and, but for the dissolution, would probably have proceeded to an impeachment. A proclamation, issued in June, 1626, bidding both parties keep silence, was not likely to be effective, when clergymen like Sibthorp and Manwaring, holding Montague's religious views, preached sermons (1627) inculcating the principle of non-resistance and the highest notions of Divine Right. It was inevitable that Parliament should include in one common condemnation the supporters of Arminianism and prerogative, and should discover a close connexion between religious

and political ideas whose only link was the accidental and mistaken support of the Crown.

These utterances and, still more, the recent imprisonments on account of the loan were the subjects uppermost in men's minds when Parliament met again on March 17, 1628. The King's necessities were pressing. Besides the ordinary requirements of the State, a sum of at least a million and a quarter was needed for carrying on the war. At a time when the annual revenue scarcely amounted to half that sum, it was an unprecedented demand, to which the House was unlikely to yield without full compensation. The first debates betrayed a divergence between the leaders of the Commons, which widened as time went on. Eliot thundered against arbitrary taxation and innovations in religion, declaring both to be equally illegal and obnoxious. It was noteworthy that Wentworth, while attacking forced loans, illegal imprisonment, and other abuses of power, and inveighing against those who "extended the prerogative beyond its just symmetry," said nothing about religion. But the divergence went deeper than this; for Wentworth, while aiming at the abolition of misgovernment and striving after efficiency, saw that somewhere sovereignty must reside, and had no wish to strip the Crown in order to transfer that sovereignty to Parliament. Eliot, on the other hand, and those who thought and worked with him, were mindless of ulterior consequences so long as they could safeguard the liberties of the subject and the rights of the assembly to which they belonged.

The House began by registering a vote against taxation without parliamentary consent. In the discussion about imprisonment, which followed, the arguments which had weighed with the Judges in the recent case were urged on behalf of the Crown; and much was made of a famous opinion of the Judges, commonly known as Anderson's judgment, given in 1591. It is hard, as Hallam says, to see how it could have been regarded as strengthening the parliamentary case; but the House speedily adopted a resolution declaring the illegality of imprisonment without showing cause. Passing on to other grievances, they appointed a committee to enquire into the billeting and pressing of soldiers, but, at Wentworth's suggestion, showed their conciliatory spirit by unanimously voting five subsidies (about £350,000). The vote, however, was not reported; it was evidently to be conditional on the granting of their demands. Martial law was next taken up. While the Lower House debated this question, the Lords, in considering the resolutions on taxation and imprisonment, betrayed some inclination to side with the King, and sent down counter-propositions practically reserving the rights of the Crown. Wentworth proposed a Bill which should set the law against arbitrary confinement beyond doubt, while hoping that the question whether the law were above the King, or the King above the law, would not be stirred. Eventually a Bill embodying the resolutions already passed was brought in by Sir Edward Coke (April 29). In vain

Charles intervened with a promise to observe Magna Carta and other Statutes, and insisted that the House should rely upon his word. The Commons, in a Remonstrance presented to the King on May 5, pressed the necessity of legislation; but he remained firm. Wentworth's policy of reconciliation had clearly failed.

The long debate rolled on. What did the King mean? asked Pym: a promise to observe the Statutes was not a pledge that wrongful imprisonment should cease. The loan was the grievance, said Coke; let them join with the Lords in a petition against that and other wrongs. The proposal was acclaimed; on May 8, the famous Petition of Right was brought in; and two days later it was sent up to the Lords. Then began a prolonged struggle between Crown and Commons, in which, as in the days of Strafford's trial and again in those of the Exclusion Bill, all depended on which side the Upper House would espouse. At first the Lords tried accommodation. They accepted the Petition in principle, but, after making sundry small amendments, appended a clause saving the King's "sovereign power." Such an addition, it was clear to the Commons, would stultify all their efforts. "All our petition," said Pym, "is for the laws of England; and this power seems to be another power distinct from the law." The kernel of the contention lay here. Various proposals were then made by the House of Lords. Buckingham suggested the substitution of "prerogative" for "sovereign power"; Coventry endeavoured to explain that the clause meant very little; others proposed to submit the Petition to the Judges. One after another, these suggestions were rejected by the resolute leaders of the Commons. At length the Lords, persuaded that the Commons were in the right, gave way; and on May 28 the Petition passed both Houses of Parliament.

Face to face with this united opposition, the King still sought a way of escape. He questioned the Judges as to his rights, and the legal effect of granting the Petition. To two of his questions the Judges returned answers not wholly satisfactory; but to the third they replied that, as "every law hath his exposition," and the Courts of justice must determine each case, the Petition, if granted, would not absolutely preclude him from commitment without showing cause. Cautious though this answer was, it seemed to save the prerogative; but, even so, the King could not bring himself frankly to accept the Petition. Without so much as mentioning that document, he made answer that right should be done "according to the laws and customs of the realm," in such a way that "his subjects might have no cause to complain." With such an answer the Commons could not rest content. It was resolved to draw up another Remonstrance. Eliot was silenced by the Speaker, but Coke boldly denounced Buckingham as "the grievance of grievances"; whereupon the King cut short the debate. Then the Lords came to the rescue again; and, at their suggestion, a joint deputation went to

request the King for a clear reply. Hereupon, even Charles' tenacity gave way; and on June 7 the royal assent was given in the time-honoured formula "*soit droit fait comme est désiré.*"

A preamble to the Petition recited the Statutes on which the petitioners relied, and the grievances alleged. The effective portion of the document is contained in one paragraph, which enacted that henceforward no man should be compelled "to yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge" without consent of Parliament; that none should "be confined or otherwise molested," and no freeman should be "imprisoned or detained," for refusal of payment not so justified; that the billeting of soldiers and sailors should cease; and that the commissions for executing martial law should be annulled and not re-issued. The demands, it will be observed, are limited to present emergencies. There is no claim for general parliamentary control, no assertion of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, no overt attack upon the "sovereign power" or "prerogative" of the Crown. Nevertheless, since the affairs of State, foreign or domestic, could not be carried on without money, and the means by which money could be obtained, in any considerable amount, without consent of Parliament were hereby taken away, the enactment implied a constitutional change which was little short of a revolution. It is easy for us now, looking back on these events in the light of what followed, to see their meaning and importance; it is not surprising that neither party at the time perceived their full effect.

For the present, the victory of Parliament seemed to make little difference. The struggle was actively carried on. The Subsidy Bill was passed; but the question of tonnage and poundage again emerged. Manwaring, the preacher of High Church doctrines and prerogative, was impeached and heavily fined. A Remonstrance was passed (June 11), attacking Arminianism and begging the King to remove Buckingham from his counsels. It was not, as before, an impeachment, but a vote of no confidence. A haughty reproof was all the answer that the Commons received. The discussion about tonnage and poundage raised the question whether these duties were included in the Petition of Right, or not. Verbally they were not; neither in the practice of the time nor in the common acceptation of terms were they regarded as a "tax"; the omission of any direct mention of them from the Petition can hardly have been accidental. It would rather seem that neither side was anxious to complicate a matter already difficult enough by the introduction of so thorny a question. The two sides, inevitably, took different views; and, when the House presented another Remonstrance declaring that the collection of tonnage and poundage "and other impositions" without consent was a "breach of fundamental liberties" and contrary to the Petition of Right, the King lost patience and prorogued Parliament (June 26).

As to the impolicy of some of his subsequent actions there can be

little doubt. Several ecclesiastical promotions showed a needless disregard for the religious opinions of the majority of his subjects. Manwaring was pardoned and presented to a good living; Montague became Bishop of Chichester; Montaigne, who as Bishop of London had licensed Manwaring's sermons, was promoted to York; and Laud received the vacant see of London. The intention of the Government to favour an unpopular section of the Church could not have been more plainly disclosed. What was however still more remarkable, though little noticed at the time, was that Sir Thomas Wentworth became a peer, and was introduced at Court by the new Lord Treasurer, Weston (July 22). A month later, the powerful Minister, whom he had so fiercely assailed, was removed from the scene.

The subsidies voted had enabled Buckingham to push forward an expedition for the relief of La Rochelle, then closely besieged. The sturdy defenders of the city were reduced almost to the last gasp; but, owing to the continued disorganisation of government and the want of money, the English preparations dragged slowly on. Buckingham went down to Portsmouth to hurry them, and, while there, was murdered by John Felton, partly on personal, partly on public grounds (August 23, 1628). To the King the loss was irremediable. Of his affection for Buckingham there could be no doubt; he never had another favourite. But the murder had two notable results. In the first place it opened the way for a full reconciliation between the King and his wife; and, as time went on, the Queen gained an influence over her husband hardly less strong, and certainly not less detrimental, than that which Buckingham had enjoyed. The second result was that the King and his people were now left face to face. While Buckingham lived, the blame of high-handed and inefficient rule could be laid upon him; henceforward this was impossible; and the character of Charles' subsequent government shows that, for what went before, Buckingham, to say the least, was not alone to blame. With all his faults, he was no traitor; according to his lights, he did what he believed to be the best for his country, not (it is true) forgetting himself meanwhile. It was Buckingham's misfortune, and the misfortune of the country, that he was violent, short-sighted, and incapable; it was Charles' fault that, when all this was discerned by thinking and impartial men, he was yet retained in power.

The policy which Buckingham had initiated was pursued after his death. Early in September, 1628, the fleet sailed for La Rochelle. But the siege-works were too strong to be assailed with any hope of success; and two half-hearted attacks were repulsed. Negotiations, which Buckingham had begun, led to a promise from Richelieu to grant toleration to the Huguenots; but La Rochelle must surrender first. Charles demanded that the siege should be raised; and the negotiations were dropped. On October 30, Louis XIII entered the town; and the ostensible justification of war with France came to an end.

Whether peace supervened or not, the ordinary revenue did not suffice for the regular expenses of State, without the Customs—in other words tonnage and poundage, and impositions on particular articles of trade. These duties therefore continued to be collected, in spite of resistance. A merchant named Richard Chambers refused, uttered high words at the Council-board, and was committed, but was subsequently bailed. The goods of other merchants, including those of John Rolle, a member of Parliament, were seized. On the side of religion, also, there were fresh causes of complaint. John Cosin, Bishop of Durham, a man of great piety and learning, had written a *Book of Devotions*, which was vehemently arraigned by one of the fiercest of Calvinists, William Prynne. An unseemly brawl had taken place over the position of the communion table at Grantham. The “setting up of pictures, lights, and images in churches,” the sign of the cross, and other practices regarded as savouring of Rome, roused fanatical displeasure. In December, the King, with the assent of his Council, issued a Declaration, to be read by incumbents entering on a benefice, designed to promote uniformity and prevent disputes. The Declaration involved a profession of faith in the 39 Articles, a recognition of the royal supremacy and of the right of Convocation (under the King) to decide disputes about doctrine and ceremonies, and a prohibition of attempts to force upon the Articles a sense which they would not reasonably bear.

Neutral and colourless as this Declaration appears, it was blamed by Eliot, when Parliament met again (January 20), as countenancing innovations in religion. The Commons passed a resolution condemning the sense put upon the Articles by “Jesuits and Arminians,” and accepted the Calvinistic “Lambeth Articles” of 1595 as expressing the creed of the Church of England. By this attempt to determine doctrine, they placed themselves in opposition to the King’s Declaration, curtailed by implication his ecclesiastical supremacy, and adopted the intolerant attitude which was to have so large a share in bringing on the Civil War. At the same time they continued their attack upon the King’s claim to the customs duties. The climax came when, on February 24, they discussed certain resolutions, which, after reviewing the whole area of religious grievances, proposed to deal out penalties to Papists and Arminians alike, and to enforce uniformity (after their own definition) upon the Church. On March 2 the King ordered an adjournment. On Eliot’s rising to address the House, the Speaker, Sir John Finch, attempted to stop the debate by leaving the room, but was forcibly held down in his chair. A confused and hurried discussion took place. Eventually, while Black Rod was knocking at the door, three resolutions, originally drawn by Eliot, were brought forward, asserting, in curt and peremptory terms, that whoever should “bring in innovations in religion” or “introduce Popery and Arminianism,” and whoever should advise the taking of tonnage and poundage, or pay such duties

voluntarily, without consent of Parliament, should be reputed a traitor and a "capital enemy to this kingdom and the commonwealth." The resolutions passed by acclamation; the door was opened; and the third Parliament of Charles I ceased to exist.

Parliament had, unconsciously no doubt, stretched forth its hand to grasp the sovereignty hitherto attached to the Crown. The King, in his efforts to retain control, had encroached on the ill-defined liberties of the subject. The old dual system of government, sustained by mutual confidence and the pressure of foreign and domestic danger, had broken down. Both parties had been forced, by the course of events and by the national growth, into revolutionary positions, in which a compromise was no longer possible; and subsequent events showed that Charles had determined that, if he could prevent it, a Parliament should never darken his doors again. To later observers, this appears a hazardous, even a hopeless, experiment; it did not seem so then. Long periods had elapsed in Elizabeth's reign without Parliaments; longer still in the reign of James I. The parliamentary system was far from being regarded as essential to good government. In Spain it had practically disappeared. In France the States General had not met since 1614, and were not to meet again till 1789. In Germany the Diet was already little more than a diplomatic council. Holland was a Republic, and therefore out of court. Why should not England follow the way of France and Spain? All that seemed requisite was the adoption of a pacific policy abroad, the improvement of administration at home, and the gradual extension of autocratic control over the national sources of supply. Such was the policy which the Government now attempted to carry out.

The eleven years of autocratic government which followed are a period without a parallel in English history. A momentous experiment was tried, and failed. We have traced the steps which led to its trial; we have now to examine the causes of its failure. With this object, it will not be necessary to relate the history of the period in such detail as was inevitable in the first four years of the reign, filled as they are with stirring and decisive events at home and abroad. A more summary treatment seems not only permissible but appropriate to the nature of the material. Everything depended on the avoidance of an excessive strain on the resources of government, whether through foreign complications or internal disorder, until the autocratic system could be built up on an unassailable basis. The process of establishing it, in Church and State, would (it might be foreseen) cause irritation and local difficulties; but it was hoped that in time the nation, lulled by material prosperity, would acquiesce in its chains. Time was essential to the success of this policy; and time, as we shall see, was denied. The fatal strain came at last, and from a quarter where it was least expected—from north of the Tweed; and the Scottish rebellion gave back to England her parliamentary system.

The events of the period may be treated under the three heads of foreign affairs, and of civil and ecclesiastical administration. After the dissolution of 1629, peace was evidently necessary; and peace was accordingly made, with little delay. Negotiations with France resulted in the Treaty of Susa (April 24), in which both Powers tacitly gave up their pretensions to interfere in each other's religious affairs. Richelieu's hands were thus set free for the pursuit of his European schemes; and Charles could turn his attention to Spain. The sad plight of the Protestants in Germany demanded his assistance, for the Edict of Restitution had just preceded, and the Peace of Lübeck closely followed, his settlement with France. But his aims were almost purely dynastic; in the fortunes of his sister, the Electress, he was deeply interested; in those of Protestantism at large, very little. So far did he depart from the sound lines of Elizabethan policy that already the project of an alliance against the Dutch, which his son was afterwards to make with France, was held out as a bribe to Spain. Eventually the Treaty of Madrid (November 5, 1630) put an end to a war which had gone on for six years without any events worthy of note.

Charles was now at liberty to devote his resources, had he possessed any, to the pursuit of his darling object, the recovery of the Palatinate. This object he kept in view for the next ten years, with characteristic pertinacity as to ends, and a tortuous futility in the choice of means. In January, 1631, a treaty between England and Spain was actually signed at Madrid for the partition of the United Netherlands; but Spain had no real intention of breaking with the Emperor for the sake of Charles' brother-in-law. Direct negotiations at Vienna led to no result; it was known that Charles was in communication with Gustavus Adolphus, and was allowing volunteers to be raised in his behalf. After the battle of Breitenfeld, and while planning a closer alliance with the House of Habsburg, Charles nearly came to terms with Gustavus, who was ready to promise to reconquer the Palatinate for the Elector if he could obtain appreciable reinforcements from England. Charles, however, could only offer money; and the negotiation fell through. On the deaths of Gustavus and the Elector Frederick (November, 1632), Charles endeavoured to secure the active assistance of Richelieu, who was then planning an alliance with the States General, on the basis of a partition of the Spanish Netherlands. But Richelieu was too wary to pledge himself to a recovery of the whole Palatinate; and Charles' overtures came to nothing. Shortly afterwards he is found intriguing with the Spanish Netherlands, with a view to their independence; but his offers were betrayed to the Spanish Government. It seemed impossible for Charles to fix upon any settled line of policy. "The truth is," said the Spanish ambassador Necolalde, "you pull down with one hand as fast as you build up with the other."

Nevertheless, when, in September, 1633, Richelieu occupied Lorraine and, early in the following year, began laying hands on Elsass, and an

open breach with Spain was clearly impending, both Powers naturally sought the assistance of England. Here was a chance of which an astute and determined statesman might have availed himself. But the assistance which Charles offered to Spain would have been a very inadequate compensation for her support of his policy in Germany; and the opportunity passed by. The murder of Wallenstein (February, 1634) brought the two branches of the House of Habsburg closer together; and it became clearer than ever that no attempt to separate them could succeed. Still Charles continued his negotiations; and in October, 1634, the treaty for the partition of the United Netherlands was brought forward again. Meanwhile the battle of Nördlingen (August, 1634) had dashed to the ground the hopes of German Protestants, and rendered inevitable the active intervention of France. Charles' anxiety for a Spanish alliance was redoubled when, in April, 1635, he got wind of the proposed partition of the Spanish Netherlands between France and Holland; and on May 1 he agreed to a treaty with Spain, under which an English fleet was to cooperate with that of her ancient foe. It was with the object of raising this fleet that the first ship-money writs had been issued in the autumn of 1634; and thus again foreign policy had its fateful effect on domestic affairs.

On May 19, 1635, France declared war against Spain; and the great struggle on the Continent entered into a new phase. Charles' consort and his sister still pressed him to throw in his lot with France; but, as usual, he could not make up his mind. A fleet, however, was becoming necessary, if only to protect commerce and maintain neutrality. English merchants were pillaged at sea; and Dutch and Dunkirkers fought their battles in English waters. In the summer of 1636 a fleet put to sea, but did nothing beyond levying toll on Dutch herring-boats. Incapable of taking a decided line, Charles wasted time by sending Arundel on a futile mission to Vienna, to offer aid towards a general pacification, and by despatching Leicester to Paris to discuss an alliance at the moment when Spanish troops, with the aid of English gold, were invading Picardy. Nevertheless Richelieu encouraged the negotiations, with a view to prevent England from joining Spain; and, in February, 1637, a treaty seemed on the point of being signed. At the last moment, however, the French raised objections on points of detail; the summer wore on; Wentworth threw his weight on the side of peace; and Richelieu's object, that of immobilising England for another year, was secured. Before the year was out, the Scottish troubles had begun; and, though Charles fancied that he saw in them the hand of Richelieu, and leant again towards Spain, it became clear in 1638 that nothing could be done abroad till domestic disturbance was at an end. From this time forward English foreign policy ceased to have even the slight importance which it had possessed since 1629.

We return to that date, and take up the story of Charles' ecclesiastical

policy, which becomes more and more closely connected with the name of Laud. Of the foreign intrigues which have been sketched the country at large knew little or nothing. The thunder of the great conflict in Germany was scarcely heard in the quiet towns and sleepy villages of England. Only now and then, when a hero like Gustavus or Wallenstein passed across the stage, was keen feeling aroused; Protestantism, at least after Breitenfeld and Lützen, seemed fairly able to defend itself; and, what was most important, England itself was at peace. Not all the efforts of the Government, when striving to justify ship-money, could make Englishmen believe themselves in danger. But it was otherwise with ecclesiastical affairs. In that sphere what was done could not be concealed; the doings of Laud and his coadjutors were known throughout the land, even without the aid of a daily press; and more was suspected than was known. That much of this suspicion was unfounded—that neither Charles nor Laud had any idea of reviving the Papal supremacy or restoring Romanism—is true; but the fact, in this connexion, is unimportant. What was important is that their conduct gave ground for Protestant fears, and that their intolerance of any divergence from their own standard of doctrine and practice roused wide-spread hostility. That the Puritan party were every whit as intolerant as their opponents is also true; tolerance was only to be found in France and in one or two settlements across the Atlantic; but what was of moment in regard to the constitutional struggle is that the action of the party in power enabled the Puritans to raise the cry of religious liberty, and to combine it with the demand for parliamentary control.

Some part at least of Laud's intentions may meet with general approval—his efforts to inculcate reverence for holy things, to establish decency and order, to beautify the fabrics of the Church, to call art to the aid of religion; but it was in the highest degree unfortunate that, in carrying out these aims, he ignored all differences of mind and temperament, insisted on a rigid uniformity, and suppressed all opposition by tyrannical means. Over-careful of detail, superstitious, and of limited intelligence, he neither perceived the effect of his own acts, nor understood the temper of the people he was called upon to rule. Conscientious, bustling, and self-confident, he was also pedantic, narrow, and unsympathetic; but he knew his own mind, as to both end and means, and thus won a dominant influence over his slow and vacillating sovereign, whose lofty views of monarchy and episcopacy he shared and stimulated to excess. The same principles attached him to Wentworth, who, in the struggle which he saw to be inevitable, had now definitely thrown in his lot with the Crown. Throughout the early part of the reign, he had stood for good government and a reasoned national policy, rather than for parliamentary rights or individual liberties; and, when the compromise which he had sought to effect proved impossible, and he had to make his choice between King and Parliament, it was no treachery

on his part that he chose the former. His despotic tendencies were strengthened by the exercise of power which he enjoyed as President of the North (1629–32) and subsequently as Lord Deputy in Ireland; but it was not till near the end of this period that he gained ascendancy over the King. Though a man of far wider views and statesmanship than Laud, he miscalculated as grossly the difficulties of the task, and was equally ignorant (with less excuse) both of the national feeling and the national spirit. Personally unselfish, and aiming honestly at what he believed to be the good of the State, he supported courses of action even more dangerous than those into which the favourite whom he detested had plunged. Lord Treasurer Weston, the third member of what may be called the triumvirate under the throne, was a man of very different type. Unlike his two fiery colleagues, he was selfish, corruptible, and unenterprising; the drag upon their wheels, the “Lady Mora” whose lethargy hindered the policy of “Thorough” from taking full effect. Yet financial ability such as he possessed was an indispensable condition of success in the enterprise in which Charles was engaged; and Weston’s caution or timidity, largely due as it was to a consciousness of his own interest, might, had he lived longer (he died in 1635), have at least staved off the coming of the evil day.

The two chief instruments on which Laud relied to carry out his policy were the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission, accepted organs of law and order under the Tudors, engines of despotism under their successors. In his own diocese of London, he strove to suppress, by the agency of the latter Court, the authors and printers of objectionable works, and to enforce the exact observance of the Book of Common Prayer. He compelled obedience to the King’s Declaration as to the eschewing of controversial topics, and made some progress in putting down the “lecturers” (or preachers without cure of souls) who by their sermons disseminated the doctrines of Puritanism. As Chancellor of Oxford (1630) he reduced that University to order, revived academical discipline, and suppressed freedom of thought, or at least of discussion. The proceedings against Alexander Leighton in the Star Chamber (1630), on account of his book, *Sion’s plea against Prelacy*, showed to what lengths Laud was ready to go in the effort to crush his opponents. The book not only attacked the Bishops with inconsiderate violence, but displayed the political tendencies of Presbyterianism by speaking disrespectfully of the King and urging Parliament (it was written in 1628) to resist a dissolution. It was not surprising that the Court should condemn such a polemic; but nothing could excuse the cruel sentence of fine, imprisonment, and mutilation which was inflicted. While suppressing Puritan pamphleteers, Laud encouraged the controversialists on his own side. A dispute having arisen (1631) between Prynne and a Churchman named Page about bowing in church, Archbishop Abbot endeavoured to silence both; but Laud encouraged Page

to go on. On the other hand, Nathaniel Bernard, having preached at Cambridge against the "Romanising" clergy, was fined and imprisoned by the High Commission. But at Cambridge the Puritan spirit was stronger than at Oxford; and Richard Sibbes and others continued to preach doctrines which were proscribed in the sister University.

It was in the year 1633 that Charles paid that visit to Scotland whose results, described in another chapter, were to have so momentous an issue. In August of the same year Laud became Archbishop of Canterbury. It was a change of great importance, for Laud was now able to supervise the whole Church from a vantage-ground of authority which he had not hitherto enjoyed; and the war against Puritanism and nonconformity was waged with more vigour and unity than before. The harshness of sentences increased. Ludowic Bowyer, a good-for-nothing who had libelled the Archbishop as a Papist at heart—an unfounded charge, but one which took some colour from the offer of a Cardinal's hat made to Laud from Rome shortly before—was sentenced (1633) to perpetual imprisonment, branding, mutilation, and a heavy fine. Next year Prynne, for his *Histriomastix*, in which he inveighed against stage-plays and was held to have reflected on the Queen and the Court, was sentenced to a similar penalty. A letter from the King bade the Archbishop put a stop to the "lecturers" by enforcing the canon which forbade ordination without cure of souls. Conventicles, or meetings of nonconformists for divine worship, were rigorously suppressed. The question of the position of the Holy Table in churches—a question intimately connected with rival doctrines of the Sacrament—was referred by the King to the jurisdiction of the Ordinary; which meant, in most cases, that it would be decided against the Puritans. King James' *Declaration of Sports* was revived and ordered to be read in churches; an act which implied a condemnation of the Puritan Sabbath. Emigration, the one refuge of ardent consciences from religious oppression, was checked, but nevertheless went on continuously. Meanwhile Laudians were promoted to high places; Juxon became Bishop of London, and Neile was translated to York.

Between 1634 and 1637 Laud held a metropolitanical visitation of all England south of the Trent. His Vicar-General, Brent, discovered much neglect and irregularity, and more or less nonconformity in most districts; with equal energy, but with unequal justification, Laud set to work to redress both. A general order was issued to remove Communion tables to the east end of the church. This caused much disturbance; and offenders were punished by the High Commission. It must be allowed that Laud was no respecter of persons; all offenders, high or low, were haled before him; but the result, as Clarendon says, was that a bitter feeling of irritation and a longing for revenge grew up throughout the country, in the influential classes no less than among humbler folk. To these sentiments was added an increasing fear of Rome.

In 1634 Gregorio Panzani, an Oratorian, was sent to England to obtain an alleviation of the lot of Roman Catholics. He was welcomed at Court; and his conversations with Windebank and others led to a scheme being started for reunion with the Roman Church. Some notable conversions to Romanism followed; and masses were publicly celebrated. The war of pamphlets became embittered. The unlicensed presses could not be stopped. In June, 1637, it was resolved to make an example of the leading writers on the Puritan side. William Prynne, Henry Burton, and John Bastwick—the first and the last of whom had previously undergone punishment—were brought before the Star Chamber on a charge of libelling the Bishops in various publications. They were condemned to the loss of their ears, heavy fines, and imprisonment for the rest of their lives. The sentences were carried out; and the prisoners were subsequently immured in Jersey, Guernsey, and the Scilly Islands. Such penalties fatally overshot their mark; and the demeanour of the crowds who witnessed the execution and applauded the “martyrs” on their way to prison might have warned wiser men than Laud to hold their hands. But he did not desist; and the punishment inflicted on John Lilburn (December, 1637), for distributing pamphlets, heightened the general indignation. Not even the Bishops were spared by their domineering head. Williams, the statesmanlike and astute, if somewhat slippery, Bishop of Lincoln, was brought before the Star Chamber (1637), on a charge of revealing State secrets, really for opposition to Laud, and sentenced by the High Commission to suspension and imprisonment.

In all this, it is not to be supposed that Laud and his colleagues were not supported by a strong party, both in Church and State. High Church doctrines, the creed of Laud, though not his temper or his methods, were upheld by such men as Falkland, John Hales, and Chillingworth, whose *Religion of Protestants* defended Anglicanism while rejecting infallibility and deprecating dogma. George Herbert, in his quiet rectory at Bemerton, breathed the spirit which two centuries later animated Keble. In him, as in Milton in his earlier works, for instance in *Il Penseroso*, the higher Puritanism and an emotional consciousness of the charm and beauty of the Church seemed to meet. Nicholas Ferrar, at Little Gidding, combined purity of life and devotion to the Anglican faith with institutions which reflected the best side of Rome; just as men like Baxter and Hutchinson displayed the elevation without the rancour of Puritanism. But, in the fierce conflict which was now engaged, these gentler spirits fell into the background, or were driven into one or another camp. The author of *Comus* could have felt little sympathy with Prynne and his *Histrionastix*; but within three years Milton’s temper had altered, and *Lycidas* illustrates the change. The sorrow and despair of men like Falkland, the wrath and embitterment of men like Milton, mark the fatal narrowness and incapacity of Laud and the blindness of the King on whom he leaned.

While the storm was thus gathering on the religious side, the Government was putting itself more and more in the wrong with respect to civil and political liberties. That this took place was largely due to the Law-Courts, which, by their fatal compliance with the King's demands, encouraged him in dangerous ways, and showed how hard it is for lawyers to be statesmen. A few months after the dissolution of 1629, Richard Chambers (to whose case reference has already been made) received sentence of fine and imprisonment from the Star Chamber. Refusing to submit, he prayed the Court of Exchequer to quash the decision on the ground, afterwards taken by the Long Parliament, that the Star Chamber had exceeded its statutory powers; but, Chief Baron Walter having been suspended on account of his doubtful attitude, his three colleagues dismissed the plea. During the same time, a still more important case was running its course.

After the dissolution, nine members of Parliament, including Eliot, Selden, Strode, Holles, and Valentine, were imprisoned for seditious words or conduct in the House. The Judges, having been consulted by the King as to the limits of parliamentary privilege, gave an ambiguous answer, doubtless disliking, as any judges would, the pernicious practice (to which Charles was addicted) of demanding general opinions without the presentation of a concrete case. Six of the prisoners thereupon applied for a writ of *habeas corpus*; and their counsel demanded bail. When the case came on in King's Bench, the prisoners were not allowed to appear; but eventually bail was offered, conditional on a promise of good behaviour. This the prisoners refused to give. At last, in January, 1630, the Court gave judgment. It was argued by the counsel for the Crown that the behaviour of the prisoners had been seditious, and that privilege could not cover sedition. The Judges accepted the plea, and condemned the prisoners to fine and imprisonment. Either before or after this judgment, six of them made their peace and were released; but Eliot died in prison (November, 1632), a martyr to his political faith; and Strode and Valentine were kept in durance till the eve of the Short Parliament.

Meanwhile tonnage and poundage were regularly collected, in spite of much grumbling and some resistance on the part of the merchants; and, under the direction of Weston or at the suggestion of ingenious persons like Noy, who had been a strong opponent of the Government, but became Attorney-General in 1631, the medieval armoury of royal rights was ransacked for other expedients in order to raise money for the Crown. In 1630 many persons of wealth and standing were compelled to take the dignity and responsibilities of knighthood, or to pay fines by way of "composition." A little later, the Forest Laws were refurbished up. Many noblemen and others were fined enormous sums for encroachments on the ancient forest-bounds; and large areas, with the population upon them, were brought within an oppressive and antiquated jurisdiction.

But what promised to be a far more lucrative and permanent source of supply was discovered when, in 1634, Noy suggested the revival of ship-money. This tax had (as was noted above) been demanded in 1628 in order to arm a fleet. But the country was then at war; now it was at peace. It was no doubt advisable, and even necessary, to maintain a naval force afloat, if only for the protection of trade; but the real object of the fleet, which has been already indicated, could not be divulged. Defence against pirates—who were a real and constant danger, even in the Channel—was put forward as a pretext; and in October, 1634, the first writs were issued, levying contributions for the fleet on the sea-ports and coast towns. Some opposition was offered in London; but the Lord Mayor was scolded by the Council, and the City gave way. Elsewhere there was little difficulty; and a sum of about £100,000 was brought in.

Weston, who had been raised to the peerage as Earl of Portland, died in March, 1635; and the Treasury was put into commission, with Laud at its head. Here he displayed the same fussy activity, the same short-sighted views, that marked his headship of the Church. As in ecclesiastical matters he bent his energies to secure external uniformity at all costs, so in finance he exerted himself to bring money into the Treasury in every possible way, mindless of remoter consequences. Though monopolies to individuals were illegal, the King, in virtue of his right to regulate trade, was not precluded from granting patents to corporations—for which, of course, they had to pay. One of the chief of these patents was for the making of soap. Rival companies were formed, and the Court condescended to the most modern methods of advertising the wares of the company to whom they sold their preference. Eventually (1637) the King received £8 on every ton of soap made by the patentees. Other patents were granted for salt and starch, as well as to brewers, vintners, and brickmakers. The vintners were bullied into a payment of £30,000 a year. The system involved an odious excise, paid by the consumer, on several necessities of life. At the same time the forest claims were actively pushed in all parts of England; and Richmond Park was enclosed, at great expense. A new Book of Rates was issued, considerably increasing the customs. Still the revenue was not equal to the expenditure; and there was a heavy debt.

The first experiment in levying ship-money had been so successful that in 1635 it was repeated, but with an ominous extension. Lord Keeper Coventry, in an address to the Judges, urged the plea that since the nation, as a whole, was concerned in the defence of trade, therefore the whole nation should pay for such defence. It was a dangerous parody of Edward I's principle, that what concerned all should be approved by all; and it was put forward in support of a policy the very opposite of that great King's. The second writs were issued in August; the total sum required, about £200,000, was not heavy, when spread over

the whole country. Serious resistance was, however, encountered in Oxfordshire and other inland counties. The Judges were again consulted; and ten out of the twelve gave an opinion in favour of the Crown. The indomitable Chambers appealed to King's Bench; but the Court refused to hear him; and Justice Berkeley laid down the far-reaching axiom that "many things which might not be done by rule of law might be done by rule of government."

In March, 1636, Juxon, Bishop of London, became Lord Treasurer; but he was a creature of Laud's, and Laud's financial policy went on unchanged. In October the ship-money writs were issued for the third time. It was now evident that what had been generally regarded as a temporary expedient was intended to be a permanent source of supply. The resistance at once took on a new character. It was ominous that the Peers now showed a tendency to oppose. Danby ventured to remonstrate with the King; Warwick, called to account for his opposition in Essex, boldly justified his attitude. The Judges were again consulted. This time all twelve of them gave it as their opinion that the King was the sole judge of public danger and the consequent necessity of supply, and might at his pleasure levy aid. The King, as we have seen, was meditating active intervention abroad; but Wentworth dissuaded him from war. He had a fleet, but no army; and, so long as he had nothing but a fleet, he "stood but upon one leg." Let him wait till he could raise an army; he would then be safe at home and feared abroad. This was the Cromwellian despotism foreshadowed; but it was no more than a logical extension of the principle which the Judges had laid down.

In November, 1637, the question was brought to the test of law. Lord Saye and John Hampden refused to pay; and Hampden's case was selected to be heard. His counsel, St John, argued that, if the King could lay taxes as he pleased, no man could call anything his own. Holborne pointed out that the writ made no mention of danger to the State, and denied outright that the King was the proper judge. Lyttelton (Solicitor-General) replied that, in time of danger, it might be impossible to summon Parliament; and Bankes (Attorney-General) claimed that the right of decision was "innate in the person of an absolute King and in the persons of the Kings of England." The King, he concluded, "is the soul of this body, whose proper act is to command." It is needless to point out the revolutionary character of this contention, which was destructive of the old constitution. Nevertheless, early in 1638, a majority of the Judges adopted it. Berkeley declared that "*Rex is lex*"; and Chief-Justice Finch denied that any Act of Parliament could take away the sovereignty of the King. Seven of the Judges decided for the Crown, and five (on various grounds) for Hampden. By so narrow a majority was parliamentary government condemned.

But already the storm was brewing in the north which was to demolish the fabric that Charles and his supporters had so laboriously

raised. The causes and progress of the Scottish rebellion are discussed elsewhere; here we have to note the effect of that explosion on English affairs. The strain which it put upon the King's resources was evident at once. Knowing the difficulty of raising an army sufficient to compel submission, Wentworth advised Charles to restrict himself to a blockade, which would soon reduce the Scots to reason. But after the decisions of the Glasgow Assembly (December, 1638) war was seen to be inevitable. No ship-money writs had been issued in 1638; they were issued for the fourth and last time in January, 1639; but the money came in scantily and slowly. When the Bishops' War broke out, a benevolence was demanded from the City; but little money was given. The Treasury was quite incapable of meeting the strain; the troops raised were inadequate in number, and still more so in discipline and spirit; and there was no money for their pay. The English nobles were disaffected; Lords Brooke and Saye refused the military oath. When Leslie had taken up his position on Dunse Law, Wentworth was asked to send troops from Ireland; he replied that they could not be spared. A final attempt was made to raise a loan from the City; when that failed, Charles gave way. He signed the Treaty of Berwick (June, 1639), and returned home.

Unable to raise funds in his own country, Charles turned to France and Spain; but his efforts in these directions were unsuccessful. The general alarm and distrust were increased by an incident, which shows to what a low ebb his power was reduced. A Spanish fleet, which had taken refuge in the Downs, was attacked and destroyed by the Dutch. The rumour spread that it was conveying troops for the assistance of the King. In September, Wentworth came to England, and thenceforward assumed a dominant position in the King's counsels. The Scottish Commissioners, who had come south to get Charles' consent to the measures of their General Assembly, were dismissed without a settlement; and, in order to obtain funds for coercing Scotland, Wentworth advised the summons of a Parliament. In January, 1640, he was raised to the peerage as Earl of Strafford.

On April 13, Parliament met, after an interval of ten years. The Scots had tried to open negotiations with France. Richelieu had put their overtures aside; but a letter from the Covenanters, intended for Louis, had fallen into Charles' hands. On this he relied for persuading the Commons to open their purses for a war against the traitors in the north. But the House was of a different mind. Pym at once took the lead in a great speech, in which, after reviewing, in a comprehensive survey but in studiously temperate language, the long list of civil and religious grievances, he laid it down that "the powers of Parliament are to the body politic as the rational faculties of the soul to a man," and declared the evil of evils to be the intermission of Parliaments. Following his guidance, the House resolved that a full consideration of their wrongs must precede supply. The King sought the aid of the Lords, who, by

a majority of three to one, voted that the King's necessities should have precedence; but, resenting this as an unwarranted interference with their special rights, the Commons adhered to their decision. It was agreed in the Council to surrender the claim to ship-money in consideration of a grant of eight subsidies—a demand subsequently raised to twelve. The object was clear; but the House had no desire for war with a people in whom they saw their best allies; and Pym was already in communication with the Scottish leaders. Instead of a vote of aid, the Commons brought forward a petition begging Charles to come to terms with the Scots; and the King, to whom no proposal could have been more distasteful, dissolved Parliament. It had sat only three weeks.

The appeal to the nation had been confessedly an experiment. It failed; and Charles was thrown back on his own resources. Nothing daunted, Strafford now advised strong measures against the Scots. "You have an army in Ireland," he is reported to have said in Council, "which you may employ here to reduce this kingdom." The accuracy of the report may be doubted, and the exact meaning of the words is obscure; but, whether "this kingdom" meant England or Scotland, the phrase was to prove his ruin. He had himself got a vote of four subsidies from the Irish Parliament shortly before the English Parliament met; and the Council, at his instigation, had raised a considerable loan. Convocation, which, against all precedent, had continued sitting after Parliament was dissolved, and passed certain canons with a declaration in favour of Divine Right, voted six subsidies from the clergy. But the Irish Parliament now hesitated to carry its vote into effect; and London offered strenuous opposition to an order to raise 4000 men. The army which was collected in the north was worse than before; it was disaffected, even mutinous; and it was clearly no match for the Scots.

In the second Bishops' War, which began in June, 1640, the Scots took the initiative. Demanding a free Parliament in England, they forced the passage of the Tweed at Newburn and occupied Newcastle. Their demand was supported by the petition of twelve English Peers, who advised the King to call a Parliament, punish evil counsellors, and make terms with the Scots. In England there was joy at the Scottish invasion; and the parliamentary leaders had no scruple in communicating with their friends. Driven to desperation, Charles reverted to a practice obsolete since the fourteenth century, and summoned a great Council of Peers to meet at York. But the body of the nobility supported the twelve petitioners; riots in London showed the dangerous temper of the populace; and Charles was forced to negotiate with the Scots. The Treaty of Ripon conceded their demands; and writs for a Parliament were issued. With the Scots in arms on English soil, and an utterly exhausted exchequer, it would be impossible to deal with this Parliament as with the last. The policy of "Thorough" had definitely broken down.

CHAPTER IX.

THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE LONG PARLIAMENT.
(1640-2.)

WHEN the great assembly which was afterwards to be known as the Long Parliament met at Westminster on November 3, 1640, the condition of affairs was very different from what it had been in the spring of the year. It was plain, even to the King, that concessions must now be made. The Crown would probably have to surrender the claim to levy ship-money, and even the customs duties, without consent of Parliament, to abolish monopolies, and to extend the limits of religious toleration; but subsequent events showed that Charles had no intention of seriously modifying the ecclesiastical system, of accepting the principle of ministerial responsibility, or of binding himself to summon Parliaments regularly; in other words, he clung to the essentials of prerogative. The parliamentary leaders, on their part, while resolved to carry out the programme which Pym had indicated in the previous April, had at first no intention of pushing matters to extremes. Their aim was rather restorative—their plan, to thrust back the encroaching power of the Crown, to sweep away the bulwarks of despotism, to revive ancient rights and safeguards. But, as is usual in revolutionary times, mutual suspicion and mistrust prevented a halt when the work of restoration was complete; and it was at this point that the vacillating and shifty character of Charles proved of so fatal a significance. The conviction became ineradicable that the King intended, at the earliest opportunity, to withdraw the concessions into which he had been forced; and it must be allowed that, so early as the summer of 1641, incidents, to be noted later, occurred which lent only too much colour to this suspicion. Thus the measures promoted by Parliament, in order to safeguard the rights which had been gained, became more and more subversive of the old order, while acts of violence on the King's part betrayed more and more hostility towards the parliamentary party; and the two sides were gradually driven into a position of antagonism, of which the only outcome could be civil war.

The most important event of the first six months of the Long

Parliament was undoubtedly the trial of Strafford, which led to his execution on May 12, 1641. So long as influences hostile to reform surrounded the King, so long as the executive remained in the hands of men not only independent of, but hostile to, parliamentary control, a reconciliation between the Crown and the nation would be impossible. It was therefore upon the instruments of autocracy that Pym and his colleagues concentrated their attention. Abandoning the lengthy method hitherto followed, of investigating and expounding grievances, they resolved to strike boldly at the root of the mischief. Within a few days of the meeting of Parliament, a list of persons to be impeached was drawn up; it included, among others, the names of Strafford and Laud. The parliamentary leaders were not, however, in any hurry for the attack; they intended to begin by collecting evidence and making sure of their ground. That the plan was altered, and the first blow struck swiftly, was due to the fact that Strafford, hearing of their intention and anxious to anticipate his accusers, urged the King to charge Pym and others with treason, on account of their dealings with the Scots. The King hesitated; and the opportunity was lost. Pym, who was throughout remarkably well informed as to the intentions of the Court, at once carried the impeachment to the Lords; and on November 11 Strafford was committed to prison.

The importance of this initial success was very great; for it not only removed from the King's side his most devoted supporter, a counsellor whose advice would at least have been clear and energetic, but it struck terror into the hearts of others connected with the system which Strafford had upheld. It showed, moreover, that the Lords were ready to support their colleagues in the Lower House, who were therefore emboldened to proceed. The blow was speedily followed up. An attack on the relaxation of the penal laws caused (December 10) the flight of Secretary Windebank, known to have been in close touch with Panzani, and suspected of being himself a Catholic. A resolution, declaring that ship-money was illegal, and that the Judges who decided against Hampden had broken the law, led to the flight of Lord Keeper Finch (December 21). He was promptly impeached. In the following February, Judge Berkeley, whose support of the Crown had been peculiarly outspoken, was summoned from the Bench itself before the bar of the House, and committed to custody. The assumption by Convocation, in the previous summer, of rights independent of Parliament had aroused much feeling; and the canons which it had passed were condemned on political and religious grounds. These were now declared to be illegal; and Laud was impeached of high treason (December 18). Articles against him were voted in February; and on March 1 he was sent to the Tower. Thus all the most important agents of the monarchy were swept away.

Meanwhile the charges against Strafford had been roughly formulated (November 24). Several of these, such as the statements that he had

maliciously stirred up strife between England and Scotland, and had embezzled public money, were exaggerated or absurd; what was serious and, indeed, undeniable, was the twofold charge that he had "endeavoured to subvert the fundamental laws and government of England and Ireland, and instead thereof to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government against law," and that "he had laboured to subvert the rights of Parliaments and the ancient course of parliamentary proceedings." Evidence in support of these accusations was actively collected during the next two months; and the detailed Articles were voted on January 30, 1641. Three weeks later, Strafford put in his answer before the Lords; and Charles gave grievous offence by being present on the occasion, and making no secret of his satisfaction with Strafford's defence. The Peers voted that all that had been done in his presence was null and void; nevertheless, they allowed Strafford another month to prepare his case. The impatience and irritation of the Commons grew day by day. Although many important steps (presently to be noticed) had already been taken towards re-establishing the authority of Parliament, nothing, it was evident, could be regarded as secure till the main issue had been tried and settled in the case of the chief adviser of the Crown.

On March 22, 1641, the great trial began. It was a memorable scene. In that ancient hall, the work of the most tyrannical of the Norman Kings, the policy of one of the most despotic of his successors was arraigned, before a Court consisting of all the highest in the land, by the representatives of the nation which he had sought to bind. The ultimate issues went far beyond the immediate result for the individual primarily concerned. Two conceptions of government were brought face to face—government by prerogative alone, and government by King and Parliament. Pym had declared Parliament to be "the soul of the body politic"; Charles and Strafford had deliberately attempted to eliminate it from the Constitution. In the trial of Strafford this issue came to a head. The chief obstacles to the success of Pym and his colleagues lay in the difficulty of bringing Strafford's action within the legal conception of treason. Pym refused to restrict it, as heretofore, to attacks upon the person or authority of the sovereign; in his mind, an attack upon the Constitution was the more heinous crime. He sought to combine the two ideas by showing that an attempt to undermine the laws on which the authority of the monarchy reposed was to attack the sovereign in his political capacity and to threaten him with ruin. But this was a subtle and a novel idea, involving a new interpretation of the law; and, had the King frankly allowed the trial to take its course, it is at least possible that Strafford might have obtained an acquittal. But this was not to be. The army in the north was getting out of hand, and became more and more irritated with Parliament, which it regarded as the cause of its receiving no pay. This was, in a sense, true; for Parliament could not pay off the English army without also paying off and

disbanding the Scots; and to disband the Scots was to deprive Parliament of its best allies. A petition was promoted among the officers, which was to be sent to the King, assuring him of their support against pressure on the part of Parliament. Two courtiers, Sir John Suckling and Henry Jermyn, with the connivance of the Queen, endeavoured to utilise this state of feeling in the concoction of a plot for transferring the command of the army to Colonel George Goring, and in some way or other—the details remained undetermined—bringing armed force to bear on the political problem. But differences of opinion arose; and Goring, in a fit of personal pique, divulged the plot.

Pym now made up his mind that Strafford must be brought to the block. Had the parliamentary party been able to trust the King, extreme measures would have been unnecessary; but the Army Plot deepened the distrust already felt, and convinced Pym and others that death was the only security against Strafford's being employed again. The charge of advising the King to bring in the Irish army was now actively pressed. Strafford, ill as he was, defended himself with marvellous skill and courage. Reminding his judges that the evidence of a single witness (Sir Henry Vane) was insufficient to prove a charge of treason, he denied that he had ever intended that the Irish army should land in England, but asserted that "in case of absolute necessity...when all other ordinary means fail," the King may "employ the best and uttermost of his means for the preserving of himself and his people." The defence made a favourable impression; and, as the trial went on, it gradually became clear that an acquittal on the charge of treason was probable. The King had been requested by both Houses to disband the Irish army from which so much was feared; it told against the prisoner that Charles for some time sent no reply, and eventually refused to disband the army till the present business should be over. Nevertheless, on April 10, the friction between the two Houses was such that the trial was temporarily adjourned. A few days later, the "inflexible party" in the Commons decided on a radical alteration in the method of attack, and brought in a Bill of Attainder—in other words, a *privilegium* to meet the special case, in lieu of a trial by impeachment under the ordinary law. The Lords, indignant, declared that the trial must proceed. The Commons were divided on the question; Pym and Hampden advised the continuation of the trial. But on April 19 the Lower House voted by a majority of three to one that Strafford's acts amounted to treason; henceforward the Bill was inevitable, and it was read a third time by 204 votes to 59. The 59 "Straffordians" were the germ of the later Royalist party; a comparison between this vote and that on the Grand Remonstrance gives a measure of the strength conferred upon that party by the subsequent religious quarrel.

While the Attainder Bill was under discussion in the Upper House, Charles made efforts to conciliate the parliamentary leaders. It was

rumoured that they were to be given high office; Pym had more than one interview with the King. On the other hand, intrigues with the army went on; preparations were made for enabling Strafford to escape; an attempt, by Charles' orders, to introduce an armed force, under Captain Billingsley, into the Tower, failed and was discovered. The betrothal of the Princess Mary to Prince William of Orange (May 2, 1641), in itself a welcome event, could not allay the growing alarm and irritation. It was this dread of military violence that, more than anything else, determined Strafford's fate, as it was afterwards to prove the immediate cause of the Civil War. Under its influence a strongly-worded protestation was drawn up in the Lower House, binding those who signed it to defend "with life, power, and estate, the true reformed Protestant religion," the King's "person, honour, and estate," "the power and privileges of Parliament," and "the lawful rights and liberties of subjects." This pledge, a sort of English "Covenant," was adopted, not only by the Commons, but by all the Protestant Lords, and eagerly taken up in the City. The timely disclosure by Pym of Goring's plot and other military intrigues (May 5) intensified the prevailing anxiety, and finally brought over the Upper House. Essex had, a week before, spoken the grim words, "Stone-dead hath no fellow"; and the bulk of the Peers were now of the same mind. A Bill prohibiting the dissolution of Parliament without its own consent was hurried through the Lower House, and proceeded *pari passu* with the Bill of Attainder in the House of Lords. The Lords wished to limit the duration of the anti-dissolution Bill to two years—a wise provision; but the Commons refused, and the Lords gave way. Both Bills were read a third time on May 8. The London mob paraded the streets, raged about Whitehall, and clamoured for execution. After two days of agonising doubt and hesitation, the King gave his assent to both Bills; and on May 12 Strafford met his death with dignity and courage on Tower Hill. By so terrible an example was that doctrine sanctioned which now needs for its assertion and effect nothing more than a ministerial defeat on a vote of confidence, or even on some secondary question.

We now return to the general course of affairs at Westminster. It was one of the first objects of Pym and his colleagues to secure the regular holding of Parliaments, as the surest way of guarding against arbitrary government. With this object a Bill for annual Parliaments, reviving an Act of Edward III's reign long fallen into desuetude, was brought in shortly before Christmas 1640, and read a second time. Subsequently this measure was converted into a Triennial Bill, providing, by means of elaborate machinery, that Parliament should not be intermitted for more than three years, and should sit, when called, for at least fifty days. This measure, which was accompanied by a Subsidy Bill, was accepted by the Lords, and became law on February 16.

Hardly less important than the re-establishment of parliamentary

government were the changes which released the administration of the Law from arbitrary control. On January 15, 1641, the King, by a voluntary concession, declared that henceforward the Judges should hold office, not, as heretofore, *durante beneplacito*, but *quamdiu se bene gesserint*. The change seems slight, but it meant that the Judges would no longer hold office at the pleasure of the Crown; and it might be expected that, by becoming independent, they would also become more just. Soon after the execution of Strafford, Bills abolishing the Court of High Commission and the criminal jurisdiction of the Privy Council, *i.e.* the Court of Star Chamber—on the ground that they had exceeded their authority—were passed by the Lower House without a division (June 8); a month later they received the royal assent. The Councils of Wales and of the North—a sort of lesser Star Chambers in their respective districts—with other prerogative Courts, were at the same time abolished.

Unparliamentary taxation went the same way as the despotic Courts. A Bill annulling the proceedings in Hampden's case, and declaring ship-money illegal, was introduced in June, but did not receive the royal assent till August. A Tonnage and Poundage Bill, granting these taxes for a few weeks only, and establishing their parliamentary character, became law on June 22. Other Acts limited the extent of the royal forests, abolished fines for knighthood, and substituted a poll-tax for the antiquated system of subsidies.

The passing of these measures had rather been forwarded than hindered by a continuance of the Army Plots, which kept both Houses in a constant state of alarm, and by certain impolitic acts of the King, such as the elevation to the peerage of Digby, who had voted against the Attainder Bill. In the region of political reform there was as yet an almost complete unanimity in Parliament; and the consequence was a series of changes, made within the short space of nine months, which converted the views of Pym and his friends—so far as legislation could convert them—into law and fact. But in the sphere of religion it was very different. There harmony had speedily disappeared; and, though much had been attempted, practically nothing had been done.

The release of Prynne, Bastwick, and other Puritan prisoners, and their return to London shortly after the opening of Parliament, led to an outburst of anti-episcopal feeling, which found vent in the so-called "Root-and-Branch" petition, demanding the total abolition of Episcopacy, which was presented to the House of Commons in December, 1640. This petition emanated from London; similar expressions of opinion came from Kent and Essex. Other districts, notably Cheshire, subsequently sent up remonstrances of an opposite kind. Seven hundred clergy petitioned for the reform, not the abolition, of Episcopacy. It was in the debates on the anti-episcopal petitions that the first serious divergence of opinion showed itself in the House of Commons. The main objections to the existing ecclesiastical system

were due to (1) the innovations, Arminian and other, which were regarded as tending to Popery; (2) the oppression of Puritans and non-conformists; (3) the political power of the Bishops, especially their eligibility to offices of State, and their seats in the House of Lords. In the Lower House there were, as yet, few who nourished serious objections to the Prayer-Book, and still fewer who desired to set up a Presbyterian system in England; but the majority were resolved to limit, in some way not yet determined, the power of the Bishops, and that not only on religious but also on political grounds; for the Bishops were the staunchest allies of the Crown. The lay Lords, on their part, were ready enough to see their spiritual colleagues deprived of temporal office, which would mean an increase of their own power; but they regarded the proposal to expel them from the Upper House as an attack on their order and a menace to themselves. Both these proposals, however, were comparatively simple, though of a revolutionary nature; the most difficult problem would arise in providing for Church government, if Episcopacy were altogether overthrown.

The two great parties in the State, which, in later days, alternately held the reins of power, may be said to have originated at this juncture. In the debates of February, on the Root-and-Branch petition, Hyde, Falkland, Digby, Selden, while acknowledging the necessity of reform, defended the institution of Episcopacy. Pym, Hampden, St John, and the majority of the House, were in favour of at least abolishing the temporal power of the Bishops. A declaration of the Scottish commissioners, in favour of the abolition of Episcopacy, produced an effect the opposite of that intended—a temporary reaction in favour of the existing system. But, on March 10-11, the House of Commons resolved against the further exercise of legislative or judicial functions by the clergy. For some time after this, the trial of Strafford occupied almost the whole attention of the House; but, on May 1, a Bill to exclude the Bishops from Parliament was passed with little opposition.

The death of Strafford and the passing of the Act against the dissolution of Parliament without its own consent altered the complexion of affairs. On the one hand, these events immensely strengthened the House of Commons; on the other, they seemed to facilitate a compromise in other directions. On May 27 the Lords agreed that the clergy should, as a rule, exercise no civil functions, but that Bishops should retain their seats in Parliament. On the same day Cromwell and Vane brought in a Bill for the total abolition of Episcopacy, which was read a second time by a small majority. Ten days later the Lords threw out the Bishops' Exclusion Bill. Various plans for meeting the difficulty were discussed in both Houses. In the Lords a scheme, based on that of Ussher, and drawn up by Bishop Williams, for the regulation of the Church on an episcopal basis, and for the removal of abuses connected with ecclesiastical revenues and the Church Courts, was embodied in a Bill, which was

read a second time, but dropped (July). The House of Commons voted the abolition of Deans and Chapters, as well as Bishops, and accepted schemes appointing commissioners to exercise episcopal jurisdiction, and boards of ministers to ordain clergy; but no such plans commanded general approval. Milton's pamphlet, *Reformation touching Church Discipline*, gave a lukewarm approbation to Presbytery, but contributed little to a solution of the practical difficulty. The Lords threw out a Bill enforcing a Protestant test on all holders of office, which would have excluded Catholics from the Upper House. The Commons replied (June 30) by impeaching thirteen Bishops for their share in passing the canons of 1640. The two parties were sharply opposed; and a deadlock in regard to ecclesiastical questions ensued.

Meanwhile, although the work of political reform went on, as we have seen, with remarkable unanimity, and one concession after another was forced upon the King by the joint action of the two Houses, another dangerous question began to emerge—that of the control of the military forces. Plots and rumours of plots inspired a general feeling of insecurity. So long as two armies faced each other in the north of England, the chance that constitutional proceedings might be violently interrupted could not be ignored. The fear that Church questions might bring about an armed collision was already present in men's mind; and Fiennes told Hyde that, in his opinion, "if the King resolved to defend the Bishops, it would cost the kingdom much blood." The spectre of militarism stalked across the parliamentary stage. It was this fear that lay at the basis of the Ten Propositions which, on June 24, Pym carried in the Lower House, and which were accepted almost as readily by the Lords. They urged the necessity for the removal of evil counsellors, the banishment of Catholics from Court, the delay of the King's projected journey to Scotland, the disbanding of the army, and the placing of the military forces in safe hands, and requested the Lords to concert measures with the Commons for the attainment of these ends. Charles consented to the disbandment of the army, but denied the knowledge of any evil counsellors, and absolutely refused to defer his journey to Scotland. The treaty with the Scots was now completed, and a Bill passed for securing the discharge of their pecuniary claims; and on August 10 Charles set out for the north.

The King's object in going to Scotland was and still remains obscure; but that he had some understanding with the Scottish Commissioners is clear. Whatever his intentions, his departure for the north redoubled the anxiety of the parliamentary leaders, but did not prevent the continuance of their labours. So obvious was the necessity of harmony between the Houses that the Root-and-Branch Bill was dropped; but on September 1 resolutions were passed for the removal of Laud's innovations in regard to the position of the communion-table, images, candles, etc.; and an ominous attack was made on the Book of Common Prayer.

The Lords, on the other hand, voted that Divine Service should be conducted "as it is appointed by the Acts of Parliament." Meanwhile the Commons had issued an "ordinance" appointing a committee to attend the King—really to keep an eye upon his movements (August 20). They had also issued "ordinances" commanding Lord Holland to secure Hull, and the Constable of the Tower to guard that fortress. Such acts, with the assumption of military authority implied, were ominous of civil war. Having done what it could to safeguard what had been gained, Parliament adjourned for six weeks on September 9.

When the members met again, on October 20, a crisis was evidently at hand. Charles' doings in Scotland, and the alarm created by "the Incident"—as the plot to seize Argyll and Hamilton was called—are described elsewhere. The anxiety of Pym and his colleagues was not diminished by the consciousness that, in the country at large, a reaction against their ecclesiastical policy and other proceedings was making itself felt. Enough, many thought, had been done; individual liberties and parliamentary rights had been secured; the most prominent advisers of absolutism had been removed; and a terrible example had been made. A considerable measure of ecclesiastical reform was certain, if only the Houses could agree. Why go further, and bring about a chaos of which no one could see the end? Under the influence of these views the party which perceived that the preservation of the Church was wrapped up with the maintenance, under restrictions, of the authority of the Crown, was already forming.

At this crisis, as throughout the period, political and ecclesiastical considerations were inextricably fused. This was at least as evident to the parliamentary leaders as to their opponents. To the former it appeared that nothing was gained while the Church question remained unsolved; and their victories seemed insecure so long as the King, through the Bishops, held his ground in the House of Lords. A second Bishops' Exclusion Bill was therefore brought in and passed (October 23); and the Peers were asked to sequester the thirteen impeached Bishops, and to prevent the rest from voting on the Bill. Meanwhile the King had written from Scotland a letter, which was circulated among the Peers, protesting against any alteration in "the discipline and doctrine of the Church of England," and expressing his resolution "to die in the maintenance of it." It was at once a threat and a prophecy. In the Upper House it turned the scale. The Lords put aside the request of the Commons, and shelved their Bill. Again the King showed his lack of policy by translating two of the impeached Bishops to higher posts. The House of Commons, indignant at this prejudging of their cause, and stimulated by fresh disclosures as to Army Plots, resolved on drawing up a Remonstrance on the state of the kingdom, which some members at least intended to be an appeal to the people at large.

On November 1, the day fixed for the discussion of the Remonstrance,

there burst upon the country the news of the Irish rebellion. The origin and nature of this movement are described in another chapter; what we have to notice here is its effect upon the political struggle at Westminster. The Irish rising at once inflamed Protestant feeling to a white-heat of passion, increased the general alarm and the distrust of the King, and raised the question of military control in an acute form. An army was necessary to crush the rebels and to save Protestant lives and English power across the Channel; but how was it possible to entrust the King with so formidable a weapon? The ghost of Strafford seemed to rise from the grave, with not only Ireland but now Scotland also at his back. As the Scottish rebellion had forced on the Long Parliament, so the Irish rebellion, it is not too much to say, led directly to civil war. Nevertheless, the military question was at first evaded, and wider ground was taken up. A resolution was passed by the Commons, requesting the King "to employ only such counsellors as should be approved by Parliament," and threatening, if the King refused, to act independently against the Irish rebels through agents whom Parliament could trust. Although such a demand was but the corollary of Strafford's death, it was a more direct and outspoken bid for executive control than any that had yet been made; and it produced that fusion of Royalists and Episcopalians on which the Cavalier party was afterwards built up.

The struggle between these men and their opponents in the Lower House came to a head in the debate on the Remonstrance (November 8-22). The air was thick with rumours of intrigues and plots, and terrifying, if exaggerated, accounts of massacres in Ireland. It is not wonderful if, in all this, the parliamentary party saw evidence of a settled design to undo all the work of the past year. The Irish rebellion was not indeed the work of Charles; it was the result of previous misgovernment, of religious fanaticism, and, more immediately, of Strafford's mistaken policy; but the King had to bear the blame. Outside the House, Pym and his friends found their chief support, and that a potent one, in the City of London, which, intervening not for the first or the last time, expressed its willingness to lend money for the suppression of the rebellion, but demanded the imprisonment of the Catholic Lords, and the exclusion of the Bishops from the Upper House. Under influences such as these the great debate was carried on.

In its ultimate form, the Remonstrance was in the first place, as its title indicates, a review of the past actions of the King and the Parliament. Going back to the beginning of the reign, and attributing to the Papists, the Bishops, and evil counsellors, the mischiefs and grievances of which complaint was made, it referred to the precipitate dissolutions of the early Parliaments, the mistakes in foreign policy, the forced loan, the breaches of parliamentary privilege, the tyranny of Star Chamber and High Commission, the doings of Laud and Strafford, ship-money and monopolies, and a multitude of other matters, large and small,

through page after page of wearisome and often exaggerated detail. Against all this it set the good deeds of the existing Parliament—the abolition of arbitrary Courts of law, and of many illegal methods of taxation, the execution of Strafford, the Triennial Act, and other measures of reform. But the Remonstrance was not merely a review of the past; it contained also a programme for the future; and herein lies its chief importance. While repudiating any intention “to let loose the golden reins of discipline and government in the Church,” it declared a resolution to “reduce within bounds that exorbitant power which the prelates have assumed”; and begged the King “to concur with the humble desires of the people in a parliamentary way,” by depriving the Bishops of their votes in Parliament and other temporal powers; by removing “oppressions in religion, Church government and discipline”; and by prohibiting “unnecessary ceremonies by which divers weak consciences have been scrupled.” For the effecting of “the intended reformation,” a synod of divines was to be called. Further, the King was asked to remove from his Council those who supported the opposite policy, and to promise for the future “to employ such persons in great and public affairs...as the Parliament may have cause to confide in.”

The demands which this petition embodied—although, as will be observed, the army was not expressly mentioned—were such as to cause the gravest division of opinion in the House. On November 22–3 the discussion continued—a most unusual event—till long past midnight; and so fiery were the passions aroused that members clutched their swords. “I thought,” wrote one who was there, “we had all sat in the valley of the shadow of death.” By a majority of eleven votes only (159–148) the Remonstrance was carried. Had it been lost, said Cromwell to Falkland, he “would have sold all he had, and never have seen England any more.” But the Remonstrance did not contain, or at least clearly display, the whole programme of the majority. The amplification of that programme was at least partly due to incidents which immediately followed.

On November 25 Charles returned from Scotland. He visited the City, knighted the Lord Mayor, and was well received, at least by the wealthier citizens. Thus encouraged, he took the unwise step of dismissing the parliamentary guard. Though, on petition from both Houses, it was restored next day, the Commons were much agitated; and Strode moved to put the kingdom “in a posture of defence.” Thereupon an Impressment Bill was passed, which, while authorising the raising of troops for Ireland, forbade (as a safeguard against military violence) the putting of compulsion on men to serve outside their own county, except in case of foreign invasion. The Lords objecting to this provision, the majority in the Commons replied by bringing in a Militia Bill, under which the supreme command of the military forces was to be taken out of the King's hands. A Lord-General was to be nominated in the Bill, with large powers; and a Lord-Admiral, similarly

equipped, was to command the navy. This Bill, however, was carried no further.

On December 15 it was resolved to take the grave step of printing and publishing the Remonstrance—it had been presented to the King on December 1—and thus of appealing to the nation against the Crown. The effect of this action was soon seen. The elections to the Common Council of the City showed a large Puritan majority. Charles thereupon dismissed Sir William Balfour, who, as Lieutenant of the Tower, had kept out Billingsley in the previous May, and appointed Thomas Lunsford, a disreputable officer, in his place. On December 23 he made an evasive answer to the Remonstrance, showing no intention of granting any of its demands, except in regard to summoning a national synod. Soon afterwards he dismissed the Constable of the Tower, Lord Newport, whom the Commons had requested, as Lunsford's superior, to take control of that fortress. London was evidently to be overawed. Nevertheless, at the Lord Mayor's request, Lunsford was dismissed, and Sir John Byron put in his place. Meanwhile worse news came from Ireland; the whole island was blazing up in revolt. Tempers grew still more heated; the mob broke into riot around Westminster and Whitehall; blood was shed; and the Bishops, the special objects of antipathy, were hindered, or conceived themselves hindered, from attending Parliament. Twelve of them, with Williams, now Archbishop of York, at their head, signed a protest, stating their inability to attend, and declaring that everything done by Parliament in their absence was null and void. The signatories were at once impeached by the Commons; the impeachment was accepted by the Lords, who resented the protest as an encroachment on their own privileges; and on the same day the Bishops were sent to prison. Their enforced absence would clearly be a great gain to the parliamentary party in any subsequent voting in the House of Lords.

It was now rumoured at Court that the leaders intended to follow up the blow by impeaching the Queen. As to her intrigues with the Pope, the Irish, the officers of the army, and others, evidence could easily be obtained. If such were the intention, it must be anticipated at all costs. Hence the resolution to impeach five members of the Lower House—Pym, Hampden, Holles, Heselrige, and Strode; one peer, Lord Kimbolton, was subsequently added to the list. On January 3, 1642, Attorney-General Herbert impeached the members before the House of Lords, on charges including an endeavour to seduce the army, encouragement to a foreign Power (Scotland) to invade the country, and a conspiracy to levy war upon the King. The Lords appointed a committee to consider whether the impeachment was in order; whereupon the King, taking the case out of their hands, sent the Serjeant-at-Arms to the House of Commons with orders to arrest the accused. The Lords, indignant at this encroachment on their judicial rights, joined the Commons in petitioning the King for an adequate guard. Having

clearly lost his hold on the Peers, Charles now determined to carry out the arrest himself. Although, only the day before, he had solemnly assured the Commons, on "the word of a King," that no violence should be done them, he went down to the House on January 4, attended by three or four hundred armed men. Pym, who had faithful friends at Court, had received warning in time; and the five members withdrew by boat to the City. The scene which followed has been told too often to need repetition here. "I see," said Charles, as he turned disappointed away, "all the birds are flown"; and, as he left the House, cries of "Privilege, Privilege," sounded in his ears. Next day he went in person to the City in order to obtain the surrender of the accused, but again met with a repulse. He had done the irremediable thing; he had attempted a *coup d'état*, and failed. On January 10 he left Whitehall, never to enter it again until he returned to die. Next day the Commons, who had meanwhile sat in committee at the Guildhall, returned in triumph to Westminster.

So greatly were the affections, even of persons favourable to the King, alienated (as Clarendon confesses) by this violent and mismanaged action, that war could now be hardly more than a question of time. It was, however, delayed for seven long months, during which both parties, while negotiating as distinct and hostile Powers, strained every nerve to occupy points of vantage, and to arm themselves for the conflict which each felt to be almost inevitable. Yet, for some time, all hope of peace was not given up. Charles made concessions going far beyond any hitherto granted—concessions which, if made earlier, might have saved the distracted country from civil war. Even now they might have brought back peace but for the rooted distrust which the King's previous conduct had engendered, and which his simultaneous actions now continued to infuse. The Commons, on their side, had reason enough for caution and self-restraint. It was but a small majority that gave Pym and his supporters the control of the Lower House. The majority in the Lords, even in the absence of almost all the Bishops, was by no means whole-hearted in its alliance with the Commons, and not unfrequently refused assent to their proposals. These divisions were reflected in the country at large. As the demands of the parliamentary party rose, the Commons lost the reputation they had hitherto enjoyed as the champions of law and order against violence and caprice, the restorers of the ancient system in the place of autocracy. Their temper and their actions became arbitrary and tyrannical; they claimed and assumed powers as unconstitutional as those which Charles had for a while enjoyed. In short, the royalists became the true conservatives, and the character of revolutionaries passed to the other side. Parliament demanded, it is true, no more than was ultimately to pass into its hands; but the mechanism which, in the next century, was to render possible the exercise of executive control by a large popularly-elected body was as

yet far from being invented; and to many thinking men it seemed inconceivable that, without the gravest danger to the State, a Parliament should take upon itself the functions of a King. Consequently the harmony which had marked at least the political proceedings of the first year now entirely disappeared; the Commons in fact no longer represented the nation as a whole. Had it been possible to dissolve Parliament and to summon a new one, a solution of the problem might have been attained; but this outlet was barred by the Act to which, with a fatal want of foresight, Charles had weakly given his consent. Such a solution being impossible, sovereignty was divided, and anarchy ensued. If the King was primarily responsible for bringing things to this pass, Pym and his colleagues, in regard to the events which immediately preceded the outbreak of war, cannot be absolved from blame.

In view of what might happen, it was a matter of prime consequence for both parties to get possession of the sea-ports on the eastern and southern coasts—for Charles, in order to bring in men and supplies; for Parliament, to prevent such reinforcements. Among these ports, none was at this moment more important than Hull, for, in addition to its convenience as a place of landing, it contained the stores and ammunition collected for the war with Scotland. The King at once endeavoured to occupy it, but was anticipated by Parliament, under whose directions it was secured by Sir John Hotham with the aid of the Yorkshire trained bands (January 31, 1642). On the other hand, Byron refused to surrender the Tower. It was obvious, however, that he could not hold out long; and on February 11 the King consented to replace him by Sir John Conyers, a parliamentary nominee.

A few days after leaving Whitehall, Charles had announced his intention of dropping the impeachment of the five members; but he spoilt the effect of this concession by stating that he would prosecute them in another way. On January 20 he sent a conciliatory message to Westminster, inviting Parliament to state clearly what it considered necessary for the maintenance of its privileges, the security of "the true religion," and "the settling of ceremonies," and professing his willingness to meet its wishes in these respects. But, while as determined as ever on ecclesiastical change, the leaders had now come to believe that nothing would be safe without military control; and the main interest henceforward centred round the struggle for the command of the national force. After passing preliminary resolutions as to the guarding of the fortresses against surprise, and the nomination of the Lords-Lieutenant (in whom the command of the militia was at that time vested), the Commons demanded that both fortresses and militia should be placed under persons in whom Parliament could confide. After much hesitation, the Lords concurred; and, on February 5, they at length passed the Bishops' Exclusion Bill, which they had shelved some three months before. Next day the King announced that he would

drop all proceedings against the five members; while, as to the forts and the militia, he expressed his readiness to entrust them to persons nominated in Parliament, provided that he should be allowed to make exceptions, and that the concession should be only for a time. By way of answer, Parliament nominated the new officers, but refused to set a limit to their terms. It was no mere temporary arrangement at which they aimed. Nevertheless, on February 13, the King, acting on the Queen's advice, gave his assent to the Bishops' Exclusion Bill, as well as to the Impressment Bill for Ireland, with the restriction mentioned above, and promised to refer to Parliament all questions as to further reform of the Church and changes in the Liturgy, while reserving his right to consider what might be proposed. Unfortunately the effect of these large concessions was undone by the interception of a letter from Digby (who had fled to Holland) pointing to a design for getting help from that quarter, and by the Queen's departure for the same country (February 23). The fact that she took the Crown jewels with her could only be interpreted as part of the same design.

A week earlier the Militia Ordinance, embodying the parliamentary proposals, had been placed before the King. When the Queen was gone, he replied that the new officers must receive commissions from himself, and that the limitation of their terms of office must rest with him. On March 2, in spite of the remonstrances of Parliament, he set out for the north. His object, it was feared, was only too plain. Both Houses thereupon resolved that the kingdom should be put "in a posture of defence," and issued an ordinance appointing the newly-nominated Lords-Lieutenant to the command of the militia. This is the point at which, in the opinion of Ranke, the quarrel became irreconcilable. It is not surprising that the King, on his side, went back upon his former offers, and, when asked by Lord Pembroke if he would not hand over the command of the militia for a time, replied, "By God, not for an hour." Nevertheless, in the latter part of April, another attempt to settle the military question was made. A Militia Bill, based on the King's previous suggestions, was passed in the Lords, and considered in the Lower House. It was limited in its operations to two years; and it provided that the calling-out of the militia should be left to the Lords-Lieutenant (named in the Bill) acting under the King's orders signified to both Houses of Parliament.

Such divided control was unlikely to satisfy either party; and things had gone too far for a compromise. Parliament had already sent orders to remove the munitions from Hull (April 18), and by their treatment of the Kentish Petition had shown a lamentable departure from the tolerant principles they claimed to represent. This petition, drawn up on March 25 by the grand jury of Kent, begged, among other things, that episcopal government might be preserved, that a clerical synod might be called to discuss ecclesiastical differences, and that the militia

question might be settled by law with the King's consent. Four of the petitioners were sent for at once, and two were committed to the Tower; and, when on April 30 the petition was actually presented to Parliament, two of the gentlemen who brought it were likewise imprisoned. Such treatment could only do harm to the parliamentary cause. Meanwhile, on April 23, the King had attempted, in person, to occupy Hull; but Hotham held firm, and Charles, having no force sufficient to compel surrender, rode away.

The month of May passed in mutual recriminations, unsatisfied requests, and preparations for war. On June 2 Parliament sent to the King a final statement of its demands in the shape of the Nineteen Propositions—demands more advanced, in several particulars, than any made before. The members of the King's Council and other officials, even the Judges, were to be chosen by Parliament; and no new Peers were to sit in the House of Lords without consent of both Houses. The Militia Ordinance was to become law; and the fortresses were to be handed over to parliamentary nominees. The Church was to be reformed as Parliament might decree; and the children of Roman Catholics were to be educated as Protestants. Proposals such as these amounted to a complete transfer of sovereignty from the Crown to Parliament. They could not be accepted by the King, even as a basis of discussion; nor, had he been willing, would the Royalist-Episcopalian party, now at his back, have allowed him to consent.

From Scotland and from Holland Charles asked for help in vain; and no other Power showed any inclination to interfere; but his English supporters increased day by day. An exodus of Royalist members from Westminster had for some time been going on; very soon the minority in the Commons practically disappeared; and some two-thirds of the Lords rallied to the King at York. On June 16, the day after thirty-five Peers had signed a protest declaring their belief in Charles' pacific intentions, Commissions of Array were issued, empowering officers appointed by the King to raise troops in his name. Next day Newcastle was occupied by his adherents. Lord Herbert and other wealthy Peers poured their private resources into his exchequer; and the Universities sent large contributions. On the other side, the Militia Ordinance was taking effect throughout the country, at least south of the Humber; and on July 2 the fleet—a most important factor in the struggle—declared for Parliament, and accepted the Earl of Warwick as its admiral. Ten days later Lord Essex was nominated to the supreme command of the Parliamentary forces; and the members of both Houses swore to live and die with their general "for the preservation of the true religion, laws, liberties, and peace of the kingdom." On July 15 the first blood was shed at Manchester. The Civil War had begun.

CHAPTER X.

THE FIRST CIVIL WAR, 1642-7.

THE raising of the King's standard at Nottingham (August 22, 1642) was the formal opening of the Civil War. The measures taken by the two parties respectively to levy forces have already been briefly indicated. Charles had met the Parliamentary Militia Ordinance by issuing Commissions of Array (May 11); but the legality of these commissions was disputed, and in Leicestershire, the first county in which they were executed, the men refused to join. On July 4 Parliament appointed a committee of fifteen, including five peers, to see to the safety of the kingdom and its own defence; it voted that an army of 10,000 men should be raised in London and the neighbourhood, and issued a declaration (July 11) that the King had begun the war. Its numbers were by this time much reduced. More than one-third of the members had withdrawn from the House of Commons, and three-fourths of the Lords were either Royalist or neutral. Of the Peers who remained at Westminster the Earl of Essex was the most considerable. He was appointed to command the Parliamentary army; and Clarendon affirms that no one else could have raised it. Charles proclaimed Essex and his officers traitors; the Houses replied by denouncing as traitors all who gave assistance to the King.

It may be said broadly that the strength of the Royalist cause lay in the northern and western counties, while south and east sided with Parliament. But this was far from an equal division of the kingdom. The population of England was about five millions; and of this population the country north of the Trent (which now contains two-fifths) then contained only one-seventh. London had nearly half-a-million inhabitants, one-third of the whole urban population. Next to it came Norwich and Bristol with less than 30,000; and no town in the north had half that number. There was a corresponding difference in wealth. Three-fourths of the ship-money assessment in 1636 was laid upon the counties which lie south and east of a line drawn from Bristol to Hull. It is true that the King had many friends in all these counties among the nobility and gentry; but on the other hand the towns of the north were on the

Parliamentary side. Parliament held the dockyards, and nearly all the ports, and could move troops freely by sea from point to point. The great roads radiating from London also facilitated the movement of troops. The fleet consisted of sixteen ships in the Downs, and two in Irish waters, with twenty-four merchant ships; and (thanks to ship money) it was in good condition. The importance of its adhesion to the Parliamentary side can hardly be overrated. Thus assisted, Parliament gained command of the coast, and secured the customs revenues, which at this time exceeded a quarter of a million. The King found it very difficult to obtain help from abroad, or to take or hold places on the coast.

But war demands unity of direction; and here the Royalist cause should have enjoyed a great advantage. The Parliament at Westminster was a loose aggregate, embracing many shades of opinion, many sorts of character, with no defined head; the King was the unquestioned leader of his party. His shiftiness and instability went far to deprive him of the benefit of this distinction. His followers, moderates and extremists alike, lost faith in him; and his schemes were brought to failure. "Take a good resolution and pursue it...to begin and then to stop is your ruin—experience shows it you," wrote Henrietta Maria from the Hague in May, 1642; and at the end of 1644 she wrote from Paris that his reputation as irresolute was the thing of all others that had most injured him there. Her influence with him was great, and was always in favour of vigorous action; but her prejudices and want of judgment outweighed her spirit and energy.

The King, like the Parliament, had to create an army. In France there was a standing army and money to raise additional troops; and thus Richelieu had been able, as he boasted, to ruin the Huguenot faction, to humble the pride of the nobles, to reduce all the King's subjects to their duty, and to exalt the King's name to its proper position among foreign nations. With the same resources Strafford might have played the same part. But there was no *taille* in England, and there were no regular troops, except a few small garrisons. When expeditions were to be sent abroad, regiments were specially raised; and, if volunteers fell short, men were pressed. Home defence was provided for by the militia, which was based on the immemorial obligation of all men to serve, if required, in case of invasion. The obligation had been defined by the Statute of Winchester in 1285, and was enforced by commissions of array. In issuing such a commission in 1573, Elizabeth had directed that out of the total number of each shire a convenient number of men should be selected, "meet to be sorted in bands, and to be trained and exercised in such sort as may reasonably be borne by a common charge of the whole county." Thus they got the name of the "trained bands"; but the training soon dwindled into a perfunctory inspection once a month. An officer of the Essex horse wrote in 1639: "We admit into our trained bands, without judgment or discretion, any

that are offered, how unlikely or incapable soever they be of the *art militarie*; yea, which is worse, we suffer them almost every training to alter their men and put in new ones; and how is it possible, with our best skill and pains, to make such men soldiers?" It was only in London that the trained bands reached a fair standard of efficiency.

In the first Bishops' War the English army had been formed of the trained bands of counties north of the Humber; and Sir Edmund Verney wrote, "I dare say there was never so raw, so unskilful, and so unwilling an army, brought to fight." In the second war (1640) the counties south of the Humber furnished the men. They were for the most part pressed men, equally raw, and of a lower class. "Coat and conduct money" (an advance by the counties to be repaid by the Crown) was one of the exactions which were being called in question as illegal; consequently the soldiers were irregularly paid and badly clothed. They committed excesses of all sorts on their march northward, and were described by Sir Jacob Astley as "arch knaves."

In the reign of James I the militia had been relieved of the obligation to equip themselves with arms and armour; and county magazines had been formed in which their equipment was stored. The trained bands (excepting those from the City of London) played no great part in the civil war. Some refused to muster, others refused to fight, and nearly all refused to move far from home; so that they could only be used for local and temporary duty. But each side tried to secure the county magazines; and the arms in them were usually handed over to volunteers. While the King was "borrowing" arms and ammunition from the magazine at Nottingham, Oliver Cromwell, member for Cambridge, seized the Cambridge magazine for the service of Parliament. At the same time he intercepted some of the college plate which was being sent to the King; for the University of Cambridge, like that of Oxford, was Royalist.

Though the recruits of both armies knew nothing of war or of soldiering, there was no lack of officers to instruct them. Large numbers of Englishmen and Scotchmen had served in the Low Countries or in Germany; the Dutch school being the more methodical, the Swedish the more enterprising. Among the English leaders who played a prominent part in the civil war, Essex, Waller, and Skippon on the one side, and Goring, Hopton, and Astley on the other, had foreign experience. Many Scots were employed on this account, such as Crawford, Balfour, King, and Ruthven, though, as Clarendon remarks, "it was no easy thing to value that people at the rate they did set upon themselves." Charles' nephew, Rupert, son of the Elector Palatine, had seen some service as a boy with the Dutch and the Swedes. He came to England with his younger brother, Maurice; and, though he was only in his twenty-third year, Charles made him general of the horse. "He should have some one to advise him," wrote the Queen, "for, believe me, he is yet very young and self-willed."

Commissions were issued to men of influence authorising them to raise regiments of foot or troops of horse for the service of the King or of Parliament. They were formed in the district where the colonel's property lay, and equipped by their officers, though Parliament allowed "mounting money." The normal strength of foot-regiments was 1200; but the Whitecoats, raised by the Earl of Newcastle in Northumberland, were 3000 strong, while others were not as many hundreds. Troops of horse numbered 50 or 60 men, and were formed into regiments of about 500. Regiments of dragoons (or mounted infantry) were also raised on both sides. With the view of encouraging apprentices to enlist, the Houses issued an order that their indentures should not be forfeited, and that the time spent in the ranks should be reckoned as part of their term of apprenticeship.

Both sides laid great stress on the possession of Portsmouth. Its governor, George Goring, the most plausible of self-seekers, elected, after much balancing, to hold it for the King; but, finding himself shut in both by sea and land, he surrendered it to Sir William Waller (September 7). It was in order to save Portsmouth that Charles set up his standard at Nottingham on August 22, though he was not ready to fight. Ten days before, he had summoned his Protestant subjects north of Trent, or within twenty miles south of it, to meet him there; but the muster fell short of one thousand. He hoped to draw the Parliamentary forces towards him, and to enable the Marquis of Hertford, whom he had sent into the west, to go to the relief of Goring. But Hertford failed in Somerset, and was forced to take shelter in Sherborne Castle. The Earl of Newcastle, who was entrusted with the four northern counties, was raising troops in Northumberland, and had secured the Tyne as a port for the King; but Lord Strange, who became soon afterwards Earl of Derby, and had promised great things in Lancashire, met with a repulse at Manchester. Charles himself had failed with some loss of life in a second attempt upon Hull (July 15), and in an attempt upon Coventry. He had met with a lukewarm reception in Yorkshire; and there were many so-called "Gadarenes," who expressed the wish that he would go elsewhere. It seemed likely that, as Pym and Hampden were said to have predicted, he would not be able to raise an army.

"I would not have the King trample on the Parliament, nor the Parliament lessen him so much as to make a way for the people to rule us all." So Lord Savile wrote; and it was the state of mind of many better men. Even in Cornwall, where the partisans of the King exceeded those of the Parliament, Clarendon tells us that "there was a third sort (for a party they cannot be called) greater than either of the other, both in fortune and number," who preferred to be neutral. It is reckoned that the total number of men in arms was never more than about $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the population, one-tenth of the proportion which the

two Boer Republics lately put into the field; and this indicates the half-hearted sympathies of the bulk of the people of all classes. "If the King had had money," says Hobbes, "he might have had soldiers enough in England; for there were very few of the common people that cared much for either of the causes, but would have taken any side for pay and plunder." Of the nobility, some, like Savile, oscillated from side to side; others "warily distributed their family to both sides."

There were many, however, with whom the sentiment of loyalty was deep-rooted, and who, while disapproving of the King's acts and of his advisers, felt bound to draw their swords for him when it came to war; just as high-minded Southerners felt bound to go with their State in the American civil war, though they had opposed secession. Others were animated by dislike of Puritanism—for its narrowness (as Falkland), or for its rigour (as Goring)—by contempt for the classes in which the main strength of Puritanism lay, or by provincial jealousy of London dictation. Others, especially the wealthy Roman Catholics, felt that their interests were bound up with those of the King. He hesitated for a time to admit Catholics to his ranks, but they sent him money: the Earl of Worcester furnished £120,000. The nobility and gentry who joined him, not only served in person, but paid the men they brought with them. By the middle of September his numbers rose to 10,000. But the sacrifices which his adherents made for him gave rise to embarrassing claims on their part, and weakened his authority; there were jealousies between the leading commanders, and friction between the military and civil members of his Council.

The Parliamentary army which was to oppose the King was assembled near Northampton, and numbered 20,000 men when Essex took command of it, on Sept. 10. It was expected to make short work of the Royalists. There were even hopes that the King's army would dissolve without fighting, and that he might be captured in his quarters. The commission of Essex was "to rescue his Majesty's person, and the persons of the Prince and the Duke of York, out of the hands of those desperate persons who were then about him." To secure his person was the chief thing to be aimed at, just as on his side the main objective was the recovery of his capital. "So long as you are in the world," the Queen wrote to him (August 31), "assuredly England can have no rest nor peace, unless you consent to it; and assuredly that cannot be unless you are restored to your just prerogatives." It was this conviction, shared by the King and his adversaries, which ultimately cost him his head. But, if the Parliamentarians expected a short war, the aristocratic Royalists regarded their enemies as feeble and unwarlike. Both sides, in short, like true Englishmen, underrated their opponents.

Charles was not strong enough to fight a battle, or to hold his ground at Nottingham. He retreated to Shrewsbury and Chester; and Byron, who was holding Oxford for him, was obliged to retire on Worcester. He

was followed by Essex, whose advance-guard was surprised and routed by Rupert at Powick Bridge (September 23); but Essex occupied Worcester next day, and remained there nearly a month. The King found plenty of loyal support on the Welsh border. His numbers grew; but he was short of arms and money. The Queen had not been able to send him much; and part of what she had sent him had been intercepted. Half of his horse had no firearms. The foot consisted in those days of musketeers and pikemen, in the proportion of two to one. Few of the Royalist musketeers had swords, and none of the pikemen had corslets. Some three or four hundred men had only cudgels or pitchforks. The King provided for his foot, but his horse lived on the country, and searched the houses of Roundheads for arms and plunder.

On October 12 he set out from Shrewsbury to march on London. He was about half-way thither when, learning that Essex was coming up behind him, he turned and gave him battle at Edgehill (October 23). Essex had put garrisons into Worcester and other places, and to hasten his march he had left his guns behind with a guard, so that the two armies were now equal in numbers, about 14,000 each. The Parliamentarians were much better equipped than the Royalists, but the latter had 4000 horse against 3000, and they were drawn from classes more accustomed to riding and to the use of arms. It was cavalry that decided battles in those days; and in Rupert the Royalists had a leader who had learnt the shock tactics of Gustavus. "He put that spirit into the King's army that all men seemed resolved," says Sir Philip Warwick; "and, had he been as cautious as he was a forward fighter, and a knowing person in all parts of a soldier, he had most probably been a very fortunate one. He showed a great and exemplary temperance, which fitted him to undergo the fatigues of a war, so as he deserved the character of a soldier."

The Earl of Lindsey had been appointed general of the King's army, but Rupert was not placed under his orders; and there was a difference between them as to the relative merits of the Dutch and Swedish systems. Charles sided with Rupert; Lindsey resigned his office, and met his death at the head of his regiment. Rupert justified the King's decision by routing the Parliamentary cavalry on both wings, and part of the infantry. But to keep victorious horsemen in hand, and rally them for fresh action, is always difficult; the character of the Cavaliers and Rupert's own temperament made it impossible. Even the reserve of cavalry, "with spurs and loose reins, followed the chase which their left wing had led them." While the whole of the Royalist horse was pursuing and plundering, two regiments of Parliamentary horse which had been held in reserve helped their foot to get the better of the King's infantry. What would have been a decisive victory if Rupert had handled his cavalry as Enghien handled his the year after at Rocroi, proved a drawn battle, which neither side cared to renew next day. By retiring

to Warwick, however, Essex left the fruits of victory to the King, who marched on to Oxford. That city became his headquarters for the rest of the war. Patrick Ruthven, Earl of Forth (and afterwards of Brentford), an old soldier who had served with the Swedes, but was now "much decayed in his parts," was made nominal commander-in-chief.

Charles at first meant to remain at Oxford for the winter, but Rupert persuaded him to advance on London. His approach alarmed the citizens; and the Houses were induced to make overtures for peace. To take full advantage of the agitation in London he should have pushed on rapidly and offered favourable terms; but his advance was so leisurely that Essex, marching from Warwick by St Albans, reached the capital before him. Earthworks had been thrown up, fresh troops raised, and Essex was able to muster 24,000 men at Turnham Green. On November 12 Rupert drove the Parliamentary outposts out of Brentford, and sacked that town; but here the Royalist successes ended. Essex stood strictly on the defensive; and the King was not strong enough to attack. He marched up the Thames to Kingston, and crossed the river there, as though intending to strike at London from the south. He turned westward, however; and within a week his army was back at Reading. Leaving a strong garrison there, he returned to Oxford.

Both in the west and in the north the Royalist cause made progress in the latter part of 1642. Hertford had left Sherborne Castle after the surrender of Portsmouth, and had betaken himself to South Wales, where he raised some regiments of foot, with which he joined the King at Oxford. He had sent his horse and dragoons into Cornwall under Sir Ralph Hopton, one of the best and ablest of the Cavaliers; and, with the help of the trained bands, Hopton drove out the Parliamentarians. The trained bands refused to fight outside their own county; so Hopton enlisted volunteers, and marched to Exeter. Not meeting with the support he reckoned on in Devon, and being short of supplies, he retired to Cornwall; but he turned on the Parliamentary forces which followed him, routed them at Bradock Down (January 19, 1643), and took a large number of prisoners. He then prepared to besiege Plymouth.

In Yorkshire the gentry had come to an agreement for local neutrality, and those who wished to fight joined the main armies; but Parliament set this agreement aside, and appointed Lord Fairfax to command on its behalf. The Yorkshire Cavaliers invited the Earl of Newcastle to come to their assistance. He crossed the Tees with 8000 men (December 1), relieved York, and forced Fairfax to fall back from Tadcaster to Selby. Pushing on to Pontefract, Newcastle interposed between Selby and the towns of the West Riding, which were ardently Parliamentary. His troops occupied Leeds and Wakefield, but met with a repulse at Bradford; and the younger Fairfax (Sir Thomas), already conspicuous for zeal and dash, made his way thither, organised the townsmen, and soon recovered Leeds (January 23). Newcastle, however,

planted a strong garrison in Newark, which gave him a foothold south of the Trent, and brought him within one hundred miles of Oxford.

The indecisive results of the first campaign, disappointing as they were to both parties, seemed to make it possible to open negotiations for peace with some hope of success. During the autumn Charles had made two attempts to treat—one in August, only three days after he had set up his standard; the other in September. On the first occasion, Parliament rejected his overtures off-hand; on the second, when no less a person than Falkland acted as his envoy, the Houses declared their unwillingness to treat unless the King would promise to withdraw his protection from any whom they might declare to be delinquents, and to allow the charges incurred by Parliament since he left London to be defrayed from the estates of such persons. It could never have been expected that the King would accept a proposal of such wholesale confiscation; and its flagrant injustice brought numerous recruits to his side. That it was disagreeable to many even in Parliament became evident when the imminent danger which threatened during the King's march on London enabled the peace-party, never wholly suppressed during the early years of the war, to lift up its voice. Towards the end of October, a proposal for negotiation was brought forward in the Lords, and accepted by the Commons. Their object was to obtain an armistice, which the King, while things were going well with him, was not disposed to grant. After his rebuff at Turnham Green, he offered to treat; and Parliament, while blaming him for attacking Brentford during the negotiations, took his proposals into consideration (November 21). A long debate ensued, in which the war-party eventually got the upper hand. The proposals sent to the King, who was then at Reading, were practically the same as those made in September, and met with the same fate.

A more serious attempt at settlement was made early in the next year. The pacific party in the Common Council of the City, urged by the Royalist merchants, had succeeded in carrying a petition for peace. This was taken up by the Lords, who prepared certain propositions, which were considered by the Commons just before Christmas. Unfortunately the pacificators had no clear idea of how peace was to be obtained, while the war-party at least knew their own mind. Consequently, though the Commons agreed to negotiate, they resolved to insist on disbandment of both armies as a preliminary condition, and hurriedly passed a Bill for the abolition of Episcopacy, to which they gained the assent of the Lords on January 30, 1643. Such a measure augured ill for the success of the negotiations, which, however, opened at Oxford on February 1. The demands now put forward by Parliament closely resembled those embodied in the Nineteen Propositions of the previous June, with the serious additions that Bishops, Deans and Chapters,

Archdeacons, in short, the whole existing hierarchy, should be abolished; that Church government should be settled on a basis to be determined by Parliament in consultation with the Assembly of Divines, which was now sitting under authority of a Bill passed by both Houses in the previous October; that the navy as well as the army should be under parliamentary control; and that delinquents, *i.e.* the King's supporters, should be left to the tender mercies of Parliament. It is needless to describe the hollow negotiations that followed. Neither party was in earnest; and it must be allowed that the terms offered by Parliament were such as could have been accepted only by a beaten foe. The parties did not get so far even as to arrange the details of an armistice; and the war went on meanwhile. The King eventually demanded (April 8) that his magazines, ships, forts, etc. should be restored to him; that expelled Members of Parliament should be allowed to return; and that Parliament should adjourn to some place outside London. These proposals were rejected on April 14; and the "Treaty of Oxford" came to an end. No serious efforts for peace were made again during the next two years.

From the outset of the war, financial difficulties pressed heavily on both parties; but in this respect the advantage was at first with the Royalists. Although the towns and districts controlled by Parliament were far more populous and wealthy than those which adhered to the Crown, the mercantile classes were less willing to contribute to Parliamentary necessities, and were probably less able to find ready money, than the rich nobles and gentry who rallied to the King. The Prince of Orange, though unwilling to send troops, advanced over a million of money. Moreover the ancient feudal attachment of the peasantry to the lords of the soil enabled the latter to raise troops of followers at comparatively slight expense; and to this personal loyalty the enthusiasm of the townsmen for the Parliamentary cause supplied, at first, a very inadequate counterpart. Parliament, at the outset, relied on voluntary contributions. It was naturally reluctant to impose taxation, not so much because it was unconstitutional as because it was sure to be unpopular. But free gifts and loans soon proved totally inadequate to provide for an army which cost a million a year, while the navy required £300,000 besides. The customs-duties were levied by Parliament, but, owing to the falling-off of trade, brought in only £2000 a month. The sequestration of the estates of the Bishops, the cathedral lands, and the property of delinquents, could not fill the gap. Consequently, so early as November, 1642, it was resolved to impose a tax; and an assessment was ordered of all inhabitants of London and Westminster who had not made a voluntary contribution. On December 8 this was extended to the whole country. There was considerable resistance; and wealthy resisters were imprisoned. In February, 1643, the scheme of taxation was developed; and commissioners were appointed to assess property for

weekly contributions throughout the kingdom. Even this, however, was insufficient; and in March Pym proposed to levy an excise. Though this proposal was rejected at the time, the Royalist successes of the following summer proved its necessity; and on July 22 an excise ordinance was issued. On these two elastic sources of revenue, direct and indirect, Parliament mainly subsisted during the war; and its financial system was continued, in principle, after the Restoration.

The progress made in the west and north during the winter shaped Charles' plan for the campaign of 1643. He expected by March to have 40,000 men in the field; and his plan was that he should himself hold Essex in check in the Midlands, while Newcastle and Hopton, pushing south and east respectively, should join hands on the Thames below London, stop the passage of shipping, and starve the City into surrender. The Queen was now at York, having landed at Bridlington a few days before. She had been escorted from Holland by Tromp, and had brought with her a good supply of arms and money. The Commons passed a resolution for her impeachment (May 22), and sent it up to the Lords. There was little hope of other aid from abroad for Charles. The Prince of Orange had done what he could, but Dutch sympathy was mainly with Parliament. As regards France, Charles, without winning the goodwill of the Huguenots, had made an enemy of Richelieu, who (according to Madame de Motteville) "thought it absolutely necessary for the weal of France that that prince should have trouble in his country." The death of Richelieu (December 4, 1642) did not change French policy in this respect. As for Denmark, she was on the point of a war with Sweden, for which she was ill prepared; and Christian IV could do nothing for his nephew.

Apart from the army of Essex, Parliament had relied on county organisation for defence during the first few months of the war. It was found that larger units were desirable; and in December ordinances were passed for an Association of the Midland counties—Leicester, Derby, Nottingham, Rutland, Buckingham, Bedford, and Huntingdon; and another of the Eastern counties—Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge, and Hertford. The Midland Association soon broke up; Huntingdon was transferred to the Eastern Association in May, 1643, and Lincoln was added to it in September, so that it finally consisted of seven shires. These shires contained one-fifth of the wealth of the kingdom; the people were a tough stock, deeply Puritan; and the Eastern Association became the mainstay of the Parliamentary cause. The committees by which its affairs were managed included a considerable number of men of rank and position.

Among these was Oliver Cromwell. He had commanded a troop in Essex' regiment of horse, one of the two regiments which helped to break the Royalist foot at Edgehill, though it is doubtful whether he was himself present at the battle. He had told his cousin Hampden at

that time that the Parliamentary troops would always be beaten as long as they consisted of "old, decayed serving-men, tapsters, and such kind of fellows." In January he went back to Cambridge, and converted his troop into a regiment, finding plenty of yeomen eager to serve under him. He accepted none but those "who had the fear of God before them, and made some conscience of what they did." His regiment consisted of five troops in March, and rose to fourteen by the end of the year. The name of Ironsides, given by Rupert to Cromwell himself after Marston Moor, attached itself to the regiment; but the men were not cuirassiers, as the name suggests. They wore lighter armour, and were classed as harquebussiers, though their weapons were sword and pistols. Discipline was strict among them; and it was said of them two years afterwards, "there was none of them known to do the least wrong by plunder, or any abuse to any country people where they came."

Their discipline showed itself also on the battlefield. In Clarendon's words, "though the King's troops prevailed in the charge, and routed those they charged, they never rallied themselves again in order, nor could be brought to make a second charge the same day...whereas Cromwell's troops, if they prevailed, or though they were beaten and routed, presently rallied again, and stood in good order till they received new orders." He points out that this was not the case with other Parliamentary horse. While Cromwell followed Rupert's example in always attacking, instead of waiting to be attacked, he relied more on the superiority of his men in hand-to-hand fighting with sword and pistol than on the shock of a charge at speed, and he was satisfied with "a good round trot."

By occupying Oxford as his headquarters, with outlying garrisons, the King had driven a wedge into the heart of the Parliamentary territory; and during the winter he tried to widen this wedge, and lessen the intervals separating him from Hopton and Newcastle. But he lost more ground than he gained. The Royalists of Cheshire and Lancashire were defeated by Sir William Brereton at Nantwich (January 28); Lichfield was taken (March 4); and Sir William Waller, by "nimble and successful marches," surprised the troops blockading Gloucester, took Hereford (April 25), and then rejoined Essex.

In the middle of April Essex again took the field at the head of an army of nearly 20,000 men. Hampden and others urged him to "strike at the root" by marching on Oxford; but he thought it necessary first to recover Reading. The garrison of 4000 men were of much more importance than the place, but by the terms of surrender they were allowed to rejoin the King. This practice had much to do with the prolongation of the war. It was June before Essex found himself able to move on to Oxford; and by that time Charles had received the arms and ammunition brought over by the Queen, of which he was sorely in need. The Queen herself followed a month afterwards, with an escort

of 5000 men from Newcastle's army. Essex made no serious attempt to intercept her. While he moved ineffectually between Oxford and Aylesbury, his army was wasting away from sickness and desertion; and by the end of July he had less than 6000 men fit for duty. Rupert made raids to cut off his convoys; and it was on the return from one of these raids that the skirmish at Chalgrove took place, which inflicted on the Parliamentary cause the irreparable loss of Hampden (June 18).

Meanwhile things were going well with the Royalists in the west. Hopton had been unable to take Plymouth; but at Stratton, near Bude (May 16), he had stormed a camp held by 5000 infantry with guns, and had taken 1700 prisoners, his own force being only 2400. Waller, who had won the name of William the Conqueror in Gloucestershire, was sent to hold him in check, but found himself overmatched. Hopton pushed across Devon into Somerset, and was joined at Chard by Hertford and Prince Maurice. The Cornish army, as it was still called, now numbered 6000 men; it occupied Taunton and marched on Bath. Waller, a most expert "shifter and chooser of ground," baffled the Royalists there, and followed them to Devizes, where he invested Hopton's foot; but Maurice brought some fresh cavalry from Oxford, and Waller's army was destroyed at Roundway Down (July 13). He had been extolled as the coming man by those who were dissatisfied with Essex, and he attributed his disaster to Essex' jealousy. Rupert joined the victors a few days afterwards, and led them to Bristol, which was stormed after three days' siege (July 26). The west was now entirely in the hands of the Royalists, with the exception of a few towns on the coast. But the habit of living on the country, to which their necessities had driven them, persisted when there was no need for it, and made their presence unwelcome even to their sympathisers. Bitter complaints were made to the King of the plundering of Dorset homesteads by Maurice's troopers; and Maurice himself was blamed by Hertford for showing no consideration except to his men.

In the north, Newcastle had an army of 10,000 men, notwithstanding the detachments he had sent to Oxford. The Fairfaxes maintained themselves in the West Riding for a time, and Sir Thomas stormed Wakefield (May 20), taking 1400 prisoners. But he and his father were overpowered at Ardwalton Moor (June 30), and were obliged to take refuge in Hull. This was soon the only place in Yorkshire which remained to the Parliament, for Scarborough Castle had been betrayed by its governor, Sir Hugh Cholmley, in March. Hull itself had been nearly lost by the treachery of Sir John Hotham and his son, but they were arrested in time.

Essex had sent orders that the forces of the Eastern Counties should unite to relieve Lincolnshire, and if possible to lend a hand to the Fairfaxes in Yorkshire. In a skirmish at Grantham (May 13) Cromwell showed the quality of his regiment by routing a force twice as large as

his own; and on reaching Nottingham he strongly urged that the 6000 men who had been brought together there should go on to Yorkshire. But local interests were too powerful. Lord Grey of Groby, who commanded the forces of the Midland Association, was anxious about his father's house near Leicester; and other leaders were afraid of exposing their own districts to raids from Newark. Towards the end of July, Cromwell and Meldrum went to the assistance of Lord Willoughby of Parham, who was holding Gainsborough against Newcastle's cavalry. They defeated this force and killed its commander, Charles Cavendish; but they found themselves in presence of the whole army of Newcastle, and were forced to abandon all Lincolnshire, except Boston.

A plot for a Royalist rising in London was brought to light at the end of May. It was reckoned that one-third of the population of the City was in favour of the King, while in the suburbs the proportion was much larger. The plot originated with Edmund Waller, the poet, but it was matured by Lord Conway, one of the peers who had remained at Westminster to further the King's interests. The Parliamentary leaders were to be seized, as well as the gates and the magazines; and a force of 3000 men, sent by the King, was to be introduced. A commission of array signed by Charles was held in readiness to legalise the enterprise. The discovery of this plot, together with evidence that the King was negotiating with the Irish rebels, enabled Pym to persuade both Houses to impose a covenant, binding all who took it to support the forces raised in defence of Parliament against those raised by the King, "so long as the Papists now in open war against the Parliament shall by force of arms be protected from the justice thereof." Charles met this step by a proclamation (June 20), declaring the Parliament to be no longer free, and all who abetted it in its usurpation to be liable to the penalties of high treason. In August both sides began to authorise impressment.

The advantage which Parliament enjoyed from command of the sea became most apparent when the fortune of war was most adverse. The time seemed to have come for the three Royalist armies to converge upon London, and carry out the King's plan of campaign. But the Cavaliers of Yorkshire were unwilling to go south while Hull remained a Parliamentary port; the men of Cornwall and Devon insisted on the reduction of Plymouth; and both places, being open to succour from the sea, were difficult to take. The Welsh, too, were uneasy about Gloucester, the only Parliamentary garrison in the Severn valley. That place, at all events, could be shut in; and the King was assured that Massey, the governor, could be gained over. He sat down before it on August 10. Parliament made the most of the breathing-time which these sieges afforded. Before the end of the month Essex was on his way to relieve Gloucester with 15,000 men, including some of the City trained bands. A home-counties army was formed for Waller; and it was resolved that the army of the Eastern Association should be raised to 10,000 foot, and commanded by the Earl of Manchester.

On the approach of Essex the King raised the siege of Gloucester, and chose a position in the Cotswolds to bar the return of the Parliamentary army. Essex outmanœuvred him; but by dint of hard marching the King reached Newbury first. An obstinate battle was fought there (September 20), in which Falkland threw away the life of which he was weary, and the City trained bands showed the benefit of practising postures in the artillery garden by repulsing Rupert's horse on an open heath. Neither side gained the victory; but the Royalists had exhausted their ammunition, and retreated to Oxford next day, leaving the road to Reading open for Essex. There his army melted away, and he had to fall back as far as Windsor. He told the citizens of London that they must make peace unless they could discover a fountain of gold, or find volunteers who would serve without pay. Similar complaints came from other quarters, for the obligations incurred towards the Scots drained the resources of Parliament. Cromwell wrote to St John that he had "a lovely company," but no means of support for it except the poor sequestrations of the county of Huntingdon.

In November Waller tried to capture Basing House, a Royalist outpost in Hampshire belonging to the Catholic Marquis of Winchester; but his troops were mutinous for want of pay; the London regiments deserted in a body; and on Hopton's approach he had to fall back on Farnham. Hopton had been laid up by wounds for some months, but had taken the field again in the autumn. After going to the assistance of Lord Ogle, who had surprised Winchester, he relieved Basing House, and gained possession of Arundel (December 9). But his small army was too widely extended; and Waller, falling on part of it at Alton (December 13), took nearly a thousand prisoners, and recovered Arundel.

In the north, Newcastle, after spending six weeks before Hull, found himself obliged to raise the siege (October 12), and retired to York. Cromwell had been sent back to Lincolnshire, and had been joined there by Fairfax, whose cavalry, being useless for the defence of Hull, was shipped across the Humber. On October 11 Fairfax and Cromwell routed a strong body of horse and dragoons under the governor of Newark at Winceby, near Horncastle. Lincoln surrendered to Manchester a few days afterwards, and Gainsborough before the end of the year. By occupying Newport Pagnell in October, Rupert threatened the eastern counties and the roads from London to the north; but Essex succeeded in guarding them, and forced the Royalists back.

The campaign of 1643 had been distinctly favourable to the King; but his very successes forced his opponents to take a step which eventually turned the scale. Three years earlier, Scotland had intervened with potent effect in English affairs; and the tacit alliance between the Opposition leaders and the Scots had enabled the former to win their political victories during the first year of the Long Parliament. The

connexion then established had not ceased with the retirement of the Scottish army in 1641; and evidences of this connexion supplied Charles with the grounds on which he impeached the five members in January, 1642. When the King was marching on London in the following November, both Houses agreed to revive the alliance in an active form, and to invite the Scots to create a diversion in the north of England. The danger passed by; and the proposal was laid aside for the time. But early in May, 1643, Pym moved the Commons to request assistance from Scotland; and the House adopted his advice. The Lords, however, seem to have been reluctant; and action was deferred for more than two months.

Meanwhile events had occurred in Scotland² which increased the readiness of the Scots to welcome proposals for an alliance. In May it had been resolved, on Argyll's initiative, to summon a Convention of Estates north of the Tweed. This body, which was to meet towards the end of June, would supply a national authority with which the English Parliament could deal confidently. During the interval, the Earl of Antrim was taken prisoner in Ulster; and papers were found on him which disclosed the existence of a plot for a Royalist rising in Scotland, to be headed by Montrose, and supported by a Catholic force from Ireland. This was Strafford's old plan, revived in a new form, and rendered more threatening by what was known or surmised as to the negotiations then proceeding between Charles and his Irish rebels. If these negotiations should succeed, it was clear that the King would receive powerful assistance, which he might employ either in England or Scotland, or in both countries. No wonder that the common danger drew together Protestants north and south of the Tweed, and that Scottish Presbyterians and English Parliamentarians alike became convinced that "there was a fixed resolution in the Popish party utterly to extirpate the true Protestant religion in England, Scotland, and Ireland." It was under the influence of this fear that the elections for the Scottish Convention were held.

A few days after the Convention met (June 22), the news of Montrose's plot was known at Westminster. Lords and Commons at once agreed to send a deputation to Scotland; not, however, to ask for armed assistance, but merely to invite the Convention to give advice, and to send ministers to join the Assembly of Divines which was about to meet at Westminster. Then came the defeat at Roundway Down (July 13); and all hesitation disappeared. Within a week it was agreed to send five envoys northward, to ask for the help of an army of 11,000 men. To many at Westminster such a proposal was, doubtless, very distasteful, both on political and on religious grounds; and the faint-hearted feared lest the King should win the day before the Scottish army could take the field. The peace-party in the Lords won the upper hand, and carried certain propositions for peace, which involved

the acceptance of the terms offered by the King in the previous April—in other words, a complete capitulation. Nevertheless, the Commons resolved to consider the propositions. The news caused an outbreak of indignation in the City; and angry mobs filled Palace Yard. On this occasion, as on others, London exerted an influence on Parliament similar to that which Paris brought to bear on the national assemblies of revolutionary France. By a small majority the propositions were rejected (August 7). To have accepted them would, it was felt, have been to abandon all that had been striven for during three laborious years.

The raising of the siege of Gloucester (September 5) somewhat relieved the military strain, and gave the Parliamentarians breathing-time for carrying through the negotiations with Scotland. On August 7 the English Commissioners, the chief of whom was the younger Vane, arrived at Leith. The main obstacle to agreement was, on this occasion as on so many others, a religious one. "The English," says the Scottish commissioner, Robert Baillie, "were for a civil league; we for a religious covenant." The English were the petitioners, and were forced to give way. Alexander Henderson drew up a Covenant similar to that of 1638, and involving, among other provisions, the abolition of Episcopacy and a joint pledge to maintain the reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and to carry out such a reformation of the Church of England as would "bring the Churches in both nations to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in all respects." To such stringent terms the English Commissioners naturally raised objections; and Vane succeeded in introducing some verbal modifications in the direction of laxity. As amended, the Covenant was adopted by the Scottish Assembly, and ratified by the Estates (August 17). Ten days later it was laid before the Assembly of Divines at Westminster. This body objected to the unrestricted promise to maintain the Church of Scotland; and the House of Commons agreed with its objection. On the other hand, the establishment of Protestantism in Ireland was added to the objects of the league. The peace-party endeavoured to leave the door open for a modified Episcopacy, but were overruled. Early in September, the Scottish Commissioners arrived; and, with their consent, the agreement took its final form. It was accepted by the Lords; and on September 25 it was sworn to by the Assembly of Divines and by 112 members of the House of Commons.

Whatever reluctance there was, was overcome by the news from Ireland. It was the Irish Cessation, according to Baillie, that "most of all made the minds of our people embrace that means of safety." In April Charles had directed Ormonde, his lieutenant-general, to treat with the rebels for a cessation of hostilities for one year, and to bring his troops to England as soon as it was agreed upon. The negotiation was completed by the middle of September, seven-eighths of the country

being left in the hands of the Catholic confederation; before the end of October regiments from Ireland were landing in Somerset, and a few weeks later others joined Byron in Cheshire. Hopton says that they were "bold, hardy men and excellently well-officered, but the common men very mutinous and shrewdly infected with the rebellious humour of England." This soldiery readily changed sides, and the King gained less from their services than he lost by the widely-spread belief that he was bringing over Irish rebels to fight for him. Such was not yet the fact, but the belief was not unjust to his endeavours.

In its final shape, the "Solemn League and Covenant for reformation and defence of Religion, the honour and happiness of the King, and the peace and safety of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland," pledged its supporters to maintain the reformed Church of Scotland, to reform religion in England and Ireland "according to the Word of God," and to endeavour to bring the Churches in the three kingdoms to uniformity "in religion, confession of faith, and form of Church government." In other words, Presbyterianism was to be established throughout the three kingdoms. The rights and privileges of Parliaments were to be preserved, without any intention to diminish "His Majesty's just power and greatness"; "malignants" to be discovered and punished; the union of the kingdoms was to be maintained; and mutual assistance to be rendered for the attainment of these objects. The importance of the document resides in its first clause as to religion, and in the understanding (not expressed, but already arrived at) that the Scots were to send an army to the assistance of the English Parliament—at the expense of £30,000 a month, to be paid by the English. It was a fateful agreement in more ways than one. In the first place, it enabled Parliament to win the victory over its enemies; for the aid that the King got from Ireland weighed as nothing in the scale against the Scottish army. But, subsequently, the pledge to enforce Presbyterianism in England threw an insurmountable obstacle in the way of peace, led to the subsequent breach between Parliament and army, and so brought on the second Civil War and the death of the King. No more important step was taken during the whole of the struggle.

It was the last work of Pym, who, after some months of illness, died on November 8. With his death, and those of Hampden and Falkland, already noticed, three of the noblest figures of a period rich in distinction had disappeared. Of Pym it may be said that he was the first great Parliamentary statesman of modern times, the first who by the combination of experience and intellect, elevation of character, firmness of purpose, practical insight, and oratorical power, gained a complete ascendancy over a popular assembly. From the position of a mere country gentleman he became by these qualities the uncrowned king of half the nation. Eliot was a greater orator, Wentworth more fertile in ideas, Cromwell more subtle in design and more potent in action;

but none of Pym's predecessors or contemporaries, and few, if any, that came after him, enjoyed his peculiar pre-eminence. Religion, liberty, the State, were to him no mere phrases; with whole-hearted energy and devotion he strove for their attainment or maintenance. What was salutary and permanent in the work of the Long Parliament was mainly due to him; and if, in the latter part of his career, he was led into steps which endangered those very objects that he had at heart, he is to be pitied rather than blamed.

In the winter which followed his death, the body over which he had presided found a rival, or rather a parody, in the Parliament which the King summoned to meet at Oxford. It consisted of all members who had left Westminster, and it met on January 22, 1644. About one-third of the Commons and the great majority of the Lords were found to be on the King's side; but many of these were unable to attend. It is not easy to see what was Charles' object in summoning this body. Evidently it was not *the* Parliament; and such a body could add little, if anything, to the legality of his actions. Its meeting only showed, what everybody knew already, that Parliament was divided in itself; and it could not help in any negotiations which might be contemplated, for the members at Westminster naturally refused to recognise it as a Parliament at all. It denounced the invasion of the Scots, and addressed a letter to Essex, whose tendencies were known to be pacific, begging him to help in bringing about a peace. Essex' reply was to send to Oxford a copy of the Covenant, and an offer of pardon from Parliament to all who should accept it. Subsequent overtures from "the Lords and Commons of Parliament at Oxford" having been rejected, the Oxford members declared those at Westminster to be traitors, and authorised the King to levy a forced loan and an excise. As, however, the Oxford assembly began to show some signs of independence, suggesting economies, and begging the King to pay some regard to "tender consciences," it was prorogued (April 16). There was in fact more dissension at Oxford than in London. There was a growing weariness of the war; and those who were most zealous for it were at feud with one another. The Queen was jealous of Rupert's influence. Rupert quarrelled with Digby and other advisers of the King, and with his own subordinates, Wilmot and Goring. Charles, as usual, leaned first to one and then to another.

Meanwhile, at Westminster, the fruits of the new League were making themselves felt. On February 5 Parliament ordered that every Englishman over eighteen years of age should take the Covenant; and signs of opposition to a new ecclesiastical tyranny at once appeared. The Westminster Assembly had pledged itself to Presbyterianism; but all its members were not Presbyterians. It contained a small knot of men—Philip Nye, Thomas Goodwyn, and others—who received the name of Independents, as maintaining the right of every congregation to govern itself. Outside the Assembly the sects—Separatists, Antinomians, etc.

—began to raise their voices against the uniformity which was now to be enforced, and in favour of toleration still more complete than that which men like Fuller and Chillingworth would have been willing to allow. The Baptists even advocated a complete separation of Church and State. Roger Williams published, early in 1644, his tract, *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecutions*; pamphlets by other writers upheld full liberty of conscience. It was ominous that some of these men began to lean towards the King. So early as October, 1643, Thomas Ogle had carried to Oxford overtures for a settlement on the basis of a restricted Episcopacy, combined with toleration of objectors. The Westminster Assembly itself felt obliged to issue a declaration in favour of "the rights of particular congregations" (December 23); and this seems to have put an end to intrigues with the King. How potent an ally the Independents were subsequently to find in Cromwell was not yet apparent; for, though he did not sign the Covenant till February, 1644, when he was appointed Lieutenant-General, and though he soon showed a reluctance, for military reasons, to impose it on the army, his tolerance was rather the result of political insight than of personal feeling. It was not till September, 1644, that he persuaded Parliament to pass a resolution instructing the Committee appointed to treat with the Scottish Commissioners and the Assembly of Divines to "endeavour the finding out some way, how far tender consciences...may be borne with according to the Word." The resolution gave grievous umbrage to the Scots; but it marked out Cromwell as the leader of the party which was to raise him to power, and contained the germ of one of the greatest political changes of the seventeenth century.

We must now return to military matters. The beginning of 1644 found the King master of two-thirds of the country; but the tide was turning, and time was on the side of the Parliament. Its troops were learning their trade, and were becoming more than a match for the Cavaliers. Its northern ally was about to come into the field. It still held several ports in the west—Poole, Lyme, Plymouth, Pembroke, and Liverpool. An ordinance was passed (February 16) appointing a Committee of Both Kingdoms to manage the war, to consist of seven peers, fourteen members of the House of Commons, and four Scottish Commissioners. It superseded the original Committee of Safety, and was given much larger powers as a responsible executive. Essex, Manchester, Waller, and Cromwell were members of it.

On January 19 the Scottish army crossed the Tweed, under Alexander Leslie, Earl of Leven. It consisted of 18,000 foot and about 3000 horse and dragoons. Newcastle (who had been made a Marquis in October) hurried northward to meet it, leaving Lord Bellasis to hold Yorkshire. He succeeded in throwing himself into the city of Newcastle before the leisurely Scots arrived there; but he had only 5000 foot and 3000 horse,

and he asked that Rupert should come to his assistance. Left to his own resources, he had to fall back on Durham. Sir Thomas Fairfax had gone to Cheshire at the end of 1643, to help Brereton; and on January 25 the two Parliamentary commanders fell upon Byron, who was besieging Nantwich, and defeated him with a loss of 1500 prisoners, more than half of whom enlisted under Fairfax. Among the prisoners was George Monck; on the other side, John Lambert commanded a regiment of Fairfax' horse.

The only Royalist stronghold in Lancashire was Lathom House, held by the Countess of Derby. Fairfax summoned it in vain, but did not stay for the siege, which lasted three months and proved in the end ineffectual. Returning to Yorkshire, he joined his father near Selby, which was stormed on April 11, Bellasis being among the prisoners taken. This blow obliged Newcastle to come southward, and shut himself up in York. The armies of Leven and Fairfax encamped before York on April 22, and were joined there on June 2 by Manchester with the troops of the Eastern Association. These troops had been raised to a strength of 14,000 men during the winter. Cromwell, now Lieutenant-General, complained in Parliament of the backwardness of Lord Willoughby, who commanded the Lincolnshire forces; and they had been placed under Manchester.

During these months Rupert had not been idle. In January he made an unsuccessful attempt on Aylesbury, having been led to believe it would be betrayed to him. In March he went to the relief of Newark, and obliged Meldrum, who was besieging it, to capitulate. "The enemy ... was so confident that he had not a strength to attempt that work, that he was within six miles of them before they believed he thought of them." He swept over Lincolnshire; but, in spite of Newcastle's appeals, he was then obliged to restore his troops to the garrisons from which he had borrowed them, and return to the Welsh border. In the middle of May he set out from Shrewsbury for Yorkshire, having persuaded the King with difficulty to adopt his plan of campaign, viz. that, while he himself pushed the war in the north, and his brother Maurice in the west, Charles should manœuvre on the defensive round Oxford.

Marching by way of Lancashire, he relieved Lathom House, and stormed Bolton and Liverpool. Goring joined him with forces which brought his numbers up to nearly 15,000 men. The Parliamentarians raised the siege of York on his approach, and encamped near Long Marston to bar his road; but he worked round by the north, crossed the Ouse, and joined Newcastle. The King had written to him (June 14): "If York be relieved and you beat the rebels' armies of both kingdoms which were before it, then, but otherways not, I may possibly make a shift upon the defensive to spin out time until you come to assist me." Rupert construed this as "a positive and absolute command to fight the enemy"; and, though Newcastle demurred, he drew out his troops

next day (July 2) for that purpose on Marston Moor. He was afterwards blamed for so doing, but he could not stay in Yorkshire; and to have returned without a battle, leaving the enemy to resume their siege, would have been a lame conclusion.

The two armies were nearly equal in cavalry, each having about 7000; but of infantry the Royalists had 11,000, the Parliamentarians 20,000, so that they had a longer line and overlapped the Royalist right. They began the battle by a general advance about 5 p.m. The horse forming their right wing, under Sir Thomas Fairfax, were driven back by Goring, who pursued them to their camp. In the centre, the Yorkshire infantry under Lord Fairfax was also repulsed and broken; but five or six regiments of Scots, which were to the right of it, stood firm though assailed both by horse and foot. The East-Anglian troops formed the left of the Parliamentary army, with some Scottish horse in reserve. After hard fighting, with some alternations of fortune, Cromwell and David Leslie defeated the Royalist cavalry on that wing; Rupert was unable to turn the tide, and was himself driven off the field. Sending the Scottish light horsemen in pursuit, Cromwell halted and reformed his regiments; Crawford brought up the foot, which had got the better of the troops opposed to it; and the whole, wheeling to the right, attacked the flank of the victorious Royalists. Goring's troopers returning from their pursuit were met and routed by Cromwell. Newcastle's whitecoats made a gallant stand, but were nearly all cut to pieces. The King's army broke up; and Manchester's scoutmaster says that "Major-General Leslie, seeing us thus pluck a victory out of the enemies' hands, professed Europe had no better soldiers."

Marston Moor was the greatest battle of the war, and also its turning-point. It damaged the prestige of Rupert, and destroyed the hopes that had been built on the northern army. Newcastle, disgusted and despairing, went abroad. If not the paragon he seemed to his wife, his efforts and achievements for the King's cause deserved something better than Clarendon's sarcasms. Rupert made his way back to Lancashire with 6000 horse; and York surrendered a fortnight afterwards. The Parliamentary forces then separated, the Scots marching north to besiege Newcastle, which held out till the middle of October, and Manchester returning to Lincolnshire; while the Fairfaxes set themselves to recover Pontefract, Scarborough, and other places still held by the Cavaliers in Yorkshire. Before they parted, Leven, Manchester, and Lord Fairfax sent a joint letter to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, recommending the establishment of Presbyterianism, and the making of peace with the King. Vane had sounded the generals in June about the deposition of Charles; but they would not entertain the thought of it.

The hopes that had been built on the Royalist army of the west broke down even sooner. Half of it, under Maurice, was besieging Lyme, when the other half, under Hopton, was attacked and beaten by Waller

at Cheriton (near Alresford, March 29). Essex and Waller then marched upon Oxford. The Queen's state of health made it necessary for her to leave a city which might be besieged; she took what proved to be a last farewell of her husband, and went to Exeter. After there giving birth to the Princess Henrietta (afterwards Duchess of Orleans), she embarked at Falmouth for France (July 14). Oxford was invested by Essex on the east, by Waller on the south and west; but Charles, breaking out with 3000 horse and 2500 musketeers (June 3), retreated to Worcester, and thence to Bewdley. It was the intention of the Committee that in such a contingency Essex should watch the King, and Waller should go into the west; but Essex reversed this arrangement, on the ground that he had the heavier train, and the greater strength of foot. When the King knew of their separation, he doubled back to Oxfordshire, evading Waller, raised his numbers to nearly 10,000 men by drawing troops from the garrison of Oxford, and advanced to Buckingham. He had some thought of trying a stroke at London, which was almost unguarded; but, while he hesitated, Waller was coming up behind him, and had to be dealt with. At Cropredy Bridge (June 29) Waller was defeated in an attempt to cut off the King's rearguard; but he was able to effect a junction with Browne, who was bringing him a reinforcement of 4000 men, while Charles went back to Evesham.

As soon as the emergency was over, Waller's army, largely composed of trained bands, began to melt away. He assured the Committee that "an army compounded of these men will never go through with your service; and, till you have an army merely your own, that you may command, it is in a manner impossible to do anything of importance." Washington wrote to Congress in 1776 in much the same strain; and just as Congress was at length persuaded to form a "continental army," to serve till the end of the war, so Parliament passed an ordinance (July 12) raising a new force of 13,000 men for permanent service.

Waller's army was unfit to keep the field, and could only garrison Abingdon and Reading. Freed from all concern about it, Charles decided to follow Essex, who had raised the siege of Lyme, and gone on towards Plymouth. On the King's approach, Essex marched into Cornwall; but he had only 10,000 men; the country was against him; and by the middle of August he found himself shut up in the Fowey peninsula by an army of 16,000. His cavalry broke out and reached Plymouth, and he himself escaped thither by sea; but his infantry was forced to surrender (September 2). They were released, after laying down their arms, on condition that they should not fight against the King till they had reached Portsmouth or Southampton. The easy terms made the Lostwithiel capitulation far from an equivalent to Marston Moor. In London it was said that "by that miscarriage we are brought a whole summer's travel back"; but it paved the way for the replacement of Essex by a more vigorous and capable commander.

The rank and moral worth of Essex, and his staunchness to the Parliamentary cause, had given him a hold upon the office of general which nothing short of such a failure could shake.

The King was not in a position to reap substantial advantage from his success. His army was reduced in numbers, and mutinous in temper. Horses, clothes, and money were wanting. Weariness of war made some of his officers turn to that solution which the Parliamentary generals rejected—the deposition of Charles in favour of his son. Wilmot, who was said to have thrown out this suggestion, was arrested; and the command of the cavalry was given to Goring. Rupert was raising fresh troops in Wales and the Marches, of which he had been made President; but, mortified by his failure and disgusted with the course of affairs, he had fallen into despondency, and gave himself up to self-indulgence at Bristol. It was near the end of October when he set out to join the King with 5000 men.

By the middle of that month Charles reached Salisbury. His immediate object was to relieve the Royalist outposts, Basing House and Donnington Castle (near Newbury). But he had only 10,000 men, and, when he arrived at Whitchurch, he found an army of nearly twice that strength in front of him. It was made up of the troops of Waller, Essex, and Manchester, and was commanded by a council of war which included two civilians. Essex himself was ill at Reading. Finding himself unable to reach Basing House, the King turned northward to Donnington Castle, the siege of which was raised on his approach. The Parliamentary army followed; and a second battle of Newbury was fought (October 27). The Royalists were in a strong position, in the angle formed by the Lambourne and the Kennet. Waller, accompanied by Cromwell, made a circuit and attacked them from the west, while Manchester made a belated and unsuccessful attack from the north-east. The King's army was beaten, but by the fault of Manchester was able to escape in the night without much loss.

The King reached Oxford on November 1, and was joined there next day by Rupert, who was made general in place of Brentford. The reinforced army then returned to Newbury, where the Parliamentary army still lay. It declined the offer of a fresh battle, and fell back to Reading, allowing the Royalists to raise the siege of Basing House. There was great disappointment in London; and Cromwell, called upon in Parliament to say what he knew about the causes of the miscarriage, laid the whole blame on Manchester. That "sweet, meek man," as Baillie calls him, had lost all zeal for the war. He argued that it was useless to continue it, for "if we beat the King ninety and nine times, yet he is King still, and so will his posterity be after him; but if the King beat us once we shall be all hanged, and our posterity made slaves." After Marston Moor Manchester had found excuses for remaining inactive at Lincoln till the beginning of September; and it was tardily

and with reluctance that he obeyed the orders of the Committee to bring his troops to the help of Essex and Waller.

Manchester and his major-general, Crawford, had been on bad terms with Cromwell for some time. Intolerant of Popery and Prelacy, but tolerant of all shades of Puritanism, Cromwell insisted that good soldiers should not be excluded from the ranks "because they square not with you in every opinion concerning matters of religion," and he had signed the Covenant with reluctance. Impatient of the obstructive action of the Lords, he had said that "he hoped to live to see never a nobleman in England." As a Presbyterian and an aristocrat, Manchester had come to dislike and distrust him, and longed for an accommodation with the King. He replied to Cromwell's attack on him by counter-charges. The Lords, now reduced to about a dozen, espoused his cause, and were warmly seconded by the Scottish Commissioners, who denounced Cromwell as an incendiary; but the Commons stood by their member.

To avert a rupture, Cromwell (December 9) threw out a suggestion which took shape in the Self-denying Ordinance, excluding members of both Houses from offices and commands, military and civil. This was passed by the Commons on December 19; but the Lords, regarding it as aimed at themselves and the generals belonging to their order, rejected it (January 13), on the ostensible ground that it was unwise to make the changes involved till the reform of the army, which had been taken in hand some two months before, should be complete. The argument was plausible, but, as a matter of fact, the two measures were closely connected; and the war-party were resolved that the new army should not be wasted by being placed in the hands of incompetent commanders.

It was chiefly under Cromwell's influence that the question of army reform had been taken up. He felt strongly that it was useless to discuss ecclesiastical changes, or to negotiate with the King, so long as the fortune of war remained in its present balanced condition. If the King were once thoroughly beaten, there would be time enough afterwards to settle everything else. With that wonderful combination of reserve, practical sense, and fervour, which made the strength of his character, he bent all his energies on the one aim—complete victory in the field. In demanding military reform he drew support from the obviously defective and unwieldy character of the existing organisation. Manchester had denied the right of Parliament to dispose of his troops without the consent of the counties which had raised them; and the counties made formal complaint of this use of their men, and of the heavy burden laid on them for maintenance, which amounted to nearly half-a-million a year. The Commons, already impressed by Waller's warning, referred their petition to the Committee of Both Kingdoms (November 23), and directed it to "consider of a frame or model of the whole militia." The Committee recommended that there should be an army of 22,000 men (viz. 14,400 foot and 7,600 horse and dragoons), apart from local

forces; and that it should be regularly paid from taxes assessed on those parts of the country which were suffering least from the war. The ordinance for the creation of this "New Model" army passed the Commons on January 11, two days before the Lords rejected the Self-denying Ordinance. The reply of the Commons was to appoint Sir Thomas Fairfax as Commander-in-chief, thus depriving Essex of command, and settling in advance the main question raised by the Ordinance. Fairfax was only 33; he had given ample proof of energy and decision, and was not identified with any sect or faction. Skippon was appointed Major-General, in the place of Manchester. The place of Lieutenant-General, carrying with it command of the cavalry, was not filled.

The New Model Ordinance was now sent up to the Lords (January 28); but, so long as there seemed to be any chance that the negotiations with the King (to be presently related) might issue in peace, they were reluctant to give up their direct influence on the army. There was some wrangling over amendments by the Lords; but, when it became clear that there was little, if any, hope of peace, and when an ominous mutiny at Leatherhead showed the disorganisation of the army, they accepted the Ordinance (February 15). In its final form, besides settling the numbers and character of the new army, and confirming the appointments already mentioned, it provided that the appointment of officers should be made by the Commander-in-chief, subject to the approval of both Houses; and that both officers and men should take the Covenant.

Thus half the battle for efficiency was won; but meanwhile, owing to disorganisation on the Parliamentary side, and incapacity on the other, no progress was made with the war. On February 25, after the rupture of the Uxbridge negotiations, a new Self-denying Ordinance was prepared by the Commons; and a list of officers, drawn up by Fairfax, was sent up to the Lords. Still striving against the recognition of Independency, they tried to modify the list, but, in view of the military difficulties, gave way, and, a few days later (April 3), accepted the Self-denying Ordinance. As ultimately modified, it ordered that members of either House, holding office or command, should resign their appointments; but it did not disqualify them for future employment. Designed to satisfy the Lords, this provision turned to the profit of Cromwell, who, on June 10, was reappointed Lieutenant-General. Combining high military command with membership of Parliament and of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, Cromwell henceforward held a unique position. The Ordinance applied to the navy as well as to the army; Warwick resigned with Essex and Manchester; and the command of the fleet was given to Batten. "That violent party which had first cozened the rest into the war, and afterwards obstructed all the approaches towards peace, found now," says Clarendon, "that they had finished as much of their work as the tools which they had wrought with could be applied to, and what remained to be done must be despatched by new

workmen." It was rightly judged that the war would never be brought to a successful end by Laodiceans.

We must now go back to consider the negotiations for peace, which had been carried on simultaneously with these preparations for more energetic war. In November, 1644, when it was hoped that Marston Moor and the Scottish alliance would render the King more amenable, certain propositions were drawn up. They clearly showed the influence of the Scottish Presbyterians, and demanded a "reformation of religion according to the Covenant," reciting the clause in that agreement which pledged Parliament to "endeavour uniformity" with the Scottish Church. They also included a large proscription of the King's supporters, with total confiscation of their estates; and repeated the old demand that the army, the navy, and the nomination to all posts of importance, should be placed in the hands of Parliament. These propositions were handed to the King on November 23 at Oxford, where the royalist parliament had met again shortly before. That the Independents offered no resistance to these intolerant demands was probably due to their conviction that the King would reject them. Charles, however, did not refuse to negotiate, though, in parting with the Parliamentary envoys, he told them plainly, "There are three things I will not part with—the Church, my crown, and my friends." From these three, indeed, he never parted, except in death.

On the other hand, those who protested so loudly against innovations in religion had become tyrannical innovators; and they showed the bitterness of their intolerance by taking the life of the old man who, their worst enemy in former days, was now no longer dangerous. The trial of Laud, on a charge of treason, had gone on during the greater part of the year 1644. To prove the charge, even before such a body as the depleted House of Lords, turned out as difficult as in the case of Strafford; and the same method of solving the problem was ultimately adopted. In November the impeachment was dropped, and an ordinance of attainder brought in. The Lords, engaged in their dispute with the Lower House over the Self-denying Ordinance, resisted for several weeks; but on January 4 they gave way. Six days later Laud suffered death on the scaffold.

Such an act of vengeance augured ill for the pending negotiations; nevertheless, they began at Uxbridge on January 29, 1645. The Scots had let it be known that, if the King were willing to abandon Episcopacy, in England as well as Scotland, they would support him in other respects. It can hardly be doubted that Cromwell, in allowing and even aiding them to influence the character of the terms, was well aware that their ecclesiastical policy put an insuperable bar in the way of peace. The three propositions brought forward at Uxbridge went even beyond those presented at Oxford in November; for the King was now to take the

Covenant himself, assent to the new Directory of Public Worship (as agreed to by Parliament shortly before) instead of the Prayer-Book, hand over the army and navy, and quash the Cessation in Ireland, allowing the Parliament to suppress the rebellion there as it pleased. After some discussion, the King went so far as to offer to limit episcopal authority, allow alterations in the Prayer-Book, and abolish penalties on deviation in matters of ceremony, for Presbyterians and Independents alike. As to the militia, he was ready to hand it over temporarily to a body named half by Parliament, half by himself; but after three years the command was to revert to the Crown. These were considerable concessions, but they did not satisfy the Independents, much less the Presbyterian party; and after a month of futile argument the "Treaty of Uxbridge" came to an end (February 22). A fortnight later the Oxford assembly, which had put unwelcome pressure on the King, in order to induce him to come to terms, was again adjourned; and the King, in a letter to the Queen, congratulated himself on being rid of his "mongrel Parliament," and the "base and mutinous motions" it had proposed.

The King was the less disposed to make concessions, as he had hopes of help from various quarters. In the highlands, Montrose had beaten the Covenanters at Tippermuir, Aberdeen, and Inverlochy; he wrote (February 3) that he hoped to bring all Scotland to the King's obedience, and to be in England before the summer was over. Lord Herbert, whom Charles created Earl of Glamorgan, had formed plans for bringing over 10,000 Irish soldiers, and for securing aid from the Pope and the Catholic Powers. The Queen, after her arrival in France, had tried to persuade Anne of Austria and Mazarin to assist her husband, and was beginning to meet with some success. It suited Mazarin to prolong the struggle in England, and he wished to deprive Spain of the services of the Duke of Lorraine's troops. He offered to find pay for them, and the Duke was willing to send them, to the number of 10,000. The Dutch, however, refused to transport them.

The hope of succour from France and Ireland made it important for the King to strengthen his hold of the western counties, which furnished good landing-places and formed a good recruiting ground. The Prince of Wales was sent to Bristol in March, with Hyde and other advisers, to encourage the formation of a Western Association, and with the further view that, if the King were taken prisoner, the Prince should be at large. Taunton was the only inland town in this part of the country which was in Parliamentary hands. Essex had left a garrison in it; and Blake, who had already distinguished himself in the defence of Lyme, was governor. It had been intermittently blockaded since September; and the Royalists now determined to press the siege. Waller and Cromwell were sent to relieve it, but their force was too small. Waller fell back to Salisbury, and was so disgusted with the

“adventitious, borrowed forces” which were placed under him, and which deserted or mutinied for want of pay, that he gladly threw up his command. He abhorred the war, and wished that “the one party might not have the worse, nor the other the better.”

The formation of the New Model army, which should have been the winter's work, occupied the whole of April, 1645. The men who had hindered it tried to get it postponed for another year, and foretold disaster. Fairfax was empowered to take what soldiers he pleased from the existing armies; but they were so weak in infantry that 8500 men had to be raised by impressment. It was easier to obtain recruits for the cavalry than for the infantry, as the former received two shillings, the foot-soldiers only eightpence, a day. Many of the best recruits had served in the Royal armies. Fairfax' list of officers was framed with little regard to social rank or creed; it was approved by the Commons and, after some demur, by the Lords. Though all officers were required to take the Covenant, Independents were the dominant element. Cromwell's Ironsides served as a type for all the cavalry of the New Model. Of its fourteen troops, two were transferred to other regiments; and the remaining twelve formed two regiments, known henceforward as Fairfax' and Whalley's. Baxter, who became chaplain of Whalley's, was shocked to find that they “took the King for a tyrant and an enemy, and really intended to master him or ruin him.” In Voltaire's phrase, they were inspired by “*un acharnement mélancolique et une fureur raisonnée.*”

There were local forces untouched by the reorganisation—under Poyntz in the northern counties, Browne in the midlands, Massey and Brereton in the west; these with smaller bodies and with the Scottish army made up perhaps 50,000 men. Nevertheless, the temporary paralysis of the main army gave the Royalists an opportunity of taking the initiative in the campaign of 1645. Rupert, who was on the Welsh border, wanted the King to join him with the artillery train from Oxford, that they might relieve Chester, Pontefract, and other northern garrisons. But Cromwell made a brilliant cavalry raid round Oxford, routed three regiments of horse at Islip (April 24), captured Blechington House, and cleared the country of draught horses. The King, who had counted on them for his train, found himself unable to move.

At the end of April, when the New Model army was still much below its intended strength, Fairfax received orders to march to the relief of Taunton. The stoutness of Blake's defence, and the efforts of the Royalists, had given the place a factitious value, like that of Mafeking in our own day; and the strategists of the Committee thought more of the gain or loss of pawns than of planning a checkmate. Fairfax had reached Blandford when he was recalled; but half his force went on to Taunton, and raised the siege (May 11), when the Royalists were already in the town, and the defenders were without ammunition. The recall of Fairfax

was owing to news that the King was being joined by Rupert and Goring. Charles left Oxford on May 7, at the head of 11,000 men, and by Rupert's advice marched on Chester. He hoped to recover lost ground in the north, to defeat the Scottish army, which had been weakened by detachments in consequence of Montrose's success, and perhaps to effect a junction with Montrose. Goring, who was against this plan, was sent back to the west with full control of the operations there.

At Market Drayton Charles learnt that the siege of Chester had been raised. Instead of advancing into Lancashire, he turned eastward and marched on Leicester, which was stormed and sacked (May 31). He meant to make his way north through the more open country, rallying his Yorkshire partisans; but this was on the assumption that Oxford could hold out till his return. Fairfax had been ordered to invest it; and it was already crying out for succour. Much to the discontent of the Yorkshiresmen, the Royal army marched south to Daventry, and halted there till Oxford should be revictualled. On the news of the storming of Leicester, Fairfax had been told to abandon the siege of Oxford and see to the security of the eastern counties, which seemed to be threatened. The City petitioned that he should be given a free hand, "without attending commands and directions from remote councils." Consequently he was authorised to act upon his own discretion, subject to the advice of his council of war; and that advice was to seek out the enemy and fight him. Before the enemy knew of his approach, Fairfax was within eight miles of Daventry (June 12). At the request of Fairfax' council, the House of Commons had, as already mentioned, appointed Cromwell Lieutenant-General; and he now joined the army with 600 horse.

The King's army numbered about 4000 horse and 3500 foot, while Fairfax had 6000 horse and nearly 8000 foot; but a large proportion of his men were raw soldiers, and his officers were held in undeserved contempt by the Cavaliers because they had not served abroad. In Cromwell's phraseology, they were "a company of poor, ignorant men." The Royalists at first moved northward, wishing to avoid a battle; but finding that his rear would be overtaken, Charles turned at Market Harborough and attacked Fairfax in a position north of Naseby on the morning of June 14. Like Wellington at Waterloo, Fairfax had drawn up his troops on a low ridge, which hid his reserves from the enemy's view; and his dragoons lined a hedge on his left, from which they took the Royalists in flank. Nevertheless, the left wing under Ireton was broken by Rupert, and chased to the outskirts of Naseby. In the centre, the Royalist foot under Astley fired one volley and then, "falling on with sword and butt-end of musket did notable execution," against odds of two to one. But on the right, Cromwell, with seven regiments of cavalry (including his own Ironsides), overpowered the northern horse under Langdale, and then fell upon the flank and rear of the Royalist

foot, which was forced to lay down its arms. Rupert, returning from Naseby, joined Langdale; but the Cavaliers could not be brought up for a second charge. They retreated; the retreat soon became a flight; and they were hotly pursued as far as Leicester.

The battle cost the King all his infantry and artillery and half his cavalry. His cabinet was captured, with drafts or copies of his letters to the Queen. These were published; and the country learned that he was prepared to repeal the laws against Catholics, and was trying to bring Irish and foreign troops to England. His cause had now become hopeless, but he was far from recognising it. He turned west, and by the 19th he was able to muster a force of 7000 men at Hereford, while Goring was reckoned to have twice that number. With Irish assistance, Charles hoped to be in "a far better condition before winter than he had been at any time since this rebellion began."

Fairfax and his council decided that it was a more urgent matter to deal with Goring in Somerset than to follow the King into Wales. That task might be left to the Scots. The siege of Carlisle, which had occupied them for many months, was near its end. The town surrendered on June 28; and, in spite of English remonstrances, a Scottish garrison was placed in it, as in Newcastle. Leven had begun to move south so soon as it was clear to him that the King was not taking the road to Carlisle, and by June 22 was at Nottingham. Receiving instructions there to attend the King's movements, he marched slowly to the Severn, crossed it above Worcester, and at the end of July invested Hereford.

Fairfax made more despatch. He left Leicester on June 20, and, marching by the uplands, reached Dorchester by July 3. On his approach, Goring raised the siege of Taunton, and posted his troops on the north side of the Parrett and its tributary the Yeo. This enabled him to fall back on Bristol or to join forces with the King. To force the passage of these rivers was "a business of exceeding difficulty, it being also a moorish ground." On his way to Taunton, Fairfax had escaped this necessity by the route which he had chosen; and, approaching them now from the opposite direction, he confined himself to demonstrations of attack on the bridges held by the Royalists while he passed the Yeo higher up, at Yeovil. Goring drew his troops down to Langport, where he was attacked by Fairfax (July 10). He had sent off his train to Bridgewater, and fought only to gain time; but, though the ground was favourable, his men made no stand against the impetuous onset of six troops of Ironsides. The horse were chased to Bridgewater; the foot soon surrendered on the moors.

Goring made his way to Barnstaple; but Fairfax did not follow him, for the lesson of Lostwithiel was not forgotten. He laid siege to Bridgewater, and succeeded in taking it in eleven days. The King, who was at Raglan Castle, trying with indifferent success to raise fresh troops in Wales, had been assured that Bridgewater was impregnable, and was

concerting plans for its relief with Rupert, who was at Bristol. On the news of its fall, Rupert advised him to make peace, but Charles replied, "I confess that, speaking either as a mere soldier or statesman, I must say there is no probability but of my ruin; but as a Christian I must tell you that God will not suffer rebels to prosper, or this cause to be overthrown."

Parliament had now a chain of posts from Bridgewater to Lyme, to hold in check the counties of Cornwall and Devon; and this chain was strengthened by the storming of Sherborne Castle (August 15). During the siege of it Fairfax was much hampered by the Dorset club-men, bands which had been formed in the western counties to prevent plundering, and to keep the war out of their neighbourhood. Rupert and Goring had had some trouble with them, for it was the depredations of the Cavaliers which had occasioned their assembly; but now they were instigated by the Royalists to act against the Parliamentarians. They had met Fairfax with threats on his first arrival, and, though he had kept his promise to enforce strict discipline, they became more aggressive in August. At length Cromwell, having tried persuasion in vain, stormed their camp on Hambledon Hill, and succeeded in dispersing them without much bloodshed.

Bath had surrendered on July 30; Bristol also must be taken before the army could safely move on into Devonshire. Rupert had 3500 men there; but they were newly-levied Welsh, and the circuit of the works was about four miles. The officers of the New Model preferred to run risks rather than waste time over sieges, and Fairfax himself "was still for action in field or fortification." Invested on August 23, Bristol was stormed on September 10. Rupert still held the western forts, and to save the city from destruction he was allowed to withdraw to Oxford.

While Fairfax was engaged in Somerset and Dorset, the King made a fruitless raid into the Midlands. Passing round Leven's army, he crossed the Severn at Bridgenorth, and reached Doncaster on August 18 with 2000 horse and a few foot. But Pontefract and Scarborough had fallen; the Parliamentary forces under Poyntz gathered to meet him; and David Leslie was coming up behind him with 4000 horse. Turning south, Charles made his way to Huntingdon; and Leslie did not follow him, for he was needed in Scotland. Montrose had crowned his career of victory at Kilsyth (August 15); but within a month Leslie brought it to an end at Philiphaugh. From Huntingdon the King went to Oxford, his troopers plundering Royalists and Roundheads alike, and by the beginning of September he was at Worcester. Leven was still lying before Hereford; but without cavalry, and without pay or supplies for his men, his position was difficult; he raised the siege, and marched back to Yorkshire.

Charles was again at Raglan, making plans with his sanguine adviser, Digby, for the relief of Bristol, when news came of its fall. Rupert had

talked of holding it for four months. The King was already prejudiced against his nephew as an advocate of peace; and the anger and distrust aroused by this unexpected blow were fostered by Digby. In a letter which is not without pathos, Charles told Rupert to seek his subsistence somewhere beyond seas. He dismissed him from all his offices, and he also displaced his friend, William Legge, who was Governor of Oxford. The King had no longer any object in remaining in South Wales. Sending orders to Goring, who was with the Prince of Wales at Exeter, to join him, he marched north and reached Chester on September 23. His hopes were built upon Montrose, of whose defeat he was unaware, and he looked to joining him in Scotland. But his cavalry was beaten next day at Rowton Heath by Poyntz; and he was obliged to seek shelter in Wales. At Denbigh he received news of Philiphaugh; and from there he made his way to Newark, after sending fresh orders that Goring should join him, and that the Prince of Wales should go to France.

The Cavaliers of the west were unable or unwilling to obey the King's summons. Their own homes were threatened, and they were clamorous for peace. Fairfax had followed up the capture of Bristol by taking the castles of Devizes and Berkeley. At the end of September he sent Cromwell to Hampshire to deal with the posts which still threatened the road from London, while he himself marched on into Devon. He took Tiverton Castle (October 19); but to besiege Exeter, or to pass it by, was hazardous at that season of the year. The wet weather and the deep Devonshire lanes impeded movement, and his men were tired and sickly; so he placed them in cantonments to the east of Exeter. Cromwell rejoined him on October 24, having done his work with his usual thoroughness and speed. Winchester Castle had surrendered after two days' battering, and he had moved on to Basing House. The Parliamentarians had spent nearly six months before it in 1644; Cromwell took it in six days. There had been a lack of siege-guns in the early part of the war; but the New Model army was provided with a good train. Guns of six-inch and seven-inch calibre, and twelve-inch mortars, were used against Sherborne Castle and Basing House. Shell-fire from mortars, which had come into use only about twenty years before, was especially formidable to castles and fortified houses. It threatened their magazines; and Devizes surrendered on this account.

The King remained some weeks at Newark, uncertain what course to take. A report that Montrose had beaten Leslie led him to move northward; but it proved unfounded, and he returned. Digby with 1500 horse went on to Scotland, and reached Dumfries after being worsted in a confused fight at Sherburn (October 15). Finding enemies before and behind him, he turned south again; his men deserted him; and he took refuge in the Isle of Man. It was perhaps to avoid meeting Rupert that he had left Newark. The Prince arrived there in the middle

of October and claimed to be judged by a council of war, which pronounced that he had shown no want of courage or fidelity in the surrender of Bristol. There was no real reconciliation, however, between him and his uncle; and, after an angry scene relating to Digby and his influence, Rupert left Newark, and applied to Parliament for a pass to go abroad. This was refused, as he would not pledge himself never again to bear arms against it. He went to Oxford in December and asked pardon of the King, who had returned thither on November 5; but he was not restored to his command. His opinion that it was useless to continue the war was shared, as Charles was shocked to find, by nearly all the leading Royalists at Oxford.

The sluggish and ineffectual action of the Scottish army had caused great discontent at Westminster. Parliament complained that Leven had disregarded instructions, had placed Scottish garrisons in English towns, and had levied unauthorised contributions. The Scottish Commissioners retorted that he was bound to take care of his army, and that the money and supplies promised by Parliament had not been furnished. At the end of November Leven took part in the investment of Newark, which he had been asked to do two months before; but at the beginning of 1646 he had only 7000 men there, of whom less than half were infantry.

The return of the King to Oxford made it necessary for Fairfax to detach some of his best cavalry to watch his movements. Towards the end of the year the Prince of Wales advanced to the relief of Exeter with a force reckoned at 11,000 men. Goring had handed over his command to Lord Wentworth, and had gone to France. On January 9 Cromwell surprised some of Wentworth's horse at Bovey Tracey, and spread such panic that the Royalists fell back on Launceston. After storming Dartmouth, Fairfax returned to the blockade of Exeter, which was now shut in on all sides. Hopton, with his usual self-sacrifice, accepted the command of what Clarendon describes as "a dissolute, undisciplined, wicked, beaten army," and made a fresh attempt to relieve the city. Fairfax went to meet him, drove him out of Torrington (February 16), followed him into Cornwall, and by March 10 had reached Truro. The Royalists refused to fight any longer. The foot were sent to Pendennis Castle, and the horse surrendered. The Prince of Wales had sailed from Falmouth to the Scilly Isles at the beginning of March; and Hyde employed his enforced leisure there in beginning his History. In April the Prince withdrew to Jersey, and in June to France, by desire of the King and Queen, but much against Hyde's advice. Mazarin, hoping to make use of him, had made large promises.

Fairfax had marched into Cornwall sooner than he would otherwise have done, in consequence of the rumour that troops were coming from France and Ireland; and this also led to the ready submission of the Cornishmen, who had suffered enough from the exactions and severities

of their own countrymen. Exeter, cut off from all hope of deliverance, capitulated on April 9; and in a few weeks Pendennis Castle was the only Royalist stronghold in the west. Chester had surrendered to Brereton two months earlier; and the Parliamentarians were masters of South Wales. The Irish levies had to remain in their own country because there was no port where they could be landed. The King still hoped to collect a force at Oxford, with which he might take the field; but Astley, one of his best soldiers, when bringing 3000 men from Worcester, was attacked at Stow-on-the-Wold on March 21; and, though numbers were about equal, his men laid down their arms. A month later, Charles left the city on his way to the Scots. Oxford was invested on May 11, and opened its gates on June 24. The Duke of York was sent to London as a prisoner, but Rupert and Maurice were allowed to go abroad. Other places soon followed the example of Oxford. With the surrender of Raglan Castle to Fairfax (August 19) the work of the New Model army came to an end; and the war might be said to be finished, though the King's flag was still kept waving at Harlech till March, 1647.

The secret of the success of the New Model army was that it was well paid and well found. This made it possible to maintain strict discipline, and to carry on a continuous campaign of more than fifteen months without marauding or mutiny, and without serious losses from desertion. The Royalists themselves admitted the contrast between their soldiers and those of the Parliament, though they put the best face on it: "In our army we have the sins of men (drinking and wenching), but in yours you have those of devils, spiritual pride and rebellion."

CHAPTER XI.

PRESBYTERIANS AND INDEPENDENTS.

(1645-9.)

WE must at this point return to consider the tangled negotiations which were due to the position resulting from the military events that we have sketched, to the growing divergence between the forces whose union had gained the victory, and last, but not least, to the character of the King, who strove to recover by tortuous diplomacy at least a portion of what he had lost in the field. The chief parties in the game were now the King, intent mainly on preserving the Episcopalian Church and his control over the armed forces of the State; the Parliament, pledged to Presbyterianism, but still more anxious to retain command of the army, and to reduce the Crown to impotence; the Scots, resolved on the establishment of Presbyterianism in both kingdoms, but indifferent to other English demands. These three elements do not, however, exhaust the list. Behind the English Parliament stood the English army, now mainly composed of Independents—not as yet playing a leading part in negotiation, but resolved on obtaining liberty of conscience, whatever form of Church government might issue from the strife, and forming a growing body of opinion which no other party could ignore. In the background were the Irish Catholics, with whom Charles negotiated throughout; the English Royalists, who, though beaten, decimated, and half-ruined, were ready, if the opportunity came, to renew the struggle; and France, which, under the government of Mazarin, and assiduously plied by Queen Henrietta, was anxious—if such an object could be gained without military intervention—to see Charles come to his own again. The whole history of the three years from December, 1645, to January, 1649, is the history of one long, complicated, and futile intrigue, interrupted by a second civil war, and ending in the death of the King. The main stages of this conflict are marked by the flight of the King to the Scots; his surrender to the Parliament; his seizure at Holmby House, and the march of the army on London; the Engagement and the Vote of No Addresses; the second Civil War; Pride's Purge; and the scaffold at Whitehall.

As the struggle between Cavalier and Roundhead became more and more unequal, the King found fresh ground of hope in the disagreements of his enemies. The successes of the New Model army had strengthened the Independents. After Naseby, Cromwell had pressed on Parliament their claim to toleration: "I beseech you," he wrote to the Speaker, "not to discourage them"; and again, after the capture of Bristol, "from brethren in things of the mind we look for no compulsion but that of light and reason." The Presbyterians fought hard to maintain their ascendancy and to restrain the vagaries of the sects. In the House of Commons they had, as a rule, the majority. But nearly 150 new members had been added to the House to fill vacancies; and it was now made up of groups rather than of parties. The House of Lords was also mainly Presbyterian, but it gradually became of less and less account.

The Scots soon began to scent danger, both from the English Parliament and the English army. They distrusted the somewhat unsteady Presbyterianism of the former; they feared still more the growing Independency of the latter. But they had hopes of the King, and, not reckoning on his stubborn adherence to the Episcopalian system, believed that the conditions they could offer would be more acceptable than those that would be enforced by the English Parliament and army. Within a month of the battle of Naseby, some Scottish lords tried to open a negotiation with Charles, but found him unwilling to go beyond what he had offered at Uxbridge. Two months later, after Montrose's final defeat at Philiphaugh, the Scottish Commissioners made more official overtures. Their anxiety for peace was not diminished by the fact that Parliament was slow to discharge its obligations towards the Scottish army, whose pay was much in arrears.

In the autumn of 1645 Parliament took some steps towards the establishment of the Presbyterian system, especially in London, which was becoming strongly Presbyterian; but it was not till the following March that this policy was extended to the kingdom at large. Even then, it was not the Scottish system, pure and simple, that they intended to introduce, but one which the Scots stigmatised as Erastian, and which would have kept ecclesiastical control in lay hands, while allowing some measure of toleration to the sects. The Independents, on their part, demanded full liberty of conscience. On the initiative of the Lords, Parliament tried to satisfy them by appointing a committee (November) to consider means of "accommodation." The Independents, however, opened secret negotiations with the King; and Parliament was driven (December) to consider propositions for peace. The discovery of a plot hatched by certain noblemen at Oxford, who, enraged at the rejection of the Independent overtures by the King, offered to hand him over to Parliament, forced the King to take a step forward. He expressed his willingness to negotiate, and proposed to come to Westminster for

the purpose. Parliament, however, declined to admit the proposal, until the bases of an agreement should have been laid down.

Meanwhile the French Government had intervened. Mazarin had become uneasy at the progress of Parliament; and, as a check upon it, he wished to renew the old relations between France and Scotland, and to induce Charles to throw himself on the support of the Scots. With this object he accredited an agent to them, Jean de Montreuil, who arrived in London in August. Terms of agreement were drawn up by the Scottish Commissioners; and in January, 1646, Montreuil went to Oxford to urge the King to accept them and to join the Scottish army before Newark. The Queen, at first unwilling to negotiate, on account of the hope she nourished of active assistance from abroad, subsequently threw her weight into the same scale. The Scottish terms were practically a renewal of the Uxbridge Propositions, with the additional demand that Charles should take the Covenant. His answer was that he would rather lose his crown than his soul. His objection was not wholly religious, for, like his father, he held that "the nature of Presbyterian government is to steal or force the crown from the King's head." Beyond toleration for the Presbyterians in England he could not be induced to go, nor would he throw over Montrose.

During these secret negotiations with the Scots, the King made offers to the Parliament, proposing to restore the Church to the condition in which it had been under Elizabeth respecting doctrine and ceremonial, and to grant full liberty of conscience, including even the use of the Directory recently drawn up by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster; but he would make no promises about Ireland or the militia. These propositions were considered on January 16; but various discoveries prevented Parliament from paying serious attention to them. Lord Digby's correspondence, captured at Sherburn, had made the Houses aware of the King's dealings with the Scottish lords in the previous August, and of his attempts to secure help from Holland, Denmark, France, and Ireland. In January they learned of the offers made by the Scots, and of negotiations carried on by Sir Kenelm Digby in the Queen's name with the Pope, which were to result in an expedition of several thousand French soldiers paid by the French clergy. They also learned, and published to the world, the treaty concluded by Glamorgan in Ireland, in which he pledged the King to all that the Pope's nuncio, Rinuccini, thought fit to demand, in order to obtain 10,000 Irish for service in England. Charles disavowed Glamorgan; but the affair helped to confirm what Rinuccini spoke of as "the common belief of his inconstancy and untrustworthiness."

Influenced by a sense of common danger and by the pressure of Montreuil, the Scots now modified their terms, withdrawing their demand that Charles should take the Covenant, or accept all the Uxbridge Propositions (March 19). Parliament having again refused to let the

King come to Westminster, he now offered to join the Scots at Newark. The Scots engaged to receive him, on a vague promise about Presbyterianism, trusting to enforce more definite terms when they had him in their power. Time was pressing, for Fairfax had done his work in the west, and was approaching Oxford. Charles made overtures to the Parliamentary General; but, as these met with no response, he set out from Oxford, on April 27, disguised and accompanied by only two attendants. After approaching London, as if still uncertain what to do, he turned northward, and put himself into Scottish hands at Southwell on May 5. Two days later, Newark having surrendered at the King's orders, the Scottish army retired, with their prisoner, upon Newcastle.

Meanwhile, fortress after fortress had fallen; and, with the surrender of Oxford (June 24, 1646), the war was practically over. Parliament had already voted (May 19) that the Scottish army was no longer needed, and should be paid off; but nine months were to pass before they surrendered their prize. Charles' reception in the Scottish camp was by no means what he expected. On his arrival he found himself a prisoner. He declared that he was "barbarously treated." His captors disavowed the assurances which had been given to him through Montreuil, and declared that he had come to their camp without any agreement whatever. He had expressed his willingness to be instructed in their Church principles, and he was taken at his word. They pressed him to sign the Covenant, or at all events consent to the establishment of Presbyterianism in all three kingdoms. They made him send orders to his garrisons to capitulate, and to Montrose to lay down his arms. Nevertheless, the terms they offered were far better, politically speaking, than those on which the Parliament insisted. Argyll wished to establish a form of Presbyterianism, which, in England at least, might be elastic in system and not intolerant in practice, and to restore the monarchy on a constitutional basis. But Argyll was a statesman; the majority of his colleagues were less open to compromise. Still, if Charles could have frankly accepted Presbyterianism, he would have had the Scots at his back. It is to his credit, if it was his misfortune, that he remained firm on the essential point.

In July Parliament had formulated its terms; and, at the end of that month, Parliamentary Commissioners arrived in the north, to discuss what were afterwards known as the Newcastle Propositions. These included a demand that Charles should take the Covenant, allow it to be enforced on all his subjects, and accept a reformation of the Church on that basis, with stringent laws against recusants. Parliament was to control the army and navy for twenty years, and after that time to arrange for their future administration. All high officials were to be named by Parliament. Many Royalists were to be proscribed; and the rebellion in Ireland was to be put down as Parliament should direct. What place was left for the King in these conditions it is hard to see. An intolerant

Presbyterian and parliamentary tyranny was to be set up. The King, still hoping for assistance from France, made an evasive reply. The Scots pressed him to take the Covenant, offering, if he would do so, to support his rights in other respects. The Queen, who thought one heretic as bad as another, begged him to throw over the Church.

At length, on the rupture of the Irish peace, and the dissipation of hopes from France, the King informed the Scottish Commissioners (October 13) that he was ready to give up the militia for ten years, or even for life, and to grant Presbyterianism for five years, provided that a regulated Episcopacy should follow. These proposals failed to satisfy the Scots; still less could they satisfy the English Parliament. The two bodies now came to terms. The Scots had already offered to withdraw their forces on payment of their expenses and arrears. They estimated these at half-a-million; Parliament offered £400,000, which the Scots agreed to accept. The Houses voted that they should dispose of the King; and the Scottish Parliament, convinced at last that Charles was obdurate, assented. At the end of January, 1647, the Scots, having received half the sum to be paid them, handed over the King to the English Commissioners, and left Newcastle. By February 11 the last of them had recrossed the Tweed. They have been much blamed for "selling their King"; but this is unjust. The money they received was in discharge of a debt incurred by the Parliament which their assistance had saved. They rendered up the King because he refused to assent to the only terms which would have enabled them to raise their fellow-countrymen in his behalf.

The Scots having withdrawn to their own country, and the King having been brought south and lodged at Holmby House in Northamptonshire, Parliament and army were now left face to face, to settle their own differences and their dispute with the King as best they could. The Presbyterian majority in the Houses and in the City of London appear to have thought that, having got rid of one body of inconvenient allies, it would be comparatively easy to dispense with the other. There were several reasons which made them anxious to accomplish this end. In the first place, it would leave their hands free to deal with the King. Secondly, the existence of an armed force, now predominantly Independent, was an obstacle to the settlement of the ecclesiastical question on a strictly Presbyterian basis. Lastly, the cost of the army was enormous, and imposed a strain on the resources of the country which, though borne with more or less equanimity while the war lasted, was now regarded as unnecessary, and would, if continued, make the Parliamentary Government highly unpopular. The Parliamentary revenue has been calculated at about a million and a half, more than twice as much as Charles had ever enjoyed. Of this sum the army and the navy together swallowed up, in 1647, about three-fifths. The ravages of war, bad harvests, and a natural falling-off of trade, weakened

the national capacity for bearing such a burden, and increased the general discontent. There was good reason, therefore, for a large reduction of military expenditure. The continued existence of rebellion in Ireland, which it was highly important to put down, supplied a pretext for transporting a large part of the force to that country. The rest, it was thought, might be disbanded. But Parliament reckoned without its host.

In February, 1647, a scheme for the reduction of the army was brought forward; it passed both Houses by March 6. No infantry was to be kept in England, except in garrisons; the fortresses were to be mostly demolished, so that the number of garrison-troops would be but small; on an emergency, infantry for the field could be furnished by the trained bands. The cavalry, as requiring more training, was to be kept up at the figure of 6600. A force of about 12,500 men, horse and foot, was to be sent to Ireland; this force, however, was not to be composed of existing units, but of volunteers—a measure which would destroy that potent military element, *esprit de corps*. The remaining infantry, amounting to about half that of the New Model army, were to disappear. Had Parliament at the same time satisfied the soldiers' just claims for arrears of pay, there might have been some chance for this project; but money was scarce, and Parliament neglected this indispensable condition of success.

A deputation was sent to Saffron Walden, where the bulk of the army was encamped, to invite volunteers for Ireland; but only about one in ten accepted the invitation. The officers put inconvenient questions, asking especially for satisfaction in regard to arrears, and security for pay and subsistence if they went to Ireland. The arrears varied from about four months to ten or more, and amounted in all to over £330,000. The soldiers also demanded an indemnity for their actions in the war. Had they got satisfaction on these points, many would have been willing to go to Ireland, preserving their regimental organisation and under Fairfax and Cromwell as their leaders; but Parliament had made choice of Skippon and Massey, both Presbyterians; and it evidently intended to break up the army and get rid of the prominent Independents. The soldiers argued, "If they be thus scornfully dealt withal for their faithful services whilst the sword is in their hands, what shall their usage be when they are dissolved!"

They therefore drew up a petition to Fairfax, asking his assistance in obtaining the above-mentioned demands and certain others of a moderate nature. Parliament, highly indignant, declared the petition to be mutinous, but made no motion to redress the wrong. As, however, the Parliamentary Commissioners with the army failed to obtain volunteers for Ireland, and many of those who had offered their services withdrew, Parliament was compelled, in April, to vote six weeks' arrears of pay, afterwards increased to eight, to be paid on disbandment. Such

a resolution, while recognising the justice of the complaints, did not go near to satisfying them; and the army began to organise itself with a view to pressing its claims. Towards the end of April, the soldiers of eight cavalry regiments chose agents, or "Agitators," two for each regiment, to carry their petition to Westminster, and otherwise to act on their behalf. Early in May the example set was followed by the whole army. Parliament, in much alarm, sent Cromwell and other military members down to pacify the soldiers, with instructions to promise an indemnity, immediate payment of a large part of the arrears, and security for the rest. The efforts of the mediators were successful; and the officers, after consultation with the Agitators, drew up a friendly "Declaration," asking that these somewhat vague promises might be further defined (May 16).

Meanwhile Parliament had been casting about for the means of offering armed resistance, if necessary, to the petitioners, and had issued orders remodelling the City militia, from which all Independents were to be excluded. But a much larger design was now being hatched. Plans were considered for bringing the Scots again upon the scene; and four Commissioners, with Lauderdale at their head, were sent by the Scottish Committee of Estates to England, with instructions to reopen negotiations with the King. Ostensibly they were to support the Newcastle Propositions; secretly they were instructed to drop the demand that the King should take the Covenant, and to insist only on a temporary adoption of Presbyterianism. On May 13 Lauderdale was allowed to go to Holmby House, whence the King had, on the previous day, addressed a communication to Parliament offering to adopt Presbyterianism for three years, and to resign the militia for ten. A few days later Parliament agreed to accept this offer as a basis for discussion.

The foundation of an alliance between Scottish and English Presbyterians and an understanding with Charles being thus laid, Parliament proceeded to vote the disbandment of all soldiers who should not go to Ireland. The Agitators at once protested. Under Cromwell's influence Parliament offered some concessions; but on May 25 the majority decided to proceed with the disbandment, and to bring the artillery train from Oxford to London. The Agitators now determined to resist; the army got out of hand; and mutinies broke out at Chelmsford and elsewhere. The Presbyterians were discussing a plan for removing the King to Scotland; some time previously the army had considered the advisability of capturing him for itself. Face to face with military anarchy, Cromwell was obliged to take a side; and, with his connivance at least, Cornet Joyce carried off the King to Newmarket, where a general rendezvous had been arranged (June 4-8). Fairfax had nothing to do with Joyce's raid, but he and Cromwell joined the army at Newmarket; and, on the initiative of the latter, a "Solemn Engagement" was subscribed. Throwing the blame on their Presbyterian opponents

the soldiers agreed not to disband without receiving satisfaction, and established a "Council of the Army," composed of officers and representatives of the men, which should in future conduct their joint affairs. The army thus took up an independent position in the State.

Emboldened by this success, yet anxious to justify its action in the eyes of the world, the army now widened its demands. Hitherto the soldiers had merely claimed justice and consideration for themselves; they now began to assert the rights of the nation against a tyrannical Parliament, and to formulate political views. From their camp at Triploe Heath, a few miles south of Cambridge, they sent a remonstrance to the City of London (June 10), demanding a recognition of their rights, not as soldiers but as Englishmen, and threatening to enforce them. They then set out to march by Royston towards the capital. On June 15 they issued a "Declaration," in which they asserted their right, as not being "a mere mercenary army," to speak for the people whose liberties they had been called on to defend. For the first time they put forward a positive political programme, in the formulation of which the dominant influence of Henry Ireton has been traced. They demanded that Parliament should dissolve itself; that the future duration of Parliaments should be fixed by statute; that offences should be punished by law; and that the right of petition should be recognised. The presentation of this remarkable document to the House of Commons was followed by charges against eleven members, including Holles and William Waller, whose suspension was demanded on the ground that they had sought to overthrow the rights and liberties of subjects, and had sown dissension between army and Parliament. Parliament refused these demands, whereupon the army moved to Uxbridge. The Commons gave way; and, with permission of the House, the eleven members retired.

Other demands, more specially concerning the army itself, were subsequently put forward; but the real point at issue was whether Parliament should remain predominantly Presbyterian, and therefore intolerant, or not. Some of the hotter heads in the army were for entering London and purging the House of Commons at once; but Cromwell, who acted throughout as a mediator, dissuaded them for the time; and the army withdrew to Bedford (July 22). The Presbyterians, encouraged by this apparent hesitation, recovered themselves. A mob from the City invaded the Houses, and compelled them to reverse their recent concession; and the eleven members returned. Meanwhile the army had opened direct negotiations with the King, offering to restore him to the throne, and to accept Episcopacy, if only they could have complete toleration. Thus from the Scots and from the army he received offers of help, combined in the one case with Presbyterianism, in the other with religious liberty.

On July 17 Ireton had sketched out a policy for the army in the far-sighted plan called the "Heads of the Proposals." Under this scheme

the Bishops were to be deprived of coercive jurisdiction; no penalties were to be inflicted on nonconformists; and the Covenant was to be put aside. The existing Parliament was to fix a date for its dissolution; future Parliaments were to be biennial, with a redistribution of seats giving more weight to populous towns and districts; and their duration was to be limited. A Council of State, to be named at first by agreement, was to exercise a large control over public affairs, including the regulation of the militia for ten years. During the same period, Parliament was to appoint military commanders and the higher civil officials; after which time the King was to appoint commanders with the approval of Parliament, and to choose civil officials out of a list of three nominated by Parliament in each case. Stipulations for "a lenient treatment of Royalists" concluded this statesmanlike paper, which, however, was too radical to stand much chance of acceptance at that date.

Having made its intentions clear, the army now advanced upon London, which was almost in a state of anarchy. As it approached, some 67 Independent members, including the two Speakers, Manchester and Lenthall, joined it outside the walls, and returned with it when, on August 6, it marched through the City. The eleven members and other Presbyterians fled; and for a little time, the Independents had a majority in Parliament. The first collision between the military and the civil power had ended, naturally, in the victory of the army; but the advantage which it had gained was only temporary.

Cromwell had for some time striven to reach a basis of agreement with the King—an attitude which brought him into suspicion with the hotter spirits in the army, who thought him to be bargaining for personal honours and private ends. As he was already suspected by the majority in Parliament, detested by many, and feared by all, his position as a mediator became very difficult. He was charged with hypocrisy; and his changes of front, though not difficult to explain on another hypothesis, gave some colour to the charge. As he said himself, when charged with ambition, "no one rises so high as he who knows not whither he is going." But an impartial estimate will not charge him with aiming at the height which he eventually reached. His talents had placed him in a position of responsibility from which he could not retire without shame, even had his fervent temper and his consciousness of ability allowed him to withdraw. Being there, he met each difficulty as it arose, not looking far ahead, but seeking the likeliest visible method of securing the objects on which his heart was set. Such a course, involving not a few sudden turns, was naturally open to misinterpretation.

At this time, convinced as Cromwell was throughout that a monarchy was the only stable form of government in England, he was resolved, if possible, to come to terms with the King. It was not his fault that an agreement with Charles could not be made. The "Heads of the Proposals" were modified to meet the King's views; but Charles' conviction that he

held the best cards and must win in the end rendered all these efforts fruitless. "Sir," said Ireton, "you have an intention to be the arbitrator between the Parliament and us; and we mean to be it between your Majesty and the Parliament." Nevertheless, he told Parliament that he preferred the "Heads"—as well he might—to the Newcastle Propositions, urged upon him by Scottish and English Presbyterians. Parliament voted this answer a refusal. In vain Cromwell and Ireton pressed him to adopt their views. The failure of his allies in Ireland—Jones' victory at Dangan Hill (August), the storming of Cashel (September), the rout of Lord Taaffe at Mallow (November)—might have shown him the danger of delay. But nothing would induce him to take a decided line, for he was bent on playing off one party against another, until the dissensions between them should give him a chance of recovering power through a second civil war. Though Cromwell was, or pretended to be, blind to this design, many less responsible persons in the army appear to have seen through it. The temper of the soldiers grew more bitter; and an anti-monarchical feeling began to manifest itself.

It was now that the nickname "Levellers," a designation which explains itself, was first applied to the advanced section of the Independent party. Their tenets came to light in "The Case of the Army fully stated" (October 9) and "The Agreement of the People," which appeared three weeks later. The former of these documents put forward the theory that, since "all power is originally and essentially in the whole body of the people," and "their free choice and consent by their representatives, the only original foundation of all just government," Parliament, *i.e.* the representative Commons, must be supreme. Parliaments were to be biennial, and elected by manhood suffrage. It was implied that the Crown and the House of Lords were superfluous, or at least should be entirely subordinate. So complete a transfer of Divine Right from King to people had not hitherto been suggested.

The "Agreement," while in several respects repeating the "Heads of the Proposals," was peculiar in that it reserved, even from the otherwise omnipotent control of the representative Parliament, certain unalterable principles, the chief of which were: that all should enjoy complete religious liberty, that none should be forced to serve in the army, and that none should be exempt from the ordinary course of law. Here we find foreshadowed that principle of distinguishing certain inalienable rights of man, which was so marked a feature of both the American and the French Revolution. But such radical views as these were not endorsed by the leaders of the army. On the contrary, a committee appointed on Cromwell's initiative to consider these schemes drew up a fresh plan, which, while adopting the "Heads of the Proposals" in the main, with insignificant modifications, expressly preserved the monarchy and the House of Lords. This plan may be regarded as embodying the minimum demands of Cromwell and his more moderate allies.

Meanwhile, as the control of the militia became more and more the dominant consideration in 'Charles' mind, the Scottish Commissioners were gaining favour with him at the expense of their rivals. On their part, the Scots dreaded more and more the power and the radical doctrines of the army, and became more ready to make concessions to the King. They now urged him to escape. Acting on their advice, he secretly left Hampton Court, made his way to the south coast, and, hoping to find a vessel to convey him to France, crossed to the Isle of Wight. There he took refuge with Colonel Hammond, who lodged him in Carisbrooke Castle (November 14). On the same day, the exasperation of the army culminated in a dangerous mutiny at Ware, which was only suppressed by Cromwell at the risk of his own life. Discipline was restored, but it was significant that only one mutineer was punished. Cromwell's eyes seem to have been opened to the fact that further adhesion to the policy of mediation would destroy his hold upon the army. Thenceforward, though he did not abandon the hope of saving the monarchy, he ceased to be Charles' friend.

Charles' first step at Carisbrooke was to renew the negotiation with Parliament (November 16). He offered Presbyterianism for three years, with subsequent consideration of ecclesiastical reform, and the militia for life. There was to be a measure of toleration; and the demands of the army were to be fairly considered. Thereupon Parliament made a selection from the Newcastle Propositions, which they embodied in what were called the Four Bills. The chief of these proposed to enact that Parliament should control the militia for twenty years; that the Crown should never afterwards administer it without Parliamentary consent; and that the present Parliament might adjourn itself whither it pleased. The Bills were submitted to the King on December 24. But it can hardly be doubted that his previous offer must be regarded as a mere blind, put forward with the object of gaining time; for the intrigue with the Scots had now reached a head.

On December 26 Charles agreed with the Scottish Commissioners in what was afterwards known as the "Engagement." In this document it was arranged that the Covenant should be confirmed by Act of Parliament, though no one should be forced to take it; that Presbyterianism should be established for three years, after which a religious settlement should be made with the King's assent; and that the Sects, *i.e.* the Independents and other nonconformists, should be suppressed. The King was to control the militia; and a new Parliament was to be called. The Scots were to support the disbandment of the army; and, if this were refused, they were to issue a declaration asserting the King's rights over the militia, and to send an army into England in support of the claim. Other clauses were added, providing for the admission of Scotsmen to the Privy Council, and their employment in other places of trust. Of the perfidy of this transaction there can, unfortunately, be no doubt.

In November Charles had offered toleration to one party. Next month he expressly repudiated it in his agreement with another. Having thus taken a step which could only lead to civil war, he formally rejected (December 28) the Four Bills.

These intrigues were of course unknown to the public. All that was apparent was that the conflicting parties could not agree, and that the King's position was at least no worse than it had been at any time in the last year and a half. The country was sick of incertitude; the Royalist reaction gained ground; and riots broke out in many places. Parliament knew nothing of the Engagement, but they surmised the cause which emboldened the King to his last step. They were probably not without an inkling of the fact that the Scottish Commissioners had for some time been engaged in concerting measures with the English Royalists for a general rising, to coincide with their own invasion. On January 2, 1648, the Commissioners left London.

Next day Parliament put an end to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, and placed executive power in the hands of its English members. The Commons also passed a vote that no further addresses should be sent to the King; in other words, they treated him as a hostile power. The Lords, after much hesitation, accepted this "Vote of No Addresses" on January 15. This action was justified in a "Declaration" (February 11), a sort of repetition of the Grand Remonstrance, in which the King's misdeeds were set forth, especially his efforts to bring in forces from Ireland, France, Holland, and elsewhere, to undo the results of the four years' struggle, and to kindle anew the flames of civil war throughout the land. The Declaration was warmly supported by Cromwell, who was now trying to get the Prince of Wales proclaimed King in the place of his father. A curious sidelight of humour is thrown upon these darkening clouds in the incident related by Ludlow, when, after he had vainly tried to get Cromwell to declare himself for a monarchy or a republic, the two generals took to pelting each other, like boys, with cushions, till Cromwell ran away.

Preparations for the war that was felt to be inevitable were now begun by both sides. Signs of the Royalist reaction multiplied; and arrangements for a combined rising were actively pushed forward. The sailors of the fleet, long dissatisfied with the action of the army, were annoyed by the appointment of Rainborow, a leading "Leveller," to command them in the place of the Presbyterian Batten. It was hoped that they would declare for the King. In the Scottish Parliament, which met in March, there was a decided majority for Hamilton and war; but Argyll, who clung to peace, had a strong party at his back, and was supported by the bulk of the ministers, who condemned the "Engagers" for upholding a non-covenanted King. Cromwell still strove to put off the evil day, and vainly tried to bring the King to abdicate in favour of the Prince of Wales. Another project of the same fertile brain, to

put the Duke of York on the throne, was frustrated by the escape of the young Prince, disguised as a girl, to Flanders (April 21).

A few days later, news came to Westminster that the Scottish Parliament had resolved to raise an army. Their manifesto, issued on May 3, demanded that all Englishmen should take the Covenant, that all heresy should be suppressed, that the King should be brought near London for the purpose of negotiation, and that the Independent army should be disbanded. Royalism and the Covenant made an ill-assorted combination; the Scots were aiming at irreconcilable ends; and their host was divided in its aims. But the imminence of the danger brought the English Parliament and army nearer together than they had been for two years. Cromwell induced the House of Commons to consent, by a large majority, to a settlement under which government by King, Lords, and Commons would be retained, and toleration, under a Presbyterian system, would be secured. Who the King should be, was not declared. Then Cromwell hastened to Windsor, to meet the Agitators, in whom his continued efforts to win over the King had inspired a deep-seated distrust. After three days of anxious prayer and discussion, amid a tumult of emotion, the meeting agreed to prosecute the war with all their force, resolving, as one who was present has related, that "it was our duty, if ever the Lord brought us back in peace, to call Charles Stuart, that man of blood, to an account for the blood he had shed, and the mischief he had done to his utmost, against the Lord's cause and people in these poor nations." In such stern temper the second Civil War began.

The Royalist combination was formidable, but it was difficult to secure concert between its ill-assorted elements. The Scots wanted time for preparation, while the English Cavaliers feared that delay would enable Parliament to tie their hands. A premature explosion was brought about in South Wales by the disbandment of Laugharne's troops, which had won that country for Parliament in 1645, and by the dismissal of Poyer from the governorship of Pembroke Castle. By the beginning of May the insurrection had become so serious that Cromwell was sent to suppress it. Fairfax himself was to go north, for Berwick and Carlisle had been seized by Royalists. It became necessary to trust the City militia with the care of Parliament and the capital, though the riots which had lately occurred (April 9 and 10) gave good ground for uneasiness. The southern counties, fretted by the burdens they had to bear, were now as malcontent as those of the north. Essex, Kent, and Surrey petitioned for an arrangement with the King and the disbandment of the army. Towards the end of May there was an extensive rising in Kent; Dartford and Deptford were seized; while six ships lying in the Downs declared for the King, and helped to get possession of the castles on that part of the coast.

Fairfax had to postpone his march northward, and went to meet

the Kentish insurgents with 8000 men. He found them behind the Medway, between Maidstone and Rochester, numbering about 11,000, and under the command of the elder Goring, whom Charles had made Earl of Norwich. Crossing the Medway above Maidstone, Fairfax stormed that town on June 1 and dispersed the Royalist gathering. While he was restoring order in east Kent, Norwich made his way from Rochester to Blackheath and crossed the Thames, followed by a few hundreds. He hoped to be joined by the men of Essex, and to be welcomed by the Londoners; but Warner, the Lord Mayor, and Skippon, who commanded the militia, kept the City gates closed.

About 5000 Royalists mustered at Chelmsford, and Norwich, disappointed of London, decided to lead them northward; but Sir Charles Lucas, a Colchester man, persuaded him to take that town on his way, as a good recruiting ground. He arrived there on the 12th; Fairfax appeared before the place next day with 5000 men, having crossed the Thames at Gravesend. Its old Roman walls made Colchester a sort of fortress. The Royalists were quickly driven into the town from the position they had taken up outside; but an attempt to penetrate by one of the gates was repulsed; and the Parliamentarians found they had a siege before them, for which they were ill provided. Fairfax, anxious to employ his troops elsewhere, offered good conditions—passes for the officers to go abroad, and pardons for the men. These terms were refused, for, as Lord Capel wrote to Langdale, "We here conceive that our tying and obliging Fairfax to us is the best way of proceeding for His Majesty's service."

While Fairfax was blockading Colchester, Cromwell, who found the rising in South Wales already half suppressed through Horton's victory at St Fagan's, was waiting for his siege-guns before Pembroke. His batteries opened fire on July 4, and a week later the town and castle surrendered. His work in South Wales was done, and he was badly needed in the north, for the Scots had crossed the border on the 8th. What caused more alarm at Westminster was the appearance of Lord Holland at Kingston on July 5, at the head of some 500 horsemen. He held a commission as the Royalist commander-in-chief, and hoped to gather an army from the southern counties. But he soon found that impatience of taxation was not the same thing as readiness to fight for the King. A few troops of Parliamentary horse proved more than a match for his men. He made his way with a small following to St Neots, and was taken prisoner there on July 10.

The Scottish army had been raised slowly and by compulsion. Royalism wore a Presbyterian mask in Scotland; and its programme was to set free Parliament as well as the King, and to settle religion. But many officers of experience, including the Leslie's, kept aloof; the soldiers were raw; and the commander, the Duke of Hamilton, had neither military ability nor decision of character. At first only 10,000

men entered England, but they were joined by 4000 Cavaliers under Langdale, by 3000 veteran Scots from Ulster under Munro, and by other reinforcements, which gradually brought their numbers up to 24,000. Lambert, the Parliamentary commander, had only about 5000 men; he was obliged to fall back into Yorkshire, and placed himself near Knaresborough, to cover the siege of Pontefract, which the Royalists had surprised. On August 13 he was joined by Cromwell, who had been urged to make haste lest Parliament should "vote an approbation of the coming in of the Scots army." The attitude of Parliament was most uncertain. The Commons had, indeed, declared the Scots to be enemies (July 21); the Lords not only declined to adopt this position, but published a Scottish manifesto refusing toleration to either sectaries or episcopalians.

Hamilton now held a council of war at Hornby, which decided for an advance through Lancashire, instead of crossing the fells into Yorkshire. Cromwell had less than 9000 men disposable, of whom 2000 were Lancashire levies, but he reckoned it his business "to engage the enemy to fight." As the Scots moved south he struck west, and, marching up the Wharfe and down the Ribble, by August 17 he was near Preston, where he expected Hamilton would halt to collect his troops. The main body of the Scottish infantry was on the point of crossing the river there when Cromwell arrived. Most of their cavalry was at Wigan, fifteen miles south; and 5000 men under Munro and Musgrave were at Kirkby Lonsdale, thirty miles north. Langdale was left to hold the Parliamentarians in check, while the Scots passed the Ribble to recover touch with their horse. The Cavaliers stood their ground gallantly for four hours, and were nearly all killed or taken. Leaving a force to hold Preston, Cromwell pursued Hamilton's army, which hurried southward, marching night and day. The Scottish foot surrendered at Warrington on the 20th; and Cromwell, whose men were worn out with doing execution on the enemy for thirty miles, turned back, leaving the chase to Lambert, to whom Hamilton himself surrendered on the 25th at Uttoxeter. Munro retreated into Scotland, leaving his English allies to shift for themselves. He was followed by Cromwell, who went on to Edinburgh, and helped Argyll to get the better of the discredited Engagers. Cromwell remained in Scotland for about two months, and did not return to London till December.

The hopes of aid from France or Ireland had come to nothing; and the attempts of the King to escape from Carisbrooke had failed. Nor did the fleet prove of much service to the Royal cause. The ships that had declared for the King in May had sailed for Holland, and had been joined by others. In the middle of July they put to sea with the Prince of Wales on board, and Willoughby of Parham as vice-admiral. They lay for some weeks in the Downs, capturing merchantmen, and were joined there by Batten, who brought the number of ships up to

eleven. The Prince had just come to terms with Lauderdale as to his joining the Scottish army when that army ceased to exist. Warwick had been reappointed admiral by Parliament; but he was not in a position to attack the Royalist fleet, for some of his ships were at Portsmouth and some in the Thames. Towards the end of August the Royalist fleet sailed up to the Nore, and tried to bring on an action, but a gale intervened. The Royalists were obliged to return to Holland for supplies; and Warwick was able to unite the two halves of his fleet in the Downs.

By this time Colchester, which had looked in vain for help from the Prince, had been starved into surrender. Fairfax, reinforced by the trained bands of Suffolk, had drawn his lines tightly round it; and the foot-soldiers of the garrison would not allow their officers and the horse to break out, leaving them behind. The news from Preston put an end to all hope of relief; and, as surrender became more certain and less urgent, the besiegers' terms grew harder. By the conditions signed on August 27 quarter was allowed to privates and subalterns, but superior officers "submitted to mercy." Two of them, Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle, were shot next day, "for some satisfaction to military justice, and in part of avenge for the innocent blood they have caused to be spilt, and the trouble, damage, and mischief they have brought upon the town, this country, and the kingdom." The two lords, Norwich and Capel, were reserved for the judgment of their peers. With the fall of Colchester, the war in England was practically over.

The execution of Lucas and Lisle has been denounced and defended from that day to this. "The manner of taking the lives of these worthy men was new and without example, and concluded by most men to be very barbarous," says Clarendon, "and was generally imputed to Ireton, who swayed the general, and was upon all occasions of an unmerciful and bloody nature." But, as Macaulay says of Monmouth, "every man who heads a rebellion against an established government stakes his life on the event." One may admire the man, and yet recognise the justice of the penalty. In the first civil war, King and Parliament had declared each other's adherents to be traitors; but there were good reasons for not treating them as such. The case was by no means the same with the second war; and cool-judging men might well come to the conclusion that some severity would be wholesome. When Sheridan was sent to restore order in Texas in May, 1865, after the Confederate Government had been broken up, Grant instructed him that those who resisted should not be regarded as belligerents, but were in the condition of outlaws. Both Lucas and Lisle had been paroled in the first war; and that was doubtless one reason why they were "pitched upon for this example," though the ground taken by Fairfax and his council was that Parliament had pronounced them traitors and rebels.

The situation was now again something like what it had been in

February, 1647; but there were great differences. In the first place, it was no longer necessary to consider the Scots; the crushing defeat of Preston had deprived Presbyterianism of all hope of assistance from that quarter. In the second place, the temper of the army had changed; and the time had come for them to redeem their vow. On the other hand, the end of the long struggle on the Continent was in sight; and France and Holland would shortly be free to intervene, if they wished, in the affairs of England. The Peace of Westphalia was actually signed on October 24 (N.S.), 1648. The possibility of such intervention could not be ignored; and the hope of it on one side, the fear of it on the other, had disastrous results. If it confirmed Charles in his expectant and dilatory attitude, it quickened the pace and embittered the decisions of his enemies. That the Fronde would effectually paralyse the French Government for some years to come could not have been foreseen when Colchester fell.

The first measures of the Parliament showed that the Presbyterians—for the eleven members had returned, and there was again a Presbyterian majority at Westminster—had learnt nothing, and were as fully determined as before to ignore the army which had saved them a second time. They passed a resolution repealing the vote of No Addresses (August 24); they completed their scheme for the establishment of Presbyterianism, without a vestige of toleration; and on September 18 they reopened a negotiation, known as the Treaty of Newport, with the King.

Charles began by withdrawing his declarations against Parliament, but insisted that no concessions which he might make should be held valid until a complete scheme of settlement should be arranged. Parliament reluctantly accepted this stipulation; and thus an air of unreality was spread, from the outset, over all that passed. Parliament then drew up a series of Bills, abolishing Episcopacy and the Prayer-Book, establishing the Presbyterian system and the use of the Directory, imposing the Covenant on all persons, including the King himself, and handing over military control to Parliament for twenty years. Charles, in his reply (September 28), refused to take the Covenant himself or to enforce it on others, but offered, as before, to accept Presbyterianism, with toleration, for three years, and to hand over the army and the nomination of officials for ten. After three years, the Bishops were to return, but with restricted powers. Ireland he was willing to leave to the tender mercies of Parliament. His offer was unanimously rejected (October 2). Thereupon he yielded so far as to accept the demand about the militia, and to propose further limitations on episcopal jurisdiction. Had Parliament been wise, it would have accepted these terms, than which Charles could not have been expected, without violation of his conscience, to offer anything better. But the Presbyterian majority was uncompromising; and on October 27 they rejected the terms. This virtually closed the negotiation, though the Parliamentary Commissioners remained at Newnort till November 27.

Meanwhile the ill-humour of the army, and its irritation at the delay, were increasing daily. Petitions for a speedy settlement, or for justice on the King, kept pouring in upon the Council of Officers, not from soldiers only but also from civilians. Losing patience, Ireton now drew up (October) the "*Remonstrance of the Army*," in which he showed the danger of protracted negotiation, and the impossibility of binding the King, on account not only of his character, but also of royalist theories as to the inalienable rights of the Crown. Insisting on the "*sovereignty of the People*," he demanded a speedy trial, on the ground that no one, not even a King, was exempt from the law; and he hinted, not obscurely, that the trial should end in a sentence of death. The constitutional settlement which he proposed was, in the main, based upon the "*Heads of the Proposals*," but with the addition, taken from the "*Agreement of the People*," of the reservation of certain fundamental liberties. Nothing was said about ecclesiastical matters; but it may be presumed that liberty of conscience was regarded as a fundamental right. On the other hand, all future Kings were to be admitted "upon the election of, and as upon trust from, the people," and were to renounce the "*negative voice*" (or veto) upon the decisions of the representative body or Commons in Parliament. Finally, the whole scheme was based on the notion of contract; no one, from the King downwards, was to benefit by it who did not "*consent and subscribe thereunto*." A remarkable combination of thought and prowess, a very workshop of political ideas, was this body of militant Independents. In no other army, before or since, have so many constitutional theories or expedients been conceived.

The Remonstrance was considered by a Council of Officers, which met, under the presidency of Fairfax, at St Albans (November 7). The general deprecated extreme measures; and a practical compromise was agreed upon. The treaty with the King was to go forward; but the army was to take part in the negotiation, with a view to the enforcement of certain conditions. These were largely drawn from the "*Heads of the Proposals*"—biennial Parliaments, redistribution of seats, Council of State, and so forth; but, while the existing Parliament was to fix a date for its dissolution, the army was not to be disbanded until after the meeting of the first biennial Parliament. It is noteworthy that nothing was said about the royal veto or about an ecclesiastical settlement; but it may be presumed that religious liberty was regarded as otherwise secured. The concessions to be made by the King were not to be temporary but permanent. Certainty and finality were indispensable.

These terms were promptly laid before the King, who, on November 17, declined them as he had previously declined those of Parliament. By this refusal he practically signed his own death-warrant. The Council of Officers thereupon presented the Remonstrance to Parliament. Cromwell, who had hitherto acted with Fairfax in striving to defer the King's trial, was now convinced that further efforts were hopeless, and

threw his weight into the same scale. Parliament, however, refusing military dictation, deferred consideration of the Remonstrance. This action left the army no alternative but capitulation or the use of force. Their choice was soon made. On December 1 Charles was carried off from Newport, and lodged in Hurst Castle, a lonely fort on a spit of land opposite the Needles. Next day the army entered London, still nominally under the lead of Fairfax. On December 5 Parliament condemned the removal of the King, and voted his answers to be a basis for settlement. But the military intervention of August, 1647, was now to be repeated on a larger scale.

The officers had for some time decided to destroy the independence of Parliament, which, it must be allowed, was no more representative of the nation as a whole than was the army. It was a question whether this should take place through a “purge” or a dissolution. Eventually the former method was preferred, partly as less violent, still more (probably) because a general election was out of the question and the remaining members would give some shadow of legality, however faint, to future proceedings. On December 6, Colonel Pride, with his men, stood at the door of the House of Commons, and turned back about one hundred and forty members. Most of these made no resistance, but some forty were taken into custody. Cromwell returned to London the same evening. He had not been consulted, but expressed his pleasure at the event. Fairfax had given no orders, but he made no attempt to prevent, or to undo, this act of violence, which obtained the name of “Pride’s Purge.”

The members left in the House lost no time in cancelling the votes which had reopened the negotiation with Charles in the previous August, but they declined to fix a date for their own dissolution. They were not pressed on this point, for their assistance was required in the approaching trial of the King. Charles was brought from Hurst to Windsor (December 19–23); and, at the instance of certain peers and with the consent of Cromwell, who still wished to defer the trial, final overtures were made to him. As the proposals appear to have involved changes which would have reduced the King to the position of “a Doge of Venice,” it is not surprising that he refused even to see Denbigh, who brought them down. This refusal determined his fate. A hostile verdict being a foregone conclusion, it had been discussed whether the sentence should be death or deposition. Charles’ last action put an end to Cromwell’s hesitation. He decided for an immediate trial and the penalty of death.

On January 1, 1649, the Commons passed an ordinance establishing a Court, and resolved that it was treason in a King of England to levy war upon his Parliament. The Lords, who, though now reduced in numbers to something under a dozen, preserved some independent spirit and sense of law, unanimously rejected the ordinance as *extra vires*.

Thereupon the Lower House proceeded to act upon the principles laid down by Ireton, and resolved that "the people are, under God, the original of all just power"; that the Commons, as representing the people, "have the supreme power in this nation"; and that their enactments, without consent of King or Lords, have the force of law. Next day they passed (January 6) an "Act" (as it was now called) setting up a Court of 135 Commissioners, to try the King, and stating in outline the charges to be brought. In the preamble to this Act he was accused of a design "to subvert the ancient and fundamental laws and liberties of this nation, and in their place to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government," and of having prosecuted this design "with fire and sword" and by means of "a cruel war." For these "high and treasonable offences" he might long since have been condignly punished, had not Parliament hoped to attain peace by other means; but, since their leniency had only led to fresh commotions and invasions, and in order that no future ruler should follow his example, he was now to be brought to justice.

Of the Commissioners appointed only 52 appeared when the Court held its first sitting on January 8. Serjeant John Bradshaw was chosen to preside. Fairfax was present on the first occasion but on no other. On the 19th the actual trial began, in the same historic place, Westminster Hall, which had witnessed, eight years before, the impeachment of Charles' greatest minister. On the charge being read, the King objected to the authority of the Court; but his objection and those of others were overruled. It is useless to describe in detail the proceedings of a case in which law and precedent were set at naught, and the issue of which had long been decided elsewhere. In vain Charles demanded to be heard before the Lords and Commons; the Court decided there could be no appeal. On the 27th the sentence was read to the prisoner; on the 30th it was carried out in front of his palace of Whitehall, before a sorrowing and horror-stricken crowd.

Charles met his fate with the calmness and dignity which never deserted him. He died with forgiveness of his enemies on his lips, and a protest against the subjection of his country to the power of the sword. His character, with its good and bad sides, need not be discussed here. It is sufficiently displayed in the history of his reign; and men will always hold various opinions of so mixed and contradictory a nature. It would be absurd to say that he alone was guilty of all the miseries that befell the State in his time; others were also to blame—some, perhaps, as much as he. It was a hard fate which called Charles to rule the country at a crisis which required in a sovereign qualities that he did not possess. But the impartial verdict of History must be that, if, as is true, he died a martyr to his convictions, he died also a victim of his own incapacity and untrustworthiness.

CHAPTER XII.

THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY.

RELIGIOUS grievances formed one of the chief irritant causes of the revolt heralded by the meeting of the Long Parliament in November, 1640. As a consequence, the attention of both Houses was immediately on their assembling directed to these grievances; and the consideration of them consumed a serious part of the time of the Parliament during the first three years of its existence. Most of the religious debates and agitations of these three years, 1640-3, proved futile, in the sense that very little sound legislative enactment resulted from them: but in another sense they proved effectual beyond the anticipation even of extremists. For they brought to light an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the party of moderate reform and the Root-and-Branch party. From the moment that the Long Parliament accepted the Covenant as the price of Scotch military aid, the reconstruction of the national Church on a Presbyterian basis became a political necessity; and, so soon as the Long Parliament clearly apprehended that necessity, the existence of the Assembly of Divines was determined and its work was outlined in prospect.

There is thus an important difference in kind between the attempted religious legislation of the Long Parliament prior to the outbreak of the Civil War and the actually accomplished legislation after its outbreak. Starting with a marked unwillingness to approach the question of Episcopacy as an institution, the House of Commons gradually, by means of its debates of December, 1640, on the moderate proposals of the "Ministers' Petition," and of February and March, 1641, on the more drastic proposals of the "London Petition," rose to the point of challenging Episcopacy as a system. At the same time, and proceeding quite independently, the House of Lords was, under the guidance of Bishop Williams' Committee, feeling its way to a standard of reform a little, but not much, short of that reached by the Commons. The debates in the Commons resulted in the Bill of April, 1641, for removing Bishops from the House of Lords: while the debates in the Lords finally resulted in the Bill of July, 1641, for regulating Bishops and Ecclesiastical

Courts. Both Bills proved abortive; and it was doubtless the indignation of the Commons at the loss of their Bill in the Upper House which gave the opportunity for the introduction of the Root-and-Branch Bill in May, 1641. Henceforward the extremists held the field, and the moderate standard of ecclesiastical reform previously proposed was thrown over. But the important point to notice is that even when the extremists thus held the field their proposals not merely fell short of a Scottish Presbytery but were essentially different in kind from it. The Root-and-Branch debates resulted in the formulation of a scheme of ecclesiastical discipline and proposals for ordination which were essentially non-Presbyterian in character. This was the point reached by the Long Parliament in July, 1641, and beyond that point it never went of its own initiative. After the recess the Parliament was occupied with the debates on the Grand Remonstrance; and, as the year 1642 advanced, the certainty of the outbreak of strife made the extremists in the Commons only too well pleased to let religious reform rest until the necessity for the Scottish alliance and the price to be paid for that alliance should have become clear.

The degree of intimacy in the relations between the Scottish faction and the English parliamentary leaders will probably never be known, any more than the precise date of the commencement of negotiations between them. There can be little doubt that when in November, 1641, the Parliament in the Grand Remonstrance desired of the King the summoning of a general synod of the most grave divines of the island to effect the intended reformation, the secret understanding between the parliamentary leaders and the Scottish was already at work. In the following February, 1642, the Commons returned to the project; and from April onwards they were intermittently engaged in nominating the divines who were to constitute the Assembly. But although, when the nomination of the divines was finished, the Commons proceeded to the next logical step and read for the first time (May 9, 1642) a Bill for calling an assembly of the divines, it was not until June 17 of the following year (1643) that the Bill finally passed. The interval is to be regarded as taken up with the fluctuating negotiations between the English parliamentary leaders and the Scottish. The chequered story of these negotiations and the extraordinary parallelism between their course and that of the military fortunes of the Parliament is too long to be presented here. Within a fortnight of the final passing of the Bill for calling the Assembly, the Long Parliament had practically made up its mind to purchase Scotch assistance at whatever price. The Solemn League and Covenant bound both countries to use all their endeavours for the preservation of the true Protestant Reformed religion in Scotland, and for such a reformation of the Church in England as would bring about a uniformity in the two countries of religion, faith and Church government, according to the example of the best Reformed Church and

the Word of God. Although this Covenant was not solemnly sworn to by both Houses until September 22, 1643, its acceptance was already clearly understood as a foregone conclusion by July 1, 1643, the date of the first meeting of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster.

According to the Ordinance of June, 1643, which summoned the Assembly, that body consisted of 30 lay assessors (10 English lords and 20 English commoners), 121 English divines, 3 scribes, and 8 Scottish commissioners (5 thereof clerical and 3 lay). The Assembly sat at first in Henry VII's Chapel at Westminster; but, as the winter approached, the Chapel proved too cold, and in the end of September, 1643, it moved its sessions to the Jerusalem Chamber in the Abbey. In its palmy days the ordinary attendance was about sixty, and the members received pay for their attendance.

Although the Long Parliament had had a matter of eighteen months within which to prepare a programme for the Assembly, yet when the divines met there was as a matter of fact no programme of agenda before them. In all its resolutions covering the interim period February, 1642, to July, 1643, the Parliament had refrained from any but the most general expressions of resolve. It voted the abolition of Episcopacy and declared its intention of a due and necessary reformation of the government and liturgy of the Church, and for the better effecting thereof to have consultation with divines, but it framed no programme for the Assembly. To have done so would have been to give to the divines a larger reference and a more comprehensive authority than the Parliament had ever intended them to have. Of set and deliberate policy the Commons chose the alternative course of deciding piecemeal and as it went along what particular questions should be referred to the Assembly for debate and advice. By such a method of piecemeal reference the Parliament not only kept its finger on the whole conduct of the Assembly's debates, but also deprived its work of any appearance of creative independence. It was not for the Assembly to take in hand the reformation of the Church: that was the high function of Parliament alone: the Assembly's work was only to advise the Parliament on such points as the latter specifically referred to it for advice upon them. Although therefore the Assembly met on July 1, it was not until the 5th that the Commons agreed to the rules for guiding the divines in their debates, and autocratically sent to the Assembly the first meagre instalment of agenda.

The constructive work of the Assembly may be reviewed under the following heads:

The Thirty-nine Articles. On July 5 the Parliament requested the Assembly to consider the first ten of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, in order to free and vindicate the doctrine contained therein from all aspersion and false interpretations. Six weeks later the Parliament similarly referred the succeeding nine Articles to

the Assembly for consideration. By October of the same year, 1643, the divines had reached the 16th Article; but at that point the work was interrupted. In the course of its subsequent labours the Assembly worked so much of the Thirty-nine Articles as it thought worthy of preservation into the Confession of Faith, and tacitly dropped the Articles. But in December, 1646, the Commons required of the Assembly all that it had accomplished on the Articles; and on April 29, 1647, the Assembly accordingly presented to the House its revision of Articles 1-15 in "the proceedings of the Assembly of Divines upon the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England." Beyond inserting this revision in a mutilated form in December, 1647, in the propositions sent to Charles at Carisbrooke Castle the Parliament did nothing with it.

The form of Church Government: Presbytery. Following up the formulation of the Solemn League and Covenant, the General Assembly of the Scottish Church on August 19, 1643, elected eight Commissioners to treat with the English Parliament for the union of the English and Scottish Churches in one form of Kirk Government. These Scottish Commissioners made their entry into the Assembly of Divines on September 15, 1643; and three days later the Commons referred it to the Assembly to consider of a discipline and government of the Church apt to procure nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland. Besides sitting in the Assembly, however, the Scotch Commissioners claimed an independent function as Treaty Commissioners specifically appointed *ad hoc*—that is for the consideration of Church union; and in this capacity they held weekly meetings with a Committee of the two Houses and with another Committee of the Assembly. It was in these weekly treaty meetings that the initiatory proposals on this subject were made, to be thence carried to the Assembly for debate. Under the unseen guidance therefore of these Grand or Treaty Committees the Assembly began its debate on the great question of Church Government on October 12, 1643. It was the debate of this thorny subject which brought to the front the bitter antagonism between Independent and Presbyterian. In the matter of the officers of the Church, the Independents were for the divine institution of a doctor or teacher in every congregation as well as of a Pastor: and they argued strongly against the divine institution of the ruling Elder. In the matter of Church organisation, they objected to the inclusion of several parishes in one presbytery. On all these points hot and obstinate debates ensued, the Independent minority being led by Thomas Goodwyn, Nye, Burroughs, Bridge, Carter, Caryll, Phillips and Sterry; while the Presbyterian majority was led by Marshall and Burgess, and of course supported by the Scottish Commissioners. After a preliminary trial of strength in February—March, 1644, and an ineffectual attempt at conciliation between Independents and Presbyterians, the systematic debate on the subject of Presbytery was begun in September, 1644; and on November 8 following, "The Humble Advice

of the Assembly concerning some part of Church Government" was presented to the House of Commons. A second and fuller report was submitted on December 11, following. After debating these two reports the Commons appointed a Sub-committee to prepare proposals for the erection of Presbyteries in London and throughout the counties of England; and it was while this sub-committee was still engaged in its deliberations that the Assembly presented to the Parliament on July 7, 1645, its completed draft scheme of Church Government under the title of "The Humble Advice of the Assembly of Divines concerning Church Government." The result of the debates in both Houses on this "Humble Advice" was the Ordinance of August 19, 1645, for the election of Elders; on which Ordinance was based the first abortive attempt of the Long Parliament at the erection of Presbyteries.

Ecclesiastical Discipline. On October 12, 1643, the Parliament ordered the Assembly to confer upon such a discipline and government of the Church as might be most agreeable to the Word of God. The Assembly set to work on the task, and from January 8, 1644, was engaged in hotly debating the contested points involved in the exercise of ecclesiastical censures and the guarding of the Sacraments from defilement by the admission of scandalous persons. The Presbyterians, who now formed an overwhelming majority of the Assembly, were in favour of conferring upon the clergy the fullest power of censuring and absolving from censure. But a very strong opposition to the proposals came from the Independents and in another direction from the Erastians, led by Selden. In consequence of the strong opposition and of frequent interruptions of the debate, it was not until the following October that the divines voted that a power of censure resided in Church Assemblies. The next logical step was to draw up a Directory for Church censures and excommunication. At this point the Scotsmen intervened and offered to the Assembly a ready-drafted Directory. Almost abjectly accepting this draft as a basis for its debates, the divines discussed it from January, 1645, onwards, and, after drawing up a catalogue of excommunicable sins, passed it and sent it up to Parliament in February, 1645, in the form of two papers, "The Humble Advice... concerning excommunication," and "The Humble Advice... concerning a Directory for admonition, excommunication, and absolution." The story of the treatment which the Long Parliament accorded to these two papers is too long to be given here. In brief, the Parliament, under the lead of the Erastians, insisted on "voting" or defining the particulars of the matters of scandal which should be examinable by the eldership, and at the same time gave a right of appeal from the congregational eldership to the Classical, Provincial, and National Assemblies, and thence in the final resort to Parliament itself. From this attitude the Parliament never in substance budged. The divines of the Assembly shared to the full the sullen disappointment of the clergy generally; and

it was as a mere sop to this sullen discontent that the Parliament permitted the Assembly to consider of further or more extended enumerations or catalogues of scandals (June and August, 1645). Not satisfied with this, the Assembly on August 1 presented to the House its "Humble Petition," desiring an unlimited jurisdiction. The agitation in the clerical mind was intense both in the Assembly and among the City clergy; and under the pressure of this agitation the Parliament was led to propose the establishment of a standing Parliamentary Committee of Appeal for the consideration of scandals not enumerated. The Parliamentary Ordinance embodying its proposals was issued on October 20, 1645. Thereupon ensued a clerical agitation against the Ordinance, which lasted for about eight months, and in which the Assembly itself joined, only, however, to receive a most determined rebuke at the hands of the House of Commons. Opposition and agitation alike proved unavailing, and the final Parliamentary Ordinance for Scandal of June 9, 1646, contained all the provisions for lay or parliamentary control against which the Presbyterian clergy, both inside and outside the Assembly, had so tenaciously struggled.

Passing over the contest waged in 1646 between the Parliament and the Assembly on the question of the *jus divinum* of Presbytery, as being less constructive in its nature than the rest of the work of the divines, we may more briefly sum up the remainder of the constructive part of that work.

Ordination. This question was in debate from January, 1644, onwards, and in the following April the Directory for Ordination was carried up to the House. In their Doctrinal Propositions attached to the Directory the Assembly had voted that the power of Ordination lay in the hands of the preaching Presbyters. Under the influence of the Erastians and the Independents, the House rejected the whole of these propositions, and insisted on controlling the nominations of those authorised to exercise the power of Ordination. Thus, in the end, as in the case of excommunication and *jus divinum*, the Assembly was again signally worsted.

The Directory for Worship. By Ordinance of both Houses on October 12, 1643, the Assembly was empowered to debate and expound concerning a Directory of Worship or Liturgy to be used in the Church. By a manœuvre of the Scots the work of preparing it was at first entrusted to a small Committee composed of the Scottish Commissioners and five of the Assembly. The various portions of the draft directory were under debate in the full Assembly from April, 1644, onwards, and were sent up to Parliament in the following November as "The Humble Advice ... concerning a Directory for the public worship of God in the three Kingdoms."

The Confession of Faith was one of the latest fruits of the Assembly's labours, and one as to which there was less division of

opinion. The consideration of this subject was begun in April, 1646, and after eighteen months' interrupted debate, it was carried up to House in September, 1646, as "The Humble Advice...concerning of a confession of faith." The remainder of the Confession was carried up on December 4 following: the scriptural proofs were completed the Assembly in April, 1647, and at the end of that month the complete Confession with the proofs added was again submitted to Parliament. It amounted, in a word, to a clear-cut Calvinistic symbol—the expression of a Calvinism, generic it is true in form, but unyielding and unmodified on the subject of the Divine Decrees, and of the restriction of Redemption to the elect.

The Larger and the Smaller Catechism. The debate of a Catechism was commenced in December, 1644; but the project slept for a time, and, when it was taken up again in January, 1647, it was determined to prepare two Catechisms, a Larger and a Smaller. The Larger was in debate from April to October, 1647, and the Smaller from August to November of the same year. The Larger—in a great measure an abridgment from the Confession—was delivered to the Parliament in October, 1647, and the Smaller—less directly so abridged, but quite thoroughly Calvinistic—in June, 1648.

With this last item the effective constructive work of the Assembly practically closes—for we may disregard its work on the metric revision of the Psalms, as in this connexion it attempted no direct constructive original work of its own.

In point of time also the discussion of the Catechisms represents the last deliberative work of the Assembly. The Larger was completed in October and the Smaller in November, 1647; and from that time onwards with the single exception of the merely academic debate in 1648 of the Long Parliament's queries concerning the *jus divinum*, the remainder of the Assembly's existence was devoted to the examining and approving of ministers. This function the Assembly had all along performed at scattered moments; but from August, 1647, it had, under the lead and in subordination to the Parliamentary Committee Plundered Ministers, specially devoted itself to this work as a temporary makeshift to meet the pressing need for a clergy ordination office. The formal sessions of the Assembly ceased on February 22, 1649, ten weeks after the execution of Charles. From that date onwards the work of the divines of the Assembly as remained members of it became the Committee for the Examination of Ministers, and held meetings for that purpose every Thursday morning till March 25, 1652. On that day Cromwell dissolved the Rump, with which the Committee of the ailing moribund Assembly of Divines automatically disappeared. The functions which it had performed in its later years were subsequently in 1653 transferred to the Commissioners for Approbation of Public Preachers.

The respect which has been paid to the memory of the Westminster

Assembly is due only to the individual learning of its leading members. As an assembly, that is in the aggregate, it was merely a tool in the hands of a Parliament engaged in a factious revolution. It had none of the freedom of action of an ecclesiastical Council; its constructive proposals have, therefore, none of the constitutional significance attaching to the decisions of any of the Great Councils of the Church; there was no doctrinal width or scope in its debates, so that there attaches to its record not a particle of the intense dogmatic interest attaching to a great doctrinal synod such as, say, the Synod of Dort. The purpose for which the Westminster Assembly was called was a purely practical purpose. At the behest of its master it had to put down on paper a plan for the various portions of the Church edifice which the Parliament had set itself to rear. An Attorney-General who drafts a party Bill for a party Government performs a function exactly like that performed by the Assembly.

But not only so. The Assembly was not merely entirely subordinate to the two Houses; bereft of initiative and again and again checked and chidden by them, it was also itself a prey to faction, not really theological but political; and it was dragged along in the wake of the faction fight which was raging in the political world of England at that time.

The opposition of the Independents to the Presbyterians in the Assembly was simply a prolongation of the same faction fight which was being fought out in the Parliament and in the Army; and the Scots joined in the fray in the Assembly with just as open and vehement intrigue as they did in the political domain. "Plots and packing worse than those of Trent," says Milton. It is impossible to accord to the Assembly the respect which would be due to it, had it been a free and unfettered body with an initiative and programme of its own, and it is equally impossible to clear its memory from the stain of servile subjection to political faction. Even with regard to some of its practical creations—the Confession and the Catechisms—which have earned for it the gratitude and respect of the Presbyterian Churches from that day to this, it is uncertain whether they owe their origin to the divines of the Assembly or to the Scottish Commissioners.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE LATER YEARS OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

(1635-48.)

THE abstention of all but a few historians from essaying a comprehensive account of the final period of the Thirty Years' War reflects only too faithfully the weariness of the generation which, heartsick and hopeless, witnessed the last thirteen years of the struggle carried on in the central regions of Europe. From 1635 to 1648, the War continued its course through what may be called its Franco-Swedish stage, shifting to and from almost every part of Germany between the Alps and the Baltic, and everywhere leaving behind it desolation unutterable. But what made this last period of the War so singularly bewildering, and to those Germans in whom a spark of national feeling survived so humiliating, was the fact that, after France had come to take a direct part in the conflict, it centred in a contention on German soil between alien ambitions and interests. Sweden was now wholly intent upon a settlement guaranteeing to her the safeguards which her position as a Baltic Power demanded, together with some acknowledgment of her sacrifices and successes in the earlier part of the War. As, however, between France and Spain, whose Government since the fall of Wallenstein had identified its interests with those of the House of Austria, there seemed no prospect of a solution being found for the resuscitated problems of their historic rivalry—which had to be fought out on German soil, with the aid of German arms, and at the cost of the very life-blood of the German nation. No Estate of the Empire could find shelter within the four corners of the Peace of Prague, or protect itself by means of any newly devised league of armed neutrality, against the fury of this War, which was essentially foreign and hardly even pretended any longer to be waged for religious ends. The soldiery of the House of Habsburg and its allies still alternated the old Catholic war-cries with the Imperialist "Ferdinandus"; and the remnant of their German adversaries still saw in the "*cause commune*," for which they fought side by side with the troops of France, the Gospel cause commended to Heaven by the soldiers of Gustavus Adolphus on the morning of so

many a battle. But all the world knew that France was Catholic as well as Spain; that Cardinals of the Roman Church directed the policy of France, and on occasion commanded her armies. Nor was it a secret that the policy of the House of Habsburg, whether in prosperity or in adversity, was entirely at odds with that of the Pope who reigned during two-thirds of this period. In a later chapter of this volume it will be shown how and why Urban VIII, though he could not be induced to lend his active support to Richelieu's anti-Habsburg designs, would not lift a finger to impede their progress. The attitude consistently maintained by this Pontiff materially contributed to divest the latter part of the Thirty Years' War of the character of a religious struggle, and thus, on both sides, augmented its perplexities; and the personal impotence of his successor, Innocent X, left the political situation in Europe virtually unchanged.

During the summer of 1635, the renewal at Compiègne of the Franco-Swedish alliance, of which Oxenstierna had taken care to delay the ratification, failed to counterbalance the Emperor's success in concluding the Peace of Prague. That Peace had drawn, or was drawing, over to him nearly all the Protestant Estates of the Empire. Early in July, William of Weimar placed his troops under Saxon control; and by the end of that month Duke George of Lüneburg accepted the Peace and threw up his command under the Alliance of Heilbronn. Even Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel declined to unite his troops with those of Bernard of Weimar, outside whose camp there remained no rallying-point for militant German Protestantism. Much therefore had to be accomplished before the Franco-Swedish alliance could dominate the progress of the conflict, as it had in the days of Gustavus Adolphus' victorious advance. Unless the truce concluded in 1629 through French mediation between Sweden and Poland, and about to expire in the autumn of 1635, were renewed, and converted into an enduring peace, Sweden could not command the resources necessary for carrying on the war in Germany. In vain, before concluding with France, Oxenstierna had sought to raise funds in England and Holland, and at Venice. The Swedish Government was, moreover, suspicious of the intentions of Christian IV of Denmark. In the early part of 1635 he actually thought of entering into an alliance with Poland; but Oxenstierna opportunely facilitated the succession of the Danish Prince Frederick in the archiepiscopal province of Bremen, and Christian IV never acceded to the Peace of Prague. But if Sweden was to continue to take part in the German War, she must come to terms with Poland; and to this end Richelieu sent one of the most capable of French diplomatists, Claude de Mesmes, Count d'Avaux, to Stuhmsdorf, where the negotiations for the renewal of the Swedish Truce with Poland were carried on. His efforts were supported by the Dutch and English ambassadors at the conference, and expedited by a lavish flow of money.

The desire of George William of Brandenburg for a settlement giving him undisturbed possession of his Prussian duchy prevailed over the Imperialist policy which, by Schwarzenberg's advice, he had followed in acceding to the Peace of Prague. The compact concluded between Sweden and Poland at Stuhmsdorf in September, 1635, for a period of twenty years, left Brandenburg in full possession of East Prussia; but, by liberating the Swedish troops under Torstensson which had held Prussia and Livonia, placed both Mecklenburg and Pomerania in the power of Sweden; jeopardised the prospect of the acquisition of Pomerania by the Brandenburg dynasty on the death, then imminent, of Duke Bogislav XIV; and seriously threatened the security of the Mark.

Oxenstierna could now once more pursue the German War with vigour, and relieve Marshal Banér, who had stood his ground himself in a very difficult situation with that tenacity which distinguished him even among Swedish commanders. During the earlier months of 1635, and after the conclusion of the Peace of Prague, his army, which to the indignation of the Elector of Saxony was quartered in the diocese of Magdeburg, diminished in numbers and was much disheartened. He feared that his neighbour, Duke George of Lüneburg, between whom and himself there had been constant friction, would entirely go over to the Imperial side, as both he and Duke William of Weimar, with their forces, actually did before the close of the year. A dangerous conspiracy against Banér's authority had to be suppressed in his own headquarters; and Oxenstierna, against whom the malcontents were violently excited, was obliged to take his departure secretly by night from Magdeburg to the Baltic coast. From July, 1635, onwards, a collision between Banér's army and the Saxon troops seemed imminent; and while they closed in upon the Elbe, Banér, who was losing all control over the mutinous German officers in his army, fell back upon Thuringia. On October 16 John George issued his declaration of war against Sweden, in a document full of involutions worthy of the Saxon Chancery; and, while his army marched down the Elbe past Havelberg in order to cut off Banér from Pomerania and the sea, an Imperial force attempted to prevent Torstensson, now approaching from the north, from effecting a junction with him. But Torstensson, though a constant sufferer from infirmities brought on by his imprisonment at Ingolstadt after he had fallen into the enemy's hands at Nürnberg, had learnt rapidity of movement as well as strategical skill from his master Gustavus, and outmarched his opponents. Thus, when on November 1 Banér had by a successful fight at Dömitz opened the passage across the Elbe into Mecklenburg, Torstensson was quickly on the spot; and between them the two Swedish generals once more controlled all Mecklenburg and Pomerania. The attempt of the Saxons to advance into the former duchy was repelled by the Swedes at Goldberg (December 7); and, driving them back into Brandenburg, Banér took Havelberg, the fortifications of Werben, and the dam at

Fehrbellin (December 12—January 2). Meanwhile, Torstensson had defeated another division of the Saxons at Kyritz further north (December 17). At first the Elector of Brandenburg had trembled both for the safety of his capital and for his own; but Berlin was covered by Saxon and Imperialist troops; and, while Banér's moved on to Thuringia and Saxony, George William on January 26, 1636, launched against him a uselessly provocative declaration of war.

While thus in north-eastern Germany Sweden recovered much of the ground formerly held by her, and of her military prestige, the operations of France proved by no means equally successful.

War was actually declared by France against Spain by a herald who made his appearance at Brussels on May 26, 1635; and the war which Richelieu had for some months been assiduously preparing was opened all along the line of the French eastern frontier. The efforts of France in the Netherlands, in Italy, and in the Valtelline, have been noted elsewhere. A fourth army, under old Marshal La Force, was to cooperate with Bernard of Weimar in the defence of the Rhine. But, notwithstanding the diplomatic exertions of Feuquières, the relations between Bernard and the French Crown were still unsettled, and La Force was detained in Lorraine by the attempt of Duke Charles to recover his duchy (April). Bernard, eager to recross the Rhine from Speier and to offer battle to Gallas, who at the head of 20,000 men was approaching the right bank, was unable to run the hazard without French support, and, to make sure of this, was obliged to move back; while the Imperialists secured all the places of transit on the Upper and Middle Rhine, taking Kaiserslautern where the famous Swedish Yellow Regiment was cut to pieces, forcing Heidelberg to capitulate, and laying siege to Mainz (June—July). It was not till July 27 that Bernard, whose force had dwindled to 7000 men, effected his juncture with an army of 12,000 French under Cardinal La Valette, whom Richelieu had at last ordered to advance from Langres. La Valette, though not a general of first-rate capacity, cooperated loyally with Bernard of Weimar; and his indifference to the wrath of Pope Urban VIII made him a fitting agent of the present policy of his fellow Cardinal. The siege of Mainz was now raised by the Imperialists; and on August 8 Bernard held his entry into the city, while La Valette took Kreuznach. But they were unable to prevent their adversaries from shortly afterwards occupying Frankfort, which, though so long the headquarters of the Suedo-German Alliance, always favoured the Emperor.

Bernard of Weimar's position in the Gustafsborg on the right bank of the Rhine opposite Mainz speedily became untenable. No dependence was to be placed upon his officers, who had remained unpaid for about a year, unless he could satisfy their demands; and he informed Feuquières that, if he was to carry on operations on the right bank for the King and "the common cause," he must have a sufficient army, and

a subsidy wherewith to pay it. But the French Government having reduced his proposals as to men by one-third, and as to money by three-fourths, he returned to the left bank, after parting with several of his officers. His withdrawal was effected in conjunction with that of La Valette's army, in which Turenne, who had hoped to hold Mainz, distinguished himself by his exertions. The retreating troops had more than one brush with the vanguard of Gallas' army before, at the end of September, they reached Metz in safety. Their strength was not above 5000 men, chiefly cavalry; but Richelieu was overjoyed that the army had been saved; and the good understanding between the two leaders had been most satisfactorily maintained.

Gallas, who had reached Lorraine in November when King Louis XIII himself appeared on the scene to confront him and Duke Charles, was, probably in consequence of Banér's victories in the Mark, ordered to fall back on Elsass. His retreat was carried out in wintry weather, and amidst extraordinary sufferings—"*splendidissima miseria*" is the phrase of the Irish chaplain of Devereux's (formerly Walter Butler's) regiment. About half of Gallas' army of invasion reached Zabern (Saverne), where in its winter-quarters it dwindled still further. But, though the attempt to drive the French and Bernard out of Elsass and Lorraine had failed, the Middle Rhine, the Lower Moselle, and the Saar, as well as the Main and the Neckar, remained in the hands of the Imperialists; and, besides Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Frankenthal, Mainz had capitulated to them (December). Bernard of Weimar was cut off from the right bank of the Rhine, Strassburg being the only place of transit across the river not in hostile hands.

The results of the French campaign on the Rhine had thus been hardly less disappointing than that of the other campaigns designed by Richelieu for the year 1635; and it had become clear that, if another Imperialist irruption across the Rhine was to be prevented and the right bank to be attacked, terms must be made with Bernard of Weimar. There was no other body of German troops as to which negotiation remained possible except that levied by Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel, who was still hesitating as to his ultimate action.

The difficulties of Bernard's position had increased by his retreat upon Lorraine after he had half committed himself to France. Had he been devoid, as he was not, both of national pride and of religious enthusiasm, he might still have become a freebooter like some Protestant Princes in an earlier stage of the War, or followed the example which had now been so widely set, and made his peace with the Emperor. Even at a later date a *locus poenitentiae* would have been found open for him, if he had brought his troops over with him. But he preferred the readier way: and, on October 27, an agreement was signed at Paris between his agent Ponikau and the French Government, which remained the basis, though a somewhat shifting one, of the subsequent relations

between Bernard and the French Crown. He was to receive annually four millions of *livres*, to be paid to him in quarterly instalments; but one-half of the first million was to be paid at once for the equipment of his troops. In return, he was to maintain an army of at least 6000 horse and 12,000 foot; the payments to be reduced in proportion, if the force fell short of this total, or if it was able to maintain itself in invaded hostile lands; while a share of the subsidy was to be made over by him to any German Prince or city that should join him as a belligerent. King Louis undertook, in the event of the capture of Bernard or any of his generals or officers, to conclude no peace that should not provide for their release; and Bernard in return promised for himself and any allies of his to conclude no peace with the Emperor except with the King's approval. A secret article assured to Bernard the title of *Général des forces de la confédération*; but, though he was allowed the immediate direction of military operations, he bound himself not to employ the forces maintained by the King of France except under the royal authority. For himself, he was promised an annual grant of 200,000 *livres*, to be reduced to 150,000 on the conclusion of peace; while another secret article assured to him the possession of the "land-gravate of Elsass" with all the rights (including those over the fortified places) that had belonged to the House of Austria.

This compact, which had been speedily ratified by Louis XIII, was promptly signed by Bernard on November 19. The only stipulation which he desired to add was that the quarterly payments of the subsidy on which the maintenance of his army would depend should be made in advance. It is not easy to decide whether the French or Bernard correctly interpreted the agreement between them: in other words, whether he had become a paid officer of the French Crown, or whether he still stood towards it in the relation of an auxiliary. But for the ambiguity in the terms of the compact, it would probably never have been concluded. As a matter of fact, the payment of the subsidy was constantly delayed; the force for which it was to provide was always found insufficient; and so things went on in a vicious circle. The first two months of the year 1636 passed without Bernard's being able to augment his army, which had been ordered to occupy the line of the Saar and face the Spaniards at Luxemburg, and without any money reaching him from Paris. Early in March he presented himself in person at the French capital. But his and Grotius' representations there only resulted—and this through the personal intervention of Richelieu—in obtaining for him an immediate payment of 600,000 *livres*, with which, worn in both health and temper, he returned in May to the scene of war.

In the meantime Richelieu's resolution to overthrow the ascendancy of the House of Habsburg was more firmly fixed than ever; and Oxenstierna, after long hesitating as to the ratification of the Treaty of

Compiègne, had in consequence of the successes of the Swedish arms become less intent upon the scheme of a separate peace with the Emperor, and more disinclined to accept Danish mediation. Thus, on March 20, 1636, the Treaty of Wismar was concluded between France and Sweden, in which for the first time the two Powers agreed to join in the conflict with the House of Habsburg, France prosecuting it on the left bank of the Rhine, while Sweden, annually subsidised by France with a million of *livres*, carried her arms into Silesia and Bohemia. But for the present this treaty, like that of Compiègne, remained unratiſied by Queen Christina; and soon afterwards Oxenstierna returned home to Sweden, whence he did not again return to Germany. He had formed the wise resolution to restrict himself henceforth to general instructions concerning the conduct of the war, upon which he perceived that the political settlement of German affairs entirely depended. The councillors of war who from 1635 onwards "assisted" the chief Swedish commanders seem ordinarily to have abstained from indiscreet interference.

The campaign of 1636 on the Lower Rhine was left to the Dutch, with whom France in April concluded a subsidy treaty; in Italy, Marshal Créquy was with Italian assistance to drive the Spaniards out of Lombardy; and Condé was to occupy Franche Comté. Thus, if La Valette and Bernard of Weimar succeeded in completing the expulsion of the Spaniards from Elsass and Lorraine, not only would the whole eastern frontier of France be rendered secure, but it would be advanced to the Rhine and the Jura, and the war might even be carried to the right bank of the river by Bernard's augmented army. The Imperialists were, however, on their side, determined on a great offensive operation, the invasion of Picardy. In May the Alsatian campaign began, La Valette, who had already gained some successes there early in the year, relieving Hagenau, and then, in conjunction with Bernard of Weimar, besieging Zabern (July). Turenne was wounded in the course of the siege, which ended with the capitulation of the place, into which a French garrison was laid. Nearly the whole of Upper Elsass was now in the hands of the French and Bernard; and Gallas was practically precluded from entering Franche Comté, to whose capital, Dôle, Condé was laying siege.

Bernard of Weimar would gladly have taken advantage of his successes by crossing the Rhine and coming to the rescue of Hanau. From the autumn of 1635 to June, 1636, this fortress, where the "black" Sir James Ramsay, an indomitable Scottish captain celebrated in both history and fiction, had been placed in command by Gustavus Adolphus, held out in the midst of terrible hardships against a besieging Imperialist army. Urged on by his consort Amalia Elizabeth, a Countess of Hanau by birth, and beyond question one of the most remarkable women of her time, Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel had come to an understanding with France; and on June 14, with the aid of a Swedish force under

Alexander Leslie (afterwards Earl of Leven), now commanding in Westphalia, relieved the gallant garrison. But, though the anniversary of this spirited exploit was celebrated for at least two centuries as a day of thanksgiving and rejoicing, it was of no avail; for the Imperialists soon began a new siege of Hanau, which this time remained unrelieved. Bernard of Weimar was prevented from crossing the Rhine by the refusal of the Strassburgers, who feared the vengeance of Gallas, to allow him the use of their bridge or to supply materials for the construction of a substitute. Ramsay concluded an honourable capitulation, and was allowed to remain in Hanau as a private individual. In December, 1637, he contrived to recover temporary command of the place, but soon lost it again and died in prison. Landgrave William, unable to prevent the awful devastation of his dominions by the Imperialists under Götz, was in August placed under the ban of the Empire; and the administration of his landgravate was granted to his enemy, George of Hesse-Darmstadt, who retained it till William's death in September, 1637. His high-spirited and sagacious widow managed to conclude a truce with the Emperor, who could not leave out of account the Hesse-Cassel troops, now encamped at Leer in East Frisia. Thus not only was the landgravate preserved from political extinction, but, after Amalia Elizabeth had at Dorsten concluded a treaty with Sweden and France (August, 1639), her Government asserted itself as an all but independent Power in the transactions of both war and peace.

Meanwhile, in July, 1636, the invasion of Picardy, heralded by a manifesto issued by the Cardinal Infante on behalf both of the Emperor and of Spain, had begun in earnest; and the whole country between Somme and Oise was flooded by an irruption of horsemen. The most redoubtable among their leaders, Johann von Werth, caused a panic among the Parisians, though no attempt was actually made to cross the Oise and to march upon Paris. On the southern frontier Condé was ultimately obliged to raise the siege of Dôle, which he had invested in May, and to retire from Franche Comté; and in the same month (August) La Valette and Bernard of Weimar were unable to prevent the junction between Charles of Lorraine and Gallas, which seemed the prelude to a second invasion of France, with King Ferdinand of Hungary at its head. But this was prevented by La Valette and more especially by Bernard of Weimar, who captured the camp of the renowned Croat cavalry general, Isolani; and, finally, the memorable relief of St Jean-de-Losne, gratefully remembered by France down to the days of the Revolution, obliged Gallas once more to evacuate the Burgundian frontier-lands (November).

Bernard had been unable to render to France or to the "common cause" any service beyond that of a strenuous defence. By the end of October, 1636, a mere dribble of the promised subsidies had come into his hands; and his army numbered little more than one-third of the

contemplated total of 18,000. On the other hand, fortune had once more favoured the Swedish arms in the east. In September, Banér issued forth from his camp at Werben on the Elbe (in the Mark), and on October 4, at Wittstock on the Brandenburg-Mecklenburg frontier, gained, with Torstensson's assistance, a signal victory over the army commanded by the Elector of Saxony and the Imperialist general Hatzfeldt, which though superior in numbers lacked the requisite unity of control. The victory of Wittstock, besides in a great measure restoring to the Swedish arms the reputation forfeited at Nördlingen, had important immediate results. It opened the road for the Swedes not only into Brandenburg, which Marshal Wrangel at once invaded, but further up the Elbe towards Thuringia, whither by the middle of November Banér advanced as far as Eisenach. A Swedish army was once more close to the centre of the Empire, and Oxenstierna could invite Bernard of Weimar to supply a cooperation which he would only too willingly have rendered.

After the warfare along the French frontier had come to an end with the recrossing of the Rhine at Breisach by Gallas in January, 1637, Bernard spent several months in negotiations at Paris, where he agreed to give a receipt in full for all the payments hitherto made to him by the French Government, though they fell short by at least one-half of the amount promised to him. But he arrived at no satisfactory settlement, even as to his own powers in the conduct of the war. Before, however, the campaign of 1637 opened, the political situation as a whole had been changed by some important events.

The Emperor Ferdinand II, after a reign of almost unparalleled vicissitudes of peril and of success, had passed away (February 15, 1637). His tenacity of purpose, due in part to religious bigotry, which at the beginning of his reign had enabled him to breast a sea of troubles, had, together with the subsequent triumph of his arms, produced in him a self-confidence which seemed to raise him to the height of his opportunities. But he was not really capable of conceiving or carrying through any definite policy of his own, or even of consistently following the counsels of his advisers. After he had abandoned Wallenstein, and thrown himself upon the support of the Princes of the Empire, his policy became less aggressive, though he was not to live to see the complete breakdown of the religious restoration on which he had set his heart. The changes which he sought to enforce in the religious condition of the Empire had brought Sweden into the field, and given France her opportunity of intervention. But the revival of the conflict between France and the House of Habsburg was inevitable; nor is he to be held accountable for it, any more than for the renewed cooperation between the Austrian and Spanish dynasties. The expansion, during the last three years of his reign, of the Great War into a general European conflict, cannot therefore justly be laid to his charge.

The election, on December 22, 1636, of his son and namesake as

Roman King had been achieved by Ferdinand II in the face of many difficulties, of which the chief had been the intrigues, carried on with the approval of Pope Urban VIII, for the choice of Maximilian of Bavaria in his stead. Ferdinand III resembled his father in his religious earnestness and in the purity of his personal life. But, though a pupil of the Jesuits and a rigorous Catholic in the affairs of his own dominions, he was in matters of religion more amenable to reason than his predecessor; and, though he had the nominal credit of the victory of Nördlingen, his disposition was not warlike. Thus, however difficult it might prove to obtain his assent to the sacrifice of any right which he possessed or any hope that he cherished, his accession on the whole improved the prospects of peace.

Pope Urban had proposed himself to France as mediator in peace negotiations, to be carried on at Cologne between the Catholic Powers; but Richelieu had demanded that to these negotiations the United Provinces and Sweden should also be admitted. The States General, after being approached on the subject by the Seignior of Venice, signified their willingness to be represented at the conferences; but from Sweden only a lukewarm assent was to be extracted (December, 1636). Even now Sweden, desirous of still keeping open the possibility of a separate accommodation with the Emperor, had not ratified the Wismar Treaty; so that d'Avaux, on being appointed French plenipotentiary in Germany in April, 1637, proceeded not to Cologne, but to Hamburg, to discuss there the situation with Adler Salvius, to whom, with Steno Bielke, Oxenstierna on leaving Germany had entrusted the conduct of Swedish diplomatic affairs.

The prospects of France and her allies in the spring of 1637 were sufficiently clouded to render Richelieu willing to listen to pacific overtures. In Italy, Duke Odoardo of Parma concluded a treaty of neutrality with Spain; and, in the Valtelline, Rohan yielded to a general rising in the Grisons against France. Richelieu threw the strength of the French forces on the Netherlands frontier, while Bernard of Weimar, detained in Franche Comté, could not attempt any movement to the right bank of the Rhine till late in the summer. Thus Banér, who after falling back from Leipzig upon Torgau looked for aid from Bernard, was left unsupported to face the approach of Gallas from the Rhine, and of the Imperialist forces from Westphalia. He had moreover, before the close of 1636, detached a division of his army under Marshal Wrangel into Brandenburg, with the object of compelling George William to treat with Sweden. But, in December, the arrival in the electorate of an Imperialist force finally gave the upper hand to Schwarzenberg's counsels; and the Elector resolved upon levying an army of his own in support of the Emperor. The death of Bogislav XIV of Pomerania was imminent, and actually took place in March, 1637; and George William at once set up his lawful claim to the coveted duchy, now for

the most part in Swedish hands. The levy of what was, properly speaking, the earliest Brandenburg army must be allowed to have been a bold measure; but it broke down in the execution. For the force never reached anything like its intended numbers, and, after inflicting more suffering on the country than had been caused by any invading army, was disbanded in the ensuing year.

Meanwhile Banér, whose army had sunk to not more than 16,000 men, had felt himself unable to face the Imperialists, of whom a force nearly doubling the Swedish in numbers was approaching under Gallas. Spreading the report that he was about to march on Erfurt, he carried out a retreat into Lusatia and towards the Oder with such skill, that he had put fifteen hours' march between himself and Gallas before the latter had tidings of his departure from Torgau. He reached Fürstenberg on the Oder on July 3, and was about to continue his march to Landsberg on the Warthe—which marks the boundary-line between Silesia and Poland—and there unite with Wrangel, when he learnt that Gallas had by a shorter route already reached that place with his whole force. Once more, however, Banér deluded his adversary by spreading a rumour that he designed to march through Poland on Pomerania, and, recrossing the Oder in light marching order, effected his junction with Wrangel at Neustadt. Gallas now withdrew upon Küstrin; and Banér had in masterly fashion, as represented by a popular engraving of the day, opened the sack with his sword and made his way out. Nevertheless, his retreat into Pomerania had involved the sacrifice of all the positions gained in Saxony and Brandenburg in consequence of the victory of Wittstock; and by far the larger part of Pomerania had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists, although they took up their winter-quarters in Mecklenburg, as a less exhausted territory.

Bernard of Weimar, although, after a successful campaign in Franche Comté, he had early in August crossed the Rhine at Rheinau, half-way between Strassburg and Breisach, and successfully engaged Johann von Werth at Ettenheim, was in September obliged to return to the left bank, and had to find winter-quarters for his troops in the bishopric of Basel. In this operation he was greatly aided by Erlach, an officer in the service of Bern—of whom more hereafter. The general had been much discouraged by the futility of his campaign, and by the lack of support which had once more reduced his force to less than 4000 men. Before long the series of successes which marks the final part of his career was at last to ensure consideration for his demands; Bernard's sympathies and interests were alike on the right bank of the Rhine; and Richelieu was gradually awakened to the fact that, notwithstanding his bargain with France, this German Prince could not be used merely as an instrument for securing the French dominions on the left.

In the winter of 1637–8 Bernard began by ignoring the federal

susceptibilities of the Catholic Cantons (November), the hostility of the Bishop of Basel as a member of the Catholic League, and the resistance of Archduchess Claudia (widow of Ferdinand II's ambitious brother, Leopold), Governor of Anterior Austria. In November, 1637, he gained possession, without a blow, of the celebrated fastness of the Hohentwiel, a Württemberg *enclave* which Duke Eberhard was prepared to make over as the price of reconciliation with the Emperor, but which its commander preferred to surrender to Bernard. Then he made himself master of the Austrian *Waldstätte* on the Upper Rhine—Säckingen, Laufenburg, Waldshut, and finally Rheinfelden, for the possession of which he had to fight two battles. In the earlier (February 28, 1638) one of his best officers, the Rhinegrave John Philip, fell, and the Duke of Rohan received his death-wound; the second (March 2) resulted in a crushing victory, the capture of all the hostile generals, including the terrible Johann von Werth, and of 3000 troops, most of whom took service under Bernard. The whole of the Rhine above Basel had been gained by this mid-winter campaign; and the fall of Rheinfelden and capture of Johann von Werth were celebrated by a *Te Deum* in Notre Dame at Paris.

In January, 1638, the whole of the 2,400,000 *livres* due to Bernard had at last been paid, and he had been promised a similar sum for the second year of the compact. But the question of the supreme command remained unsettled, and it was not till the beginning of May that a body of 4000 French troops under Count de Guébriant actually joined Bernard near Rheinfelden. He had now some 14,000 men under his command, as against the 16,000 Imperialists under Count Götz, who had reached the Black Forest in order to protect Breisach, on the capture of which Bernard was known to be intent. Götz contrived to throw some supplies and a small body of troops into Breisach; and though Bernard sat down before the fortress, he found his strength insufficient for pressing the siege further at present, and followed Götz in the direction of Strassburg. The course of the campaign had materially reduced the numbers of Bernard's army; and before he could risk a decisive battle in the open he must have French support.

At last it arrived, though in scanty numbers. Once more Bernard had put strong pressure upon the French Government—this time through an agent of remarkable capacity, who had begun his career as page to the arch-politician, Christian of Anhalt. Hans Ludwig von Erlach, after serving under several commanders, including Gustavus Adolphus himself, had entered the service of his native city, Bern, where, in opposition to the efforts of the Swiss Cantons for the preservation of a common neutrality towards foreign belligerent Powers, he had come forward as a partisan, first of Sweden and the Heilbronn Alliance, and then of France. At the first battle of Rheinfelden he was in Bernard's camp, but fell into the enemy's hands, out of which

Bernard's subsequent victory delivered him. He now entered into Bernard's service, and became his right hand in Court and camp during the remainder of his life. Erlach's prolonged endeavours at Paris to secure for the Duke the French contingent promised to Bernard by Feuquières, and a substantial portion of the subsidy due to him, were, however, only partially successful; nor could he obtain any assurance as to the fulfilment of the promise of investiture with the "landgravate of Elsass," made to him in the treaty of October 27, 1635. To place so much power in the hands of a Protestant Prince was repugnant to the powerful Jesuit party at Court, and even to the supple Father Joseph. The concessions actually made to Bernard were doubtless largely caused by the attempts made to draw him over even now to the side of the Emperor. At this very time (June, 1638) efforts were made in this direction by his own family, and in particular by its head, Duke John Ernest of Weimar, who sent an official named Hoffmann to urge Bernard's acceptance of the Peace of Prague. But he haughtily rejected these overtures, and, while declaring himself in favour of a satisfactory general peace, recommended the Emperor, if of the same way of thinking, to send ambassadors to Hamburg to negotiate with those of France and Sweden.

The confidence in France which Bernard had on this occasion manifested or professed proved in so far warranted that, on August 6, his army in the Breisgau was actually joined by about 2000 French troops (less than half of the force promised to Erlach) under Turenne, whose military reputation already stood high. Thus reinforced, Bernard marched upon the Kinzig, along which stood the forces of the enemy. The army of the Empire opposed to him, amounting to some 12,000 men, was led by Field-Marshal Count von Götz, a general of great self-confidence but moderate military ability (formerly a Protestant and a Mansfelder), to whom the Elector of Bavaria had after the capture of Johann von Werth delegated the chief command; while a smaller division, levied by the Emperor, was under the incompetent Duke of Savello. On May 9, when Savello with the vanguard of the Imperialist army was approaching Breisach with supplies, Bernard of Weimar fell on him as his soldiers were straggling out of the defile at Wittenweier, and put him to flight before Götz came up with the rear-guard. After a brave resistance he was likewise routed, and Bernard's extraordinary *élan* had gained another signal victory. The Imperialist army was all but annihilated, though Götz and Savello made their way to Tübingen and Heilbronn respectively, there to engage in mutual angry recriminations.

Now that the Breisgau had been freed from the foe, the opportunity had at last arrived for Bernard to seize the prize which he had so long coveted. On August 18 his army arrived in face of Breisach. The fortress, crowning a steep rock on the right bank of the Rhine, which was connected with the Alsatian side by means of a bridge running

across two islets, was thought to be impregnable. But Bernard knew that the supplies in it would not hold out for more than two months, and that both fortress and town largely depended for their bread on a mill which might be cut off by a wide circumvallation on the right bank of the river. This work was completed by the beginning of October; and, after the entrance to the bridge on the left bank had been occupied, the blockade was complete. When Charles of Lorraine, who had been unable to join the Imperialists before the battle of Wittenweier, approached the Rhine from the west, Bernard, by a brilliant cavalry attack, scattered his forces at Sennheim (October 14). Reinforced by a further French division of 1000 troops, he then turned again to meet the Imperialists under Götz and Lamboy, whose attack on the right bank was frustrated by Turenne. Field-Marshal von Reinach, the Governor of Breisach, held out without flinching. But after the arrival of a further French force of 3000 men, sent by the Duke of Longueville, the failure of Götz (who continued to march round Breisach "as a moth goes round a candle") to take Laufenburg, and his final supersession by Count Wolf von Mansfeld (November 29), all prospect of relief vanished. The advice given by Erlach, when temporarily left in charge of the siege, to starve out the garrison, had been near the mark. Towards the end of November, while Reinach was still parleying, all the horrors of famine had set in at Breisach. On December 17 the Governor signed the capitulation, and honourable conditions of departure were granted to the garrison; though Bernard at the last hesitated before accepting an agreement which had been delayed at so terrible a cost.

In view of the strength of the fortress, the magnitude of the efforts made to relieve it, and the success with which they were averted, the siege of Breisach forms one of the most memorable events of the Great War. Yet, although the place, and the passage over the Rhine which it commanded, were of unequalled importance to the Powers contending for the mastery of the border-lands from the Alps to the Low Countries the progress of the War was not so decisively affected by Bernard's capture of Breisach as might have been expected. As a matter of fact France had during this year dissipated her strength, and there had been nothing to redeem a series of failures—in the Netherlands, in Italy, and above all on the further side of the Spanish frontier, except the progress of Bernard which had culminated in this success.

On the other hand the Swedish arms had once more made a signal advance. Oxenstierna had finally abandoned all thoughts of a separate peace with the Emperor, and was intent upon reaching a complete understanding with France. After long negotiations at Hamburg between Salvius and the Marquis St Chaumont, and his successor, Count d'Avaux, a treaty was in March, 1638, concluded for three years which renewed the Franco-Swedish alliance, adapting it to the altered

conditions brought about by the Peace of Prague. The two Powers undertook to carry on war jointly against the House of Austria, and neither to treat nor to conclude peace unless by mutual consent. France, notwithstanding her financial distress, undertook to pay to Sweden annually a million of *livres*. France was to carry on the war in the south-west, while the Austrian dominions were to be the concern of Sweden, who by accepting this arrangement implicitly renounced any claim to the undivided hegemony over the Protestant remnant in the Empire.

Banér hereupon received reinforcements and supplies from Sweden which enabled him, in July, 1638, to resume operations with renewed vigour, and, after recovering Pomerania and Mecklenburg, to drive Gallas into Silesia and Bohemia, where the reduced Imperialist forces took up their winter-quarters. The military activity of the Swedes could not but confirm the Elector George William in the fears which inclined him to adhere to the Emperor, and which induced him, in this year 1638, to conclude at Kössenick an important commercial treaty with Poland. The compact was to be followed up by the joint invasion of Swedish Livonia by Poland, Brandenburg, and the Emperor. This explains why, early in 1639, the Polish Prince John Casimir was arrested at Marseilles on his way to Spain.

On the other hand the Swedish Government gave some support to the attempt set on foot early in 1638 at Meppen on the Ems by the young "Elector Palatine," Charles Lewis, to recover his patrimony by means of an expedition equipped by English money. But the design ended disastrously in October at Hochfeld between Weser and Werra, where the remnant of the delivering force was practically annihilated. This was the only actual contribution on the part of England to the later stages of a conflict in whose beginnings she had played so prominent a part. In 1638, Sir Thomas Roe, Elizabeth of Bohemia's assiduous correspondent, appeared at Hamburg as representative of the English Government in the futile peace negotiations which were being carried on there; but his declaration that England had no wish for an open rupture with the Emperor was only significant of his master's well-founded suspicions of the French Government. The same feeling would in the following year (1639) have induced Charles I, had he been able, to support a final design of Spain to obtain the control of the Baltic.

But this was a mere effort of the imagination. From the Franco-Swedish alliance, on the other hand, great things might be expected in 1639, if cooperation proved possible between two such commanders as Banér and Bernard of Weimar. The energy with which the Swedish Marshal entered on his campaign in January implied that he actually looked forward to such a cooperation. Crossing the Elbe, he passed through the Brunswick lands, apparently with the view of obliging Duke George of Lüneburg to abandon his neutrality; but he soon

turned upon the Saxons and their Imperialist allies, and, after driving the former back upon Dresden, defeated the latter under Archduke Leopold William on April 14, 1639, near Chemnitz. He then took Pirna, scattered an Imperialist force near Brandeis, and at the end of a month sat down with a much augmented army before Prague. But after a brief cannonade he withdrew to the Elbe, waiting there in vain to be reinforced by Bernard of Weimar and meanwhile devastating parts of Bohemia and Moravia.

Before Banér's campaign, which had begun so successfully, came to an inglorious end, Bernard of Weimar's career had been cut short at what had seemed its most critical moment. The crowning achievement of Bernard's military career, the taking of Breisach, had at once brought to the front the question—who should be master in the captured fortress? Bernard regarded the French promise to him of the "landgravate of Elsass" as including the possession of the fortresses there; and no reservation to the contrary had been made by the French Government. Now, although Breisach was not in Upper Elsass but in the Breisgau, the Austrian Government had administered both territories conjointly; and Bernard insisted upon the fact that Elsass had no value for him without Breisach. On the other hand, the French Government was resolved upon resisting his claim on the fortresses, and on Breisach in particular, especially as he coupled with it a demand that the annual subsidy paid to him should be doubled, since his army now amounted to nearly 18,000 men. About the turn of the year he had anticipated events by naming Erlach Governor of Breisach; and when in January, 1639, he marched in person into Franche Comté and took up his quarters at Pontarlier, he clearly indicated that, at the risk of relieving the Imperialists of any immediate apprehensions and postponing the conjunction with the Swedes, he meant in the first place to protect his own interests. In March he sent Erlach to Paris, and secured the concession that he should hold Breisach and the other fortresses in accordance with the treaties, together with the promise of an augmentation of the French troops commanded by Guebriant. But his pecuniary demands were not satisfied; and the instructions sent to Guebriant included the imposition upon Bernard of a written declaration that he held the town and fortress of Breisach under the authority of the French Crown, and would never admit troops into it except by that authority.

The tension between him and the French Government was increasing; and Bernard's self-confidence could not but be heightened by the overtures made to him from other quarters. The truce concluded by the Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel had in August, 1638, led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Mainz, by which the Calvinist Estates were to be admitted to the Peace of Prague; but the Emperor refused to ratify the essential clause of the treaty. Bernard hereupon pressed the Landgravine

to take the advice of Sweden, France, and the States General, and to break off negotiations with the Emperor and unite the Hessian troops (still numbering over 10,000) with his own. But the Hessian general, Melander, was intent upon an independent line of action, for which he had already obtained the assent of the Brunswick Dukes and of Neuburg, and hoped eventually to secure that of Denmark and even of Poland; namely, the formation of a third party which, excluding the influence of foreign Powers from the Empire, should effect an understanding with the Emperor on the basis of the Peace of Prague. Of this league of peace Bernard of Weimar was to be constituted the commander-in-chief. But he decisively rejected the suggestion, insisting on the expediency of keeping up the great foreign alliances and condemning the idea of including Catholic Princes in the proposed league. He scornfully rejected the attempt of his old adversary Savello to bring him over to the Emperor; and refused an Imperial invitation through Denmark to send an ambassador to the abortive peace negotiations at Cologne and Hamburg, unless all the Electors and Estates were represented there. He would receive no Imperial or Spanish agent, and was scrupulously loyal to the French "alliance"—for as such he persisted in regarding it. But since he had obtained possession of Breisach, he was more intent than ever upon establishing a princely power of his own which he should retain after the conclusion of peace.

Such were the contradictions in which the uncertainty of his position, together with an ambition neither unnatural nor ignoble, involved this brave soldier of fortune, who was at the same time a sincere patriot and an ardent Protestant. The charge, brought against him by French diplomacy at Hamburg, of a desire to secure a dominion for himself at the expense of the King of France was only partially correct. The immediate plans entertained by him in the last weeks of his life remain, however, to some extent obscure; his ambition was still unquenched, but he seems to have had some forebodings of the nearness of his end. Early in July he left Franche Comté, though with what precise purpose in his mind is unknown; an outbreak of the plague at Pontarlier furnishes a sufficient reason for his departure. At Hüningen on the Rhine he was prostrated by an attack of sickness, and was taken on by boat to Neuenburg, where he died on July 11, 1639, in his thirty-fifth year. Whether he was carried off by fever, apparently of a typhoid kind, or was poisoned, has long been disputed; in the latter case, the deed was one of private resentment because of the excesses committed by his soldiery in Franche Comté. He bequeathed his "very considerable" conquered lands and fortresses, which he wished to remain part of the Empire of the Germanic nation, to such one of his Weimar brothers as might accept the charge, and admonished his inheritor to be true to Sweden. Should none of his brothers accept, his conquests were in equity to go to the King of France, provided that garrisons consisting of his

own troops as well as of the King's should be maintained in his dominions, and that, in the event of a general peace, they should be restored to the Empire. The command of his troops he made over explicitly to Erlach, with whom were to be associated in the first instance three other German officers named in the will.

Sixteen years passed before the remains of the great captain were committed to their last resting-place at Weimar. No such interval occurred before the dissipation of his schemes, which had depended solely on his own personality as a commander. The first and most anxious care of the four "Directors," as Erlach and his associates were now called, was to keep the army together; and, as the French subsidies had for the present stopped, a month's pay was at once provided by means of a fund of some 300,000 *livres* reserved by Bernard for emergencies. The army was reckoned, according to a calculation which no doubt included the garrisons, at 6000 foot and 5000 horse; and even if this estimate of its actual numbers was excessive, they might at any time be increased by a victory to a force so formidable as decisively to effect the progress of the War. To whom would this army offer its allegiance?

Many suitors, to borrow Queen Christina's satiric phrase, presented themselves. The Queen of Sweden's own agent, Mockel, was in attendance at Benfeld, and sought to sow discord between the soldiery and their commanders. But as Sweden would have had to take the army into her pay without the least chance of securing the Breisgau, the prospect possessed no attraction for Oxenstierna. The attempt of the Palatine pretender, Charles Lewis, to put in an appearance with the aid of English money was frustrated by his being arrested at Moulins by Richelieu's orders (October), and confined at Vincennes for the greater part of a year. The Weimar Dukes, though announcing their intention to accept their brother's territorial legacy, would have nothing to do with his army. On the other hand, the Emperor, by mandates and by direct negotiation at Breisach, sought to bring over officers and soldiers into his service. But the effort broke down; and there is no proof that a simultaneous attempt was made by Spain. Finally, the suggestion that the army should, under the command of the Directors, make war on its own account, could not be seriously entertained as a permanent solution of the problem.

The Directors and other chief officers of the army had from the first made up their minds that it was necessary for them to come to terms with France; and in the circumstances in which they were placed it seems idle to talk of treason. A fortnight after Bernard's death, they sent Colonel von Flersheim to Paris to furnish the King with a general assurance of their faithful services, and to ask for a continuation of the subsidies. Early in August Guébriant informed the officers at Breisach that Duke Bernard, whom they had honoured as a Prince, had been simply their commanding officer, and that they belonged less to

him than to the King, from whom both he and they had drawn their pay. Guébriant was not speaking without book; and Erlach at least must have known of the interviews between Guébriant and Bernard at Pontarlier a few weeks before the Duke's death, when he had promised in writing that in the event of his death his successors would give the King the satisfaction as to Breisach and the other conquered places which he had himself been at all times prepared to furnish. Nor can Erlach have been unaware of the secret article in the treaty of October 27, 1635, by which Bernard acknowledged the supreme authority of the King of France. Other arguments were not wanting to expedite the negotiations carried on at Breisach during the latter half of September by Baron d'Oysonville (afterwards unwarrantably named Governor in Erlach's absence), State Councillor de Choisy, and Guébriant. Some of the officers obtained pensions and grants of land, and the soldiery received the pay due to them, with a modest bonus amounting to not more than 150,000 *livres*. But the essence of the transaction lay in the desire of officers and men to preserve the unity of the force under its old commanders, and in the determination of the French negotiators that its oath of fidelity should henceforth be to the King alone. On this basis a treaty was signed on October 9, by which, in addition to satisfactory provisions as to the pay of the army, it was settled that the old Bernardine treaties should continue in force and the army remain together under the command of the Directors, the artillery being placed under their and Guébriant's joint control; that Breisach and the other conquered places should be delivered into the hands of the King of France, but their garrisons should consist half of German, half of French troops, under the command of officers chosen from the Bernardine army. A secret article provided that the Governors of the fortresses should be in the first instance those appointed by Bernard, and that there should be no interference with the free exercise of the Protestant religion either in the conquered places or in the army.

Erlach was appointed Governor-General of the conquered places in the Breisgau and Upper Elsass, and his salary was raised from 12,000 to 18,000 *livres*; but it was only in the year before the close of the War that he was appointed Lieutenant-General of the French armies in Germany. Up to that date his success as a negotiator had brought him little but bitterness; and, though his reputation rose in his last years, it has continued to suffer from the obloquy which always attaches to such transactions as that which he carried through in 1639. But the violent abuse of him as a traitor to Bernard of Weimar, to his House, and to the cause which he had served, is unjustified. Erlach acted in the spirit of his former chief; and his army only sold itself in the sense applicable to most of the armies of the Thirty Years' War.

On October 30, 1639, the "Directors" and other regimental commanders of the Bernardine army swore fidelity to the King of France

at Colmar, in the presence of the Duke of Longueville, who now assumed the supreme command. Eight hundred French troops were shortly afterwards admitted into Breisach, and three hundred into Freiburg. On October 20 the army under Longueville set forth on its march down the Rhine, and within a few weeks, besides threatening Landau, took Germersheim, Bingen, and Kreuznach. On December 28 the Rhine was crossed in effective style at Bacharach and Overwesel. This crossing of the Rhine, far more directly than the mere conclusion of the Breisach treaty, influenced the conduct of those German Princes who were still hesitating about casting in their lot with France and Sweden, or dallying with the notion of a third party in the Empire. The Landgravine, Amalia Elizabeth of Hesse-Cassel, who, in order to save the "princely liberty" of her House, had consented to neutrality, instead of allowing Melander to play an "independent" part, now (March, 1640) concluded a temporary subsidy treaty with France; and Duke George of Lüneburg, bent upon adjusting the action of his House to both wind and sun, was encouraged by the determination of the "Great Landgravine" to side with the open adversaries of the Emperor.

That the German War after Bernard of Weimar's death entered into a new and more active stage was not only due to Richelieu, and to the rapidity with which, at the very time when he was assailing the power of the Spanish monarchy by sea and land, he took advantage of the opportunity offered in Germany by the death of the great captain whose movements France had so imperfectly controlled. It was also due to the energy and diplomatic skill of the Swedish commander-in-chief, Marshal Banér. Nothing had come of the Emperor's attempt in the summer of 1639 to draw off the Swedes from Bohemia by an incursion into Livonia under the command of Colonel Booth; or of the diplomatic efforts at Hamburg of the Imperial plenipotentiary Count Kurtz to tempt Sweden to a separate peace by the offer of Stralsund and Rügen.

In May, when Banér, after moving from Bohemia into Saxony and then into Thuringia, was joined at Erfurt by the Duke of Longueville, his army numbered not less than 22,000 foot and 20,000 horse; and included, with the Bernardines, the Hessians under Melander, and George of Lüneburg's troops under General von Klitzing. But the opportunity of striking a decisive blow with this large combined force passed away again for the present. Banér, who was much depressed by the death in camp of his wife, failed to keep the force together, and the Imperialists under Piccolomini at Saalfeld refused his challenge to battle. Melander resigned his command in dudgeon; and a wide-spread dissatisfaction among the Bernardines had to be suppressed by Longueville, who later in the year was succeeded in the command by Guébriant. In June, Banér moved towards the Weser, followed by the Imperialists; but neither army could find the necessary supplies in the north-west.

The sufferings entailed upon a large proportion of the Empire by

these constant marches and counter-marches, billeting of troops and shifting of quarters—which it would be futile to pursue in detail—were becoming no longer bearable; and a general cry was arising throughout Germany for a final settlement, such as the Peace of Prague had wholly failed to bring about. Even the Catholic Princes had for some time been disposed to favour a general measure of oblivion, which should make possible a reunion among the Estates of the Empire. With this end in view a *Kurfürstentag* which met at Nürnberg in January, 1640, while showing its loyalty towards the Emperor by urging the continued detention in confinement of the Elector of Trier, agreed to the proposal that a Diet should be summoned; and in September it was actually opened at Ratisbon by Ferdinand III.

The motives that had led to the Peace of Prague were thus once more at work to bring about a more effectual settlement on similar lines. On the other side it seemed clear that some effort should be made to stay the flow of Imperialist sentiment; and the requisite antidote was supplied by a publication which appeared in this year, 1640, under the title *Dissertatio de Ratione status in Imperio Romano-Germanico*. This pamphlet bore the pseudonym "Hippolithus a Lapide," but has been attributed with much probability to the Pomeranian Martin Chemnitz, afterwards historiographer to the Crown of Sweden. It would be difficult to exaggerate the effect—both immediate and enduring—of the demonstration supplied in this famous treatise both of the inherent weakness of the Emperor's position in the constitutional system of the Empire, and of the manner in which the House of Austria, in accordance with its traditional policy, had abused its Imperial opportunities. The *Dissertatio* cannot be shown to have exercised any direct influence upon the proceedings of the Diet of Ratisbon; but the reception given by the Diet to the Emperor's proposals as to the best way of securing peace, and of carrying on war till peace was assured, proved its desire to restore and render permanent, by means of a general amnesty, the distribution of power in the Empire which had existed before the outbreak of the War.

The prospects of the opponents of a dominant Imperial authority were further improved by the death (in December, 1640) of the sorely tried Elector, George William of Brandenburg, who was not born to set right the time. He was succeeded by a prince of stronger mould, Frederick William, afterwards called the Great Elector, the inconsistencies of whose policy were not less than those of his father's, but were at all events successful in advancing the political importance of his State. He threw off the control of Schwarzenberg, who died shortly afterwards (March, 1641); and soon, under the form of a truce, concluded a treaty of neutrality for two years with Sweden, to the hand of whose young Queen he for a time aspired (July, 1641). Before this, the Ratisbon Diet, which had drawn up a statement of the appalling sufferings inflicted

upon the Empire by the War, was rudely surprised in the midst of its deliberations.

Whether or not in secret conference with Duke George of Lüneburg, Banér had, in December, 1640, returned to Erfurt, where he was joined by Guébriant and the Bernardines. Early in January, 1641, he began a march which about a month later brought him so close to Ratisbon that he was able to fire a few cannon-balls into the city across the Danube. But stress of weather prevented him from crossing the river, and obliged him gradually to retreat to his old quarters at Zwickau, while Guébriant, with whom he had been involved in more than one dispute, established himself in Thuringia. In April Banér received the news of the death of Duke George of Lüneburg, one of the shrewdest of the Protestant Princes, though intent upon dynastic ends rather than on the victory of the "common cause"; and on May 20 Banér himself succumbed at Halberstadt to his fatigues, or perhaps to his excesses; thus ending, in his forty-fifth year, a career distinguished by rare military and political ability.

Meanwhile the Diet at Ratisbon had continued its deliberations on the *gravamina* preferred on both sides, and was not dissolved till October, 1641, after an *Abschied* announcing an amnesty from which the Emperor's hereditary dominions were excluded. Moreover, it was rendered nugatory by being made conditional upon an actual reconciliation with the Emperor of the Estates desirous of benefiting by it—in other words upon their renunciation of their adherence to Sweden and France. These two Powers had, on August 21, renewed the treaty of alliance concluded for three years in March, 1638; and their proposal that future negotiations for peace should be carried on at Münster and Osnabrück was accepted by the Emperor and Spain (December, 1641), March 25, 1642, being appointed as the day of the opening of the congress at these two places. The Ratisbon Diet had agreed that the Electors and other Estates were entitled to take part in these negotiations; but the meeting of the *Deputationstag* at Frankfort, which the Diet had arranged for the following May, was delayed till February, 1643.

The desire for peace, to which the restricted amnesty granted at Ratisbon was regarded as a preliminary step, was intensified by the successful recovery of the Swedes from the difficulties which had followed upon the death of Banér. The bonds of discipline had of late been utterly relaxed in his army, in which the Swedish troops formed a quite small minority, amounting, according to one account, to not more than 600 men; and there was a serious danger of the army falling hopelessly into pieces. But Guébriant, who had rejoined Banér shortly before his death, contrived to infuse new spirit into what had been a malcontent and leaderless host. On June 29, 1641, Archduke Leopold William and Piccolomini, intent upon relieving the Imperialist garrison at Wolfenbüttel, which the Brunswick Dukes were seeking to recover, made an

In August Torstensson, execrating his ill luck, left Wrangel to carry on the Danish War (the further course of which is narrated elsewhere), and moved south with his main force. In November he stood on the Saale, face to face with Gallas; but for this year it was impossible to do more than inflict a defeat upon him at Jüterbok, and oblige him to withdraw into winter-quarters in Bohemia. Gallas' force had dwindled to 4000 men, less than a third of its former number; and the disfavour incurred by him was such that he had to resign his command.

In the west, too, the affairs of the Franco-Swedish alliance had once more begun to prosper. After his interview with Torstensson, Marshal Guébriant—whether or not in pursuance of a plan concerted between them for an attack upon Bavaria—had marched towards the Neckar (December, 1642). The Bavaro-Imperialist army of defence was commanded by Field-Marshal Franz von Mercy, while a cavalry force under Johann von Werth was near at hand. Tired of the pleasures of his French captivity, the renowned commander had, early in the year, been exchanged for the Swedish Field-Marshal Horn, and was now once more at the front. Guébriant, though much discouraged by the death of Cardinal Richelieu, was assured by the new Minister, Cardinal Mazarin, of his confidence, and warmly congratulated on the successful repulse of an attempt by Johann von Werth. But the French Marshal was unable to undertake any offensive action without further assistance; and his operations were hampered by the death of Louis XIII, though immediately afterwards Enghien's great victory of Rocroi (May 19, 1643), assured the safety of the northern frontier of France. It was not till the latter part of October that Enghien, drawing near from Lorraine, sent to Guébriant a reinforcement of 5000 men under the command of the Holstein Count Rantzau. Guébriant hereupon designed to march upon Munich; but, while engaged in the siege of Rottweil, he was wounded, and died on November 24, 1643. On the same day, his troops, commanded by Rantzau, were routed at Tuttlingen by the Imperialists, whose entire cavalry had been now placed under Johann von Werth; and Rantzau himself was taken prisoner with a large number of officers.

But, as is related elsewhere, the French Government and its new chief, Mazarin, whom Richelieu had himself designated as his successor, were resolved to adhere to the course marked out by him. On Guébriant's death, Turenne, who had recently earned fresh laurels by the conquest of Piedmont, was appointed to the command of the army of the Rhine; and at the head of 10,000 men, including the remnants of the Bernardines and Guébriant's other troops, held the left bank of the Rhine as far down as Breisach against the Bavarians under Mercy. After, in June, 1644, he had crossed the Rhine and was advancing upon the sources of the Danube, Enghien at last joined him; and their superior forces now confronted those of Mercy and Johann von Werth. A protracted series of battles now ensued (August 4, 5, and 9) near Freiburg in the Breisgau,

which ended in a hurried retreat by Mercy, whom however Enghien was unable to overtake. Hereupon, he moved rapidly upon Philippsburg, which was quite unprepared for his approach, and took the place (September 12). The campaign ended with a well-ordered and almost unresisted advance of the French army down the Rhine as far as Mainz; which surrendered on September 17. Its fall was followed by that of Landau; and Turenne also captured Bingen, Oppenheim, and Worms. The readiness with which the population on the left bank of the Rhine submitted to French control was attributable not only to the skill with which Enghien with Turenne's aid carried out the comprehensive plan of operations long cherished in vain by Guebriant, but also to the wise humanity that characterised their proceedings. "If," Grotius wrote about this time to Oxenstierna, "the French continue by their acts to show that they have come to make themselves not masters, but protectors of German liberty, they will also be able to allure other German States to their side."

Thus in the following year (1645) the Emperor's enemies were able to close in upon his hereditary dominions and upon those of his Bavarian ally. Every effort was made by Ferdinand to meet the approach from Saxony of Torstensson, who had with Oxenstierna's assent postponed a resumption of the Danish campaign. In February, after securing the cooperation of Rakoczy, he set forth to meet the Imperialist army, commanded by Hatzfeldt, Götz, and the ubiquitous Johann von Werth, and animated by the arrival of the Emperor at Prague and the news that the Blessed Virgin had in a vision promised victory to his arms. At Jankau, near Tabor, the two armies met on March 5, each numbering about 16,000 men, when a battle in which no quarter was given on either side resulted in a complete victory for the Swedes—mainly, it would seem, due to their artillery. In the end they surrounded the Imperialist centre, making prisoners of between four and five thousand officers and men, including the commander-in-chief Hatzfeldt, with all their field gear. The Emperor made his way back to Vienna, which once more trembled for its safety. Gallas was substituted for Hatzfeldt, and the defence of Upper Austria was entrusted to Archduke Leopold William; the Court withdrew to Grätz. By the end of April Torstensson was within little more than 30 miles of Vienna, but diverged to lay siege to Brünn. Fortunately for Ferdinand III and the safety of his archduchy, the Transylvanian, George Rakoczy, after concluding, in April, 1645, a treaty with France, which, in return for liberal subsidies, pledged his services to her and Sweden, was during his advance through Hungary repeatedly defeated by the Imperialists under Götz and Puchheim, and finally stopped in his march by a message from Constantinople. Ordered by the weak Sultan Ibrahim to cease at once from hostilities against the Emperor, Rakoczy concluded a peace, in which he entirely disengaged himself from the Franco-Swedish alliance (August).

While Torstensson had once more been disappointed by the course of a campaign begun with high hopes, the defensive forces of the Emperor had steadily increased. In his hereditary dominions he had ordered a more or less general levy; and in the west Mercy's surprise and defeat, on May 5, of Turenne, who had once more crossed the Rhine, at Herbsthausen, near Mergentheim (the old Franconian seat of the German Order), set free a further Imperialist force. In September Torstensson therefore judged it well to raise the siege of Brünn, and to begin a retreat upon Bohemia.

But this turn in the course of the War was not to prove enduring. After his reverse at Herbsthausen, Turenne had withdrawn upon Hesse-Cassel, where the indefatigable Landgravine had induced Christopher von Königsmarck to unite his Swedish division with Turenne's army, already reinforced by her own troops. Königsmarck, a daring campaigner, had in 1644-5 rendered substantial service to his Government by the conquest of the dioceses of Verden and Bremen, of which he had been appointed Governor-General. When Enghien and Turenne had once more united on the Neckar (July), their forces exceeded 30,000 men, and even after Königsmarck had taken his departure to Saxony (July), still considerably outnumbered the Bavarians under Mercy, who, on August 3, gave battle to the French at Allerheim, near Nördlingen. A furious cavalry charge under Johann von Werth failed to turn the fortunes of the day in favour of Mercy's army, and he fell himself in the field. Enghien's victory—doubtful to the last, and very dearly bought—was followed by the capitulation of Nördlingen, which the Imperialists had held since the great battle of 1634; but the success was not vigorously pushed, and the French troops took up their winter-quarters on the left bank of the Rhine, in Elsass.

Still, the French arms had asserted their ascendancy in the south-west, while Königsmarck carried fire and sword through the Saxon electorate, and by threatening to reduce the country for many miles round Dresden to a desert, forced the Elector John George to a six-months' truce (September). This truce, concluded at Kötschenbroda, and afterwards prolonged till the conclusion of the War, at last freed the Saxon electorate from the incubus of Swedish occupation, thirteen years after the conclusion of the Peace of Prague. Besides being granted a free transit through the Elector's dominions, the Swedes were left in possession of Leipzig, together with Torgau; and, being now on a friendly footing with Brandenburg, they had the whole course of the Elbe and Oder, as well as that of the Weser, under their control. In the same month Christian IV at last signed the humiliating Peace of Brömsebro with Sweden and the United Provinces. Thus, when in December, 1645, Torstensson's bodily infirmities obliged him to resign the chief command, he was succeeded in it by Karl Gustaf Wrangel, a gallant officer, but not comparable in political grasp to either Torstensson or Banér.

Wrangel was unable in 1646 to prevent the junction of part of the Bavarian army with the Imperialists under Archduke Leopold William; and their consequent preponderance of strength obliged the Swedes to abandon Bohemia. Wrangel's wish to effect a junction with the French army, now under Turenne, was—perhaps in part owing to Mazarin's continued desire to spare Bavaria—not carried into effect till July. The invasion of the electorate, which inflicted terrible sufferings upon its inhabitants, then began, and soon extended over the whole country. Augsburg was only saved by the sudden appearance of Johann von Werth, with the vanguard of the Bavaro-Imperialist army (October); and though Munich, recently put in a better condition of defence, was left unattacked, and eastern Bavaria undevastated, Maximilian's lands were suffering unspeakably from both friend and foe, while his treasury was empty. He could see no prospect of peace dawning at Münster, and at last showed himself willing to treat for a separate settlement.

Such was the meaning of the truce concluded at Ulm on March 14, 1647, between the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne on the one side, and Sweden and France on the other. The Bavarian troops were withdrawn from the Emperor's army; and the free Imperial towns of Überlingen and Memmingen were placed in the hands of the Swedes. Augsburg was to remain neutral; but Bavaria at large was to be evacuated by the French and Swedes, the Upper Palatinate remaining open to the transit of their troops. The Elector of Mainz and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt hastened to give in their adhesion to the compact.

Thus the whole weight of the task of carrying on the war against Sweden and France had been thrown back upon the Emperor; and, although the excesses of his troops in Bavaria and his neglect in the peace negotiations of the Elector's interests might palliate Maximilian's action, the indignation at Vienna knew no bounds. The Elector was given to understand that his Palatine claims would now have to take care of themselves; and no secret was made of the Imperial overtures for a separate peace which Wrangel transmitted to Queen Christina. Ferdinand III did not hesitate to summon the Bavarian army—numbering some 20,000 men—to prefer the allegiance which it owed to him as Emperor to any territorial claim; nor did the call remain altogether unanswered. It was obeyed by the impetuous Johann von Werth, whose loyalty to Maximilian had hitherto been more than unimpeachable, with Count von Sporck, and a few other officers. The Elector replied by setting a price on Werth's head, and ordering the devastation of his estate; and Werth's and his companions' own regiments declared their intention of adhering to the Elector.

Maximilian was, however, within a few months partly frightened, partly encouraged into a further change of policy. In September, 1647, he concluded the Treaty of Pilsen, by which he returned to the Imperial alliance, though refusing to receive back Werth and Sporck.

The Imperial and Bavarian armies were hereupon united once more, and, Gallas having died in the preceding year, were placed under the command of Melander (Holzapfel)—the gigantic, peasant-born soldier, who, after commanding the Hesse-Cassel troops till he quarrelled with the Landgravine and her foreign allies, passed into the service of the Emperor and was created a Count of the Empire. The truce with Sweden was at an end; but Maximilian was still hoping to remain on good terms with France, when just before the close of the year a trumpeter brought to Munich Turenne's message that his Government had likewise broken with Bavaria.

Meanwhile Wrangel had begun his campaign of 1647 by the recovery of Nördlingen (April); but the instructions of Oxenstierna, consistently intent upon keeping open the line of communication between the Baltic coast and the Austrian dominions, transferred the operations of the main Swedish army to Bohemia. In July Wrangel took Eger, though Melander was less than fifteen miles off. The Emperor was himself in camp, and barely escaped capture in a cavalry surprise; in return, Johann von Werth, who with Melander was fretting at the interference of *Hofkriegsrathspräsident* Count Schlick, executed a brilliant *coup de main* after his own heart at Triebel (August). But no general engagement ensued; and, after the Bavarians had reinforced the Imperialists, Wrangel withdrew, by way of Saxony and Hesse, to the further side of the Weser. Melander delayed in Hesse, in order to settle accounts with the Landgravine, and thus lost the chance of crushing Wrangel; for the menaces of France induced the Bavarian Elector once more to withdraw his contingent from the Imperialist army (November—December).

Neither in 1646 nor in 1647 had France been able to put out her strength; and Mazarin's success in alienating Bavaria from Austria had failed to achieve the expected result. The French army had to be recalled from Germany; for the northern frontier of France had become unsafe since the Dutch had slackened their military operations, so that Archduke Leopold William, now Governor-General of the Spanish Netherlands, was preparing to assume the offensive together with the irrepressible Duke of Lorraine. Thus, in May, 1647, Turenne withdrew across the Rhine into Elsass; but was stopped by an attempt at mutiny on the part of the remnant of the Bernardines, who refused to serve outside Germany or for any cause but that of German and Protestant liberty. Recrossing the Rhine, he succeeded in repressing this attempt, partly by a ruthless use of force, partly by arrangements made with the help of Erlach. A fraction of Bernard's old followers rejoined Turenne's force; the rest marched to Franconia; and some 1600 of these were actually incorporated in Königsmark's division of the Swedish forces.

By the end of the year 1647, however, France had definitively broken

with Bavaria, and renewed her promises of subsidies to Sweden. Turenne received instructions to unite with Wrangel; and, when the campaigns of 1648 opened, the military situation had already ceased to be favourable to the Emperor. His belated attempt to draw over to his side the young Elector of Brandenburg, and the breakdown of Frederick William's scheme—by no means the first of its kind—for setting up a third party in the Empire, will find later notice. Towards the end of March, 1648, the junction between Turenne and Wrangel was accomplished in the Ansbach territory, the Imperialists under Melander retreating before the allies across the Danube. How were these vast hosts to be fed? Melander is stated to have estimated their joint numbers at 180,000 souls: a calculation sufficiently illustrative of the "family" life in the camps of the Thirty Years' War. Swabia seemed the only region of the west where supplies were still obtainable; and here at Zusmarshausen, a few miles north-west of Augsburg, Melander's army suffered a decisive defeat, the stalwart warrior himself falling in the fray, shot through the heart (May 17).

The Imperialist army under Montecuculi and Gronberg hereupon hurriedly withdrew upon the Isar, followed by Wrangel and Turenne, whose troops, for the most part Germans, devastated the dominions of Maximilian, now a fugitive at Salzburg, with extraordinary fury. Their progress was arrested by the Inn, heavily swollen by the spring floods, and, though several attempts were made to cross this river, it proved the boundary of their march. Behind it stood Piccolomini and Count Francis Fugger, with a force of not less than 20,000 men. Early in August the two armies came to closer quarters, and Johann von Werth's efforts more than once brought sections of them into actual collision. As the season wore on, however, the Franco-Swedish forces withdrew beyond the Lech (October); and Piccolomini was about to make his way into the Upper Palatinate in order thence to pass into Bohemia and take part in the conflict there, when, greatly to his relief, and to the disappointment of the Swedes, the news arrived of the conclusion of peace (November).

Meanwhile (for the successful operations in Hesse against the Imperialists under Lamboy must be passed by) Königsmarck, whom Wrangel before his invasion of Bavaria had detached from his main army, had entered Bohemia from the Upper Palatinate. Early in the morning of July 26, his force, not numbering more than 500 foot and 500 horse, of which the nucleus consisted of the remnant of the Bernardines, arrived before the *Kleine Seite* of Prague (on the left bank of the Moldau), and just before daybreak by an escalade took possession of part of the wall close to the Premonstratensian convent of Strahow. Their guide was Count Odowski, formerly an officer in the Imperial service, from which he had been dismissed by Melander. The seizure, effected without the loss of a single man, was followed

by the looting of this quarter of the capital, which included the royal palace, filled by Rudolf II with innumerable choice treasures of art and literature and with priceless historical material, and many of the palaces of the nobility.

At the end of the month 8000 Swedish troops, under the Count Palatine Charles Gustavus (afterwards King Charles X of Sweden), arrived; while Count Rudolf Colloredo, who defended the city on the right bank, received a reinforcement of about the same strength. A prolonged siege ensued; and at the end of October Charles Gustavus, whose efforts had so far failed, had marched towards Eger in order to unite his forces with Wrangel's main army, where in Bohemia too, where thirty years earlier the Great War was held to have begun, its course was stopped by the news of the conclusion of peace.

How this end had been reached, and on what terms the settlement was at last made, will be told in another chapter. There also some attempt must be made to indicate, however faintly, the lacerated and all but lifeless condition in which the War now ended had left the midlands of Europe.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.

THE Peace which, whatever its shortcomings, achieved its purpose of putting an end to the 'Thirty Years' War was not made at once; and such had been the multitude and the complexity of the interests involved, the frequency of the changes in the political situation brought about by the shifting fortunes of the War, and the growth of mutual mistrust on all sides, that the efforts of the peace-makers had seemed foredoomed to an endless succession of failures. The evil, however, wrought its own remedy; and advantage was taken of one among many variations in the course of a seemingly interminable struggle to re-establish the European political fabric on bases which in the main endured for nearly a century and a half. Change itself—the transition from war to a peace which the nations could no longer see deferred—"reigned over change."

It has been seen in previous chapters how the project of securing to the distracted Empire the blessings of peace had fared since Wallenstein had in vain striven to be its arbiter, as his detested opponent Gustavus Adolphus had been the arbiter of war. In May, 1635, the Elector John George of Saxony, whose Imperialist sympathies had survived the Edict of Restitution and the sack of Magdeburg, as well as the battles of Breitenfeld and Lützen, succeeded at last in bringing to pass the compact known as the Peace of Prague. Though it provided for the restoration of no Protestant Prince dispossessed since 1630, and for the retention in Protestant hands of no ecclesiastical property acquired since November, 1627; though it secured neither the exercise of the Protestant religion in the dominions of any Catholic Government, nor any rights whatever to the Calvinists—yet its acceptance by the Saxon Elector, and the belief that the Swedish Power would prove unable to maintain itself permanently in Germany, gradually drew over nearly the whole of the Protestant Governments in the Empire to an acceptance of its terms. But it could not liberate even John George's own dominions from hostile occupation; and the War was destined almost to double its length before it came to an end.

Thus, the endeavours made in the last two years of Ferdinand II's

reign, and in the early half of that of his successor, to bring about a general peace, alike broke down. Towards the accomplishment of the end in view two sovereigns in especial—the Pope and the King of Denmark—were persistently eager to give their services as mediators; but each of them was profoundly distrusted by one of the two belligerents between whom he proposed to mediate. Pope Urban VIII, so early as the summer of 1635, had made proposals through his uncle at Vienna for the assembling of a congress to discuss the conditions of peace. In 1636 Ferdinand II and Philip IV, though perfectly well acquainted with the French sympathies of the Pope, agreed to send ambassadors to Cologne, where a congress was now actually gathering round the papal legate, Cardinal Ginetti. But, though France had assented to the Pope's proposal, a pacific settlement would at this time have ill suited the policy of Richelieu; and a pretext for hesitation was found in the refusal of the Emperor and Spain to allow passes for the Swedish and the Dutch ambassadors respectively. The Swedish Government were thus warranted in declaring that they would have nothing to do with conferences held in a Catholic city with the Pope as mediator; and, after a futile offer of mediation by the Seignior of Venice, the Cologne Congress came to an end without having even brought about a truce. Urban VIII renewed his endeavours in 1638—this time with the approval of Richelieu, whose purposes could not have been better suited than by a prolonged cessation of arms on the basis of *uti possidetis*. But Sweden demanded from France the payment of an annual subsidy of a million *livres* so long as the truce concluded should endure; and the Pope's suggestion to transfer the conference from Cologne to Rome was absolutely rejected at Vienna.

Before his death in February, 1637, Ferdinand II had fallen back on the familiar conception that peace could only be obtained from France by detaching Sweden from her. With this end in view, rather than that of a general pacification, his agents had entered into negotiations at Hamburg with the Swedish ambassador to the free city, the versatile and unscrupulous John Adler Salvius, with whom we shall meet again at Osnabrück. He was playing a double part, inasmuch as the Swedish Government was really intent upon the renewal of its alliance with France, which in the following year (February, 1638) Salvius actually consummated. A conference which early in 1638 the feeble Government of Charles I in the interests of his Palatine nephew sought, with some support from France, to bring about at Brussels proved utterly abortive. The Hamburg negotiations languidly continued, being on the Imperial side chiefly conducted by an active diplomatist, Baron Kurtz (Count von Valley); but the restored self-confidence of the Swedes would not tolerate the mediation of Christian IV, whose services Ferdinand II had invited, and the Danish King was entirely alienated from Sweden by her alliance with France. Brandenburg and Luxemburg's attempts at mediation

proved equally futile; and Count d'Avaux, the experienced diplomatist in charge of the French interests at Hamburg, was again delaying rather than expediting progress. Both he and Salvius, however, though far from any understanding between themselves, kept up some kind of touch with the Imperial Councillor Count von Lützow, who had arrived at Hamburg in 1640. Endless discussions were carried on as to allowing representation at the definitive Peace Congress, when it should be opened, to the Estates of the Empire, and as to the form of the letters of safe-conduct to be granted to those attending it. In the meantime the great engine for the continuation of the general war—the Franco-Swedish treaty of alliance—was renewed at Hamburg on January 30, 1641.

The Emperor Ferdinand III—who, like his father before him, sought so long as it was possible to reach success by half-measures—had in vain attempted a settlement by and for the Empire alone. His propositions at the Diet of Ratisbon in 1640 aimed at expanding the Peace of Prague into a settlement for the Empire at large, on the basis of an amnesty. There is no reason for doubting the pacific intentions manifested by Ferdinand III, ever since in 1635 he had in his capacity of probable successor approved Pope Urban's proposal of a peace congress. But, though the action of the son was not dominated in the same measure as that of the father by religious considerations, Ferdinand III was at Ratisbon still unable to realise under what conditions alone peace could be contemplated—not to say concluded. The indispensable preliminary condition of a pacific solution acceptable throughout the Empire was that the proposed amnesty should be a complete one. But even now Ferdinand III refused to include in it those Protestant Estates who were still in alliance with foreign Powers, or to entertain the notion that the Protestants as well as the Catholics should return to their obligations to the Empire on a basis of rights of territorial possession extending beyond that adopted in the Peace of Prague. He was unable to perceive that the Protestant opposition in the Empire refused to be coerced now as it had after the Smalcaldic War, and that even a united Empire would no longer be able to control the European political situation.

The Diet of Ratisbon, while steadily keeping in view the assembling of a general peace congress, resolved that certain questions concerning the internal affairs of the Empire, and more especially the Imperial administration of justice, should be in the usual way referred to a *Deputationstag*. Such a supplementary assembly actually met in 1642 at Frankfort, where for some three years it carried on its inanimate proceedings. But, though the Emperor had intended to charge it with so much of the business of the peace negotiations as concerned the Empire only, and thus to keep the several German Governments out of the general peace congress, he had, as we shall see, to abandon this policy; and in April, 1645, the Frankfort *Deputationstag* broke up.

Some years before this, the scheme of a General Congress had at last matured. On the one hand, it had come to be recognised, even at Vienna, that, when the terms of a final pacific settlement came to be actually discussed, the real difficulties to be overcome would lie in the conditions of the "satisfaction" to be granted to France and to Sweden respectively at the cost of the Empire. On the other hand, a serious obstacle would arise if the Emperor, continuing to regard his interests as identical with those of Spain, were to insist on the conclusion of peace between himself and his adversaries being made dependent on a simultaneous settlement between Spain and France; although there could be no reason against advantage being taken of the opportunity for negotiating a separate peace between Spain and the United Provinces (still technically included in the Empire), which to Spain was becoming more and more necessary.

Though the peace negotiations at Hamburg had not entirely collapsed like those at Cologne, it had at length become obvious that business would proceed more rapidly, and a successful issue seem less remote, if the separate negotiations with France and Sweden respectively were carried on in two localities between which communication was easy. Hence the felicitous proposal, brought forward by d'Avaux in the latter part of 1641, that for Cologne and Hamburg should be substituted Münster and Osnabrück, two Westphalian towns which are not more than thirty miles distant from each other. The proposal was after some hesitation accepted by Sweden, and then by the Emperor, upon whom it was urged by the Ratisbon Diet. Lützow, d'Avaux, and Salvius hereupon succeeded in negotiating at Hamburg the Preliminary Treaty, which was concluded on December 25, 1641, and is to be regarded as the first step actually taken towards the final Peace. It provided for the opening on March 25, 1642, of peace conferences at Münster and Osnabrück; the two assemblies to be regarded as forming a single congress, and both towns to be declared neutral territory. Inasmuch as the Peace was technically to be concluded between the Emperor and his allies on the one hand, and the Kings of France and Sweden and their allies on the other, safe-conducts were to be made out on behalf of the Emperor to the allies or adherents of France or Sweden respectively. With France the Emperor would treat at Münster under the mediation of the Pope and the Signiory of Venice, with Sweden at Osnabrück under that of Christian IV of Denmark. The Preliminary Treaty was ratified by Louis XIII on February 26, 1642; but the Emperor delayed his ratification till July 22; nor were the difficulties besetting the assembling of the Congress even then at an end. Before the Imperial ratification Lützow had made one more futile attempt to detach the Swedish from the French Government; and about the same time Maximilian of Bavaria, utterly sceptical as to the assembling of a general peace congress, was seeking to induce the Electors of Cologne and Mainz to join with him in a separate negotiation with France—a scheme which

he sought to revive after Mazarin had succeeded Richelieu in the direction of the foreign policy of France (December, 1642). In the end, however, with the aid of the impression created by Torstensson's victory at Breitenfeld, all obstacles were removed; the Preliminary Treaty was accepted by Spain, and the Emperor agreed to furnish letters of safe-conduct even to those members of the Heilbronn Alliance who had not yet become reconciled to him. The date of the meeting of the Congress at Münster and Osnabrück was fixed for July 11, 1643.

But though the Imperial plenipotentiaries made their appearance in both places with praiseworthy punctuality, such was not the case with most of their colleagues; and the French ambassadors did not reach Münster till April, 1644, having on their way concluded an offensive alliance with the States General against Spain. This alliance, however, failed to prevent the ultimate conclusion of a separate peace between these two Powers; just as the Emperor's promise that he would not make peace with France till Spain should also have concluded peace with that Power was to be ignored in the settlement between France and himself at Münster. The course of the negotiations between Spain and the United Provinces, and their result, will be related in a later chapter; in the Peace of Westphalia proper these Powers were included only as allies of two of the belligerents respectively, the Emperor and France; the "Burgundian Circle" of the Empire being treated as in the hands of Spain.

During the year 1644 the ambassadors continued to arrive, and the beginnings of a great international concourse stirred the quaint cloisters of the Rathhaus in the ancient cathedral city of Münster, and the more scattered streets and lanes of Osnabrück. In accordance with the tendencies of an age delivered over to formalities in Church and State, in council and in camp, the beginnings of the discussions between the plenipotentiaries were occupied with questions of precedence and procedure, before they so much as approached the problems which the issue of these discussions was to decide. The Congress did not actually get to work till the spring or early summer of 1645, by which time all the immediate (and a few of the mediate) Estates of the Empire had received their summons to attend, so that 26 of the votes at the Diet were represented at Münster, and 40 at Osnabrück. On June 1 the French and the Swedish plenipotentiaries at the two places of meeting brought forward their propositions of peace—the former in their own language, the Swedes in Latin. The general progress of business at the Congress may be summed up as follows. The propositions of the two Crowns were received, answered, debated, and settled during a period extending from the above-mentioned date (June 1, 1645) to that of the signature of the Treaty of Peace (October 24, 1648); but the discussions of these propositions by the Estates of the Empire lasted only from October, 1645, to April, 1646. On the other hand, the deliberations on the religious

grievances brought forward on one and the other side occupied the greater part of the period during which the Congress sat, from February, 1646, to March, 1648. As some of the chief plenipotentiaries at the Congress necessarily exercised a controlling influence upon both the main divisions of its labours, it may be convenient here to enumerate the most notable among the members of a bipartite assembly of politicians, unprecedented alike in the numbers of its members, and in the variety of the interests represented by them.

To the Emperor's chief plenipotentiary, Count Maximilian von Trautmansdorff, the work which the Congress actually achieved was pre-eminently indebted. His firm and self-sacrificing resolve to carry to a successful issue the task which proved to be the final task of his life, rather than any great subtlety in dealing with affairs or irresistible personal charm, enabled him to compass his end. Like Eggenberg, to whose group or party in the Court and Government at Vienna Trautmansdorff had attached himself, he was early in life converted from Protestantism. After supporting Wallenstein he had at last counselled the arrest of the Dictator; but he continued to cherish some of the great would-be pacificator's designs. After taking over from Eggenberg the direction of Ferdinand II's counsels, he had helped to bring about the Peace of Prague; and under Ferdinand III, whose entire confidence he commanded, his consistent efforts for peace were as unacceptable to the Spanish party as his loyalty to the House of Austria was vexatious to Bavaria. Trautmansdorff did not make his appearance at Münster before December, 1645; but from this date onwards till his withdrawal in July, 1647, more than a year before the signing of the Peace, he was not only, in Oxenstierna's phrase, the soul of the Imperial embassy, but succeeded in contributing more than any of his fellow-plenipotentiaries to the work of peace. His success was due to a remarkable flexibility in the conduct of business; but he was always careful of the dynastic interests of the House of Austria, and cannot be acquitted of having sacrificed to these the security of the Empire at large on its western border. His efforts were supported at Münster by Isaac Volmar, an astute lawyer and experienced official, and by the personal graces of Count, afterwards Prince, John Lewis of Nassau-Hadamar; and at Osnabrück by a pair of ministers who in much the same way balanced each other.

Each of the Electors—Spiritual and Temporal—was individually represented at the Congress; but the Bishop of Osnabrück (Count Francis William von Wartenberg, also Bishop of Bremen and Verden, and afterwards Bishop of Ratisbon and Cardinal), who had received powers from the Elector of Cologne and certain other ecclesiastical dignitaries, was finally named representative of the entire Electoral College. An illegitimate scion of the Bavarian House, and a pupil of the Jesuits, he had rigorously carried out in his diocese the

Edict of Restitution, and was in the Congress the chosen champion of German Catholic interests—for the policy of the Bavarian Elector was distracted between Catholic sympathies and a growing desire to lean upon France. Among the plenipotentiaries of the Protestant Electors and Princes on the other hand, the foremost was Count John von Sayn-Wittgenstein, the trusted ambassador of Frederick William of Brandenburg. He had served in arms under Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel, if not under Gustavus Adolphus himself, and had been a member of the *consilium formatum* of the Heilbronn Alliance. Familiar with Swedish as well as with French politics, he was able to promote with skill and vigour the interests of Brandenburg, which may be said already at this Congress to have borne itself as the leading Protestant German State. Many of the other Estates of the Empire were represented by diplomatists of proved experience, some of whom were also celebrated publicists, and, as in the case of the Benedictine Adam Adami, afterwards Bishop Suffragan of Hildesheim and the historian of the Congress, exercised a powerful personal influence upon its deliberations. In the discussions among the German Estates Adami and the Bishop of Osnabrück frequently commanded a majority of the entire Catholic vote; more moderate members of the party being as a rule found at Osnabrück, and the more extreme at Münster, while Jesuit agents eagerly watched and reported on their action. Among the plenipotentiaries of the Protestant Princes mention should be made of the learned Brunswicker Jacob Lampadius, and the Württemberger John Conrad Varnbüler, a worthy pupil of Gustavus Adolphus' faithful counsellor Jacob Löffler. The chief advocate of the interests of the Swiss Confederation was John Rudolf Wetstein, Burgomaster of Basel, so influential a personage that he was known by the sobriquet of "King of the Swiss."

The Emperor's ally the King of Spain had, in addition to a pompous grandee, Gasparo de Bracamonte (afterwards Viceroy of Naples), and a learned ecclesiastic, Joseph de Bergaigne (Bishop of Hertogenbosch, and from 1645 Archbishop of Cambrai), commissioned two capable diplomatists, Count Guzman of Peñaranda and a famous man of letters, Antoine Brun (Bruins). To their labours was mainly due the actual conclusion of peace between Spain and the United Provinces, without the intervention of France. Each of the United Provinces was individually represented at Münster; Holland and Zeeland respectively sending Adrian Pauw, Lord of Heemsteede, and John van Knuyt. The latter of these, as an adherent of the Prince of Orange, was at the outset supposed to have no desire for peace; but Frederick Henry modified his views before his death in 1647, and the States General, under the influence of the bold diplomacy of Francisco de Sousa, the Portuguese ambassador at the Hague, took up a stand which forced Spain into a settlement. At Münster the diplomatic agents of the

newly re-established kingdom of Portugal, and those of the Catalan insurgents, appeared under the wing of the French peace embassy.

The French plenipotentiaries at Münster were Abel Servien, Marquis de Sablé, and Claude de Mesmes, Count d'Avaux. The share taken in the Hamburg negotiations by d'Avaux, who had succeeded Charnacé as the chief agent of the policy of Richelieu in the Empire, has been already noted. He was a strong Catholic, and as such enjoyed the particular goodwill of Maximilian of Bavaria. Some jealousy prevailed between him and his colleague, who, though his inferior in knowledge of affairs, surpassed him in certain other diplomatic qualities and, since Mazarin had taken the helm, was better supported from home. The inconveniences caused by this estrangement, together with the wish to give *éclat* to the French embassy, induced the Queen Regent in 1645 to furnish it with a figure-head in the person of Henry of Orleans, Duke of Longueville; and in 1647 Servien was detached on a special mission to the Hague. But Mazarin kept up an understanding with him, and on his return to Münster the Duke quitted the city before the actual conclusion of the Peace. D'Avaux himself was recalled just before the signing of the Treaty.

The Swedish plenipotentiaries at Osnabrück were also, though in a less marked degree than their French colleagues at Münster, on unfriendly terms with one another. Count John Oxenstierna, the eldest son of the Chancellor, had served in the German War under his relative Field-Marshal Horn, and had gained some knowledge of the chief European States by travel. But he was not his father's equal in intelligence, or able to fall into line with the statecraft of John Adler Salvius, whose experience of affairs extended back to the Prussian War of Gustavus Adolphus, and who was favoured by the young Queen Christina, jealous of the Oxenstierna influence ever since, in December, 1644, she had taken the government into her own hands.

It remains to note that, of the Mediating Powers, Pope Urban VIII, and after his death in 1644 his successor, Innocent X, was represented in the Peace negotiations by Fabio Chigi, formerly Papal Nuncio at Cologne and afterwards Cardinal and Secretary of State under Pope Innocent X, whom he in his turn succeeded as Pope Alexander VIII. With Chigi, who was perhaps better qualified for his labours at Münster than for the greater task that awaited him, was appointed Alvisi Contarini, a member of one of the most illustrious of Venetian families, whose diplomatic services to the Republic had already extended over nearly two decades. On the whole they acted in harmony with one another; and the falling off of the Venetian's French sympathies synchronised with the change in the policy of the Vatican on the death of Urban. The ambassadors of King Christian IV, who acted as mediator at Osnabrück, Justus Hög and Gregers Krabbe, both of them members of the *Rigsraad*, had been instructed by their sovereign to indulge in a lavish expenditure;

but the outbreak of hostilities between Denmark and Sweden led to their departure from Osnabrück in December, 1643; and the negotiations there were thenceforth carried on without a mediator. No Christian Power was unrepresented at either Münster or Osnabrück except the Kings of England and Poland and the Grand Duke of Muscovy—and the former two were included in the Treaty as allies both of the Emperor and of Sweden, the Muscovite as the ally of Sweden only. The Porte took no part in the Congress. It should be added that the extravagance displayed there on all sides was largely dictated by a desire to show that the sacrifices of the war had not exhausted the resources of the various belligerents: the entry of d'Avaux into Münster lasted for a whole hour, and at Osnabrück Oxenstierna never showed himself in public except in quasi-royal state. Much money was spent on polite entertainments, and more on drinking-bouts. As to the expenditure for purposes of corruption, neither its occasions nor its amount admit of definite statement.

As already observed, the question of the success or failure of the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück really turned on the "satisfaction" of the Swedish and of the French Crown. Though, in his first answer to the original Swedish peace propositions the Emperor had stated that he was unprepared to proffer any satisfaction to either Power, inasmuch as both rather owed satisfaction to him, he declared himself willing to assent to a money payment by the Estates of the Empire to Sweden. In reply, that Power appealed to the fact that Gustavus Adolphus had been induced against his own wish to enter into the war, and that the enormous and irreparable sacrifices entailed by it upon Sweden included that of the King's own precious life. When at last the Swedish plenipotentiaries were brought to formulate their demands, these included the permanent cession to the Swedish Crown of Silesia, the whole of Pomerania, with Mecklenburg, Wismar, and the island of Poel, the archbishopric of Bremen, the bishopric of Verden, and certain other ecclesiastical lands, with a compensation to the officers and soldiers of the Swedish army.

The territories forming part of the Empire Sweden did not desire to sever from it, but to hold as Imperial fiefs, the Swedish sovereign thus becoming an Estate of the Empire and entering into the obligations towards it implied by this relation. But although, as has been seen, the Swedes at the end of the War still held a considerable number of places in the Empire, including part of Bohemia, they obviously had no intention of insisting upon the demand of Silesia. Pomerania, on the other hand, they had long resolved to annex, with or without the consent of Brandenburg. The Elector George William had steadily refused to yield on this head to Gustavus Adolphus, when at the height of his power; but by his acceptance of the Peace of Prague

the Elector had finally gone over to the side of the Emperor; so that when by the death in 1637 of Bogislav XIV, the last native Duke of Pomerania, the House of Brandenburg acquired an indisputable right to the entire Duchy, Sweden had a sufficient pretext for occupying it. Although Imperial troops had by repeated incursions into Pomerania contested this occupation, the Swedes had not given way, even after the accession in 1640 of Frederick William as Elector. The Pomeranian Estates were on the whole (notwithstanding some Lutheran qualms) in favour of the Brandenburg claim, while the Swedish pretensions were founded simply on the *de facto* occupation. Thus, it was ultimately agreed that the old division between *Vor-* and *Hinterpommern* (Western and Eastern Pomerania) should be revived; and that, while the latter passed to Brandenburg, the former, with the island of Rügen and the town of Stettin, and certain places on the eastern side of the Frische Haff, should be allotted as a distinct duchy to Sweden. This arrangement necessitated a compensation to Brandenburg, while the further cession to Sweden of the port of Wismar and the island of Poel made it requisite to find some equivalent for Mecklenburg. Sweden also acquired, as secular duchies held under the Empire, the archbishopric of Bremen, of which she had at the outbreak of hostilities with Denmark in 1643 deprived its Danish occupant, Prince Frederick, and the adjoining bishopric of Verden, from which she had expelled the pluralist Bishop of Osnabrück. This was the earliest in the series of secularisations effected in the course of these negotiations; no expedient commended itself so readily for use, and none could have more plainly demonstrated the failure of the whole policy of reaction and restitution which had begun and protracted the War. Sweden would henceforth have seat and vote at the Imperial Diet, and be a member of three of the Circles of the Empire; and in Pomeranian Greifswalde she would, as was specially provided, possess a German University of her own. It should be noted that, by a special provision of the Treaty of Osnabrück, all Swedish garrisons were withdrawn from the Mark Brandenburg.

Finally, a settlement was made as to the claims preferred by the Swedish Crown on behalf of the officers and soldiers in its service during the War. Though the Imperial plenipotentiaries had maintained that every Power ought to deal with its own soldiery, Queen Christina insisted most strongly on the "satisfaction of her militia"; and, after a demand of twenty million dollars had at first been put forward, a contribution of five millions for this purpose was imposed upon seven of the Circles of the Empire.

France, like Sweden, was slow in formulating her terms of "satisfaction." When they were at last presented, the recognition of her sovereignty over the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, of which she had been in actual possession for all but a century, was granted without much ado. The sovereignty of the King of France over

Pinerolo was likewise recognised, the provisions of the Treaty of Cherasco between France and Savoy (1631) remaining practically unaltered; but Savoy retained its existing territorial rights and limits. Duke Charles of Lorraine was left out of the Congress, and out of the Treaty.

The claims of France upon Elsass were not so easily settled. The French Government had repeatedly declared that it made war upon the House of Austria, and not upon the Empire; and it was clear from the outset that the House of Austria would have to defray the main cost of the French "satisfaction." This view of the case, which commended itself to Bavaria and the Spiritual Electors hardly less than to the Protestant Princes, throughout governed the diplomatic action of France in this matter; and she began by simply demanding the cession to her of the Austrian possessions and rights in Elsass. But when the French Government and its agents, with Servien at their head, entered into these far-reaching negotiations, they were quite uninformed as to the actual extent and character of these rights, and as to the relations to the Empire of the component parts of Elsass. Moreover, unhappily for the integrity of that Empire and for the future peace of Europe, it did not suit the purposes of the House of Austria—desirous of averting any French designs upon other territories in its possession—to dispel the ignorance of the French negotiators.

As a matter of fact, although so late as the middle of the seventeenth century Elsass had lost neither its unity of race, nor a certain cohesion of life and culture, its two historic divisions of Upper and Lower (southern and northern) Elsass had followed quite distinct lines of political growth. Of the two landgravates into which the ancient duchy had been administratively divided, that of Upper Elsass had, from the days of its landgrave the great Emperor Rudolf I, fallen more and more under the control of the House of Habsburg, to which nearly four-fifths of the land were now feudally subject. In Lower Elsass, on the other hand, the Austrian rights were virtually restricted to those of the *Landvogt*, who since the reign of Ferdinand I exercised a certain administrative authority in a district comprising, besides some forty villages in Lower Elsass, the so-called "ten free Imperial towns of Elsass" in both its divisions (Hagenau, Colmar, Schlettstadt, etc.). The nobility of Lower Elsass retained their independence, and its Diets their activity, while the dignity of "landgrave" had here become merely titular (with a domain or two attached to it) and, so far back as the fourteenth century, had been acquired by purchase by the Bishop of Strassburg. The see had no other formal connexion with Lower Elsass; nor was there any tie of the kind between the latter and the free city of Strassburg, which, like the see, was immediate to the Empire.

Yet, when in 1645 Mazarin instructed the French plenipotentiaries to demand, in addition to the fortresses of Breisach and Philippsburg, "Upper and Lower Elsass" (the Sundgau being treated as part of the

former), there can be no doubt that he and they supposed the whole of Elsass and its Estates to be in one way or another subject to the House of Austria. Being, however, apprised by their Bavarian friends that the case was not quite so simple, they thought it expedient to raise their terms by throwing in a demand for the whole Breisgau (on the right bank of the Rhine), which by November, 1645, Mazarin reduced to a claim on the fortress of Breisach only.

In these terms the Emperor acquiesced, secretly instructing Trautmansdorff to this effect in March, 1646; and though some further haggling followed on both sides, a settlement on the subject was now to all intents and purposes assured. The Austrian proposals brought forward in April, and substantially agreed to in the Preliminary Treaty signed in September following, were embodied in the final instrument of peace. Breisach—to which Bernard of Weimar had so tenaciously clung—was made over to France. But as to the cession of the “landgravate of Upper and Lower Elsass,” or of the “landgravate of both Elsasses” (for both terms had been in use) which, together with the *Landvogtei* over the ten towns and their dependencies, was to pass in full sovereignty to France, certain ominous obscurities remained. In the first place, while the King of France undertook to respect the liberties and the immediacy to the Empire, not only of the Bishops of Strassburg and Basel, but also of all the other immediate Estates in both Upper and Lower Elsass, including the ten free towns, he did so on condition (*Ita tamen*) that the rights of his sovereignty should not suffer from this reservation. The clause gave rise to much alarm at the time, and was afterwards deliberately misinterpreted; but its chief purpose was, beyond all reasonable doubt, simply to secure to the Crown of France the measure of rights which the House of Austria had formerly possessed in Elsass. In the second place, the expression *landgraviatus inferioris Alsatiæ* implied a measure of rights which the House of Austria could not transfer, because, as has been seen, it had never possessed them. No “landgravate of Elsass”—a term first imported by Austria into the negotiations—had ever existed; and the “landgravate of Lower Elsass” implied a title to which Austria had not a shadow of a claim. Thus in Lower Elsass Austria had nothing to surrender beyond the Hagenau *Landvogtei*, which in no wise involved the surrender of the ten free Imperial towns, though these were in certain respects subject to her authority. For the misleading phraseology, by which, as conferring upon France rights in Lower Elsass that Austria had never possessed, Louis XIV afterwards sought to justify his notorious “Reunions,” Austria, and not France, was in the first instance responsible.

The attempts of the Estates of the Empire at Münster and Osnabrück, and of the Estates in Elsass itself, to get rid of the ominous *Ita tamen* clause were skilfully eluded by Servien, who professed himself quite ready to accept the alternative suggestion that France should hold both

Upper and Lower Elsass as fiefs of the Empire. But the Emperor, who had no desire for such a vassal, would not hear of this solution. Nothing was gained by the agitation except that the city of Strassburg was expressly named among the Estates to be left untouched in their liberties, though Servien declared that there had never been any intention of including it in the French "satisfaction." Neither with regard to Elsass at large, nor most certainly with regard to Strassburg, is there any evidence that either Servien or the French Government had at this time deliberately formed any ulterior design.

An article of the Treaty obliged the King of France to maintain Catholic worship in Elsass wherever it had been carried on under the Austrian Government, and to restore its exercise where it had been interrupted in the course of the War. A compensation of three million *livres* was granted by France to Archduke Ferdinand Charles, who had held the position of Governor of the "Anterior" Austrian possessions; and a part of his debts was taken over by her. Though France had not insisted on the cession of Philippsburg, she was allowed the right of maintaining a garrison in the fortress, while the town was left to the Bishop of Speier.

The Peace provided for a general and unlimited amnesty in the Empire which was to go back to the Bohemian troubles—*i.e.* to the year 1618—and to extend to all Princes and other Estates, immediate or mediate, and their subjects, possessions, and public and private rights. But the particular changes and settlements in the Empire expressly mentioned in the Treaties were held to override any general provision; and on this head the exceptions were in part of very great significance.

Foremost among the Princes of the Empire whose interests had been impaired by the Swedish "satisfaction" stood the Elector of Brandenburg. Regarding the sees of Brandenburg and Havelberg, together with that of Camin (a dependency of Eastern Pomerania) as permanently appropriated by his House, he now demanded certain Silesian principalities, without any serious expectation of inducing the House of Austria to hand them over to him, together with the secularisation, in favour of his dynasty, of the archbishopric of Magdeburg, and the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Hildesheim, Osnabrück, and Minden. His vigorous diplomacy actually secured to him the first and the last named of these bishoprics, and the archbishopric of Magdeburg, as hereditary possessions. Magdeburg was, however, not to pass to his House as an hereditary duchy until the determination of Prince Augustus of Saxony's life tenure. The much-vexed administrator Prince Christian William was granted an increase of the pecuniary consideration allowed to him in the Peace of Prague.

The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, in compensation for the transfer of the lucrative port of Wismar, obtained possession of the sees of

Schwerin and Ratzeburg; certain actual or contingent equivalents being granted to his kinsman of the Güstrow branch.

The interests of another north-German House had been prejudiced by these arrangements and the absorption by Sweden of the archbishopric of Bremen. This was the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, which under Duke George, up to his death in 1641, had played so prominent a part in the latter part of the War. But the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes, who had in 1642 at Goslar prematurely concluded a separate peace in their own interests, were now obliged to give up Hildesheim to its Catholic Bishop, the Elector of Cologne, and to see Minden transferred to Brandenburg. Of the three sees on which the Princes of the ambitious House of Brunswick had set their hopes, only a moiety of one was assigned to them. For it was settled that at Osnabrück the present Catholic Bishop should be succeeded by the Brunswick-Lüneburg Duke Ernest Augustus, and that after him the see should be alternately held by a Catholic and a Protestant, in the latter case preferentially by a Brunswick-Lüneburg Prince. By another abnormal arrangement the Bishop, Chapter, and Estates of Osnabrück were made liable for the payment of 80,000 dollars to the former occupant of the territory, Count Gustaf Gustafsson, of Vasaborg, an illegitimate son of the great King. On the other hand, a still outstanding claim of the heirs of Tilly upon the principality of Calenburg (Hanover) was now quashed.

The Dowager Landgravine Amalia Elizabeth of Hesse-Cassel had in the face of difficulties innumerable maintained so close a connexion with both the Swedish and the French Government that their military commanders and diplomatists alike never lost sight of her interests and pretensions. Special mention accordingly was made of them in the first peace propositions of both Powers. Her claims were judiciously spread over a large and varied extent of territory; but in the end Hesse-Cassel acquired the secularised Prince-abbacy of Hersfeld, which had long been under its control, together with other lands and the large sum of 600,000 dollars for the payment of its soldiery, to be contributed by divers spiritual potentates. The compact between Cassel and Darmstadt securing to the former part of the long-disputed Marburg succession was also confirmed in the Peace; so that the "great Landgravine"—a Princess whose extraordinary sagacity and determination deserve enduring remembrance—was now entitled to sing her *Nunc Dimittis*. She died in 1651.

The Peace of Westphalia failed to effect any final settlement of the Jülich-Cleves-Berg question, which had so nearly antedated by a decade the outbreak of the Great War. A pious hope was expressed that the "*interessati*," who, besides the "possessing" Princes, were Brandenburg and Neuburg, the Elector of Saxony and the Duke of Zweibrücken, would soon come to terms; but this hope was not fulfilled till 1666, when, by the Treaty of Cleves, Brandenburg was awarded the permanent

possession of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensburg, and Neuburg of Jülich and Berg—a settlement which lasted till the expiration of the Neuburg line in 1742. The Donauwörth difficulty, too—another of the causes of the Thirty Years' War—was left over for settlement by the next Diet; and Bavaria remained in possession, compensating the Swabian Circle for the loss of the town's contributions. A third and more important question, which during the course of the War had only gradually fallen into the background, once more became prominent in the peace negotiations and had finally to be settled by a compromise. The voice of England, the one Western Power unrepresented in these negotiations, could no longer be raised on behalf of Charles Lewis, the eldest son of the late Elector Frederick; and the States General could hardly be expected to intervene actively on behalf of a family of which they had long grown weary. On the other hand, Bavaria would leave no stone unturned in order to retain possession of the Electoral dignity and of the Upper Palatinate. If Maximilian had to surrender this acquisition, he would at once claim from Ferdinand III his father's pledge of Upper Austria and a debt of thirteen million dollars; and, if Maximilian lost his Electorship, there would be an end of the Catholic majority among the Temporal Electors. It was accordingly at last agreed that the Upper Palatinate, and the fifth electorate which had been transferred to Maximilian in 1623, should remain with the Bavarian branch of the House of Wittelsbach, while the Lower Palatinate, with a newly-created eighth electorate, was assigned to Charles Lewis and his descendants. As the new Elector Palatine would participate in the general amnesty, the Emperor undertook to avert so far as he could any opposition in the Lower Palatinate to the restoration of Charles Lewis, and even promised him a certain measure of pecuniary relief and support. Unfortunately it neither supplied his economic needs on his return to the desolate remnant of his patrimony, nor brought about a reconciliation between him and his mother, the ex-Queen of Bohemia, who after her Odyssey of woes was never to see Heidelberg again.

Both the Baden-Durlach line, which had been deprived of its territories after the battle of Wimpfen (1622) and the House of Württemberg, of whose domains Ferdinand II had in his last years distributed a large part among his ministers and commanders, had been excluded from the amnesty granted at the Peace of Prague and were now reinstated. This was mainly the work of Varnbüler, who thus signally contributed to the preservation of Protestantism in south-western Germany. Several other Estates of the Empire, which had likewise been excluded from the Prague amnesty, and others which had not been so excluded, endeavoured to secure similar recoveries; and in the end a stop had to be put upon these transactions, which threatened indefinitely to postpone the conclusion of peace. The Elector of Trier, thanks to French support, re-entered into all the rights and possessions which he had forfeited, and

his soldiery replaced the Imperialist garrisons in his fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein and Hammerstein.

While the loose connexion between the United Provinces and the Empire was allowed to lapse in silence in view of the recognition by Spain of the independence of what still formed part of the Burgundian Circle, the independence of the Helvetic Confederation of the Thirteen Cantons was explicitly recognised in the Treaties of both Osnabrück and Münster.

It remains to summarise the efforts made in the Peace of Westphalia to deal with the religious and political difficulties, for the most part so repeatedly and persistently brought forward as "grievances" at the Diet and other meetings of Estates of the Empire, that had long distracted and disturbed its life, and had materially contributed to bring about the War. The gravest of these difficulties dated back in their origin to the Reformation; nor could any settlement of them be reached unless they were regarded as radical and treated accordingly. The peace propositions of the Swedish plenipotentiaries demanded that all mutual grievances between the Catholic and Protestant Estates should be entirely uprooted (*funditus extirpentur*). As representing a Catholic Power, the French plenipotentiaries were precluded from professing the same purpose; and thus it was only at Osnabrück that the religious grievances were discussed, and the principle of their being *ultimately met* by a reunion of the religions was once more asserted. The endeavours of the Imperial plenipotentiaries to refer the religious grievances to the Diet broke down, and to the exertions of Sweden, whose services to the preservation of Protestantism did not come to an end with the career of Gustavus Adolphus, are to be ascribed such results as were on this head reached in the Peace of Westphalia.

The Treaty of Passau (1552) and the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) were acknowledged as fundamental laws of the Empire, but were here broadened in their application by the important provision, that among the "adherents of the Augsburg Confession" should be held to be included those who proposed the "Reformed" (Calvinist) form of faith. The Elector of Saxony, consistent to the last, protested against this article. So far, however, was it from implying any general religious tolerance, that the same Treaty of Osnabrück expressly directed that no other religion except those expressly mentioned should be allowed in the Empire—a declaration not of course intended to prevent any particular Government from granting such protection as it might think fit to individual adherents of other forms of religion.

Sweden had originally proposed that, in view of the manifold grievances on both the Catholic and the Protestant side, the state of possession which had existed in the year 1618 should be restored and made perpetual in the case of ecclesiastical foundations and property of all kinds, and in that of all other disputed matters admitting of being

so regulated. This proposal represented so enormous an advance upon the Prague settlement, which had fixed the year 1627 for the same purpose and allowed a period of possession from that date onwards of not more than forty years, that, after prolonged discussions and determined Catholic resistance, the date of January 1, 1624, was, on the motion of Electoral Saxony, definitively adopted. It was favourable to the Protestants, as entirely excluding the operations of the Edict of Restitution, and even some changes effected by Tilly; on the other hand, a large number of immediate Church foundations were thus left to the Catholics.

Exclusively, then, of those ecclesiastical foundations—chiefly secularised sees—specific dispositions as to which formed part of the satisfactions or compensations—all immediate foundations and estates, whether archbishoprics, bishoprics, abbacies, convents or other, were to remain in the undisturbed possession of whichever of the religions had held them on January 1, 1624, until by God's grace the religious disunion should have an end. If the occupant of such a foundation changed his religion, his occupancy would *ipso facto* cease. In Cathedral Chapters, if at that date they had been composed partly of Catholic, partly of Protestant members, the same proportion was to be permanently maintained. Thus the knot of the old problem—the question of the validity of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*—had been suddenly cut; but practically, so far as the great debatable land of the west and south-west was concerned, the decision was wholly in favour of the Catholics. A final stop was put upon the spread of Protestantism in the Empire by means of conversions in high places. The same rule of date applied to mediate spiritual foundations—mainly convents; no religious Order was to be admitted into a convent hitherto held by another, except in the case of its having become extinct *in loco*; and even then no Order founded since the Reformation was to be introduced—a stipulation palpably directed against the Jesuits.

Of deeper interest to us, because of its connexion with the principle of tolerance which in this generation was only beginning to dawn upon a few minds, was the problem of the public and private exercise of their religion by subjects who professed a form of faith different from that of their territorial sovereign. The declaration in the Peace of equality between Catholics and Protestants was restricted by the addition "in so far as is in accordance with the constitution and laws of the Empire, and with the Peace itself"; and it had to be reconciled with the right of determining the religion of his territory (the *jus reformandi*) granted by the Religious Peace of Augsburg to every territorial lord or immediate estate, while to subjects who dissented there remained the alternative of emigration.

The Lutherans and the Reformed, whom the Catholics left to settle their own practice on this head, agreed that, without prejudice to liberty

of conscience, existing compacts should continue in force where Lutherans were actually under a Reformed territorial ruler, and *vice versâ*; and that in future cases the ruler, while appointing Court-preachers of his own religion, should not interfere with his subjects' exercise of their religion, or with the religious condition which had obtained in churches, schools, universities, etc., in his dominions at the time of the Peace. The Lutheran lands about to come under the rule of the Elector of Brandenburg were no doubt kept specially in view.

For Catholics and Protestants living under rulers of the opposite faith, the conditions of public and private religious worship, of the constitution of consistories, and of the patronage and tenure of churches, convents, hospitals, etc., which had obtained at the most favourable date in the year 1624, were to be accepted as decisive, and to be maintained *semper et ubique* (till the day of religious reunion). A single exception was made, in the case of the see of Hildesheim, where a settlement less advantageous to the Protestants than the state of things in 1624 was adopted. In places in this diocese possessed of only a single church, "simultaneous" Catholic and Protestant worship (*i.e.* worship at different hours of the same day) was allowed—an odd compromise largely resorted to elsewhere, though with very doubtful legal warrant.

Subjects who in 1627 had been debarred from the free exercise of a religion other than that of their ruler were by the Peace granted the right of conducting private worship, and of educating their children at home or abroad, in conformity with their own faith; they were not to suffer in any civil capacity nor to be denied religious burial, but were to be at liberty to emigrate, selling their estates or leaving them to be managed by others. Some ambiguity, however, attaches to the stipulations of the Peace on this head. One passage provides for the patient toleration of subjects not of the ruler's religion; but another seems to imply that, exceptions apart, the ruler may oblige such subjects to emigrate, though without forcibly abducting them or fixing their destination.

An important and perfectly distinct exception to these last provisions was however made in the case of the subjects of the House of Austria. The Emperor Ferdinand II had steadily refused to yield to the demand pressed upon him in the negotiations for the Peace of Prague that the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg in his dominions should be allowed the free exercise of their religion wherever they had enjoyed it in 1612; and a similar *non possumus* was opposed by Ferdinand III to the proposals made at Osnabrück, where the years 1618 and 1624 were successively named. (The earlier of these was to have included the Bohemian troubles.) He insisted on his *jus reformandi*; and Trautmansdorff repeatedly declared that his master would sooner lose throne and life than assent to such a demand. Certain concessions were granted in the cases of the three Silesian duchies of Brieg, Liegnitz, and

Münsterberg-Oels, and of the city of Breslau, as well as in that of the nobility of Lower Austria; but nowhere else in the Austrian dominions was any exercise of their religion allowed to the Protestants of any class or condition.

In accordance with the principle of the general amnesty announced in the Peace, persons who had emigrated from the Austrian dominions during the course of the War, and who in many instances had taken service under hostile Princes, were now allowed to return home, but without recovering either the free exercise of the Protestant religion or the possession of their lands.

Much trouble between the Confessions had always existed in the free towns of the Empire. It was now settled that where only a single religion had been exercised in 1624 the town should be treated as Catholic or Protestant accordingly; but in certain towns, of which Augsburg was the most prominent instance, where the adherents of the two religions were mixed, they were to be equally free to exercise that which they professed. At Augsburg, however, a complicated arrangement, quite unfair to the large Protestant majority among the citizens, was adopted as to municipal offices.

From religious grievances we finally pass to political—though, as in the interesting provisions as to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the two fields of discussion lay very close to each other. At the root of the conflict which had at last become war had lain the opposition between territorial and Imperial claims. Ferdinand III and his advisers expressed much surprise on finding that both the Swedish and the French peace propositions referred so largely to the rights and liberties of the German Estates; but it was in vain that they sought to postpone to the next Diet considerations which possessed so great an interest for the two foreign Crowns.

What was at issue was nothing short of the restoration of the old territorial sovereignty (*Landeshoheit*) of the Estates of the realm (a few Imperial rights being reserved), and a fresh statement of certain rights supposed to be inherent in that sovereignty.

Among these rights, Sweden, France, and the Princes of the Empire, were above all anxious to place beyond all reach of dispute the right of concluding alliances, whether with Estates of the Empire or with foreign Powers. This was effected by the provision, common to both the Treaty of Münster and to that of Osnabrück, which secured to every Estate the right of concluding any such alliance with a view to his own security, provided that it was neither directed against the Emperor, the Empire, or its *Landfrieden*, nor against the conditions of the Peace of Westphalia itself. Notwithstanding these safeguards, a virtually complete independence was thus assured—so far as any of them could assert it—to each of the 300 or more political bodies which made up the Holy Roman Empire; and this independence extended to the

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decrees, prevented any real assimilation of its procedure to that of the *Kammergericht*. The Ratisbon Diet of 1653-4 was largely busied with these matters; but they were not brought to a conclusion by it.

France and Sweden would gladly have lessened the prestige of the House of Austria by introducing into the constitution of the Empire a provision that henceforth no election of a Roman King should be held during the lifetime of an Emperor. They were also desirous of augmenting the power of the Estates at large, among whom Sweden was now herself to be numbered; and France hoped to exercise an enduring influence, by making their assent requisite for the holding of any such election, and for the settlement of a permanent *Wahlcapitulation* limiting the Imperial authority. But the Austrian diplomacy succeeded in holding over the consideration of these matters for the next Diet. On the other hand the two Powers were able to delay the actual conclusion of the Peace for some time after its articles were complete by long discussions as to the proper ways of executing and of securing it. The Peace was actually signed at both Münster and Osnabrück on October 27, 1648; but, though the Emperor's edicts for its execution were issued a fortnight afterwards, the ratifications were not exchanged till February 8, 1649. Meanwhile the exchange of prisoners and other matters appertaining to the execution of the Treaties had been taken in hand by the military commanders, and were not wound up till June, 1650, at Nürnberg. The protest which the Papal Nuncio had offered against the Peace immediately after its conclusion, was reiterated a month later by Pope Innocent X in the Bull *Zelo domus Dei* (November 26, 1648); but its validity had been denied beforehand in the Peace itself, and no proceeding could have demonstrated more palpably the complete estrangement which now prevailed between the Imperial and the Papal authority. As a matter of fact, the Papal protest is not known to have been ever invoked by any Power against any stipulation of the Peace of Westphalia.

Each of the two Powers, whose alliance had prolonged the War, might now seem to have achieved its ends. The statesmanship of Sweden, hardly less than the heroic deeds of her great King and a succession of eminent commanders, had obtained for her the position of a great European Power. But her losses in men were so serious, that a war on a similar scale could hardly be contemplated by the living or the next generation; while the monarchy could only defray the financial cost of the effort by processes which ended in changing the bases of Swedish constitutional life. The Swedish Crown had acquired a fair German province which provided the security desired by both Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstierna for the kingdom itself and for the sufficiency of its share in the control of the Baltic. Sweden hereby also secured a permanent right to a participation in the affairs of the Empire, which might at any time be used for the purpose of once more gaining the control of them. But she had to reckon with the jealousy of her new

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petty and powerless, with few securities for their rights and an endless divergence of interests, the dissolution of the bond that held them together must sooner or later follow; more especially if the historic ascendancy of the House of Austria and its traditional tenure and transmission of the Imperial dignity should cease to endure.

But the political losses and gains which the Peace of Westphalia entailed upon the Empire and its Princes sink alike into insignificance, and even the undeniable advance towards religious freedom marked by the adoption in that Peace of the principle of equality between the recognised religious confessions is obscured, when we turn to consider the general effects of the War now ended upon Germany and the German nation. These effects, either material or moral, cannot be more than faintly indicated here; but together they furnish perhaps the most appalling demonstrations of the consequences of war to be found in history. The mighty impulses which the great movements of the Renaissance and the Reformation had imparted to the aspirations and efforts of contemporary German life, were quenched in the century of religious conflict which ended with the exhausting struggle of the Thirty Years' War; the mainspring of the national life was broken, and, to all seeming, broken for ever.

The ruin of agriculture was inevitably the most striking, as it was the most far-reaching, result of this all-destructive war. Each one of those marches, counter-marches, sieges, reliefs, invasions, occupations, evacuations, and reoccupations, which we have noted, and a far larger number of military movements that we have passed by, were accompanied by devastations carried out impartially by "friend" or foe. For the peasants who dwelt upon the land there was no personal safety except in flight; their harvests, their cattle, the roof over their heads, were at the mercy of the soldiery; and, as the War went on, whole districts were converted into deserts.

Bohemia, where the War broke out, had the earliest experience of its desolating effects, above all in the sorely tried north-west of the kingdom; but its sufferings reached their height—long after the Bohemian rising had been crushed, as it seemed, for ever—early in the last decade of the War. The destruction of villages, from which most parts of the Empire suffered, was probably here carried to the most awful length; of a total of 35,000 Bohemian villages, it is stated that hardly more than 6000 were left standing. The sufferings of Moravia were in much the same proportion, and even more protracted; those of Silesia only ended when it was made over by Saxony into the Emperor's care at the Peace of Prague. Upper and Lower Austria also enjoyed some relief during the last part of the War, when the main anxiety of the Emperor was to keep it out of his hereditary dominions. The inflictions to which Maximilian's electorate was subjected during the victorious campaigns of

Gustavus Adolphus and the subsequent invasion of Bernard of Weimar were followed by far more grievous treatment by the troops of Banér and Königsmarck. During the concluding years of the War no other German land underwent more terrible sufferings than Bavaria, where—especially in its eastern part—famine and desolation stalked unchecked. Franconia and Swabia, too, were made desolate by the ravages of war, famine and disease, especially after the catastrophe of Nördlingen; the pasture-lands of the Schwarzwald and the vineyards of the Upper Rhine and Neckar country were alike desolated. The Lower Palatinate, when this portion of his patrimony was at last recovered by the Elector Charles Lewis, was little better than a desert; so utterly had war, anarchy, and emigration changed the face of the garden of Germany. The regions of the Middle Rhine were in little better plight than those of the Upper; Nassau and the Wetterau had suffered unspeakably, especially during the latter part of the War, and the Hessian lands but slightly more intermittently. In the north-west neither the Brunswick-Lüneburg lands nor even remote East Frisia had escaped the scourge of military occupation; in Calenburg (Hanover) whole forests had been cut down by the Swedes. In central and north-eastern Germany, Brandenburg and Saxony had during nearly two-thirds of the War been at no time free from occupation or raids, especially on the part of the Swedes; the Anhalt principalities had suffered as if to atone for Christian's share in lighting the flames of war; and the Mecklenburg Dukes on their return home found the land desolate and depopulated.

The depopulation of Germany was an even more ominous feature in the aspect of the Empire after the War than the devastation of its soil. The statistical data at our command rest on no very satisfactory bases; but a comparison of statements as to particular territories seems to show that the population of the Empire had been diminished by at least two-thirds—from over sixteen to under six millions. In accounting for the loss it was reckoned (but how could this reckoning be verified?) that not far short of 350,000 persons had perished by the sword; famine, disease, and emigration had done the rest. In particular territories the loss of population had been enormous. In the Lower Palatinate only one-tenth (for the much-quoted figure of one-fiftieth must be dismissed as fictitious), in Württemberg one-sixth survived; in Bohemia, where, as in the Austrian duchies, emigration had largely helped to depopulate the country, it was reckoned that already before the last invasions of Banér and Torstensson the total of inhabitants had since the opening of the War diminished by more than three-fourths.

Notwithstanding the terrible sufferings which the War had inflicted upon the unprotected peasantry in by far the greater part of the Empire, this unfortunate class were by no means relieved from the burdens ordinarily imposed upon them. The poll-tax and the taxes on articles of consumption were exacted where it was possible to levy them; the

services (*Frohn*) were raised to so enormous a height during the War as to convert the position of a large proportion of the peasantry into one of serfdom, without the advantages of a fixed tenure which there was no legal means of ensuring. An inevitable result of the devastations due to the War was the practical afforestation of large tracts of arable land, and the imposition on the peasantry of a fresh burden of services, besides the infliction of endless damage, arising out of the chase. To these evils was added the insecurity of life and property due to vagabondage—the inevitable accompaniment and the long-enduring consequence of wars carried on by mercenaries, and more especially of one conducted on an unprecedented scale and extending over so large a part of Europe.

The economic effects of such a condition of things upon the soil and its cultivators need not be discussed at length. During more than a generation after the conclusion of the War a full third of the land in northern Germany was left uncultivated. Cattle and sheep diminished to an extraordinary extent, and many once fertile districts became forests inhabited by wolves and other savage beasts. The cultivation of many products of the land passed out of use in particular districts or altogether. Prices fell so low that in Saxony, for instance, the average price of wheat during the first twelve years after the Peace was a little less than half what it had been before the War, and that of rye even proportionately lower. Nor was there any prospect of agriculture recovering from so terrible a depression unless in regions where, as in the Palatinate, the exceptional fertility of the soil cooperated with the solicitude shown by the territorial rulers here and in Württemberg, as well as under less favourable conditions in Saxony and Brandenburg, for the interests of the rural population.

If the War reduced agriculture to an almost hopeless depression, and lowered the condition of the peasantry to a level at which it remained for the better part of two centuries, its effects were hardly less disastrous upon the middle or burgher class, and upon the trade and industry to which the members of that class had primarily owed their prosperity. The population of the towns, as a whole, is estimated to have diminished during the War in a ratio less by one-third than that of the country districts. As to property, though the townsmen had more to lose, they were of course on the whole far better protected, and the wealthier among them had opportunities of securing their capital in banks at a distance, or investing it in foreign trade. At the same time the fall in the production of raw material which might be worked at home or exported, together with the disturbance of all trade routes and lines of communication with foreign countries, were prohibitive of any revival of German industry and commerce.

Their chief centres had from of old been the free Imperial towns; but among these only the three great northern cities, which practically represented the remains of the Hanseatic League—Hamburg, Bremen,

and Lübeck—had kept the scourge of war more or less at a distance, undergoing comparatively little of the tribulation which fell to the lot of the inland towns of Germany. Though, however, during the thirty years the population of these maritime cities increased, they had to expend large sums upon their own protection, and incurred great losses through the utter insecurity of both the land and the sea carriage of goods. And, above all, their trade suffered from the political impotence to which the Empire had been reduced after the brief vision of maritime dominion had passed away. As has been noted in an earlier chapter, the Hanseatic League now virtually came to an end, though it was still formally represented by plenipotentiaries at Osnabrück. Lübeck, once the proud head of the Hansa, fell into a rapid decline, having lost almost everything that remained to her of Baltic navigation and trade—a result which Danes and Swedes were alike active in promoting and which was consummated by the permanent establishment of Swedish control over the West Pomeranian coast. Though their decay seemed not so hopeless as that of Lübeck, the prosperity both of Wismar, now a Swedish port, and of Danzig, tied for better and for worse to Poland, had been brought low, and the vast corn trade of the latter seemed on the eve of extinction. Hamburg and Bremen had been more favoured by fortune; they had been more easily able to make good their losses, and replace by new industries those which they had lost; while, for the carrying trade which for a time became the most important branch of their commercial activity, they possessed unrivalled facilities.

Among the leading commercial towns of central Germany, Erfurt, the chief mart of Thuringia, seems to have suffered more than Leipzig, which recovered by means of its fairs; Magdeburg, after rising from its ashes, was again and again under military occupation, but, owing to its great advantages as a natural centre of the carrying trade, was able to regain part of its former prosperity. The towns of Westphalia and the adjoining districts lay low; and, if the Rhenish were in a somewhat better state, it was as hangers-on of the Dutch that they picked up a small share of their neighbours' prosperity. But Cologne was entering upon a long period of commercial and industrial insignificance; and even more complete was the decay of Aachen, whose population had sunk to one-fourth of its former total.

On the Middle and the Upper Rhine the balance of trade, which had formerly been largely in favour of the products of German, and particularly of Franconian, industry, had now entirely shifted in favour of France. Frankfort, although, together with the surrounding districts, it had suffered severely from the War, recovered with comparative speed; on the other hand, neither Augsburg nor Nürnberg was destined to regain the leading position which these two great towns had held in the commerce and industry of the Empire. The smaller free towns of the south-west lost all mercantile importance; and their unwillingness to be

merged in the principalities around them deprived them of the last chance of arresting the departure of prosperity from their gates.

Wherever throughout the Empire particular manufacturing industries had flourished, the War had brought about a decline which lasted long after its close. The cloth of Westphalia and of Bavaria, the linen and wool, the glass and pottery, of various parts of the country, were vanishing from the market. Everywhere the twofold lack of capital and of labour made itself felt. Only in those lands where a wise administrative care specially devoted itself to fostering the native industries—in the Electorates of Brandenburg and Saxony, and also in the Palatinate—were there early signs of recovery. In those of the Habsburg lands which passed through so many vicissitudes in the successive stages of the War—in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia—various industries had greatly suffered, most of all perhaps the mining industry, which had been largely transferred into Saxony.

As a matter of course, the mercantile policy of each one of the German Governments, which the Peace of Westphalia had rendered to so large an extent independent of the Imperial authority, was regulated entirely by what it conceived to be its particular interests, or by the arbitrary choice or whim of its ruler. This applied to systems of communications, and to tariffs of duties and tolls. While there was no question of combination or union between several Governments for the advancement of trade or industry, the development of internal traffic in any particular principality was liable to be impeded or stopped by greed, ignorance, or stupidity. The worst of all the bad financial expedients to which any of the three hundred or more Governments into which the Empire was split up could resort was that debasement of the coin already noted; fortunately, however, this evil practice reached its height so early in the War that measures for arresting it could not be delayed.

The decline of German commerce and industry could not but lead to the domination of the foreign trades in the ports, along the river-ways, and through entire regions, of the interior of the country. A large proportion of the natural and industrial products of western Germany served to supply the Dutch with articles of export, some of which they occasionally brought back in a different form as imports into the Empire. The Dutch were masters of the outlets of the Rhine; and, except in so far as in the North Sea and the Baltic England had begun to compete, they practically controlled the trade of the German ports in both seas. On the other hand, French manufactures commanded an ascendancy in almost every sphere of life—partly because of the deference paid to France in the political, and not less in the literary and artistic world, partly because of a craving for finery of all sorts which was characteristic of the age, and which the French market alone could meet. Thus the French export trade flourished as that of

Germany, whose exports were mainly confined to her natural products, essened and languished.

If we pass from the material to the moral effects upon the nation of the tremendous social upheaval of the 'Thirty Years' War—whether we trace these effects in the pages, only too truthful in their colouring, of contemporary romance, or in the endless mosaic of details accumulated by historic research—they seem hardly to admit of exaggeration. Some of them are no doubt merely continuations of phenomena noticeable already in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the War; but for the unparalleled depression as a whole, of which to this day the effects cannot be said to have been altogether effaced, the War itself must be held accountable. Not only was this a conflict in arms more extensive in its range and more protracted in its duration than any that the Empire had previously experienced. It was a religious war, in which even the most high-minded of those who took part in it could not so much as pretend to be guided solely by the inspirations of religious enthusiasm, while the deadliest promptings of religious hatred were designedly fostered and the whole savagery of religious fanaticism was deliberately let loose upon its prey. It was a civil war, fought between members of the same nation, at times between subjects of the same Princes, between kinsmen and brothers; but it inflicted upon the greater part of Germany invasions of foreign troops from almost every corner of Europe—Swedes and Danes, Spaniards and Frenchmen, Transylvanians, Magyars, Croats and Poles. Very early in its course, it became a war of mercenaries, a character which it more or less maintained throughout—thus combining every element that deadens and destroys the impulses, the convictions, the hopes, which in a measure redeem the brutality of all warfare. Such, and worse than this, was the 'Thirty Years' War. How then could its moral effect upon all classes of the population have been other than that of a deadly blight? The Princes, with certain exceptions no doubt, had unlearned, with the sense of loyalty towards the Empire, the consciousness of duty towards the States over which they severally claimed sovereign authority; their eyes were turned westward in admiration of the splendours of a Court which was seeking to make itself the centre of all public and private effort; and it is in this period, rather than in the much-decried age preceding it, that there grew up the notion, anything but German in its essence, of a rigidly exclusive princely dignity and authority. The territorial potentate, who esteemed himself the sole fountain of honour, by enlarging the numbers of his nobility lowered its political and social importance; while the official class, passing more and more completely under his personal control out of that of the territorial Estates, became marked by that offensive blend of servility and insolence which was to mark the German bureaucracy of so many successive generations.

Among both the nobility and the well-to-do section of the burgher

class the abrupt changes produced by the War, more especially in the economic conditions of existence, gave rise to a recklessness in the conduct of life, manifesting itself in many ways, but most alarmingly in a wholly unrestrained self-indulgence. It showed itself in an eagerness to gratify, not only the national tendency to excess in eating and drinking, but also a liking for costly, extravagant, and grotesque fashions of dress—in its way one of the most repulsive of the many repulsive features of the times.

The order, the comfort, the decency which had so long distinguished German town life had come to an end, as the War made sieges, and the fear of sieges, a normal experience; nor had the comeliness of the flourishing towns of central and western Germany, with their comely walls and smiling gardens, their busy markets and gay *Vogelwiesen*, undergone a more complete change than had the local patriotism and solid self-esteem, the whole moral tone and temper, of their citizens. The horrors of which some of the towns shared the remembrance with the villages of the peasantry—only that in the case of the former the fury of their captors had usually been intensified by long expectancy and licensed by military usage—had left their degrading mark on the life of families, whose womenkind had been dragged away into the servile gipsydom of the moving camps.

In the midst of this social chaos religion, in whose name these iniquities were perpetrated, was trampled in the mire; but in its place superstition reared its hundred heads unchecked. No doubt, in this instance also the age had but entered into a *damnosa hereditas* of previous generations; but it put out the legacy to multiple usury. Terror, suffering, the loss of all effective spiritual guidance and the absence of all controlling mental discipline, drove the population at large—and first and foremost the soldiers who were the prime agents of the universal unsettlement—headlong into the wildest and most irrational varieties of misbelief. In the earlier years of the War the popular delusions as to witches and witchcraft from time to time demanded their saturnalia of sacrifice; but, as the conflict went on, men's minds became more and more unhinged by the volume of sufferings which overwhelmed the country; and though these very sufferings diverted public attention from minor causes, or supposed causes, of trouble and calamity, we hear to the last of wholesale burnings of witches—as if something must be done to balance the account with the author of evil. Within the years 1627–8 the Bishop of Würzburg is stated to have put to death 9000 witches and wizards, and between 1640 and 1641 nearly 1000 of these unfortunates are said to have been sent to the stake in the single Silesian principality of Neisse.

If we ask, in fine, what restraining curative and consoling influences sought to counteract such phenomena as have been noted,—together with a mass of others of the grossest sort at which it is impossible here to

glance—we shall look in vain for active impulses of national patriotism, or, unless in isolated individuals, for that absorption in philosophic speculation or mystic abstraction which is able to divert the attention of nations as well as individuals from the experiences of actual life. The general influences of education were but faintly exerting themselves, and those of literature with a still feeblar voice. The renewal of religious life by that sense of individual human responsibility to God and man, from which confessional orthodoxy had become estranged, was a work left for another generation; and the course and significance of this most interesting movement must be examined in a later passage of this book.

As to popular education, the village schools which the Reformation had not attempted to make much more than appendages to the village churches, had been for the most part swept away by the storms of the War; though it is interesting to find that immediately after the proclamation of peace—in 1649—the Württemberg Government, always specially intent upon the care of education in all its branches, sought to impress upon its subjects the general obligation of school attendance by their children. In the “Latin” schools of the Catholic towns the Jesuits lost no time in resuming their activity where it had been interrupted; in the Protestant towns a new influence was needed to animate a system of teaching hardened and narrowed by confessional jealousy, and by the long-continued subordination of all intellectual effort to theological ends. This influence was found in the gradual assertion of the idea of individual education of the individual, which found expression in the pedagogic principles of the great Moravian John Amos Comenius (1592–1671).

In the Universities, an all-subduing formalism had in the earlier half of the seventeenth century seized upon, and half-petrified, student life. In this backwater phase of academical history the Universities isolated themselves from the life of the nation. “*Pennalism*”—the effort to codify the usages of student life, especially with regard to the treatment of freshmen—reached so rank a growth that in 1654 the Diet of the Empire thought it necessary to issue an ordinance. This barbarity of manners had only too close a counterpart in the unprofitableness of University teaching, and its failure to communicate that highest impetus without which all academical life must sink into stagnation. Not, of course, that here also exceptional instances to the contrary were altogether lacking; we know that Milton’s treatises were used in the German Universities about 1651; and at Helmstädt George Calixtus during a forty years’ tenure (1614–56) of the professorship “of controversies” applied himself single-mindedly to the solution of the problem of religious reunion, and bequeathed his sanguine aspirations to the great mind of Leibniz. Helmstädt was also the immediate sphere of the scientific labours stedfastly carried on during these troubled times by the celebrated polyhistor Hermann Conring (1606–81), and by other

correspondents of the eminent Hamburg gymnasarch Jacob Jungius (1587-1657) a typical example of the persevering spirit of true science.

Where education so largely failed to exercise a remedial influence, literature, whose opportunities were even more intermittent and could be more easily ignored, could only play a still more subordinate part. Christoph von Grimmelshausen, *Adventurous Simplicissimus* (1669), closes a satirical narrative of a shrewd peasant's experience in an age of military violence, quackery, and vagabondage, with his relegation to a desert island, and his refusal to return thence to Germany, the land of his birth. Not less lurid is the light thrown on this age of war and outrage by the last seven of the *Visions of Philander* (1641-4), in which Johann Michael Moscherosch went on from an imitation of Quevedo's generalising satire to a series of largely original sketches. But these works contained no suggestion of recovery from the ills of the times, or of a real cure of them. With the exception of some hymn-writers, among whom the Lutheran Paul Gerhardt is pre-eminent, there are but two figures in the German literature of the period of the Thirty Years' War to whom our sympathies are attracted as standing forth from their generation and its sphere of ideas. The one is that of the Jesuit Friedrich von Spee, who, moved by a missionary enthusiasm for which the world was not too wide, is remembered not so much by his hymns as because of his exertions against the persecution of witches; and the other, that of an enthusiast of a different type, Jacob Böhme, the inspired shoemaker of Görlitz, whom orthodoxy passed by with repugnance on the other side, but with whom both in his own and in other lands lofty and loving spirits in later generations were to find themselves united in mystical fellowship. But Spee died in 1635; Jacob Böhme already in 1624.

The durability of the Westphalian settlement, and the extent to which its provisions met the existing condition of things at home in the Empire and beyond its borders were to be severely tested during the decade which followed upon its conclusion. The whole of this period exhibits a persistent revival of the old and ineradicable tendency among the Estates of the Empire towards the formation of leagues and associations of all kinds, stimulated by their continued distrust of the policy of the House of Austria and encouraged by the recognition in the Peace of the right of alliance as appertaining to the sovereignty of each immediate Estate. The movement began quite unpretentiously in April, 1651, by an alliance between the members of the two Rhenish Circles. In February, 1652, followed the so-called Hildesheim Alliance, an association for military purposes, including, together with the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the possessor of the duchies of Bremen and Verden—in other words, the Swedish Crown. It was afterwards joined by the Catholic Bishop of Paderborn.

Though of no great intrinsic importance, these alliances were significant of the combinations which seemed in the end likely to determine the course of affairs in the Empire, unless indeed any particular Government proved powerful enough to set the balance right from its own point of view. But an attempt of this kind on the part of the Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg, who in 1651 by a *coup de main* (the so-called "Jülich War") sought to settle in his own favour the perennial problem of the Rhenish duchies left open by the Peace of Westphalia, was thwarted in time by his Neuburg opponent.

On June 30, 1653, Ferdinand III opened his last Diet at Ratisbon. Its meeting had been delayed by the disputes between Sweden and Brandenburg as to the evacuation by the former of Eastern Pomerania; but the Emperor had quite recently (May) contrived to secure the object nearest to his heart, the election of his eldest son Ferdinand as Roman King. He was thus encouraged to make a stand at the Diet in questions directly affecting his interests, concerning the authority of the *Reichshofrath* and the composition of the College of Princes. But in the matter of religious parity in the College of Electors he had to accept a settlement by which a fourth vote equalising the two parties was accorded to the three Protestant Electors by whom it was to be held in rotation. This result was due to the action of the Elector of Brandenburg, and the politician who at this time was his chief adviser. This was Count (afterwards Prince) George Frederick of Waldeck, who served in turn under the Great Elector, Charles X of Sweden, and William III of Orange, and counted for much in the counsels of each of these great Princes. Distinguished as a commander, he was still more eminent as a statesman, far-sighted in his combinations as Christian of Anhalt had been a generation before, but much superior to him in solidity and power of judgment.

On July 9, 1654, the young King Ferdinand, who was to have followed his father on the Imperial throne, died; and the question of the succession became one of paramount interest. Waldeck, who had been planning the formation of a League of Protestant Estates of which the leadership would naturally fall to Brandenburg, recognised that, as there could be no question of a Protestant Emperor, the readiest way of excluding the House of Habsburg from the succession would be to secure the election of his only possible Catholic rival, Ferdinand Maria, since 1651 Elector of Bavaria. This "great design" was nursed by him during the years next ensuing; and with a view to carrying it into execution he entered into protracted secret negotiations with Mazarin. In September, 1654, Brandenburg entered into a defensive alliance with the Brunswick Dukes, which was formally confirmed in July, 1655. But this combination had led, in December, 1654, to the conclusion of a counter-alliance, also "defensive," between the Electors of Cologne and Trier, Philip William of Neuburg, and the martial Bishop of Münster

(Bernard von Galen). Before, however, the death of Ferdinand III in 1657 brought this complication of alliances to a more definite issue, an imminent danger threatened the peace of the Empire.

The quarter whence this danger had mainly come was not the west, but the north. The harryings of Charles of Lorraine had been stopped by his imprisonment in 1654. On the other hand, the ambition of Sweden had soon revived under its German King, Gustavus Adolphus' nephew, Charles X Gustavus. Already before his accession (1654) Sweden, taking advantage of a quarrel between Oldenburg and Bremen, had sought to lay hands upon the free city, which had not been included in the cession of the duchy to Sweden. But the Emperor and the Diet then took the side of Bremen; and, the Swedish King being unwilling to involve himself prematurely in a quarrel with the Empire, the independence of the city had been saved.

Charles X of Sweden, as will be shown elsewhere, had other ends more immediately in view; and the general unrest which pervaded the Baltic coasts marked out these as the theatre of his conquering ambition. He was desirous, not only of lengthening out the Swedish coast-line, but also of securing to Sweden the port-duties along the Prussian coast, which, combined with those of the Pomeranian, possessed an importance for her exchequer, paramount like that of the Sound-dues for the Danish. This involved an encroachment on Brandenburg-Prussian as well as on Polish rights; and Frederick William of Brandenburg could not remain a neutral spectator of the conflict preparing itself among the Baltic Powers. Indeed, as early as September, 1654, Sweden showed her hand at Berlin by suggesting that Brandenburg should give up the Prussian ports of Pillau and Memel in exchange for an inland Polish province.

Frederick William had treated his vassalship to Poland in his capacity as Duke of Prussia lightly, refusing to the Polish Crown any share in the Prussian coast-dues. Nevertheless, he was anxious to be rid of the vassalship itself; and Waldeck advised him to take advantage of the present occasion. If, however, he had to run the risk of a Swedish alliance, a friend in reserve might be of use. Hence Frederick William's defensive alliance with the States General, concluded for eight years in July, 1655, at the very time when Waldeck was carrying on negotiations with Sweden at Stettin. But Charles X would have no such double-dealing; the Stettin negotiations were broken off, and Brandenburg had to be contented with a more modest programme of gains. But even this proved premature. In July, 1655, Charles began his Polish war, which is narrated in another chapter. By October the doom of Poland seemed sealed; and Frederick William could only hold in readiness for future wants the fine army of near 18,000 men which he had on foot. Much alarm was felt at Vienna, where King John Casimir was suing for aid and whither accurate reports were sent by Baron Francis von Lisola, a diplomatist of notable sagacity and zeal. But Ferdinand III was not

prepared to listen to the Brandenburg proposals, which, if carried out, would have amounted to an early partition of Poland; and Frederick William had to prepare to act alone.

In October, 1655, he reached Königsberg, and began to form an alliance with the Estates of Polish (Western) Prussia, by which he placed himself *de facto* in hostile relations with Sweden. But already in December Charles X broke through these thinly woven toils; Thorn and Elbing capitulated to him; and in greater strength than ever he faced the Elector of Brandenburg. Before long Frederick William had conformed to the necessities of the situation, and by the Treaty of Königsberg (January 17, 1656), submitted to the far more burdensome overlordship of Sweden in lieu of that of Poland, undertaking in the event of another war against the latter to furnish a contingent of 1500 men. Pillau and Memel remained in his hands; but half of the Prussian port-dues were henceforth to belong to Sweden. Warmia (Ermeland) was however transferred to Brandenburg, though also as a Swedish fief.

This compact left Frederick William with an unemployed army; and, on the assumption that the Northern troubles were for the time at least at an end, he quickly concluded (February 24, 1656), a "defensive" treaty with France, who, in return for his support in her war against Spain, was to aid him in securing the portion of the Jülich-Cleves inheritance possessed by Neuburg. But, as is related elsewhere, the Polish rising that took place at this very time drove Charles X to seek safety within the walls of Warsaw, and Frederick William found himself the object of the most seductive solicitations. By the advice of Waldeck he however decided on preferring the Swedish to the Polish side, and by the important Treaty of Marienburg (June 25, 1656), concluded an alliance which bound both Governments mutually to defend their respective Polish and Prussian acquisitions, Brandenburg's full sovereignty over a large part of Great Poland being recognised in the treaty. The great victory gained by the allies in the three days' battle of Warsaw (July 29-31), justified his decision; and the judicious self-restraint of Charles X in forbearing to seize Danzig induced the Dutch to enter into a commercial treaty with him, which further strengthened his position and that of his ally.

But at Vienna the success of Charles X and Frederick William augmented the ill-will cherished against the King of Sweden; and on December 1, 1656, an Austro-Polish alliance was concluded, which, though putting in the foreground the Imperial mediation for peace, promised an Austrian contingent of 4000 men. Charles was proportionately desirous of retaining the alliance of Frederick William; and the latter in consequence insisted upon readjusting its conditions in his favour. The Treaty of Labiau (November 20, 1656) acknowledged the sovereignty of the Duke of Prussia over his duchy and Ermeland, while Sweden renounced her share of the Prussian port-dues; but

Frederick William was still denied the right of keeping warships in the Baltic. Would he be able to assert against Poland the independent sovereignty in ducal Prussia, which Sweden had thus been forced to acknowledge? In consequence of the conclusion of this treaty against his advice, Waldeck passed from the Brandenburg service into that of Sweden. The situation was difficult enough; it would become still more unmanageable if the Imperial Government carried out its promise of aid to Poland.

It was at this crisis that on April 2, 1657, Ferdinand III died. But, thanks mainly to previous exertions on the part of Lisola, the decision of the House of Austria in the Polish question had been taken; on May 27, 1657, the Austro-Polish alliance was signed; and in July an Austrian army under Count von Hatzfeldt entered Poland, where, after driving back the bands of George Rakoczy, it in the following month held its entry into Cracow. Instead of adopting the advice of Mazarin, and retaliating by an invasion of the Austrian hereditary dominions, Charles X turned upon Denmark, reserving to a later date his settlement with the House of Habsburg. The final abandonment by Charles X of what had hitherto been the chief theatre of his ambition, and the definitive entrance of Austria into the war, determined Frederick William to a further change of attitude. Neutrality being out of the question, he resolved to face both ways. While Mazarin sought anxiously to avert a rupture between Brandenburg and Sweden, Lisola more successfully operated to gain over the Elector to the Austro-Polish alliance. After persuading King John Casimir to yield the crucial demand of the Prussian sovereignty, this bold diplomatist kept in his pocket certain minimising instructions, and thus brought about on September 19, 1657, the signature of the Treaty of Wehlau, which, in return for a Brandenburg auxiliary force of 6000 men, recognised Frederick William's sovereignty over the duchy of Prussia. Some final difficulties having been overcome with the aid of Queen Marie-Louise of Poland (a Gonzaga), the definitive Treaty of Bromberg was signed on November 6 following.

The northern conflict had inevitably led to violations of the territory of the Empire on the part of Poland and Denmark; and, if Charles X of Sweden could have come to terms with the Protector Oliver Cromwell, England might in 1657 have been found in occupation of the duchy of Bremen, or at least of the important position of Stade. The heroic Swedish King fought out his first war with Denmark, and achieved the triumph proclaimed by the Peace of Roeskilde (February, 1658), while Frederick William was trying to take advantage of his late ally's difficulties to reopen the question of the cession of Western Pomerania. At Vienna the question of the Imperial succession was under eager consideration; and on February 14, 1658, an Austro-Brandenburg offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded against Sweden, a

secret article of the treaty empowering Brandenburg to occupy with her troops certain places in Swedish Pomerania, including Stettin, when the news of the Peace which made Sweden mistress of the Baltic obliged the versatile Frederick William to cover his position by means of French negotiations.

Before the signal was given for the actual opening of the attack upon Sweden by the strangely concerted alliance between Austria, Poland, and Brandenburg, the question of the election to the vacant Imperial throne had been decided. The struggle to prevent the election of the young Archduke Leopold Ignatius, who, at the time of the death of his elder brother in 1654 was only in his fifteenth year, and whose election as Roman King it was therefore then impossible to press, might almost be said to form a final episode in the war of France against the House of Habsburg, whose Austrian branch was still suspected of furnishing support to the Spanish. Mazarin, after some flourishes in favour of the choice of his own sovereign, resolved on pressing the candidature of the young Elector Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria, which Swedish diplomacy likewise supported. Among the Electors, Mazarin's Brandenburg ally, so long as Waldeck directed his policy, the impecunious Charles Lewis of the Palatinate, and the Elector of Cologne (Maximilian Henry), as a kinsman of the Elector of Bavaria, were likewise in his favour. But Ferdinand Maria was devoid of aspiring ambition, and the female influence at his Court was divided. Thus he adhered loyally to his resolution of supporting Archduke Leopold; and when, on the death of the Emperor Ferdinand in 1657, Mazarin renewed his efforts, they were made in vain. Saxony as usual adhered to the House of Austria, and Brandenburg was tied by policy to her interests. The Elector of Mainz (John Philip von Schönborn), who played the most prominent part in these transactions, was intent on utilising the occasion in favour of the conclusion of peace between France and Spain, but not on ultimately thwarting the House of Austria. Thus, with his assistance and the support of Brandenburg, Mazarin in the end concentrated his efforts upon securing a *Wahlcapitulation*, which included a direct engagement on the part of Archduke Leopold that he would renounce all *de facto* support of Spain, either in the Netherlands or in Italy. This was the price paid by the House of Habsburg for the unanimous election of Leopold as Emperor (July 18, 1658); and the sagacious purpose of the Elector of Mainz, to make sure of the Franco-Spanish peace before assenting to the candidature of the head of the House of Austria for the Imperial throne, was thus practically fulfilled.

The political complications in the Empire were about this time increased by the contention between the Bavarian and Palatine Electors as to the Vicariate of the Empire (settled a century later by the adoption of the obvious expedient of alternation) and by the action that resulted

the endeavour of the Elector John Philip of Mainz to establish a counterpoise in the Empire to influences which might threaten the rights and interests of its Princes. Such an influence must primarily be exercised by the House of Austria, so long as its policy was attached to that of Spain; but the action of France might at any time excite similar apprehensions in the promoters of the league. The secularisation of the archbishopric of Mainz had been actually suggested during the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia; and the Elector's trusted counsellor, John Christian von Boyneburg, was not only a patriot, but an ardent advocate of the religious reunion to which his younger friend Leibniz afterwards aspired.

In August, 1655, the Elector of Mainz had, by joining the Catholic counter-alliance and bringing about its amalgamation with the Rhenish alliance of 1651, at once enhanced its importance and enlarged its scope. He was now desirous of widening it still further, and completely freeing it from any confessional character by including in it the members of the Hildesheim alliance of 1652; but these efforts were only very partially successful, though the Brunswick Dukes and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel joined.

On the death of the Emperor, and during the interregnum which ensued, the policy of the Elector of Mainz and his alliance developed further. He was, as has been seen, willing to support the Austrian candidature on condition of a change in the Austrian policy; but, although by no means disposed to assist France in securing an Emperor favourable to her interests, he proceeded, especially after the election of the Austrian candidate was assured, to avail himself of the assistance of France in obtaining the desired safeguards against the policy and action of the new Emperor. (Brandenburg, it must be remembered, was now the ally of Austria.) Mazarin, who as late as the summer of 1657, continued to show much reserve towards the Elector of Mainz and his friends, now, after his policy as to the Imperial election had failed, was ready to go hand in hand with the *Rheinbund*. Both this alliance and France desired above all to hold down the Emperor to the promise of his *Wahlcapitulation* which bound him to refrain from support of Spain, and thus assured Spain's acceptance of peace with France a certainty. In the case of certain members of the *Rheinbund* corruption may have cooperated with motives of self-interest; but such was not the case with its chief promoter, the Elector of Mainz, and with other Princes who like himself sought to make use of France, without intending to become her vassals, a course full of danger, but not for that reason to be condemned as tainted with treason.

On August 15, 1658, the new league was formally signed as a defensive alliance for three years by the three Spiritual Electors, the Bishop of Münster, the Count Palatine of Neuburg (who had taken an early and active part in the negotiations with Mazarin), the Brunswick-

Lüneburg Dukes, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. As Sweden signed for Bremen and Verden, Brandenburg refused to sign; nor was the league joined by Frederick William till 1665, three years before it came to an end. On August 16, at Mainz, the league was formally joined by the King of France in his capacity of "member of the Peace" of Westphalia. The military force of the alliance was fixed at 10,000 men; and as a matter of fact its object was entirely military, and no political purpose was indicated in its deed of agreement. While it indicated to the Princes of the Empire a mode of action which they had adopted before and were tolerably certain to adopt again, its chief political importance lay in its ensuring the conclusion of a pacific settlement between France and Spain. Its main value consequently passed away so soon as the Peace of the Pyrenees had been actually signed.

On the very day on which the *Rheinbund* was formally concluded (August 15, 1658), Charles X began his second Danish war. His expedition against Copenhagen at once relieved Frederick William of the fear of a Swedish invasion, for which he had already laid his account at Berlin, and enabled him at the head of a motley host of Brandenburgers, Austrians, and Poles, to open his campaign in Holstein against the Swedish attack upon the Danish troops there. On December 14 he took the island of Alsen, which had been occupied by the Swedes, but he was grievously hampered by the want of a fleet, and could obtain no active cooperation from the Dutch, notwithstanding their recent naval victory in the Sound. Although the Swedish attempt on Copenhagen had failed, and the Danish mainland was cleared of the Swedes, the allies were, even with Dutch support, unable to occupy Fünen, and it seemed advisable to attack the Swedish power in another quarter. In August, 1659, an Austrian army laid siege to Stettin; but, though Frederick William and Montecuculi now also appeared in these parts and most of Pomerania was soon in the hands of the allies, Stralsund and Stettin, with the mouth of the Oder, still remained in Swedish hands.

For a time it seemed as if peace was still distant. The refusal of both Sweden and Denmark to agree to the proposals of England and Holland (First Hague Concert), and of Sweden to accept the modification allowed by Denmark (Second Hague Concert) led to Dutch participation in active pressure upon Charles X. On November 24 the allies gained the victory of Nyborg; and Fünen was recovered from Sweden. But the Dutch had no desire to see either of the two Scandinavian States completely crushed, and Mazarin had throughout adhered to the policy of maintaining in northern Germany the power of Sweden—a military power, always likely to be open to the influence of subsidies. Thus, after he had concluded the Peace of the Pyrenees with Spain (November, 1659), he proceeded to take decisive steps for breaking up the anti-Swedish coalition. Charging Frederick William with having violated the Peace of Westphalia by the invasion of Pomerania, he threatened

to retaliate by a French advance upon Jülich, and attempted to stir up the Princes of the *Rheinbund* to cooperation. His efforts were not very successful; but these Princes for the most part desired peace, and were averse from war against Sweden, as actually one of the members of the alliance. Though on February 23, 1660, Charles X unexpectedly died, the ambition of Brandenburg found no support in any quarter; and negotiations began in March, 1660, which ended in December with the conclusion of peace at Oliva (near Danzig). The Elector of Brandenburg derived no advantage from this Treaty, concluded under the mediation and, it may be said, by the management of France, except one of which the significance could hardly become apparent at once, namely the recognition of his sovereignty over "ducal" Prussia. Western or "royal" Prussia returned to its Polish allegiance. On the other hand not an inch of Pomerania was secured by Brandenburg. The House of Austria gained nothing from its more or less tardy efforts towards the defence of Poland—not even the elusive prospect of a Habsburg succession to the Polish throne.

Thus, the Peace of Westphalia was, though in a less important degree than by the Peace of the Pyrenees, supplemented by the Peace of Oliva, as this Peace was in its turn by the Swedish pacifications with Denmark and Russia. From the north no menace seemed likely to arise against the settlement of Münster and Osnabrück. The Empire still had to fear the perennial but far from extinct Turkish peril, and the pressure on the western frontier which party alliances might seek to avert or to control, but which there hardly remained so much as the pretence of an Imperial authority, commanding the support of a nation, to withstand.

CHAPTER XV.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE 'PROTECTORATE.
(1649-59.)

THE execution of Charles I was followed by votes of the House of Commons for the abolition of the House of Lords (February 6, 1649) and of the kingship (February 7). Although the formal Acts for putting these votes into execution only passed on March 17 and 19, the votes themselves were instantly effective. The Lords did not meet again after February, 1649. The new executive was vested in a Council of State of 41, with full authority in the management of home affairs. But the Council of State was intended to be subordinate to the Parliament which nominated it, and to that end its duration was fixed for one year only. Further, the members of it were to declare their approval of the execution of the King and of the abolition of the monarchy. No personal head was chosen for the Council; and, to prevent the possibility of any such office developing itself, Parliament refused to allow the title of Lord President to be adopted (although Bradshaw was subsequently elected President and by tacit consent was generally styled Lord President). Out of this Council of 41 not less than 31 sat in Parliament; and, as the average attendance in the latter body was only 56, the Council might be regarded as simply a large committee of the House. It is a mere question of terms whether this Government should be described as a mixture of the legislative and the executive or simply as a double-headed executive; or again whether the Council should be held to have ruled the Parliament or *vice versâ*. The main feature of the situation was that there was practical unanimity between the two. This unanimity did not, however, eliminate a certain amount of confusion. The Council worked by means of committees, and at the same time the Parliament had its committees; and not unfrequently the two sets are, or seem, competitive, and can only with difficulty be distinguished from each other. Thus by the vote of February 22 the power of the Admiralty was vested in the Council; but two days later the House appointed a committee of its own for the Navy. Similarly by the side of the Council's power over the Army

there ran the power of a Parliamentary Army Committee. But this confusion and the perpetual necessity of reference or report from the Council to the Parliament did not interfere with the executive activity of the Council, which, if judged by its fruits, must be regarded as an efficient machine. Beneath the Council and the concomitant Parliament the lower ranges of administration remained practically undisturbed. After negotiations with the Parliament a sufficient number of Judges were induced to continue in office to work the Common Pleas and the Upper (formerly the King's) Bench. And so with the local branches or aspects of the legal and administrative machinery. Except in one or two counties, such as Staffordshire and Cheshire, no difficulty appears to have been experienced in filling up the annual lists of sheriffs; and, wherever justices of the peace could not be trusted, fresh commissions were at once issued and fresh instructions drafted.

So far as the mere organisation of governmental machinery is concerned, the Revolution may be held to have put itself into working form with remarkable speed and smoothness—a result in part attributable to the fact that in the country at large there was at the outset no strong opposition or disaffection to meet, although the Government was certainly not popular.

The first trial of its efficiency was, as might have been expected, a military and not a civil one. In Ireland Ormonde had in June, 1649, made a treaty with the Confederate Catholics at Kilkenny, and deemed himself strong enough to invite Charles II to make Ireland a starting-point for an invasion of England. In Scotland Charles had been proclaimed King on February 5, the day following that on which the news of his father's execution had arrived; and the Scottish Parliament instructed its Commissioners in London to repair to the Hague in order to negotiate with the new King. With correct insight, the English Government (Parliament and Council), apprehending that the more immediate danger threatened from Ireland, made provision for a standing army of 30,000 men for England, and of 12,000 for the invasion of Ireland. On August 15, 1649, Cromwell landed at Dublin. On September 11 he stormed Drogheda, and on October 11 captured Wexford. Six months later, after the surrender of Clonmel, Cromwell sailed for England, leaving Ireton behind him as Lord Deputy (May 26, 1650).

The danger from Scotland was met with a vigour not less swift and decisive. Charles had landed there in June, 1650, after swearing to the Covenantants just before he left his ship. On the 28th of the same month Cromwell set out for the north, and on September 3 he defeated the Scotch under Leslie at Dunbar. In order to bring to a head the tedious work of the subjugation of the country, he left the road to England open to the Scotch, and when once (July 31, 1651) they were

fairly on the way he started in pursuit (August 2). From Falkirk the Scotch marched through Carlisle, Lancashire, and Cheshire, to Worcester, where Charles arrived on August 22. Moving in a parallel line further to the east, Cromwell marched through Northumberland, Durham, Yorkshire, and formed a junction with Lambert and Harrison at Warwick. On August 27 he arrived at Evesham, and on September 3 destroyed the Scotch force under Charles at Worcester.

After Worcester, and the subsequent completion by Monck of the subjugation of Scotland, all fear of opposition from the Royalist party in the three kingdoms was practically at an end, and the Government of the Commonwealth was able to address itself to larger questions of constitutional administration at home and of national policy abroad.

The military danger and political needs which had held together the army and the Parliament, and which had brushed aside the demand for a new legislature, had been dissolved by the victory of Worcester. As a result the constitutional question at once emerged; and Cromwell was left free to urge the demands of the army and the nation alike for the calling of a new Parliament. His reappearance in Parliament after Worcester was followed by the introduction of a Bill for the calling of a new assembly. On November 14, 1651, it was voted that the dissolution should take place on November 3, 1654. In this compromise Cromwell had himself acquiesced; none the less, he was deeply dissatisfied at the Parliament's attempt thus unduly to prolong its life, and thereby the existing unconstitutional Government. In order to propitiate popular feeling the Parliament entered upon the work of law reform and evinced its regard for the interests of trade by passing the Navigation Act. By prohibiting the importation of the produce of Asia, Africa and America in any but English or Colonial bottoms, and of that of European countries save in English bottoms or those of the countries of its origin, the Act struck a powerful blow at the carrying trade of the Dutch. Finally, in May, 1652, when the nation was on the verge of the Dutch War, but opposition was still unallayed, it was proposed to broaden the existing Parliament by filling up the seats vacated by "Pride's Purge." For the moment, however, the outbreak of the First Dutch War again postponed the question of the constitution. Its opening (June 30, 1652) was followed by Blake's victory off the Kentish Knock (September 28), his defeat off Portland (February 18, 1653), Lawson and Monck's victory off the Gabard (June 2-3, 1653), and Monck's off the Texel (July 31). Peace was concluded on April 5, 1654. Its terms were far more moderate than those at first proposed by the Parliament. The Dutch were to exclude the Stewarts from their country; to salute the British flag in British seas; and to submit to arbitration the amount of compensation payable to British merchants for their maritime losses in the East and elsewhere.

In pressing on the Dutch War the Parliament had overridden a

strong peace party in the Council of State, headed by Cromwell himself, who herein represented the dominant opinion of the majority of the officers of the army. It was accordingly under the influence of this discontent that the officers on August 2, 1652, drew up an army petition demanding comprehensive reforms and the immediate election of a new Parliament. Mediating between the two extremes, Cromwell obtained an amendment of this final demand. Parliament was to be requested to consider of such qualifications as might secure the election of members pious and faithful to the Commonwealth. The House received the petition and made a show of proceeding upon it; but so suspicious and dilatory was its action that, in November, Cromwell was driven to give expression to the strong and growing dissatisfaction of the army. In January, 1653, the army officers and the Council of State came to a general agreement that a new Parliament should be chosen. For four months Cromwell, who objected to a forcible dissolution, held back the army from an attack on the Parliament. But, when on April 13, under Vane's leadership, a vote of the House practically transmuted the long-discussed new representative (New Elections) Bill into a scheme for filling up vacancies, Cromwell's hesitation was at an end, and a week later he dissolved the Rump, and with it the Council of State (April 20, 1653).

A welter of opinion ensued as to the new form of government which should be settled; but in the end the views which appear to have been advanced by Lambert almost immediately after the dissolution came gradually to prevail. He proposed a written Constitution in which a small Council should govern, to be ultimately joined by an elected Parliament; and on April 29, 1653, a small Council of ten (seven soldiers and three civilians) was actually established. After some delay, there appeared on May 6 Cromwell's proclamation announcing the calling of a Parliament. The delay was due, partly to Cromwell's desire of broadening Harrison's idea of a Sanhedrim of pious fanatics into that of a gathering of patriotic Puritan notabilities, and partly to divisions of opinion amongst the officers on the subject of religious toleration. Among them all Cromwell had the truest spirit of tolerance; but Fairfax' refusal to take part in the new Government convinced him that he could not propitiate the Presbyterian party. At last, therefore, shortly after the appearance of the belated Declaration of May 6, letters were sent out in the name of Cromwell and of the Council of the Army to the Congregational Churches in each county, asking them to nominate persons fit to be members of the new representative. The Churches promptly returned their nominations, which the Council of the Army discussed from day to day, selecting from the lists or substituting names of their own. By the beginning of June the lists were complete. The Nominated Parliament was to consist of 140 representatives; 129 for England, 5 for Scotland, and 6 for Ireland.

The writs ran in Cromwell's name as Captain and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces.

The Parliament (commonly called, with a play on the name of one of the City members, the "Barebones Parliament") met at Whitehall, as summoned, on July 4; and Cromwell forthwith and in good faith made over to it his dictatorship. By an instrument which he caused to be read to the Parliament on the opening day the supreme authority was devolved upon it until November 3, 1654; and three months before its dissolution it was to choose another assembly to succeed it. Assuming the powers thus, by however doubtful authority, conferred upon it, the Assembly now calling itself a Parliament nominated a Council of State of 31 as an executive. In this Council the civilian element predominated; but Cromwell had a seat in both Council and Parliament. Further, by the reconstruction of the Council of State on November 1, he obtained a working majority in it in favour of peace with the Dutch and of a more conservative policy in Church and State. But in the Nominated Parliament itself there was no such working majority. To immature and reckless attempts at legislation for the abolition of tithes and for law reform this Parliament added impracticable conclusions on finance, and finally stultified itself by its hopeless divisions on Church questions. The fatuity of its proceedings precipitated the reaction and gave form to the demand for a written Constitution, such as had been sketched in the "Heads of the Proposals" (August 1, 1647) and in the "Agreement of the People" (January 15, 1649); save that the question of the hour was no longer, as formerly, the control of the executive, but the imposition of checks on the despotism of a single House.

As always before, the impulsive force came, not from Cromwell, but from the Council of the Army. In the last days of November the officers prepared a draft Instrument, offering Cromwell the government with the title of King; but on December 1 Cromwell, still averse from a second military expulsion, refused the offer. Within a fortnight the officers forced Cromwell's hand by procuring a seemingly voluntary resignation of the Nominated Parliament. On December 12, 1653, the majority of that body (80 in all, as it finally proved) waited on Cromwell, at Whitehall, and announced their resignation. On the following day in the Council Chamber Lambert produced before a number of the officers of the army that "Instrument of Government" which the Army Council had in its debates three weeks earlier elaborated as a paper constitution. After a two days' debate it was accepted by Cromwell. In accordance with the terms of the Instrument he was to be Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, but with no hereditary office and with practically no power of veto on legislation. A triennial Parliament was to be elected on a high electoral property qualification; Roman Catholics were to be permanently

excluded, and Royalists from the first three Parliaments. The executive was to consist of a Council of from thirteen to twenty-two members, who were to be irremovable and to be independent alike of Protector and Parliament.

To this Constitution Cromwell took the oath on December 16, 1653, in the Court of Chancery, and was installed as Protector. Until September, 1654, the day on which a Parliament was to meet, Cromwell and the Council were empowered to issue ordinances and to raise money for the army, navy, and civil government. In accordance with this article eighty-two administrative ordinances were thus issued in the interval before the calling of Cromwell's first Parliament.

Once installed as Protector, Oliver, by his more moderate attitude towards the Dutch, facilitated the conclusion of peace (April, 1654). This success was followed by commercial treaties with Christina of Sweden (April 11, 1654) and Frederick III of Denmark (September 15, 1654), and by the completion of another, long delayed, with Portugal (July 10, 1654).

Concurrently with these commercial treaties Cromwell was carrying on the most tortuous and involved double negotiation for an alliance with Spain on the one hand and France on the other—a negotiation which illustrates more forcibly than any other event in his career the extraordinarily involved, confused, and hesitating method of working of Cromwell's mind during the preparatory stages of a great decision, and at the same time the singular combination in his nature of strong religious feeling with intensely practical sense. His long hesitancy ended at last in the expedition against Hispaniola—a scheme which he definitely embraced in July, 1654, but which was delayed until the following winter by unaccountable mismanagement in the fleet and land forces, and in the arrangements as to the command. It resulted, in May, 1655, in the partial success of the capture of Jamaica.

Yet even the events in the West Indies did not instantly precipitate a war with Spain in Europe. It was not until October 15, 1655, that the Council decided on war (declared October 23) in defence of the freedom of the sea in the western hemisphere. The effect of this breach with Spain was instantly seen in a better understanding with France, among the first effects of which was the pressure brought to bear by Mazarin in July, 1655, on the Piedmontese Government to end the Vaudois persecution. On October 24, 1655, the treaty with France was signed in London, but it did little beyond restoring commercial and general friendly relations with France; nor was it until the failure of the negotiations between France and Spain in the following year (September 5, 1656) that Mazarin consented to pay Cromwell's price and to turn the treaty into an alliance against Spain. From May 8, 1656, onwards, Cromwell's special envoy, Lockhart, had been pressing on the French Government Oliver's desire for the acquisition of Dunkirk, if and

when it should be captured from Spain by the joint forces of France and England. But it was only on November 8 following that the French Government could bring itself to accept so unpalatable a proposition; and even then four months more of tedious negotiation were necessary before the final treaty of alliance was signed on March 23, 1657. In this form the treaty aimed immediately at the joint reduction by English and French arms of Gravelines, Mardyck, and Dunkirk. Meanwhile the naval war carried on by England on her own account against Spain had been slowly progressing; but beyond Blake's capture of the Plate fleet (September 10, 1656), it produced only one great event, the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Santa Cruz (April 20, 1657), a victory soon afterwards followed by Blake's death (August 7).

On land the treaty of March, 1657, led to prompt action on Cromwell's part. The English forces landed at Boulogne on May 13, 1657; Mardyck surrendered on September 25 following. The battle of Dunkirk was fought on June 13, 1658, and was followed, twelve days later, by the surrender of the town, which was immediately delivered over to Lockhart in accordance with the terms of the French treaty.

At home, the elections for the first representative Parliament of the three kingdoms (Scotland and Ireland had each been allotted 30 members) took place in the summer of 1654. Under the restrictions imposed by the Instrument, and in consequence also of the extraordinary precautions taken by the Government, the Irish and Scotch returns were entirely favourable to the Administration, the majority of these members being officers of the army. In England, however, the precautions had not been so successful. Some pronounced Republicans had been returned, and in the west even some Royalists. But the main result was decisive. The extreme party, the fanatics and revolutionaries of the Nominated Parliament, were swept away.

The new Parliament met on September 3, 1654, and almost immediately proceeded to the consideration of the Instrument. While willing to accept from the House a constitution which might take the place of the Instrument, Cromwell and the Council were determined that any such constitution should make impossible the despotism of a single House by providing for the command of the militia and for religious freedom. It was in this sense that Oliver harangued the members in the Painted Chamber (September 12). Before they were readmitted the members were asked to subscribe to four "fundamentals." These declared that government should be by a single person or a Parliament; that Parliaments should not make themselves perpetual; that there should be liberty of conscience; and that neither Protector nor Parliament should have absolute power over the militia. No difficulty was experienced in obtaining the subscriptions of the majority of the members; and on September 15 the readmitted subscribers to this Recognition resumed the debate on the Instrument. For five months the parliamentary

warfare continued, until on January 22, 1655, it was forcibly ended by Cromwell's dissolving the House in deepest anger. The difference between the House and the Government covered practically the whole field of the fundamentals enunciated on September 12 previously by Oliver; but it was the question of the command of the militia and the threat of disbanding the army implied in the financial proposals of the Parliament that forced Cromwell's hand, though, as before, the impulsive force at the crucial moment came, not from his unwilling mind, but from the army officers. Once again they had, against his truer instinct, forced his hand.

The result of the dissolution was that Cromwell and the army found themselves in the position from which, during all his remaining years, the Protector strove in vain to escape—that of an unfettered executive, or in other words a military despotism, with only its self-imposed Instrument as its guide.

The events of the succeeding months were of a nature to test the validity and legality of such a governmental system. The Royalist plots which resulted in the isolated risings in Yorkshire and elsewhere (March 8, 1655), and in Penruddock's rising in Wilts (March 11–14), raised the question of the trial of the Royalist rebels and revealed an unwillingness on the part of the Judges to act on a treason trial commission based on no greater authority than the Instrument. From another quarter the same fundamental objection was raised in the trial in May, 1655, of a London merchant, Cony, who had refused to pay customs. Such legal opposition raised the vital questions of the Protector's right to levy taxes and the validity of ordinances issued under the terms of the Instrument.

But this questioning of the very fundamentals of the power and existence of the Protector's Government only resulted in renewed agitation for the revival of the monarchy (June—August, 1655). The civilian element of the Council favoured the expedient, but once again the interference of the army officers wrecked any possibility of a settlement. Though desirous of remodelling the Instrument, the officers had, from the rumours of plots and from the patent failure of two succeeding Parliaments, become convinced of the danger of fresh constitutional experiments, and had decided for the nonce to adhere to the prescriptions of the Instrument as the sheet-anchor of the Protectorate. Accordingly, Royalists were imprisoned without legal warrant (June and July, 1655); and the new establishment of the army was promulgated by the authority of the Protector and Council alone (July 31), as was also the scheme of Major-Generals. This scheme was intended, primarily, as a mechanism for the control of the militia, and for keeping the Royalists in check; and, secondarily, to supplement or supplant portions of the local authority of the magistrates. It was adopted on August 9, and followed by instructions (August 22) and commissions

(October 11), with the subsequent adjuncts of county commissions for the preservation of the peace (September 21). The Government did not even attempt to defend the legality of these measures.

Under the seventh clause of the Instrument a Parliament was to be called on September 3, 1654, and after this a fresh Parliament once in every third year "to be accounted from the dissolution of the present Parliament." Inasmuch as the Nominated Parliament resigned in December, 1653, the Instrument thus prescribed the calling of a Parliament to meet late in 1656. In scrupulous observance of this paper constitution writs were sent out on July 10, 1656, the elections took place in August, and the new Parliament met on September 17 at Westminster. In spite of the exertions made by the Government, through the powerful machinery of the Major-Generals, to secure favourable returns, a great number of the members of the last Parliament who had been most resolute opponents of the Government were again elected. As a remedy against this it was accordingly determined to refuse admission to any member except on the production of a certificate of his having been approved by the Council of State. This certificate ran as follows: "These are to certify that — is returned by indenture one of the (Knights, etc.) to serve in the present Parliament for the (County, etc. of —) and is approved by his Highness's Council." Accordingly, after listening to the Protector's speech in the Painted Chamber, the members repaired to their House to find persons posted there by the Protector's appointment to receive from each member the above certificate as a preliminary to their being allowed to enter. The result of this drastic and high-handed action on the part of the Administration was at once seen in the composition and proceedings of the House. Out of a total of 455 not less than 103 members were excluded for not producing their certificates; of the remaining 352 members at least 175 were army men, place-holders or relatives of the Protector. In view of such figures it is easy to understand the obsequious treatment which the Government received at the hands of the new Parliament. The "secluded" members petitioned the House for their admission; and thereupon the sitting members, after hearing the Clerk in Chancery, requested from the Council of State its reason for insisting on the certificates. On September 22 Lord Commissioner Fiennes reported to the House the Council's reply, which, in brief, appealed for the legality of its act to the twenty-first and seventeenth articles of the Instrument. After a brief debate it was resolved by 115 to 29 to refer the secluded members to the Council, "and that the House do proceed with the great affairs of the nation." How many of these secluded members subsequently made their peace with the Council is not known. The number was doubtless small, but at least eight of them are subsequently found voting for the Humble Petition and Advice. It is certain also that this arbitrary act of the

Government disgusted many of the otherwise neutral or favourable members of the House. For in the division immediately preceding the one detailed above the numbers had amounted to 195; so that it would appear that over 50 members withdrew voluntarily or at least abstained from voting.

The tame and submissive act of the House in thus condoning an outrage upon itself implied at the outset a tacit acceptance of the Instrument. But the Parliament was prepared to go much further than this. Even before the elections had been held, proposals were advanced for making the Protector's title hereditary; and from the moment of its meeting the air was thick with rumours of some impending attempt in this direction and in that of changing the title itself. The earlier proposals, which had been made in December, 1653, by Lambert and the officers, and again in December, 1654, by Augustine Garland and Anthony Ashley Cooper, and again in the summer of 1655 by a civilian petition in the City of London, had all taken the form of urging Cromwell to take the title of King. But the narrower form of the project which was now brought forward differed from these. The present proposal was to make Oliver's Protectorate hereditary—the very idea against which Cromwell had so strongly protested in his speech at the dissolution of Parliament on January 22, 1655.

This first form of the proposal was made on October 28, 1656, by Major-General William Jephson; and it agitated both the army and the Parliament all through November. But early in December the matter was dropped; and, when in February, 1657, it was again brought forward by Sir Christopher Packe, it had assumed a wider form. The lawyers, under the lead of Whitelock, had seized upon the proposal with avidity, and in adopting it had extended its range so as to include the old idea of the revival of the kingly title. Whitelock says, "I declined the first delivery of the Petition and Advice, not liking several things in it; but Sir Christopher Packe, to gain honour, presented it first to the House, and then the Lord Broghil, Glyn, I, and others, put it forward." Ludlow says that the Commonwealth's men fell so furiously on Packe for his presumption that they bore him down from the Speaker's chair to the bar of the House. Writing to Monck on the proposal, Secretary Thurloe says, "I do assure you, it arises from the Parliament only; his Highness knew nothing of the particulars until they were brought into the House, and no man knows but whether if they be passed his Highness will reject them. 'Tis certain he will, if the security of the good people and cause be not provided for therein to the full."

According to contemporary newsletters "there are two to one for it. The souldgery are against it in the House and without doors. They mutter but I am of opinion it will passe...They [the legally minded majority in the House] are so highly incensed against the arbitrary

dealings of the Major-Generals that they are greedy of any powers that will be ruled and limited by law." "All the Major-Generals voted against it, and most of the officers of the army now in town talk openly of their dislike to it."

As a preparation to the great work of the settlement of the Constitution, the House appointed a fast to be held on Friday, February 27. Whilst the Commons attended their fast, the officers of the army met "as they do weekly" at Whitehall, where the business of the kingship was debated; "and, hearing that the Major-Generals were met at the Lord Desborough's lodgings, sent a committee to acquaint them with the fears and jealousies that lay upon them in relation to the Protector's alteration of his title, and to desire the knowledge of the truth of things. The Major-Generals hereupon invited them to come thither, where the Lord Lambert opened the substance of the Bill for kingship.....After several officers had particularly delivered their judgments in dislike of the thing the meeting broke up." Subsequently on the same day, after the devotional exercises were done, one hundred officers of the army waited on Cromwell at Whitehall and, through Colonel Mills as spokesman, presented him with an address praying that he would not hearken to the title (King), because it was not pleasing to his army and was matter of scandal to the people of God. In reply Cromwell disclaimed all knowledge of the proposal "till the day before that Colonel Mills acquainted him with it," and that he had never been at any cabal about it, and had no delight in the mere vain title of King, but that he thought it convenient that a check should be put upon the unlimited power of the Parliament; and, after rating them soundly for always forcing his hand and making him their drudge, he invited ten of them with some other friends to meet him and debate things for their satisfaction. The immediate result of Oliver's direct appeal was remarkable. Three Major-Generals were won over, the officers were quieted, and many fell away from the rest. A newsletter of March 5 adds the sequel. "This day the officers sent a committee to wait upon his Highness to assure him of their satisfaction in his Highness and of their resolution to acquiesce in what he should think to be for the good of these nations." This temporary conciliatory acquiescence of the army was further evinced when the first clause of the Remonstrance (as the Petition and Advice was first styled) came to be debated in the House. It ran as follows: "That your Highness will be pleased to assume the name of King." By agreement this clause was postponed till the end of the debates of the whole House; and on the following day (Tuesday) "several officers of the army met at Whitehall, and other members of the Parliament and army joined with them; and upon debate of the business of kingship much satisfaction was given of the proceedings and result of the House therein."

Accordingly on the same day the House accepted without division the succeeding paragraph empowering Cromwell to nominate his successor. This unwonted harmony between Parliament and officers remained apparently undisturbed through the succeeding debates as to the qualifications of members of Parliament, as to toleration, and as to the revenue. But on the final debate on March 25, 1657, as to the postponed clause relating to the title of King, the division revealed that there were 62 against and 123 for it. "There were several bitter speeches made against it; but they [the malcontents] could not carry it."

The new draft Constitution thus framed was presented to Cromwell in the Banqueting House at Whitehall on March 31. Oliver, in reply, asked time to deliberate. On April 3 he refused the title, and therewith the whole proposed new Constitution, but not in express or peremptory terms. "I have not been able to find it my duty to God and you to undertake this charge under that title." On April 8 he repeated his refusal, but in an even more enigmatic and hesitating form—hinting that he desired first to be satisfied of many things in the Humble Petition and Advice. Seizing the possibility of compromise which this invitation held out, the House appointed a committee to confer with him. Of the succeeding conferences there are many, but mutilated and confused, accounts. These extraordinary debates between Oliver and the committee took place on April 11, 16, 20 and 21. From the mass of involution and logomachy it is possible to disentangle Oliver's clear, strong, rugged conviction that, though the legal arguments for the kingly title were strong, they did not establish the necessity of it but only its convenience; and that this was counterbalanced by the offence which the title would give to the army. The other objections taken by Cromwell to the Humble Petition and Advice were of minor import.

Oliver's rejection of the Petition and Advice in its first form disconcerted and amazed his supporters in the House. On May 8 several officers of the army petitioned the House not to press his Highness further; and at last, on May 19, the Parliament resolved by 77 to 45 to insert the title of Protector instead of that of King in the Petition and Advice. As so amended, it was presented to Cromwell on May 25, 1657, and received his assent. Once again the army officers had triumphed by deciding Oliver's indecision; once again their want of practical sense had frustrated a settlement of the nation; and the lawyers who had boasted that they would make penknives of the soldiers' swords hung their heads in sullen defeat.

On June 26 Oliver was solemnly invested at Westminster in his new function, and on the same day, after presenting to the Protector further clauses additional to and explanatory of the Humble Petition and Advice, the Parliament was adjourned till January 20, 1658.

Summarised quite briefly, the Humble Petition and Advice laid down that Oliver should bear the title of Lord Protector of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and should during his lifetime declare his successor; that he should call Parliaments consisting of two Houses once in three years at least; the qualifications of elected and elector were laid down; the Second House was to consist of seventy persons named by the Protector; a yearly revenue of £1,300,000 was provided; a Privy Council of twenty was prescribed; and finally, terms of religious toleration were set out. At the same time it gave Cromwell a retrospective ratification of his government. Clause 12 ratified his Acts and Ordinances for the sale of Crown and Church lands; and Clause 16, ratified all other Acts and Ordinances not contrary to the Humble Petition and Advice itself.

Before the Parliament reassembled in January, 1658, Oliver had issued the writs summoning the members of the Second House. The list of these members contains nine peers and sixty-one commoners.

Accordingly, when Parliament again met on January 20, 1658, it consisted of two Houses, and Oliver opened it in the House of Lords in the ancient manner. But the face of the Lower House was now seriously changed. By Clause 3 of the Humble Petition and Advice the excluded members were now freely admitted, with the result that over 100 (Cromwell himself stated them at 120) of bitter enemies of the Government were now present. Oliver had also taken more than forty of his best managers from the Commons to help towards forming his new Second House, with the further result that the handling of his business in the Lower House suffered correspondingly. The disastrous consequence of this double change became quickly apparent. Led by the Republican newcomers under Scot and Heselrige and by the now recalcitrant officers, who objected to the very existence of a Second House, the Commons set themselves to question factiously the title and powers of that House. Oliver tried personal intervention, and summoned both Houses to his presence (January 25), exhorting them to unity and particularly to an honest acceptance of the Humble Petition and Advice as a working Constitution. His efforts were vain. The Republican party in the Commons had ramifications in the City and in the army; and an intrigue was set on foot to promote a petition in both those quarters. Under cover of specious demands for the right of Parliament to control taxation and for the irremovability of soldiers and officers except by a court-martial, the petition aimed at a Commonwealth. There was to be sent up at the same time, if rumour spoke truly, another petition supported by ten thousand persons demanding the restoration of Charles Stewart. As part of the Republican intrigue, it was intended, on the presentation of the first of these petitions, to pass a vote in the House to ask for a limitation of the Protector's power over the army, and, if need were, to supersede him by Fairfax.

Oliver had quickly perceived that the question of the status of the

Second House was merely a side-wind by which to raise the larger question of his own position, and so to tear up the constitutional settlement of the Humble Petition and Advice. But it was not till he received news of the intrigue between the Republicans in the House and his army that he saw its full significance. In a hurricane of wrath, and with a swiftness of decision characteristic of him in his greatest moments, he dissolved the Parliament (February 4, 1658).

The dissolution was promptly followed by the arrest of Hugh Courtney, John Rogers the preacher, Major-General Harrison and John Carew. The immediate danger from his own army Cromwell met with equal promptitude. Two days after the dissolution he summoned the officers to the Banqueting House, and there in a two hours' harangue so prevailed with them that all, with the exception of seventeen or eighteen, swore to stand by him and the cause. Lambert was dismissed with a pension; and six officers of the Protector's own regiment, after a few days spent in futile reasoning with them, were cashiered. They were all Anabaptists.

The threatened Royalist rising and invasion were dealt with not less swiftly. This Royalist danger had been impending since before the preceding December. Royalist congregations had met openly in the City; and a gathering of Cavaliers on Benstead Downs was only just anticipated in time. Daily arrests of Cavaliers took place. The sudden dismissal of the Parliament averted the more immediate danger, but by no means allayed the Protector's fears. On February 25 a proclamation was issued commanding all Papists and Royalists to depart from London, not to reside within twenty miles of it, and not to leave their homes. A fortnight later, on March 12, Oliver summoned the Mayor, Aldermen, and Councillors of the City to Whitehall, and there in the presence of many of the officers expounded to them in a two hours' speech the imminent danger threatening from the Royalists and advised them to settle their militia and to put their city in a posture of defence. The City instantly adopted the advice, and the militia enlisted cheerfully. Later, on Wednesday, March 20, all the general and field officers about head-quarters met at Whitehall and signed an address of loyalty to the Protector. A general search was then made in the City for Royalists, and many were taken prisoners, including Sir William Waller and Colonel Russell. On April 13 a High Court of Justice was constituted, and it met on May 12 for the trial of fourteen Royalists. Mordaunt, the brother of the Earl of Peterborough, escaped conviction; but Sir Henry Slingsby and Dr Hewet both suffered death, together with three others of lesser note, Colonels Ashton, Stacey, and Betteley. While these trials were proceeding, a belated attempt at a rising was made in London on May 15. The militia were called out, and forty conspirators were arrested. Some weeks later seven of these were brought before the High Court (July 1). Six of them were convicted and three executed.

During the few remaining months of his life Oliver's Government stood at its greatest height of power. Abroad his arms had been successful and his influence decisive; at home all opposition and intrigue, Royalist and Republican alike, had been beaten down, and his hold over his army remained unshaken. There is even some evidence that he had gained over such Commonwealth men as Ludlow, Rich, and Sir Henry Vane. If he had lived to meet the Parliament which he intended to call late in the year the probability is great that he would have secured that recognition of his Government and that financial support from Parliament which in February, 1658, he had only missed through an unnatural combination of Royalist and Republican intrigue.

But it was not to be. On September 3 he died; leaving an unsanctioned military absolutism to be administered by a man who had no hold whatever over the army, no prestige, no administrative gift, no force of character. On the following day, September 4, 1658, Richard Cromwell was proclaimed Protector. At some time during Oliver's last illness he had verbally nominated Richard as his successor. On all hands, by army and country alike, the new Protector's accession was peacefully acknowledged; and a fortnight later the officers at Whitehall unanimously adopted a loyal address to him.

But this unanimity quickly disappeared. Intrigue against the civil power began afresh in the army; and early in October a petition was presented by the malcontents, praying that Fleetwood might be appointed General of all the forces with power to grant commissions, and that none should be cashiered but by court-martial. Fleetwood himself communicated the petition to Richard, who, however, firmly refused to part with the power of the sword. For the moment the agitation was quieted by Fleetwood and Desborough (October 8 and 18); and hereupon Fleetwood was appointed Lieutenant-General of all the forces. But in November the agitation among the officers recommenced. They had met several Fridays in succession at St James'; but until November 12 it is distinctly stated that they meddled not with the affairs, civil or military. On that day they began to break out and to hint at some alterations in the army. Accordingly, on November 19 Richard again met the officers with the object of remaining on good terms with his army. To all appearance he succeeded in again quieting them. "He courted them at a high rate" says Whitelock. A fortnight later Thurloe wrote to Captain Stoakes that those little notions that were in the army were all quieted and things in good order (November 25, 1658).

When, however, the financial needs of the Government led to the calling of the expected Parliament, the old antagonism between the military and the civil power at once emerged again. On December 3 Richard, by advice of the Council, resolved to call a Parliament to meet on January 27, 1659. Taught by the experience of Oliver's last two

Parliaments, in which the redistribution of seats (the disfranchisement of the lesser boroughs and an increase in the representation of the counties) had served only to produce a strong and independent country gentlemen's party, the Government now resolved to fall back on the old electoral model. The representation of the counties was cut down to two knights each, and the petty boroughs received back their franchise. For the Second House the full number of 70 was summoned; but only 44 at any time appeared, some declining the summons out of disdain, whilst others were in their commands at home or abroad. As before, Heselrige, though summoned to the Lords, sat in the Commons, being elected for Leicester town. The Upper House therefore remained in this Parliament as despised a nonentity as it had been in the last one. When the Commons were summoned to the Lords to hear Richard's speech at the opening, not more than twelve or fifteen members of the Lower House obeyed.

On February 1, 1659, a Bill was introduced for the recognition of Richard's title as Protector. This Bill, which rekindled the fires of faction and intrigue, was put forward by Thurloe ready-drawn, and represented the desires of the Court, civilian, and legal parties. In opposition to the measure were ranged the Republicans, led by Ludlow and Heselrige—an opposition intent on remodelling the Humble Petition and Advice by additional clauses which should recover to the Parliament the power over the militia and the abolition of the Protector's veto. The votes of the House, taken on February 21, amounted to the acceptance of the principle of such remodelling. It is true that the courtiers were strong enough three days later to pass by 176 to 98 a vote empowering the Protector to issue orders to the fleet. But this vote was not intended in any quarter as a settlement of the constitutional question of the command of the forces. It was to divert the attention of the House from this crucial question that the courtiers directed the debate to the problem of the Second House and its recognition, as a preliminary to the greater problem of the fundamentals. On March 28 it was resolved to recognise the Upper House during the current Parliament. The numbers on this division (198 to 125) probably represent the respective strengths of the two parties, Court and Republican.

The division in the House reproduced itself in the army, which was now split into factions, but in which there had at last emerged triumphant that cross current of motive—personal ambition—which during Oliver's life had been kept sternly under. The factions in the army now consisted of the Commonwealth men, led by such personalities as Colonel Lilburn; the Wallingford House party (so called because led by Fleetwood, at whose residence, Wallingford House, the Council of Officers met from April, 1659, in conjunction with Desborough), which desired to make Richard its puppet and so rule through him; and a smaller remaining faction under the lead of Ingoldsby, which sided with the

Council in supporting Richard. Whitelock attributes the succeeding *coup d'état* to the Wallingford House party and ascribes it to the personal ambition of Fleetwood. But it is clear that the Commonwealth men in the army were at one with the Grandees (the Wallingford House party) in desiring to put an end to a Parliament in which the Court party were proving too strong for the Republicans. Nehemiah Bourne's account of Richard's fall distinctly states that the Republican party in the House, finding itself defeated, applied to the officers of the army. Several debates were held, but the superior officers were despondent; nor was it till the generality of the officers took heart and began to work upon the Grandees, that these began to incline towards reviving the good old cause.

Some confirmation seems to be lent to this view by the fact that the scheme of an army petition was set on foot on the very day (February 14) on which the Court party had carried the vote of Recognition in the House. On that day a committee of officers was appointed to draw heads of a petition to be presented to the Commons. The heads of the petition were resolved upon on April 2, at a great meeting of all the officers at Wallingford House. The petition itself was presented to Richard on April 6 following and was by Richard forwarded to the House on the eighth. Ostensibly the main item of the petition concerned the provision of pay for the soldiers. But the merely formal heads of the petition were immaterial. The underlying motive and mainspring of the whole was the army's jealousy of the design of the Court party in the House to vote Richard the power of the sword as General of all the armies of the Commonwealth. That scheme had the result of uniting against Richard the Grandees (who wished their commissions to be secure against Richard), the Republicans (who detested the Protectorate), and the common soldiers (who were deceived by current rumours of an impending restoration of Charles Stewart, for whom Richard was said to be only keeping the saddle warm). The course of events during the next ten days (April 8-18) can only be reconstructed with the greatest difficulty. Whitelock says that Richard advised with the Privy Council as to whether the Parliament should be dissolved or not, and that the majority were in favour of dissolving it. Ludlow on the other hand vaguely charges Richard with intriguing with the Parliament, with a view to engaging the House in his defence as against the Army Council. Nehemiah Bourne says not less vaguely that Richard intrigued with a section of the army, so as to create a party of his own there. Not one of these statements is satisfactory. The most natural explanation seems to be that, until the Parliament had completed the acceptance of the Humble Petition and Advice, every dynastic interest of his own dictated that Richard should hold by the Parliament; that, as the army became more antagonistic to the House, he was obliged to defend the Parliament against the soldiers; and that, if finally he

threw over the Parliament, it was only as the result of the army revolt and under the pressure of sheer force.

According to this view (which is borne out by Edward Phillips' narrative in his continuation of Baker's *Chronicle*), Richard's change of front could only have taken place on April 21. But against this view there must be set several statements. Writing to Lockhart on April 14, Thurloe says, "His Highness a few days since said that God had revealed it to him that he must sink with or stick to the party." Being asked who they were, he said, "The Commonwealthsmen in the House." "Who were they?" he was asked, and he answered, "Sir Arthur Heselrige and Sir Harry Vane. Charles Stewart and his family must be disowned." This highly suspicious statement would seem to indicate that Richard had begun to change possibly even before the army petition. Again, Lord Broghill says that Richard gave a commission to Fleetwood and Desborough to hold a Council of War at Wallingford House. This meeting was probably that which was held on April 13. At Richard's request Broghill attended the meeting and thwarted the designs of the Wallingford House men. He then persuaded Richard to revoke that commission, and Richard seems to have done so on the following day, going himself to Wallingford House for that purpose, and, after listening quietly to the debate for an hour, rising and dissolving that Council. Nehemiah Bourne's statement, that "they so far obeyed him as to forbear any general meeting," may refer to this particular juncture. Finally, yet another version, but probably a disingenuous one, is contained in Sir Henry Vane's words spoken in the great debate in the House on April 18, "I heard it abroad and from one in the Council Chamber—I am not able to name the person—that the occasion of the calling together this Council [of War] was by his Highness on purpose to try if they [the soldiers] would take commissions from him exclusive of the Parliament." In the absence of any detailed record of the proceedings of the officers during this crucial period, April 8-18, the point must be left uncertain. Thurloe's statement, if it be accepted, must be read as confirming Bourne's assertion that Fleetwood and Desborough and others went to Richard and dissuaded him from urging the point of the generalship by his courtiers in the Parliament; "which he promised them he would, and that there should be nothing done on it." If true, this must have been prior to the votes in the House on April 18.

It is clear that, although Richard had revoked his special commission for a meeting of a Council of War (to adopt Broghill's questionable terminology), the General Council of the Army did not dissolve itself. Accordingly on April 18, debating with closed doors, the Commons resolved that there should be no General Council of the Army save with the consent of the Protector and both Houses; and, secondly, that no person should have command in the Army or Navy who

declined to pledge himself not to disturb the free meetings in Parliament.

These votes carried with them by implication that the command of the army was now to be in the Protector and the Parliament. Richard summoned the officers to Whitehall on the same day, and there with threats bade them dissolve their General Council of Officers. Three days later, on Thursday, April 21, the Mayor and Aldermen of the City presented a petition to Richard declaring their resolution to stand by him and the two Houses; but they were followed by the officers of the City trained bands with a representation in favour of the army petition. Richard sent for his Life Guards, but even his own regiment marched away and went over to the army, and all the force that Richard's friendly colonels could raise for him did not amount to three companies or two troops. Another report puts the situation more clearly. "Thursday night all the regiments here, both horse and foot, were in arms. That of the late Lord Pride marched into Whitehall without opposition. His Highness gave orders to Colonel Hacker's and other regiments to march to Whitehall for the preservation of his person; but, having before received other orders from the Lord Fleetwood, they with all the rest obeyed his Excellencie's [Fleetwood's] orders rather than those of his Highness." That night Fleetwood and Desborough were closeted with Richard till eleven o'clock, "and then declared their full satisfaction in what his Highness had then said to answer the desires of, and to live and dye with the armies."

The result of this *coup d'état* was quickly seen. On the following day (April 22) Richard signed a commission dissolving the Parliament. In face of the military revolt engineered by Fleetwood he had yielded to force, had thrown over the Parliament and with it the last uncertain chances of constitutionalism, and had thereby signed the death-warrant of his dynasty and of the Commonwealth. Henceforth till the Restoration anarchy and the sword prevailed in the land.

If the intention of the Wallingford House party had been to retain Richard as a tool or puppet, and with him the Protectorate, but shorn of the command of the army and shorn also of the veto, they quickly found that they could not prevail against the now rampant republicanism of the inferior officers. On the very next day (April 23) the Council of Officers sitting at Wallingford House at once took the direction of affairs, debating the settlement of the government: whether it should be by way of the Humble Petition and Advice, by a recall of the Rump, or by again a new constitution. The Grandees of the army wished for a nominal or mere figure-head Protector; but the inferior officers, who on the same day held a Council of their own at St James', demanded a republic.

On May 2 conferences began between representatives of the officers and of the remains of the Long Parliament; on the 7th the Rump reassembled at Westminster, and on the 25th Richard sent a message

to the House conveying his formal submission to the new Government—whatever this may have meant. If Richard's protectorate can be said to have terminated on any particular day or by any particular act, it was by this submission on May 25, 1659. But, as a matter of fact, from the dissolution of his Parliament on April 22 he had dropped out of view as a nonentity.

The ecclesiastical history of this period is simply a record of confusion. The key to the religious problems of the Commonwealth is to be found in the conflict between the political necessity which drove Oliver to attempt to conciliate the Presbyterians and that exalted conception of freedom and toleration which distinguished him beyond all his contemporaries. So irreconcilable were these two conflicting interests that to the end of the Commonwealth no religious settlement was ever arrived at. The triumph of the army meant that of the principle of toleration; but this victory never obtained full legislative expression, and the remains of the Presbyterian system were left cumbering the ground. Its position as the legally recognised form of national Church government was never legally abrogated; and all attempts at a religious settlement subsequent to 1649 took the form of such a definition of toleration as would secure the liberty of individual men and congregations on the one hand, and as would guard the State against the dangers of Popery and blasphemy on the other.

Such a problem of necessity resolved itself into a discussion, not of principle or of forms of Church government, but of a definition of fundamentals of Christian belief. So long as Parliament was not sitting, the problem hardly existed for Oliver. The religious freedom which he had won with the sword he was strong enough to keep by the sword; and under his rule a statesmanlike tolerance prevailed. But whenever Parliament was in session the ineradicable itch of the theologian-politician for a systematic definition of fundamentals instantly reappeared. During these periods it is always the Parliament which plays or tries to play the part of the divine, of the intolerant persecutor. In 1650 the Rump persecuted the Ranters. In February, 1653, it promulgated a standard of conformity and of toleration; but the scheme was rendered abortive by the ejection of the Rump. The project of the Nominated Parliament for such a declaration as would give fitting liberty, whilst discountenancing blasphemies, met a similar fate. In December, 1653, the Instrument declared for a toleration "of all professing faith in God by Jesus Christ, provided that liberty extend not to Popery and Prelacy nor be abused to the disturbance of civil peace." The attempt to define these simple words "faith in God by Jesus Christ" led Oliver's first Parliament to summon a second Assembly of Divines to draft the fundamentals of belief (November, 1654). Whilst the Independent divines (now stigmatised by Baxter as stiffly orthodox) were engaged

in their congenial repressive task, the Parliament was persecuting John Biddle for heresy. But again the whole contemplated work fell to the ground when, in January, 1655, Oliver dissolved the Parliament.

In Cromwell's second Parliament the antagonism between his own large-minded tolerance and the Parliament's intolerance was still more strikingly evinced. He intervened with the object of saving James Naylor from persecution at the hands of the Commons and refused their Bill for catechising. But he accepted the scheme of fundamentals of belief as set out in the eleventh article of the Humble Petition and Advice. This is therefore the first, and down to the fall of Richard Cromwell it remained the only, legislative pronouncement of the Commonwealth period on the subject of toleration.

It is this impotent and delayed legislation which accounts for all the chaos of parochial Church affairs throughout the period. Presbytery, voluntary association, separatist congregation and sect existed side by side, with no legally enforced definition of their position. As between them all the civil power was only concerned to keep the peace, while maintaining a watchful eye on Papist and Episcopalian. And indeed, save in a disjointed, piecemeal way, the Protector's Government never made any attempt at restoring the broken machinery in the higher ranges of Church organisation. The question of tithes was never settled: the problem of providing maintenance for ministers was whittled down to the mere granting of augmentations out of certain specific funds vested *ad hoc* in the hands of the Plundered Ministers Committee and of the Trustees for Maintenance, a scheme comparable to the later Queen Anne's Bounty rather than to anything else. Finally, the only provision made for any trial of the fitness of ministers and for their ordination was contained in the imperfect machinery of the Committee for Scandalous Ministers and the Commissioners for Ejection and the Commissioners for Approbation or the Triers.

Confused and difficult as is the subject of the Commonwealth Church organisation, that confusion and difficulty sink into nothing by the side of the perplexity of the problem of Commonwealth finance. In 1649 the Exchequer, so far as its receipt was concerned, was completely out of joint and practically non-existent. The Customs and Excise, the former of which had constituted the main branch of Exchequer revenue, were worked through the Customs House and the Excise Office respectively. The older and more insignificant and casual sources of Crown revenue formerly received in the Exchequer had either disappeared, or were administered by a parliamentary committee styled the Committee for the King's Revenue. Many, too, of the Exchequer officials had followed the King to Oxford, carrying with them the mysterious knowledge which was necessary for the working of that ancient institution.

On the other hand, the enormously increased financial needs of

the Civil War period had necessitated the invention of new financial machinery. Even had it existed, the old Exchequer Receipt system would have been quite unable to cope with the problem of organising and auditing the ever-increasing stream of new forms of taxation and revenue. In the absence of any adequate machinery, therefore, the Long Parliament was for twelve years reduced to working the complicated financial system by means of special committees. The names of those committees are legion. Each one had its own treasurer and treasury, and orders for payment were issued upon these various treasuries or funds indiscriminately by the Parliament or by the Committee of Both Kingdoms. By the time of the establishment of the Commonwealth, however, these various committees, treasuries, or funds had been reduced to the following:

(1) The Committee for the Advance of Money, sitting at Haberdashers' Hall, appointed in November, 1642, to provide the sinews of war for the Parliamentary party; and the Committee for Compounding (with Delinquents), sitting at Goldsmiths' Hall. From April, 1650, these two Committees are practically identical; after February, 1654, they are known as the Committee for Sequestration.

(2) The Prize Office, in Threadneedle Street.

(3) The Revenue Committee. This had formerly been styled the Committee for the King's Revenue, but at the establishment of the Commonwealth its title was changed to that of the Committee for the Public Revenue. It administered such parts of the old Crown revenues as had formerly been paid through the sheriffs, viz. casualties, the Crown lands, etc.

(4) The Treasurers at War, who administered the regular monthly assessments.

(5) The Treasurers for Sale of Dean and Chapter's lands.

(6) The Excise Office in Broad Street in the City.

(7) The Customs, managed from the Custom House.

But there were also other committees which, while apparently not administering, *i.e.* receiving and handling funds (being themselves fed by funds from the other treasuries above named), had the disposal of funds; that is to say, were empowered to issue money warrants. Such were the Navy Treasury, the Treasury of the Council of State, and so on. Finally the Committee for taking the Accounts of the Kingdom, which sat at Worcester House or the Duchy House, was an audit committee.

Even before the establishment of the Commonwealth the inextricable confusion produced by the coexistence of these various separate financial machines had been keenly felt; and, from 1649 onwards, repeated attempts were made both by the Council of State and by the Parliament to reduce the system to order. On July 16, 1649, the Council of State appointed a committee to consider how the whole income and

expenditure of the Commonwealth might be brought under the control of a single institution. Committee after committee was appointed with the same purpose by the Council (August 16, October 11) and by the Parliament, until in November, 1649, the Council had got so far as to draft an Act for the purpose of bringing all public money into one treasury. There for the time, however, the matter slept; but in July, 1652, it was again taken up by the Council (July 22), and three months later in the House (October 1). Accordingly, on December 10, 1652, an Act of Parliament passed appointing four commissioners to enquire into the several revenues and treasuries of the Commonwealth and the bringing of them into one system. All this parliamentary legislation on the subject was, however, rendered fruitless by the abortive termination of the Rump and after it of the Nominated Parliament. It was therefore not until June 21, 1654, that the Act for bringing the public revenues of the Commonwealth into one treasury was passed; and then it was issued on the authority merely of the Protector and his Council. This Act, which re-established the receipt of the Exchequer as from 1654, June 24, for the receiving of all moneys representing the old hereditary and casual revenues of the Crown, and of Customs, Excise, and Prize goods, requires scanning narrowly before it gives up its whole secret. It practically restored the old Exchequer system in its entirety both for receipt and issue, but only for such funds as had been administered by the Exchequer before the outbreak of the Civil War. It therefore did not give to the re-established Exchequer the administration of the monthly assessments. On this head the Act was significantly silent.

Why did not Cromwell turn the Assessments into the Exchequer? The problem is a most interesting one; and the answer is not wholly clear. There were probably two reasons. First, the old Exchequer system had never managed monthly assessments on the plan adopted during the Civil War. It had only managed the old-fashioned subsidies of Tenths and Fifteenths, etc.; and was consequently neither by its records nor by its mechanism fitted at the moment to undertake the working of the novel institution of the assessment. Secondly, Oliver was doubtless jealous of keeping the means of supplying his army under his own eye and hand, unfettered by any of the sacrosanct constitutional safeguards as to the issue of money (privy seals, etc.) which had gathered round the Exchequer system through centuries of English history, and which were now revived as part of it. By keeping the administration of the assessments in the hands of the Treasurers at War, and so under his own immediate power, he escaped all conflict with those hoary constitutional safeguards and he at the same time evaded all that liability to audit which throughout English history has been the chief glory of the Exchequer system. It must therefore be carefully borne in mind that from June, 1654, onwards there were two parallel Treasuries

in England, (1) the Exchequer administering the old hereditary revenues of the Crown, including Customs and Excise, and (2) the Treasurers at War, administering the assessments.

In so rapid a survey as this it is quite out of the question to attempt a statement of income and expenditure for the years 1649-54—that is for the years during which the multifarious Treasuries above described were in existence. But from 1654 onwards it is possible to furnish a brief statement and authentic figures. During the five-and-a-half years from Michaelmas, 1654 (when the Exchequer opened its doors) to Easter, 1660, the total income received in the Exchequer was £4,745,358, yielding an average of £862,791 per annum. The total receipts of the Treasurers at War during the period June 24, 1654, to Easter, 1660, from assessment was £3,576,174, or an average of £621,908 per annum. The total average annual yield therefore of all revenue (Exchequer revenue and assessments combined) was £1,484,699 per annum. It must be borne in mind that these figures do not include the following items:

(1) Such portions of the receipts from the sale of, and the doubling upon¹, Crown lands (which from 1649 onwards produced £1,993,951) as were realised within the above period of five years and a half, since this fund was separately administered by its own Treasurers;

(2) the similar portions of the moneys raised by the sale of Dean and Chapter lands (which from 1649 onward produced £980,724 by August 31, 1650, and possibly a further £503,178 later), since this fund also was likewise separately administered. Of the sale of Bishops' lands no account has survived; but the sale had probably been completed, and the money expended, before 1654;

(3) the ecclesiastical revenues which were administered by the Trustees for the Maintenance of Ministers. This fund amounted to roughly £110,000 per annum;

(4 and 5) the revenue of Scotland and that of Ireland.

The figures, given above, however, include all receipts from sequestrations from September 29, 1654, onwards, as from that date all such moneys were received by the Receivers-General of the Counties and by them were accounted for in the Exchequer.

The present writer has calculated that on an average there was a deficit of from £400,000 to £500,000 yearly on the total expenditure of the three kingdoms. In the statement for the year 1659, which is printed in the Commons Journals and in the Report on the Dartmouth MSS, the total revenue for England, Scotland, and Ireland is given as

¹ The system of doubling was a device by which both in England and Ireland the Parliament succeeded at once in postponing redemption and raising further credit. If a creditor of the State agreed to advance to it a further sum equal to that already advanced by him, he was given a special security out of State (Crown) lands.

£1,868,717. 9s. 0d.; the total expenditure as £2,201,540. 15s. 4d.; thus leaving a deficit of £332,823. 6s. 4d., and this was at a time when the expenditure was much less than in the preceding years. It may be very roughly reckoned that the extraordinary sources of income (viz., the sale of Bishops' lands, Royalist compositions, and the sales of Crown lands and of Dean and Chapter lands) made up this yearly deficit and kept the Commonwealth fairly solvent till about 1654, from which time onwards the deficit became an accruing and ever-increasing debt. In 1659 this debt is estimated in the Commons Journals at £2,474,290. 0s. 1d., which if averaged for the five-and-a-half years' period as above would make the annual deficit tally with the average deficit of £400,000 to £500,000 estimated above. There can be little doubt that the practical repudiation of the greater part of this debt at the Restoration was an act of national bankruptcy, and that the consequent distress among the creditors of the nation must have been one of the most decisive causes of the commercial and financial stagnation which ensued immediately upon the Restoration.

The effect which this financial strain produced upon the economy and the policy of the Commonwealth may be stated in a very few words. It consisted in the ever-recurring desire, or attempt, to reduce the standing army and to substitute for it the militia. The militia was a wholly inexpensive force; and, what was more important still, the burden of its maintenance would have been local, not national. This desire has throughout only one basis, namely, retrenchment. Whatever later polemical writers may have thought or think to the contrary, there never was in it throughout the Commonwealth period anything political. Over and over again the scheme split and was brought to naught, because the militia could not be trusted. On this point Dr Gardiner's estimate of the chances of Oliver's ever securing a loyal militia is probably far too favourable. There never was any substantial prospect of such a consummation. When the scheme was at last firmly tried it brought with it the institution of Major-Generals as a necessary concomitant, for the simple reason that the Government dared not trust the militia to the hands of the old County Lieutenants, who were Royalist to a man. And the abolition of the Major-Generals, after a brief experience of them, is to be regarded as the result, not so much of the revolt of the country against their tyranny and repressive Puritanism, as of the perception on Oliver's part that the whole militia movement was a failure, and that it was consequently impossible, while leaning on so broken a reed, to risk a great disbandment of the standing army. From this source, or indeed from any other, financial relief was destined never to come to Oliver or his son. The clear perception of this only brings out in stronger relief the unfaltering courage with which, in spite of all, Oliver pursued his high and strong foreign and domestic policy.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE NAVY OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE
FIRST DUTCH WAR.

To students of the seventeenth century it must always appear remarkable that the period of the Commonwealth should have witnessed, in a State already exhausted by civil war, a striking increase in naval power and a vast extension of the range of naval operations. The fundamental cause is to be found in that change in the political conditions of the time which substituted France and the United Provinces for the declining Power of Spain as England's real foes. This change carries us back to the beginning of the Stewart period, but the historian of the Commonwealth navy need not look so far behind him. On the side of ship-building, his investigations should begin with ship-money, for it was in the ship-money fleets that the foundations of success in the First Dutch War were laid. But for naval administration he need only go back to 1642, when the winnowing fan of revolution purged the floor; and the history of naval action does not seriously begin for him until 1648, with the partial revolt of the Parliamentary fleet.

Although the ship-money fleets achieved little in action, they mark an epoch of great importance in the development of the English navy. In the earlier expeditions of the century there had been a helpless dependence upon the mercantile marine; but the second and third ship-money fleets discarded merchantmen, and thus an important step was taken towards the establishment of a real professional navy. It is true that in the stress of the First Dutch War there was a reversion to armed merchantmen; but the Government now aimed at the permanent maintenance of a standing naval force. Charles I's revival of naval activity was fated to assist in working his political ruin; and this fact has invested ship-money with a sinister significance in the minds of constitutional historians, and has obscured its real importance in naval development. The ship-money fleets were, however, scarcely more than an experiment; the great development of the fighting strength of England at sea belongs to the period between 1649 and 1660. During the eleven years of the Commonwealth no less than 207 new ships were added to the royal navy—a vast increase upon the modest accessions of earlier times.

The period of the Commonwealth undoubtedly saw a notable advance in the purity and efficiency of naval administration. The moral exaltation of the times, which raised the standard of duty, and created an atmosphere unfavourable to corruption, contributed to this result. But perhaps too much stress has been laid upon considerations of this kind, and too little upon the complete transformation of administrative methods accomplished by the Great Rebellion. Under Charles I the higher government of the navy had been in the main aristocratic. It was in the hands of great personages absorbed in other business and cut off by their want of professional knowledge from the effective supervision of naval affairs. But the Civil War tapped a new reservoir of administrative ability. Parliament was now learning the art of government and appropriating large territories hitherto outside its province. The supreme control of naval affairs passed to a parliamentary "Committee of the Navy," whose members were frequently changed; and subordinate to this committee were the "Commissioners of the Navy"—a body of experts charged with the management of executive detail. Under this system the activity of the Parliamentary Committee made effective supervision possible; and as most of the Admiralty staff, like the combatant members of the service, cast in their lot with the Parliament, the new Government could take over a going concern, while the old vicious traditions of Court influence and the sale of places came to an end.

In the year 1649 the work which the Civil War had begun was completed by a further reorganisation, which has been described as the application to the navy of the principles of the New Model. The office of Lord High Admiral, hitherto held by the Earl of Warwick, was taken over by the Council of State, which proceeded to divide its functions. The distribution and movements of ships were determined by the advice of Popham, Deane, and Blake, who were appointed on February 27 "generals at sea"; while the other duties of the office were delegated to an "Admiralty Committee" of the Council of State. This Committee comprised a majority of soldiers, including three Puritan colonels as active members, and the younger Vane as chairman. Parliament was still represented by a "Committee of the Navy," which claimed, and on occasion exercised, supreme authority; and five "Commissioners of the Navy," appointed in February, 1649, attended to the building, repairing, cleaning, and victualling of ships, and to the difficult business of providing them with men. It was very probably the paramount importance of placing the command of the fleet in absolutely trustworthy hands, which led to this reorganisation of 1649, and to the substitution for Warwick, who was neither an Independent nor a regicide, of a group of trusted army officers. But the results of the change, as they gradually unfolded themselves, proved to be of a far-reaching character. Since the close of the Civil War the Parliamentary Committee of the Navy

had been losing influence, and it was now destined to be eclipsed by the Admiralty Committee of the Council of State; and, inasmuch as experience in war had already come to be experience in business, the administration of the navy was thereby improved at one of its weaker points. But at the same time the expert "Commissioners of the Navy" began to eclipse their own official superiors, the Admiralty Committee. These Navy Commissioners bore the brunt of the work of administration; and, although their proceedings in the matter of hiring merchantmen and private trading are not entirely above suspicion, they were on the whole remarkably efficient, and displayed great devotion to the service. The change which thrust corrupt parliamentary influences into the background, and brought forward experts of relative honesty, forms an important landmark in English naval history.

Under the Stewart monarchy the numerical growth of the navy had been associated with an almost incredible administrative inefficiency. The King's service was "shunned as a serpent"; and there was always the greatest difficulty in obtaining men. Wages were lower than in the merchant service, and they were not punctually paid; the arrangements for supplying victuals were inconceivably bad; the want of proper clothing was a standing grievance; and there was no satisfactory organisation for dealing with the great amount of sickness caused by the horrible conditions of life imposed upon the seamen. The revolutionary Governments went a long way towards setting these things right. Both the Long Parliament and the Commonwealth disposed of large resources; they were not, like Charles I, straitened for supplies and hampered by constitutional restrictions; and they had the strongest motives for contenting the seamen, and so retaining them in their due obedience to the authority of Parliament. Thus there was for a time, and especially during the Civil War, a great improvement in the punctuality of payment, although subsequently complaints about overdue pay became frequent again. The same motives which led to an improvement in pay led also to the provision of better victuals. But in this department also the Commonwealth failed to maintain the standard of the Long Parliament. Complaints began to be frequent about 1650; and in the years 1653 and 1654 the expressions used recall the palmiest days of maladministration. In 1655 a State victualling department was substituted for victualling by contract; but the new method had scarcely a fair chance. On the eve of the Restoration things were as bad as they could be.

The Commonwealth was the first English Government to make systematic provision for sick and wounded seamen, besides regarding the men as subjects for humane consideration in other ways. All this reacted favourably upon their attitude towards the service; and there was no serious difficulty in finding men until the outbreak of the Dutch War created an altogether unprecedented demand for them. The fleets of Charles I had been manned by 3000 or 4000 men; the estimates of 1653

provided for 16,000. Even now the seamen who volunteered came willingly; and the few cases of insubordination which occurred were due rather to delay in the payment of wages or prize-money than to Royalist sympathies or to dissatisfaction with the general conditions of service under the Commonwealth. When the war with Spain broke out a new kind of difficulty was experienced, for the men displayed a great fear of tropical climates. It was reported that they "are so afraid of being sent to the West Indies that they say they would as soon be hanged."

Although much was done under the Commonwealth to improve the condition of the navy, the more serious evils could not be eradicated all at once. The administration could not be manned from top to bottom with new men; nor did the mere substitution of a parliamentary for a monarchical government kill the old abuses. John Hollond, writing in 1638, ascribes many of the disorders of Charles I's reign to insufficient payment. Men had to buy their places in the first instance, and then, for want of sufficient means from the King, they were "necessitated...either to live knaves or die beggars—and sometimes to both." When pay was small, and still more when it was unpunctual, pursers, gunners, boatswains, and clerks were driven to "daily embezzlements, thefts, and purloinings." But Hollond also attributes abuses in part to the laxity of discipline from above, for everyone was entangled in the same net. No man suffered as an officer "for any kind of delinquency in his place, though he hath been convicted of direct stealths, burglaries, etc." because the higher officers knew that their inferiors, like themselves, could not live upon their pay; so that the whole service came to be engaged in a vast conspiracy to lower the standards of public duty. The Commonwealth abolished the sale of places, and within certain modest limits increased the scale of pay; but it failed to keep up punctuality of payment, and it inherited an army of officials already debased by systematic corruption. As Pepys was to discover later, the tone of a public service can be permanently raised only by the long-continued pressure of authority. The Puritan movement deeply affected English habits of thought, and therefore in the long run influenced conduct; but its immediate effect upon the generality of men is often overestimated. The minor officials of the navy adapted themselves readily enough to the new fashion of religious speech; but the spiritual revival failed to renovate a public service which had degenerated in obedience to the laws of its environment. The charges of corruption which Hollond brings against the naval administration of the Commonwealth are supported by other evidence, although he omits to record the conscientious efforts made by the higher officials to put down abuses.

The history of naval action during the period of the Civil War may be said to begin in May, 1648, when a partial revolt of the Parliamentary

fleet gave the Royalist party the control of a naval force. The greater sea power was still retained by the Parliament, for the revolted squadron consisted only of one second-rate, five third and fourth-rates, and three small pinnaces. Nevertheless there was now a Royalist fleet, and from this fact consequences of great importance flowed. It enabled the Prince of Wales to make a demonstration off the English coast which was useful, and only just missed being successful; and made it possible for Rupert to cooperate with Ormonde in Ireland.

Rupert sailed from Helvoetsluys on January 11, 1649, with eight ships under his command; but they were all miserably undermanned, and nothing but speedy success made it possible for them to keep the sea. If he could have cooperated effectively with Ormonde, Rupert might have rendered a really great service to the Royalist cause; but either his equipment failed him, or his genius was ill suited for the more sustained efforts by which the issues of war are really decided. The dashing cavalry leader who had plundered the Parliamentarians speedily mastered the art of destroying commerce upon the sea. He established himself without difficulty at Kinsale, and during his voyage thither, and after his arrival, captured so many prizes that his financial difficulties were for the present removed. He also relieved the Scilly Islands, which Sir John Greenville was holding as the headquarters for Royalist privateers. But the serious issues of the war lay with Ormonde, and Rupert failed to support him, although urged to render assistance by blockading Londonderry or Dublin. The opportunity was missed; and before long the greater resources of the Commonwealth, both by sea and land, were brought effectively into play. The defensive scheme of the Commonwealth against Ormonde was Cromwell's invasion of Ireland, and an element in that scheme was the elimination of Rupert's fleet. On May 22 Blake arrived off Kinsale and blockaded the harbour, thus clearing the way for Cromwell, who landed in Dublin on August 15. During the whole of the summer the commanders of the Commonwealth kept a close watch upon Rupert, and at the same time prevented communication between Munster and the Continent, and intercepted privateers cruising under letters of marque from Charles II. The work was useful work, but it strained the resources of the fleet to the utmost; and in October, when the blockading squadron was driven off by a storm, Rupert with seven ships escaped to the open sea. His course now carried him very speedily outside the range of the Irish squadron. On December 1 news came that he was capturing English merchantmen off the coast of Spain; and soon afterwards he made his way with a number of prizes to Lisbon, where he was hospitably received by King John IV, and allowed to sell some of his prizes in order to arm and equip the rest with the proceeds, thus increasing his force to 13 ships.

Rupert's reception at Lisbon created a fresh difficulty for the Commonwealth. The strength of the new military State made it an important

factor in Continental diplomacy, a desirable ally for every Power; and yet every Power regarded it with detestation because it had executed a King. The States of Europe were disposed to recognise Rupert if they dared, and swarms of privateers were let loose from every European port to prey upon English commerce. It was therefore a matter of vital necessity for the Commonwealth to vindicate its claim to all the rights of a properly constituted Government, as well as to protect the trade routes and to destroy Rupert wherever he might be found; and to this end the English Government nerved itself to an energetic display of force in distant waters. In February, 1650, Blake with twelve ships of war sailed on a southern expedition; and on March 10 he cast anchor outside the fortified entrance to the river Tagus, and opened negotiations which aimed at persuading the King of Portugal to expel Rupert as a pirate from his port. These dragged on for two months, and then the King cast in his lot with Rupert. On May 26 Blake was reinforced by Popham, who brought four ships of war and four armed merchantmen, together with authority from home for open war with Portugal. The main business of the next three or four months, from the end of May to the middle of September, was the maintenance under difficulties of a blockade of Lisbon. Blake and Popham could no longer obtain supplies from the shore, and they had to detach ships from the blockading squadron to fetch them from Vigo and Cadiz, where the hostility between Portugal and Spain guaranteed a friendly reception. On the other hand Rupert was not only well provided, but he could now reinforce his fleet with ships furnished by the Portuguese and by the French merchants at Lisbon. In these circumstances the complete failure of Rupert's two attempts to break out proves both the efficiency of the blockading squadron and the ineptitude of the Portuguese. On the other hand, Blake succeeded on September 14 in intercepting their fleet of twenty-three sail from Brazil. After a three hours' action, fought in the midst of a violent gale, he sank the Portuguese Vice-Admiral and took seven prizes: he then raised the blockade and departed with his prizes to Cadiz.

The duel between Blake and Rupert was now to be transferred to other waters. From Cadiz Badiley was detached to convoy the prizes home, but Blake himself remained there with seven ships. On October 12, Rupert, now no longer a welcome guest at Lisbon, put to sea with six ships, and made for the Straits to prey upon English commerce. "Being destitute of a port," wrote one of his followers, "we take the confines of the Mediterranean for our harbours, poverty and despair being companions, and revenge our guide." Intelligence having reached Blake on October 27 that Rupert had attacked some English merchantmen in the harbour at Malaga, he was speedily within striking distance of Rupert's fleet; on November 3 he captured one of his ships; and on November 5 the rest were driven ashore and wrecked in attempting to

escape from Carthagenæ. Rupert and Maurice, who had been separated from the rest of their squadron, made their way with two ships to Toulon.

The final extinction of Rupert's squadron as a fighting force was for the present deferred. In Toulon he succeeded in increasing his force to five ships; and with these, "conceiving all disasters past, he fixed his resolution to take revenge on the Spaniard," who had furnished Blake with a naval base. The hunting-ground of the Elizabethan pirate-captains still retained its glamour for the seamen of the next generation; and, with the Azores as his goal, he was able to man his ships, and sail westward, capturing English and Spanish prizes indiscriminately on the way. Though it was Rupert's intention ultimately to support the King's cause in the West Indies, his ships' companies cared only to spoil the Egyptians. They refused to leave Spanish waters, and the chance of achieving anything was lost. During the rest of 1651 the squadron lingered off the Azores; in the spring of 1652 it cruised off the coast of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands; nor was it until the summer of 1652 that Rupert reached the West Indies—six months after Ayscue's fleet had secured Barbados for the Parliament. Political results could no longer be achieved; and meanwhile the fleet had been steadily deteriorating. In 1651 the flagship and another vessel were lost; early in 1652 the crew of the *Revenge* mutinied and carried her over to the Parliament; in September of the same year Prince Maurice and two ships were lost in a storm. In March, 1653, Rupert returned to France with his own ship and a few unseaworthy prizes. His squadron was now finally broken up, and the Royalist party ceased to command naval power.

When on February 13, 1651, Parliament solemnly thanked Blake, and voted him £1000, the statesmen of the time showed their perception of the fact that he had achieved something more than "breaking the head and pulling up the roots of the enemy's marine strength in Prince Rupert." With the appearance of the English flag in such force in the Mediterranean began the acceptance of the Commonwealth by the Powers of Europe—the recognition of the "pariah State." From Blake's southern voyage there also dates a new departure in English naval policy—the establishment of systematic convoy to the Mediterranean. Hitherto the English Government had only acknowledged the duty of protecting commerce in the neighbourhood of the English coasts—more particularly in the Channel and the North Sea. Now, the operations of Rupert, the privateers, and the French cruisers, forced upon the Commonwealth the duty of protecting commerce over a wider field; and for this purpose it was necessary to maintain a large naval force in the Mediterranean. The date of the new departure can be fixed with precision. On October 31, 1650, an Act was passed adding 15 per cent. to the customs, and providing that the money thus obtained should be used in paying the expenses of men-of-war employed to convoy merchantmen.

From this time the system of convoy was entirely remodelled; and first Hall, and then Appleton and Badiley, were employed in escorting the Levant trade.

The destruction of the naval power which the Royalists had acquired by the mutiny of May, 1648, is the most important episode in the period of Commonwealth naval history which precedes the outbreak of the First Dutch War; but the command of the sea was of high value to the Commonwealth elsewhere as well as in the Mediterranean. The fleet intercepted arms and stores destined for Ireland, and cut off communication between Charles II in Scotland and his friends in Holland. Cromwell's invasion of Scotland would have been scarcely feasible at all, had not his army been furnished with supplies landed from the fleet which accompanied its march. It was to the command of the sea also that the Commonwealth owed its ability to wind up so speedily the affairs of the monarchy, and to assert its sovereignty over the whole of the dominions of the House of Stewart. The Scilly Islands, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands—all of them nests of Royalist privateers—were successively reduced during 1651, mainly by an exertion of naval force; and in 1652 Ayscue's fleet ensured the submission of the West Indian Islands and of the plantations on the mainland of America. The Commonwealth was at last supreme, not only over the whole realm of England, but over her dominions beyond the sea.

The Government which had thus established itself so firmly in England was in closer touch with commercial interests than any of its predecessors, for the control of foreign affairs had passed out of the hands of Kings and diplomatists into those of members of Parliament. By a singular coincidence, the same thing had happened in the United Provinces, when in 1650 the death of the Stadholder, William II, the son-in-law of Charles I, threw the control of the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic mainly into the hands of the merchants of Holland, and substituted for dynastic and family sympathies the interests of the great ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Commercial rivalry between the English and the Dutch was thus accentuated; and the First Dutch War, which opens the heroic period in the naval history of England, is also an important landmark in her commercial history. Moreover, the reigns of James I and Charles I had witnessed a wider distribution of sea-borne commerce, and a progressive improvement in the size and efficiency of ships, which were destined to affect profoundly the character of the war itself. The navies of 1652–4 could keep the sea and strike at great distances in a way which would have been impossible at an earlier time. The old conception of a naval militia, reinforced by armed merchantmen, was disappearing in favour of a professional navy permanently in the service of the State; and associated with this was an increased professional feeling among officers

and men. Even in the merchant service the seamen had long experience of fighting, since piracy and privateering thrust upon them the necessity of going armed. Ships sailing on the Indian and American voyages, and even those in the Levant trade, carried large crews, heavy guns, and a complete equipment. It would be a mistake to suppose that until the time of Blake professional and caste feeling did not exist in the royal navy; but between 1642 and 1660 this feeling was greatly developed. Squadrons were kept at sea for longer periods of the year; the number of seamen employed in the ships of the State bore an increasing proportion to the mercantile marine; and both officers and men now had experience of continuous service. Such an episode as Blake's pursuit of Rupert, with the delicate calculations involved in the maintenance of a blockade of Lisbon from so distant a base as Vigo or Cadiz, must have gone a long way towards the production of properly trained crews. Clarendon's description of seamen as "in a manner a nation by themselves" thus acquires a new significance in its application to this period. In a word, the Commonwealth was able to bring against the Dutch—what had not existed a generation earlier—a great professional navy.

In the character of their resources the two combatants differed widely. England was still a pastoral country, although with a growing maritime trade. The prosperity of the United Provinces was established upon fisheries, manufactures, and the carrying trade. Amsterdam was "built upon herrings"; and the yield from the export of cured fish was said to be greater than all the treasure brought from the New World by the galleons of Spain. The manufacture and export of fabrics was facilitated by the Dutch water-ways, which on the one hand gave cheap and easy access to Germany, and on the other hand placed the Dutch manufacturing towns within reach of the sea. The position of the United Provinces—between France and the Baltic, at the mouth of the great German rivers, and within reach of the Mediterranean—made them "the waggoners of all seas." Last of all, the great Companies engaged in the Colonial and Eastern trade were tributary to the full-fed river of Dutch prosperity. Thus, as a contemporary observer remarked, the Dutch "sucked honey, like the bee, from all parts." Yet in the event of a war between the Commonwealth and the Dutch Republic the geographical advantages were with the former. Lying, as it were, upon the flank of the Dutch trade, England occupied a strategic position which gave her control over its main thoroughfare. Ships trading to the Baltic started from points immediately opposite the English coast. Ships trading to the Mediterranean must pass the Channel at its narrowest part. In relation to the Eastern trade also England occupied interior lines; and, even if a homeward-bound fleet should take the long and dangerous voyage round the north of Scotland, it could easily be cut off before it reached the Dutch ports. Moreover, the general conditions of navigation compelled sailing ships to hug the English coast; and the

prevalence of westerly winds was to the advantage of an English force attacking the Dutch coasts or shipping, and to the disadvantage of a Dutch force delivering a counter-attack.

The geographical advantages of England over the United Provinces were in 1652 seconded by the possession of what was, on the whole, a better fleet. The Dutch claimed that in comparison with their own the English had but a small navy. It was true that the United Provinces possessed more ships; but they were not able at any given moment to put more ships into the fighting line, and they were also relatively deficient in large vessels. Owing to the fact that their great struggle with Spain had shaped itself as a land war, the number of ships actually fit for sea had sunk as low as fifty, and the deficiency had to be made good by hastily arming merchantmen. In England, on the other hand, during the years 1649–51 forty-one new ships had been added to the navy list, though before these additions the navy of the Long Parliament was already the strongest navy which the country had ever possessed. The English ships were more solidly built than the Dutch, being "full of timber"; an English sea-captain had expressed the difference by the phrase, "we building ours for seventy years, they theirs for seven." The sandy character of the Dutch coast also affected the size of their ships. Thus, when the rival navies came to action upon the open sea, it was found that the English ships could stand battering better than the Dutch; and, where the former were only crippled, the latter were sunk outright. The English ships were also more heavily armed, and were certainly better provided; and, although the Dutch had a larger number of merchant ships to draw upon for the service of the State, the English merchant ships were larger and carried more guns. The manning of the fleets was a difficulty upon both sides; but the English officers and men were much more experienced in the actual business of war, for the Dutch navy had seen little real service since 1609. When the war broke out, the seamen Ayscue and Penn had just returned from long cruises, the former from America and the latter from the Mediterranean; while the soldier Blake had already accumulated a large naval experience in his dealings with Rupert. Moreover, among the higher English officers political divisions had ceased to affect naval efficiency, whereas in the United Provinces the perpetual conflict between the great merchants and the House of Orange had been fanned into fresh flame by the ambition of the Stadholder William II. As a result of this, an attempt had been made to purge the Dutch navy, and to introduce into it officers who were not professional seamen. The counterpart of this in the English navy was the employment of military officers; but under seventeenth century conditions their experience of fighting could easily be applied to the sea.

It has been suggested that the English officers and seamen also enjoyed the advantage of that serene confidence and high religious

enthusiasm which had carried the soldiers of the New Model to victory, and had made the enemy "as stubble to their swords." But this comparison between the army of Cromwell and the fleet of Blake has probably been pressed too far. Both the political and the religious life of the army had been kept in full tide by the election of agitators, the Church-meetings of the sects, and the free intercourse between the regiments. In the navy the conditions were wholly different. The separateness of ships, the need for perpetual vigilance, the various preoccupations of life upon the sea, must have proved unfavourable alike to religious intercourse and to political speculation. Except in a few instances, the letters of the naval officers fail to yield any evidence of the strong Puritan zeal which is supposed to have animated them. The seamen were pressed without distinction of doctrine, and, so long as they were well fed and punctually paid, they served the Commonwealth cheerfully and fought for it courageously; but there is nothing to show that they were profoundly interested in religious questions. The influence of Puritanism upon the English navy is rather to be sought in the higher administration on land than in the ships at sea. The naval administrators of the Commonwealth were more honest, energetic, and capable than any of their predecessors; and they supported the fighting fleets more efficiently than they had ever been supported before. But it must not be forgotten that the tone of Dutch feeling was scarcely less religious, while Dutch patriotism burned with an even brighter flame.

In contrast to the comparative precision and effectiveness of the English naval direction, the Dutch administrative methods were singularly ill-adapted to put forth the whole strength of the nation upon the sea. Even in the days of the stadholderate the naval organisation of the Seven Provinces had been extraordinarily loose, and local feeling had succeeded in expressing itself in five distinct and separate Boards of Admiralty. The only real link between the Boards was the Stadholder, who as Admiral-General presided over each Board. Thus, when in 1650 the stadholderate was abolished and the powers of the Admiral-General passed to the States General, an organisation already loose suffered a kind of disintegration. The appointment of officers of ships, hitherto made by the Admiral-General on presentation of the Boards of Admiralty, was now transferred to the States General, the members of which were at once more susceptible to local pressure, and more ignorant of naval affairs. It must also be remembered that, of the seven Provinces represented in the States General, four had no direct interest in the navy. The only influence counteracting this tendency to disorganisation was the preponderance of the Province of Holland, which contributed five-sixths of the fleet and controlled three of the five Admiralty Boards.

Thus the advantages in the coming conflict were likely to be almost entirely on the side of England; and, to crown all, she enjoyed this further advantage that in her case the war was one of limited liability.

For the Dutch everything was at stake—their carrying trade, their import and export trade, their fisheries, and their colonial trade—and therefore they could be satisfied with nothing less than absolute naval supremacy. England, on the other hand, with a naval force almost as great, was risking far less commercially; and the result of this disproportion of risks is to be seen in the fact that the Dutch prizes taken during the war amounted to something like double the value of the whole ocean-going mercantile marine of England. The solitary advantage enjoyed by the Dutch was a better banking system, supported by greater financial resources; and even this was to a certain extent neutralised by the jealousies of the Provinces, and the difficulty of adjusting between them the burden of the war. Moreover, the finance of the Republic was based upon its commerce, and Raleigh's comment, made a generation earlier, had lost none of its point: "If...they subsist by their trade, the disturbance of their trade (which England only can disturb) will also disturb their subsistence." On the other hand, at no previous time had England been able so easily to bring her whole financial resources into play. The revolutionary Government had already emancipated itself from the vicious traditions of the subsidy, and had organised the whole power of the country for war; it was free from the constitutional limitations which had proved a hindrance to heavy taxation in the past; and the irresistible force of its veteran army could be applied at every point of the national life.

The outbreak of the war between England and the United Provinces was at one time attributed to the passing of the Navigation Act on October 9, 1651, but is more properly assigned to the effect upon the Dutch carrying trade of the informal maritime war between England and France. The letters of reprisal issued by the English Government let loose privateers, not only upon French ships, but, in accordance with the older maritime law, upon French goods in neutral ships; and this in turn carried with it the right of search. Down to the beginning of 1652, however, there was nothing to show that war was close at hand; but in February the irritation among the Dutch merchants was greatly increased by the news that Ayscue's fleet had seized at or near Barbados 27 Dutch ships found trading there in contravention of an Act of October 3, 1650, forbidding all commerce with the Royalist colonies of Virginia, Bermuda, Barbados, and Antigua. The result of the policy of England towards neutral commerce was that on February 22 the States General decided to fit out 150 extraordinary ships of war, over and above the ordinary fleet, which had been increased already to 76 ships. In spite of financial and other hindrances, by the end of April as many as 88 out of the 150 were reported to be nearly ready for sea. The arrangements made for their distribution show that the chief preoccupation of the Dutch Government was to guard against an invasion; but the instructions given to Tromp involved the ultimate certainty of war.

He was ordered to resist any attempt to exercise the right of search, and it should also be observed that he neither received nor gave any instructions upon the important point of striking the flag.

Meanwhile, although negotiations were still going on in London, the English Government also was busily preparing for all eventualities. The news of the decision to fit out the 150 ships reached Westminster on March 5; and the first of the Orders of the Council of State designed to meet the new situation was dated March 8. The arrangements made included the reinforcement of the summer guard, the building of ships, and the purchase of ordnance. The nature of the emergency compelled the Government once more to rely in part upon armed merchantmen. On March 13 the Council required from all the ports a return of ships of 200 tons burden and over, fit to carry guns, and ordered the owners of them to get them ready for sea. The opening of hostilities might perhaps have been delayed if the two navies had not come into premature collision over the question of the flag. The action off Folkestone on May 19, 1652, was then and afterwards supposed to have been the result of a premeditated attack by the Dutch fleet. It is, however, now certain that the conflict was due to a misunderstanding between Tromp and Blake. The news was received by the Dutch Government with something like consternation; but the English Commission of Enquiry reported that Tromp had deliberately provoked the conflict, and against this it was impossible for the advocates of reconciliation to make any headway. Nor was it in England only that the tide of popular excitement was rising. The Dutch Government had always to reckon with the possibility of a revolution in favour of the House of Orange, if they should appear to be sacrificing the national honour of which the Stadholders had always been so jealous. Accordingly, on June 30, the final rupture took place, and the Dutch ambassadors withdrew. One of them remarked just before their departure: "The English are about to attack a mountain of gold; we are about to attack a mountain of iron."

The war opened with an English attack upon Dutch commerce. On June 26 Blake, with about sixty ships, set sail for the north. He was ordered "to take and seize upon the Dutch East India fleet homeward bound," and to "interrupt and disturb" the Dutch fishery upon the coast of Scotland and England, and the Dutch "Eastland" (or Baltic) trade, at the same time securing that of the Commonwealth. Ayscue with a small force was left in the Downs to guard the mouth of the Thames, and to intercept Dutch commerce as it passed the narrow part of the Channel. On July 2 with nine ships he attacked the Dutch fleet homeward bound from Portugal, and managed to take seven and burn three. Tromp had been prevented from an immediate pursuit of Blake by northerly winds; and he therefore turned upon Ayscue in overwhelming force, with 96 ships of war and 10 fireships, and on July 11 prepared to attack him in the Downs, where he lay with only 16 ships. By great

good fortune, however, the wind dropped, and then blew strongly from the south, making it impossible for the Dutch to beat up against it through the Narrows, and at the same time giving the long-looked for opportunity for the pursuit of Blake. But it was only by this accident that Ayscue escaped annihilation.

When on July 11 Tromp started on his pursuit of Blake, he was without any certain information of the English admiral's whereabouts, and was prepared to "search the whole of the North Sea, even as far as Shetland"; and it was off Shetland that he found him, fresh from the inglorious exploit of breaking up the herring fleet. But once more the weather befriended England. On July 25, a few hours after Tromp had succeeded in locating the English fleet, a great storm blew up from the south-west, converting the Shetlands into a dangerous lee shore for the Dutch, while they served to shelter Blake, who was north-east of them, from the fury of the gale. On the morning of the 26th Tromp could only muster 34 warships out of 92 and one fireship out of 7. Most of the missing ships ultimately reached Dutch ports in safety, but at the time they were supposed to have been lost, and it was therefore decided to make for home.

When Tromp sailed away to the north, leaving Ayscue undamaged in the Downs, a situation was created which compelled the Dutch Government to take further steps for the protection of that part of their commerce which passed through the Straits of Dover. For this purpose a new fleet of 23 men-of-war and 6 fireships, under the command of Michael de Ruyter, put to sea on August 1 escorting a number of merchantmen outward bound to Spain and Italy, and intended to meet the ships homeward bound. Meanwhile, the policy of the English Government was being determined by precisely similar considerations. On July 20 instructions were sent to Ayscue to sail to the westward for the better security of the ships homeward bound from the Indies, the Straits, Guinea, Spain and Portugal, convoying them, if necessary, from the Land's End, or Scilly, or even "further to sea." Thus the two fighting fleets, drawn by identical motives, were moving westward along the great highway of trade; and the next action of the war was sure to be fought at the point at which they should meet. The fleets met on August 16 between Plymouth and the coast of France; and, in spite of the fact that Ayscue with his 40 men-of-war and 5 fireships outnumbered the war fleet of the enemy, now reinforced, by something like four to three, he was compelled, after a sharp engagement, to put into Plymouth to repair damages, and Ruyter was able to send his convoy on its way. The disparity of forces was to a certain extent redressed by the fact that some of the merchantmen which Ruyter was escorting were armed, and it is possible that they took part in the fight. In this engagement, as in the later battles of the war, the English fire was directed mainly upon the hulls of the Dutch ships; the Dutch, on the

other hand, fired at the masts, sails, and rigging, "the enemy's main design being to spoil them, in hope thereby to make the better use of their fireships upon us." It is also noticeable that both sides complained of the behaviour of some of their captains.

The next action in the war was due to considerations of a different kind. On his return from the North Tromp had been suspended; and the command of his fleet had been given to Vice-Admiral de With. Towards the end of September de With found himself reinforced by Ruyter, and set free for a moment by the safe arrival of the home-ward-bound fleet from Spain and Italy from the necessity of protecting trade; he was therefore tempted to strike directly at the English war-force in the hope of overwhelming Blake and obtaining command of the sea. For such an enterprise the force at his disposal was inadequate; but this was not realised at the time, and on September 25 he appeared at the back of the Goodwins, intending to attack Blake as he lay at anchor in the Downs. The weather, however, made the operation impossible, and the action was not fought until September 28, when Blake took the initiative, and with sixty-eight sail encountered the Dutch fleet of fifty-seven ships off the Kentish Knock, one of the most easterly of the sands which guard the mouth of the Thames. The fight began about five in the afternoon, "continuing till it was dark night." The resistance of the Dutch, strenuous and fierce as it was at the beginning, was beaten down by sheer weight of metal and accuracy of fire. They lost two ships in action and their fleet was further weakened by the withdrawal of about twenty more, most of them commanded by captains from Zeeland, who were hostile to the domination of Holland, which de With represented. On September 30, therefore, de With decided to return home, under the erroneous impression that Blake's fleet had been strengthened by the arrival of sixteen large ships on the preceding day.

The importance of the victory off the Kentish Knock appears to have been exaggerated by the English Government, who regarded the war as over for the year. The batteries constructed to protect the anchorage in the Downs were dismantled, and Blake was ordered to detach twenty ships for service in the Mediterranean. Towards the end of November, 1652, he was left with only forty-two ships of war in the Downs, besides fireships and smaller craft. Meanwhile the Dutch Government had recalled Tromp to his command, and had been straining every nerve to set forth another fleet. On November 21 Tromp put to sea from Helvoetsluys with a force which was soon augmented to eighty-eight ships of war, besides five fireships and eight smaller craft. He was, however, hampered by an enormous outward-bound convoy; and on the 22nd he had with him altogether as many as 450 ships. Leaving his merchantmen off the Flemish coast, on November 29 he appeared suddenly at the back of the Goodwins, and Blake decided to leave his anchorage and fight.

The two fleets came into action off Dungeness about three in the afternoon of November 30. The fight was stubbornly maintained with what a contemporary account describes as "bounteous rhetoric of powder and bullet" until the combatants were separated by the darkness, when Blake, completely outmatched, retreated to Dover Road under cover of night, and the next day returned to his anchorage in the Downs. The Dutch had succeeded in taking two ships; besides this, one had been burnt, three blown up, and many others severely damaged. Besides his inferiority in force there was another cause for his defeat—"much baseness of spirit, not among the merchantmen only, but many of the State's ships." The defence of the defaulting captains was that they "had not men enough to ply their tackle"; and the evidence of the want of seamen about this time makes this very probable.

The effect of their victory off Dungeness was to transfer to the Dutch the control of the Channel; and the great highway of Dutch trade once more swarmed with ships. English prizes were taken almost at pleasure, and a projected attack on the Thames itself was only abandoned for want of pilots. It was at this time, according to the popular fable, that Tromp hoisted a broom at his masthead to indicate that he had swept the English from the seas. There is of course no good authority for crediting so steady and sober-minded a seaman as Tromp with any such melodramatic proceeding. The year 1652 also closed badly for England elsewhere than in the Channel, for the Dutch established a decisive superiority in the Mediterranean, with the result that, early in 1653, the English Levant trade was at their mercy; and their understanding with Denmark led to the closing of the Sound against England, and the detention of English merchant ships bringing "Eastland commodities" from the Baltic. This cut the English navy off from the main source of its supply of hemp, tar, and certain kinds of timber and plank, but the starvation of the dockyards was averted, as naval stores came in slowly from various places in spite of the measures taken to intercept them, and the naval administrators of the Commonwealth displayed much ingenuity in opening new sources of supply.

The defeat off Dungeness was followed by an enquiry into its causes, and this in turn by extensive measures of reorganisation in the English navy, which were destined to exercise an important influence upon the issue of the war. A new scale of pay was adopted for officers and seamen; a new scheme was adopted for putting an end to the delays in the distribution of prize-money; and, by the Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, published on December 25, 1652, captains and ships' companies displaying reluctance to engage were rendered liable to the penalty of death, as also those guilty of slackness in defending a convoy. A change of the utmost importance was also made in the system upon which armed merchantmen were hired. The reluctance of the merchant captains, who were often part-owners, to risk their ships in action, had

contributed not a little to the defeat off Dungeness. It was now ordered that the captains of hired ships should be "chosen and placed by the State," and the other officers "likewise to be approved of."

It was not until the middle of February, 1653, that Blake's reorganised fleet of from seventy to eighty sail was fully manned; but it was ready in time to dispute Tromp's passage through the Channel, as he returned in charge of the homeward-bound merchantmen from the Mediterranean, and to compel him to fight the three days' action of February 18-20, generally known as the battle "off Portland." Tromp had a fleet of about seventy-five sail, but he had to cover from 150 to 200 merchant-ships, and to fight a rear-guard action. Moreover, the Dutch were now to experience the enormous disadvantage of fighting far from their base. The English fleet was fresh from port and fully supplied with ammunition and stores; while Tromp had had no opportunity of replenishing his magazines since the action off Dungeness, and was therefore obliged to husband his resources. It was only by a magnificent display of judgment and seamanship that he was able to draw off his convoy homeward. Four Dutch ships of war were taken and five sunk, and it was claimed that as many as fifty merchant-ships were taken, but the information on this point cannot be accepted as entirely trustworthy. One English ship was sunk, one burned by accident, and three disabled.

From March to May, 1653, there was a lull in the major operations, but the silent pressure of naval war was beginning to be severely felt on both sides. It proved impracticable in the long run efficiently to protect trade in the Channel, and the Dutch merchant traffic was being diverted to the long and dangerous route round the north of Scotland. The imperious necessity of protecting commerce on its newly chosen route at first drew Tromp to the north with convoys. The English fleet followed, but failed to meet him. The next encounter took place nearer home on June 2 and 3 off the Gabbard Shoal, east of Harwich. Tromp had with him 98 men-of-war and six fireships, while the English fleet numbered 100 men-of-war with five fireships; but the English ships were altogether superior in size and weight of metal, and the calmness of the sea was all to the advantage of the heavier English guns. Administrative deficiencies also prepared the way for disaster, for after the first day's fighting the Dutch found themselves short of powder; and on the second day the English fleet was reinforced by Blake, with thirteen fresh ships. Although Tromp was able to effect a retreat, he lost twenty men-of-war, all of which had fallen to the enemy as prizes; and the English fleet could now blockade the Dutch ports, reduce to a standstill such trade as remained, and even plan—although not carry out—a landing of troops.

The establishment of a blockade of their coasts compelled the United Provinces to make a supreme effort to regain control of their own waters. The beaten fleet of Tromp was refitted in the Meuse, and

de With collected a squadron in the Texel; but the Dutch admirals could achieve nothing of importance until they had united these two forces. It was Tromp's attempt to do this in the teeth of Monck's blockading fleet which led to the final battle of the war. On July 24 Tromp put to sea with 80 men-of-war and five fireships; and on July 28 Monck left his anchorage with about 90 men-of-war and a number of smaller craft, and allowed himself to be drawn southward in pursuit of Tromp. He brought the Dutch rear to action off Katwijk; but the soldier had been out-manceuvred by the seaman, and de With's escape from the Texel was now assured. In the afternoon of the 30th he joined the main fleet with 27 men-of-war and four fireships; and on the 31st Monck found himself confronted off Scheveningen by a numerically superior force. But once more the issue was decided by the larger ships and the heavier guns. Tromp fell as the fleets were coming into action, and was thus saved the humiliation of witnessing a great disaster. When the engagement was ended by the approach of night, the Dutch were in full flight towards the Texel, having lost heavily, both in ships and men. But the English fleet was too much damaged to keep the sea without refitting; and thus Tromp's last achievement was to break the blockade and to open the sea once more to Dutch commerce, although at a prodigious cost.

On the side of the United Provinces there was as yet no thought of giving up the conflict. A successor to Tromp was found in the person of Opdam, a land officer, of whom a contemporary wrote: "Never having sailed anywhere but on the canals of Holland, he was obliged to make up by his goodwill and courage for the naval experience in which he was deficient." But much the same might have been said of Monck on his first appointment; and Opdam was to have Ruyter as his Vice-Admiral. So considerable was the revival of energy and confidence, that nothing but want of provisions prevented the Dutch fleet from attacking the mouth of the Thames and endeavouring to block the river by means of sunken ships. But at the end of October de With's fleet, riding off the Texel, encountered a furious gale from the north-west, by which half of it was destroyed or dismasted. The rest of the history of the war is concerned only with small captures on both sides.

Of the two belligerents the Dutch were the more exhausted. The impossibility of completely protecting their commerce had caused a shrinkage in the volume of sea-borne trade, and a consequent diminution in the area of productive business upon which the wealth of the country was based. Furthermore, the captures at sea had caused an actual transference of fixed capital from one side to the other. The loss to Dutch commerce occasioned by the war may be measured from the fact that the prize goods sold in England in the seven months between July 27, 1652, and March 8, 1653—at prices in all probability much below the normal market values—amounted to £208,655. Thus peace, which was

to England only a relief, was to the Dutch a vital necessity; and this difference in the situation of the two countries was reflected in the terms of the treaty signed on April 5, 1654. The Dutch acknowledged the English claim to a salute for the flag "in the British seas," undertook to pay compensation on account of the massacre at Amboina, promised to make good the losses of the owners of the English merchantmen detained in the Sound by the King of Denmark, and by implication accepted the Navigation Act. Each State also agreed to expel from its borders the enemies or rebels of the other. Commenting on this last provision from the Royalist point of view, Hyde wrote: "The news of the treaty has struck us all dead." But if the terms of peace ruined the Royalists, the war which it ended had helped to wreck the Commonwealth. The causes of the Restoration make up a whole chapter of history, but among them a prominent place must certainly be given to the financial exhaustion of the revolutionary State.

If the naval operations of the First Dutch War are viewed as a whole, something of the nature of a progressive evolution may be detected in the strategical conceptions by which they were governed. It has been pointed out that this may be regarded as the first modern naval war, because it presents for the first time "vast concentrations of naval force merely for naval operations," as distinguished from enterprises like those of Cadiz and Ré—or even from that of the Spanish Armada itself—in which naval force was employed to escort and cover a land expedition. But although in this sense it was a modern war, the employment and distribution of naval force was not determined by modern rules. The war begins, not with an attempt to secure the command of the sea by striking at the enemy's fleet, but with an eager attack upon Dutch commerce, which ignored altogether some of the considerations that weigh with modern naval strategists. When Blake sailed to the north with a large fleet to do what a large fleet was not required for, he left Ayscue exposed to annihilation, and nothing but the accident of a change of wind saved him from destruction. In regarding the destruction of Dutch commerce as the primary object of the war, the instincts of the English seamen of that day were not altogether at fault, for the trade of the Dutch Republic was its life. What they did not at first realise was that the best way to attack commerce was to find out and destroy the enemy's fighting fleet. On the other hand the instructions to Tromp and his despatches to the States General at the opening of the war suggest that the Dutch seamen were already thinking upon more modern lines. When Tromp followed Blake to the north, he had evidently grasped the idea that the best way to protect the herring-fleet and to put the homeward-bound merchantmen out of danger was to find and fight the fleet that threatened them.

Notwithstanding Tromp's breadth of view, which his correspondence shows to have been shared in a measure by the administrators who

instructed him, this principle was not yet accepted as axiomatic; and the Dutch Government was always under strong temptation to surrender to the merchants, and to make the protection of commerce the primary object of naval operations. So much was this the case that, generally speaking, the whole of the first phase of the war, so far as the engagement off Plymouth, was dominated by the idea of the destruction of commerce on the one side and its protection on the other. But a development of strategical conceptions can be traced in the later phases of the war. Although the modern phrases were not as yet in use, the battle off the Kentish Knock may be described as a deliberate attempt on the part of de With and Ruyter, now unhampered by convoys, to find and destroy the enemy's fleet, and so to secure the command of the sea with all its ulterior advantages. The failure of this attempt threw the Dutch back once more upon the protection of trade; but their fleet was not limited to the business of convoy, and it went out of the track of trade to engage the British fleet. The action off Dungeness was fought to obtain command of the Channel and to free it to Dutch commerce; but the reorganised English fleet challenged Dutch control in the action off Portland; and the result of it closed the Channel, and diverted the trade of the Provinces to the longer route round the north of Scotland. In attacking off Portland, Blake may still have thought of himself as intercepting commerce; but the action off the Gabbard shows that the English also had now firmly grasped the importance of searching out and destroying the enemy's fleet; and the result of it enabled them to take the offensive and to blockade the Dutch upon their own coasts. Last of all, in the operations off the Texel, Tromp, by a stupendous effort, flung off the tightening coils, and set the Channel free.

The tactical problems involved in the history of the First Dutch War are at once important and difficult of solution. The contemporary accounts of the naval battles are incomplete, confused, and contradictory; and the absence of conclusive evidence upon the points at issue establishes conditions favourable to controversy. The papers already published show that the Dutch fleets possessed a complete squadronal organisation. They were divided into three, four, and even five squadrons; and each squadron was itself subdivided—usually into three divisions, each under its own commander. In the English fleet squadrons can be traced at least as far back as the expedition of Norreys and Drake to Portugal in 1589, and they occur in the expeditions to Cadiz and Ré. As far as the Dutch War was concerned, the foundation of a squadronal subdivision was laid on May 19, 1652, when Penn was appointed Vice-Admiral and Bourne Rear-Admiral; and it is clear that the English fleet was divided into three squadrons under Blake, Penn, and Bourne at the battle off the Kentish Knock, although at Dungeness, we are told, while "the Dutch had divided themselves into three battalions or squadrons, ours continued in one entire body."

Another controversial question connected with the tactics of the First Dutch War is the battle formation of the fleets. At the beginning of the war the current conception of the way to fight an action was that expressed in Lindsey's Instructions of 1635, and again in a slightly different form in the instructions given to Penn in 1648—an assault by the admiral, vice-admiral, and rear-admiral upon the corresponding ships of the enemy, the other ships to “match themselves accordingly as they can,” and “to secure one another as cause shall require.” Under this system the commanders would manœuvre for the wind, and, having gained it, would bear down upon and thrust themselves through the hostile fleet, the ships of each squadron rallying round their own flagship. The action would then resolve itself into a general *mêlée* in which individuals would perform prodigies of valour; but there would be no attempt at concerted action on any important scale. Of such a kind was the first battle of the war, fought off Folkestone on May 19, 1652. The conflict was unpremeditated; there is no satisfactory evidence of a regular battle formation; and, after battle was joined, there appears to have been a general *mêlée*, the ships being crowded together at short range. It was only to be expected, however, that the experience gained from the first continuous series of fleet actions at sea would lead to a development of tactical conceptions; and in this war a remarkable advance is noticeable towards the establishment of the line ahead as the inevitable battle formation of fleets.

But it is by no means easy to determine precisely how far the development of tactics towards the line ahead was carried by the seamen of the Commonwealth; for the meagre allusions in the contemporary accounts do not enable the historian to realise in imagination exactly how the battles were fought, and there is a standing temptation to interpret doubtful phrases in the interest of a preconceived idea. The whole of the evidence is now before us so far as the three days' battle off Portland on February 18-20, 1653, and it is not too much to say that it contains no suggestion of the existence of a line formation upon either side. The common form for the description of these actions on the English side is to say that a particular flag-officer “charged” the enemy “stoutly” or made “a furious assault,” and the context makes it probable that he was supported only by a group of ships. The formation of the Dutch fleet is indicated by Tromp's Resolutions of June 20, 1652, “On the distribution of the Fleet in case of its being attacked.” These provide that the vice-admiral's squadron is to “lie or sail immediately ahead of the admiral,” and the rear-admiral's “close astern of the admiral”; but nothing is said about a line formation, and each captain is required only “to keep near” the flag-officer whom he serves. As each squadron had a divisional vice-admiral and rear-admiral, besides the admiral in command, these instructions when carried out in practice would have involved an organisation in small

groups, but that the effect produced was not that of a line formation appears from the contemporary accounts. It is expressly stated that the Dutch "lay in a close body" at the beginning of the action off the Kentish Knock; and Gibson's account of the battle off Portland is that "the Dutch fleet in a body bore down upon the generals."

The action off the Gabbard on June 2, 1653, appears to have impressed contemporaries somewhat differently from the earlier battles of the war. The older phrases are not used to describe it, and an eye-witness observes of the English fleet that the ships "did work together in better order than before, and seconded one another." The action off Scheveningen on July 31, 1653, was also described as "a very orderly battle." These references to a better order are the way in which the contemporary accounts reflect what was not far short of a revolution in naval tactics. The way for this had been prepared by the reorganisation of the English navy which had taken place just before the battle of Portland. In the earlier actions of the war the presence of large numbers of armed merchantmen would have been fatal to orderly fighting; for the merchant captains, who were always trying to save their ships in action and could not be trusted to obey a simple order to engage, would scarcely have been able to carry out fighting instructions which required concerted action of an elaborate kind and at the same time exposed individual ships to greater risks. The reorganisation of 1653, which placed the hired merchantmen in the charge of officers chosen by the State, was a condition precedent to the adoption of a tactical system in place of promiscuous fighting.

The new tactical system was imposed upon the navy when on March 29, 1653, the Generals-at-sea—Blake, Deane, and Monck—issued the first Fighting Instructions which aimed at the line ahead as a battle formation; and it was under these instructions that the action off the Gabbard was fought. They required the ships of each squadron, so soon as the signal to engage was given, to "endeavour to keep in a line" with their own flag-officer, unless he should be disabled; in which case his squadron "shall endeavour to keep in a line with the admiral, or he that commands-in-chief next unto him, and nearest the enemy." That an attempt was made to carry this out in practice appears from an account of the action of June 2 sent from the Hague, stating that the English "put themselves into the order in which they meant to fight, which was in file at half cannon-shot."

It should, however, be observed that the problem of the introduction of the line ahead is not of so simple a nature that it can be regarded as entirely solved by the issue of the Fighting Instructions of March 29, 1653. On the one hand it is usual for fighting instructions to crystallise previous experience rather than to establish a novelty, and the English naval commanders must have been feeling their way towards the new formation before they embodied it in formal instructions. It is probable

that the influence of Monck was exerted in favour of introducing some of the orderliness of a land battle into battles at sea; but it is not likely that Monck could have carried through a revolution in tactics unless it had been justified by the larger naval experience already acquired by his colleagues of longer service. On the other hand, although the Instructions of 1653 establish the line as a formation for squadrons, it would be premature to conclude upon the evidence at present available that we have here the single line ahead of later naval tactics. It is improbable that such a system would spring suddenly into being in full completeness to replace the older form of fighting; and, if such a revolution in naval tactics actually took place, we should expect it to leave deep marks upon the history of the problem. In the battle off the Gabbard the English fleet consisted of one hundred men-of-war and five fireships; in that off Scheveningen Monck had ninety men-of-war and a number of smaller craft. If these had gone into action in a single line ahead the difference in the formation from that of the earlier battles must have struck the contemporary imagination; and, if so, it would have been reflected in contemporary narratives, which would have teemed with statements supplying positive evidence of the fact. A "very orderly battle" appears a singularly inadequate phrase in which to record so striking and obtrusive a change; and yet the documents at present accessible yield nothing more definite. The one statement which, if true, would be conclusive,—that on July 31, 1653, the English fleet was drawn up for battle "in a line more than four leagues long"—rests on questionable authority.

The idea of the single line ahead is, no doubt, to be found in the Fighting Instructions of 1653; but, if practice rather than theory is considered, the transition from promiscuous fighting to the single line ahead would appear to lie through an application of the system to squadrons rather than to fleets. However this may be, recent investigation has effectually disposed of the notion once current among historians that the new system was borrowed from the Dutch. The line ahead and its applications were English from the beginning, and there is no satisfactory evidence upon which the Dutch admirals can be credited with initiating the change.

Three months after the signature of the treaty of peace with the United Provinces England found herself drifting towards a commercial war with Spain; and by the end of the year 1654 the Protector was employed in carrying out the "Western Design." The expedition of Penn and Venables, which sailed in December, was the one irredeemable failure of Cromwell's military career. He had approached the details of the scheme with some of the irresponsible optimism of Buckingham; and the enterprise reproduced most faithfully all the administrative defects which had ruined the expeditions to Cadiz and Ré. Although

the demeanour of Penn and Venables towards each other during the voyage was reported as "sweet and hopeful," the jealousy between them accentuated the evils arising out of a divided authority. The soldiers were not seasoned regiments, but drafts from different parts of the country chosen by their colonels for foreign service because they were useless at home. The victuals were found to be defective, and the "casualties of diseases...that men are subjected to" in the tropics had not been sufficiently taken into account. The troops landed in Hispaniola on April 13, 1655, and marched to attack the city of Santo Domingo; but no satisfactory arrangements had been made to keep open communications with the fleet, and the want of supplies, and especially of water, reacted disastrously upon discipline. The attempt upon the city proved a hopeless failure, and on May 4 the expedition re-embarked for Jamaica. Here success was cheap and easy, as the total Spanish population did not exceed 1500 persons, and of these not more than 500 were capable of bearing arms. On June 25 Penn set sail for England with his larger ships, leaving the frigates to guard the new acquisition and to look out for prizes; and soon afterwards his example was followed by Venables,—with some justification, as he was dangerously ill. An attempt was made to suggest that Jamaica was practically part of Hispaniola; but to the Protector the failure of the expedition stood confessed. He had hoped to command the trade-route of the Spanish treasure-ships, and, as he himself had phrased it, to "strive with the Spaniard for the mastery of all those seas." His great scheme had broken down, like those of Buckingham,—upon the details of administration—and at a prodigious cost in men and money he had acquired only a useless island. Yet, after all, the occupation of Jamaica must be viewed as part of a greater whole. The Dutch War had given England the command of the sea; and thus she was led to take the first step upon the road which was to lead to Empire in the West.

The "Western Design" had grown out of the Protector's relations with Spain: his relations with France led to the adoption as a principle of the maintenance of a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean. When Blake set sail on October 8, 1654, with twenty-four ships of war, his immediate purpose appears to have been to frustrate the expedition which the Duke of Guise was preparing for the conquest of Naples; and it is probable that his presence in the Mediterranean goes far to explain the ultimate abandonment of the project by France. But the expedition was also intended to protect the Levant trade against the Barbary corsairs, to show the flag in the Mediterranean ports, and to continue the reprisals against France. The problem of piracy was a standing perplexity of the English Government in the first half of the seventeenth century, and attempts had already been made to deal with it. Rainborow's blockade of Salée in 1637, in particular, is for several reasons a

notable exploit in naval annals. He was the first commander to recognise the value of the boats of a squadron for purposes of blockade; he anticipated Blake in attacking forts with ships; and the proposals made by him on his return home for dealing with Algiers by protracted blockade anticipated the plan carried out in Charles II's reign under Narbrough, Allin, and Herbert. Blake's dealings with Tunis in 1655 mark another stage in the development of naval operations. Tunis itself was invulnerable; but Blake found nine of the Dey's men-of-war lying in the neighbouring harbour of Porto Farina under the protection of a fort and batteries. On April 4 he made his way into the harbour with fifteen sail, and silenced first the batteries on the moles and then the guns of the castle, "the Lord being pleased to favour us with a gentle gale off the sea, which cast all the smoke upon them and made our work the more easy." Meanwhile, under cover of the fire from the ships, "boats of execution" boarded the Tunisian vessels, and set them on fire one by one. The fleet then warped out again, having inflicted ruinous loss upon the enemy at the trifling cost of twenty-five killed and forty wounded. It was not the first time that a fleet had successfully engaged shore batteries, and the landing of troops had been covered in this way before; but here we have a naval operation pure and simple, in which, without any landing of troops, the fire of shore batteries was overpowered and silenced direct from the sea. In spite of this exploit, Tunis remained obdurate; but, when on April 28 Blake appeared before Algiers, he met with quite a different reception. The treaty of 1646, securing freedom of trade to English merchants, and the exemption from slavery of Englishmen captured after that date, was extended to inhabitants of Scotland and Ireland, and numerous captives were ransomed. Blake's work was completed three years later by Stoakes. In January, 1658, he appeared before Tunis and obtained from the Dey a treaty protecting English trade from interference and giving the warships of each State free access to the ports of the other; and from Tunis he repaired to Tripoli, and obtained for the asking a treaty similar to those which had been made with the other piratical States.

On October 24, 1655, peace was signed with France: a few days earlier, on October 15, the Council had decided upon war with Spain. During the months which intervened between this decision and the formal declaration of war by Spain in February, 1656, a powerful fleet was equipped in the English ports for service upon the Spanish coast, and Edward Mountagu, afterwards Earl of Sandwich, one of the Protector's personal friends, was assigned as a colleague to Blake. His appointment as General-at-sea dates from January 2, 1656; but the fleet of about forty-six sail did not leave Torbay until March 28. The expedition was too late to intercept the treasure-fleet, and nothing could be done at Cadiz, for the Spanish warships had taken refuge in an inner channel of the harbour. Blake and Mountagu were therefore obliged to fall back upon

their secondary objects; and one of these was to occupy a point in Spanish territory from which they could control the Straits and intercept any expedition for the relief or reconquest of Jamaica. The first suggestion for the occupation of Gibraltar as a naval base had been made at a Council of War held at sea on October 20, 1625, to decide on the objective of the ill-fated expedition which went to Cadiz. During the winter of 1651 Penn had used Gibraltar as an anchorage when he was watching the Straits night and day for prizes; and Blake himself had already had abundant opportunities of appreciating the importance of the rock which commands what has been called the "Mediterranean defile." Thus it was only a further step upon a road already taken when it was now proposed to seize and occupy Gibraltar. It is probable that the project had been already discussed with the Protector before the expedition sailed, and he recommended it in a despatch of April 28; but this did not reach the Generals-at-sea until after the idea had been abandoned as impracticable; and a second reconnaissance only convinced them that the place could not be taken without a land force of 4000 or 5000 men. The generals therefore contented themselves with maintaining the blockade of Cadiz. It was in the course of this operation that Richard Stayner, one of Blake's best captains, with only three ships in action, attacked and nearly destroyed the Spanish Plate fleet of eight sail on September 9, 1656. One of the prizes was a great treasure-galleon valued at £600,000, while the total loss to Spain was something like two millions.

After the destruction of the Plate fleet Stayner and Mountagu with several of the larger ships went home; but Blake, undertaking a new departure in naval warfare, maintained the blockade of the Spanish coast all the winter through. Not long after Stayner had rejoined him in the spring, news reached him that the silver-fleet from America had got as far as Santa Cruz in Teneriffe. On April 20, 1657, he arrived there with 23 ships, to find the fleet moored in the harbour under the protection of the castle and a number of smaller forts and entrenchments. The harbour was not an easy one to get out of, especially as the breeze was off the sea, and Blake had to take great risks. He stood into the bay with the flowing tide, intending to destroy the ships and forts, and come out when the tide turned. Any miscalculation in point of time might have meant a grave disaster, but Blake's confidence in his guns was not misplaced. By three o'clock in the afternoon every Spanish ship was sunk, blown up, or burnt, without serious loss to the English fleet, which drew off on the ebb as its commander had intended. The legend is now rejected that the retirement was assisted by an almost miraculous change of wind.

The blow struck at Santa Cruz had great results. The destruction of the silver-fleet, and the interruption by England's sea power of the flow of treasure from the New World, disorganised the military operations of Spain both in Portugal and Flanders. With this great achievement the work of Blake was ended, and he was ordered home; but he died on

board his ship on August 7, 1657, at the entrance to Plymouth Sound. His successor, Captain John Stoakes, maintained the power of England off the coast of Spain and in the Mediterranean; but the political troubles which preceded the Restoration were felt far away from the centre, and in June, 1659, Stoakes was recalled.

In the year 1657 the English military and naval forces found a new objective, and in alliance with France they were directed against Mardyck and Dunkirk. The share of the navy in this enterprise was limited to the maintenance of a fleet of twenty-six ships off Dunkirk to cover the military operations and to cooperate with the besieging army. In March, 1659, also, an English fleet under Mountagu was ordered to the Sound, to arrange, and if necessary to enforce, in conjunction with the Dutch, such a peace between Denmark and Sweden as should prevent the Baltic becoming a Swedish lake. The experience of the Dutch War had shown how important free access to Eastland commodities was to both the great naval Powers.

Meanwhile the tide of events was beginning to run strongly towards a Restoration. The revolutionary Governments of the period of the Commonwealth had been based upon military power, and except for Monck, who combined the parts, it may be said that the Restoration was effected by soldiers and not by seamen. But no opposition came from the navy. Mountagu's resolution in favour of the King was adopted on May 3, 1660, at a Council of War, without a dissentient voice; and Pepys tells us that "all the fleet took it in a transport of joy." On May 12 the fleet sailed from the Downs, and on the 25th it reappeared with the King on board; and thus the weapon of naval power first forged by the Stewart House passed into its keeping again. But in the interval this weapon had acquired a keener temper and had been wielded by stronger hands. England as a military State, disposing of a veteran army, must in any case have exercised an important influence upon the system of States to which she belonged. But England, armed on land, was also armed at sea, and a period which had begun with the ineffective expeditions of Charles I's reign, ended with intervention everywhere, supported by a naval and military force which seemed almost irresistible. Thus the Commonwealth may be regarded as a period of transition between the naval tradition of Elizabeth and the modern conception of the English navy. It is curious to find this most strikingly expressed by a statesman who during the impressionable years of youth had himself watched the great conflict between the English and the Dutch for naval supremacy. Shaftesbury, who served under Cromwell, and who was still a young man at the Restoration, had been nourished in a period of revolution upon the ideas of the future, and he put one of these into words when he said to the Pension Parliament: "There is not so lawful or commendable a jealousy in the world, as an Englishman's of the growing greatness of any Prince at sea."

CHAPTER XVII.

SCOTLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF CHARLES I TO THE RESTORATION.

BEFORE the accession of Charles I Scotland had already had experience of an absentee King; in the twenty-two years during which James ruled the two kingdoms he had but once visited his native country, and his visit had extended to less than eleven weeks. But in the case of James there always remained the closest relation between himself and his northern subjects. Of none of their Kings had the Scots a more vivid impression than of the son of Mary Stewart—an impression partly due to his personal idiosyncrasies, and partly to the peculiar circumstances of his reign. As the result of the Reformation, a national consciousness had been awakened which had quickened the popular interest in all the actions of the Government to a degree unknown at any previous period. Nor had any former King of Scots shown such a direct and persistent interest in every question that bore however remotely on the relations of the Crown to the subject. Thus it was that James and his Scottish people had come to a mutual understanding of each other's character and affinities which his long absence could not wholly efface. It was James' boast that he "knew the stomach" of his Scottish subjects, and his subjects had an equal knowledge of his own. In the case of his son it was wholly different. As we follow the events of Charles' reign, we have a difficulty in deciding whether King or people most completely misunderstood each other. Of the peculiarities of the Scottish intellect and temper, of the general conditions of the country which were the net result of its previous history, Charles to the last showed hardly a glimmering of knowledge, or even of appreciation. On the other hand, the Scots showed an equal inability to understand the character and motives and ends of a King whose ideals and methods of government seemed to them expressly directed against their national traditions and aspirations. In time they came to form a definite conception of him as their prince; but the man Charles remained to them a mystery to the end.

The Scottish Constitution, as Charles had inherited it from his father, made him virtually an absolute monarch. By a simple and effective process James had converted Parliament into a "baron court." As the business of the Scottish Parliament was arranged, it was directed and controlled by the "Lords of the Articles," and since their origin the election of these officials had been a ground of contention between the Crown and the Estates. The persistency and astuteness of James secured their election by the Crown, with the result that Parliament in all matters of high policy became the simple instrument of his will. From the date of his migration to England, indeed, it was not through Parliament but through his Privy Council that he governed Scotland, and of the one he was as uncontrolled master as he was of the other. In previous reigns the members of the Council had been chosen partly by the Estates and partly by the King; but, favoured by peculiar circumstances, James had succeeded in acquiring the sole privilege of nominating every member of the body. It was no vain boast, therefore, when James addressed his English Parliament in these words:—"This I must say for Scotland, and may truly vaunt it: here I sit and govern it with my pen; I write and it is done; and by a Clerk of the Council I govern Scotland now—which others could not do by the sword."

In the Church James had made himself as supreme as in the State. It was mainly by the exercise of the royal authority that he had imposed Episcopacy on the country; for no collective expression of the national will had demanded it; and, as the new ecclesiastical system was constituted, it completed his conception of an ideal State. He nominated the Bishops on the same grounds as he nominated the Privy Councillors and the Lords of the Articles—the agreement of their views with his own on all questions that concerned the royal prerogative. But before the close of his reign James had been significantly reminded that there was a limit to his interference with the national conscience. He had successfully substituted the Episcopal for the Presbyterian form of Church government; but when, by the Five Articles of Perth, he sought to introduce novel rites and ceremonies (kneeling at Communion, Private Communion in cases of necessity, Private Baptism in like cases, the observance of the great annual festivals of the Christian Church, and Confirmation by the Bishops), he was warned alike by his ecclesiastical advisers and by the feeling of the nation that he was venturing on a dangerous way. Emboldened by his triumph over previous opposition, however, James through dexterous management procured the sanction of the Articles by both General Assembly and Parliament. But the double sanction commended them none the more to the nation. "And for our Church matters," wrote Archbishop Spottiswoode, who had from the first been James' most trusted adviser in Church affairs, "they are gone unless another course be taken." It was the heritage of these Five Articles that committed Charles to the policy which in his eyes was a Divine mission, but

which in the eyes of his subjects involved the forfeiture of his right to rule over them.

The period from the accession of Charles in 1625 till his coronation in the Chapel of Holyrood in 1633 was exempt from those civil commotions that were to give the remainder of his reign its disastrous distinction in the national history. Yet in Scotland as in England these years saw unmistakable symptoms of the future revolt that was to cleave both kingdoms in twain. During these eight years the train was effectually laid for that breach between Charles and his Scottish subjects which involved the National Covenant, the Solemn League and Covenant, and the collapse of the royal authority for a space of more than twenty years. It was through the joint action of the people and the nobility that these results were accomplished, and it was by Charles' policy during the opening years of his reign that the alliance between these two classes of his subjects was prepared. By an unhappy coincidence Charles at one and the same time alienated both his Scottish commons and nobility.

The prime concern of the people at large was the maintenance of that form of Protestantism which was their inheritance from the Reformation, and since Scottish Protestantism had come to birth it had been haunted by one constant dread—dread of Roman Catholicism, with which Scotland had yet more completely broken than any other country. But by the first acts of his reign Charles raised suspicions of the soundness of his Protestantism among his Scottish subjects, which were never allayed and rendered a mutual understanding impossible. His marriage with the Catholic Henrietta Maria, unpopular in England, was incomprehensible to Scottish Protestants, to whom any compromise with Rome was at once a menace to their faith and the abandonment of a fundamental principle. Charles' attitude towards the Five Articles of Perth (always regarded as a papistical backsliding) gave further ground for alarm regarding his future ecclesiastical policy. While he waived them in favour of such ministers as had taken Orders before their enactment, he made it distinctly understood that the Articles were henceforward to be the indisputable law of the Church. As yet the wide-spread discontent with these actions of the King could not express itself in open revolt; but by frequent meetings (prohibited by law), ministers and congregations mutually encouraged their fears and fostered the spirit which was to produce the Covenants.

Along other lines of his policy Charles equally alienated his nobles, by whose support, it is to be noted, his father had been enabled to give effect to his innovations in Church and State. Even under James the nobility had shown signs of restiveness at the status and authority that had been conferred on the Bishops. It was speedily seen, however, that Charles meant to go beyond his father in the bestowal of place and power on ecclesiastics. In reconstituting the Privy Council in 1626 he

admitted five Bishops and the Primate Spottiswoode, who by Charles' express order was to take precedence of every subject. As in subsequent reconstructions of the Council Charles still further increased the number of ecclesiastical members, the nobles could not misunderstand his deliberate intention of giving the first place in his councils to churchmen, equally in affairs of Church and State. To the nobles of every shade of religious opinion, therefore, the whole episcopal order became a growing offence, and the overthrow of the Bishops was more than a subsidiary motive when as a body they threw themselves into the great revolt.

But it was another action of Charles, that, apart from purely religious motives, determined the Scottish nobles in joining the people in their uprising against his general policy. In this action, also, they saw only a deliberate purpose to weaken their order and to deprive them of their ancient standing in the country. In the first year of his reign Charles announced his intention of revoking all grants of Church and Crown lands since the beginning of the reign of Mary. Such an Act of Revocation was no new thing in Scotland; but previous revocations had been restricted to grants that had been made during each King's minority. There was hardly a family of consequence that would not in more or less degree be injuriously affected alike in its possessions and standing by the operation of Charles' measure. The nobles would be the main sufferers by the transactions, but the burghs, the Bishops, and even the lower clergy, all of whom had profited at one time or other by grants of Church lands, regarded the sweeping revocation with grave alarm.

In revoking the Church lands Charles might be accused of a high-handed action, taken mainly in the interest of the Crown; but conjoined with this measure there was another proposal which was undoubtedly in the public interest, and which Charles held out as the great inducement to the acceptance of his scheme. Besides the Church lands which had been so lavishly bestowed by the Crown, there had been equally lavish grants of the teinds or tithes, which had formed a substantial proportion of the revenue of the pre-Reformation Church. As these teinds had been promiscuously granted to persons other than the owners of the lands on which they were levied, the consequence had been equally disastrous to landowners and clergy. It was the intolerable grievance of the former that they could not remove their crops, exposed to all the changes of weather, till the "titular of the tithes," as he was called, had laid his hands on the proportion that accrued to him, while the clergy complained that they received only a fraction of the teinds, which by right should have been their exclusive property. Charles' proposal for remedying these evils was simple and effective: every landholder or heritor was to have the privilege, if he chose to use it, of purchasing his own teinds from the titulars. Alluring as this inducement must have been to many of his subjects, it was in defiance of opposition at every step that

Charles gave effect to his revolutionary measure. At length, in a Convention of the Estates which met in 1629, Charles definitely announced the arrangements he had adopted in the case of the Church lands and the teinds alike. For the revoked lands the Crown was to indemnify their owners at the rate of ten years' purchase—nine years' purchase being fixed as the heritable value of the teinds. As the future was to show, the Act of Revocation was at once an economical and a political fact of the first importance. In the end it placed the stipends of the clergy on a secure basis—a happy arrangement which had been unknown since the Reformation. From the political consequences of the Act Charles was himself to be the chief sufferer. By the nobility in general it was regarded as a deliberate assault on their order; and their resentment was in proportion to the sense of their diminished wealth and authority. According to the contemporary chronicler, Sir James Balfour, Lyon King-of-Arms, the Act of Revocation was “the ground-stone of all the mischief that followed after, both to this King's government and family.” The statement is doubtless an exaggeration; but by slighting his nobles in favour of ecclesiastics, and by reducing their estates and overriding their privileges, Charles had supplied their order with potent motives to hold a reckoning with the royal authority when the opportunity should come.

During the interval of eight years between Charles' accession and his first visit to Scotland in 1633 it was through his Privy Council that he had directed the affairs of the country alike in Church and State. As it was at once a legislative, an executive, and a judicial body, every interest of the subject came more or less directly under its cognisance; but it is in two directions of its activity during the period prior to Charles' visit that we find an immediate and significant bearing on the momentous events that were to follow. Throughout the whole period there was one matter which beyond all others preoccupied the Council—the extirpation of Roman Catholicism throughout the length and breadth of the kingdom. Not a year passed without the proclamation of penal laws against the Catholics as a body, and without an active prosecution of prominent individuals. In 1629 the action of the Council culminated in a measure meant once for all to cleanse the country of the dreaded pest. Commissioners were appointed for every part of the kingdom with express powers to seize “all and sundry Jesuits, seminary and mass priests, and excommunicated rebellious papists,” as well as all persons “going in pilgrimage to chapels and wells.” The motive for this furious proceeding was not merely religious zeal but the general conviction that the numbers and influence of Catholics in the country were a serious menace to the stability of the kingdom. In the subsequent national revolt against the ecclesiastical policy of Charles it was this dread of a Catholic reaction that influenced the mind of all classes beyond every other motive. The National Covenant was a national bond of defence and

aggression against every influence and tendency that favoured the religion of Rome.

Next to the extirpation of Popery the business which most continuously occupied the Council was the maintenance of law and order in the Highlands, Islands, and Borders. By its own admission the Council signally failed in this object. During the last years of James' reign these districts had been reduced to a state of tranquillity and order such as had been unknown at any previous period; but his son, engrossed in the affairs of his southern kingdom, had neither leisure nor inclination to pay the same attention to these "peccant parts" of the country. From the beginning of his reign, therefore, there had been a gradual slackening of discipline equally on the Borders and in the Highlands. Due allowance must always be made for the exaggerated language of statutes, but, after every legitimate reserve, the following sentence from a proclamation denouncing the Marquis of Huntly and a long list of other persons, reveals a state of things little short of anarchy. "Disorders are grown to that height that almost nowhere in the North Country can any of his Majesty's subjects promise safety to their persons or means, the breach of his Majesty's peace in these parts being so universal and fearful as the very burghs and towns themselves are in continual danger and fear of some sudden surprise by fire or otherwise from these broken men." The impotence of the Council in the discharge of its most important function had at once a general and a particular result in the impending contest between the Crown and the people. An impression grew that Charles' government was directed by a hand less firm than his father's, and the anarchy of the Highlands prepared a field for the future exploits of Montrose.

Almost every year from his succession Charles had given a promise that he would visit Scotland to receive his crown; but at length, after eight years, he crossed the Border and entered his northern capital on June 15, 1633. The central and public event of his visit was to be his coronation in the Chapel of Holyrood; but, as Parliament had been specially summoned to meet during his sojourn, it was well understood that business would be transacted of the first importance for the country. As the affairs of the Church had been the engrossing matter of public interest both in his own and his father's reign, the momentous question of the hour was how he would declare himself with regard to the Five Articles of Perth which had been tormenting the consciences of so large a proportion of his people. By the time his visit was completed, every doubt was removed regarding Charles' future ecclesiastical policy. By his own overt actions and by the measures he imposed on his Parliament, he definitely declared his intention to carry his father's policy to its legitimate conclusion. In the ceremony of the coronation the rites of the Church of England were ostentatiously followed. To the horror of such Presbyterians as the historian John Row, the officiating

Bishops appeared in full Anglican costume; there were candles, the semblance of an altar, and a crucifix before which the Bishops bowed as they passed. In the church of St Giles on the following Sunday two English chaplains, we are told by the same historian, "acted their English service"—the service being immediately followed by a noisy banquet in a neighbouring mansion.

Long before Charles' coming, steps had been taken to man the Parliament with persons who would record their votes as desired. James VI, if he had not invented the method by which this process was accomplished, had at least greatly improved it. The process was a simple and effective one; in the case of the commissioners for the burghs the Privy Council brought convincing pressure to bear on the electing magistrates, who were dismissible at its pleasure; and the sheriffs of the counties, appointed by the Crown, did a similar service in the election of the representatives of the lesser barons. But, as the business of the House was conducted, such precautions were hardly necessary. As has already been said, the direction and control of such measures as were proposed was entirely in the hands of the Lords of the Articles. The method of passing bills into law had likewise been perfected in the previous reign: the Lords of the Articles drafted the bills, and, without any special debate on each, the vote was taken on them in the mass. The success of this ingenious arrangement depended solely on the Lords of the Articles, and James had made sure of the satisfactory action of these officials. The Lords of the Articles were twenty-four in number, eight being chosen to represent each of the three Estates, the greater barons, the Bishops, and the lesser barons and burgesses. In reigns previous to that of James, when the powers of the Crown and the Parliament were more equally balanced, it had been the rule that each Estate should choose its own Lords of the Articles, but in his persistent extension of the prerogative James had set this rule aside along with so many others. As the arrangement for their election was settled by James and followed by Charles, the nobles chose eight Lords from the Bishops (all, be it noted, the King's nominees), the eight Bishops chose eight from the nobles, and the sixteen together chose eight from the lesser barons and burgesses. Thus the Bishops virtually elected the whole body of the Lords of the Articles, and Parliament was thereby reduced to the footing of a "baron court."

Among the Acts passed by the Parliament in the manner described, two only were of pre-eminent importance for the future development of the reign. By the one all the Acts of James VI touching religion—that enforcing the Five Articles of Perth among them—were approved and sanctioned; by the other it was ordained that during Divine service and sermon Bishops were to array themselves in "whites," and the inferior clergy in surplices. In spite of all the precautions taken to secure a unanimous vote the House gave emphatic proof that it was

not of one mind regarding the measures it was asked to approve. A general protest was drawn up against the method of voting, but, before all the protesters could sign, the Parliament had risen; and in the final vote on the collective legislation the majority was so narrow that there was a suspicion of a dishonest count. By the two Acts regarding religion, Charles had unmistakably shown what was to be his future ecclesiastical policy; but, if further evidence were wanting, he gave it emphatically by refusing to look at a petition by the ministers in which they called his attention to "the disordered estate of the Reformed Kirk." Yet, when on July 18, 1633, he left his northern capital, he could with justice say that according to the letter of the law, in both Church and State, he had left things precisely as he had found them.

It was speedily made plain that the opposition to his policy had made no impression on the mind of Charles. The place and power assigned to the Bishops was, as he must have known, equally distasteful to the nobility and to his subjects in general; yet, in the September following his departure, he added to their number by creating a diocese of Edinburgh, a diocese unknown to the pre-Reformation Church. In October he sent down prescriptions regarding the apparel of the clergy, and in the same month gave orders that the English liturgy should be used in the Chapel Royal in Holyrood and in the University of St Andrews, the abode of the metropolitan, Spottiswoode. In October, 1634, he revived the Court of High Commission, which had been created by his father for the punishment of ecclesiastical offences, enlarging its powers to an extent that made it a veritable Inquisition. The appointment (January, 1635) of Spottiswoode to the Lord Chancellorship, an office which had not been held by an ecclesiastic since the Reformation, was a further plain hint to the nobles that they were to give place to the Bishops in State as well as in Church. The proceedings in the famous trial of Lord Balmerino afforded a striking example of the extent to which Charles was prepared to strain the prerogative. The nobles, defeated in their protest during the late meeting of the Estates, had subsequently drawn up a remonstrance which Charles refused to receive. A copy of the document, with mitigating alterations in Balmerino's hand, came into the possession of Spottiswoode, who, contrary to his usual moderate policy, sent it to Charles and urged that Balmerino should be called to account. For more than a year (1634-5) the trial was allowed to drag on, and on grounds so specious and flimsy that loyalists so dissimilar as Laud and Drummond of Hawthornden denounced its folly and injustice. By a majority of one the judges found him guilty; but by the advice of Laud Charles eventually granted him a conditional pardon. Yet, as affairs now stood in the country, the pardon was of as evil effect as the trial itself. The injustice of the proceedings had roused the indignation of all classes, and especially of the nobles who had seen their own order menaced in the

case of Balmerino; and now the ominous discovery was made that the Government could be influenced by public opinion.

The actual breach between Charles and his subjects came in the year 1636; and the Act by which it was effected was, in the opinion of Charles' own best friends, one of the most fatuous in the history of his reign. Throughout all the ecclesiastical changes under James VI, Knox' Book of Common Order and the Second Book of Discipline had held their place as containing the authoritative declaration of the polity and ritual of the Church. In point of fact, however, neither of these formularies was applicable to the Church as it now existed under the sanction of the State, and a new formulary was needed to define its actual character and position. In the portentous Book of Canons, which had passed the Great Seal in May, 1635, Charles now announced to his Scottish subjects what was henceforth to be accepted as the polity and ritual of their national Church. The contents of the book, its origin, and the method by which it was imposed, equally offended all classes in the country. James VI in all his ecclesiastical innovations had studiously gone through the form of procuring the sanction of the General Assembly and the Estates, but solely by his own fiat Charles now imposed his Book of Canons on the country. Moreover, the implications of the book itself considerably transcended the limits of the authority which his father had ever claimed in civil and ecclesiastical affairs. James had never declared in so uncompromising a fashion his headship of the Church and his sovereignty in the State. In its prescription of rites and ceremonies it went so far beyond what had been known in Scotland since the Reformation, that it was universally held to be a papistical much more than a Protestant document. By a wanton defiance of public opinion, moreover, the book even commanded the acceptance of a Liturgy which had not yet appeared, and the contents of which were unknown except to certain of the Scottish Bishops who were in Charles' confidence. In Clarendon's words, the Canons "appeared to be so many new laws imposed upon the whole kingdom by the King's sole authority, and contrived by a few private men of whom they had no good opinion, and who were strangers to the nation; so that it was thought no other than a subjection to England by receiving laws from thence, of which they were most jealous, and which they most passionately abhorred." Charles had, in fact, created a situation similar to that which Mary of Lorraine had created on the eve of the Reformation: he had effected a bond between patriotism and religious scruples; and the result in each case was a revolution.

On December 20, 1636, the Privy Council, which as a body had no responsibility for the action, formally announced that the promised Liturgy would shortly appear, and that on its appearance it would be enforced as the only legal form of worship in the Scottish Church. Every minister was to procure two copies—an injunction which the Council

subsequently explained as being meant only to secure the ministers' own edification, and not the imposition of the book on their congregations. In May of the following year the long-dreaded volume at length made its appearance, and its contents confirmed the liveliest fears of the nation. To a liturgy in itself there was no general opposition, as Knox' Book of Common Order had been in use since the Reformation; but to this particular Liturgy there were many and insuperable objections. It was universally believed that it was mainly the work of one man—Archbishop Laud, an Englishman, and, as was the common conviction, a papist at heart. Tainted at its source, the book in the eyes of the great majority of all classes bore all the marks of its origin. In its variations from the English Service Book on which it was based it was indignantly noted that its authors had made deliberate approximations to the usages of Rome. A "*Popish-English-Scottish-Mass-Service-Book*"—such was its summary characterisation by Row; and the fate of the book was to show that patriotism and religion had in equal measure been evoked to withstand it.

By the imposition of "*Laud's Liturgy*," as the book came to be popularly called, the issue was fairly joined between Charles and the Scottish people. As the future was to show, the gulf that divided them was one that could not be bridged. With a show of justice Charles could say that in all his actions he had but followed the precedent of his father; for James had claimed and had all but made good his claim to be "supreme governor of this kingdom over all persons and in all causes," and, such being the extent of his prerogative, it seemed to his son but a cumbersome form to consult Parliament and General Assemblies. Yet the very disregard of consequences which characterised his action is the proof of the sincerity of his convictions. He had seen evidence not to be mistaken that the nobility as an order were now arrayed against him, while even among the Bishops it was only a minority of his own creation that cordially supported the Book of Canons and the new Liturgy. To every eye that could discern the signs of the times it was evident that only by an armed force could Charles maintain the ground he had taken; but now as ever it seemed to him that the rage of a people against their prince was but a temporary madness with which they were stricken for their sins.

On July 23 the new Liturgy was introduced in the Church of St Giles, Edinburgh, in the presence of the Archbishop of St Andrews, the Lords of the Privy Council, and the Lords of Session. The historic tumult that ensued was the first open defiance of the royal authority, and proved to be the beginning of revolution. So defiant continued the opposition of the Edinburgh populace to the book that, in spite of the threats of Charles and his Council, it could not find a hearing in any church in the city; and in every part of the country it encountered the same determined resistance. It was a crisis similar to that which had

preceded the overthrow of the ancient Church, and the precedents of that time were now closely followed. It was by means of petitions that the Protestant leaders had sought to convince Mary of Lorraine that she was acting in opposition to the national will and the laws of the kingdom. From parishes and Presbyteries, from nobles, barons, and burghesses, therefore, petitions now poured in on the Privy Council, the one burden of which was the protest against the "fearful innovation" of the Canons and the Liturgy. In September the Duke of Lennox was commissioned by the Council to lay specimens of the petitions before Charles and to obtain his directions for dealing with them. On October 18, amid an excited crowd which had flocked from the country on the occasion, Charles' reply to the petitions was read from the town cross. It took the form of three distinct proclamations: the first announced that the Privy Council should henceforth have nothing to do with ecclesiastical affairs, and commanded every stranger to leave the city within twenty-four hours; the second declared that the Council and the Law Courts were to be removed from Edinburgh; and the third condemned a book against the Canons and the Liturgy which had been widely circulated among the people. The demonstration that followed the proclamation, in which the most unpopular of the Privy Councillors were somewhat roughly handled, was a significant warning that Charles had reckoned too confidently on the obedience of his subjects. It was, in truth, now brought home to the Government that it had to reckon with a manifestation of public feeling which paralysed its own powers of action. As a means towards quieting the tumult throughout the country, and preventing the concourse of all classes to the capital, a suggestion was made with the approval of the Council, which, however expedient at the time, was to be of disastrous effect to the royal authority. The suggestion was that each of the four Classes—nobles, lairds, burghers, and ministers—who had taken part in the petitions, should choose a "Table" or Committee to represent its desires, and that a central Table, composed of four representatives from each of the several Tables, should sit permanently in Edinburgh. Thus a rival authority was set up in the State, which, supported by national opinion, could deal on more than equal terms with the legitimate Government. The Protesters, now an organised body, were emboldened to raise the demands of their original petitions. In a "Supplication" presented to the Council, then sitting at Dalkeith, they demanded not only the recall of the Canons and the Liturgy, but the removal of the Bishops from the Council as the authors of all the mischief between the King and his people. It was in December, 1637, that this Supplication was presented; and in February of the following year came Charles' reply. Again couched in the form of a proclamation, it announced that the Liturgy would not be withdrawn, that all the petitions against it were illegal, and that such petitions would henceforth be punished as treason. The Protesters, who had

secret information regarding the counsels of the Court, were fully aware of what would be the nature of Charles' reply, and had made their preparations accordingly. At Stirling, Linlithgow, and Edinburgh, where the proclamation was successively read, it was in each case followed by a formal protest in the name of the four Tables.

Charles' unbending attitude towards the demands of his discontented subjects only strengthened their worst suspicions regarding his ultimate intentions. In the minds of such of them as were influenced by religious motives no doubt was left that they stood face to face with the same enemy with whom their fathers had so often done battle in the past; and it was naturally conceived that he should now be fought with the same weapons. In their struggles against the ancient religion, both in the reigns of Mary and James VI, the Protestants had entered into a bond or covenant, binding themselves to common action against all enemies of their faith, and such a covenant it was now proposed to renew as the most effectual means of consolidating the ranks of the petitioners and of giving unity to their action. The special form which the covenant assumed showed that their counsels were directed by men whose zeal did not outrun their prudence. The basis of the document was the Negative Confession, or King's Confession which had been drawn up in 1581 with the sanction of James VI, and the burden of which was denunciation of the religion of Rome. There was a double reason why this Confession should have been chosen in preference to that which had been submitted to the Estates by Knox and his fellow Reformers. Charles could not object to a document which his father had approved and subscribed; and, moreover, the petitioners themselves could not have agreed on a confession which precisely defined all the points of Protestant doctrine. The Negative Confession, however, did not stand alone; the additions that formed an integral part of the National Covenant, as it came to be called, made it a revolutionary document. Following the Confession came a list of the Acts of Parliament which had confirmed it; next an indictment of the recent innovations; and finally, an oath for the defence of the Crown and the true religion. The enthusiasm with which the Covenant was received proved how completely it expressed the feeling of the hour. By every shire, by all the burghs except Aberdeen, St Andrews, and Crail, and by every Protestant noble with the exception of five, it was subscribed amid an exaltation of feeling to which there is no parallel in the national history. "Now," Archbishop Spottiswoode is said to have exclaimed on this unmistakable expression of the national will, "now all that we have been doing these thirty years past is thrown down at once"; and the flight to England of himself and all the Bishops except four, who made "solemn recantations," proved that for the time the reign of Episcopacy was at an end.

From this moment the conviction was forced on both the opposing parties that the sword alone could decide the quarrel. As neither

two parties were, each in its own interest, irreconcilably opposed. In accordance with earliest precedent the Covenanters insisted that laymen had a right to sit and vote in the Assembly. But it was not only early precedent but present policy that determined the Covenanters in insisting on this privilege of laymen. It was by disjoining the laity from the ministers that James had achieved his triumph over Presbyterianism; and in the existing crisis both ministers and laymen were agreed that their common presence in the Assembly was an indispensable condition for the safety of their cause. In the teeth of all the King's protests, therefore, it was unanimously resolved that, in agreement with an Act of the Assembly held at Dundee in 1597, three ministers and a lay elder should represent each Presbytery. On the other question Charles and his subjects were equally in contradiction. It was the contention of Charles that the Bishops, in virtue of their office, had a legal right to take part in all General Assemblies, while, in the opinion of the Covenanters, to have admitted this right would have nullified all their past proceedings. The ground of all their complaints had been that Bishops were an unconstitutional innovation, and that they had been the main cause of the misunderstanding between Charles and his people. If, therefore, Bishops were to appear in the Assembly it should not be as members but as culprits at the bar of the House; and the Tables gave emphatic proof of this contention by a formal arraignment at once of the office and of the personal character of the Bishops as a body. Beaten on both issues, Charles had at least the consolation that he could deny the legality of an Assembly which admitted laymen and excluded Bishops.

The General Assembly which met in Glasgow on November 21, 1638, has been compared in its character and issues to the French National Assembly of 1789; and, due allowance being made for difference of times, the comparison cannot be regarded as inapt. The Glasgow Assembly met in virtual defiance of the Crown; though it was nominally a religious body, ninety-eight out of its two hundred and thirty-eight members were laymen, representing all classes in the community; the Acts to which it gave its sanction affected the royal prerogative in its civil not less than in its ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and, finally, its deliberations issued in a revolution which convulsed two kingdoms and effaced the powers of the Crown for a period of twenty-two years. And a further analogy might be found in the fate of certain of the personages who had now assembled in Glasgow at this crisis of the national destinies. Hamilton, who as Royal Commissioner presided over the Assembly; the Earl of Argyll, subsequently "the Great Marquis," who now decisively took his side in the cause of which he was to be the astutest champion, but which all his sagacity could not save from eventual ruin; Johnston of Warriston, the Clerk of the Assembly, who was the Covenant incarnate and whose legal knowledge made him an indispensable agent in every transaction in which the Covenant was concerned; Montrose, who reminds us of

Lafayette by his picturesque personality and by his subsequent desertion of the party of which he was now one of the extreme champions; Sir Robert Spottiswoode, President of the Court of Session, like his father the Archbishop a faithful supporter of his royal master—all were sooner or later to perish by the hands of the common executioner.

In the minds of all parties the proceedings of the Assembly were a foregone conclusion, and both the Commissioner and his opponents had arranged their general plan of action. On November 28, a week after the Assembly had met, the anticipated crisis came. The great stroke which the Covenanters had ever contemplated was the indictment of the Bishops, and the consequent extinction of their order. Aware of this intention, Charles had prepared a counter-stroke which was the only alternative at his disposal. In accordance with his instructions the Bishops refused to recognise the legality of the Assembly and to appear before the tribunal. The Assembly replied that it was a legally constituted body duly summoned by his Majesty, and had an inherent right to sit in judgment on the Bishops. This was the issue for which the Commissioner had been duly prepared, and in the name of the King he formally dissolved the Assembly and forbade its continuing in session under pain of treason. To have obeyed this command would have been to stultify all the proceedings of the last year and a half; and, three or four members only dissenting, the Assembly resolved to carry to its logical issues the work which it had taken in hand. Before it rose on December 20 it had effectually completed its task. In a series of sweeping measures it abolished Episcopacy and the Court of High Commission, abrogated the Book of Canons, the new Liturgy, and the Five Articles of Perth, and, in fine, demolished the entire ecclesiastical edifice which had been reared by Charles and his father. With equal enthusiasm it completed the work of reconstruction, and restored by one comprehensive Act the whole machinery of Presbyterianism with its Kirk Sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies, further enacting that schools should be erected in every landward parish and maintained at the expense of its inhabitants. "We have now cast down the walls of Jericho," said the Moderator, Alexander Henderson, in his closing words to the Assembly. "Let him that rebuildeth them beware of the curse of Hiel, the Bethelite." The future was to supply but an ambiguous commentary on Henderson's application of the sacred text.

There were now two rival powers in the kingdom, and only the sword, as it seemed, could decide between them. It was with a mutual understanding, therefore, that Charles and the Covenanters made their respective preparations for the inevitable trial of strength. Charles' hope was to overawe his revolted subjects with a force that might render bloodshed unnecessary. By his extensive plan of invasion two contingents from Ireland were to effect a landing on the west coast; another force was to cooperate with Huntly in the north; a fleet was to

occupy the Firth of Forth; and he was himself to cross the border at the head of 30,000 men. For operations on this scale Charles' resources were totally inadequate. A fleet under Hamilton entered the Firth of Forth, but, though it inflicted some injury on trade, it did little to determine the contest. Instead of an army of 30,000 men, Charles with all his exertions could muster only 18,000 foot and 3000 horse, and these neither well disciplined nor equipped nor enthusiastic in his cause. The Covenanters, on the other hand, with the great majority of the nation at their back, and with the Tables to give effect to their arrangements, carried out a general levy with an enthusiasm which showed that they were prepared to face their King even in the field. The numbers raised were only 20,000 men, slightly less than the army of the King; but, according to the testimony of one of themselves, they were in a temper to face all Europe arrayed against them. In March open hostilities began. The castles of Edinburgh, Dalkeith, Douglas, and Dumbarton, were taken by the Covenanters, and in the north Montrose broke the power of Huntly, whom with his eldest son he sent as prisoner to Edinburgh Castle. On June 5 the main armies of Charles and the Covenanters were face to face—the one at the Birks, about three miles from Berwick, the other at Dunse Law, some twelve miles distant. Now that the decisive moment had come both parties realised the momentous issues that hung on the stake of battle. With his half-hearted force and with his English subjects indifferent or unsympathetic, Charles could no longer hope to intimidate the enemy, and the chances were not in his favour that in a trial of battle victory would be on his side. On their part, the Scots had their own grounds for disquiet, either in the event of victory or in that of defeat. In either case there was a prospect of permanent unsettlement which they could not but regard with perplexity and dismay. It was with common consent, therefore, that negotiations were opened with the object of effecting a mutual understanding and averting civil war. The result of the negotiation was the Pacification of Berwick (June 18, 1639)—a hollow truce in the opinion of both contracting parties, and one which but postponed the final settlement. Formally, Charles had the advantage in the treaty, as he refused to recognise the legality of the Glasgow Assembly; but in consenting to the summons of a free Parliament and another free Assembly he knew that, unless a change came over the spirit alike of the English and the Scottish people, the future could be only a repetition of the past.

During the negotiations at Berwick Charles had announced his intention of making a progress through the kingdom and of being present in the General Assembly that had been arranged to meet in Edinburgh on August 12. Further thought convinced him, however, that nothing would be gained by his appearance in the coming Assembly; and he found a convenient pretext for withdrawing his promise. Traquair, the Lord Treasurer, was mobbed by the Edinburgh

populace, to whom the Treaty of Berwick seemed a weak concession to the royal policy. But the proceedings of the Assembly, when it met on the appointed day, convincingly proved that there was no thought of concession in the minds of any of its members: without naming the Glasgow Assembly it simply did over again the work of that body. In accordance with a petition, signed by Montrose among others, the Privy Council enacted that the signing of the National Covenant should be enforced on all the lieges. They were only following the example of Charles, who had made the subscription of the King's Covenant compulsory by an edict of the same body; but by following that example they were making straight for the same *impasse* as that into which Charles' policy had inevitably conducted him. What is remarkable, however, is that through Traquair, who had succeeded Hamilton as Royal Commissioner, Charles ratified every Act of the Assembly, including the forced subscription of the Covenant. What his motives were in this action, he had made known to Archbishop Spottiswoode six days before the Assembly met. "You may rest secure," he wrote, "that though perhaps we may give way for the present to that which will be prejudicial both to the Church and the Government, yet we shall not leave thinking how to remedy both." For Charles, in truth, an Assembly, from which the Bishops had been excluded, was an unconstitutional body to whose Acts no sanction could give the force of law. Very different was his course of action when the Estates, which met that day after the Assembly rose, ratified all its Acts against Episcopacy and in favour of Presbyterianism. Not only did Traquair, in accordance with his instructions, refuse to sanction these Acts, but he dissolved the Parliament without its own consent—"the like," says the Lyon-King Balfour, "never being practised in this nation."

The first Bishops' War and the Pacification of Berwick had left the contending parties precisely where they were, and once more they were face to face with the alternative of civil conflict. Till the Acts against Episcopacy had received the royal sanction the Covenanters could only regard all their labours as lost, and Charles was more convinced than ever that only the display of superior force could break the will of his refractory people. Again on both sides preparations began for the apparently inevitable struggle. In the course of the first Bishops' War Charles had endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to secure the services of a Spanish contingent, and, with the approval of Montrose, among others of their leaders, the Covenanters, with equal want of success, now appealed to France for assistance against their sovereign. But, as they fully realised, it was on their own resources that they must depend if they were to maintain the position which they refused to abandon. Without the royal sanction a meeting of Parliament was convened—the chief proceeding of which was to appoint a Committee of Estates for the conduct of the impending war. The appeal to the country for the

means of supporting an army met with an enthusiastic response, and by the beginning of July, 1640, General Leslie, who had commanded during the previous rising, was at the head of a well-equipped force of some 20,000 men. On the other hand, Charles found greater difficulty than ever in raising a force adequate to effect his purposes. His English subjects were now still less disposed to abet him against the Scots than they had been in 1639; the Short Parliament refused him supplies though it had been summoned expressly with that object; and, when on August 22 he at length appeared at York, it was to find an army inferior in both numbers and quality to that of the Covenanters.

It was a significant commentary on the altered affairs of Charles, that in the second Bishops' War the Scots were the invading party. Throughout in close communication with the English Parliamentary leaders, the Covenanters were fully aware that their appearance south of the Tweed would be welcomed as a happy intervention in the interests of the English Commons. Crossing the Tweed on August 20, Leslie dispersed a force that opposed him at Newburn-on-Tyne, and, ten days after entering England, took up his quarters at Newcastle. Again, as at Dunse Law, the Scots submitted their demands to Charles, demands which involved the sanction of all the Acts of the Glasgow Assembly. With the force at his disposal, Charles had no alternative but to submit to negotiations; and he agreed that Commissioners for this purpose should meet at Ripon on October 2—the Scots to receive £850 a day so long as the negotiations continued. But it was not at Ripon that the treaty was to be concluded. On November 3 the Long Parliament met, and the hopes and fears of Charles and all England were centred in its momentous proceedings—the abolition of the Star Chamber, of the Court of High Commission, and of the Council of the North, the death of Strafford, and the fall of Laud. Engrossed by these events of national importance, neither Charles nor his Parliament had leisure for the affairs of the Scots; but the final arrangement made with them on August 10, 1641, was an adequate reward for the long delay. When they recrossed the border, it was with every demand conceded and with the sum of £200,000 as a compensation for all their losses and expenditure.

The recent proceedings of the Long Parliament had convinced Charles that he had more to hope from his Scottish than from his English subjects; and, to the dismay both of the Covenanters and the English Parliamentary leaders, he now announced his intention of visiting his northern kingdom. The natural fear of the latter was that Charles by temporary concessions might persuade the Scots to make common cause with him against themselves; and it was because of this apprehension that they commissioned two members of the House of Lords and four (Hampden among them) of the House of Commons, to attend upon him while he

should remain in Scotland. The Covenanters had equal reason to dread the appearance of Charles in their midst. Besides the party known as the "Incendiaries," who had supported him from the beginning, a party favourable to him had appeared in the ranks of the Covenanters themselves. This party, designated as the "Plotters," of whom Montrose was the most eminent, were actuated partly by jealousy of the ascendancy of Argyll and partly by a reaction of sympathy with Charles himself. The most overt act of the "Plotters" had been the "Bond of Cumbernauld" (August, 1640), expressly directed against Argyll and his immediate supporters; and so dangerous were the Plotters thought to be that in June, 1641, their chiefs were imprisoned in the Castle of Edinburgh.

When on August 14, 1641, Charles entered Edinburgh, he could thus reckon on a considerable body prepared to give him its material support if the opportunity should occur. But, as his actions proved, he had come with the intention, not of gaining over a mere party, but of winning the nation to his side. In the Parliament which was sitting on his arrival he sanctioned with even undue readiness the terms of the late treaty which abolished the ecclesiastical system established by his father and himself. "After a tough dispute" he likewise gave way on an all-important point, consenting that officers of State, Privy Councillors, and Lords of Session should be chosen "with the advice and approbation" of the Estates. These concessions doubtless gained new supporters for Charles, as with a show of reason it could be maintained that he had granted every demand which had been made on him. Between the King and the main body of the Covenanters, however, there was a fatal bar which no concessions could remove. That main body, headed by Argyll, was convinced that only the pressure of circumstances had constrained Charles to concede their demands, and that he was only biding his time to restore the *régime* which in his heart he desired as a man and as a King. One advantage, however, he had gained by his presence in Scotland: he had deepened the cleavage in the ranks of the Covenanting party, and the results were to be seen in the immediate future. The mysterious affair, known as the "Incident," a conspiracy on the part of the Plotters to remove Argyll and Hamilton, who had for the time identified himself with the Covenanters, issued in no definite result; but it placed Argyll and Montrose with their respective followers in irreconcilable antagonism. When, on November 18, Charles returned to London, where the news of the Irish Rebellion demanded his presence, he left the main object of his visit unaccomplished, as before many months was to be fatefully brought home to him.

In the Civil War which broke out (1642) between Charles and his Parliament, the Covenanters knew that their own existence was at stake, and the two contending parties equally recognised that the Scots might have it in their power to decide the issue of their quarrel. It was with like eagerness, therefore, that both Charles and the English Parliament

sought to secure the Scottish sword for their cause. The decision of the Scots gave conclusive proof that Charles had failed to reassure the national party by his late concessions. Supported by popular feeling, they identified themselves with the English Parliament in the "Solemn League and Covenant" (August, 1643), which in their intention, if not in the intention of their allies, had for its object the imposition of the Presbyterian form of Church government on all the three kingdoms. It was a momentous decision, and the consequences were to prove the ruin of the Covenanters; but their past action had, in truth, left them no alternative. If Charles should be victorious, and at the moment the chances were in his favour, they had every reason to believe that he would seize the first opportunity of undoing all their work since the uprising against his authority. It had been the ground of Charles' ecclesiastical policy that equally in the interest of religion and the State there should be religious uniformity throughout his three kingdoms, and it was on a similar ground that the Solemn League and Covenant was based. As events were to prove, the one policy was as much a dream as the other, but at the juncture when the League was formed a Presbyterian England seemed even to the shrewdest of the Covenanting leaders a consummation to which they could reasonably look forward. Their Commissioners in London who conducted the Treaty of 1641 had been flattered and caressed by the English Parliamentary leaders; Episcopacy had been abolished with the consent of both Houses, and Presbyterianism was in the ascendant in the national councils. What they did not foresee was that the sword of Cromwell was the impending instrument of fate.

On January 19, 1644, the Scottish army, raised for the support of the English Parliament, entered England, where for three years it was to remain. It appeared at a doubtful moment, and its first year's action in large degree determined the issue of the war. On July 2 it decisively contributed to the victory of Marston Moor; and by the close of autumn, all England from the Humber to the Tweed was, largely through its services, secured to the Parliament. But from this moment, both in England and at home, may be dated the decline of the Covenant. Within the period between the autumn of 1644 and the autumn of 1645 Montrose's succession of victories in the cause of Charles ended in his disastrous defeat by David Leslie, at Philiphaugh. But it was the course of events in England that was eventually to work the ruin of the Covenanting party. The defeat of Charles at Naseby (June 14, 1645) rendered their further assistance unnecessary to the Parliament, and thenceforward they were regarded as an encumbrance to be got rid of with all convenient speed. Their dream of a Presbyterian England was now proving a fond delusion which had lured them into an impossible position. The ascendancy of Cromwell and the Independents had created a new situation which every month rendered more embarrassing. Between Charles and Cromwell they were in a dilemma from which, as

events were to prove, there was no escape without disaster. When on May 5, 1646, Charles rode into their camp at Southwell, near Newark, they were brought face to face with an alternative of which they had little dreamed when they had originally crossed the border. When Charles refused to be a covenanted King, it was in consistency with all their principles and their past action that they surrendered him to the English Parliament. To have retired with him to Scotland would at once have occasioned civil war at home and invited invasion from England—two disasters which they temporarily avoided, but which in the end were inevitable. From their ill-starred enterprise there had, indeed, followed one result which makes it ever-memorable in the national history. The Westminster Assembly had miserably deceived their hope of seeing Presbyterianism triumphantly established in both kingdoms, but it at least gave to Scotland a possession which may be truly called a national inheritance. The existing Confession of Faith of all the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, which embody that Confession, and the Version of the Psalms, sung to this day by congregations of worshippers, have for two centuries and a half supplied the spiritual nutriment of the great majority of the Scottish people.

In the beginning of January, 1647, the Scottish army recrossed the border. A profound change had manifestly passed over the spirit of the nation: in every class which had supported the Covenants—nobles, barons, and burgesses—defection had set in on a scale which proved that the Covenants were no longer the prime concern of a united people. On one point, however, both dissentients and Covenanters were equally agreed—that it was with Charles and not with Cromwell that an understanding must be sought. But the hopeless fact of the situation was that such concessions as Charles was prepared to make could not satisfy both parties in the divided nation. By the secret treaty known as the “Engagement,” concluded at Carisbrooke Castle in the Isle of Wight (December 27, 1647) Charles agreed to establish Presbyterianism for three years, with the stipulation that the Covenant should not be made compulsory, while the Scots were to aid him with arms against his English Parliament. The publication of the treaty revealed the irreconcilable opposition between the Scottish parties. “Engagers” and “Anti-engagers” now divided the nation between them, but it was conclusively shown that the upper classes of the laity were generally for the treaty. In a meeting of the Estates, presided over by Hamilton, a commanding majority voted for the invasion of England in the interests of the King. Inflexibly opposed by the majority of the clergy, especially in the west, Hamilton succeeded in raising an army, but it was an army neither in numbers nor discipline equal to the enterprise in hand. On July 8, 1648, Hamilton led his force across the border, and in three days’ fighting (August 17-19) suffered hopeless defeat at Preston, Wigan, and Warrington, himself falling into the enemy’s hands.

As the result of Hamilton's defeat the Anti-engagers once more resumed their ascendancy. At the head of 6000 men drawn from the west the Chancellor Loudon and the Earl of Eglinton marched upon Edinburgh, whose populace, faithful to their past traditions, received them with open arms. Over the main body of the Covenanters Argyll was now supreme; but he had to reckon with a power with which their broken ranks were no longer in a position to contend. In the first week of October, 1648, Cromwell appeared in Edinburgh and dictated terms which were entirely acceptable to Argyll and his following. All the supporters of the King—"Malignants," as he called them—were thenceforth to be excluded from all public offices: a measure to which sweeping effect was given by the Act of Classes, passed by the Estates in January of the following year (1649). In this measure Cromwell and the Covenanters could find common ground, as the Malignants were equally the enemies of both, but it was speedily to be seen that Presbyterianism and Independency were in as hopeless antagonism as the Covenants and the royal prerogative. On January 30, Charles was executed at Whitehall, and by the vast majority of the Scottish people his death was regarded as a ground for war against the party in England who were responsible for the deed.

In the great controversy between Charles and his Scottish subjects there had been the same constitutional difficulty as in the case of the rebellion in England. In Scotland as in England the insurgent nation had appealed to earlier, and the King to later, precedent in justification of their respective actions. In the fifteenth century the English lawyer, Sir John Fortescue, wrote that the King of Scots "may not rule his people by other laws than such as they assent unto," and in the sixteenth an English resident at the Court of Mary was amazed by the "beastly liberty" of the Scottish nobility. However it might be in theory, in point of fact throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Kings of Scots had never been able to exercise the powers which had been acquired by the Kings of England, France, and Spain. James III had been dethroned for misgovernment; James V had been thwarted and finally defeated in his policy of seeking alliance with France in preference to England, and it was in defiance of the royal authority that the Reformation had been accomplished: and during the first half of his reign James VI had had convincing experience of the "beastly liberty," not only of the nobles, but of all his Protestant subjects. To these precedents it was that the Covenanters appealed in defence of all their action, for even in making the Covenants compulsory they had the example of James himself in the case of the Negative Confession. On the other hand, Charles could maintain that the latter half of his father's reign had seen a constitution established which made the King supreme equally in Church and State, and that in this constitution the nation had at least formally acquiesced by its Parliaments and General

Assemblies. What his own reign and the immediate future proved was that he and his revolted subjects were alike contending for a theory which was incompatible with the essential principle of Protestantism itself. In his own case the Divine right of Kings to impose a special form of religion on their subjects had ended in disaster, and it was now to be seen that the same fate awaited the similar attempt of a section of the people to impose its beliefs on a nation.

Never was a party in a more hopeless dilemma than the Covenanters at the death of Charles I. With a few insignificant exceptions, they regarded monarchy as a divinely prescribed form of government, sanctioned by Scripture and by immemorial use in the case of their own land. But where were they to find a King who should combine in his own person both a legal right and the necessary consecration that should fit him to be the ruler of a covenanted people? Yet in the existing circumstances there was but one choice possible. In previous crises of the national history, as in the period that followed the dethronement of Mary, a Regent had been appointed to carry on the government; but the rightful heir of the Crown was now of full age, and the appointment of a Regent would have been tantamount to rescinding his right. On February 5, 1649, six days after the execution of Charles I, the Scottish Estates proclaimed his son King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and by an Act passed two days later laid down the conditions on which alone he would be allowed to ascend his father's throne: he must subscribe the National Covenant, the Solemn League and Covenant, and swear to maintain the existing religious settlement. The negotiations that followed with the youthful Prince at Breda reveal the full irony of the mutual relations of the contracting parties. Charles agreed to accept a compact which his whole soul loathed, and which he had the full intention of casting to the winds at the first opportunity; and the Covenanters received his pledge in the full knowledge that their deepest convictions were but the idle jest of their chosen King. Even before the negotiations had closed conclusive proof had been given that it was only as an unavoidable alternative that Charles had signed the agreement at Breda (May 1, 1650). With the design of subduing Scotland in the interest of his master, Montrose had landed in Caithness at the head of some 1200 men, but on April 27 his force had been annihilated at Carbisdale by the Kyle of Sutherland, and he was himself taken prisoner a few days later. His enterprise had deliberately aimed at making Charles King independently of the Covenanters, and his execution was at once an act of policy for the future and of revenge for the past.

In accepting Charles as their King the Scots fully understood that they threw down the gauntlet to the Commonwealth of England. So soon as

he had been established as King of Scots, both parties knew that his immediate action would be to make himself King of England also. It was with politic promptness, therefore, that on July 22 Cromwell entered Scotland with an army of 16,000 men. By the skill of the Scottish general, Leslie, the evil day was postponed, but at Dunbar on September 3 the Covenanting host was hopelessly overthrown. The immediate result of the defeat, however, was in the interests of Charles himself. Divided in their counsels before, the ranks of the Covenanters were now sundered into two sections, and henceforth ceased to be a united national party. By the one section the acceptance of a Malignant King was regarded as a base betrayal of the Covenants; to the other it seemed the only means of saving the Covenants and the kingdom alike. In the unflinching "Remonstrance" submitted to the Committee of Estates (October 30, 1650), the Remonstrants or Protesters arraigned the whole policy of Argyll's government, and declined thenceforth to have any dealings with a Malignant King. Weakened by this secession, and with Cromwell in possession of Edinburgh and Leith, the "Resolutioners," as the party of Argyll was designated, had no alternative but to identify themselves with the supporters of the King. On November 26 the Estates virtually abolished the Act of Classes, thus opening both civil and military offices to every type of Malignant, and on January 1, 1651, Charles was crowned at Scone, Argyll placing the crown on his head. As the force of the Remonstrants had been crushed at Hamilton in the preceding December, Cromwell was the only enemy that had to be faced in arms. But Cromwell was now in possession of all the country to the south of the Forth, and an army placed under the command of the experienced Leslie was unequal to the task of ejecting him. A movement on the part of Cromwell at the end of July decided the issue between the two kingdoms. Crossing the Forth to Burntisland, he marched on Perth and thus cut off Leslie's communication with the North. The result had been foreseen by Cromwell. On July 31 the army of Charles began its march into England in the vain hope of a royalist rising, and on September 3 was cut to pieces at Worcester by the forces of the Commonwealth.

With its King in exile, its armies annihilated, and its political and religious parties devoid of a common policy, Scotland might seem to have been rendered powerless for years to come. What many English Kings had attempted and failed to accomplish, however, the Commonwealth now effectually took in hand—the political union of the two kingdoms. To achieve this end the military conquest of Scotland must first be completed, and, in the existing state of parties, the task was a sufficiently easy one. By the action of General Monck the entire kingdom, even including the Orkney Islands, was reduced by the close of February, 1652, the Marquis of Argyll himself being constrained to acknowledge the authority of the Commonwealth. So thoroughly had

the conquest been accomplished, that till the Restoration of 1660 only one Royalist rising in the Highlands, speedily suppressed, disturbed the peace of the country. The ground being thus prepared for the union of the two kingdoms, the Commonwealth addressed itself to the task, subsequently followed up by the Protectorate, of providing a common government. As arranged under both systems of rule, Scotland was represented by thirty members in the united Parliament. But a common Parliament was only part of the plan for the amalgamation of the two peoples. In the administration of justice, in trade, in education, in religion, Scotland was to be admitted to all the blessings which England had to offer. In October, 1651, eight Commissioners were appointed to carry on the government of the country—a body displaced in October, 1655, by a Council of State, consisting of eight members with a President and Secretary. For the administration of justice a separate body of seven Commissioners was set apart, and the manner in which they discharged their responsibilities raised the wonder of the Scots, to whom speedy and just decisions of law were a novel experience. An equally welcome boon was the privilege of free trade with England—the loss of which after the Restoration revealed its full importance. Nor were the higher interests of the nation neglected by either Commonwealth or Protectorate: money was voted for Protestantising the Highlands and Islands—a work that had never been thoroughly done before; the universities were substantially aided; and the improvement of elementary education formed part of the duty imposed on the Council of State. In religion the same policy was followed as in England; toleration was granted to every sect that did not disturb the peace of the country—a condition which involved the prohibition of General Assemblies as turbulent bodies.

The Scots could not close their eyes to the fact that under the Commonwealth and Protectorate they enjoyed tranquillity, order, and justice in a degree never known to them under any of their native rulers; but in their eyes these blessings were vitiated in their source. To every class in the country the English domination was from first to last more or less distasteful. The nobles could only regard with horror an authority which had proscribed the great majority of their order; to the clergy, though, of course, in less degree to the Protesters among them, the religious settlement was an incubus which they were prepared to cast off at the first opportunity; and to the people in general the presence of English officials was a perpetual reminder of the loss of national independence. When, on January 1, 1660, Monck took his departure for England, with the intention, as he assured the representatives of the Scottish burghs and shires, of restoring the liberties of the three kingdoms, he bore with him the good wishes of all ranks of the Scottish people; and the enthusiasm which hailed the restoration of Charles II was the spontaneous expression of a loyalty which had never

been extinct in the heart of the nation, even in the years when the assertion of the royal authority had seemed most intolerable.

In the long controversy which had sundered the throne and the people much had been said and done by both parties which finds its only justification in the spirit of the time and in the nature of a struggle which involved the deepest issues in the national destinies. Yet, regarded in its true meaning and scope, the controversy was one which assuredly did no discredit either to King or people. In the case of both the one and the other, convictions were at stake for which they were willing to sacrifice what they regarded as their dearest possessions. In refusing to take the Covenant, Charles I had shown that he was prepared to forfeit his kingdom rather than retain it on conditions which marred his idea of the kingly office. But in giving effect to his prerogative, as he conceived it, he had, in Archbishop Spottiswoode's words, made himself both King and Pope, and had evoked an opposition founded on convictions not less absolute, and, in the case of the nobler among his adversaries, more disinterested than were his own. What the long contention had shown was that neither Charles' belief in his Divine right to impose his will on his subjects, nor the Covenanters' belief in the exclusive Divine sanction of their creed and polity, was compatible with the rational government of a people. Both conceptions had had their trial, and each alike had failed to find acceptance with the nation. But the lessons of experience are slowly learned, and the reigns of two more Stewart Kings, each faithfully following the precedents of his predecessors, were needed to convince responsible men of all parties that only by a prudent compromise, alike in politics and in religion, could subject and prince meet on the common ground of mutual rights and responsibilities.

CHAPTER XVIII.

IRELAND.

FROM THE PLANTATION OF ULSTER TO THE CROMWELLIAN
SETTLEMENT. (1611-59.)

It is usual to describe the thirty years that elapsed between the plantation of Ulster and the Rebellion of 1641 as a period of peace and prosperity. That they were so in a relative sense is not to be denied. It is unquestionable that the country, thanks to the industry of the new settlers, made rapid progress in material prosperity. All the same it was a period of deep unrest and suppressed discontent. For the time, the sword had done its work. Their chiefs slain, exiled, or imprisoned, themselves decimated by famine and pestilence, the natives looked on in impotent rage while the chicaneries of the law stripped them one by one of lands to which they believed they possessed an indefeasible right.

In the years immediately following on the plantation of Ulster three other plantations, in North Wexford (1610-20), Longford and Ely O'Carroll (1615-20), Leitrim and the midland districts along the Shannon (1620), comprising nearly half a million acres of land, were taken in hand. But, though not one of these could be regarded as even moderately successful, and though the market price of land in Ulster averaged not more than £50 for a thousand acres, such were still the fortunes to be made in land-jobbing that it seemed as if the natural boundaries of Ireland could alone set a limit to the craving for Irish land. It was indeed an age of planters and plantation projects; and the philosophical reasoning of Bacon was hardly required to convince men willing to risk their lives and fortunes in trying to effect a settlement in Virginia or on the inhospitable coasts of Newfoundland that they would find a more remunerative sphere for their labours nearer home, and would at the same time render the State signal service by spreading order and civility among the Irish. For Ireland it was unfortunate that the former consideration largely outweighed the latter. The whole aspect of affairs had changed entirely since the days when Henry VIII had proposed to win Ireland by "sober ways, political

drifts, and amiable persuasions." For this alteration the Irish had themselves been largely to blame. Their inability or unwillingness to accommodate themselves to English ideas, their repeated rebellions and intrigues with foreign Powers, had exhausted the patience of English statesmen and forced them, at first more in self-defence than from any other reason, to adopt a policy of extirpation and plantation.

But, with whatever feeling of satisfaction the plantation policy might be regarded in England as offering a hopeful solution of the Irish problem, in Ireland it provoked wide-spread indignation, not merely on the part of those on whose ruin it was based, but amongst those whose loyalty to the English Crown had never been called seriously in question. To the old settlers of Anglo-Norman origin the new plantations constituted a grave political danger. Notwithstanding their loyalty they had long been feeling dissatisfied with their position. More than once they had formally protested against the unconstitutional methods of the Irish Government, especially in the matter of cess, and had insisted on the recognition of their rights as Englishmen. Unfortunately for the favourable consideration of their demands and the development of constitutional government they were almost to a man Roman Catholics. Their hopes that with the accession of James I their position would undergo a change for the better had been disappointed; and, as the determination of Government to enforce the Act of Uniformity became unmistakable, they could not close their eyes to the danger that menaced them through the ever-rising tide of Protestant immigration. As symptomatic of the change that had come over them, it was noticed by a contemporary writer that whereas "until of late, the old English race, as well in the Pale as in other parts of the kingdom, despised the mere Irish, accounting them a barbarous people void of civility and religion," now "the slaughters and rivers of bloodshed between them are forgotten," "and, lastly, their union is such, as not only the old English dispersed abroad in all parts of the realm, but the inhabitants of the Pale, cities and towns are as apt to take arms against us (which no precedent time hath ever seen) as the ancient Irish." A common religious belief has furnished the cement to many strange alliances; and in Ireland, where religion was becoming more and more the touchstone of national life, it was little wonder if, in face of the danger menacing them, the gentry of the Pale should have thought their only chance of safety lay in a union with the native element. Whether the bond of religion would prove strong enough to withstand the dissolving influences of social and racial differences, it was for the future to decide.

It is significant of that strange antithesis between respect for the letter of the law and indifference to its spirit, which ever and again shows itself in the history of the English rule in Ireland, that, after wresting six entire counties from the Irish by more or less equivocal methods, the Government of James I should have thought it necessary to secure the

assent of Parliament to its proceedings. Still, if it had been merely a question of obtaining a parliamentary confirmation of the plantation, precedents were not wanting from Elizabeth's reign to show that it might have been accomplished without resorting to any methods that went beyond the constitution. But the known intention of the Government to propose fresh measures of penal legislation against the Catholics, and the natural apprehension that the opportunity would be seized to use the plantation for securing a Protestant majority in Parliament, forced the gentry of the Pale into a position of extreme hostility to the Crown, when its intention of exercising its right to create some forty new boroughs became known. In itself there was indeed nothing very outrageous in this exercise of the royal prerogative; and, if some of the newly-created boroughs were hardly to be found on the map, there was in this respect, as James shrewdly remarked, no very great difference between them and many of the older ones. The real objection was of course that they were merely Government pocket-boroughs.

In announcing (November, 1611) the King's intention to summon a Parliament, Chichester, with an appearance of the utmost candour, invited the nobility of the Pale to confer with one another as to the measures they thought necessary to pass for the benefit of the country. This they refused to do, urging their right, according to a doubtful interpretation of a clause in Poynings' Act, to be made acquainted as part of the Council of the realm with the measures intended to be passed in Parliament. But, finding Chichester absolutely determined not to admit their claim and confirmed in their worst anticipations of further penal legislation by the public execution or martyrdom, in February, 1612, of Cornelius O'Devany, Catholic Bishop of Down and Connor, they addressed in November a strong remonstrance to the King. In it they complained that they had not been consulted by the Deputy as the statute required, and that the erection of corporations "consisting of some few and beggarly cottages" could "tend to naught else...but that...penal laws should be imposed upon your subjects." No attention was paid to this protest; and in April, 1613, the elections took place amid great excitement. No sooner had Parliament met on May 18 and a motion to elect Sir John Davis Speaker been made, than the long pent-up storm broke loose. On the ground that Davis, having no residence in county Fermanagh, had been improperly returned as a knight of that shire, the Opposition insisted on scrutinising all elections before proceeding to any other business. But, allowing themselves to be persuaded to nominate a candidate of their own, and letting their choice fall on Sir John Everard, the supporters of Sir John Davis, following English precedent, retired from the chamber to tell their numbers. During their absence the Opposition declared Everard elected and placed him in the chair. Apprised of what had happened, the Government party finding themselves in the majority returned in hot haste, and, having ejected Everard, installed

Davis in his place. Hereupon the Opposition, declining to take further part in the Parliament, withdrew. Their friends in the Upper House made common cause with them; and Chichester, after vainly trying to effect a compromise, yielded to their request to allow them to send a deputation to submit their complaints to the King. In the meantime he prorogued Parliament.

The petition resolved itself into an elaborate attack on Chichester's administration. It was, as James confidentially admitted, a specious document; and, though he was convinced that it was all a piece of jesuitry, yet, inasmuch as he was anxious that his Irish subjects should learn "rather to address themselves to the sovereign by humble petition ...than, after the old fashion of that country to run out, upon every occasion of discontent, to the bog and wood," he thought it advisable to appoint a Commission to investigate their complaints. How far his impartiality extended was seen from his nominating Chichester head of the Commission. It reported on November 12; and on April 20, 1614, James read the Irish deputation a severe lecture on their undutiful and disgraceful behaviour. Their charges against Chichester he pronounced wholly unfounded; and all that, as a matter of grace, he would concede was the temporary disfranchisement of several boroughs, provided the petitioners consented to sign a formal instrument of submission.

But the opposition which he had encountered gave James reason to pause; and when Chichester reopened Parliament in October he was authorised to announce that the Bill against the Jesuits had been withdrawn. The concession worked favourably on the Catholics; and under Sir John Everard's leadership they offered no further resistance to Government. With their support a subsidy Bill was passed in the following session, and there was every prospect that with a little goodwill on both sides a reasonable compromise might have been effected. Unfortunately at this juncture Parliament was dissolved and Chichester recalled.

Where he had failed, there was little reason to expect that either Sir Oliver St John (1616–22), or Lord Falkland (1622–9), would prove more successful, hampered as they were in their anti-Catholic line of policy by having to regulate their conduct according as the wind blew from Spain or in a contrary direction, and by the perennial bankruptcy of the Irish treasury. The time had passed away when the Counter-reformation could be dammed in by shilling fines for non-attendance at church and futile proclamations for the banishment of the Catholic clergy. Such proceedings and the constant rummaging of the land for plantation purposes served only to irritate. Year by year the dissatisfaction grew; and in 1626 it was more than doubtful whether Government could command the majority in Parliament which it had possessed ten years earlier. Anyhow, the experiment was one that Charles preferred, if possible, to avoid. But, with a war with France likely to be added to that with Spain, it was imperative that Ireland, which was openly spoken of as the

back-door to England, should be put in a posture of defence. For this purpose Falkland was authorised (September, 1626) to sound the nobility and gentry as to their willingness, in return for certain valuable concessions, to undertake on behalf of the country to maintain an army of 5000 foot and 500 horse. These concessions, known as the "Graces," were skilfully contrived so as to appeal to the interests of every class in the community and were coupled with the promise of a speedy confirmation by Parliament. To the Catholic landowner in Connaught in particular, whom fear of a plantation kept in a constant state of anxiety, the offer of the Crown to accept sixty years' possession as a bar to all claims came as a special boon. Nevertheless, so general was the repugnance to this extra-parliamentary method of taxation that the agents representing the landed gentry only with the greatest difficulty could be induced (May, 1628) to bind the country to contribute £120,000, to be spread over three years, and to be deducted from whatever subsidies might be granted by Parliament. The contribution began at once; and Falkland in fulfilment of his part of the transaction made preparations for calling a Parliament. But whether Charles deliberately meant to cheat the nation, or whether, as seems more likely, his courage to confront the difficulties of the situation evaporated, time went by, and no Parliament was summoned. In 1629 Falkland was recalled. By reducing the army one-half and by exercising the strictest economy his successors, the Lords Justices Loftus and Cork, managed to spread the contribution over four years. The neglect to call a Parliament was, however, an irreparable blunder, not merely because it rendered such contributions precarious in the future, but chiefly because, by weakening the general confidence in the sincerity of Government, it created a situation of which the Jesuits were not slow to take advantage. Indeed the only interest which the period possesses is that which attaches to the extraordinary progress made in it by Roman Catholicism. The fact is bewailed in nearly every State-paper of the time; but, beyond knocking down a few mass-houses and digging up St Patrick's purgatory, the Lords Justices could suggest no means of counteracting it. Without the courage, and perhaps the will, to take the only step that promised safety they looked on helplessly, while the country drifted into anarchy.

Such was the situation of affairs in January, 1632, when Charles announced the appointment of a new Deputy. More than a year and a half elapsed before Wentworth landed at Ringsend; but his influence had long before then made itself felt in the affairs of the country. With the single object before him of making Ireland a source of strength to the Crown instead of one of weakness, as it had hitherto been, he succeeded, by alternately playing on the fears and hopes of the Catholic party and flattering the loyalty of the Protestants, in obtaining a prolongation of the contribution for two years. Thus he secured for himself breathing-space in which to develop his policy.

Starting with the axiom that a prosperous people is also a loyal people, Wentworth bent all his energies to the development of the natural resources of Ireland. And it must be said for him that, if in trying to accomplish his purpose he spared no one who ventured to oppose him, neither did he spare himself. His eye was everywhere. If the exportation and manufacture of wool had to be discouraged as detrimental to the staple trade of England, he, by way of compensation, personally superintended the development of the linen industry, and insisted on a free export of hides and tallow. He arranged the details of a commercial treaty with Spain, calculated to encourage the fishing industry; he brought over experts to explore the mineral resources of the country; laid down stringent regulations for the preservation of the rapidly disappearing forests; exerted himself to improve the breed of cattle; cleared the narrow seas of the pirates that infested them and rendered commerce insecure; and, by buying out all private interests detrimental to the Crown, succeeded in more than doubling the revenue of the State. Knowing the value of order and decorum in public life, he insisted on a strict observance of Court etiquette; repaired Dublin Castle; cleared out the wine-vaults under Christ Church; and by his own example infused a spirit of emulation in the army which shortly raised it to the highest pitch of efficiency. For the rest, he was content to bide his time. What he could do to realise his friend Laud's wishes in the matter of ecclesiastical uniformity and discipline by pressure on the episcopacy, and to restore dignity to the Church by the recovery of its property, he did. But it was no part of his policy to irritate the Catholics by fining them for non-attendance at church when, as was too often the case, there was no church for them to attend. Doubtless he made many enemies by his policy of "thorough"; but in his struggle with Cork, Wilmot, Mountnorris, Crosby, and the rest, we cannot deny him a certain measure of sympathy. Under his controlling hand Ireland emerged from the state of anarchy into which she had drifted, and, feeling confident of his ability to steer an independent course, he obtained Charles' reluctant consent to risk a Parliament.

The event more than answered his expectations. Parliament met on July 14, 1634. It was the most splendid scene Dublin had ever witnessed. In his opening speech Wentworth announced the King's intention to hold two sessions, the one for himself, the other for the benefit of his subjects. The proposal to separate grievances from supply was agreeable to neither Catholics nor Protestants; but so evenly balanced were they that, as Wentworth put the case, neither party would allow the other to rob it of applying the whole grace of His Majesty's thanks to itself. Hence, when the motion for supply was made, both "did with one voice assent to the giving of six subsidies to be paid in four years." But, if the Commons ever imagined that their loyalty would be rewarded by a candid confirmation of the long-promised Graces, they

were speedily disabused of the idea. There was nothing on which Wentworth depended more for an improvement of the revenue than a new plantation and a strict revision of the old ones. He was therefore determined at any cost to prevent the confirmation of any Grace which threatened to cross his purpose, and particularly of that which accepted sixty years' possession as a bar to all claims on the part of the Crown. To this end he divided the Graces into three classes: viz. those which he thought not fit to be granted, those which might be continued by way of instruction, and those proper to be passed into laws. By neglecting, as by Poynings' Law he was able to do, to transmit any except those in the last class, he transferred all responsibility in the matter from the Crown to himself and the Irish Council.

When Parliament reassembled in November the indignation of the Catholics knew no bounds, and finding themselves accidentally in the majority, they rejected without consideration all and every measure submitted to them. For a moment Wentworth thought of adjourning Parliament; but the Protestants came to his rescue and enabled him to bring the session to a satisfactory conclusion. For the next four years his course was clear; and with characteristic energy he at once took up his plantation project.

Hitherto, however they might have answered their purpose of substituting a British for a native proprietary, the plantations had proved singularly unprofitable to the Crown. Not only had vastly more land, for which they of course paid no rent, been passed to the undertakers than was set out in their patents, but their eager haste to turn their estates to immediate profit had led to such a general breach of the conditions of plantation as constituted a serious danger to the State. So notoriously was this the case in regard to the London Society that in 1632 the Star Chamber had ordered the suspension of its charter and the sequestration of its rents. Though not responsible for this step, Wentworth fully approved it; and, on the confiscation of the Society's Charter in 1635, he suggested the conversion of its estates into an appanage for the Duke of York. But the Londoners were not the only offenders; and, though it was impossible to deal with private individuals in the same drastic fashion without imperilling the whole settlement, the Commission for the remedy of defective titles was admirably contrived to make them pay handsomely for their defaults and at the same time to teach them a salutary lesson for the future. As for the plantations which he intended himself to set on foot in Connaught and elsewhere, though inconsiderable in comparison with those already established, he hoped, by a stricter admeasurement of land and by making estates only *in capite*, to render them not less profitable to the Crown, and by at the same time restricting them to English undertakers, to create a counterpoise to the Scottish settlers in the north. For himself, he was perfectly convinced of the validity of

the Crown's title to the lands he intended to plant; but, wishing to give an air of legality, not to say of beneficence, to his proceedings by eliciting a voluntary recognition from the reputed landowners in question, he was enraged beyond measure when the jurors of Galway county, declining to follow the lead of those of Roscommon, Sligo, and Mayo, refused to find a title for the King. It was a comparatively easy matter to punish them in the Court of Castle Chamber and by an order in the Court of Exchequer to procure a reversal of their verdict; but all this required time, and, before things could again be brought into order, his attention was absorbed by more important matters.

The little cloud which had been gathering over Edinburgh in the summer of 1637 had spread with such alarming rapidity as at the beginning of the following year to cast its shadow over Ireland also. From Scotland the contagion of the Covenant had spread to Ulster, and, faster than either he or his chief ecclesiastical agent, Bishop Bramhall, was aware, the country was slipping out of his control. As the prospect of war between England and Scotland grew more certain, and it became necessary to reckon up his resources, Charles was unreasonably annoyed when reminded that the Irish army barely sufficed to guarantee order in Ireland itself; and, while accepting the Deputy's offer of 500 men to garrison Carlisle, he could not avoid contrasting the scanty help thus furnished him with the recent magnificent promise of the Earl of Antrim to attack Argyll in his own country with 10,000 men. It was ever Charles' misfortune to be unable to look facts fairly in the face; and, finding it impossible to convince him that Antrim's offer was merely intended as a "handsome compliment," Wentworth moved the bulk of the army to Carrickfergus, by way of giving what countenance he could to the project.

The Treaty of Berwick afforded a slight breathing-space; and, the Deputy's quarrel with Lord Chancellor Loftus having brought him to London in September, 1639, Charles eagerly turned to him for advice. Wentworth's remedy was a Parliament. He remembered how, when everybody had predicted failure, he had been splendidly successful in Ireland in 1634. Let Charles follow his example: he was convinced that no Englishman would refuse money for driving the Scots out. To hearten the experiment he would himself hold a Parliament in Ireland; of the result there could be no doubt. How little he knew his own countrymen was soon to appear; but so far as Ireland was concerned his experiment was crowned with success. He returned to Dublin Earl of Strafford. Parliament was already in session. On March 23, 1640, the Commons with one voice voted four subsidies, or £180,000. Never had such a scene of unanimity been witnessed; hats were thrown in the air and assurances given that if more money was wanted more would be forthcoming, even if they left themselves nothing but hose and doublet. Overjoyed at his victory, Strafford, after appointing Sir Christopher

Wandesforde his deputy and leaving instructions with the Earl of Ormonde to add 8000 men to the army, hastened back to England. He had calculated that the example of the Irish Parliament would find imitation in England; he had not considered that the conduct of the English Parliament might cause a reaction in Ireland. But it was no sooner evident that the day of his power was over than the Commons of Ireland joined with their brethren in England to bring the fallen Minister to justice. To Strafford's plea of good government they replied with a remonstrance under fifteen heads, which formed the backbone of his impeachment. For a time the universal hatred with which he was regarded kept them unanimous. Pillar after pillar of the building which he had raised with so much care was thrown to the ground amid general applause. Step by step the country drifted back into the state of anarchy from which he had rescued it. The Nemesis that lies in wait for despotism had overtaken the policy of "thorough." On November 12 Parliament was adjourned to January 26, 1641. During the recess Wandesforde died, and after some wrangling Sir William Parsons and Sir John Borlase were appointed Lords Justices. In Parsons the new settlers had obtained a ruler after their own hearts.

Meanwhile all eyes were directed to the army, which under Strafford's instructions Ormonde had raised to nearly 10,000 men. "You have an army in Ireland you may employ here to reduce this kingdom," Strafford was reported to have advised Charles. Whether "this kingdom" meant England or Scotland might be disputed, but there could be no question as to the deadly insult to public opinion implied in the suggestion. No words can adequately express the loathing and utter abhorrence which the mere suggestion of employing Irish soldiers in England excited in the breasts of Englishmen. To the demand of the English Commons for its instant disbandment Charles returned an absolute refusal. The fact was that the Irish army was beginning to assume a new importance to him, as the idea of playing off the Irish Catholics against the English Parliament took hold of his mind. Granted that he could detach the Scots from their bond with the Parliament, which was his immediate object, it would not, he imagined, be impossible by conceding the Graces and by extending practical toleration to the Catholics to win over the Irish Parliament to his side. Scotland and Ireland conciliated, the Irish army would materially strengthen his hands in dealing with the English Parliament. It was therefore of the utmost importance that it should be kept together. His intentions were suspected, and being driven to consent to the disbandment of the new levies he tried a middle way by issuing warrants for their transportation to Spain.

Curiously enough, this step was strongly opposed by both parties in the Irish Parliament: by the Protestants on the ground that, in case of invasion, it was extremely dangerous to permit so many Irishmen well acquainted with every creek and haven in the kingdom to enter the

Spanish service; by the Catholics on the ground that it was the height of madness to allow so many men to leave the country when its liberties were menaced by English Puritans and Scottish Presbyterians. The difficulty of finding money to pay their arrears caused some delay; but towards the end of July this obstacle was overcome, and the soldiers were already assembling at the ports appointed for their embarkation, when secret instructions arrived from Charles to the Earls of Ormonde and Antrim, requiring them to keep the army together, and if possible to raise its strength to 20,000 men. The message arrived too late; and an express sent to inform the King of the fact found him at York on his way to Scotland. From York the order came to get the men together again and hold them in readiness, if the occasion arose, to declare for the King. The officers in charge of the disbanded soldiers readily fell in with the plan; and steps were taken to sound the gentry of the Pale and the leaders of the old Irish as to their views on the subject.

It was at this point that the plot, if we may so designate a movement authorised by the King, ran into another of quite independent origin. We know now, what no one at the time suspected, that a rebellion had long been brewing in the north, having for its object the recovery of Ulster and ultimately of Ireland for the Irish, and depending for its success on support promised by Owen Roe O'Neill, commanding in the Spanish service in the Low Countries. On him, since definite tidings had arrived of the death of John O'Neill, commonly called the "Conde de Tirone," before Monjuich, the mantle of leader had fallen. Everything had been prepared, and only the opportunity was wanting for a general rising in Ulster. To Rory O'More, Lord Maguire, and the other northern conspirators nothing could therefore have happened more in accordance with their wishes than the chance thus afforded them of accomplishing their own designs under colour of assisting in a quasi-legal plot. It was the cue of the King's party to lie quiet and wait instructions; but, as September drew to a close, a rumour got about that the plot was abandoned, and O'More and Maguire reverted to their old plan.

At a meeting of the conspirators on October 5 the rising was finally fixed for Saturday the 23rd. The rebellion broke out simultaneously all over Ulster on the day appointed. The attempt to capture Dublin failed. Derry, Coleraine, Lisburn, Carrickfergus, Enniskillen escaped; but Dungannon, Charlemont, and Newry were captured by the rebels. There was no general massacre; but everywhere the colonists were turned out of house and home, stripped of their possessions, and too often left without a rag to cover their nakedness. Large numbers perished of cold, hunger, and ill-treatment; and many, there is no doubt, were butchered in cold blood; but the great majority managed to escape.

The Rebellion took everyone by surprise, none more so than the quondam allies of Maguire and O'More. Charles, whose conscience may perhaps have reproached him for his share in the mischief, and who was

really alarmed when he heard that the rebels were pretending to act by his authority, was the first to insist on active measures being taken for their suppression. And, indeed, had Government shown a firm hand, the rebellion might easily have been confined to Ulster. Munster, Connaught, and Leinster showed at first no signs of rising. The Catholic gentry of the Pale, though ready enough to countenance any *coup d'état* which promised to secure them a practical toleration of their religion, together with a recognition of their proper position in the State, were by no means anxious to throw themselves into a movement which seemed likely to be attended with little advantage to themselves and which was already discredited by its barbarity. Even in Ulster itself the ease with which the colonists, after they had recovered from their first surprise, were able to hold their own, was evidence enough that with a little courage the rebellion might have been crushed in its beginning. Unfortunately the Government was not prepared to act vigorously. The Lords Justices, who had saved themselves as it were by a miracle, seemed to have lost their senses entirely. Their first impulse to trust the Catholic gentry by providing them with arms to defend themselves yielded to an ill-defined dread lest they might thereby be arming their enemies. They could think of no action beyond putting Dublin in a state of defence, concentrating all the available troops in the neighbourhood, laying waste the districts around, and husbanding their resources until their piteous appeals for help from England were answered. Judging from their conduct it might have seemed as if they were rather anxious than otherwise to force a general insurrection. This at any rate was its effect. For, finding themselves so utterly distrusted and unable to maintain a position of neutrality, the gentry of the Pale, impelled by their fears and encouraged by the defeat of a small force detached for the relief of Drogheda and the apparent impossibility of that town holding out against the forces investing it, finally, in December, threw in their lot with the northern rebels. In announcing the fact to their friends in England, the Lords Justices warned them against attaching too much importance to what they called the defection of "seven Lords of the Pale." For, though it might seem to add some reputation to the rebels, they who knew that their tenants and followers had long before gone over to the rebels knew that it added no real strength to them. This point they desired to emphasise, lest the State might be misled into consenting to conditions injurious to His Majesty, when on the contrary "their discovering of themselves now will render advantage to His Majesty.....and those great counties of Leinster, Ulster, and the Pale now lie the more open to His Majesty's free disposal and to a general settlement of peace and religion by introducing of English." As the event proved, the Lords Justices erred greatly in their forecast of the probable consequences of the defection of the Pale; but their suggestion of a new plantation did not miss its calculated effect.

Meanwhile the rebellion had been seriously occupying the attention of all parties in England. On the main point all were of one opinion; and, had it been simply a question between England and Ireland, money and men would have been speedily forthcoming to gratify the national desire for revenge. In the first flush of its wrath, the House of Commons voted that 10,000 foot and 2000 horse should forthwith be raised for its suppression and that the offer of Scottish assistance should be accepted. Gradually cooler counsels prevailed. The more the leaders of the parliamentary party came to know of Charles' intrigues, the more they were convinced that the Irish rebellion was only part of the general problem they were trying to solve. To place a victorious army in Charles' hands was merely to fashion an instrument for their own destruction: until security was obtained on this point nothing of importance could be done. Towards the end of December Sir Simon Harcourt arrived at Dublin with 1500 men; in February, 1642, Sir Richard Grenville brought 1500 foot and 400 horse to the relief of the President of Munster; in April Robert Munro reached Carrickfergus with 2500 Scots. These forces, and a contribution of £37,000, were the whole of the aid furnished to the Government of Ireland during the first six months of the Rebellion. Meanwhile, however, no opportunity was neglected of exasperating public opinion against the Irish, so as to render a reconciliation between them and Charles impossible. On December 8, 1641, it was resolved that the King should be asked to declare that he would never consent to a toleration of the popish religion in Ireland. On February 24 following, the Lords and Commons voted that, as several million acres of "profitable lands" in Ireland were calculated to have been rendered liable to confiscation by the Rebellion, the proposal of "divers worthy and well-affected persons" should be accepted for raising £1,000,000 by the sale of "two millions and a half of these acres, to be equally taken out of the four provinces of that kingdom" in the proportion for each adventure of £200, £300, £450, and £600 of one thousand acres in Ulster, Connaught, Munster, and Leinster respectively. On March 19 Charles was forced to give his consent to this atrocious scheme of national robbery. With these two Acts the English Parliament closed the door against any hope of reconciliation.

In Ireland, matters were not progressing favourably for the rebels. In March their lack of artillery compelled them to raise the siege of Drogheda; a month later the Earl of Ormonde inflicted a crushing defeat on them at Kilrush; in May they were driven out of Newry. These and other disasters, though in a measure counterbalanced by the rapid extension of the rebellion, did not fail to exercise a depressing influence on the gentry of the Pale; and after the retreat of the northern rebels from Drogheda they made a desperate effort to extract themselves from the critical position into which their fears had driven them. But the Lords Justices, whom success and the prospect

of confiscation rendered pitiless, not only rejected every overture for a compromise, but endeavoured by every means within their power to prevent any such offers from reaching the King. Orders were issued that no quarter should be given to any rebel found in arms, and that the commanders of garrisons should not grant protection to the Irish, or enter into any treaty with them on any pretext whatever, but prosecute them from place to place with fire and sword.

Finding the door of mercy thus resolutely closed upon them and the Government bent on a war of extirpation, the gentry of the Pale took steps in May to organise their resistance by appointing a Supreme Council of Nine to act as a provisional government, pending the meeting of a General Assembly to represent the nation at Kilkenny. Help for them was already on the way. In July Owen Roe O'Neill arrived in Lough Swilly with a hundred veterans and considerable supplies of arms and ammunition, and almost at the same time Thomas Preston and five hundred men with artillery and other stores of war landed at Wexford. With their arrival the rebellion passed out of the stage of sporadic insurrection into that of regular warfare. On October 24, the day after the battle of Edgehill, the General Assembly of the Confederated Catholics met at Kilkenny. It was virtually a parliament of the Irish nation. But, regarding themselves as a merely provisional assembly brought together under exceptional circumstances to devise means for protecting themselves until His Majesty could take measures for their preservation, the Confederates confined themselves to providing for the administration of justice, the assessment of taxes, and the organisation of their military strength. The Supreme Council was reconstituted to consist of twenty-four members, of whom twelve were to reside constantly at Kilkenny, or wherever they should judge most expedient, to form a central and permanent government for the management of all affairs civil and military. For the administration of local justice and carrying out the behests of the Supreme Council, each county was provided with a separate Council consisting of one or two deputies from each barony, and each province with a provincial Council consisting of two deputies out of each county. For military purposes each province was assigned its own army under its own chief commander—O'Neill in Ulster, Preston in Leinster, Garret Barry in Munster, and John Bourke in Connaught. The form of government having been thus settled and agents appointed to plead their cause at the principal Courts in Europe, the General Assembly addressed two petitions, the one to the King, explaining the reasons which had forced them to take up arms, protesting their loyalty, and requesting permission to submit their grievances to him; the other to the Queen, entreating her intercession with the King.

To Charles it would have been extremely satisfactory, if by coming to terms with the Confederates he could have set free his army in Ireland to fight his battles in England. The obstacles to such an agreement

appeared, however, insuperable. For quite apart from the fact that the Confederates were not likely to recede from their demands for civil and religious liberty, any attempt to come to terms with the "Irish murderers" was sure to raise a storm in England and dash his hopes of raising a party in Scotland. Nevertheless, the deplorable condition of the royal forces in Ireland justified him in pleading military necessity for trying to obtain a cessation of arms. Influenced by these considerations, he authorised Ormonde on January 11, 1643, to sound the Confederates as to the precise nature of their demands, at the same time, however, privately warning him that he could on no account consent to a legislated toleration of the Roman Catholic religion, or to any claim for parliamentary independence, such as a repeal of Poynings' Law implied.

When the commission was opened at the Council Board, Parsons and others strenuously opposed the proposal to treat, and, the Confederates taking exception to the terms of the letter requiring them to appoint agents to submit their grievances, the Lords Justices, in the hope of breaking off the negotiations, managed with difficulty to get 1500 men in marching order. This force they proposed to entrust to the command of Lord Lisle; but Ormonde, who was tired of submitting to their dictation in military matters, insisted on commanding himself. On March 18 he won a complete victory over Preston at Ross; but owing to lack of provisions was compelled to return to Dublin without reaping the fruits of his success. Meanwhile the Confederates had reconsidered their position; and on the day before the battle they handed in a statement of their grievances to the commissioners appointed to receive them. Their demand for a new Parliament and religious toleration afforded little prospect of a settlement. Quite apart from the opposition of men like Parsons, it was generally felt that the concession of a free Parliament at that time would imperil the entire English interest in the country. Nevertheless, it was clear to any but the blindest partisan that, with the army on the verge of mutiny and without a penny in the treasury, nothing but a cessation of hostilities could save the situation.

After his defeat at Ross Preston had rallied his forces, and in May managed to capture Ballynakill. On June 4 Castlehaven inflicted a crushing defeat on Sir Charles Vavasour in Munster, and a fortnight later Galway Castle capitulated to Colonel Bourke. Against these successes the Confederates had to set the defeat of Owen O'Neill by Sir Robert Stewart at Clones; but Stewart had been unable to improve his victory, and a week or two later O'Neill was as strong as ever. Each day added to the difficulties of Ormonde's position. In April Charles had written again, insisting on a cessation, and Ormonde once more opened negotiations for a truce. But the Confederates, who were fully alive to the strength of their position, persisted in their demand for a new Parliament and for a thorough investigation of their grievances. Unable

to offer them any guarantee on these points, Ormonde once more appealed to the sword. This time, however, Preston avoided giving battle; and Ormonde, having convinced himself that there was nothing for it but a cessation, availed himself of new orders that had reached him from Charles in July to reopen negotiations. The attachment of Parsons and other prominent councillors of his faction about the same time on a general charge of obstructing the King's service rendered his task easier; and on September 15 a cessation for twelve months was concluded in order to enable the Confederates to submit their case personally to Charles, and, as it was hoped, to arrange a permanent settlement with him.

But, since the cessation had not been effected without considerable friction among the Confederates themselves, and, as Carte candidly admits, "more out of a sense of duty than policy," so, no sooner was it proclaimed than it was at once denounced by the adherents of the Parliament. The report of it greatly injured the Royalist cause; but it enabled Charles to accomplish his immediate purpose of setting free part of his army in Ireland. By the beginning of November four regiments had arrived at Bristol from Munster, and more were ready to follow as soon as Lord Inchiquin could find means to transport them. In the same month 2000 men under Sir Michael Ernely landed in Flintshire to form the nucleus of a small army under Lord Byron. But the assistance had been dearly purchased. On January 25, 1644, Byron was defeated and his army routed by Sir Thomas Fairfax at Nantwich. It was hard for Charles to find his hopes thus dashed; but it was harder still to see these same "Irish Papists," for whom he had drawn upon himself the odium of his own subjects, enlisting, after their defeat, in the service of his enemies. The Irish danger had been averted; but Parliament was keenly alive to the necessity of preventing such expeditions in the future by furnishing Ormonde with sufficient occupation at home. While, therefore, a Scottish army under the Earl of Leven prepared to invade England to assist the Parliament, messengers were despatched to Ulster to assure Munro and the northern commanders of the speedy arrival of money and provisions, and to promote a general engagement to the Covenant. Strange to say, Munro's refusal to recognise the cessation was not distasteful to Charles, who calculated, not without reason, that it would prevent any help from that quarter reaching Leven. Moreover he was not without hope that, if Antrim succeeded in transporting, as he professed himself able to do, 2000 redshanks into Scotland to cooperate with Montrose, Leven might speedily find himself recalled. Hitherto Antrim had not proved very deserving of confidence; but in July he actually managed, with Ormonde's assistance, to land 1600 men in Scotland, where under the leadership of Alaster MacDonnell they not a little contributed to Montrose's success.

Meanwhile the agents appointed by the Confederates to arrange the

terms of a settlement with Charles had arrived at Oxford in March. Conscious of their improved position, they insisted on the repeal of all penal laws against the Catholics, the abrogation of all acts and ordinances of the Irish Parliament since August 7, 1641, the summoning of a freely elected Parliament, and a general Act of Oblivion. These terms granted, they bound themselves to furnish him with 10,000 men, and to expose their lives and fortunes in his service. But, tempting as the offer was, it was impossible for Charles to consent to its conditions without forfeiting the support of his own followers. In his dilemma he referred the matter back again to Ormonde. But unfortunately, at the very moment when it behoved him to strengthen the hands of his much-tried Deputy by every means within his power, he had the inconceivable folly to add immeasurably to his difficulties by refusing the well-grounded request of Inchiquin for the Presidency of Munster. In his wrath Inchiquin openly declared for the Parliament in August. The necessity of coming to terms, and that speedily, with the Confederates was more pressing than ever. But it was with a heavy heart and little hope of success that Ormonde reopened negotiations in September, only to break them off a week or two later owing to his inability to satisfy the Catholic demands without sacrificing the Protestant interests. He asked to be relieved of his post; but Charles knew his worth too well to accede to his request. At the same time, however, recognising that he was hardly the right instrument to carry out his crooked policy, he yielded so far as to appoint the Earl of Glamorgan, whom he had already designated to command the Irish levies, to assist him in negotiating with the Catholics.

Various circumstances prevented Glamorgan from reaching Ireland before the beginning of August. In the meantime fresh instructions reached Ormonde, authorising him to conclude a peace, and if necessary to concede the demand for the repeal of the penal laws and the suspension of Poynings' Act. Armed with these new powers Ormonde reopened negotiations with the Confederates in April, 1645, but only to find that, under the influence of the papal agent Scarampi and the clerical party, they had added to their demands another for the retention of all such churches, chapels, and abbeys as were then in their possession. Exasperated beyond measure at this new demand, Charles declared that rather than consent to it he would withdraw his army from Ireland, whatever hazard that kingdom might run by it.

Affairs were in this critical position when Glamorgan arrived with a commission authorising him to treat directly with the Confederates, but couched in such curious terms and conferring on him such extraordinary powers as raised strong, but apparently unfounded, doubts of its genuineness. Finding on his arrival that the only hindrance to the conclusion of the treaty was the newly raised question of the churches, and being determined to secure at all costs the military support, which was to be the price of the bargain, Glamorgan persuaded the Confederate

commissioners to embody their demand in a secret article, to which, on the strength of his commission, he pledged the King's conditional assent. Matters being thus smoothed over in a way unknown to Ormonde, the public treaty, as it must now be called, made rapid progress; and, the Assembly having voted the 10,000 men, Glamorgan was delighted with the success of his plan, when an accident put a sudden end to his hopes. On October 17, in an attempt to recover Sligo, the Irish were defeated with heavy loss by Sir Charles Coote. Among those killed in the battle was the warlike Bishop of Tuam, Malachias Quaelly or Keely. In his pocket was found a copy of the Glamorgan Treaty. Its subsequent publication by the Parliament caused a profound sensation, and did more than anything else to ruin the King's cause. But, even before his intrigues had come to light, Glamorgan had encountered a new and unexpected obstacle in the person of Giovanni Battista Rinuccini, recently appointed Legate by Pope Innocent X. Hitherto, under the restraining influence of Innocent's predecessor, Urban VIII, clerical influence had made itself little felt in the counsels of the Confederates; but after the arrival of Rinuccini at Kilkenny on November 12, with a considerable supply of money and ammunition, the clerical party began rapidly to gain the upper hand. Naturally, he had to be made acquainted with the secret treaty, and, being from the first more intent on promoting the papal than the royal cause, he made no secret of his dislike to the conditions attached to it. However, at an interview with him on December 20 Glamorgan, by pledging the King's conditional assent to the appointment of a Catholic Viceroy and the admission of the Catholic Bishops to sit in Parliament, succeeded in winning from him a reluctant consent to his scheme.

Glad to have overcome this difficulty, Glamorgan hastened to Dublin to get things in readiness for transporting his men, when, in consequence of his secret treaty having come to light, he was arrested at the instance of Lord Digby. His arrest spread consternation among the Confederates. None of them questioned his *bona fides*, and, in consequence of their strong remonstrance, coupled with a threat of renewing the war, Ormonde consented to release him on bail on January 21, 1646. Returning to Kilkenny, he endeavoured by every means within his power to bring the treaty to a conclusion; but, now that his disavowal by the King was known, Rinuccini absolutely refused to abate one jot of his demand for a confirmation of the concessions in the secret treaty before he would agree to the conclusion of the peace, professing to have information of a treaty in progress between the Pope and Sir Kenelm Digby on behalf of the Queen, containing more favourable terms even than the secret treaty.

On the other hand, the majority of the Supreme Council were anxious to conclude the peace on the basis of the agreement with Ormonde, leaving further concessions, on the guarantee given by Glamorgan, to Charles' generosity. The time, they urged, had nearly passed when

their assistance could be of any service to him; and their own position was suffering in consequence of the delay. Accordingly, after a long and stormy debate, Articles of Peace, containing many valuable concessions, but leaving the question of religion to the King's decision, were signed on March 28. In deference to the Nuncio it was agreed to postpone its proclamation till May 1, in order to afford him time to obtain a copy of the pretended papal treaty, but in the meantime to despatch the long delayed assistance to the King with all possible speed.

Unfortunately, the opportunity for this had passed away. By the end of spring every available sea-port along the western coast of England was in the hands of the Parliament. The collapse of the King's cause in England and the activity of the parliamentary party in Ireland, especially in Connaught, brought forcibly home to the Confederates the necessity of immediate and united action, if their own cause was to avoid a similar fate. Accordingly, nothing having been heard of the papal treaty, and Ormonde refusing absolutely to sanction Glamorgan's, the Supreme Council passed a resolution authorising the ratification and publication of the peace. The resolution had been carried in face of the fiercest opposition of the Nuncio. Outvoted in the Council, Rinuccini, after entering a formal protest against the resolution, summoned Owen O'Neill to his support. His messenger found that general in the full flush of victory, having on June 5 almost annihilated the Scottish army under Munro at Benburb. It was the only great success that the Confederate arms had achieved, and its consequences might have been even more important than they were, had O'Neill been allowed to carry out his intention of attacking the Scots in their own quarters. Recalled from his pursuit of them, he gave instant obedience to Rinuccini's summons; while the Legate, relying on his support, convoked a meeting of the clergy to Waterford, where on August 12 a resolution was passed condemning the peace and forbidding its proclamation under pain of excommunication. The Supreme Council was powerless to resist him; and, though the peace was proclaimed at Dublin and Kilkenny, it was everywhere else rejected. On September 18 Rinuccini entered Kilkenny in triumph, and, having caused his opponents to be arrested, he appointed a new Council, consisting of his own immediate followers, with himself as President, pending the election of a new General Assembly. It was a most successful *coup d'état*, and Rinuccini could with reason boast that under his leadership the much despised clergy of Ireland had as it were in the twinkling of an eye made themselves masters of the kingdom. His victory ruined the national cause.

For the moment, however, he was master of the situation, and he at once turned his attention to the capture of Dublin. It was late in the year to begin operations; but, having effected a reconciliation between Preston and O'Neill, whose mutual jealousy had constantly weakened the Confederates, he determined to make the attempt, and in November sat

down before the city with 16,000 foot and 1600 horse. Believing himself unable to offer any successful resistance, Ormonde had already in September made overtures to hand over the city to the Parliament; and, shortly after the siege had begun, commissioners arrived to arrange the terms of its surrender. Influenced, however, by reports of fresh dissensions in the camp of the Confederates and of their being prevented by the bad weather from pursuing the siege with vigour, he plucked up courage to reject the terms offered by Parliament. But his confidence was short-lived, and in February, 1647, he renewed his offer to surrender on the terms formerly granted him.

Several months elapsed before the negotiations were completed, and it was not till July 28 that he formally handed over the sword of State to the Commissioners appointed by Parliament to receive it. Aroused to a sense of their danger, the Irish exerted themselves to recover the advantage of which their dissensions had robbed them; and, O'Neill having withdrawn with his army to Connaught, Preston prepared to resume operations against Dublin by breaking down the girdle of fortified places surrounding it. But it was too late. Michael Jones, to whom the defence of Dublin had been committed, had lost no time in restoring confidence and discipline to his troops, and in strengthening his position by opening up communication with Sir Henry Tichborne at Drogheda. At the beginning of August, hearing that Preston was trying to capture Trim, he sallied forth with the united garrisons of Dublin and Drogheda for the purpose of forcing a battle. Compelled by Jones' approach to change his plans, Preston endeavoured by a flank movement to cut off his communications with Dublin. The two armies met at Dangan Hill, a few miles south-east of Trim. The advantage of position lay with Preston, but Jones was superior in cavalry, and it was the cavalry that decided the day. In the battle that followed (August 8) Preston was completely defeated and his army almost exterminated, with the loss of all his artillery. Through the intervention of O'Neill, Jones was prevented from reaping the full fruits of his victory, but its effect was tremendous. Disaster followed quickly on disaster. Inchiquin, whom Castlehaven and his own necessities had long kept inactive, had at last been able to assume the offensive. By the end of August he had recovered the greater part of Munster; on September 13 he stormed the rock of Cashel, putting the garrison and many of the inhabitants to the sword with a savagery that has handed down his name to the execration of posterity; on November 13 he routed and almost destroyed the Confederate army under Lord Taaffe at Knockninoss near Mallow; and by the end of the year his light cavalry had swept the country almost to the very walls of Kilkenny. Nor was this the sum of the Confederates' misfortunes. In July Parliament appointed Monk commander of all the forces in Ulster with the exception of the Scottish regiments under Munro. Though hampered in his action by lack of provisions, his presence served to stiffen resistance there; and by

the beginning of October he was able to hold out a helping-hand to Jones.

North, south, and east, the Confederates had lost ground. Under the influence of these losses the moderate party among them recovered their authority, and, being readmitted to their places in the Supreme Council, they insisted on appointing commissioners to proceed to Paris to arrange the terms of a treaty of peace with the Queen, and at the same time to invite the Prince of Wales to Ireland. They could not have chosen a more propitious time for their purpose, in view of the wide-spread dissatisfaction created by the breach between the Parliament and the army, and of the opportunity which it furnished for an alliance between the Royalists and the Presbyterians against their common enemy, the Independents. Among the first to take the alarm was Inchiquin, who after carefully sounding Ormonde in the matter openly declared for the King in April, 1648. A month later he succeeded, in spite of the opposition of the Nuncio, and the general abhorrence with which he was regarded by the Irish, in concluding a cessation with the Confederates. The ground being thus prepared for a Catholic-Royalist alliance, Ormonde returned to Ireland early in October, and on January 17, 1649, a treaty was signed at Kilkenny on the basis of the Peace of 1646, whereby the Irish were secured in the free exercise of their religion and the independence of their Parliament, and in return for which they agreed to furnish Ormonde with 15,000 foot and 500 horse. As was to be expected, Rinuccini opposed the peace with all his might, but his period of power was over, and in February he quitted Ireland.

To Ormonde the prospect seemed brighter than ever before, and he sent a pressing message to the Prince of Wales to put himself at their head. Even the execution of Charles served rather to improve the situation than otherwise. For though nothing could shake the fidelity of Jones, or Monck, or Coote, the "old Scots" in Ulster declared for Charles II, and, after they had managed to surprise Carrickfergus and Belfast, Monck was driven to seek refuge in Dundalk, and, after the surrender of that place to Inchiquin in July, to retire to England. Want of provisions prevented O'Neill from opposing; and Jones, deprived of Inchiquin's support, was obliged to confine himself to defensive operations. Dublin, Drogheda, and Derry alone held out. Towards the end of January Rupert appeared before Kinsale with eight vessels. Nothing but one determined effort was, it seemed, wanting to win the whole of Ireland. But appearances were delusive. The country was exhausted; provisions of all sorts were scarce; money was nowhere to be got; O'Neill's attitude was at best doubtful; the loyalty of Inchiquin's army uncertain; the fleet under Rupert, owing to his jealousy of Ormonde, useless. Still, the situation was beyond all question really critical.

Believing it to be such, Cromwell on March 30 definitely accepted the command of the army destined for Ireland, and, pending the conclusion

of his preparations, despatched 2000 men to reinforce the garrison of Dublin. It was June before Ormonde could take the field with about 6000 foot and 2000 horse. Marching on Dublin, he took up his position between Castleknock and Finglas, while Inchiquin with a considerable force advanced against Drogheda. Before the end of the month Drogheda surrendered, and shortly afterwards Dundalk, Trim, Newry, and Carlingford.

Ormonde had now about 7000 foot and 4000 horse; and he determined to push his lines closer up to the city in the direction of Baggotrath, with the intention of cutting off Jones' foraging grounds. While thus engaged, and having unfortunately sent Inchiquin with a considerable force to Munster on a report that Cromwell intended to land there, he was suddenly attacked at Rathmines by Jones on August 2. His army was completely routed, with the loss of 1800 prisoners, all his military stores and artillery, and his money-chest.

The battle of Rathmines decided the issue of the war. When Cromwell landed at Dublin a fortnight later with 8000 foot and 4000 horse Ormonde could oppose to him nothing but the shadow of an army. Recognising that neither he nor the Commissioners of Trust, acting for the Confederates, could put another army in the field, and that the sole hope of resistance rested with O'Neill and the garrisoned towns, he threw 2300 of his best troops under the command of Sir Arthur Aston into Drogheda, and opened negotiations for a reconciliation with O'Neill. But the time when cooperation could be of use had passed away. Himself stricken down by a fatal disease and hardly able to support his own army, O'Neill, though expressing his willingness to come to his assistance and actually sending him 3000 men under his nephew Hugh O'Neill, could do no more. On November 6 he died at Cloughoughter in county Cavan. Left to himself, Ormonde could only look on in helpless inactivity. On September 3 Cromwell appeared before Drogheda with 10,000 men. A week later he stormed the town, and put to the sword the whole garrison and not a few civilians, including every priest on whom he could lay his hands, in all about 2800 persons. "I am persuaded," he wrote, "that this is a righteous judgment of God upon those barbarous wretches who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood, and that it will tend to prevent the effusion of blood for the future, which are the satisfactory grounds to such actions, which otherwise cannot but work remorse and regret." As a matter of fact the sack of Drogheda, however it may be excused by the laws of war, was a most useless and unjustifiable measure—useless, because after the first terror had passed away it did not serve to weaken the resistance of a single garrison, and unjustifiable, because not one man of the garrison had in all likelihood been concerned in the "massacre." But that Cromwell could in all sincerity urge the "massacre" as a justification of his proceeding only shows how successful

the propaganda carried on for the last eight years by such men as Parsons, Jones, and Temple, supported by an unscrupulous press in England, had been in misleading public opinion as to the real facts of the case. For the moment, however, the terror inspired by the fate of Drogheda was indescribable. Dundalk and Trim were deserted by their garrisons. Wexford, with a better chance of resistance, was betrayed and shared the fate of Drogheda, while New Ross capitulated without a blow. But Duncannon and Waterford successfully defied the besiegers; and, with an army sadly diminished by dysentery and fever, it might have fared hard with Cromwell, had not the revolt of Inchiquin's army and the Munster garrisons at this juncture, besides providing him with safe winter-quarters and the means of recruiting his forces, broken down Ormonde's strongest line of defence. As Ormonde's ability to offer an effectual resistance declined, so likewise did his authority. In December, a meeting of the Catholic clergy at Clonmacnoise published a manifesto calling on the nation, whether old English or old Irish, new English or Scots, to unite against the common enemy in defence of their religion, lives, and fortunes. As threatening a prolongation of the war, the manifesto greatly angered Cromwell, and so soon as the weather permitted he marched against Kilkenny in the hope of crushing the Confederacy in its stronghold. But Kilkenny, plague-stricken though it was, offered a more stubborn resistance than he expected, and it was only after conceding terms, which he had hitherto denied, that he got possession of it. Against Clonmel, where Hugh O'Neill had entrenched himself with 1200 men, he was even less successful. An ineffectual attempt to storm the place cost him 2000 men; and, when in the end it capitulated on May 10, 1650, it was only to find that O'Neill and the garrison had made good their escape. A fortnight later Cromwell quitted Ireland, leaving the work of further conquest to his son-in-law Ireton. Though the end was no longer doubtful, Ireland had still two years of bloodshed to pass through before she collapsed. During the summer Ireton captured Carlow, Waterford, and Duncannon, while Coote and Venables were successfully breaking down the Scoto-Irish combination in Ulster. On June 21 the last remnant of Owen O'Neill's once formidable army, under the command of the Bishop of Clogher, Ever MacMahon, was cut to pieces at Scariffholis, near Letterkenny, and a week or two later the last outstanding fortress of Charlemont was surrendered by Sir Phelim O'Neill. Limerick, Galway, and Athlone alone remained. On October 6 Ireton sat down before Limerick; but, recognising that the season was too far advanced for regular siege operations, he shortly afterwards retired into winter-quarters. Meanwhile, the clerical reaction that had shown itself in the Clonmacnoise manifesto was gaining ground among the Irish. Though still in a measure possessing the confidence of the Confederates, as represented by the Commissioners of Trust, Ormonde, especially since the disavowal by Charles II of the Peace of 1649, had

ceased to exercise any practical influence on the course of events. And it scarcely needed the formal demand addressed to him by the clergy on August 10, that he should surrender his authority into hands more worthy of the confidence of the nation, to induce him to retire from a position which had long been hateful to him. Accordingly, having transferred his powers to the Earl of Clanricarde, he quitted Ireland on December 11. For a moment an offer of assistance from the vainglorious Duke Charles of Lorraine shed a ray of light through the gathering gloom; but the conditions attached to it, though acceptable to the clerical party as represented by the Bishop of Ferns and Sir Nicholas Plunkett, were indignantly rejected by Clanricarde as "a total transferring of the crown from His Majesty to a foreign Prince."

It was late in the following year before Ireton took the field. Having forced the passage of the Shannon in the face of Castlehaven, he formally summoned Limerick on June 3. Nearly five months, however, elapsed before the city, worn out by famine and pestilence, capitulated. As the garrison marched out it was noted by Ludlow that two of the soldiers fell down dead of the plague in the ranks. Ireton himself caught the infection, and died on November 26, leaving Ludlow to finish the work of conquest. Meanwhile, Athlone had surrendered to Coote on June 18. At the beginning of 1652 Galway and a few isolated garrisons alone held out. Galway capitulated to Coote in April, on terms which the Parliamentary Commissioners refused to ratify. But the country was by no means conquered. Everywhere considerable bands of soldiers, amounting together to several thousands, with whom the soldiers of the Commonwealth had difficulty in coping, carried on an exasperating guerrilla warfare. Cromwell's decree of no pardon had long ago been given up; but all the same it seemed as if the war would never come to an end. The cost of maintaining the army was becoming unbearable and the Adventurers were clamouring for a speedy settlement of their claims. Urged by these considerations, the Commissioners of Parliament held out offers of more favourable treatment as an inducement to submit. On May 12 terms were concluded with the Earl of Westmeath on behalf of his Irish forces in Leinster, permitting him and his men, with the exception of such as had been guilty of murder, to transport themselves abroad into any country at amity with the Commonwealth. These terms, known as the Articles of Kilkenny, furnished the basis for further surrenders. During the summer one leader after another submitted; and when Fleetwood arrived in September most of the Irish had laid down their arms. No fewer, it was calculated, than 34,000 Irish soldiers took the opportunity thus given them to quit the country. A large number still remained, insufficient indeed to offer any effectual opposition, but sufficient to frustrate any scheme for the extirpation of the nation.

The settlement of Ireland could now begin; and no man could have

been found better qualified to carry it into execution than Fleetwood, by reason of his profound belief in the efficacy of the plantation policy to secure the permanent settlement of Ireland and the safety of England. Two great Acts of State furnished the ground-plan of what is called the Cromwellian Settlement, viz., first, the Act of March 19, 1642, for raising £1,000,000 on the security of two and a half million acres of Irish land, together with certain subsequent Acts and Ordinances, commonly called the "Acts of Subscription," and, secondly, an Act passed on August 12, 1652, called an "Act for the settling of Ireland." By the Act of 1642 it had been assumed that two and a half million acres of land had been forfeited by the Rebellion; by the Act of 1652 measures were taken to realise the assumption contained in the former Act. To this end all Irishmen—old Irish, Anglo-Irish and Scoto-Irish—who could not prove their innocence and good affection to the Commonwealth of England were taken to have been guilty either as actors or abettors in the Rebellion, and were to be punished either by loss of life and property or of property alone (wholly or partially) according to the degree of their guilt. To determine the cases of those who were to lose their lives a High Court of Justice was immediately established. But that property was the main thing aimed at is evident from a clause of the Act exempting all labourers, ploughmen, and landless men generally from the consequences of the Rebellion provided that they had not been guilty of murder and submitted at once. A fund of land having been thus, as it were, provided for the liquidation of the debts incurred in the suppression of the Rebellion, and Commissioners having been appointed to survey the forfeited lands, the next step was to settle their distribution. To this end an Act called the "Act of Satisfaction" was passed on September 26, 1653. For the purposes of the Act Ireland was regarded as divided into two portions—the one comprising the province of Connaught, including county Clare, the other the three other provinces—the former to meet all claims arising on the part of such Irish proprietors as should manage to save any part of their lands in any part of the kingdom; and the latter for the satisfaction of the Adventurers, soldiers, and other creditors. As Connaught was to be wholly Irish, so the five counties of Kildare, Dublin, Carlow, Wicklow, and Wexford were to be formed into a new English Pale, from which all Irish were to be excluded. Ten counties, viz., Waterford, Limerick, Tipperary, Queen's and King's counties, Meath, Westmeath, Armagh, Down, and Antrim (to which were added as a sort of reserve in case of deficiency Louth, part of Cork and Fermanagh, together with a belt of land round Connaught), were put aside to answer the claims of the Adventurers and the army, which since June 5, 1649, had been engaged in the actual conquest of Ireland. The remainder (excluding Dublin, Carlow, Kildare, or the greater portion of these counties, and a moiety of county Cork, together with all walled towns and ecclesiastical lands, which the State

reserved for itself) was assigned to answer all other debts, including the arrears due to the parliamentary armies in England and Ireland prior to June 5, 1649, commonly called the "English" and "'49 arrears" respectively.

The ground-plan of the settlement having been thus laid preparations were made to put it in execution. For this purpose the lands designed for the new settlers had first of all to be cleared of their old owners. The first step in this direction had already been taken by an Order issued on July 2, requiring all Irish proprietors to transplant themselves and their families to Connaught before May 1, 1654, and afterwards, on October 14 (such at least seems to have been the interpretation generally adopted), extended to all Irishmen without exception.

When May 1 came it was found that 1589 certificates, representing 43,308 individuals, had been lodged with the Commissioners at Loughrea, appointed to assign lands in Connaught; but of a general transplantation there was not the faintest sign. For a moment it seemed as if the transplantation policy would undergo modification. But in the end the views of Fleetwood and the military party prevailed. On November 30 a fresh Declaration was published requiring all transplantable persons to betake themselves to Connaught before March 1, 1655, under pain of death. This time, so far as the proprietors were concerned, the Order did not remain a dead letter. During the winter hundreds of families removed into Connaught. But nothing could induce the natives as a body to move. A few were hanged as an example; multitudes—men, women, and children—were, under the pretext of vagrancy, shipped off to Barbados and elsewhere. But it was all to no purpose. Self-interest and humanity urged the abandonment of a policy that was turning Ireland into a wilderness and leaving it a prey to the wolf and the Tory. Meanwhile the necessity for a speedy settlement had become imperative. The debt to the army was alarming. There had been a slight disbandment and a partial settlement of "'49 arrears" in 1653, for which purpose Leitrim had been withdrawn from the lands assigned to the Irish; but there were still more than 30,000 men in pay. To add to the difficulties of the situation, it was found that the land at the disposal of the State was insufficient to answer all obligations. To remedy this deficiency, the army consented to the rates at which the lands were to be calculated being raised; a new and more accurate survey, known as the Down Survey, under the direction of Dr William Petty was ordered; and further lands in Connaught were added to the general fund. Meanwhile the army was put in possession of the rents accruing from the lands assigned for its satisfaction. In September, 1655, the first great disbandment took place. In March, 1656, Petty had finished his survey; and by the close of the year the army had, except the bulk of the "'49 arrears," been practically settled on the lands allotted to it. By the end of 1658 most of the Adventurers' claims had been satisfied.

There was still much to do in the way of settling all the obligations incurred by Government, but under the mild rule of Henry Cromwell, who had succeeded Fleetwood in September, 1655, though not actually appointed Deputy till November, 1657, the country gradually emerged from the chaos in which the war and the plantation had involved it. Infinite were the sufferings of the dispossessed Irish. Murder and outrage stalked through the land. The new planters, whithersoever they came, carried their lives in their hands. But the dream of a new England across the Channel, as it had long floated before the imagination of English statesmen, seemed at last to have been realised. Two-thirds of the soil of Ireland had passed into the hands of Englishmen. By the identification of its commercial interests with those of England, and the incorporation of Ireland with that country for parliamentary purposes, under the Instrument of Government, and by the care taken to secure a monopoly in the representation to the new settlers, the Commonwealth had as it were placed its seal on its victory. Henceforth the English interest in Ireland might be considered safe.

After the death of Cromwell the government of Ireland shared the fate that overtook the Commonwealth. In vain Ludlow, to the last true to his Republican principles, tried hard to avert the inevitable and to reconcile men who would not be reconciled. The country was tired both of the rule of the army and of a discredited Parliament; and when on December 16, 1659, Monck declared for a free Parliament the army in Ireland under Coote and Broghill acquiesced. The Restoration brought many changes with it, and among them a fresh land settlement; but, as an expression of the will of England, the Cromwellian Settlement was too firmly laid to be radically altered.

CHAPTER XIX.

ANARCHY AND THE RESTORATION.

(1659-60.)

THE fall of Richard Cromwell was a gradual process. It began on April 22, 1659, when he dissolved Parliament, and ended with his formal abdication on May 25. But his government came to an end on May 7, when the Long Parliament reassembled at Westminster. Fleetwood and the great officers of the army who forced Richard to dissolve his Parliament had not intended to overthrow the Protectorate. They meant to limit his power and that of the civil element in his Council, and to govern in his name. Accordingly they at first endeavoured, as a Republican said, "to piece and mend up that cracked Government," though without success. For the inferior officers who were Republicans outvoted their superiors in the Council of the Army, and rejected the plan of the "Grandeers." John Lambert, who was readmitted into the army by the Council on April 29, and restored to his old rank of Major-General, made himself the advocate of the Long Parliament which he had helped to expel, and he was seconded by many other officers whom Cromwell had likewise cashiered for opposing the Protectorate. Nor did it a little contribute to the success of the movement that the Independent ministers, especially the extremer sectaries, exerted all their influence with the army in favour of the return to a republic. A hasty negotiation between the leaders of the Long Parliament and the heads of the army followed, in which only the vaguest understanding was arrived at between the two parties. The members of the Long Parliament were then invited to resume their authority; and forty-two of them reassembled at Westminster on May 7. In all about 130 members were qualified to sit, of whom about 120 put in their appearance at different times; but the highest number present in the House during the next five months was 76. To this *simulacrum* of a legislature the army was obliged to commit supreme power, because it needed some shred of constitutional authority to cover its domination and to provide for its maintenance. But the members of the Long Parliament themselves returned to their seats without a doubt that they possessed an indefeasible right to rule a people, some fraction of which

had once elected them to represent it. They were the Bourbons of republicanism. The new Government was accepted by the nation with a passive submission which approached indifference. It received pledges of support from every quarter. Rear-Admiral Bourne and the squadron in the Downs gave in their adhesion at once. On May 12 General Monck and the army drew up a declaration of fidelity. On May 18 Lockhart and the garrison of Dunkirk expressed their acquiescence; and about the middle of June Henry Cromwell surrendered the government of Ireland to five Commissioners whom Parliament had appointed to succeed him. Foreign Powers recognised the Government without any scruples; and though the French ambassador made some secret offers of help to Richard, he speedily transferred his support to the Republic.

On the other hand the change of Government roused the hopes of the Royalists to an uncontrollable pitch. Oliver's death had given them new courage, and during the winter they had begun fresh preparations for insurrection. The young men of the party were eager for action; and in March, 1659, the King appointed six new Commissioners for the management of his affairs in England, of whom John Mordaunt was chief. The committee of older men, known as the "Sealed Knot," to whom his business had previously been entrusted, taught by former failures, were reluctant to take up arms, but were pushed into action by Mordaunt and his friends. August 1, 1659, was fixed as the time for a general rising. When the day came, there were gatherings of Cavaliers in Kent, Surrey, Gloucestershire, and Nottinghamshire; but most of the King's party never stirred. Willis, one of the Sealed Knot, had been in the pay of successive Governments ever since 1656; and by postponements and other pretexts he prevented concerted action amongst his party. Nevertheless a formidable rising took place in Cheshire and Lancashire and North Wales, where Sir George Booth, one of the members expelled by Pride's Purge in 1648, got together five or six thousand men. Booth was a Presbyterian; and the Presbyterian party in general was hostile to the men at Westminster. But he did not openly declare for Charles II; and his manifesto spoke only of a full and free Parliament, though the Royalists who joined him proclaimed the King at Wrexham and Warrington. Once more Charles II prepared to land in England. In August he left Brussels for Calais, while the Duke of York went to Boulogne. With or without the knowledge of Mazarin, Marshal Turenne had promised James a couple of thousand soldiers, arms for three or four thousand men, and ships to transport them. Rye was fixed upon as the landing-place. There were hopes too from the fleet in the Baltic. A secret agent from Charles had been in negotiation with Admiral Mountagu, who suddenly left his station in the Sound and set sail for England. But all these hopes were made futile by Booth's inability to keep the field. Major-General Lambert marched against him with about 3000 foot and 1200

horse, and routed him on August 23 at Winnington Bridge, near Northwich. The Welsh castles which had been seized for the King fell into Lambert's hands; and Booth himself, disguised as a woman, was taken prisoner a few days after his defeat. All was over by the time Mountagu's fleet reached England; and, though he explained his return by the plea of want of provisions, he lost his command, and had difficulty in saving himself. His ships passed under the control of Vice-Admiral Lawson, an Anabaptist whose republicanism was above suspicion. The victory of the Republican leaders was completed by the prospect of filling their depleted treasury from the confiscated estates of the rebels. In their triumph they drew up an engagement renouncing the claims of the Houses of Stewart and Cromwell, and promising fidelity to the Republic against a King, single person, or House of Peers, which they designed to impose upon all officials civil and military.

On the Continent the influence of the Republic had been steadily growing during the four months which had elapsed since its foundation. Its foreign policy, directed by the experienced hand of Vane, was firm and moderate, and the friendship of the United Provinces seemed its chief aim. The Republic continued the Protector's attempt to mediate between the northern Powers, but it was less partial to Sweden. A treaty between France, England, and the States General, signed at the Hague on May 21, 1659, pledged them to joint mediation in order to bring about a settlement based on the terms of Roeskilde. A second agreement between the same Powers on July 24, modified the Roeskilde terms to the advantage of Denmark. By a third (August 4) England and the United Provinces alone undertook to use their fleets to force Sweden and Denmark to accept this compromise. Denmark yielded; Sweden protested. "Are Republics to give laws to Kings?" asked Charles Gustavus, indignant at being called on to halt when Copenhagen seemed about to drop into his hands. "Sire," answered Algernon Sidney, the head of the English embassy, "the acceptance of these conditions is the price of the friendship of England." Unluckily the return of Mountagu's fleet to England robbed these lofty words of their effect. "A few shot of our cannon would have made this peace," wrote Sidney; but the belief that England would not resort to force encouraged the King of Sweden in his obduracy and contributed to his downfall.

Meanwhile the relations between France and England, so intimate during the Protectorate, were rapidly becoming less close. The league of the two Powers against Spain expired in March, 1659. On May 8 an armistice between France and Spain was agreed upon; on June 4 a preliminary treaty was signed; on November 7 the work of peace was completed by the signature of the Treaty of the Pyrenees. In the armistice England was included for Dunkirk: in the final agreement the only stipulation directly touching the republic was a secret article by which France engaged neither directly nor indirectly to assist England

against Spain. However Lockhart, the English ambassador, obtained the insertion in Article 80 of a clause designed to protect the English Government against Charles II. By it the Prince of Condé was bound to disband all his forces without making them over to any other prince or potentate, and he was therefore unable to place them at the disposal of the young King for his projected expedition to England. Charles, who had undertaken a journey to Fuenterrabia, obtained nothing but fair words; and the hopes of the Royalists that France and Spain would now unite their arms to restore the Stewarts were shown to be baseless. Mazarin's refusal to give the hand of his niece, Hortense Mancini, to Charles II showed the King that he had little aid to expect from the Cardinal; and hitherto the support of Spain had proved of little value. Hopeless of a restoration except through the army, some ardent Royalists urged a match between the King and General Lambert's daughter.

Yet though the English Republic seemed secure against foreign arms or Royalist insurrection, its apparently imposing fabric was undermined by the dissensions of its supporters. There were no recognised party leaders and no party discipline among the sixty or seventy members who sat at Westminster. "Chaos," wrote a Royalist on June 3, 1659, "was a perfection compared to our present order and government: the parties are like so many floating islands, sometimes joining and appearing like a continent, when the next flood or ebb separates them so that it can hardly be known where they will appear next." In foreign affairs Vane had the chief influence, in matters of internal policy Sir Arthur Heselrige. Vane's alliance with the extreme sectaries and his advocacy of constitutional changes discredited him with parliamentary Republicans, while Heselrige's narrow parliamentarism and overbearing character disqualified him from uniting the military and civil sections of the Republican party. The army leaders, who expected to control the Government they had set up, found themselves reduced to a subordinate position. In the House they had little power; in the Council of State less than one-third of the seats were allotted to them. "To bring the military sword under the power of the civil authority, as it ought to be in a free nation," was the avowed purpose of the parliamentary leaders; and they carried it out with very little regard for their temporary allies. Although Fleetwood was appointed by Act of Parliament Commander-in-chief of the forces of the three nations, he was deprived of the power of appointing his officers which previous generals had enjoyed. The selection of officers was entrusted to five Commissioners, but their nominees required the approval of Parliament, and received their commissions from the Speaker's hands. A sweeping purgation of the list of officers followed, in which political as well as moral delinquencies were taken into account. The same process was applied to the navy, while the reorganisation of the militia supplied Parliament with an instrument meant to counterbalance the standing forces.

Parliament's open distrust of the soldiers was made more galling by its neglect of their material interests. The soldiers demanded "an effectual and full Act of Oblivion" to protect them from the legal consequences of acts done during the Protectorate. After some delay they obtained merely "an imperfect and ineffectual Act of Indemnity." Without giving them security for what they had done it made them liable for whatever they had received; and it was possible that some of them might be called upon to refund large sums of money. Another grievance was the neglect of Parliament to confirm the Acts and Ordinances of the Protector, on the validity of which the title-deeds of many soldiers depended.

If there was a cause the army really had at heart it was the maintenance of freedom of conscience, and the further extension of that measure of freedom which had existed during the Protectorate. In this desire it was at one with the sectaries, who had done so much to persuade it to recall the Long Parliament. Both agreed in demanding complete toleration and the separation of Church and State. In the House itself Vane was the chief champion of their views; outside it, Milton. In February, 1659, Milton had published his *Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes*, showing that it is not lawful for any Power on Earth to compel in Matters of Religion. In August he followed it up by *Considerations touching the likeliest means to remove Hirelings out of the Church*. Not only tithes, he argued, but all customary fees for ministerial services at baptisms, marriages, and funerals, should be abolished; for the only lawful maintenance of the ministry consisted in the voluntary offerings of their flocks. Milton had hailed the members of the Parliament lately restored as "the best patrons of civil and religious liberty that ever these islands brought forth"; but his enthusiasm was dashed by their adoption of Cromwell's policy of maintaining a national Church. Like Cromwell, the House answered petitioners for the abolition of tithes, by voting that their payment should continue till some other more equal and comfortable maintenance could be discovered (June 27). Moreover it turned a deaf ear to the petition of the struggling Independent congregations in Scotland for freedom from the discipline of the Kirk.

Still more contentious was the question of the form to be given to the new Government. "It seems to me," wrote the French ambassador, "that if a perfect commonwealth were established, it would appease a great many malcontents"; but no two sections of the Republican party agreed what a perfect commonwealth was. As a body the members of the Long Parliament held that the best form of republic was a replica of that existing between 1649 and 1653, an omnipotent single Chamber, with a Council of State responsible to it. The politicians of the army wanted a republic in which the supremacy of the representative assembly was limited by a system of checks and balances, as in the written

constitutions of the Protectorate. Some proposed that there should be by the side of a popular assembly "a select number of men in the nature of the Lacedemonian Ephori," entrusted with a power of veto to defend the fundamental laws of the constitution. Others suggested two Councils, both chosen by the people, one consisting of 300, empowered only to debate and propose laws, the other of 1000 empowered to resolve and determine, and both renewable by rotation. The last scheme was the work of James Harrington. In November, 1656, he had set it forth at length in his *Commonwealth of Oceana*, and it seemed to him that the moment had now come for putting it into practice. Not a month passed without a pamphlet from his pen in support of it, and twice during the summer of 1659 petitions in its favour were presented to Parliament. But his ideal commonwealth was too fantastic and too complicated to attract practical politicians, though it was a favourite subject of debate in London coffee-houses. For while there was still some waning enthusiasm for the old political ideals, there was none to vivify these new speculations.

Parliament was very reluctant to discuss the constitutional problem. It resolved that the present House should not sit beyond May 7, 1660, but that was all. During August the matter was frequently discussed in committees of the whole House, and on September 8 a special committee was appointed to "prepare something to be offered to the House for the settlement of the commonwealth." The sole result was an inconclusive discussion on October 3, "touching filling up the House with members," which indicated a return to the plan frustrated by Cromwell in 1653.

Meanwhile the army was growing impatient. After Booth's defeat the officers of Lambert's army assembled at Derby, and drew up a petition. They declared that the political proposals contained in the army petition of May 12 furnished "the best and only expedient to a happy and durable settlement," demanded that Fleetwood should be appointed Commander-in-chief with Lambert and other general officers under him, and pressed for the severe punishment of all concerned in the late insurrection. The House answered by declaring, on September 23, that to have any more general officers was "needless, chargeable, and dangerous to the commonwealth," and reproved the petitioners. Upon this a new petition, signed by 230 officers, was presented on October 5, in which they added two new demands, that no officer should be appointed save by the commissioners for nomination, and that no officer or soldier should be dismissed save by sentence of a court-martial. The House answered the petition firmly, and took measures more vigorous than wise to overawe the army. On October 11 it passed a Bill annulling all acts and ordinances passed since April 19, 1653, except in so far as they had been confirmed by the present Parliament, and declaring it high treason to levy money contributions of any kind on

the people without their consent in Parliament. Next day, discovering that signatures to the petition were still being collected, it cashiered Lambert and eight others, and vested the government of the army in seven Commissioners. The seven were Fleetwood, Ludlow, Monck, Heselrige, Morley, Walton, and Overton, but only three of them were in London; and, while Fleetwood openly took part with the mutineers, neither Heselrige nor Morley had any influence with the soldiers. On October 13 Lambert beset Westminster with soldiers, kept the members from entering the House, and turned back Speaker Lenthall on his way thither. Morley with a couple of regiments endeavoured to defend the House; but their ranks were thinned by desertions, and at night they abandoned their posts without a blow. The officers set a guard on the doors of the House, and issued a letter informing the country that they had been "necessitated to obstruct the sitting of Parliament for a time," and would for the present take over the government themselves. Ten days later a Committee of Safety nominated by the Council of Officers superseded the parliamentary Council of State (October 23).

"Illegal, scandalous, barbarous," cried Milton, "or rather scarce to be exemplified amongst any barbarians, that a paid army should, for no other cause, thus subdue the supreme power that set them up"; but resistance seemed impossible. London was apathetic and indifferent. On the 13th, "in all the hurly-burly the streets were full, everyone going about his business as not concerned," and when Parliament sent for help to the City, the City answered that "it would not meddle in the dispute." It had become customary for the minority in the army to follow the majority, whatever cause it adopted, and the forces in and about London had long determined the action of the whole body. The Irish army remained passive, or rather seemed to favour Lambert; and its commander, Ludlow, hastened to London to mediate between army and Parliament. The only sign of opposition came from Scotland. As soon as General Monck heard of Lambert's *coup d'état* he wrote to the Speaker announcing his resolve "to stand by and assert the liberty and authority of Parliament." Monck had no sympathy with the political ambitions of the officers in England. He had been bred, as he said, in Holland, "a commonwealth where soldiers received and observed commands, but gave none"; and he had escaped the epidemic of democracy which broke out in 1647 because he was fighting in Ireland at the time. Obedience to authority was his guiding principle; he had been faithful to Cromwell, had acquiesced with reluctance in the removal of Richard, and having accepted the government of the Long Parliament had never wavered in his fidelity to it. During Booth's rising he had refused even to listen to the overtures made to him from the King, and had exacted from the leading Scottish Royalists an engagement not "to act or contrive anything in behalf of Charles Stuart." Though Monck was sore at the removal of some of his favourite officers by Parliament, he promised

it his support when he saw the crisis approaching, and that promise was one of the causes which led the House to act with such precipitate vigour. As he conceived it, the struggle was not a question between monarchy and a republic, or between a parliamentary and a constitutional republic, but whether England was to be governed by law or the sword. "I am engaged," he wrote, "in conscience and honour to see my country freed from that intolerable slavery of a sword government, and I know England cannot, nay will not, endure it." Confidently, yet warily, Monck set to work. Fortunately he had in his treasury some £70,000, and he was an economical administrator. The force at his disposal was ten regiments of foot, two of horse and one of dragoons, less than ten thousand men in all; with whom he had to hold Scotland as well as to beat Lambert. His first business was to reorganise his army, and get rid of all officers he could not trust; his next to come to some agreement with the Scots, so that he might reduce the garrison he left to the lowest possible point and secure the peace of the country during his absence in England. For these purposes he needed six or eight weeks, and to gain that time entered into negotiations with the agents of Lambert, and talked about compromises and reluctance to shed blood. A treaty was signed on November 15.

In England the army leaders, anticipating no serious struggle, had fallen to their old game of constitution making. On November 1 the Committee of Safety appointed a sub-committee of 14 persons "to consider and prepare a form of government," in whose deliberations Vane, Ludlow, and other members of the expelled Long Parliament condescended to take part. A senate of 70 to be called the Great Council was the favourite plan; but there was much dispute whether the new constitution should receive its sanction from Parliament or from the Council of the Army. Finally they resolved that it should be submitted to a representative Council, consisting of two officers from each regiment in the three nations and of ten persons elected by the navy, which was to meet on December 6. Civilian wits were as busy as military with political theory. Harrington and his disciples founded the Rota Club, and met every night at Miles' Coffee-House in Palace Yard to discuss and ballot about the principles on which States should be organised. "Their discourses in this kind," says Aubrey, "were the most ingenious and smart that ever I heard or expect to hear,; the arguments in the Parliament House were but flat to it."

Meanwhile England was beginning to move. Monck's protest against the rule of the sword found echoes everywhere. London shook off its apathy. Nearly half the commissioners of the City militia were in favour of Monck, and much the wealthier half too. The Committee of Safety found it impossible to raise a loan from the London merchants. The apprentices got up a petition for the restoration of the Parliament, defied the orders of the Committee against it, and mobbed the

soldiers who published their proclamation. On December 5 there was a riot in which some citizens and apprentices were killed by the soldiers. The Corporation demanded a free Parliament, control of their own militia, and the removal of all soldiers out of the City.

The members of the deposed Council of State were active too. On November 24 they sent Monck a commission to command all the forces in England and Scotland. Three of them, Walton, Morley, and Heselrige, persuaded Nathaniel Whetham, the Governor of Portsmouth, to admit them into that stronghold, declared for the restoration of the Parliament, and began to gather troops to effect it (Dec. 3). The regiments sent to besiege them revolted, and went over to Heselrige. Another member, Scot, after failing in a plot for the seizure of the Tower, fled to the fleet in the Downs, and persuaded Vice-Admiral Lawson and his captains to declare against the arbitrary proceedings of the army (December 13). The next news which reached the Committee of Safety was that Ireland was lost. Ludlow had left Colonel John Jones and Sir Hardress Waller to command the army there in his absence, and they had taken the side of the English army. On December 13 Dublin Castle was surprised by Colonels Bridges and Theophilus Jones; Athlone, Limerick, Drogheda, and other garrisons, were seized in the same way. Sir Charles Coote and Lord Broghill joined the movement, declared for the restoration of the Parliament, and entered into communication with Monck.

By this time Monck was ready to march into England. He had disavowed the treaty of November 15 on the ground that his agents had gone beyond their instructions. He had come to an understanding with representatives of the Scottish shires and burghs, by which they were to endeavour to maintain the peace of their districts during his absence, and, though allowing them to raise a small police force, had successfully evaded their demand for arms. He had obtained from them also a few horses for his cavalry and baggage, a little money, and some recruits for his infantry. On December 8 he established his headquarters at Coldstream, where he brought together about 6000 foot and 1800 horse. Lambert, whose headquarters were at Newcastle, had some 4000 foot and 3500 horse, and his superiority in cavalry made Monck's advance into England dangerous. But Lambert's men had no heart in their cause. They felt that it was not their quarrel. As they marched north some said boldly that they would not fight, but would make a ring for their officers to fight in; and when the scouts of the two armies met, they fired their pistols into the ground instead of at each other's heads, and indulged in a friendly gossip. While Monck and Lambert faced each other on the border, the Government which the army had set up in England was putting the finishing touches to its new constitution. The general Council of Officers fixed for December 6 met on the appointed date, though without the proposed representation of the regiments in Scotland and Ireland. It discussed for five or six

days the form of government which the nominees of the Committee of Safety had drawn up, agreed upon seven principles as "unalterable fundamentals," and elected twenty-one "Conservators of Liberty" to see that they were maintained. Finally, in accordance with the vote of the Council, the Committee of Safety on December 14 issued a proclamation summoning a new Parliament to meet on January 24. Next day came the news that the fleet had declared for the restoration of the old Parliament, followed in rapid succession by the tidings of the desertion of the troops sent to besiege Portsmouth, and the sudden revolution in Ireland. The rule of the army collapsed like a house of cards. On December 24 the soldiers about London assembled in Lincoln's Inn Fields, declared for the Parliament, and marching to Chancery Lane owned Speaker Lenthall as their general. Fleetwood sent the keys of the House to Lenthall, withdrew the guards he had set upon its doors, and declared his submission to the mercy of the Parliament. Two days later those members who were in London resumed their places at Westminster.

As soon as Monck received this news he marched into England. Newcastle opened its gates to his vanguard on January 3; while Lord Fairfax, who had headed a rising in Yorkshire, occupied York for the Parliament. Lambert's army melted away with the advance of Monck, who at the invitation of Parliament continued his march to London, cashiering officers and reorganising regiments on his way. When the Long Parliament met again on December 26 only 36 members were present, and the House never numbered at its highest more than 53, but its belief in its right to govern England was undiminished. Heselrige, "very jocund and high" at its triumph, was the recognised leader of the House. Scot, the regicide, became Secretary of State, and a new Council, of the purest republicanism, was appointed. The first step taken was to reassert the control of the civil power over the army. Lambert and eight other leading officers were cashiered, and ordered to live remote from London. Once more the army list was purged; and every man who had supported Lambert and Fleetwood was replaced by an officer of sounder principles. It was said that scarce one in ten of the officers of the army retained his commission. Next came the turn of the members of Parliament who had acted with the army during its usurpation. Vane and Sydenham were expelled, Salwey suspended, Whitelock frightened away from the House, and Ludlow threatened with impeachment for his attempt to mediate. Simultaneously the settlement of the constitution was taken in hand. A Bill was passed obliging all members of the Council of State to take an oath abjuring the line of Stewart. Another was brought in imposing the same test upon all members who sat or should sit in Parliament, but met with unexpected opposition. Fifteen members divided against the first reading, and though the Bill was read twice no attempt was made to

push it further. Moreover half the new Council of State refused to sit rather than take the oath required. Oaths it was said were useless, and had but "multiplied the sins of the nation by perjuries"; the truth was that few cared to pledge themselves against the possibilities of the future. The question of the test was comparatively unimportant, and it was on the composition of the Parliament that the fate of the Commonwealth depended. On December 27 Prynne, with twenty-one of the secluded members, came to demand readmission. Once more they were kept out by force and the votes against them confirmed. Instead of admitting them the House, returning to the abortive scheme of 1653, resolved to recruit its numbers by the election of new members, so as to bring the total up to 400. Meanwhile for the general satisfaction it published a declaration promising the speedy settlement of the Government and the reformation of all grievances in the Commonwealth. "They declare," wrote Pepys, "for law and gospel, and for the tithes; but I do not find people apt to believe them."

Not merely incredulity, but contempt and hatred were the dominant feelings in the public mind towards the little gang of Republicans who clung with such avidity to power. In the debates of Richard Cromwell's time, Major-General Browne, one of the Presbyterian leaders, had incidentally styled the fag-end of the Long Parliament "The Rump," and this nickname was now in everybody's mouth. Every day some new derisive ballad about it was sold and sung in the streets of London. "The Re-Resurrection of the Rump," "A New Year's Gift for the Rump," "The Rump Carbonadoed," "The Rump Roughly but Righteously Handled," and the like. In the country the rising spirit of revolt took a more serious form. County after county sent up petitions demanding the readmission of the secluded members, as the first step to the convocation of a full and free Parliament. Devonshire led the way; Berkshire and others followed the example. The House sent the gentlemen who presented the Berkshire petition to the Tower, and threatened to treat others in the same fashion, but its threats were met by defiance. Recognising that Monck and the force he commanded were the real arbiters of England's fate, the petitioners turned to him, and, as he marched through the Midlands, he was met by similar petitions from the adjacent counties. Monck remained inscrutable. In a letter to the Devonshire gentlemen he declared strongly against monarchy, argued against the readmission of the secluded members, and urged submission to the existing Parliament. Other petitioners he received coldly, and answered with studied brevity and vagueness. Many were left with the impression that he would stand by the Rump through thick and thin; but some were still confident that he would finally declare in favour of their demands. For the moment the Royalist agents abandoned all hope that he would do anything to forward the King's cause. "The most sober judgment,"

wrote one of them, "is that he entertains fortune by the day, not absolutely determining in his own mind what he will do or say on his arrival."

One thing Monck had resolved, and that was to keep the power of deciding the crisis in his own hands. As he drew near London he demanded the removal of the regiments quartered there, and their replacement by his own troops. This granted, he entered London on February 3 with 5600 men, dispersing in detachments throughout the country the regiments on whom Parliament had previously relied. The citizens received him coldly; and, as he passed through the streets, there were repeated shouts for a free Parliament. By the Republican leaders he was effusively complimented; to fix him to their interest they had recently voted him a thousand a year, and made him Ranger of St James' Park. In reply, he protested his devotion to the Republic. "We must live and die for and with a Commonwealth," he said to Ludlow. On the other hand, he roused some suspicion by refusing the oath of abjuration, and by telling the House, in answer to its thanks, that the fewer oaths and engagements they imposed, the sooner they would attain their settlement. They should endeavour, he added, to broaden, not to narrow, the basis of the Commonwealth by conciliating "the sober gentry," meaning the Presbyterians, and allow no share of power to either the Cavaliers or the fanatics. At the same time he plainly revealed that he considered himself pledged to the convocation of a free and full Parliament, though not to the admission of the secluded members. "Monck has now pulled off the mask and is clearly Republican," wrote a Royalist agent (February 6).

Two days later the quarrel between London and the Parliament came to a head. The City had refused to pay taxes till the House was filled up, and the Republican leaders resolved to reduce it to obedience by force. Monck was charged to march into the City, arrest eleven of the Common Council, remove the posts and chains set up in the streets, and break down the gates and portcullises. He accepted the unenviable duty; but seized the opportunity of posing as mediator between the two antagonists. On February 9, after accomplishing the first part of his task, he wrote to Parliament urging the remission of the order about the gates, because it would exasperate the citizens, and he had reason for hoping to bring them to submission by milder means. At Heselrige's instigation the House answered by bidding him carry out the remainder of his orders, and by voting the immediate dissolution of the Common Council. The favourable reception given the same day to a petition in favour of the abjuration oath showed that there was no prospect of the adoption of a conciliatory policy.

Monck completed his task, and returned to Whitehall; but determined to be no longer the tool of the Rump. Since he came to England he had realised the general hostility of the nation to that assembly;

and he now understood the impracticable character of its leaders. The prolongation of the crisis would lead to fresh civil war; yet, except under pressure, the party in power would make no concession. He would therefore apply just the amount of pressure necessary to extort concession, without any direct appeal to force. For in order to effect a settlement he must use the only piece of constitutional machinery which had survived the Civil War, and not adopt the drastic methods of Cromwell and Lambert. The moment was favourable for a change of front. His officers and soldiers, indignant at their late employment, and the citizens, enraged to the utmost, would both stand by him.

Accordingly on the morning of Saturday, February 11, Monck sent a letter to the Parliament in the name of himself and his officers, couched in a tone of command rather than entreaty. The substance was: We took up arms against Lambert, not only to restore you to your trust, but to vindicate the liberties of the people. The reason for the present dissatisfaction and trouble in the nation is that it is not fully represented in Parliament. Therefore we must insist that you issue writs for filling up the vacant seats within the next six days, and that you punctually dissolve by May 6, as you promised to do. Having despatched this manifesto, he marched back into the City, explained his change of conduct to the Corporation, and was welcomed with universal acclamations. Bells and bonfires celebrated the impending downfall of the Rump, and it was burnt in effigy in every street in London.

Parliament showed its resentment by seeking to limit Monck's military power. It rejected the proposals of his partisans to make him Commander-in-chief, and, while reappointing him one of the five commissioners for the government of the army, sought to tie his hands by its choice of his colleagues. Nevertheless it tried to propitiate him by pushing on the Bill for filling up the House, which was passed on February 18 and the writs ordered to be issued. An engagement to be faithful to the Government "in the way of commonwealth or free state, without King, single person or House of Lords," was substituted for the abjuration (February 14). On the same day, however, the House passed a vote that no person whose father had been sequestered as a Royalist should be capable of being elected to the coming Parliament, although hitherto only those who had actually fought for the King had been similarly disabled. It was obvious that the new Parliament would not be the free and representative body Monck and the nation demanded.

Hitherto Monck had refused to take up the cause of the secluded members. He had accepted the compromise proposed by the Parliament, to the effect that the qualifications imposed should be such as not to hinder their re-election if the constituencies wished to choose them. He had arranged two meetings between representatives of the sitting

members and the secluded ones, in the hope of obtaining their re-admission, but both ended in disagreement. The sitting members could not pledge their absent colleagues; the secluded members would not pledge themselves against monarchy. Monck determined to take the settlement of the question into his own hands. He had told the Republicans that if the secluded members attempted to bring in the King he would himself prevent them, and did not doubt his ability to do it. The determination of the future Government he reserved for a free Parliament. But without the presence of the secluded members in the House the majority necessary to secure such a Parliament could not be obtained. He knew well enough that a free Parliament would recall the King, and had made up his mind to facilitate his restoration.

Accordingly Monck called the secluded members together, and laid before them the conditions upon which he would effect their readmission. They must engage in writing to settle the government of the army, provide money for its maintenance, issue writs for a new Parliament to meet on April 20, and dissolve themselves as speedily as possible. No time for their dissolution was specified; but it was thought eight days would suffice for all they had to do. It was understood that they should not alter the form of the government, and their leaders had definitely promised not to attempt it. No force was needed to effect the re-installation. Monck simply ordered the officer in charge of the guard of the House to let them enter on the morning of Tuesday, February 21. "The other members of the House heard nothing of all this till they found them in the House, insomuch that the soldiers that stood there to let in the secluded members, they took for such as they had ordered to stand there to prevent their coming in." This peaceful revolution was hailed with no less joy in London than Monck's declaration against the Rump ten days earlier. The citizens knew what it meant. "It was a most pleasant sight to see the City from one end to another with a glory about it, so high was the light of the bonfires, and so thick round the City, and the bells rang everywhere."

Some 73 secluded members entered the House on Tuesday, February 21, and others followed, so that the total number sitting there rose finally to 150, and the party hitherto in power were hopelessly outvoted. They began their work by voting Monck Captain-general of all the forces in England, Ireland, and Scotland, and joint commander with Mountagu of the navy. They elected a new Council of State thoroughly Presbyterian in colour, restored the privileges of London, and released Sir George Booth and other prisoners of State. They fixed the meeting of the new Parliament for April 25, and the date of their own dissolution for March 15. Some constitutional difficulties arose about the details of the Bill which was to carry out these last resolutions. It was argued that the Long Parliament was legally dissolved by the death of the King, and, on the other hand, that it

could not be dissolved without the consent of the Lords, who were still prevented from sitting. There was a great dispute in whose name the writs should run. Prynne said boldly, "In that of King Charles," but it was decided to issue them in the name of the Keepers of the Liberties of England. There were other disputes about the qualifications of voters and candidates. Royalists were excluded from being elected, but allowed to vote, and the engagement to be faithful to a Commonwealth was abolished. The future assembly, if not absolutely a free Parliament, would be more free than any elected since 1640.

During the same weeks a new Militia Act was passed. It disbanded the local levies raised by the Rump, and appointed men of rank and fortune in the various counties to reorganise the militia. Neither Cavaliers nor fanatics were to have a share in the military power. A test was imposed both on commissioners and officers. They were to declare that the war undertaken by both Houses of Parliament in their defence against the forces raised by the late King was just and lawful; and that magistracy and ministry were ordained by God. Parliament intended to have an armed force at its disposal which it could use, if necessary, against its insubordinate regular army. "When our militia is formed," wrote a Royalist, "we shall be able to declare our desires by our representatives without fear of sectaries or discontented soldiers."

At the same time the reorganisation of the Church was taken in hand. In his speech to the secluded members Monck had told them that "moderate not rigid Presbyterian government, with a sufficient liberty for consciences truly tender," would be in his opinion the best way to a settlement; and they took him at his word. The Presbyterians were in an overwhelming majority in the House, and resolved to complete the establishment of Presbyterianism begun in 1646. The Confession of Faith drawn up by the Westminster Assembly in that year was confirmed and ordered to be published. The Solemn League and Covenant was ordered to be set up in all the churches, and to be read there publicly once a year. An Act for the appointment and admission of ministers ordered the division of all England into classical presbyteries, while another reaffirmed the right of ministers holding the livings of the ejected clergy to tithes and other emoluments. For though desiring a monarchical restoration the Presbyterians were afraid of its consequences. "The great fear," wrote James Sharpe, "is that the King will come in, and that with him moderate episcopacy at the least will take place." They resolved therefore that Charles should find their own ecclesiastical system impreguably established.

A greater fear still began to possess many of the beaten Republicans. Before their dread of a King their aversion from a Protector began to disappear. If they must have a "single person," Richard or George would be preferable to Charles. About the end of February an intrigue for the restoration of Richard Cromwell was set on foot, but only to be

killed by ridicule. In March there was a movement to offer the supreme power to Monck under any title he chose. "The Commonwealthsmen," wrote Sharpe on March 15, "are now for anything but the King's coming in; they would set up Monck, but he will not be induced to it." He was not ambitious, and knew the feeling of the nation too well. Outside Parliament it revealed itself more boldly every day. "Everybody," noted Pepys on March 6, "now drinks the King's health without any fear, whereas before it was very private a man might do it."

Within Parliament, as the day fixed for the dissolution drew near, an obvious hesitation to take the plunge manifested itself. In spite of their promises the members of the triumphant majority sought to prolong their tenure of power. "If they dissolve," owned a Presbyterian, "they fear the next Parliament will bring in the King, without security for religion and the public cause." Prynne said boldly that "If the King must come in, it was safest for them that he should come in by their votes who had made the war against his father." There was a general wish to sit longer in order to treat with the King.

Monck was deaf to all arguments for an extension of time. It was all he could do to prevent a revolt in the army. As soon as he became Commander-in-chief he had replaced a number of officers whom he judged too fanatical or too obstinately Republican to be trusted. Major-General Lambert, unable to find the heavy bail required by the Council of State, was committed to the Tower on March 8. Major-General Overton, the Governor of Hull, the most troublesome and dangerous man who still retained a command, was deprived of his government on March 12; and the Governors of many minor garrisons were changed. Nevertheless even the officers Monck had brought with him from Scotland began to show signs of alarm and insubordination. They drew up about March 7 a protest, which they urged Monck to present to the House, demanding that it should pledge itself against the restoration of a King and a House of Lords. A week later they endeavoured to prevent or delay the passing of the Militia Bill. Monck answered them stoutly, saying that "He brought them not out of Scotland for his nor the Parliament's Council: that for his part he should obey the Parliament, and expected they should do the same." So the stated period passed without open disturbance; and at last, on March 16, "after many sad pangs and groans," the Long Parliament was dissolved.

The way was now clear for the meeting of a free Parliament and the recall of the King. On March 16, as an outward sign of the changed times, the inscription "*Exit tyrannus Regum ultimus*" set up by the Commonwealth in the Exchange where the King's statue had once stood, was publicly blotted out at noonday. "The controversy," wrote a Royalist agent to Hyde, "begins now to be rather upon what terms, than whether the King shall be restored." For the forty days which intervened before the Parliament met, government was in the

hands of Monck and the Council of State. That Council, elected on February 23, was almost entirely composed of Presbyterians; and it now took up again in earnest the projected treaty with the King. Outside the Council the dozen Presbyterian peers who had adhered to the parliamentary cause up to the moment of the late King's trial worked for the same object. Both sought to impose upon Charles II the acceptance of the terms offered his father at the Treaty of Newport in 1648, or of even more stringent conditions. An Act of indemnity; the confirmation of the sales of Church and Crown lands; the control of the militia; the permanent establishment of Presbyterianism—such were their demands. "They did intend to have brought him in," said Admiral Mountagu to Pepys, "with such conditions as if he had been in chains." Monck prevented this. When the leaders of the Council applied to him to consent to the propositions they wished to send to the King, he absolutely refused, saying that "he would leave all to a free Parliament, as he had promised the nation." His refusal was wise, for a public treaty with the King would probably have caused a much more formidable revolt in the army than the rising which actually took place. Moreover neither the Council of State, nor the little clique of Lords associated with them, had any moral or legal authority to bind the nation.

Nevertheless, either to secure himself, or to facilitate the good understanding between King and Parliament which the nation plainly desired, Monck did not scruple to enter into communication with Charles behind the backs of his colleagues. Two or three days after the dissolution he sent for his cousin, Sir John Greenville, and accepted at last the letter which the King had written to him in the previous summer. "If you once resolve to take my interest to heart," wrote Charles, "I will leave the way and manner of declaring it entirely to your own judgment, and will comply with the advice you shall give me." Monck answered that at heart he had been ever faithful to the King, though till now never able to do him service; and then set forth the policy which he wished the King to adopt. Charles was to promise a general amnesty from which not more than four persons should be excepted; he was to confirm the possessors of confiscated property in their acquisitions, whether obtained by gift or purchase, and whether the lands in question were Crown lands, Church lands, or the forfeited estates of Royalist delinquents; he was to grant liberty of conscience to all his subjects. Finally, since England was still at war with Spain, he urged the King for the sake of his own security to remove at once from Spanish to Dutch territory, and recommended Breda as a suitable resting-place.

Armed with these verbal instructions (which Monck was too wary to commit to writing) Greenville reached Brussels about March 26. The King submitted Monck's proposals to Hyde, Ormonde, and Nicholas. The principle upon which they were based, that the King's concessions

should be acts of free grace rather than the results of a bargain, was readily accepted. Apart from its political expediency, it obviated several constitutional difficulties which a formal treaty would have involved. As to the extent of the concessions suggested there was more hesitation. Neither the King nor his counsellors were willing to grant so universal an amnesty, to accept so sweeping a transference of property, or to guarantee such unlimited freedom of religion to all sects. It was therefore resolved to adopt the expedient which Hyde had recommended in earlier negotiations with the Presbyterians and the Levellers, and, while granting in general terms what Monck demanded, to refer to the wisdom of Parliament the precise limits of the King's concessions, and the responsibility for carrying them into effect. Charles felt confident that the coming Parliament would not exact more from him than he was willing to concede. Accordingly a declaration was drawn up on these lines, and dated from Breda, whither the King removed on April 4, 1660. Bearing this declaration, Greenville returned to England.

Meanwhile in England the elections were in full swing. Never had there been such competition for a seat in Parliament. "The meanest place," wrote a Royalist, "hath five or six importunate pretenders, many fifteen, sixteen, or twenty." In the little boroughs, where the electors were few, some Republicans managed to get chosen. Scot was elected at Wycombe; Ludlow persuaded 19 out of the 26 electors of Hindon to give him their votes. In the counties, where the electors numbered thousands, the King's friends carried all before them. The torrent of reviving loyalty was irresistible.

Among the few who opposed it to the last was Milton. About the end of February he had published his *Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth*. His scheme for the organisation of the Republic was more practicable than Harrington's, which he condemned as too intricate and too rigid, rejecting altogether the scheme of rotation. The governing body of the State was to be a permanent Grand Council, renewable, if it were thought well, by degrees, and combined with this an extended system of local self-government, so that each county would become a sort of little commonwealth, with council, schools, and law-courts of its own. Yet England was not to be a loose federation of sovereign States like the United Provinces, but "many commonwealths under one united sovereignty." Wise or unwise, such schemes were now idle fancies which had ceased to attract even a moment's attention. It was rather as the last word of expiring Republicanism that it forced a hearing. Milton sought to stay "the epidemic madness" which was driving the misguided multitude back to the thralldom of kingship. To him a Free Commonwealth seemed "the noblest, the manliest, the equalest, the justest government, the most agreeable to all due liberty and proportioned equality both human, civil, and Christian, most cherishing to virtue and true religion." He cared little that most

Englishmen sincerely preferred monarchy. Freedom was a natural right of which the greater number could not justly deprive the less and a minority might forcibly compel a majority to remain free.

By this time even the army had abandoned the Miltonic theory of the rights of minorities. On April 10 the officers of the regiments about London presented Monck with an address in which they declared their willingness to submit to whatever settlement the coming Parliament's consultation should bring forth, "knowing that Parliaments only can secure us in our religious and civil rights." On the same day Lambert escaped from the Tower, and set to work to raise an insurrection. But the officers remained faithful to their pledge; and the soldiers obeyed their officers. Three colonels and a few captains joined Lambert; a troop mutinied at Nottingham; and some deserters tried to surprise York; but the anticipated military revolt did not take place. The parliamentary Republicans did not stir. Heselrige was too dejected, Scot was in hiding, Ludlow, like many others, distrusted the sincerity of Lambert's republicanism. Those who took up arms represented no definite principle, except aversion from monarchy. Ludlow asked one of Lambert's agents what his general declared for; he was answered that "It was not now a time to declare what we would be for, but what we would be against, which was that torrent of tyranny and popery that was ready to break in upon us." A purely negative programme was a bad rallying-cry; and Lambert got together less than a thousand men. Colonel Ingoldsby, with a force of about the same strength, met them near Daventry on Easter Sunday; Lambert's men would not fight, and the insurrection collapsed without a blow. Lambert, taken by Ingoldsby as he fled, was brought prisoner to London on April 24. So ended the rising of the "fanatics," which for some months all men had dreaded. "Their whole design is broken," wrote Pepys, "and things now very open and plain, and every man begins to be merry and full of hopes."

Next day the newly elected members of the Commons met at Westminster. One of the last acts of the Long Parliament had been a vote for restoring the ancient rights of the peerage, and thirteen peers met also. The leaders of the Presbyterian party in the Council of State had planned to set on foot at once a treaty with Charles II. They hoped to secure a majority by enforcing the restrictions against the election of Cavaliers in the Lower House, and by limiting the numbers of the Upper. According to their theory only those peers who had remained faithful to the parliamentary cause during the war had a right to sit. The lords who had sided with the King, those created by him during the war and the exile, and even the young lords who had inherited peerages or grown up to manhood during the interregnum, were to be shut out; Manchester, Northumberland, and about fifteen others would thus have controlled the action of Parliament. But the

reign of "the lordly Rump" ended in a couple of days. On April 27 eight of "the young lords" took their places; and by May 1 the House numbered forty-two peers. In the Lower House a similar defeat awaited the Presbyterians. It was calculated that a hundred, or a hundred and sixty members would be excluded, if the qualifications prescribed in the Act of the late Parliament were strictly observed. Monck's unexpected opposition frustrated this last attempt to limit the powers of Parliament in order to impose conditions on the King.

Some days before the two Houses met, Sir John Greenville reached England bearing the King's declaration, and letters to Monck, to the Speakers of the Lords and Commons, and to the City of London. On April 27 Greenville waited on Monck; as the letter to the General was to be communicated to the Council of State, Monck did not open it, but told Greenville to hand it to the Council. The Council refused to open it without the directions of Parliament, and bound Greenville over to attend the next sitting of the House. On Tuesday, May 1, the letters and declaration were read in both Houses. Charles granted a free pardon to all who should claim its benefit within forty days; "excepting only such persons as shall be hereafter excepted by Parliament." "We declare," he added, "a liberty to tender consciences, and that no man shall be disquieted or called in question for differences of opinion in matters of religion which do not disturb the peace of the kingdom; and we shall be ready to consent to such an Act of Parliament as upon mature deliberation shall be offered to us for the full granting that indulgence." He concluded by promising that all differences relating to sales and purchases of confiscated lands should be determined in Parliament, and that the soldiers of the army under Monck should receive full satisfaction for their arrears of pay. This reference of all disputed questions to Parliament was accompanied by a panegyric of the parliamentary system which Hyde placed in the mouth of the King. "We do assure you upon our royal word that none of our predecessors have had a greater esteem of Parliaments than we have... We do believe them to be so vital a part of the constitution of the kingdom, and so necessary for the government of it, that we well know neither prince nor people can be in any tolerable degree happy without them...we shall always look upon their counsels as the best we can receive, and shall be as tender of their privileges, and as careful to preserve and protect them as of that which is most near to ourself and most necessary for our own preservation."

Both Houses received the King's declaration with enthusiasm. "Its reception," wrote Clarendon, "was beyond what even the King could expect or hope." A joint vote for the restoration of the ancient government was passed, and a joint committee appointed to answer the declaration. On May 8 King Charles was publicly proclaimed; and the proclamation emphasised the fact that his Majesty's title to the

Crown dated from the moment of his father's death, and that the throne was his not in virtue of any parliamentary recognition, but "by inherent birthright." Though there was some show of drawing up Bills for presentation to the King, any attempt to make his restoration conditional was abandoned; and on May 29 Charles entered London.

The restoration of the monarchy was the inevitable consequence of the rupture between the civil and military sections of the Republican party which occurred in October, 1659, and of the division between the two which dated from April, 1653. In the confusion which followed every imaginable form of republic was proposed, with the result that the feeling in favour of the old constitution became irresistible. It seemed the only form which offered an escape from the two alternatives of military rule or anarchy. Monck perceived this feeling, and by using first one party, then another, enabled the national will to find expression through the constitutional channel. It was not without dissimulation and falsehood that he achieved his purpose. Doubtless he regarded them as weapons which it was justifiable to use, in politics as well as war, in order to secure success. "*Victor sine sanguine*" ran the words of the patent which made him Duke of Albemarle. "Monck has done his business, but with some baseness," was the verdict of one of his helpers. The generation Monck served condoned the baseness because he effected without bloodshed a settlement which closed eighteen years of revolution. The question which perplexed contemporaries was not the morality of his conduct, but the precise date when he resolved to work for the King. Was it by accident or design that Monck became the instrument of his restoration? Gumble and Price, Monck's biographers, assert that he was a Royalist from August, 1659; Clarendon, that he was converted to loyalty about March, 1660. Despite his panegyrists it is impossible to accept the view that he projected a restoration in August, 1659, and certain that he intended it when he readmitted the secluded members in February, 1660. While the Restoration was the result of a general movement of opinion too strong to be withstood, the shape it actually took was due in the main to Monck. His determination to reserve the settlement for a free Parliament coincided with the resolve adopted by Charles under Hyde's influence to leave the details to the same body. Owing to this coincidence the Restoration was from the first a restoration of parliamentary monarchy rather than of personal government.

CHAPTER XX.

THE SCANDINAVIAN NORTH.

(1559-1660.)

THE century of Scandinavian history which closes with the great settlement of the North in 1660 was a time of perpetual rivalry between the Danish and Swedish States. While Gustavus Vasa lived, his free and warlike peasants were probably a match for the hated "Jutes." But after his death in 1560, Sweden had to endure half-a-century of domestic and foreign strife, while Denmark was enjoying tolerable government and almost unbroken peace. It is therefore not surprising that in the War of Kalmar (1611-3) even the youthful genius of Gustavus Adolphus proved inadequate to the task of vanquishing the Danes, and that for fully two-thirds of his reign he was regarded by Europe as a less powerful sovereign than his rival Christian IV. The collapse of the Danish intervention in Germany, however, in conjunction with the Swedish triumphs over the Poles and the forces of Empire and League, showed that the Scandinavian balance had turned, and in three several wars between 1643 and 1660 the successors of Gustavus trampled upon Christian and his son. War brought to Sweden, empire; to Denmark, reform; and the harvesting of these gains at the close of our period forms an epoch in the history of the North.

The story of Sweden to 1630 and the share of Denmark in the Thirty Years' War have been dealt with in previous chapters. It remains to indicate the chief domestic forces and events which conditioned the foreign policy of Denmark from 1559 to 1660, and to sketch the history of the three Scandinavian kingdoms during the thirty years which followed the entry of Gustavus into Germany in 1630.

The Danish throne, upon which Frederick II succeeded his father Christian III in 1559, was that of an empire wide in extent but somewhat heterogeneous and unstable in character. The waters of the Sound, flanked by Copenhagen and Malmö, the two chief cities of the realm, formed the centre of Denmark in the sixteenth century. On the one side lay Scania and other provinces which now form the coast of southern Sweden, but which were then the home of a sturdy Danish

peasantry, while Denmark's possession of the islands of Bornholm, Gotland, and Oesel indicated and confirmed her predominance in the Baltic. To the westward of the Sound lay Zealand, Fyen (Fünen), and Jutland, each of which, like Scania, was governed by its own code of laws. Norway, though its confines then stretched further towards the south and east than at the present day, possessed but a scanty population, whose history was chiefly that of plague, fire, and famine. Since 1536 a mere dependency of Denmark, it was neglected by its Danish Kings and pillaged by the Danish nobles. The ancient realm, as one of its sons complained, had lost for the time being the strength of its manhood, and had grown grey and weary, so that the weight of its own fleece bore it to the ground.

The geographical situation of Denmark marked her out for close relations with Sweden and Germany, the only nations whose frontiers marched with hers. To her Scandinavian neighbour she was a perpetual menace. Save for a single narrow outlet towards the North Sea at the point at which Göteborg now stands, Sweden found herself cut off from western and central Europe by a Power superior to herself in renown, in resources, and in population, with Germany close at hand as a recruiting-ground and with the memory of the Kalmar Union to inspire Danish Kings with dreams of Scandinavian hegemony. The Danes moreover had not yet learned that Sweden, although vulnerable at many points, could by her vastness and poverty maintain her freedom so long as her King and people were at one. The years 1611-60 were therefore for Scandinavia still a time of discord, to which a succession of four bloody wars failed to put an end.

With Germany, on the other hand, Denmark grew more and more intimate. The contrast between the two nations, due to their separate historical development and political independence, was being diminished by influences which in the case of Denmark affected every class of the population. The Danish Kings were of German origin and made German marriages; the language of their Court and Chancery was German; the nobles imitated the social and political pretensions of their German peers; Danish commerce was largely in German hands; and the Danish Reformation had been introduced and nourished from Germany. Danish policy had at this time no dearer aims than to rival or to repress the commercial aristocracies of Lübeck and Hamburg, and to secure the permanent union of Schleswig and Holstein with the Crown. As the Swedish power grew, it became clear that in Germany alone could Denmark find scope for the territorial ambition of her Kings.

The social and constitutional condition of the Danes under Frederick II, however, gave little promise of political advance. The King himself "drank hard and had a great power over all who did so, which was a great people." The men of Jutland were noteworthy for the ferocity with which they pursued the trade of wrecking ships.

Whatever claim to distinction Denmark possessed she owed to a few individuals, among whom the theologian Nils Hemmingsen and the astronomer Tycho Brahe were the chief. The Crown, which alone could frame a policy for the State, was in great measure a separate power. The Kings, it is true, inherited carefully limited claims upon the revenues and services of sections of the nation, but they also possessed independent resources and interests which were not necessarily advantageous to the Danish State. A monarch, whose office was elective and who must therefore purchase it by conceding some of its rights to the nobles, was none the less the proprietor of an income which included the profits of the Sound, then the most productive custom-house in Europe. The fleet, moreover, consisted literally of "King's ships," while his independent position as ruler of Norway and as part-ruler of Schleswig-Holstein made it possible for the King to enlist an army over which Denmark had no control. But the real rulers of the Danish people were the nobles, a caste now some 800 or 900 strong, whose privileges had been swollen by centuries of consistent self-seeking. They had secured, not only a monopoly of fiefs and offices under the Crown and that immunity from taxation which formed the badge of their rank, but also the right to nominate and in great measure to control the local judges and agents of administration. Thus fortified against the Crown, they had broken in upon the exclusive trading rights of the burghers, while Frederick II, himself an aristocrat in feeling, permitted them to acquire the lands of the peasants. This arrogant aristocracy was ruining the State. The nobles despised or evaded the military service which alone could in some measure compensate the country for their usurpations. The remonstrances of the Kings were futile. In the *Rigsraad*, or Council of the Realm, the nobles possessed a corporation of great officers which, though nominated by the Crown, could always impede and usually frustrate royal efforts towards reform.

The Danish sovereigns moreover could not imitate the Swedish Vasa by appealing in the last resort to a free people, for popular freedom had almost disappeared. Christian III had reached the throne by trampling upon the insurgent burghers and peasants. "*Bonde*" (peasant), a title honoured in Sweden, was becoming in Denmark synonymous with "thrall." Servitude, it is true, was often voluntary in origin; for, since the burden of taxation fell upon those who were independent and not noble, the yeomen sought to become tenant-farmers, and the tenant-farmers labourers. After 1570 the peasants find no place in the Diets. Nor was the Danish Church better able to arrest the advance of the pretensions of the nobility. Despoiled and humiliated at the Reformation, she shared the feelings and impotence of a people whose ignorance and bigotry she only too faithfully reflected. A priest might purchase a living by taking to wife the cast-off mistress of a noble patron, or, where the parishioners retained the right of appointment, by marrying

the widow of his predecessor, who would otherwise have been chargeable to them. So long as the University remained unlearned and the towns small and weak, the Church could possess little or no power of leadership or independent source of strength.

These abuses, however, roused neither Frederick II nor his successor upon the throne to undertake a resolute campaign against the nobles. From 1559 to 1570 the energy of the young King was taxed to the full by foreign affairs. His reign began with a joint expedition of the rulers of Schleswig-Holstein against the district of Ditmarschen, where in 1500 a community of free fienmen had repulsed a similar invasion with a great slaughter of nobles. In 1559, however, their brave defence, in which women played a part, was unavailing against the genius of John Rantzau; and the remnants of their tribe were forced to swear fealty to Frederick and his uncles.

In 1563 the latent antagonism between Denmark and Sweden broke out in the Northern Seven Years' War. Frederick was the aggressor, but his failure to lead his troops to Stockholm quenched his ardour for strife. For eighteen years after the Peace of 1570 Denmark had leisure to recover from the war, while the King hunted and drank, occasionally rousing himself to take measures for safeguarding the strict Lutheranism of his dominions or for exploiting the Sound Dues. Above all, however, he effected a measure of settlement in the question of Schleswig-Holstein, which for more than four centuries intermittently distracted Danish statesmen, before it became one of European significance.

Since 1386, when the Counts of Holstein compelled the King of Denmark to acknowledge them as hereditary Dukes of Schleswig, this question had passed through several phases. For nearly sixty years the sworn undertaking of King Waldemar, that Schleswig should never again be united with Denmark, had prevailed. In 1448, however, Christian of Oldenburg, a nephew of the sole ruler of Schleswig-Holstein, was, through his uncle's exertions, elected to the Danish throne. Twelve years later he inherited the duchy and county, and became the ruler of both Schleswig and Holstein on swearing that their constitutions and their union should be undisturbed. Schleswig-Holstein (Holstein was now a duchy) thus became an independent possession of the Danish royal House, and in 1533 joined Denmark in a federal alliance so intimate as to be not inappropriately called a union. In 1544, however, Christian III of Denmark and his two brothers partitioned it like a German estate, choosing in turn one of three portions. Three ducal lines, named from their chief fortresses Sonderburg, Hadersleben, and Gottorp, came thus to rule territories scattered over both duchies; while common rights and a common debt bore witness to the unity of the whole. For Holstein the three brothers did joint homage to the Emperor, but the younger two resisted the attempt of the eldest, Christian III, to make good the feudal claims of the Danish Crown over Schleswig.

Such was the tangled problem which descended to Frederick II from his father Christian III. Thanks to the vigilance of Rantzau, he managed to take part in the Ditmarschen campaign, and so prevented the conquered district from being appropriated by one or both of his uncles. Five years later, in acknowledgment of the right of John his younger brother to a share in the estate of their father, one-third of the royal or Sonderburg portion was assigned to him. At this point, however, the fatal policy of partition was checked by the remonstrance of the Estates of Schleswig-Holstein. John, though endowed with lands and title, was excluded from a share in the government, which, so far as affairs common to the whole of the two duchies were concerned, was to be carried on by the King and the two Dukes in annual rotation. The protracted dispute with regard to the feudal claims of the Danish Crown over Schleswig was mitigated if not terminated in 1579, when the three rulers consented each to serve the Danish Crown with 40 horse and 80 foot in wars to the making of which they were privy. Next year the line of Hadersleben came to an end. Fresh disputes arose, but from 1580 to 1586 there were but two ruling Dukes in Schleswig-Holstein. In 1588 each of these was represented by several sons, but the Estates made good their right of election and chose Christian IV and Philip to be ruling Dukes. Thenceforward the existence of the House of Gottorp in Holstein implied that Denmark's immediate neighbour was a Power whose lot was closely, but not of necessity beneficially, interwoven with her own.

In 1588 Frederick died. His heir Christian IV was not quite eleven years of age, and it therefore fell to the *Rigsraad* to provide for a regency. Fully convinced of the superior advantages of their own government, they determined that the King should remain a minor until his twentieth birthday, and that the administration should be delegated to four aged officers of State. For eight years, therefore, the country was ruled by a moderate aristocracy, chastened by the sense of the dawning power of the young monarch. Although Denmark neglected to profit by the Russo-Swedish war and the temporary paralysis to which Sweden was subjected by the accession of Sigismund, the Danish nation was not ungrateful for the prolongation of peace.

Christian IV, whose birth, heralded according to general belief by voices of another world, had thrown the nation into a fever of delight, attained to his majority in 1596; and the event was hailed by an outburst of national enthusiasm. Three royal dynasties had passed away since an heir to the King of Denmark had been born within the land. Of this remembrance Christian IV enjoyed the benefit during a reign of sixty years, and five centuries of Danish history must be scanned to find a sovereign who was his peer in the reverence and affection of his subjects and of their posterity. He lived in the midst of his people and toiled restlessly in their service: he brought his country to the greatest political prominence that it has reached since the Middle Ages;

and, when he died, the preacher could find no parallel to him save David of Israel. Yet the royal duties which he left undone were more weighty than those which he performed, and he involved his people in disasters which rendered his labours futile. A calm comparison of his grandiose policy with his reckless neglect of the means indispensable to its fulfilment must result in enrolling him with Christian II as one of the very worst Kings of Denmark of modern history.

His character was as full of contradictions as his career. He was refined in taste and foul in speech, industrious and frivolous, grasping and extravagant, pious and dissolute. Even in that profligate age his "stark rouses" and other breaches of the moral law astonished travellers from all Europe. Yet he hazarded his life to attend divine service when in the grip of disease, and he lived in full assurance that at Rotenburg Christ had appeared to him. His popular habits concealed, but did not banish, the deep-lying aristocratic prejudices which as a Duke of Holstein he shared with the magnates of northern Germany. He danced at peasant weddings, scaled a tottering church-steeple to see to its repairs, and rose at daybreak to work as foreman on the royal wharf; but he was also the King who enlarged the hunting-grounds of the Crown, who viewed with equanimity the monstrous privileges of the nobles, who set his face against Diets, who admired the Spanish monarchy, and who could never understand that burgher corporations might have rights. He seems in truth to have been the victim of a feverish energy which banished all power of reflexion. Alike in peace and in war, he took much upon himself, but in neither field of government could he formulate a policy, organise an administration, or even communicate to his fellow-labourers a spark of his own zeal. Denmark paid dear for his blunders; but in the hour of peril he showed activity and courage which in some measure redeemed them.

At his accession to full power in 1596 Christian was a youth of nineteen, masterful, adventurous, and enamoured of the sea. All his chief passions he was able to gratify in Norway, a land which the royal House may almost be said to have now discovered anew. In 1591 he made the first of more than a score of voyages thither, and amid scenes of revelry entered on a lifelong endeavour for the welfare of the Norwegian people. Unhampered there by an indigenous caste of nobles, he chastised tyrannical officials, established silver and copper mines, and founded a series of towns, of which the chief, Christiania, bears his name. His belief in the potential wealth of Norway heightened his sensitiveness to the claims of Charles IX of Sweden upon districts in the extreme north, and helped to precipitate the War of Kalmar in 1611.

War with Sweden, however, ensued only after a long struggle in Denmark. From the accession of Charles IX in 1599, Christian felt acutely that, with so violent an anti-Jute on the throne at Stockholm,

nothing could be more humiliating and perilous than to allow the decline of the Danish forces to continue. He did all that lay in his power to prepare for a conflict which appealed to his martial instinct and which seemed to promise him, as his power increased, no less a prize than the Crown of Sweden. He accumulated treasure, created a fleet, exhorted the Danish nobles to take up arms, and cultivated the friendship of his brothers-in-law in Brandenburg and in Scotland. For a full decade, however, his plans were frustrated by the Raad. He reduced its numbers and left great offices of State unfilled, but he was powerless to deprive it of the moral support of an aristocracy which dreaded both the burden of war and the danger that war might augment the power of the Crown. In 1601, indeed, the Raad met Christian's arguments by propounding a formidable dilemma. Sweden, they rightly maintained, was by nature a realm most easy to defend against invasion; for a small army would be crushed there and a large one would starve. Their military insight was vindicated by the event. In 1611, however, Christian succeeded in forcing Denmark into a war which, in spite of the prowess of the King and his mercenaries, brought her little permanent advantage. The War of Kalmar none the less demonstrated the value of the royal fleet and the lack of a native territorial army. In 1614 Christian endeavoured to organise at least a system of home defence, but the development of the art of war and the selfishness of the nobles combined to frustrate his attempts to create even a small permanent national militia. A foreign army hired and controlled by the King was the natural outcome of the faults of Denmark.

It may not unreasonably be supposed that the ruin of his designs on the Crown of Sweden threw Christian with heightened zest into that policy of aggrandisement in Germany which, in spite of the opposition of the Raad, led to his participation in the Thirty Years' War. The ambition of the King of Denmark to intervene in the settlement of the Empire at least contributed to the maintenance of peace in Scandinavia.

The rivalry between Christian and Gustavus, accentuated by the arrogant claim of the master of the Sound to control the Baltic, revealed itself in many acts of diplomatic and commercial unfriendliness; but in 1624 peace was formally prolonged at a meeting on the border of the two kingdoms. So long as the forces of the Counter-reformation triumphed, moreover, Denmark and Sweden were forced by their common danger into a reluctant and jealous *entente*. Thirty years of peace between the Scandinavian kingdoms followed the War of Kalmar.

This period, 1613-43, in which Denmark for the last time essayed to play the part of a Great Power, revealed but did not remedy the flaws in her constitution. The chief of these were still the irresponsible ascendancy of the nobles and the half-independent position of the King as a foreign potentate. This position, which had enabled Christian to force the War of Kalmar upon the Danes, by declaring that he would in

any case make war as Duke of Holstein, enabled the Raad to treat his intervention in Germany as primarily an affair not of Denmark but only of the Lower Saxon Circle. In the hour of disaster they demurred to receiving the royal mercenaries into the islands, while the peasants of the northernmost part of Jutland saved their crops and homesteads by cutting off the retreat thither of 3000 of Christian's horse (October, 1627). Much might have been pardoned in a King who would have set himself to wrest power from the nobles and to redeem from political insignificance the other classes within the State. For this, however, Christian was too haughty or too short-sighted; and in such skirmishes as happened to arise the nobles proved easily victorious. In 1604 the King convoked representatives of the Jutish towns to confer with him at Horsens; but in deference to the wishes of the Raad and of the nobles he cancelled the invitation. Twenty-five years later the men of Jutland laid before the King an indictment against the nobles which emphasised the grievances of burghers and peasants alike. In 1636, however, a royal ordinance forbade all such complaints to the King unless they had been endorsed by the lord of the fief from which they came. Particular critics were severely dealt with. The theologian Dybvad was deprived of his professorship because of an academic attack upon the freedom of the nobles from taxation. His son, who declared that until the nobles were thrust aside the King could be King only in name, was condemned in 1620 to close imprisonment for life. Christian's proposals, in 1634, for the abolition of serfage in eastern Denmark proved futile; and his policy of marrying his numerous daughters to the chief nobles of the land was not calculated to assist the Crown in any future campaign against the caste as a whole.

Nor can it be said that Christian's administrative labours, laudable as they were, remedied the chief disease of the Danish body politic. Minor administrative duties, indeed, he performed with so much zeal as to see that his pigs were fed with green-meat in the dog-days. He built castles and towns, founded colleges, organised commercial companies, developed posts, promoted manufactures, invited useful immigrants into the kingdom, and sought profit in regions as far distant as Greenland and Ceylon. This prolonged and well-meant activity meant something to the towns, much to the peasants on the Crown estates, most of all perhaps in the fulness of time to the monarchy itself. But, where constructive legislation was essential, there Christian's abilities proved inadequate. He tried in vain to reform the government of the towns, and to secure the emancipation of the peasants from feudal dependence. Heavy taxes pressed upon the commons of Denmark and Norway for many years without bringing compensation in the shape of a formidable standing army, while all foreign nations were estranged by the spoliation of their merchants in the Sound. Towards Sweden, although the Raad consistently advocated a policy of friendship,

Christian showed in many ways an ill-will which Axel Oxenstierna was of all men the least likely to condone. The descent of the Swedish hosts upon Denmark in 1643 was thus provoked by her King. It found her isolated and unprepared; it left her humiliated and dismembered.

The fall of Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen (1632) had left the Swedish Government face to face with two great problems. The German war had never excited the enthusiasm of the people at large, and the Swedish Constitution was still undefined. Forty-two years had passed by since Sweden had enjoyed more than glimpses of peace, and in such a period no class could escape from grave sacrifices of blood and treasure. The nobles resented the weakening of their cherished privilege, for, as was said with justice, "this they thought to be freedom, to give nothing to the Crown." The peasants showed their discontent by struggling more and more frequently to evade the conscription, on several occasions even by revolt. None but a King, and no King save another Gustavus, could hope to inspire the nation with a spirit of sacrifice adequate to the task which it had undertaken.

Nor was it entirely clear upon whom power ought now to devolve. Christina, the only child of Gustavus, was not yet six years of age. Some of the Swedes, the more readily that the Polish Vasa stoutly maintained their title by right of birth, were still disposed to regard the throne as elective. The Queen-Mother, the hysterical Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg, and the Count Palatine John Casimir, the brother-in-law and Minister of Gustavus, presented embarrassing claims to influence the Government. The new method of administration by "colleges" or boards could show hardly any other title to existence than the will of the late King, while, as a corporate body, the Råd, or Council of High Officials and Statesmen, possessed only an ill-defined authority.

At this crisis, intensified as it was by a desperate war, Sweden was saved by the reputation and ability of the Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna. Without leaving Germany, where he watched over the war and the Swedish provinces, he piloted the ship of state through the shoals. Thanks to his counsel, the Diet of 1633 authorised the Råd to govern the realm in the name of Queen Christina; and in 1634 a constitution drawn up by him was accepted by both Råd and Diet. The "Form of Government" of 1634 is a great national memorial of Gustavus as a constitutional statesman. Invoking his authority, prefaced by words supposed to be his, it aims with success at making permanent his principles of administration and his administrative machine. It serves also as a measure of the swift progress of Sweden from the almost patriarchal government of Charles IX to a fixed and elaborate constitution which served as a pattern to other lands. Attributing the past sufferings of the realm to disputed successions, religious disunion, and the lack of an organised government which might supplement and modulate the exercise of royal power, the Form proceeds to remedy the last of these defects. The

King, it is clearly enunciated, is and must be the supreme governor. The business of the realm is, however, too great for him to transact alone; and he therefore appoints helpers in accordance with the law and the needs of the land and his own good pleasure. These helpers are the officials, from the five great officers of State and their colleagues in the Råd down to the National Huntsman, who already existed and whose status and competence now receive the definition and sanction of the law. Henceforward, whenever necessary, the Steward, Marshal, Admiral, Chancellor, and Treasurer were empowered collectively to supply the place of the King. Save that the number 25 was suggested as its normal complement, no attempt was made to deprive the Råd of the elasticity desirable in a body whose great functions were to advise the King, to provide him with confidential envoys, and to influence the Diet on his behalf. In sharp contrast with the freedom conceded to the central power, the five "colleges" which shared the burden of administration were carefully circumscribed. These were, first, the High Court with its branches at Stockholm, Åbo, Dorpat, and Jonköping, which was competent to deal with all ordinary cases at law, then the War Office, the Admiralty, the Chancery, through which diplomatic correspondence passed and in which all official documents were drawn up, and lastly the Treasury. No member of a "college" might exercise individually the authority which belonged to the "college" as a whole, and no "college" might encroach upon the domain of another. Sweden thus gained a true civil service, of which every member was a pillar of the State as well as a servant of the King. Nobles by birth, they acquired from their calling the corporate feeling of a bureaucracy.

For twelve years from the death of Gustavus, Axel Oxenstierna, though not unopposed in the Råd, controlled the foreign and domestic policy of Sweden. From 1636, when he quitted Germany, to the close of 1644, when the minority of Queen Christina ceased, his chancellorship was in reality kingship. He was surrounded and supported by nobles of the new generation whom Gustavus had inspired and trained for service in peace and war. His own brother was Steward and his cousin Treasurer, while in Jacob de La Gardie, Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm, Klas Fleming, and Per Brahe he possessed colleagues as able in administration as their contemporaries John Banér and Leonard Torstensson in strategy. Sweden was fortunate moreover in enlisting the services of the Walloon, Louis de Geer, who made his adopted country eminent in the manufacture of munitions of war.

In its main features a continuation of the foregoing reign, the policy of the Regency was not untinged by the opinions of the Chancellor. While he pressed forward the war and the work of developing the country and promoting education, Oxenstierna showed himself less eager than Gustavus to meet the people face to face, but perhaps more eager to advance religious toleration and freedom of trade within the realm.

Again the Church defeated an attempt of the State to reduce it to order by the establishment of a General Consistory Court. The greatest difficulty, however, was the financial. The strain upon the Swedish treasury was doubled when in 1635 Wladislaw of Poland exacted the retrocession of the Prussian provinces with their lucrative customs-dues as the price of the prolongation of the Truce. In spite of a rigorous scrutiny of the receipts and so much attention to the customs that their yield increased fourfold in thirteen years, Sweden could not escape a deficit. An honourable peace was for the time being out of reach, and Oxenstierna was determined not to abandon Germany with dishonour.

Under these circumstances the Regency was compelled to resort to measures which left a deep impress upon Swedish history. They accepted subsidies from France, admonished their generals to make the war support itself, and in 1638 won the consent of the Råd to a *frälseköp*, or sale of noble rights, to the extent of 200,000 crowns. The *frälseköp* of 1638 formed a precedent adopted in moderation by the Regency and followed to the verge of bankruptcy by Queen Christina. The whole administration was at this time based upon the produce or rents of the Crown estates. To sell these estates or rents, which nobles alone had the right of purchasing, was to endow the buyer either with the land itself or with an income from moneys hitherto paid to the Crown by what had been practically a body of yeomen owning their homes and farms on condition of making fixed payments. The effects of the *frälseköp* were both to divert the revenue of the kingdom into private pockets and to place at the mercy of the nobles a class which had hitherto enjoyed immunity from feudal servitude. From this time forward the latent antagonism between nobles and commoners was intensified, and the cry for a "Reduction," i.e. a resumption of these royal grants, grew louder year by year.

From 1641 onwards, peace negotiations between Sweden and the Emperor were on foot. In 1643 Oxenstierna felt emboldened to express in action his long-standing beliefs that the true ambition of Sweden should be to dominate the North, and that her mortal enemy was Denmark. Throughout his reign Christian IV had shown towards his neighbour a spirit which made it easy for Oxenstierna to lay before the Råd a formidable list of his offences. He had incited the Poles to attack Sweden, aided the widow of Gustavus to insult Sweden by flight, schemed to plant his brother upon the throne of the Tsars, struck heavy blows at Swedish commerce by high-handed action in the Sound, and posed as a mediator in Germany in order to rob the Swedes of the fruits of victory. "We find," wrote the Chancellor, "that Denmark is not less inimical to us than Austria, and the worse enemy because she is the nearer." In face of this manifest hostility it was perhaps unnecessary to seek further ground for war and for the Råd to allege that the Danish armaments were menacing Sweden and that Christian was in reality the aggressor.

On May 25, 1643, the order was sent to Torstensson to lead his army into Denmark. He received the Chancellor's letter in Moravia, exactly four months later, and for six weeks more, until he had reached Havelberg on the Elbe, he kept its contents secret even from his staff. In November the Danish resident at Stockholm warned Christian that the augmented courtesy of the Swedes meant mischief afoot. So late as December 12, however, the King continued to scoff at the suggestion of war and to refuse to burden the land with costly and unnecessary armaments. On that very day Torstensson marched into Holstein. Duke Frederick of Gottorp purchased neutrality by opening his gates, and Jutland lay almost defenceless. Before the end of January, 1644, the Swedes were masters of the mainland, and waited only for the freezing of the Little Belt to attack Fyen. Their plan of campaign was to conquer Scania and Jutland at the same time, and then with help from the Dutch to transport both the victorious armies to the intermediate islands. In February, Gustav Horn crossed the eastern frontier of Denmark, but on the shores of the Sound he was checked by the stubborn defence of Malmö. In the west, Torstensson's hopes of a bridge of ice had been disappointed. The fate of Denmark depended upon the command of the sea.

At this crisis, despite his 67 years, Christian saved the State. From the moment of Torstensson's inroad he had worked with all the energy of his younger days to organise the defence of the islands. Indeed, he even dared to take the offensive by attacking Göteborg. The plan was too bold; but in May the fleet created and directed by him entered the North Sea, encountered the squadron of 32 ships which Louis de Geer had enlisted in Holland, and compelled it to return. Soon afterwards, however, Klas Fleming with the royal navy of Sweden sailed from Elfsnabben, the naval base near Stockholm, towards the Little Belt. On his way he captured Femern, the southernmost of the Danish islands, but was confronted off its coast by the King in almost equal force. Although four encounters brought no decisive issue, the desperate naval struggle of Kolberg Heath (July 1, 1644), did more than many victories to enhance Christian's fame. Blinded in one eye and suffering from more than a score of wounds, he fought on until nightfall and infused something of his own courage into his men. After the battle the Swedes were penned in the fiord of Kiel, where Klas Fleming was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball from the land. Christian's thoughts travelled as far as the capture of Elfsnabben; but, during the night of August 1, Wrangel, Fleming's successor, extricated the Swedish fleet.

Isolated, save for the presence in Holstein of Gallas, the sluggish Imperialist general, and hampered by the Raad, which now as always clamoured for peace, Christian was henceforward impotent to stay the flood of disaster. In October, Wrangel and de Geer joined forces and secured the command of the sea by destroying fifteen Danish

vessels. In 1645, while Christian could only hope for mediation, the Swedes continued to prove their superiority by land and sea, and Wrangel captured Bornholm. Their daring scheme, however, had demanded for its complete success that Denmark should be crushed by the first combined attack or that the whole force of Sweden should be turned against her. Christian and his navy had removed the former possibility and to the latter the claims of Germany were fatal. At the same time, although war with Denmark had been welcomed in Sweden, a growing party now embarrassed Oxenstierna and the young Queen by pressing for its termination. To promote war in Germany, France mediated for peace in Scandinavia; and, after six months' conference on the border, the Treaty of Brömsebro was signed in August, 1645. Its terms marked clearly the degradation of Denmark from the primacy of the North. The ancient freedom of Sweden from the payment of dues in the Sound and the Belts was, though with an important reservation, confirmed and extended to the commerce of her provinces on the east of the Baltic and in Germany. As security for this freedom, Halland, a province on the shores of the Sound, was ceded to her for thirty years, while she acquired on the one flank the islands of Gotland and Oesel, and on the other the Norwegian provinces of Jemteland and Herjedalen. It is said that Christian flung the treaty in the face of Korfits Ulfeld, who had conducted the negotiations on the Danish side.

During the next three years (1645-8), while the Swedes were securing the fruits of their labours in Germany, Christian in the evening of his life was forced to reap the troubles which he had freely sown. The war had impoverished Denmark without giving her consolidation. Norway indeed, under the able and ambitious Viceroy Hannibal Sehested, had made some progress towards a separate national existence, and this was attested by a military force of its own. But the national peril had not roused the Danish nobles to any display of patriotism; and the King was now clamouring for the repayment of a million thalers that he had lent to the sorely taxed commonwealth. While the Crown, and therefore the nation, was weaker than before the war, Denmark remained in perilous international isolation. The Swedish power established itself on the lower Elbe and Weser, in the ports of Western Pomerania, and, by means of alliance with the House of Gottorp, in Holstein itself. To the Dutch, Christian paid dear for his former extortions and for his intrigues with Spain. Their natural and consistent aim was to secure free access to the Baltic, which they styled "the mother of merchants," and which accounted for more than one-half of the tonnage of their ships which were engaged in foreign trade. During the negotiations at Brömsebro they had given diplomatic support to Sweden; and de With had dealt the "lord of the Baltic" the most painful blow that he ever received by sailing unchallenged through the Sound. At the Peace of Christianopol

(August, 1645) Christian made concessions to them which reduced the revenue from the Dues to an inconsiderable remnant; yet in the same year they renewed their alliance with Sweden for a term of forty years.

In the hope of securing one ally among the Protestant Powers, Christian despatched his son-in-law, Korfits Ulfeld, on a mission to the Hague (December, 1646). The chief result of seven months' costly diplomacy was to demonstrate and embitter the domestic strife which now surrounded the Danish throne. Four years after the death of his Queen in 1611, Christian had made amorganatic marriage with Christina Munk, who bore him two sons and eight daughters. One of the latter became the bride of Hannibal Sehested; another, the King's beautiful and accomplished favourite, Leonora Christina, was married to Korfits Ulfeld. These two sons-in-law were jealous rivals for power; but their rivalry was overshadowed by the feud between the relatives of Christina Munk, who had been dismissed for infidelity in 1630, and a third group of the King's children, the offspring of her maid Vibeke Kruse. This domestic struggle, complicated by the claims of the noble caste to which Christina Munk belonged, ended with the triumph of Ulfeld over all competitors for power and with the humiliation of the monarchy.

Spurred on both by the obvious needs of the State and by an avarice which grew with age and misfortune, the King had striven to commute the antiquated knight-service of the nobles into a tax, and to farm out the fiefs of the Crown to the highest bidder. To overcome the opposition of the nobles, he made concessions both in central and local government. Henceforward when a vacancy occurred in the Raad the remaining members might nominate six or eight nobles from whom the King was to choose a successor. Commissioners appointed by the nobles were to replace the direct control of the Crown over the local officials. In 1647, however, the death of his heir, the profligate "Elected Prince" Christian, compelled the King to surrender all his hopes in order to secure the succession for his second son Frederick. In February, 1648, before the Diet had met to make the election, he died, broken by trouble.

The events which followed the death of Christian IV gave new proof that Denmark had lost the balance of her constitution. The peasants were no longer free, and the monarchy now became a shadow. For some months the realm was governed by the four great officers of State, with Ulfeld at their head; and the Raad claimed that the nobles alone possessed the right to elect a King. Before they acquiesced in the accession of Frederick they succeeded in destroying the few remnants of royal independence in order to safeguard aristocratic privilege. The King-elect acknowledged the supremacy of their power and bound himself not to make war or alliance, and not to call out the land forces or arm the fleet or even quit the country without their consent. Frederick III, though well-educated and well-meaning, thus

found himself too closely fettered to accomplish great things for a land in which the Commons were looking eagerly towards the Crown. Reserved and self-contained, he was long in gaining any hold upon the imagination of the people. Some development of internal communications and the fortification of Fredericia constituted the meagre profits of his early years as King.

For three years indeed Ulfeld rather than Frederick was the chief man in the State, while the inevitable struggle between their consorts distracted the Court. Early in 1649 Ulfeld embarked on a second and more fruitful mission to the Hague. He conceded to the Dutch freedom from the Sound Dues in return for an annual composition of 120,000 thalers, a bargain which pleased neither nation and which was revoked in 1653. To the disgust of the Swedes, however, he secured a treaty of defensive alliance with their allies in the Netherlands. On his return to Denmark he found himself accused of peculation and of conspiring to poison the King. The latter charge broke down; but, to escape the former, which had just proved fatal to the career of Hannibal Sehested, he fled to Holland with his wife and treasure. Soon, however, he took up his abode in Sweden and became the open enemy of Frederick III. His flight in July, 1651, marked the fall of the children of Christina Munk from power. A caste rather than a single family thenceforward wielded an aristocratic tyranny in Denmark. Nevertheless, it was as an ill-organised and unwarlike State that, as will be narrated below, she in 1657 once more came into conflict with Sweden.

The period from 1645 to 1648, from the humiliation of Denmark by the Peace of Brömsebro to the establishment of the Swedish power in Germany by the Peace of Westphalia, marks the gradual decline of Oxenstierna's supremacy in Sweden. In 1645 he received the thanks of the Queen and became Count of Södra Möre; but in 1648 little save humiliation and reproach fell to his share. The daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, it was clear, would tolerate no preceptor. Once more the personal characteristics of a monarch became of the first importance in Swedish history.

In some respects unique, Christina shared largely in the common heritage of the Vasa. Like her royal ancestors, she was strong in body and keen in brain, ardent, restless, and autocratic. In courage she was excelled by none of them. Her education had been that of her House. At eighteen she read Thucydides and Polybius in Greek, and wrote and spoke Latin, French, and German; at twenty-three she conferred daily with Descartes. Besides her sex, however, there was much that was unprecedented in her succession. From the moment of her birth, unlike almost all of her predecessors, she had been the destined heir to the throne. Her early training was such as to deepen at every stage her sense of isolation. An only child, she lost her father before her sixth birthday, and before her twelfth the aunt Catharine,

wife of John Casimir, who had brought her up, while reasons of State dictated the removal from her side of a mother who despised Sweden. She grew to womanhood as the living embodiment of a monarchy which the most consummate statesman and the most formidable army in Europe combined to make resplendent. Lonely as she was, conscious of energy and imagination beyond the ordinary, hourly exposed to the flattery of her Court and the reverence of her people, it need excite little wonder if she failed to discriminate between her own greatness and the greatness of her office. "It is a pleasure," wrote the French ambassador Chanut, "to see her lay the crown beneath her feet and declare that virtue is the only good." "She held it an honour," ran Christina's comment on this verdict, "to place under her feet what other kings set upon their heads." "Thou hast made me so great," she cried to God, "that if Thou gavest me the whole realm of earth my heart were not content."

Like Elizabeth of England, Christina was constantly importuned to provide for the welfare of the State by marriage. The Elector of Brandenburg, as the nominee of Gustavus Adolphus, was first spoken of, and Count Magnus de La Gardie enjoyed the obvious favour of the Queen; but her cousin and playmate Charles Gustavus soon became her expectant lover and the choice of the people. Marriage, however, she regarded as a repulsive servitude and she resolved never to endure it. In 1649 she wrung from the Råd and the Diet a reluctant acknowledgment of Charles Gustavus as her eventual successor upon the throne; and next year, in spite of the opposition of Oxenstierna, his male descendants were placed in the line of succession.

Administrative routine in a Government of which the monarch was still the centre filled Christina with disgust. Her zeal for learning, illustrated by her patronage of Grotius, Salmasius, and Descartes, as well as of the Swedish men of science Stiernhöök and Stiernhielm, found expression in educational reform. But this service to the State was far outweighed by her neglect of affairs, and especially by her financial incompetence. Simple in diet and in dress, she set no bounds to the flood of her liberality. In ten years she doubled the number of noble families and endowed them with grants of estates so lavish that the Crown had no more to give.

The recklessness of the Queen strengthened a movement which had been gathering strength since the *frälseköp* of 1638, and which found open expression at the Diet of 1650. Led by Professor Terserus and Nils Nilsson, the Mayor of Stockholm, the Commons demanded a Reduction, or resumption of part of the alienated estates and revenues of the Crown. The Diet was prolonged to the unprecedented duration of four months; and for a moment civil war seemed to be at hand. The Commons, however, assured of the Queen's sympathy with their defence of their freedom, contented themselves with presenting to her a written

indictment of the nobles. Many began to look upon Charles Gustavus, who for the time being held aloof from politics, as the destined saviour of the State.

Amid extravagant festivities, however, Christina was crowned in October, 1650. In February, 1654, she informed the Råd of her irrevocable determination to abdicate. In the meantime she had received further proofs of the toilsomeness and unpopularity of her rule, and had found a new and potent motive for laying it down. In December, 1651, a rhymed pamphlet was discovered which attacked the government of the Queen and called upon Charles Gustavus to overthrow it. The author, Arnold Messenius, suffered death; but investigation showed that he had been but the imprudent spokesman of the Opposition. Charles Gustavus cleared himself to the Queen's satisfaction, and by her command the matter was hushed up. In 1652 she met the Diet, which in face of the threatening attitude of Poland and Denmark did not refuse to vote three years' conscription and augmented taxes.

The grievances of the peasants against the nobles, heightened as they were by the negligence and extravagance of the Queen, seemed none the less to threaten revolution. The ferment of the nation could not but increase Christina's distaste for her crown. So early as 1648 she had spoken privately of abdicating, and three years later she published her design. Her subsequent hesitation was now brought to an end, as seems probable, by her eagerness for full reception into the Church of Rome. Accomplished and sympathetic foreigners, Chanut, Bourdelot, the French physician whom she believed to have saved her life, disguised Jesuits, above all, since 1652, the Spanish ambassador Pimentelli, had prepared the way for a conversion which it was impossible for a Swedish monarch to complete. Having secured a substantial appanage, Christina formally put off the trappings of sovereignty in June, 1654. A few days later she was rejoicing in the hope that she had quitted Sweden for ever.

The abdication of Christina signified neither the extinction of the Vasa dynasty in Sweden nor a breach in its long sequence of distinguished monarchs. Charles X Gustavus, who succeeded her, was the grandson of Charles IX and the grandsire of Charles XII, and proved himself not unworthy to be named with them or even with the great Gustavus. A Wittelsbach by descent on the father's side, he belonged in thought and character to the land which had sheltered the Count Palatine, John Casimir, his father, and in which he himself was born and bred. With France, Germany, and Denmark he was already well acquainted. He had learned strategy from Torstensson and diplomacy from Oxenstierna, while at Leipzig and in Öland he had gained experience of administration. His kinship to the royal House had made him from infancy the centre of party strife; and it was in war that he had sought

refuge from this and from his pain at the rejection of his suit by Christina. He came to the throne as a man of thirty-two, experienced and pious, modest and firm, inscrutable yet winning, and ready to face with an immense reserve of energy the chaos in which he found the nation.

His conduct towards Axel Oxenstierna, who had been the most steadfast political opponent both of John Casimir and of his son, gave early proof of his magnanimity. With filial reverence, the King at once turned to him for help; and when, in August, 1654, the aged Chancellor died, he appointed his son Erik in his stead. His statesmanship was next tested by the need of transforming a bankrupt and divided nation, fringed by provinces which it had conquered but not assimilated, into a State able and willing to seize, in the face of many enemies, the present opportunity of expansion. For reasons to be mentioned immediately, King and Råd decided in 1654 in favour of a Polish war. It remained for the Diet of 1655 not only to endorse their decision, but also, at the expense of the recently aggrandised nobles, to restore the balance of the constitution and the revenue of the Crown.

The demand of the Commons for some "*Reduction*" gained irresistible force from the mere contemplation of the national impotence. When the navy was short of provisions, and the King's horses without hay, it was clear that some of the estates which formed the only source of such supplies must be resumed by the Crown. But, while the peasants fiercely insisted upon a sweeping measure of confiscation, the great nobles, whose united force could almost defy coercion, were loath to disgorge more than a small fraction of their gains at the price of a secure title to the remainder. Charles solved the problem by proposing, with the consent of the Råd, a reduction large enough to give the State a revenue and not too large for a firm and tactful monarch to carry into effect. Those estates which were termed "*indispensable*," because the maintenance of a definite part of the Administration was specifically charged upon them, were to be resumed in their entirety. Of the remaining alienations one-fourth was to be surrendered. The great nobles succeeded, however, in limiting the latter provision to the estates which they had acquired since the death of Gustavus Adolphus, and in confining their immediate sacrifice to an annual payment in money. A special "*college*" or department of Government, under the active presidency of Herman Fleming, immediately began to investigate the title to lands and to "*reduce*" the appropriate fraction to the full ownership of the Crown. Although the subsequent turmoil made it impossible to complete the work, the Crown thus regained nearly three thousand homesteads.

The remainder of his short reign proved that Charles lacked neither interest nor skill in administration. He was a keen-eyed overseer of the land, and kept an open ear for the complaints of his people. In six years he convoked the Estates five times, and again and again

succeeded in persuading his weary subjects to make the sacrifices necessary for foreign war. He rivalled his predecessors in zeal for learning. From him the University of Upsala received a constitution which remained valid for almost two hundred years (1655-1853). He granted to the Livonian Palmstruch in 1656 a patent for the term of thirty years for the first Swedish bank; and the famous iron and steel industry of Eskilstuna was at the same time transplanted thither from Riga. Many signs betokened the advent of a strong and beneficent ruler possessing the confidence of his people.

Outside the peninsula the King's first duty, besides furthering the political advantage of Sweden by means of a suitable marriage, was to bring to an end the war which Bremen had been waging with some success against Christina in defence of its ancient rights as a free city of the Empire. His marriage in October, 1654, with Hedwig Eleonora, the second daughter of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, was a bid for security against the hostility of Denmark, particularly near Elbe and Weser.

The affair of Bremen showed clearly the new international position of Sweden. The revolt of the citizens against a foreign master won the sympathy of their fellow Germans, while France was hopeful that the new monarch, as heir of the House of Zweibrücken, would march from Bremen to the Rhine, and make valid his claims to Jülich-Cleves by joining her in a common campaign against the Habsburgs. Charles was content, however, with the submission of the city, which relieved Sweden from a burdensome struggle and permitted her to sweep into her own ranks the mercenaries of northern Germany.

From the Diet of 1655 onwards, however, the history of the reign is mainly that of the Polish war, and of the wars with Russia and Denmark consequent upon it. The decision of King and people to attack Poland signally illustrates their mind and character, and the strength and weakness of Sweden. Justification for hostilities was indeed not far to seek. Since 1592 the two countries had been involved in a dynastic struggle interrupted only by truces. The last of these, arranged at Altmark in 1629 for six years and prolonged at Stuhmsdorf in 1635 for twenty-six years more, had now almost run its course. In 1648 Oxenstierna had striven earnestly to convert it into a definite treaty; but the Polish Vasa still refused to recognise their rivals as lawful sovereigns of Sweden.

France wished to establish a firm peace between two dynasties, each of which might do her good service against the Habsburgs; but both in 1651 and 1652 a congress held at Lübeck failed to accomplish her desire. Jeopardised by the revolt of the Cossacks, but no longer menaced by the host which Sweden had so long maintained in Germany, the Poles adhered to their outrageous demands that their rivals should evacuate Livonia and pay compensation for the throne which Sigismund

had forfeited in 1599. The final failure of the congress in February, 1653, left the future to decide which of the two Powers would first be ready to strike—the Poles to vindicate these claims, or the Swedes to silence them for ever. It is said that in 1654 the envoy of John Casimir of Poland issued a solemn protest against the transference of the Swedish Crown from the Vasa family to Charles Gustavus. The great settlement of 1648, moreover, had loosened all anterior political systems, and in a new phase of European international relations the Polish quarrel might well involve Sweden in a new peril.

It would be idle to pretend, however, that the momentous declaration of war in 1655 was made with the sole purpose of defending Sweden against an eventual Polish attack. The questions which Charles and the Råd set themselves to answer were in fact first, Is war desirable? and second, If so, with whom? For many reasons it might seem expedient that Sweden should not lightly abandon what has been styled her most lucrative industry; and these reasons were powerfully reinforced by the aims and predilections of the King. Eminent though he was in diplomacy and administration, Charles was at heart a soldier, scorning to loosen by compromise knots which might be cut by the sword, threatening like some new Alaric that he would march to Italy with his Goths, excelling and delighting in war. By war alone could an army like that to which Sweden owed her new empire be kept together and paid; while without war it seemed impossible to free the land from the turbulence of the disbanded soldiery and the burning strife between nobles and commons. Charles, as his own best general, might well hope that war would bring popularity to himself and power to his Crown. If these hopes overcame the half-hearted arguments that war meant fresh expenditure at a time when Sweden already owed two millions, and fresh exertion when sixty years of strife had strained her powers, there was much to indicate Poland, rather than Denmark, which some preferred, as the most profitable field of battle. Poland was not, like Russia, a land too barren to nourish the invaders. In Prussia, with its Baltic coast-line and rich customs-dues, she offered a great prize. And by victory in Poland it might now be possible to end at a blow the two great conflicts which had embarrassed Sweden for generations. Those Baltic provinces, "the magazine of Sweden," which constituted her heritage from the Knights of the Sword, might be made secure after a century of armed contention, and the dynastic schism might at last be healed by the triumph of Charles X.

At this juncture, moreover, the Republic seemed so defenceless as to warrant the assertion that it was the duty of the Swedes to intervene in Poland to prevent their Baltic transmarine possessions from being outflanked by the conquests of the Tsar. The military successes of Wladislaw IV (1632-48) had in no wise turned back the current which was bearing Poland towards anarchy. The nobles continued to

grow in luxury and power; and a new danger to the State arose in the alienation of the Cossacks from their Catholic overlords. Before the reign of the brother and successor of Wladislav, John Casimir, had well begun, the revolted Cossacks under Chmielnicki plunged the State into a desperate civil strife. After five bloody campaigns, interrupted by a brief interval of peace in 1650, the Poles had called the Tatars to their aid, while the Cossacks transferred their allegiance to the Tsar. In 1654, therefore, Poles, Cossacks, Tatars, and Russians were struggling together in the Ukraine, while the Tsar marched into Lithuania, triumphed over Prince Radzivil, and captured many places, including the strong border-fortress of Smolensk. The forces of Russia had thus secured a firm grip upon the eastern flank of Poland. Swedish Livonia sheltered fugitives from across the border, and the Lithuanian nobles sought a protector in Charles X. The Polish State seemed to be on the verge of dissolution, to the profit of the Power whose advent on the shores of the Baltic would menace the whole structure of the Swedish Empire.

To facilitate his immediate enterprise of profiting by the chaos in Poland and of anticipating the Tsar, Charles spared no effort of statecraft. Sweden and her monarch, as the affair of Bremen had taught them, were at this time suspect in Europe. The (unauthorised) declaration of Schlippenbach, her envoy at Berlin, that in the modern world a convenient opportunity of injuring a neighbour and annexing territory must take the place of dreams and prophecy as indicating the Divine Will, was not unnaturally held to express the principles of Swedish policy. Wrangel, the veteran of the Thirty Years' War, whose motto ran, "He who takes has," was not unsupported in the Råd when he advocated the political maxim, "Let us seek profit as best we can." Yet on every side, in Holland, Denmark, Russia, Transylvania, and Courland, among the Cossacks and the discontented Poles, above all in Brandenburg and England, Charles sought by diplomatic means to win security, countenance, or alliance in his adventure. The event showed that it was possible to secure some armed assistance from the Great Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg and from George Rakoczy II, Prince of Transylvania, but only at the price of territorial concessions which were bound to estrange the Poles.

The immediate plan of Charles X was to isolate and conquer the Polish province of West Prussia. His great design as developed by events seems to have been to incorporate with Sweden the whole south-eastern coast-line of the Baltic and to buttress his empire with dependent principalities carved out of Poland, if necessary by the sword. It might well be questioned, however, whether such a scheme contained even the possibility of success. Dunbar, a Scottish merchant of Danzig, anticipated, in November, 1655, the verdict of posterity upon the Polish adventure of Charles X. "Any wise man," he wrote, "may see that,

although all the inhabitants of the Swede's dominions were to be transplanted thither and distributed as cunningly as the wit of man could devise, when they shall look on the number of the conquered, ponder the robustness of their bodies, their qualification to war,...wanting nothing but discipline, which time among the experted Swedes would soon teach them, they must.....stand in continual fear of a massacre."

The Swedes, however, once more proved their devotion to their Kings. In June, 1655, Charles succeeded in overcoming the aversion of the peasants and priests of his Diet to the burden of a fresh war. By land and sea, in Sweden, Finland, Livonia, and Germany, nearly 50,000 troops had already been mustered. In July, undeterred by the offers and remonstrances of peace-envoys from the Polish Estates, the King set out for Poland from his capital, which he never saw again.

More complete success than that of the first campaign could hardly have been hoped for. Using Swedish Pomerania as a base, Arvid Wittenberg, escorted by the exile Radziejowski and followed by King Charles, hastened towards Warsaw. The capital with all its stores surrendered unconditionally, and soon the whole of Great Poland was in Swedish hands. John Casimir indeed had shown fight; but with scarcely 5000 men he could not hope to check the invaders. Soon he was a fugitive in Silesia; and the time seemed to have come for Charles to turn against Prussia. Electing, however, first to secure Little Poland, he marched southward and in October reduced Cracow, the ancient capital of the Republic. The Poles, indeed, looked with indifference upon what they regarded as a mere dynastic contest. A martial aristocracy, they might well turn with relief from their feeble and frivolous sovereign to the royal soldier who promised to respect their rights. In little more than three months, and at the cost of one battle, the western half of the territory of John Casimir had changed masters. Many nobles and soldiers, John Sobieski among them, did homage to Charles and received fiefs at his hands. The Protestants, headed by Prince Radzivil, gave him willing support; and the Catholics at least preferred him to the Tsar. Under the stress of the Russian invasion the Lithuanians formally surrendered themselves to the King and Crown of Sweden. He exercised the rights of sovereignty, and summoned the Polish Diet to meet at Warsaw.

The war was, however, by no means a simple duel between the Vasa rivals. While Russians, Cossacks, and Tatars struggled in the east and south, and Charles reduced the south-west to submission, the Great Elector, who held the duchy of East Prussia under the Polish Crown, was endeavouring to cross the Swedish plan by snatching West Prussia from the conflagration. He was cowed, however, by the speed and energy of the King, who marched from end to end of Poland, took Thorn and Elbing, the keys of the duchy, and encircled the Elector in his Prussian capital. Early in January, 1656, Frederick William

assented to the Treaty of Königsberg, which bound him to do homage to Charles for East Prussia, to surrender the half of its customs-dues, and to supply 1500 auxiliaries to the Swedish force. He received in return the bishopric of Ermeland, which rounded off his duchy, and he preserved his army, humiliated but still unbroken. Charles, now rejoicing at the birth of an heir, seemed to have only to conquer Danzig, the inveterate and powerful foe of Sweden, in order to complete his success.

In the moment of seeming triumph, however, his position was exhibiting defects due to its foundation in military force and to the complex character of the war. Proud and Catholic Poland seemed to itself contaminated by the presence of the heretic sovereign of a despised race, who in spite of his promise to maintain the Polish liberties seemed to pose as a conqueror. In the earlier stages of the enterprise the famous Swedish discipline had been maintained; and the hanging corpses of some five hundred mercenaries had marked Wittenberg's route. But as the campaign widened Charles could neither pay his men nor adequately control detachments habituated to the license of the Thirty Years' War. Their extortion and outrage kindled the national spirit of the people, and soon religion lent its aid. Towards the close of the year 1655 the successful defence of the monastery of Czenstochowa, "the Loretto of Poland," convinced devout patriots that God was on their side. The Prior did not scruple to assert that seventy monks, five nobles, and one hundred and sixty rustic soldiers had miraculously foiled an army more than forty times as great. Confederations of Polish nobles were formed for the defence of "the King, the faith, and freedom," and many isolated parties of Swedish soldiers were put to the sword. John Casimir soon returned to Polish soil and solemnly consecrated his kingdom to the Blessed Virgin.

Charles strove in vain to crush the national rising by a swift march southward in the depth of winter. Having despatched de La Gardie to observe the Russians, he quitted the neighbourhood of Danzig, and three weeks later routed Czarniecki at Golombo far beyond Warsaw (February 7, 1656). Before the end of the month he was preparing to besiege Lemberg, having reached Jaroslav, distant some 570 miles in a direct line from his starting-point. He escaped from destruction, however, only by a wonderful retreat on Warsaw, after more than two months of futile heroism in the face of danger and hardship of every kind. Thence he sped to besiege Danzig; and in June, 1656, John Casimir regained his capital. Charles had proved himself a pupil of Torstensson and a forerunner of Charles XII, but he had failed to conquer Poland.

At the same moment the Tsar began a campaign in the Baltic Provinces, where Magnus de La Gardie with a few heroic troops strove to defend the lands which his father had won for Sweden. The Russian invasion, moreover, seemed to be but the prelude to a general storm provoked by Swedish aggression. The exhortations of Pope Alexander VII,

the hostility of the Emperor who had incited the Tsar to make war, the jealousy of the Danes, the uncertain temper of his own great nobles and new provinces, and the menacing attitude of the Dutch, who seized the Swedish colony on the Delaware and determined to safeguard at all costs their interests in the Baltic—all these perils environed the Swedish King. Yet he clung to his plans, hoping that one great victory would change the whole scene. A single ally might still be purchased. Frederick William of Brandenburg had much to fear from the return of John Casimir, whose allegiance he had renounced, and much to hope from a Swedish conquest of Prussia. In June, 1656, therefore, he signed a new treaty with Charles at Marienburg, the immediate effect of which was to increase the King's Brandenburg auxiliaries from 1500 to 4000 men.

Having thus raised his army to a strength of 18,000, Charles marched on Warsaw, which was held by John Casimir and Czarniecki with at least 50,000 Poles and Tatars. Overruling the Elector, he insisted on battle, and after two days of manœuvring won a complete victory and captured the city. This brilliant feat raised the prestige of the Swedish arms still higher and checked for a moment the growth of the hostile coalition. But it was far from conquering Poland or inducing John Casimir to come to terms. The Elector refused to advance south of Warsaw; and Danzig was relieved by the Dutch fleet. With Poland unconquered, Ingria and Livonia overrun, the Baltic commanded by unfriendly ships, and Sweden hourly expecting to be invaded, Charles was forced to sacrifice some portion of his design. In September Erik Oxenstierna negotiated the Treaty of Elbing with the Dutch, by which Sweden granted them the position of the most favoured nation; and in November, after the untimely death of his Chancellor, the King made the momentous Treaty of Labiau, in order to buy off Brandenburg and so to secure West Prussia. The Elector was now to receive the full and perpetual sovereignty over East Prussia, Charles thus consenting that the Baltic coast from Memel to the eastern outlet of the Vistula should remain outside his Empire. A new alliance made in December with Rákóczy promised to deluge southern Poland with a horde of Transylvanians and Cossacks, besides perhaps serving as a check on the Emperor.

The joint campaign of Charles and Rákóczy in 1657 devastated Poland but led to no decisive success. The King, whose strategy depended upon striking heavy blows with matchless speed, wearied of a land whose vastness mocked at speed and in which he could seldom close with his opponent. At the same time the diplomacy against which he had been running a race reached its goal. In spite of the sudden death of the Emperor, an Austrian force took the field against him; and, on June 1, 1657, Denmark declared war. Aware as he was of the insufficient training of the Danes in arms, Charles hesitated for a moment between his new foes. But he could hardly hope that Frederick William, already a rebel against the Polish Crown, would now venture to oppose the

Habsburgs also. He therefore resolved to retain the advantages of attack and to make Denmark pay for whatever loss he might incur in Livonia and Prussia.

In their enterprise of 1657 the Danes were far more united than during the two wars of Christian IV with Sweden. A few of the elder members of the Raad, it is true, urged that the army was undisciplined and the treasury unfilled. But the majority joined the younger nobles in clamouring for war; and, in February, 1657, the Diet at Odense voted a war-tax of three million thalers. Frederick III clutched at war as the only hope of recovering the lost prerogative of the Crown, together with the provinces sacrificed to Sweden in 1645. He was urged on by half Europe—by Poland, Russia, Spain, the House of Austria, and above all by the Dutch. In 1656 the recapture of the Polish capital deterred him from declaring war; but now both Tsar and Habsburg were in the field and it seemed that his neighbour was hopelessly entangled in Poland. An army of 34,000 men was therefore mustered. Marshal Anders Bilde easily reconquered Bremen and Verden, while Frederick lay in wait in the Baltic to cut off Charles as he fled across the sea to Sweden.

Charles had, however, no thought of such a flight. Committing the defence of the peninsula to Per Brahe and the peasants, and leaving the Polish and Russian wars to smoulder on, he resolved to tread in the footsteps of Torstensson and to crush the Danes by an irresistible attack on land. At the head of some 6000 tattered veterans he accomplished another prodigious march—from Brecz in the heart of Poland to Stettin. There he was reinforced by Wrangel, while the exile Korfits Ulfeld came to contribute his influence and diplomatic skill to the overthrow of Frederick's throne. The horses died by hundreds; but within eight weeks from the declaration of war 13,000 Swedes crossed the frontier of Holstein (July, 1657). The Duke of Holstein-Gottorp placed no obstacle in the path of his son-in-law, and Hamburg, the steadfast foe of the Danish monarchy, supplied the invaders with every necessary. The Danes were expelled from Bremen, and the fall of Itzehoe drove them from Holstein. Some were forced into the Swedish ranks, others fled by sea to Jutland, or by land to Frederiksdodde, their new fortress on the shores of the Little Belt. Soon the 6000 defenders of Frederiksdodde formed the sole important barrier against the Swedish power on the mainland.

By matchless daring, speed, and skill, Charles had delivered Sweden proper from anything more dangerous than frontier warfare, and had established a claim to receive compensation in Denmark for his losses in the East. He could not, however, hope to partition a State with which the House of Austria, the Poles, and the Dutch were in alliance unless foreign mediation should be averted and unless his small army should continue to enjoy swift and unqualified success. The conquest of Jutland must be followed and completed by that of Fyen, which would in its turn prepare the way for the decisive struggle in Zealand. In

pursuance of this plan, the Swedish fleet sailed for the Little Belt, but on September 12 and 13 it was beaten back. It became impossible to land in Fyen and to isolate Frederiksodde. Charles was learning by experience, as Torstensson had learned in 1644, that islands cannot be conquered without the command of the sea.

At this crisis, while fencing with the mediation of France and England, Charles learned that at Wehlau the Elector Frederick William, deserted as he complained by the Swedish King, had sold his alliance to Poland. The Swedes might soon be imprisoned in Jutland by a combined force of Austrians, Poles, and Brandenburgers; and, even if they cut their way through, they possessed no bridge to Sweden. This peril was averted by a mixture of daring and good fortune which made the winter campaign of 1657-8 for ever memorable.

On the night of Sunday, October 24, Wrangel with some 4000 men surprised and stormed Frederiksodde, where Marshal Bilde was mortally wounded and more than 3000 of his troops laid down their arms. The mainland was now subdued and the new-born unity of the Danes shattered, but for three months the Swedes remained unable to cross the Little Belt. At the end of January, 1658, however, they astounded Europe by marching over the ice in face of a hostile force and swiftly conquering Fyen. The daring of this exploit was by no means limited to a crossing during which two squadrons of horse and the carriages of the King and of the French ambassador were swallowed up. By landing in Fyen Charles committed his person and his army to an island of no great size, situated in a sea which the enemy commanded.

The unwonted cold, however, continued; and, on hearing that the triple alliance of his foes had despatched against him a force greater than his own, the King thought for a moment of retracing his steps in order to strike, with the support of France and England, at the Habsburgs. But the pledge of his young quartermaster-general, Erik Dahlberg, to guide the army safely across the Great Belt turned the scale. Despite the remonstrances of Wrangel and Ulfeld, Charles resolved to tempt fortune a second time and to seek Frederick in his capital. Led by Dahlberg, the Swedes quitted Fyen on the night of February 4, and during a whole week passed from island to island, conquering each in turn. Taasinge, Langeland, Laaland, Falster, and finally Zealand formed the successive stations on a march which was accomplished almost without loss and which placed Copenhagen at the mercy of the invader. Danish peace commissioners were already on their way to Charles; and neither the severity of his demands nor his choice of the traitor Ulfeld to urge them warranted the Danes in breaking off negotiations. Before the close of February, 1658, the ring of Sweden's foes was broken by a treaty with Denmark at Roeskilde.

The terms of the Treaty of Roeskilde supplemented those of the Treaty of 1645 and completed the expulsion of the Danish power

from the south of the Scandinavian peninsula. Scania, Halland, and Bleking became Swedish, as did also Bornholm, the sole remaining Danish outpost towards the eastern Baltic. From Norway were taken Trondhjem and the maritime county of Baahus, by which the outlet of Sweden towards the North Sea was enlarged to its present size. Other clauses, more transient but no less humiliating, provided for the transfer of troops to the Swedish service, the renunciation of anti-Swedish alliances, the closing of the Sound against fleets hostile to Sweden, the restoration of the estates of Ulfeld, and an indemnity to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp which should be determined by direct negotiation between himself and Denmark.

A submission which humbled Denmark in the dust was followed by a singular display of friendship between the two monarchs. After three days of royal festivity at Frederiksborg, Charles crossed the Sound and passed in triumph through his new provinces to Göteborg, whither he had summoned a committee of the Swedish Estates. Wrangel and the army remained on Danish soil. Two marches and a skirmish comprised within a fortnight seemed to have endowed Sweden with her natural frontier, and with the opportunity of peace. The reopening of social strife seemed to assure the impotence of Denmark. The arrangements by which the south of Scandinavia became Swedish found their strongest guarantee moreover in the approval of the Dutch and English, who congratulated themselves that henceforward "the power over that narrow entry into the Baltic, being balanced betwixt two emulous Crowns, will be an effectual preventive of any new exactions or usurpations in the Sound."

South and east of the Baltic, the prospects of Sweden had also grown brighter. The Elector of Brandenburg, who had based his latest change of side on a pardonable miscalculation, was already penitent. The Tsar, repulsed from Nöteborg, Keksholm, and Riga, and menaced by the alliance of the House of Austria with the Poles, had grown weary of the struggle for an outlet towards the west. If Charles would abandon Prussia, the remnants of the coalition would not lightly assail his undivided power. And none but a soldier could doubt that in peace alone could Sweden regain social harmony and assimilate to her national life her acquisitions of the preceding fifteen years.

During the spring of 1658, therefore, the destiny of his country lay in the keeping of Charles X. Historical research has not yet fully elucidated the origin of an event which confounded all Europe and blighted the promise of a fair future for Sweden. In February, as has been shown, the concord of Scandinavia seemed assured. In July its foundations were shattered by the hand of Charles; and the catastrophe of his brief reign had begun.

Ostensibly at least, the second Danish War of Charles X arose out of the diplomatic sequel to the treaty which concluded the first. As was inevitable when systems of policy were to be reversed and provinces

to exchange sovereigns, many details remained to be discussed by commissioners, and until these were settled the infliction of the Swedish troops continued to oppress Denmark. The negotiations were protracted, and the new-born mutual confidence of the two monarchs vanished. On March 7 the English agent at Copenhagen had reported that "the only remaining business is to adjust the satisfaction of the Duke of Holstein....This will be the work but of a few days." His colleague at the Hague, however, noted the belief of the Dutch "that the King of Denmark would in making this peace deceive the King of Sweden"; and ere long the attitude of Frederick towards the Dutch seems to have convinced Charles that at Roeskilde he had stayed his hand too soon. He accepted the idea of a Scandinavian defensive alliance, but demanded that the Danes should assist in closing the Baltic to foreign armaments. This demand admitted of no compromise, for Danzig and perhaps all Prussia might be won and lost in the Sound. For two months while the ground was hardening and the crops growing ripe, the King had to wait a reply.

Then, on June 28, he wrote to his commissioners with his own hand that if Denmark would assent to this they should complete the negotiations forthwith. Thus to renounce the Dutch alliance was, however, too hard for the Danes, and they frankly confessed it. Frederick despatched Owe Juel to negotiate with Charles in person, but the die was already cast. On July 1 the Swedish commissioners were instructed that, even if the Danes should yield, pretexts for prolonging the discussion must be found. Apart from the need of succouring his brother Adolphus John in Prussia, the problem of 1655 was pressing upon Charles with a weight that his recent conquests had only served to increase. Sweden seemed still unable either to disarm in safety or to maintain her armaments without using them. The election of Leopold to the Empire cleared the political horizon of Europe and rendered a Swedish campaign in Brandenburg, Prussia, or Poland even more hazardous than before. If Charles sought employment for his troops, aggrandisement for his State, and a "free back" when his face should again be turned towards the east, he could satisfy all his needs in no other way than by renewing the strife with Denmark.

The idea was realised with the speed and secrecy which distinguish "the Swedish Napoleon." On July 7, at Gottorp, he secured the concurrence of the Råd. Eleven days later he directed Wrangel to complete the operations of the last campaign by attacking Copenhagen, Kronborg, and Christiania in turn. Again, as in 1655, the Swedish plan was to efface a State by the exertions of a small army, and again the first movements promised success. On August 7, when Charles completed the voyage from Kiel to Korsör and prepared to march across Zealand, Copenhagen seemed to be a helpless and panic-stricken town. Four days later, however, the Swedish army found the suburbs aflame and the walls

manned by a host of soldiers, students, and citizens, inspired by Frederick III, who when urged to flee replied that he would die in his own nest. Instead of the swift success upon which Charles had reckoned, he must face a bloody siege attended by wide-spread revolt in districts which he had already conquered.

But he was now confronted by other forces. In a struggle with Denmark alone Charles had little to fear. Although 30,000 Austrians, Brandenburgers, and Poles, under Montecuculi, the Elector Frederick William and Czarniecki were invading Jutland; and, although the disaffected Danes succeeded in expelling their conquerors from Trondhjem and Bornholm, he would still in all likelihood have triumphed by military force on land. Early in September the great fortress of Kronborg had fallen. As lord of the Sound Charles might well have starved Copenhagen into surrender, and his plan of dethroning Frederick, driving the nobles from the land, and uniting on his own head the three crowns of Scandinavia, might soon have been accomplished. Such an issue, however, was injurious not only to the neighbouring States, who dreaded Sweden, but also to the French, who wished Charles to turn his arms against the Habsburgs, and above all to the sea Powers, who though mutually antagonistic were resolved that no single janitor should again possess the keys of the Baltic. While the Dutch, who hoped to make Denmark their tool, feared for their trade with Danzig and Russia, the ideal of Charles encroached upon England "as giving the Swede the sole and entire possession of the chief materials, as masts, deals, pitch, tar, copper, iron, etc., needful for the apparel and equipage of our ships, too great a treasure to be entrusted in one hand." "Not a grain of Denmark," therefore, became substantially an ultimatum to Charles from two States, either of which if unchecked by the other could frustrate all that the Swedes might attempt outside their own peninsula. While England was paralysed by the death of Cromwell, 35 war-ships under Opdam forced the Sound, joined the Danish fleet, relieved Copenhagen (October 29, 1658) and drove the flag of Sweden from the sea. This vindication of the international interest in the Baltic ruined Charles' first campaign; and the so-called Concert of the Hague (May 11, 1659), by which the Dutch joined the French and English in an agreement to dictate terms to the combatants, doomed his whole enterprise to failure. The Western Powers resolved to restore peace in the North on the conditions laid down at Roeskilde and to veto the sealing of the Baltic against the fleets of non-riparian States.

This potent intervention, unwelcome even to the Danes, dwarfed all else in the war. It availed little that in December, 1658, Charles made a three years' truce with the Tsar, that his lieutenants broke the series of reverses in the east, or that the Swedish power was extended over new Danish islands. Western policy reduced the importance, though it could not dim the fame, of the valour with which the men of Copenhagen

beat back the Swedish assault and of the courage with which Charles X, now menaced by six powerful enemies, "chose rather to stand out to the last than to receive laws from anybody." The King's defiant attitude indeed provoked in July, 1659, two fresh Concerts, concluded under Dutch influence, by which still harder conditions were to be thrust peremptorily upon Sweden. Charles vainly offered to partition Denmark with the Dutch. In November, while he looked on impotent in Zealand, Ruyter ferried 9000 of the allies from Jutland to Fyen, where Philip of Sulzbach was cooped up with 6000 picked troops. At Nyborg this force was annihilated, and a Danish island second only to Zealand passed from the sceptre of Charles. Zealand and liberty were left to the foremost warrior of the age only because his overthrow would have prejudiced the commercial interest of the Dutch. The victors of Nyborg could not prevail on Ruyter to convoy them across the Great Belt.

At this crisis, while his provinces from the Düna to the Weser were being torn from his grasp, Charles sought earnestly for peace. Negotiations for converting the truce with Russia into a peace had been set on foot in May. From the Poles Charles now demanded only that the King should renounce his claim to Sweden and the Republic their claim to Livonia, and that in Prussia the *status quo ante bellum* should be restored. Suzerainty over Courland, whose Duke the Swedes had abducted a year before, was also to be demanded, but not inflexibly. After much negotiation, the monastery of Oliva near Danzig had been agreed on as the place of discussion; and the danger of an Imperial candidature for their throne made the Poles more than ordinarily compliant. Early in the new year peace with Poland was in sight.

In the west, distrustful of Denmark, Charles insisted that the three Powers of the Concert should guarantee the peace, and that southern Norway at least should remain his. To support his demands, which still embraced also the fief of Trondhjem, he despatched the aged Field-Marshal Lars Kagg on a winter expedition up the eastern shore of the Cattegat. "Horsemen have frozen to death in the saddle and sentinels at their posts," wrote Kagg, "but not a man has been heard to murmur." The last effort of Charles X, however, like that of Charles XII, failed before the walls of Hald, the border fortress upon which its sovereign now conferred the style of Frederikshald.

While still hopeful of conquering southern Norway and of recovering Fyen, Charles met the Diet at Göteborg. There he was seized with fever, which, though for a month it failed to arrest his labours, then became dangerous and soon proved mortal. His last acts were to appoint a Regency for his son, and to exhort its members to make peace and to observe the law of Sweden. In the night of February 12-13, 1660, he died, little more than thirty-seven years old. Despite grave errors of policy he had in less than six years raised Sweden from decadence to the zenith of her power.

The death of Charles X exposed his country to internal dangers even greater than any due to her foreign foes. During his brief reign his firm hand had repressed that conflict between the noble and non-noble Estates which Christina had inflamed and in which a deep-lying antagonism of interest was revealed. But his will showed traces of that early distrust of the oligarchy which had inspired his protest to Christina, praying "that God might keep him from living to see the day when, after the death of her Majesty, he should be in the hands of those lords." Dreading, it would seem, the reactionary Regency of the Råd, he had designated his untrained and emotional Queen, Hedwig Eleonora, as president with two votes. To his brother, the detested Adolphus John, he gave the second place and the office of Marshal, while his brother-in-law Magnus de La Gardie became Chancellor, and the Treasury was entrusted to Herman Fleming, the soul of the Reduction. These dispositions immediately divided the Diet into two hostile camps. The three non-noble Estates, the priests, burghers, and peasants, urged the acceptance of the will, while the Nobles, greater and lesser alike, declared that it violated the law of Sweden. In deference to the unfinished wars and to the threat that no member of the Råd would hold office if Adolphus John were in the Government, the three Estates consented that the confirmation of the will should be deferred (February 16, 1660). The guidance of affairs was therefore left to the great officers of State, who found a skilful leader in Per Brahe, the richest noble in Sweden, and Steward (*Riksdrots*) for nearly twenty years.

Towards the close of April, 1660, before the Regency was ten weeks old, peace, of which the Swedish forces in Prussia stood in desperate need, was arranged with the Poles at Oliva. In the provisions of the treaty, the forward policy in Livonia inaugurated by Erik XIV, and the Lutheran and national Swedish revolution of 1593-9, at last found complete vindication. On behalf of the Polish Vasa, now a dying race, John Casimir renounced all claim to the Crown of Sweden. At the same time, by a pact in which the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg joined, the possession of West Prussia was confirmed to the Republic, and that of Livonia to Sweden; while in East Prussia the Elector was emancipated from vassalage to any Power.

Denmark, meanwhile, though suffering acutely from the state of war, allowed the hope of recovering Scania to interfere with progress towards peace. Immediately after receiving the news of the death of Charles X, the ambassadors of the Western Powers at Copenhagen had returned with vigour to their work of mediation. Having extorted from the Swedish envoys an admission that they desired peace, they hastened to Frederick sanguine of success. His reluctance was at length overcome by the action of the Dutch, who made a treaty with Sweden and used their command of the sea to immobilise the forces of Denmark and her allies. Towards the close of March the conferences began; but a

treacherous attempt of the Dutch to force Sweden to accept their terms threw everything into confusion. In April, Ruyter seized nine Swedish men-of-war in the Sound. The Swedes retorted with an embargo upon Dutch ships and goods, and the Triple Concert was paralysed.

Where mediation failed, however, direct negotiation between the combatants proved more successful. On June 6, 1660, accelerated by the news from Oliva, by the restoration of Frederick's relative Charles II, and above all by the state of the Swedish finances, a treaty of peace between Denmark and Sweden was signed at Copenhagen. This abiding settlement between the two Scandinavian Powers conformed to the wishes of the Concert. Frederick recovered Trondhjem and Bornholm, the latter by purchasing eighteen great estates in Scania for the Swedish Crown. The terms established at Roeskilde were confirmed; but the closing of the Baltic to foreign war-ships was abandoned.

Peace with the Tsar, on the other hand, which Charles X had endeavoured to negotiate, was by no means yet assured. It was always difficult to conclude a treaty with a Power which, though it had begun to turn towards the West for tacticians, in diplomacy was still barbarian. In the spring of 1660, moreover, the Tsar's refusal to surrender an inch of his conquests broke up the conference. For a moment it seemed probable that there would at last be realised that union of Sweden and Poland to curb their dangerous neighbour which was advocated by the Polish Queen. Ill-paid and mutinous as were the armies of the Republic, the conclusion of peace at Oliva had brought them victory in Lithuania and in the Ukraine. By joining her forces to theirs, Sweden might bring the Tsar to his knees in one campaign. Despite the ruin of the finances, some of the Råd shared the martial ardour of Wrangel, a soldier who held that every knot should be cut by the sword. Some were influenced by the argument that foreign war alone could save the State from a war of revolution, while others held that the hint of a hostile alliance would bring Russia to terms. At the close of the year cautious overtures were made to Poland, and in Sweden and Livonia troops were mustered for a new campaign.

With an armed nation at their back, yet chastened by the fear that the Poles might themselves make peace, the Swedes brought their new negotiation at Kardis to a successful issue. In June, 1661, the Tsar consented to surrender his conquests, and the settlement of 1617 was in substance re-established. The great war kindled by the revolt of the Cossacks in 1648, after flaming up in a conflagration which remoulded northern Europe, had now dwindled into a smouldering feud between Poland and the Tsar. Denmark, with alien fortresses almost within sight of her capital, was preparing to avenge her mutilation upon her nobles. For the first time in the seventeenth century, Sweden was at peace with all the world.

CHAPTER XXI.

MAZARIN.

BEFORE his death Richelieu had himself designated Giulio Mazarini, called Mazarin in his adopted country, as the man best qualified to carry on his policy. Born in Sicily of humble parentage, Mazarin had nevertheless received an excellent education at Rome and in Spain. For a short time he had followed the profession of arms, but soon found his true vocation in the diplomatic service of the Court of Rome. Before Casale, in 1630, he had negotiated an arrangement between France and Spain, which ultimately brought the Mantuan War to a conclusion. From 1634 to 1636 he served as Nuncio Extraordinary in France, and in 1639 he formally entered the service of France and was naturalised. He did good work, especially as an envoy in Piedmont, and was rewarded in 1641 by the Cardinalate. The King now called him to his councils and announced his choice to the *Parlements* of France.

Louis at first made a point of showing that the death of Richelieu caused no change. A sudden rupture would have implied that the dead Minister had been the true ruler of France. The existing officials were retained in power. The late Cardinal's offices were distributed among his relations. Armand de Wignerod, now Duke of Richelieu, became General of the Galleys and Governor of Havre. Armand de Maillé-Brézé, now Duke of Fronsac, received the office of Superintendent of Navigation, and the command of Brouage. The Marshal de La Meilleraye inherited the government of Brittany. But the difference was soon felt. The Cardinal's enemies were liberated from their prisons, or returned from exile. Gaston of Orleans appeared at Court and was later allowed to be reunited to his wife, Margaret of Lorraine. The families of Vendôme and Guise came back to France. The body of the late Queen-Mother was brought from abroad and interred at Saint-Denis. The new rule was milder and more conciliatory.

The foreign policy of France was not changed. Great efforts were made to continue the war with vigour, especially on the northern frontier, where the King himself proposed to take the command. Guébriant was strengthened and encouraged to propose an effective plan

of action on the Rhine. The conquest of Catalonia was to be pressed; Prince Thomas of Savoy was assured of continued French support; and an expedition against Franche Comté was planned.

The new Minister meanwhile was strengthening his position. Supple and elusive, he masked his advance with consummate skill. Of Richelieu's creatures those whose rivalry was most to be feared were Sublet de Noyers, the able Minister of War, and the younger Bouthillier, now Comte de Chavigny. Sublet de Noyers was first pushed aside, and Michel Le Tellier, Mazarin's dependant, took his place. Meanwhile the King's health was breaking; a long minority, a long Regency were in view. Without exciting suspicion, without haste or eagerness, Mazarin succeeded in winning his way to the Queen's confidence. Now a cipher, she must later become a power. His beauty, his grace, his exquisite address, facilitated his task. Yet, when the plans for the Regency were discussed, Mazarin was careful on the one hand not to thwart the King's intention of closely limiting his wife's authority, and on the other to secure that the odium of these measures should fall upon others, especially upon Chavigny. In April, 1643, the King's plan was announced. Anne of Austria was to be Regent, the Duke of Orleans her Lieutenant-General; but both were to be controlled by a permanent Council, irremovable, deciding all questions and filling its vacancies by a majority of votes. In this Council the Queen's vote or that of Orleans was to count for no more than those of the other members—Condé, Mazarin, the Chancellor Séguier, and the two Bouthilliers. Peace and war, finance, and appointments to all important posts, were expressly reserved for the Council. Two persons alone were excluded from the general amnesty, the Duchess of Chevreuse, and the unfortunate Châteauneuf. The former was to remain in exile, the latter in prison until the end of the war. This declaration was communicated to the *Parlement* at a *lit de justice* and registered (April 20, 21).

On May 14 the King expired; and measures were at once taken to defeat his last intentions. The consent of the principal persons was obtained; the magistrates were sounded; and on May 18 the Queen and the young King appeared in the *Parlement*. The chief councillors were present but Mazarin was conspicuously absent. Orleans, Condé, and the Chancellor, demanded that the recent declaration should be cancelled, and the sovereign authority of the Queen Regent recognised. After the stern repression of Richelieu, the *Parlement* rejoiced to find its intervention in matters of high government not only tolerated but invited. The necessary resolutions were speedily passed; and the declaration registered by the express command of the late King was expunged from the Records. A fresh declaration was issued, vesting the royal power and the care of the young King in the Queen as Regent, with Orleans as her Lieutenant-General, and Condé as his Deputy. The same evening the Queen confirmed Mazarin in his post of Chief Minister.

The new rule began propitiously. Francisco de Melo had crossed the frontier and was besieging Rocroi. The French army, which Louis had intended to lead in person, had been entrusted to the young Duke of Enghien, son of the Prince of Condé, with the Marshal de L'Hôpital to supplement his lack of experience. Enghien marched to the relief of Rocroi, and, in spite of L'Hôpital, resolved to risk a general engagement. The Spanish General, eagerly pressing his siege and expecting no such bold move, allowed the French army to approach, and neglected to protect his forces by entrenchments. On May 18 the two armies confronted each other: the Spaniards numbering between 24,000 and 26,000, including five *tercios* of the redoubtable Spanish infantry: the French inferior by some 3-4000 men, the proportions of cavalry and infantry being similar in the two armies. A rash forward movement on the French left nearly led to disaster, but the mistake was remedied before Don Francisco had seized his opportunity. The day was now far advanced, and the contest was deferred till the morrow.

During the night word came to the French leader that Melo expected reinforcements in the morning. The attack must be made at once if at all. Before dawn the French moved forward. Enghien and Gassion on the right overthrew the Flemish cavalry which opposed them. On the left once more La Ferté, advised by L'Hôpital, advanced rashly, was taken in flank, and thrown into disorder by the German horse. The French artillery was captured and was turned upon the French centre, which began to retreat. At this moment Enghien rallied his victorious cavalry and fell upon the flank and rear of the Spanish centre. The Walloons and the Germans were driven in flight. The Spanish infantry still remained unshaken. On the other hand the French retreat was arrested, and their centre once more advanced. The French left reformed; the Spanish right was attacked in front and behind. Enghien left his victorious wing, and led the infantry of his centre against the *tercios viejos*. Three times they repulsed the attack: the fourth time their steadfast ranks were broken; when the slaughter had been with difficulty arrested the Spanish infantry was no more; of 6000 men present at the battle only 1500 escaped. The victory was complete; and the main credit of it fell to the young commander, though the services of Gassion with the cavalry on the right, and of Sirot in checking the retreat of the centre, had also been conspicuous.

A great general, who was also a Prince of the Blood, had come upon the scene. The decision to attack was his; the admirable dispositions of the approach and before the battle, the brilliant inspiration in the heat of combat, the final and crushing blow, all these were due to him. At the age of 21, Louis de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, had proved himself to be one of the boldest and most skilful commanders of the time. How would his Government regard him? With jealousy, fear, and suspicion, or as the fittest instrument to fulfil the destinies of

France? It must be reckoned to the credit of Mazarin that Enghien seldom failed to receive his full support and confidence until he had incurred suspicion through the rebellion of his relatives.

Mazarin saw the necessity for cooperation between the army of the Low Countries and that of the Rhine. As a preliminary step towards this end, he accepted Enghien's proposal to lay siege forthwith to Thionville (Diedenhofen) on the Moselle. The army of Champagne was ordered to assist. Guébriant was strengthened and commanded to give occupation to the Bavarians and other German forces in the south. On June 14 the investment of Thionville began; but, before it was complete, a force of 2000 men contrived their entry and raised the garrison to adequate strength. The siege was vigorously pushed; and, in spite of accidents, Thionville was forced to capitulate on August 10. Sierck was then taken, and Enghien advanced even to the gates of Luxemburg. His task in this direction was now completed, and he availed himself of permission duly granted to return to Court. Had he waited a few days, orders would have reached him cancelling his leave and bidding him march to Guébriant's succour in Elsass. The time wasted in Paris was precious; and, when at length Enghien had joined Guébriant, handed over to him the requisite reinforcements, and sent him forth to find his winter-quarters elsewhere than in Elsass, winter had almost begun. Disaster and death came to Guébriant, and the Bernardines were left without a leader. Turenne was at once chosen to command the broken and demoralised army. It can hardly have been only good fortune that led Mazarin in his first year of power to choose for high command two generals so different in stamp from those employed by Richelieu. It was certainly more than good fortune that caused him to use them and support them after their high qualities had been proved.

Older by ten years than Enghien, Henry de La Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, younger brother of the Duke of Bouillon, was at the head of a regiment in 1630, had recently held a command in Italy, and became Marshal of France in 1643. Patient, laborious, and thoughtful, Turenne attained by slow degrees the eminence which Enghien reached more rapidly. The task now before him was arduous. He had to restore order where all discipline had ceased, to reconstruct an army out of mutinous units, to conciliate the jealousy of the Bernardine captains. This work was not completed until the following June.

Meanwhile Mazarin had been gaining strength. At first he was regarded as a temporary stop-gap, and hardly taken seriously. The easy liberality of the Regency in its early months confirmed this opinion. A Government which refused nothing could not in the nature of things last long. Ambition saw an easy path to power. Even the Protestants seemed once more to be a danger; and the mission of Turenne to Italy had in part at least the object of removing from France their most illustrious leader. Their strength was, however, small, and their

grievances in reality slight; a little firmness and tact and the punctilious observance of the edicts allayed the disquiet. Personal ambitions were more dangerous. Condé and Orleans could be kept in check by playing off one against the other. But a clique was soon formed among those who had espoused the Queen's cause in the days when her friendship was perilous, and who now claimed the reward of their fidelity.

The head of this clique was the Duke of Beaufort. Vain, showy, and incapable, his ambitions were in direct proportion to his ignorance of affairs. All the malcontents gathered about him. His followers, Saint-Ibal, Montrésor, Béthune, and Fontrailles, pluming themselves upon their merit, received the name of *Les Importants*. Their object was no doubt to displace the Cardinal and open a fair field for the display of their own supposed capacity. They formed an alliance with the Bishop of Beauvais, who seemed most likely to supplant Mazarin in the Queen's confidence. They were hostile to Richelieu's heirs and Richelieu's agents. They drove from the Council the two Bouthilliers, thereby in fact removing from Mazarin's path two Ministers whose experience and ministerial record marked them as his rivals. But for the moment Mazarin seemed to stand almost alone, and his fall was daily expected. The Duchess of Chevreuse, that indefatigable intriguer, returned to Paris and counted on reassuming her former ascendancy over the Queen. She allied herself with Châteauneuf, in whom his contemporaries recognised high qualities and capacities, which he never had sufficient opportunity to prove. Her policy was reconciliation with Spain; and she remembered that the Queen was a Spaniard. She remembered also the treatment which she had received from Richelieu, and, by pressing the claims of the Vendôme family to Brittany, was preparing an alliance with Beaufort and a blow at her enemy's heirs.

Amid these intrigues Mazarin steered his way patiently and skilfully, steadily increasing his personal ascendancy over the Queen's mind. Owing to a quarrel with Madame de Longueville, Condé's beautiful daughter, the Duchess of Montbazou was ordered to leave the Court. The Duke of Beaufort, at that time her lover, resolved to avenge the insult to his mistress. In August, 1643, it would seem, he determined to attempt the assassination of the Cardinal. Several schemes having failed, the design became known; and the Duke of Beaufort was arrested on September 2 and imprisoned on the following day at Vincennes.

It seems probable that there was a plot; had there been none, it would still have been useful to invent one. With Beaufort in prison, the cabal of the *Importants* was easily scattered. Châteauneuf, Madame de Chevreuse, and the Vendôme family were banished from the Court; other supporters of the party retired, fled, or were disgraced. Mazarin felt himself strong enough to recall Chavigny to the Council. The Queen took up her residence at Richelieu's palace, henceforward known as the *Palais-Royal*, where she was constantly accessible from Mazarin's

own dwelling. This act marked the establishment between the Queen and her Minister of still more intimate relations. The remaining adherents of the *Importants* party were gradually dispersed or reduced to impotence. Mazarin even succeeded in procuring the recall of Goring, the British Ambassador, on account of his friendship with Madame de Chevreuse.

The summer of 1644 was devoted to a campaign such as Richelieu affected. An overwhelming force, commanded by Gaston of Orleans, undertook the siege of Gravelines, supported by the Dutch fleet. Enghien had only an inferior command, and had to be pacified by the gift of the government of Champagne. Meanwhile the Dutch were to undertake the siege of Sas-van-Gent. The siege of Gravelines was begun in May, and the town capitulated on July 28. Sas-van-Gent held out until September. When the fall of Gravelines appeared certain, Enghien was allowed to join Turenne; and the two generals advanced together against Mercy and fought the three vigorous actions in the neighbourhood of Freiburg (August). Mercy was forced to retreat; and the French armies, working down the Rhine, seized Philippsburg. Speier and Worms placed themselves under French protection; Mainz opened its gates; Landau was taken; and the whole of the left bank of the Rhine from Breisach to Coblenz was thus in the possession of France (September, 1644).

Though Orleans, when policy required his employment as a commander, followed on the old lines, wherever Enghien, or Turenne commanded, bold and rapid movements, intrepid attacks, took the place of Richelieu's cautious strategy, his tedious sieges. This was even more evident in the following year, when the defeat of Turenne at Herbsthausen near Mergentheim was avenged by Enghien and Turenne near Nördlingen (August 3, 1645). The campaigns in Bavaria, 1646, 1647, and 1648, forced the Elector Maximilian first to temporise and finally to yield. These operations, described elsewhere, prove either that the generals had escaped from the control of the Government, or that the conduct of the war was no longer mainly regulated by the fears of the Minister for his own personal ascendancy. The latter is more probably the case. Mazarin was secure in the royal favour as Richelieu had never been; victories enhanced his credit; France and her Government needed peace; and peace could only be won by a vigorous offensive. Enghien, who in 1646 became by his father's death the Prince of Condé, was more dangerous in inactivity than at the head of victorious armies; Mazarin trusted his own influence and his own astuteness to defeat the claims of all possible rivals. Such may have been his calculations; yet the glory of these six years of almost unbroken success must in part belong to the Minister who was not afraid of victory.

In Flanders the summer of 1645 was devoted to another campaign under the Duke of Orleans. A number of places were seized in the

direction of Dunkirk—Mardyck, Linck, Bourbourg; but the Duke did not venture to besiege Dunkirk itself, which was covered by Piccolomini. The French army then turned aside and occupied various strongholds on the Lys, among others Béthune. A separate army laid siege to one of the few uncaptured fortresses in Lorraine, La Mothe-en-Argonne, and took it. After the Duke of Orleans had left the front his lieutenants continued this petty warfare until late in the autumn. Lens, Orchies, and Arleux were occupied. Gassion even crossed Flanders between Ghent and Bruges and joined hands with the Dutch, who captured Hulst. However, the results of great efforts and expenditure during these two years were hardly adequate.

A different spirit pervaded the campaign of 1646. Political reasons suggested that the armies of the north should be divided. Orleans and Enghien received separate commands. But the two rivals united their forces and Enghien infused more energy into their joint operations. Courtrai was taken in the face of the united forces of Lorraine, Piccolomini, Beck, and Lamboy. The Dutch were beginning to be jealous of the French advance, and refused to cooperate in a joint campaign. After the recapture of Mardyck, lost during the previous winter, Orleans left the army and Enghien was in sole command. The difference was soon felt. On September 19 the siege of Dunkirk was begun. This place was the chief arsenal of the Spaniards in these parts and the base of their maritime raids. The Dutch, whose desire to protect their commerce for the moment outweighed their fears of France, ordered Tromp to blockade the port while Enghien vigorously pushed the attack by land. On October 11 Dunkirk surrendered. The French frontier was thus moved forward in this direction to nearly its present line, including also Furnes and Courtrai, which now form part of Belgium.

The danger to Dutch trade from the possession of Dunkirk by the French, the proposal of France to exchange Catalonia for the Spanish Netherlands, the declining health of Frederick Henry and his death in March, 1647, all contributed to stimulate the Dutch desire for peace. Their cooperation in 1645–6 had been but slight; they now seriously prepared to treat. Though their Treaty of Münster was not concluded until January, 1648, it had been settled in principle more than a year before; and the year 1647 saw the French left alone in their northern struggle with Spain. In this year Louis de Bourbon, now Prince of Condé, was occupied in Catalonia, and Turenne was detained in Germany by the revolt of the Bernardine troops. France was exhausted, and the conquests of Dixmuyden in Flanders and La Bassée between Béthune and Lille were compensated by the loss of Menin, Armentières, and Landrecies. In October Gassion was killed at the siege of Lens. In 1648 Condé, recalled from Catalonia, was nominated to the command in Flanders. A final effort was to be made to extort peace. Ypres had been taken and Courtrai lost, when in July he was summoned to Paris in

consequence of the opening troubles of the Fronde. Once more at the front, and joined by Erlach with 4000 men from the army of Breisach, he advanced to the relief of Lens, which he found had already surrendered to the Archduke Leopold. Retreating towards Béthune, he enticed the Spaniards to leave their entrenchments, and a general engagement followed according to his desire (August 20). The French army, though its right wing at first was roughly handled, was completely victorious. Both wings of the Spaniards were driven in flight. Beck was wounded and captured, refused all assistance, and died of his wounds. Leopold and Fuensaldaña fled to Douai. The Spanish infantry, no longer maintaining the tradition of those who had fallen at Rocroi, surrendered in thousands. The Spanish loss was 8000 men, 30 cannon, all their baggage, and 120 banners. Six days later Paris was in revolt. Many years were to pass before a similar victory was gained by the arms of France.

The great successes of France were won in fields where Condé or Turenne commanded. In Catalonia the occasional gains were outweighed by the repeated failures. In 1643 the whole of Catalonia, with the exception of Rosas and Tarragona, was in French hands. The war was to be vigorously pursued by land and sea. La Mothe Houdancourt commanded by land, the young Admiral de Brézé by sea. Brézé did his part. A fleet conveying provisions to Rosas was attacked and defeated with the loss of six vessels. A little later (September 3) the main fleet of Spain suffered a disastrous reverse off Carthagena, and the French became masters of the western Mediterranean. The complete conquest of Catalonia and perhaps further acquisitions seemed to be in sight. But La Mothe Houdancourt did nothing, laying the blame, as it would seem unjustly, on Michel Le Tellier, the Minister of War. The following year he was defeated before Lerida, which the Spaniards were besieging; and, when at length he undertook the siege of Tarragona, he was forced to raise it (September). The general was recalled, and Harcourt, with a brilliant record from Casale and Turin, was sent in his place. Siege was laid to Rosas (April 2, 1645), which at length, after a glorious resistance, capitulated (May 28). Fleix was lost, but afterwards recovered, and Balaguer surrendered after a prolonged investment (October 20). The discontent of the Catalans was for the moment appeased. Harcourt in May, 1646, laid siege to Lerida, and endeavoured to reduce the fortress by famine. But in November it was still holding out when the Spanish army attacked and surprised the French in their lines. Supplies were thrown into the beleaguered town; Harcourt was forced to raise the siege, abandoning his heavy artillery and his baggage. Catalan complaints broke out again; and, perhaps to show the province that France was in earnest, Condé himself was sent to take command as Viceroy.

But Catalonia was the grave of reputations. Condé determined to

lay siege once more to Lerida. After a month even he was forced to acknowledge that the difficulties of climate and locality were insurmountable, and the siege was abandoned. He was recalled, and Mazarin's brother Michel, now a Cardinal, was nominated to succeed him. But after long delays he did no more than visit Barcelona, and speedily returned to Rome. Schomberg, who took his place, was fortunate enough to carry Tortosa by assault, and to force its citadel to open its gates (July 13, 1648). Events in France then put an end to French efforts in this region. Catalonia had been chiefly valued as a possible exchange for the Spanish Netherlands. Had such a bargain been possible, the Catalans would have been unhesitatingly left to their fate. But this project, if ever seriously entertained by Spain, was frustrated by the opposition of the Dutch; and the waste of men and treasure thus found no adequate compensation.

In Italy alone the power of Spain remained substantially unshaken. France kept her hand upon Savoy, but the futility of attacks upon the Milanese had long since been demonstrated. The war of Parma (1642-4) divided the possible friends of France and weakened those Italian Powers which still retained a formal independence. When France had succeeded in bringing this war to a conclusion, she suffered another blow in the election of Giambattista Pamfili to the papal chair as Innocent X (1644). He was not only well-disposed to Spain, but a personal enemy of Mazarin, as was soon seen when he refused to make the Minister's brother a Cardinal, though his suit was warmly pressed.

The chief hope of France in this direction lay in the disaffection of Naples and Sicily, overtaxed in a cause which was not their own. Here the naval power which Richelieu had created might be used to full advantage. This Mazarin saw, but he failed to find fit instruments to execute his policy, and perhaps to formulate that policy with clearness and precision. He made his first advance against the Spanish *presidi* on the coast of Tuscany and in Elba, the maritime outposts which linked Naples with the dependent Republic of Genoa and so with the Milanese. The neutrality of the Grand Duke of Tuscany was secured. The fleet was entrusted to Admiral de Brézé, a bold and skilful seaman (1646). Prince Thomas of Savoy was to command on land, part of the troops being drawn from Piedmont and shipped at Savona. The enterprise was mismanaged. Telamone and San-Stefano were seized; but, instead of Porto-Ercole, Orbitello was then attacked, an inaccessible fort girt with malarial swamps. The Spanish fleet came up and was beaten off by Brézé; but, to the great loss of France, the gallant Admiral himself was killed by a cannon-shot (June 14, 1646).

His lieutenant, Du Daugnon, pretending that his fleet required repairs, hurried off to Provence, where he left his ships and made for Brouage. This important command was vacant by Brézé's death. Du

Daugnon seized and held it in defiance of the Government; and, owing to the rivalries of Condé and Vendôme, the post of Admiral remained unfilled. Meanwhile the Spaniards entered Porto-Ercole, whence they directed attacks against the besiegers. Other reinforcements came by land through papal territory. Prince Thomas was forced to raise the siege and return to Piedmont by land.

The design, but for the malarious climate of the Tuscan Maremma, was not unpromising. It failed, owing to the death of Brézé, the treachery of Du Daugnon, and the incompetence of Prince Thomas. Mazarin resolved to try again. In September a fresh expedition set forth under La Meilleraie, and at Oneglia took up troops from Piedmont commanded by du Plessis Praslin. Piombino was seized and Porto-Longone on the island of Elba was captured after a brief siege. A firm base was thus acquired for operations in the kingdom of Naples, should such appear desirable.

Mazarin was reckoning on disorder in Naples and Sicily. He was looking for a King to replace King Philip; and Thomas of Savoy had perhaps been chosen to lead the first expedition as the fittest person for such a post. Condé himself was sounded but refused. Fontenay Mareuil was sent to Rome to learn what could be learnt and to encourage a Neapolitan revolt. When the rebellion (described in a subsequent chapter) occurred, its course was uniformly unpropitious for Mazarin. It was a popular rebellion, whose leaders had no solid authority, and were not supported outside Naples. The nobles, even the middle class, were hostile. No Government was established with which the French King could treat. The intervention of the Duke of Guise was ill-judged and unwelcome. The French fleet appeared before Naples, but could not act in concert with Guise; its own operations were hesitating and indecisive; and it finally returned to Provence without attempting any serious action. The rebellion collapsed, and the places seized on Elba and in Tuscany were left isolated and insecure. Mazarin had seen what sea-power might do against Spain in Italy, but he failed to realise his vision. These failures seriously shook his prestige; and the enterprise against Milan which he undertook in conjunction with Savoy and Modena during the winter 1647-8 was equally unsuccessful.

Mazarin's authority was shaken; but, before the ground actually crumbled beneath his feet, he was able to achieve one capital effort of statesmanship. He was a born negotiator; indeed his enemies averred that he was apt to negotiate when action was required. More than once his diplomatic action influenced the course of the great German War. When hostilities between Denmark and Sweden had for a time diverted one of the chief members of the coalition to easier fields of conquest, Mazarin was instrumental in bringing about the Peace of Brömsebro (1645). War between Poland and Sweden was another danger which

he averted; and he secured French influence in Poland by arranging the marriage of Mary di Gonzaga with her King. He stirred up Rakoczy of Transylvania against Austria. He concluded at Copenhagen (1645) a separate treaty with Denmark which secured free passage for French commerce through the Danish straits. But the Peace of Westphalia was the great triumph of his diplomacy.

The preliminaries of a double Congress had been arranged in 1641; but no actual conference took place until 1644. The French envoys, d'Avaux and Servien, were despatched in October, 1643; but their first mission was to the Hague, where they renewed the alliance with the United Provinces and bound the States General once more to conclude no separate peace (1644). Preliminaries were slowly advanced, and meanwhile the efforts of Mazarin were directed to securing the support of the Imperial towns of Germany. He represented France as the champion of German liberties against the encroachments of the Emperor. He worked at the same time upon the German Princes, and, following Richelieu's tradition, especially upon the Elector of Bavaria. After negotiations had definitely begun, the Duke of Longueville was sent, in order that a person of greater dignity and position might supplement the trained ability of Servien and d'Avaux and keep their jealousies in check.

Nothing could be more complicated than the conflict of forces and interests. On the side of France, satisfaction for the Swedes, the restoration of the Palatinate to its rightful lords, the demands of the United Provinces, the obligations incurred towards Catalonia and Portugal, the protection and support of the lesser German States—all these had to be borne in mind simultaneously with the claims of France to territorial extension in Elsass, the Sundgau, Breisach, Philippsburg, and in Flanders. On the other hand, the efforts of Spain were directed against peace; and, through her influence, at the end of 1646 the United Provinces were detached from the common cause; and in 1647 the Emperor seemed inclined to suspend negotiations. The secession of the Dutch, however, while making peace with Spain almost impossible, rendered the remaining problems more manageable; and, after the Elector of Bavaria had a second time been brought to his knees, after the battle of Lens had crippled for the moment the influence of Spain, Mazarin, whose position at home was becoming more and more precarious, made his last effort; and in October, 1648, peace was concluded between Sweden and France on the one hand and the Emperor on the other. Longueville had returned to Paris, and d'Avaux had been recalled; and thus Servien, who was in Mazarin's complete confidence, was left alone to conduct the final negotiations. The Austrian rights and possessions in Elsass and the Sundgau, with Breisach and Philippsburg, were ceded to France. The three bishoprics of Toul, Metz, and Verdun, were abandoned in all sovereignty to France, who had held them by the right of the strongest since the time of Henry II. The French were to surrender the

forest towns of Säckingen, Waldshut, Laufenburg, and Rheinfelden, and to pay an indemnity of three million *livres* to Archduke Ferdinand and Charles.

The terms secured for the allies of France have been detailed elsewhere. The Emperor abandoned the cause of the Duke of Lorraine, whose territories remained in French occupation. Duke Charles was forced to throw in his lot with Spain, while the Empire was debarred from affording any further assistance to the Spanish Power. The recognition of the right of the several Estates of the Germanic body to conclude separate treaties with foreign Powers left France at liberty to ally herself with any of the German Powers, or with any combination of them. The King of France was thus established as patron of Germanic liberties, which meant in effect of German particularism. The war of 1870 was needed to efface completely the consequences of this treaty.

Peace was indeed necessary for France, where discontent was rapidly coming to a head. The Spanish statesmen encouraged the rising insubordination, by which they hoped to profit, now that their account with Holland had been closed. Hence they declined the terms of Mazarin and did their best to break his treaty with the Empire. A Spanish garrison still held Frankenthal in the Palatinate; the Spanish Habsburgs had claims upon Elsass. That fortress and those claims they refused to surrender; and thus the Austrian House in compensation had to forgo the indemnity promised for Elsass, and to leave the cities of the Black Forest in the hands of France. Hard as these additional concessions were, to continue the war was, even harder; in spite of the efforts of Spain, the Peace of Westphalia was ratified in February, 1649.

Mazarin was the heir of Richelieu, of his policy, of his system, of his debits and his credits. That policy had led to war by sea and by land, to north, south, east, and west. That system had mortgaged the future to meet the present needs. The strain of six more years of war had not improved the financial situation. At Richelieu's death the revenue for three years had been anticipated. It does not appear that the position was materially worse in 1648 than it had been in 1642. But every source of revenue had been pledged; the *traitants* or contractors had amassed enormous wealth; and each draft that the Government made upon the public revenue necessitated a new and a ruinous bargain with the great financiers. Against the territorial gains secured by the Treaty of Westphalia, we must place an impoverished nation, an empty treasury, the domination of usury, the paralysis of law, a precarious tyranny. Debts and assets alike Mazarin had inherited; he had not improved, he had not sensibly impaired his heritage. But, unlike Richelieu, he was unable to avoid the reckoning. The conflict, which began in 1648, was only a symptom of the deep-seated disorders of the State.

Mazarin's opponents were desultory and irresolute, and, from their resemblance to the schoolboys who slung stones in the moats of Paris and ran away when the authorities appeared, received their name of *Frondeurs*. The *Fronde*, which paralysed the Government of France for five years, was the outcome of many forces, political, constitutional, social, and personal. In essence it was a revolt against the lawless despotism established by Richelieu. But the French kingdom, the French people, were not so organised as to offer much hope of reform by way of revolution. Of all French institutions the monarchy alone had the vitality required for the reconstruction of society. That was to be the task of Louis XIV and Colbert; they laid the foundations on which the Constituent Assembly and Napoleon built. Yet constitutional aspirations existed, and were stimulated perhaps by the example of rights successfully asserted beyond the Channel. The English Parliament was forced to use, to test, and to develop its powers. It had proved capable of successful warfare and of government. France also had her *Parlement* of Paris, her provincial *Parlements*, similar indeed in name alone to the two Houses of the English people, and representing but one narrow class, but invested with powers which were capable of considerable extension, possessed of a high and venerable tradition, the recognised exponents of the law, the would-be arbiters between King and people. Besides the *Parlements*, there were other "sovereign" bodies, the *Cour des Aides*, the *Chambre des Comptes*, the *Grand Conseil*, with definite though inferior functions, indispensable to the lawful action of the Government.

Richelieu had set himself to confine the *Parlements* to the adjudication of causes between party and party. In 1641 he had caused a declaration to be registered at a *lit de justice*, expressly forbidding the *Parlement* to take cognisance of any matter touching the State, its administration, or its government; edicts on such matters were to be registered and published without comment; and financial edicts could only be the subject of respectful representations; they could not be rejected or amended. But at the very beginning of the new reign the aid of the *Parlement* had been needed to ratify the reversal of the dispositions for the Regency made by the late King. The edict of 1641 had been treated as a dead letter. Richelieu had coerced the *Parlement* by exiling or imprisoning obnoxious councillors, and by depriving the contumacious of their offices. Mazarin, always averse from strong measures, had endeavoured to reach his ends by conciliation and accommodation. The magistrates had ceased to fear; disorder and discontent produced a cumulative effect; until at length the *Parlement* was moved to attack the whole problem of government and to raise the most vital issues.

Since 1643 sedition had been growing. In that year revolts against oppressive taxation broke out in Poitou, Saintonge, Angoumois, Rouergue. In the following year there were risings in Alençon, in Dauphiné,

at Montpellier, and at Valence. The Controller-General, Particelli d'Éméry, showed considerable ingenuity in creating new debts to liquidate the old, in alienating revenues and domains, and inventing new offices to sell. But fresh sources of income were needed, and in 1644 the *toisé* was proposed. An old edict, which forbade the erection of buildings in a zone surrounding the walls of Paris, had been disregarded; and flourishing suburbs had grown up. The King's Council issued an edict (January, 1644), imposing a tax of 40—50 *sous* on each square fathom (*toise*) covered by the illegal buildings. The occupants resisted, and the *Parlement* took up their cause. The tax was suspended for the time; and in its place a new proposal required all wealthy persons to contribute to a forced loan. But the *Parlement* insisted in the first place on exempting all members of the four sovereign Courts; and eventually so many restrictions were introduced that the forced loan, if levied, would have fallen on the financiers alone. The Government could not afford to offend the great financial interests; and in the end, after a struggle lasting over nearly two years, both *toisé* and *taxe des aisés* were abandoned. During the contest four members of the *Parlement* were exiled, or imprisoned; but the Government was forced to recall the exiles, and the victory rested with the Assembly.

In 1647 a new tariff was drawn up of dues to be levied on goods entering Paris, and was sanctioned by the *Cour des Aides*. This measure, if successful, would have been extended to the other towns of the kingdom. But the *Parlement* again intervened; and the struggle began once more and lasted through the year. In 1648 the expiration of the period for which the *Paulette* had been established seemed to give an opportunity of exacting concessions from the *Parlement* in return for its continuance, which involved the recognition of the heritable property of the magistrates in their offices. A *lit de justice* was held on January 12, 1648, at which edicts were registered revoking the tariff and the *taxe des aisés*, imposing new imposts, creating new offices, and especially twelve posts of *maîtres des requêtes*. The other *maîtres des requêtes*, resenting the consequent diminution of their individual profits, appealed to the *Parlement*; and the *Parlement* took up the examination of this and the other edicts, although they had already been registered. The Government, at its wits' end for funds, proposed, in return for the continuance of the *Paulette*, to require four years' salary from the magistrates concerned. The exemption of the *Parlement* from the effects of this measure did not suffice to win its support. The *Parlement* made common cause with the other sovereign corporations; and on May 13, 1648, it was agreed that representatives of each should be deputed to meet in the Hall of Saint-Louis, and discuss the general situation.

Thus the financial disorder had its political effect. Extraordinary measures were needed, for which the cooperation of the *Parlement* was indispensable. The ruinous nature of the expedients usually chosen

could not escape observation. Remonstrance grew to expostulation, thence to resistance; and at last the four sovereign bodies united to take their stand, as protectors of their own interests in the first place, but incidentally as champions of the poor, as critics of the Government, and as defenders and reformers of the Constitution. For these functions, excepting that of criticism, these judicial bodies were ill-fitted. They knew nothing of the wider problems of government; they had never felt its responsibility; they possessed no legal power of initiative, no executive authority except that of administering and enforcing the law. Thus they were insensibly led to exceed their legitimate functions; their new activity found them without experience; and they eventually became the tools of selfish interests and ambitions.

Even their earliest efforts presented a medley of philosophic reform and impracticable conservatism. By July 12, twenty-seven articles had been prepared by the Assembly of the Hall of Saint-Louis, and had been laid before the *Parlement* for consideration, amendment, and adoption. These articles proposed such vital changes as the suppression of the *intendants*, the revocation of all contracts dealing with the *tailles*, and the reduction of the *tailles* by one-quarter. No edict imposing new taxes or creating new offices was henceforward to be valid without the consent of the *Parlement* voting freely; no person was to be detained in prison for more than twenty-four hours without being brought before his natural judges. Another article forbade the creation of new offices in the sovereign companies, and any change in their constitution, while others suppressed all commercial monopolies and privileges, and established a special Court of justice to deal with financiers. Finally the advances already made by the *traitants* were not to be repaid to them.

The union of the Chambers had been at first rigorously opposed by the Government. Some of the deputies were exiled, others imprisoned. But in June Mazarin ceased to resist the movement; the prisoners were delivered, the exiles recalled; and the *Parlement* was conceded to all the companies on the old conditions. Éméry was dismissed, and La Meilleraye, who knew more about siege-works than about finance, took his place (July). The *intendants* were abolished, except in the frontier provinces of Champagne, Picardy, Burgundy, Provence, Languedoc, where they were to be retained for military purposes only. The *taille* was diminished, and a Chamber of justice was established to investigate financial abuses. The uncertainty as to all bargains with the financiers led to a partial bankruptcy. The Government seemed to have capitulated.

But Mazarin was only temporising. Condé was summoned to Paris in July; terms were no doubt then arranged with him, and a course of action was settled. An open rupture with the *Parlement* was to be avoided until a victory had been won; then the army of the Netherlands was to restore the royal authority. On the news of the victory of Lens the

execution of this plan was begun. Two of the most uncompromising councillors of the *Parlement*, one of them named Broussel, were arrested. But the Government had reckoned without the mob of Paris, among whom de Retz, who now first comes to the front, had secretly established a powerful influence. On hearing of the arrests the people rose in arms; and during the night of August 26-7 innumerable barricades were raised and manned. The Government was helpless; Broussel and his colleague were released; and order was for the moment restored.

On September 13 the Court left Paris and retired to Rueil. To strengthen his own position and remove his rivals Mazarin procured the exile of Châteauneuf and the imprisonment of Chavigny. The Court was preparing to resist the *Parlement*, whose decrees were cancelled, when suddenly this course was abandoned, and negotiations were opened at Saint-Germain. Condé, who was now at Court, seems to have been the prompter of this change of policy. The envoys of the *Parlement* were admitted to treat; and on October 24 the Declaration of Saint-Germain was registered, which embodied the chief part of their demands, including a clause exempting all officers of justice from imprisonment under *lettres de cachet*, and one providing that no subject should be treated as a criminal otherwise than by legal process. The victory of the constitutional party seemed complete. But government was impossible on these terms. The revocation of the *intendants* crippled the administration; the remission of taxes meant bankruptcy; and the restrictions on fresh financial legislation were likely to cut off all sources of fresh revenues. The Declaration of Saint-Germain registered at Paris, and the Treaty of Westphalia signed at Münster on the same day, show the diverse results at home and abroad produced by the Richelieu-Mazarin policy.

With the Declaration of Saint-Germain the constitutional interest of the Fronde ends. France needed a strong Government. That principle was inadequately, unworthily perhaps, embodied in Mazarin. The monarchy needed settled principles, respect for law and justice. That need the *Parlement* dimly perceived. Had these two powers been able to work together, an orderly and law-abiding Government might have been established. But the Minister saw in law only the limitation of authority; the *Parlement* saw in Mazarin's Government only the negation of law. Both might be excused for holding such views. But in consequence the principles formulated in the Hall of Saint-Louis remained a dead letter; the monarchy set itself steadfastly to nullify the concessions made to law and justice. Thus Mazarin did not dare to restore the *intendants*; but he employed commissioners drawn from parliamentary families with similar powers and for similar duties, and so enlisted individual councillors in the service of absolutism, which collectively they had condemned.

Henceforward principles recede more and more into the background. The struggle becomes a sordid conflict of individual ambitions with

hardly a gleam of redeeming virtue. The various forces, personal and collective, group themselves variously at various times, and produce a complexity of disorder which hardly admits of simple exposition. But, neglecting minor complications, we may yet endeavour to fix the chief factors of the problem, and to indicate the principal issues at stake during the Fronde.

The central figure is Mazarin; the principal issue is his predominance. His strength lay partly in his elusive wealth of resource, his supple insistence, his unscrupulous opportunism, his patience and perseverance, but still more in the fidelity of his friends, especially that of the Queen-Mother. It seems impossible to believe that a simple relation of mistress and servant existed between the two; affection and trust seldom inspire such resolute attachment; the theory of a secret marriage, though not proved, is highly probable. Thus the cause of Mazarin, though not perhaps essentially the cause of the Monarchy, was always the cause of the Court, and could always rally to it the forces of loyalty and traditional obedience. The firm support of his able adherents, Servien, Lionne, Le Tellier, and the Fouquets, with many other humbler agents, also did much to win for him the ultimate victory.

The Duke of Orleans played in the Fronde a part not unlike that which he had played under Louis XIII. After the Queen he stood by right of birth highest in the realm. His name gave a semblance of legality to seditious action; his opposition diminished the credit of the Government. Thus each party made efforts and sacrifices to win him which far exceeded his personal value. He was governed by councillors who used his prestige to accomplish their selfish ends. The Abbé de La Rivière hoped by his means to win a Cardinal's hat, and played fast and loose with Mazarin, to whom he owed his place; in the struggle he went down and de Retz for a time controlled the Duke. His romantic and headstrong daughter, Anne-Marie-Louise de Montpensier, *la Grande Mademoiselle*, had at one time hopes of marrying her cousin, Louis XIV, and more than once, acting in her father's name, turned for the moment the course of events.

Condé stood second by birth in the hierarchy of princes, but his military talents and repute seemed to justify a boundless ambition. Several of the French regiments were raised by his family, and many of the officers obeyed him rather than the King. By instinct he supported the Crown; he was averse from the constitutional notions of the *Parlement*, and hated mob-rule. His many generous qualities were disfigured by arrogance; his biting tongue made him many enemies; in debate he was hasty and intemperate; he could not bear to be overruled, hardly to be questioned. His brother was now Governor of Champagne; he himself had Burgundy and Berry; in 1648 he received Stenay, Jametz, Clermont-en-Argonne, spoils of Lorraine, and other gifts. But he was not satisfied, and demanded further concessions for himself and his

relations. His claims were inconsistent with the royal authority; and this, as much as his personal rivalry with Mazarin, drove him at length into rebellion. He was much influenced by women; and the counsels of his sister, Madame de Longueville, and of Isabelle de Montmorency, Duchess of Châtillon, had a great share in determining his course of action. His brother, Conti, without his talents, was a useful figure-head in the rebel camp, and was completely swayed by Anne de Longueville, who in her turn was governed by her lover, the Prince de Marsillac, afterwards Duke of La Rochefoucauld and author of the *Maxims*. Chavigny was firmly attached to the Condé interest, and, when this star was in the ascendant, was regarded as the natural successor of Mazarin. Châteauneuf, on the other hand, another aspirant to the post of Chief Minister, was pursued by the undying hatred of the House of Condé for his share in the condemnation and death of Montmorency (1632). He was therefore supported by the enemies of Condé.

The head of the illegitimate House of Vendôme had but little part in these events. But the rivalry of his family with the House of Condé was an important factor, and had been clearly shown when the post of Admiral was vacated by the death of Brézé. His elder son, the Duke of Mercœur, was won by Mazarin and married the Minister's niece, Laure Mancini, in the critical year of 1651. His second son, François, Duke of Beaufort, escaped from Vincennes about the beginning of the troubles. He came to Paris before the time of the Barricades and was made the idol of the Paris *Halles*, and thus was closely associated with de Retz and the leaders of the Parisian Fronde. The populace of Paris was at first enlisted in the cause of the parliamentary Fronde; afterwards it was used to coerce the *Parlement*, or the municipal government of Paris, as happened to suit the immediate ends of de Retz, or Beaufort, whose personal charm made him a power, while his stupidity made him the tool of cleverer men.

Paul de Gondi, better known as de Retz, Coadjutor to his uncle, the Archbishop of Paris, had as such a seat in the *Parlement* of Paris. There, by his insight and skill in guiding assemblies, he played an important part; in spite of his disorderly life he had considerable influence with the Church and especially with the clergy of Paris; he spared neither pains nor money to win the favour of the Paris mob. His ambition aimed first at the cardinalate, and through that dignity at the post of Chief Minister; for this end he even endeavoured to rival Mazarin in the Queen's affections. Closely linked from the first with Madame de Chevreuse, and, according to his own statement, the lover of her daughter, he shifted his alliance as events suggested, working even with Mazarin, whose power was incompatible with his own ambitions; and his quarrel with Condé in 1651 did more than anything else to wreck the fortunes of the Fronde, then at the height of its power. His memoirs assign to him a more important place in history than he

really filled ; but he was probably the ablest, as he certainly was among the least scrupulous, of the conspirators. He saw, perhaps more clearly than any, the political and constitutional needs of France ; but he was willing to sacrifice every principle to his own advancement.

Over the army the Queen and the Chief Minister never completely lost control ; even the prestige of Condé could only divert a few regiments from their allegiance ; Turenne's influence with Bernard of Weimar's soldiery yielded to Mazarin's gold. Turenne himself and his brother the Duke of Bouillon, though more than once they joined the rebels in the hope of recovering Sedan, were induced to accept compensation in other parts of France, and rallied to the Crown (1652). Thenceforward the Government had a leader of hardly inferior quality to oppose to Condé and his Spanish allies.

The general and just discontent of France gave considerable strength to the rebels ; the feeling against Mazarin outweighed for a considerable period all other considerations ; but, apart from personal rivalries, this feeling only found expression in the *Parlements*, and among the mob and the *bourgeoisie* of Paris. The provincial *Parlements* supported, though not firmly, the constitutional movement. That of Bordeaux, through its quarrel with Épernon, the Governor of Guienne, was dragged furthest into the revolutionary course ; those of Aix and Rouen were chiefly influenced by a personal grievance, the additional posts that had been created therein for financial purposes. The *bourgeoisie* came by degrees to see that the Princes cared even less for their interests than Mazarin had done. The lovers of peace and order gradually rallied to the Government ; the nation possessed no alternative organisation ; individual leaders, one by one, lost credit or were reconciled ; and at the last Condé was left, almost alone, to fight with foreign aid against his country and his King.

Space does not permit us to dwell on the women of the Fronde, whose activity gives to that movement its character of romance, inconsequence, and frivolity. But besides those mentioned above a place must be found for Claire-Clémence de Brézé, Condé's slighted wife, who developed during his captivity unexpected qualities of fortitude and energy ; and Anne di Gonzaga, wife of Edward, a son of the Elector Palatine Frederick V, who throughout the disturbances exercised a controlling and moderating influence. An able judge of political possibilities, she was the councillor of all and betrayed none, and eventually threw all her weight on the side of the Queen, contributing not a little to the final reconciliation.

The course of events can only be briefly summarised. After the Declaration of Saint-Germain the Court returned for a time to Paris. The *Parlement* continued its attacks upon the Government ; claims were put forward by Madame de Longueville on behalf of her husband and her younger brother which Mazarin was unable to concede ; financial

difficulties were chronic; the *rentes* were not paid; the *Parlement* grew more pressing; de Retz stimulated its opposition; the war of pamphlets, characteristic of this struggle, began to rage; and in January the Court decided to leave Paris and to bring the capital to reason by blockade. In this short war (January 6 to April 1, 1649) Condé stood firm by the Crown, and even Orleans remained with the Court; but Madame de Longueville, Conti, the Dukes of Beaufort and Bouillon, Marsillac, and de Retz, placed themselves at the head of the rebels in Paris, while Longueville raised Normandy. Negotiations were opened with Spain. Turenne was won for the rebellion, and was preparing to march with the army of Germany to its aid, when his troops, bought by Mazarin's agents with money provided on the security of Condé's jewels, deserted him, and he was forced to take refuge in Holland. Harcourt kept Longueville in check; the Spaniards sent an ambassador, who was received by the *Parlement*, but their army was slow to move; Rantzau, commanding at Dunkirk, who was suspected of treason, was seized and imprisoned; Condé directed the blockade, which became more and more pressing; the Parisian levies could not face the regular troops; and finally the rebels were forced to treat (March 4). On April 1 the Treaty of Rueil was registered in the *Parlement*. Arms were laid down; the Bastille and the Arsenal were surrendered; a complete amnesty was conceded; and no general meetings of the *Parlement* were to be held till the end of the year. The Declaration of Saint-Germain was confirmed; and the decrees against Mazarin were annulled. Efforts were made to meet the exorbitant demands of the rebel leaders; but they remained unsatisfied, and the peace was only a truce.

The provincial risings on this occasion were not dangerous. Movements at Rheims, in Anjou, Poitou, Maine, were easily suppressed. The members of the *Parlement* of Aix, who had attacked their Governor, the Comte d'Alais, were for the time satisfied by the suppression of the new posts in their Court, but sporadic conflicts continued in Provence throughout the period. The *Parlement* of Normandy came to terms, and Longueville was fain to accept the amnesty. At Bordeaux, after the general cessation of hostilities, the city and the *Parlement* continued to make war on the Duke of Épernon; but for the present this conflict seemed to have only local and personal significance.

All the principal persons were ostensibly reconciled with the Court; even Beaufort and de Retz paid their visits of ceremony in August; but discontent was only repressed, not cured; and thus, for the Minister no less than for France, peace was much to be desired. But to secure peace with Spain on tolerable terms some striking success was needed to counterbalance the effect produced by the internal troubles. An effort was accordingly made in the north, and the Court went to Amiens to support it; but the best leaders were ruled out, Turenne by his recent treason, Condé by the attitude of his family. Harcourt, who received

the command, proved an inferior substitute; siege was laid to Cambrai and afterwards abandoned; the results of the campaign were insignificant. Condé might have extorted peace; confidence and employment might have kept him steady. By slighting and suspecting him the Government gave to Madame de Longueville and her friends their opportunity; the Prince was surrounded by youthful and arrogant nobles, the *petits-maîtres*, who exacerbated his passions and stimulated his ambition. When the Court returned to Paris in August Chavigny reappeared; in September an open quarrel occurred between Mazarin and Condé over the proposed marriage between the Duke of Mercœur and Laure Mancini; Mazarin was not yet ready for an open breach and in October consented, in return for Condé's promise of support, to make no important appointment without consulting him. The honours which Condé procured for his friends and their wives excited jealousy at Court, not unwelcome to Mazarin.

In December the *rentiers*, whose interest was not regularly paid, appointed deputies to press their claims; and a pretended attack upon one of these deputies was got up by de Retz to discredit the Government. By accident or design, in the disorder which followed, a shot was fired into one of Condé's carriages; and the Prince brought forward in the *Parlement* a formal charge of attempted murder against Beaufort, de Retz, and Broussel, the leaders of the old Fronde.

Mazarin's enemies were now divided. Condé affronted the Queen by protecting the Chevalier de Jarzé, who, as she thought, had personally insulted her: by assisting the Duke of Richelieu, a minor, to a secret marriage, the Prince showed designs upon Havre, of which the Duke was titular Governor, and offended Madame de Chevreuse, for whose daughter the Duke had been intended by his guardian, and Mazarin, who had hoped that he would marry one of his nieces. The cup was full; Mazarin adopted the course long urged by de Retz and Madame de Chevreuse; in order to secure Orleans La Rivière was dismissed; and on January 18, 1650, Condé, Conti, and Longueville were arrested and imprisoned at Vincennes. Madame de Longueville fled to Normandy; driven from Dieppe, driven from Arras, she at length reached Stenay, where Turenne had taken refuge. Tavannes took command of Condé's troops in Burgundy. But the alliance of Mazarin and the old Fronde, supported by Orleans and the Vendôme family, seemed strong enough to face any opposition. As a symbol of the new policy, Châteauneuf was recalled and received the seals. Chavigny was ordered to leave Paris.

The course of events was in fact favourable for a time. Marsin, who was at the head of the army of Catalonia, and devoted to Condé, was arrested at Perpignan. Gaston was left to conduct the Government at Paris under the guidance of Le Tellier and Servien, while the Court made a series of military expeditions. Normandy was completely subdued, and Longueville's officers were displaced. Richelieu

was obliged to give up Havre. Condé's fortresses in Bar were recovered except Stenay. Tavannes was forced to surrender Bellegarde in Burgundy, and his army was disbanded. Turenne concluded a treaty with Spain (April 30), but some time elapsed before he could act vigorously. At Bordeaux the principal resistance concentrated; hither repaired Claire-Clémence, Condé's wife, with her little son, Bouillon with forces drawn from his county of Turenne, La Rochefoucauld with the levies of Poitou. After a visit to Compiègne, to provide for the defence of the northern frontier, the Court at length returned to Paris (end of June) and prepared for the main expedition, that of Guienne, where La Meilleraye with the King's forces was already confronting the rebels.

On August 1 the Court was in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux, having purchased the neutrality of Du Daugnon at Brouage, by confirming him in the irregular command which he had held since 1646. Negotiations were at once begun, but were interrupted owing to some unnecessary severities, which led to reprisals on the part of the rebels; and prolonged operations were needed to bring the town to reason. An amnesty and peace were at length granted to Bordeaux on easy terms (September 29). The Princess of Condé, Bouillon, and La Rochefoucauld, received liberty to retire whither they pleased. The King and the Court entered Bordeaux, and the south-west appeared pacified. In the south, Provence alone still gave cause for anxiety. Montrond, the last stronghold of the Princes in the centre of France, surrendered towards the end of October. But, when the Court returned to Paris in November, Mazarin still saw work to be done.

While the Court was before Bordeaux, the Spaniards under Turenne had advanced into Champagne, captured Rethel and Château Porcien with other places, and defeated Hocquincourt near Fismes (August 26). This advance had terrified Paris, and necessitated the removal of the Princes to Marcoussis, a castle to the south-west of Paris near Limours. Mazarin was anxious to restore his prestige by recovering the lost places; and, after patching up an accord with Orleans and removing the Princes to Havre for greater security, he set out in December, and successfully accomplished his task, defeating Turenne. But, while he was away, a conspiracy that had long been preparing gained strength.

Mazarin had found his allies of the Fronde exacting. The nomination as Cardinal, which Retz had demanded, he thought it impolitic to concede. During his absence the Coadjutor had won more and more influence over the Duke of Orleans, and now saw his way by an alliance with the imprisoned Princes to clear Mazarin from his path to power. This alliance had been prepared by the Princess Palatine, and involved the exile of Mazarin, the liberation of the Princes, the post of Chief Minister for Châteauneuf, and the marriage of Conti to Mademoiselle de Chevreuse; it was not, however, concluded till the end of January. In December a petition for the release of the Princes was presented to the *Parlement*, who proceeded

to consider the question. Just before Mazarin's return de Retz declared for liberation; and during the whole of January the Chief Minister, deprived of the Queen's effective aid by her illness, maintained an unequal fight to prevent the union of his enemies. On February 1 Retz announced to the *Parlement* that Orleans had decided for the release, which was voted a few days later, together with a demand that Mazarin should be dismissed. On the night of February 6-7, 1651, Mazarin quitted Paris, leaving the Queen to extricate herself and protect his interests. But she was detained by force, and became practically a prisoner in the hands of the Fronde. In vain Mazarin tried to win credit by releasing the Princes from prison (February 13). For the moment the game was up, and the Minister fled through Picardy and Lorraine to Bouillon, and thence to Brühl, in the diocese of Cologne.

The alliance of the two sections of the Fronde did not last long. Mazarin from his place of exile corresponded constantly with the Queen through Lionne, Servien, and Le Tellier; and his friends, though for a time he thought otherwise, served him well. The elements of discord were skilfully utilised. The nobility and clergy assembled at Paris and demanded a meeting of the Estates General, a proposal distasteful to the *Parlement*. It was found necessary to break up the assembly of the nobles after promising a meeting of the Estates when the King should have attained his majority. The *Parlement* demanded that all Cardinals should be excluded from the King's Council, as owing allegiance to a foreign Power. Both Châteauneuf and Retz, as aspirants to that dignity, were menaced by this decision. The pretensions of Condé were equally incompatible with their ambitions. The dismissal of Châteauneuf and the substitution of Chavigny seemed to show that Condé had abandoned Retz, and was determined to reign alone. The announcement made the same day (April 15), of the rupture of the marriage between Conti and Mademoiselle de Chevreuse proved at least that he cared little if this was believed, or what other persons he might offend. Orleans was thereby alienated; and the Princess Palatine, whose plighted word had been treated as null and void, was bitterly aggrieved.

The supremacy of Condé, though temporary, was for the moment complete. He held Burgundy and Berry besides his strong places in Bar. His brother was Governor of Champagne. His friends were installed in the governments of Limousin, Saintonge, Angoumois, Anjou, and Béarn. The Condé regiments were united in the north under Tavannes. He now obtained Guienne in exchange for Burgundy, and claimed Provence instead of Champagne for his brother, two provinces chosen as discontented and accessible to Spanish naval aid. It was indeed desirable to remove Épernon and d'Alais; but, prompted by Mazarin, the Court resisted Condé's demands. Retz approached the Queen's advisers to urge the murder or arrest of Condé. Condé was warned; in July he left Paris and exacted as the condition of his return the dismissal of

Le Tellier, Servien, and Lionne, which was reluctantly conceded; but Chavigny at the same time was removed from office. The *Parlement* intervened (August) to reconcile Condé and the Queen, but to no purpose. In despair she turned to Retz. A new Ministry was formed. Châteauneuf was restored. The seals were given to Matthieu Molé, the intrepid and independent First President of the *Parlement*; the finances to La Vieuville, as a reward for the services of his friend, the Princess Palatine, who was drawing closer and closer to the Queen. Retz was to have the Cardinal's hat; and Mademoiselle de Chevreuse was to marry the young Mancini. The new alliance had only one bond of union—hatred of Condé, which reconciled for the moment the incompatible interests of Retz, Châteauneuf, and Mazarin. Each party to the treaty had the firm intention of duping the others; and Retz did well to obtain an effective nomination (September 21) and to take his own measures at Rome to hasten the action of the Holy Father, while the unstable coalition lasted.

Secure for the moment of Retz and his friends, the Queen summoned on August 17 a great meeting of Princes, officials, the sovereign Courts, and the municipal authorities of Paris, and laid before them a formal indictment of Condé. Condé and Retz appeared in the *Parlement*, each supported by an armed force; and on August 21 a fracas occurred, in which Retz narrowly escaped murder at the hands of La Rochefoucauld. The Court seemed to hesitate; immediately before the ceremony of the King's majority (September 7) the charges against Condé were withdrawn, and the banishment of Mazarin was confirmed. But Condé's patience was exhausted; he left Paris on September 6, and, backed by Orleans, demanded that the establishment of the new Ministry should be deferred. When this was refused, he moved southward. On September 15 he was at Montrond, with his sister, Nemours, La Rochefoucauld, and a few other friends; and there they persuaded him to declare for open war. Conti joined him later.

Condé relied upon Bordeaux, where the *Parlement* and above all the populace were still in open revolt; on the fleet at Brouage and La Rochelle, where Du Daugnon was Governor; on Marsin, who had been replaced in command of the army in Catalonia; on Tavannes, who was at the head of the Condé troops with the army of Picardy; on Stenay, one or two places in Burgundy, and the stronghold of Montrond in the Bourbonnais; on the influence of La Rochefoucauld in Poitou, of Rohan in Anjou, of La Force in Périgord; and above all on Turenne. He seized the public money in the districts where he was master, and levied the *tailles*. Marsin brought him four regiments from Catalonia; the rest were loyal. Tavannes collected the Condé regiments at Stenay. Orleans controlled a certain number of troops and might be won. But Turenne and his brother refused to fight against the King, now that there was no longer any Regency; and Condé was driven to make a

disastrous alliance with Spain. In return for the promise of men and money he engaged himself to make no peace in which Spain should not be included. To "faith unfaithful falsely true," he was held in bondage by this treaty; he could in consequence offer no terms which the Court could accept. His Spanish allies supported him when failure seemed imminent and withdrew their aid when complete success appeared possible; they loyally stood out for his complete restitution in 1659; but until peace was signed they used him as an instrument to weaken France; they did not desire to see him in power.

In the south during the winter Condé was steadily forced back by Saint-Luc and Harcourt. The Spanish fleet appeared in the Gironde and occupied Bourg. Negotiations were opened with Cromwell; and an extraordinary scheme for a republican government of France was drawn up under Condé's name. Meanwhile Mazarin had been recalled; and on January 29, 1652, he reached Poitiers with a little army raised in Liége. The news of his return decided Orleans to join the rebels (January 24); but this defection was more than counterbalanced by the arrival at Court of Turenne and Bouillon (February 2); the duchies of Château Thierry and Albret, the counties of Évreux and Auvergne, were the compensation for Sedan, and the price of their adhesion. In February the rebels were driven from Anjou, and Angers fell, in spite of Beaufort, who was commanding Gaston's troops. In March Tavannes joined him with the Condé regiments from the north, and Nemours with a Spanish contingent. But Beaufort was incompetent and quarrelsome; the royal advance continued and the city of Orleans was only saved by the picturesque intervention of Mademoiselle de Montpensier (March 25). In these circumstances Condé, who had been struggling hopelessly in the south, decided to take command on the Loire; he left Agen with a few followers (March 23), and joined his army at Lorris on April 1. A week later he surprised that portion of the royal army which was commanded by Hocquincourt at Bléneau, and drove it in rout, capturing 1500 men. The Court at Gien was in danger but was saved by the skill of Turenne. But, instead of following up his success, Condé repaired to Paris, where he remained for some months; perhaps entangled by the Duchess of Châtillon, but also retained by the necessity of watching Orleans and de Retz.

Turenne reorganised the royal army, defeated the rebel army at Étampes (May 4), and laid siege to that town. To save it, the Spaniards detached the Duke of Lorraine; he crossed France, plundering and burning; but, unwilling to risk the army which was his sole possession, he contented himself with persuading Turenne to raise the siege, and, when threatened by that general, returned to the Netherlands. After his retreat Turenne occupied Saint-Denis with 12,000 men, menacing Condé's army of 6000 at Saint-Cloud. Wishing to reach a safer position at Charenton Condé asked leave to pass through Paris, which was refused;

and, while making for this point by a detour to the south, he was caught by Turenne at Saint-Antoine and forced to fight with his back to the gate among the houses of the suburb. After a fierce struggle, in which Turenne's forces were roughly handled, artillery came up and Condé's defeat seemed in view, when Mademoiselle de Montpensier extorted from her father permission to unbar the gates and the Bastille opened fire on the royal troops. The remains of Condé's army took refuge in the city (July 2).

A rising had already taken place in Paris on June 25, in which some officers of the *Parlement* suffered violence. On July 4 the mob attacked the Hôtel de Ville, whither an assembly representative of all the interests of Paris had been called; some thirty of the deputies were killed or wounded and the Town Hall was burnt. The enemies of Condé alleged that he had instigated this outrage in order to force the city to join his cause. Amid growing dissatisfaction, on July 20, a provisional Government was established by authority of the *Parlement*, with Orleans as Lieutenant-Governor, Condé as Commander-in-Chief, Beaufort as Governor of Paris, and Broussel as Provost of the Merchants. But this was the last effort of the Fronde. Money could not be raised. The army was melting. Disunion prevailed. Beaufort killed Nemours in a duel. On August 6, by royal decree, the *Parlement* was transferred to Pontoise, and the rival assembly there established steadily grew in authority and numbers. To facilitate an accommodation, Mazarin once more withdrew from France (August 19) and a general amnesty was offered.

On August 9 Vendôme had defeated Du Daugnon and the Spanish fleet off Ré. Montrond capitulated early in September. The agents of Mazarin stimulated the Parisian populace against the Fronde, which was becoming more and more unpopular. The Spanish Government determined to make one more effort to support the faction; and early in September the Duke of Lorraine and Ulric of Würtemberg, with 8000 men, set forth for Paris. Turenne met them at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges and held them in check all through September. Retz and Châteauneuf opened abortive negotiations with the Court; even Chavigny was willing to abandon Condé, but, crushed by his master's wrath on hearing of his treachery, he fell ill and died (October, 1652). Towards the end of September the change of feeling in the capital became unmistakable; Broussel resigned; and the King was invited to come to Paris. The supply of provisions to the Duke of Lorraine was stopped. He was forced to retire, and Condé followed him. Beaufort resigned, and Gaston announced his intention of retiring to Blois. On October 21 the King entered Paris, and the Government was re-established. Beaufort, Châteauneuf, Rohan, Fontrailles, with ten councillors of the *Parlement*, and the Duchesses of Châtillon and Montbazou, were exiled; and an edict was registered forbidding the *Parlement* to concern itself with

questions of State, administration, or finance. Orleans retired to Blois and ordered his troops to withdraw from Condé's army. Retz was offered a mission to Rome; on his refusal he was arrested (December 19). He escaped in 1654, and went to Rome, where for a time the Pope supported him against Mazarin, who wished him to resign his claims to the archbishopric of Paris. Later, he was forced to leave Rome and became a wanderer. He resigned his see in 1662, and was permitted to live in France, but took no further part in affairs.

Mazarin's return was delayed by the necessity of resisting Condé in Champagne, where he had firmly established himself. After recovering Château Porcien and some less important places, the Cardinal left Rethel and Sainte-Menehould in the hands of the enemy, and in February, 1653, returned to Paris, where he resumed all and more than all of his former power. Of his enemies and rivals, Condé was a proclaimed traitor and commander-in-chief of the forces of Spain, Retz a prisoner, Bouillon, Chavigny, and La Vieuville dead; Châteauneuf died in this year. The *Parlement* was humbled. Turenne was the King's servant, and the King identified Mazarin's authority with his own. Only a few outlying troubles remained to be remedied. Bordeaux, where Conti and Madame de Longueville had ruled by the aid of a violent faction, called the *Ormée*, had to be reduced to obedience. Harcourt, as Governor of Elsass, had taken advantage of the disorder to seize Breisach for himself and made overtures to Spain and Lorraine. Du Daugnon still held Brouage, and one or two other leaders were in possession of governments which they could not be permitted to retain. Mercœur, the new Governor of Provence, needed aid to establish his authority against the Comte d'Alais, now Duke of Angoulême, who had joined the party of Condé. Épernon, who had been assigned to Burgundy in place of Condé, had to reduce Dijon and Bellegarde. Bordeaux made terms on July 31, 1653. Conti received his pardon; Madame de Longueville returned to her husband and after his death entered a Carmelite convent; the Princess of Condé followed the Prince to Flanders; Marsin took refuge in Spain. Guienne was restored to the Duke of Épernon. When Harcourt came to terms and surrendered Breisach (March, 1654) the Fronde was ended.

During the troubles France had steadily lost ground in Italy and the Netherlands. In 1649 Ypres was taken by the Spaniards, and Modena made peace; in the following year Piombino and Porto-Longone fell. In 1651 Barcelona was captured, and on the Flemish frontier Furnes and Bergues-Saint-Vinox. In 1652 France was forced to abandon Gravelines, Mardyck, and Dunkirk, while Casale surrendered and was assigned to the Duke of Mantua as the price of his adhesion to Spain. From 1653 onwards the tide turned, slowly at first, afterwards more rapidly. The campaigns in which the genius of Condé was matched

against the high ability of Turenne are full of interest to the military historian, but only the general results can be indicated here. Turenne had the advantage of the ungrudging support of his Government and that of undivided authority; and, though France was seriously embarrassed, her resources were yet superior to those of Spain. Condé on the other hand was hampered by the jealousy of his colleagues, and sometimes by the timidity of a superior. Moreover, owing to the clause in his treaty which gave him the sovereignty of any conquests he might make on the soil of France, the Spanish Government stood to lose by any reverse and not to gain by his success. Hence, in spite of some brilliant strokes, the fortune of war was on the whole adverse to him and his allies.

In 1653-4 he was driven from Rethel and Sainte-Menehould in Champagne and from Stenay and Clermont in Lorraine, and, defeated before Arras, had the poor consolation of making a skilful retreat. Mazarin's intrigues with Lorraine led the Spanish Government to arrest Duke Charles (February, 1654); and his troops took service under the King of France in the following year. In 1655 Landrecies and other places were taken by the French, and treasonable intentions of Hocquincourt to surrender Peronne and Ham were discovered and frustrated. In 1656 negotiations for peace were opened, but the Spanish demands on behalf of Condé proved an invincible obstacle; Turenne's defeat before Valenciennes (July 16, 1656) stiffened the resolution of Spain: and Mazarin broke off the discussion. Further successes were needed before he could obtain such terms as he desired. The Cardinal had already more than once approached Cromwell with a view to joint action against Spain; he recognised the Commonwealth in 1652; the peace of April, 1654, between the English and the Dutch seemed to offer hopes; but the Vaudois and other misunderstandings ensued, and the Treaty of Westminster (October 24, 1655), which established friendly relations between England and France, and led to the expulsion of Charles II and the Duke of York from French dominions, was only a step in the right direction. At length in March, 1657, by the Treaty of Paris, it was agreed that the two Governments should together undertake the conquest of Mardyck, Dunkirk, and Gravelines. Operations began in May, and Mardyck fell in September. The French arms, however, suffered a reverse before Cambrai (May 30); and it was not till 1658 that the allies got effectively to work. Dunkirk was invested (May); Don Juan of Austria and Condé were defeated at the battle of the Dunes by Turenne, whose force included 6000 English (June 14); the city surrendered a fortnight later and, with Mardyck, was handed over to England as agreed. Bergues-Saint-Vinox, Dixmuyden, and Furnes were then recovered in rapid succession. On July 29 Gravelines was invested, and a month later it surrendered. The conquests of Oudenarde, Menin, and Ypres followed.

In the same year Mazarin had succeeded in extorting from the new Emperor, Leopold, before his election, a promise to cease his clandestine

support of Spain, and had joined the League which was formed to maintain the independence of the Princes of the Empire as secured by the Treaty of Westphalia. Deprived of the assistance which the Austrian House had been supplying, the position of Spain was becoming more and more desperate. A proposal to marry Louis to the daughter of the Duke of Savoy was perhaps intended as a lure; at any rate towards the end of 1658 Spain offered peace and the Infanta Maria Teresa. An armistice was concluded in May, 1659; but the infatuation of Louis for Marie Mancini, one of the Cardinal's nieces, threatened to ruin the plan. This obstacle was, however, removed, and negotiations proceeded with goodwill on both sides from August to November, when the Treaty of the Pyrenees was signed. France retained Gravelines but surrendered all her other Flemish conquests except Bourbourg and Saint-Venant. Between Bourbourg and Saint-Venant Spain kept Saint-Omer and Aire, but abandoned the rest of Artois. In Hainault France acquired Landrecies and Le Quesnoy: between Sambre and Meuse, Avesnes, Philippeville, and Mariembourg: in Luxembourg, Montmédy, Damvillers, and Thionville. The county of Charolais and a few French conquests in Franche Comté were given back to Spain. The Spanish King resigned all his rights in Elsass. The last forts in Catalonia were evacuated by France; and the Pyrenees became the frontier between France and Spain on this side. The King of France promised to give no aid to Portugal; the Dukes of Savoy and Modena were to be restored to the positions which they held before the war. To Condé the possession of all his rights was secured, together with his office of *Grand Maître*, and his government of Burgundy. In return he ceded his remaining fortresses, Rocroi, Le Catelet, Linchamp, to Louis XIV. Maria Teresa abjured all rights in the succession to the Spanish Crown; but a clause stipulating the payment of her dowry as a condition of this renunciation left a loophole for dispute hereafter. The peace contained clauses in favour of the Duke of Lorraine; but he refused the terms offered, and made his own peace in February, 1661. Bar was then restored to him on condition of homage; France received Moyenvic, Clermont, Jametz, Stenay, Sierck, Pfalzburg, Saarburg. The fortifications of Nancy were rased, and France retained the right of passage through Lorraine from Metz to Elsass. On these hard conditions his duchy was restored to him.

The last years of Mazarin saw other questions settled. The restoration of Charles II in 1660 took place without much assistance from France; Hyde's party, then in favour with the English King, resented Mazarin's caution, maliciously advertised such surreptitious aid as he provided, and did their best to counteract the influence of Henrietta Maria. In 1660 Gaston of Orleans died, Louis visited, and finally pacified Provence; and his marriage was celebrated at Fuenterrabia (June). The rash enterprises of Sweden, which Mazarin had viewed with alarm, were terminated by the death of Charles Gustavus; and

peace was restored in the north-east of Europe by the Treaties of Oliva (May 3, 1660) and Copenhagen (June 6, 1660) under the influence of France. Henrietta of England was married in March, 1661, to the Duke of Orleans, brother of the French King; and France set on foot the scheme for the marriage of Charles II with the Portuguese Princess, Catharine of Braganza. When Mazarin died (March 9, 1661) he might claim that he left all in order, except the administration and the finances of France.

Even before the Fronde, war had ravaged the frontier provinces, and taxation had devastated the interior of France; Lorraine, especially, was a desert. In 1646 it is said that 23,000 persons were in prison for failure to pay the *tailles*. The *gabelle* furnished a third of the convicts. Troops protected the tax-collector, and the usurers gave him his orders. In January, 1648, Omer Talon said, "The country has been ruined for ten years"; and his testimony is supported by the sober judgment of Matthieu Molé. The Fronde brought war and the pillage of unpaid troops to almost every part of France. The environs of Paris and Bordeaux suffered most; but few regions escaped, except perhaps Brittany, the Lyonnais, and Dauphiné, on which the taxes fell with added weight. The Croats and other horsemen under Johann von Werth, the mercenaries of Charles of Lorraine, made destruction a fine art; but even among French troops discipline was impossible without pay. The charity of Saint-Vincent de Paul and of the votaries of Port Royal, hardly touched the fringe of the distress, which continued long after the Fronde had ceased. The Mediterranean was given up to pirates; plague followed on famine; hard winters and inundations aggravated the misery; and 1658 and 1660 were years of more than usual scarcity. The cessation of civil war revived the rule of the usurers.

Mazarin owed much to the Fouquets. Basile Fouquet (the Abbé) was his chief of secret police, both during and after the Fronde. Nicolas was useful in the *Parlement* as *procureur-général*. Their services were rewarded by the instalment of Nicolas at the head of the finances in 1653. Servien, nominally his colleague, became a cipher. Fouquet, charged with the receipt of revenue, had funds to meet such expenditure as he favoured, and none when payment did not suit his purpose. His influence with the financiers, in whose illicit gains he shared, made him useful to Mazarin, who shut his eyes to his defalcations, and perhaps had a part of his gains. The enormous fortune (thirty millions) left by Mazarin must have been almost entirely accumulated after the Fronde. Fouquet rendered no exact account of receipts, and bought up old claims at a low figure, which he then paid in full. On the death of Servien (1659), Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who managed Mazarin's private fortune, denounced Fouquet's transactions to his master, but Mazarin contented himself with a warning. Fouquet bought everyone who was worth buying. The money, which he made by fraud, he spent like a prince.

Of men of letters he was the magnificent patron. At the death of Mazarin he was the most powerful man in France, and prepared, if necessary, to assert his power by civil war. The story of his fall must be reserved for a later volume.

It is said that Mazarin on his death-bed left Colbert as a legacy to his master, with the advice to rule in person and without a Chief Minister, two gifts that were more valuable than all the Cardinal's fortune. Both Richelieu and Mazarin possessed transcendent gifts, but the task of universal government must always be beyond one man's power, especially when complicated by the necessity of preserving a precarious ascendancy and defeating incessant intrigue. Neither Minister attempted to establish, perhaps neither dared to establish, machinery to supplement his individual deficiencies. Only a King can delegate power without impairing his authority. The inordinate ambition of Louis XIV laid arduous burdens on his people; but his personal rule was at least free from the gravest defects that disfigure the brilliant record of the two Cardinals.

The personality of Mazarin fills his period no less than that of Richelieu the previous eighteen years. In both periods all serious public action in France was directed by or against the Chief Minister. But whereas Richelieu gave a new form to the polity of France, the energies of Mazarin were devoted to working out in his own way the formulas provided by his predecessor. In foreign policy he garnered where Richelieu had sown. At home he perpetuated Richelieu's errors and supplied none of his omissions. The second period seems to repeat the first; only the means of action are different. While Richelieu relied mainly on force for the accomplishment of his ends, Mazarin trusted to subtlety, adroitness, diplomacy, and tact. Forces which Richelieu would have crushed, at the risk of perishing in the attempt, Mazarin allowed to grow and work till they became dangerous; he then eluded, diverted, managed them, until their energy was exhausted. The brilliant victories of France, and the disorders of the Fronde, may alike be attributed to this more elastic policy; but in the result Mazarin, though always the central point of all observation, seems rather to follow than to direct the course of affairs. By adopting in every crisis the less detrimental of alternatives presented, he secured in the end successes more complete and substantial than his predecessor; but he added no new idea to the repertory of statesmen; the ends which he reached had already been indicated before his coming; a consummate opportunist, he left no distinctive and individual mark on the State or policy of France.

CHAPTER XXII.

SPAIN AND SPANISH ITALY UNDER PHILIP III AND IV.

AFTER forty-five years of wasting warfare against the Dutch Protestants Spain had been forced by sheer exhaustion to accept the humiliating truce of 1609, by which for twelve years the principles upon which she had staked her position as a great Power were to remain in abeyance. To all men unblinded by the spiritual pride that had dazzled Spaniards to their undoing, it was a confession that the nation was unequal to the mighty mission bequeathed to it by the Emperor: that of imposing religious unity upon Christendom under the hegemony of the House of Habsburg. Misery and famine stalked unhindered through the land, whilst the luxurious and the idle squandered lavishly the national resources wrung by corruption from a ruined people. All classes but the poorest evaded their national obligations, and sought to justify the hollow boast of boundless public wealth by endeavouring to live without work upon the private plunder of the State. The high hopes fostered in the first years of the reign by the golden showers of Lerma's prodigality had been succeeded by a cynical desire to enjoy the passing hour whilst it lasted, and to prolong it as much as possible by insisting more loudly than ever upon the invincible power of Spain and the inexhaustible wealth of her King. But for this determination of the Court and the people as a whole to shut their eyes obstinately to facts, and to treat the great task in which they had failed as being still incumbent upon them, a policy of retrenchment and close concentration of national effort upon domestic amelioration might yet have been adopted and have saved Spain from the slough of ruin into which she was sinking. But the spirit of pompous exaggeration and arrogance had entered into the heart of the nation, and, exhausted though the country was, not a jot of the proud claims of old was abated. The King, who was really a foolish trifler, spending all his time in alternate prayer and pastime, was "the greatest prince that the world ever saw"; and Lerma, whose abilities hardly reached mediocrity, was adulated like a demigod. Each Castilian Cortes as it met after the usual three years' interval was told in the speech from the throne that supplies must be voted

bountifully, in order that the King might "defend our holy Catholic faith and secure obedience to the Roman Church"; and the deputies, bribed to a man with pensions, places, and grants, broke their self-denying oath, and in return for their personal aggrandisement voted whatever they were asked, while their formal petitions for the relief of the suffering people were ignominiously rejected or contemptuously disregarded by the King. The expulsion of the Moriscos, though economically disastrous, raised to a higher pitch than ever the self-satisfied vanity of the majority of Spaniards; and a chorus of praise convinced Lerma and the King that they were heaven-sent statesmen in thus utilising the first year of relief from foreign war afforded by the truce by pursuing Spain's sacred mission of Christian unification within the borders of the realm itself.

While Spaniards were living in this fool's paradise and accepting the semblance for the reality of things, their rivals with clearer vision were preparing to challenge claims that appeared incapable of enforcement. Archduke Leopold of Austria, on behalf of the Emperor, had in August, 1609, obtained possession by strategy of the fortress of Jülich. Henry IV had warned Archduke Albert in Flanders that any such aggression would be resented by him, but depending, as usual, upon ultimate support from Spain, the Emperor Rudolf disregarded the warning. The heroics of Lerma and the patent weakness of Spain, combined with this and other public and private sources of irritation, convinced Henry IV and Sully that the time had come for dealing a heavy blow for the liberation of religion in Europe from Habsburg dictation. The Hollanders were as ready as Henry to resent the Catholic occupation of Jülich-Cleves, and Protestant England sympathised with them. Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, that unquiet son-in-law of Philip II, chafed under the yoke of his Spanish kinsman, who had used him for the ends of Spain alone, and had cheated him out of the guerdon for which he had hoped in Italy. But for the puling Philip III, Charles Emmanuel's own son would have been heir to the Spanish Crown, and bitter resentment filled the Savoyard's heart against those who had made him a mere catspaw of Spanish ambition. Probably the only confederate who was really in earnest about fighting besides Henry himself was Charles Emmanuel, who hoped to grasp Lombardy with the title of King: but when the French forces stood ready to cross respectively the Rhine and the Pyrenees, and to help Savoy to sweep the Spaniards from Lombardy, the knife of Ravallac changed the whole current of European history (May 15, 1610).

There is no proof whatever that the mad fanatic who stabbed the King of France was paid or inspired by Spain; but his crime prevented what might have been the inevitable triumph of the cause of religious independence in Europe, and gave to the Spanish nation, whose corrupt and decadent condition we have reviewed, another half-century of fallacious importance in the councils of Europe. The

second marriage of Henry IV with a daughter of the Tuscan House of Medici had been a triumph for the Catholic cause; and during the last weeks of the King's life he and his wife had pursued opposite courses in their foreign policy. Inigo de Cardenas, the Spanish ambassador in France, who had arrogantly quarrelled with Henry, and had dared to commit a severe assault on the Venetian ambassador before the King's eyes in Notre Dame itself, was in close relationship with Mary de' Medici, and was planning with her the marriage of the Dauphin Louis with the daughter of Philip III. Whether Henry's permission for such an alliance would ever have been obtained is doubtful, though he is said to have smiled upon the idea once; but Ravailiac's deed solved all difficulties. The new Queen Regent, Mary de' Medici, had no sympathy with Protestants, and shared none of her husband's great ambitions. Spain in her eyes was still the overwhelming Power in Christendom, and she was about to gather around her tricky Italians in Spanish pay instead of the sagacious Sully and the experienced Jeannin. To her, an alliance with Spain, secured by a double marriage, seemed to offer safety for her son's throne—which was naturally all she cared for—while to Philip it promised relief from French opposition in Italy. In the circumstances, therefore, there was no difficulty in arranging a marriage between Louis XIII and Philip's elder daughter Doña Anna, a backward delicate girl of eleven, and another between the heir of Spain, Philip Prince of Asturias, whose age was seven, and Elizabeth of Bourbon, the daughter of Henry IV. Many members of Philip's Council, with traditional arrogance, thought a union with children of the *ex-Huguenot* King beneath the dignity of Spain; but Savoy was still in arms to attack Lombardy, and when the marriage treaties were baited with a pledge that neither France nor Spain should ever again ally with the House of the turbulent Duke, Philip's and Lerma's hesitation was overcome; and, with a prodigality of splendour matching the reputed, rather than the real, wealth of Spain, the marriage treaty was ratified by the Duke of Mayenne in Madrid in August, 1612.

A close friendship between France and Spain always brought uneasiness to England, and directly after Henry IV's death, when the Franco-Spanish marriages were known to be in contemplation, James I instructed Digby to offer Henry, Prince of Wales, as a husband for the Infanta Anna. The suggestion was coldly declined by Lerma. A little later James tried his hand again, and begged Philip's second daughter Maria for his son, with a similar result, since the Prince of Wales would not openly accept the Catholic faith. Lerma and Philip thus once again found themselves courted and desired by both England and France; and the old dreams of universal Spanish predominance were revived. The truce with Holland brought to the Spaniards freedom from the depredations of their enemies upon the ocean, and the trade of Spain began somewhat to revive. The Barbary and Turkish corsairs that thronged

the Mediterranean were checked by the Spanish galleys from Sicily: and the coasts of Spain, now freed from the Morisco abettors of the pirates, gained in security and prosperity. For the first time for many years the suffering country seemed able to enjoy some degree of material comfort, though still burdened with a war in Italy provoked by the seizure of Montferrat by Savoy (1613).

Charles Emmanuel was at that period the firebrand that threatened to consume the whole edifice of Spain's new-born condition of relief. Now with feigned submission, now with insolent defiance, he kept his kinsman Philip disturbed and suspicious both with Spanish officers and with foreign Powers. On the occasion of the death of his son-in-law Francis IV, Duke of Mantua and Montferrat, he had taken possession of the latter duchy, having been promised aid by Spain's persistent enemy, the Republic of Venice. He was soon forced to evacuate Montferrat; but he now, calling himself the liberator of Italy, invaded Lombardy, and was, in 1615, thoroughly beaten by the Spanish Viceroy, the Marquis de Hinojosa. But though overpowered, Charles Emmanuel was more than a match for Hinojosa, and cajoled the latter into a treaty of peace, guaranteed by France at the instigation of Venice. In Madrid this peace, which in effect left Charles Emmanuel in possession of Asti and other conquered places, was at once repudiated by Philip's Government; and Hinojosa was replaced as Viceroy of Milan by Don Pedro de Toledo, with orders to crush the Duke at any cost. Protected and aided on the French side by the Huguenot Marshal Lesdiguières even against the orders of Mary de' Medici, Savoy managed to hold out month after month; but at length Don Pedro struck him a crippling blow at Vercelli, and in 1617 a peace was hastily patched up at Pavia, by which the conquests on each side were to be given up, and Montferrat restored to Francis' brother, Ferdinand, Duke of Mantua. This lingering little war, of scant importance in itself, is mentioned here in some detail, not for its own sake, but because it resulted in an extraordinary intrigue which moved Spain profoundly, and to which reference will be made later.

Thanks to the policy of Mary de' Medici and the timorous character of James I, now dominated by Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, afterwards Count Gondomar, Spain during these few years bulked in the eyes of foreign nations almost as imposingly as in the days of her real power; though the canker of corruption was eating ever deeper into the heart of the nation. The King was content with the bare shadow of sovereignty. "Lerma and the woods are King" was a common saying of the time: for when Philip was not hunting or dancing he was in ecstasies of self-abasing devotion; and Lerma, with his almost equally powerful lieutenant, Rodrigo Calderon, Marquis de Siete Iglesias, governed the country with none to say them nay. The Queen, Margaret of Austria, died in childbirth in 1611; and, though Philip was said to be heartbroken at his loss, he was kept so busy hunting on Lerma's estate that he could not afford

time even to attend his wife's funeral. He was still a young man, but his health was already failing, and his bouts of gaiety were more frequently than before interrupted by spells of gloomy religious apprehension. His father and grandfather had insistently wrung from one Pope after another independent royal control over the temporalities of the Spanish Church: Philip's demands from the Pontiffs were of a different description; the beatification of saintly Spaniards, the enforcement of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, the gift of holy relics, and for himself—at the age of thirty-four—a pledge that in the year of his death every altar throughout the world at which mass was said for his soul should be specially privileged; he promising, on his part, that for the rest of his life, with God's help, he would never again commit mortal sin.

Such a king Lerma well might rule by dexterous flattery and fear, for Philip had no idea of the value of money or the merest elements of the science of government, and Lerma made things comfortable for him. But there were others who were not so easily managed. The whole tendency of society was to partake, with as little labour as possible, of the golden shower which was supposed to fall from the inexhaustible reservoirs of the State. How the money was obtained or who worked for it those who enjoyed it neither knew nor cared. The King was the richest monarch in the world, and those who so constantly reiterated this statement proved it, not by the figures of his actual receipts, but by the amount of money which he was reputed to spend. The vast amounts supposed to be received were indeed, to a large extent, intercepted by corrupt officials; the revenues from nearly all sources were pledged two or three years deep to Genoese or German usurers at extortionate interest; and for years Lerma had to depend for ready money mainly upon the sales of grants from the Crown lands. While the noble class remained exempt from regular taxation, the revenue was thus progressively depleted, and owing to the constant enrichment of monastic institutions by grants and legacies of land tied up thenceforth in perpetual mortmain and exempt from national burdens, vast tracts of land all over Spain, besides being deprived of the incentive of private ownership, were condemned to unproductiveness or careless cultivation. The direct tax, or rather tribute, voted triennially by the Cortes of Castile remained at the moderate figure of 400,000 ducats a year; but the constant new needs were met by progressive increase of the *alcabalas* and "millions," or excise upon food. The former impost, which had been originally a 10 per cent. tax upon every sale effected, was gradually forced up during the next reign to an equivalent of 14 per cent.; and the "millions" excise grew from 2,000,000 ducats a year to nearly 3,000,000. No possible system of taxation could be devised more destructive to industry of all sorts than this. The cost of living was increased by the "millions," while the *alcabala*, together with the

local and provincial octrois and tolls, practically confined the sale of commodities to the place of production. Ten years before the period now under review (1614–20), the Venetian ambassador in Spain had reported that, “seeing the state at which affairs have arrived, the increasing discontent of subjects caused by bad government, the servitude in which the King lives, the intolerable burden of taxes, and other reasons indicate that if this system continues it will produce the effects usual in such cases, with greater detriment to the King than either France or Italy could inflict upon him.” The national resources had somewhat increased since Contarini thus wrote; but the locusts that battened upon them had grown to a far greater extent. Every functionary, from Lerma downward, was surrounded by a swarm of parasites and hangers-on of parasites, down to the ragged mendicants who lived in loathsome plenty upon the perquisites of a procurer’s scullions.

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distrust of Calderon's patron. Lerma's sway had been so absolute and so enduring that he hardly took the cabal against him seriously at first. But he found the King colder and more distant day by day, though he feigned not to notice it. When it was too late he took his ungrateful son to task, and warned him that ruin for them all lay in the course he was pursuing. The Count de Lemos, his clever son-in-law, was brought in to counteract the treachery of Uceda; but when he, in his turn, indignant at the coolness of Philip towards Lerma and himself, remonstrated with the King for his treatment of his old minister, Philip drily told him he might retire when he pleased. Lerma dreamed for a time of gaining the goodwill of the young Prince of Asturias; but Olivares had taken care to besiege and capture the heart of the boy, and the heir of Spain pouted and sulked when his father's falling favourite came before him. Father Aliaga, the King's confessor, a former creature of Lerma, threw the weight of his influence on the side of Uceda, and all the friars and nuns who moulded Philip's thoughts followed his example. When Calderon had been finally imprisoned and ruined, Lerma understood that the forces, clerical and lay, against him were too strong to be withstood, and his last throw was to obtain for himself from the Pope (Paul V) a Cardinal's hat, which might place him in a superior ecclesiastical position to his opponents. The clever move at least enabled him to keep intact his vast fortune—44,000,000 ducats in grants alone, it was said—but in the summer of 1618, while the Court was at the Escorial, a message was taken to him by the Prior, to the effect that he might go to Lerma or Valladolid, or whithersoever he pleased, but was to see the King no more. His rule over Spain, which had been absolute for twenty years, had, from sheer ineptitude and pride, led the nation down the rapidly increasing slope, upon the brink of which it had stood at the death of Philip II; and when Lerma fell from power it was not to give place to a successor of sounder views and clearer judgment, but to enable a fresh crew of spoilers led by his own undutiful son to complete the ruin which he had begun.

Lerma's disastrous errors of policy had been mainly fiscal and economical; but the fallacious pretence of wealth and power maintained by him had enabled Spain to secure the French marriage treaties and alliance, and to command the subservience of James I of England. The great triumph of Lerma's administration was the pompous exchange on the frontier of the two young brides who were to cement the national union. The immaturity of the Infanta Anna had delayed the ceremony from 1613, when it had been due, until late in 1615, and the poverty of the country was forgotten when the splendid train of Philip III, with all his children and Court, slowly travelled over the rough roads of Castile to Burgos, where the marriages were performed by proxy on October 18. Lerma's own expenditure on the journey was stated to have reached 400,000 ducats, though he fell ill and remained at Bribiesca,

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With a central government so weak and corrupt as this, with responsibility thus evaded by all authority, it was natural that the great personages who, either by expenditure of vast sums of money, or by favour, obtained one of the twenty viceroyalties in the gift of the Crown, should during the period of their office, usually three years, follow their own courses with but little control from Madrid. It had always been an axiom of the House of Habsburg that a great Spanish noble might not safely be employed in important central administrative offices at home, and that as far as possible they should either hold ceremonial posts about the person of the King, or else be employed abroad. Philip III had been the first conspicuously to break through this rule, by the favour he extended to Lerma, with the unhappy results we have seen; but the minister himself had preserved the tradition, as much as he could, and had taken care that the more powerful and active of the members of the old aristocracy were kept as far from the centre as possible, governing and plundering the King's possessions abroad. The lame peace effected with the Duke of Savoy at Pavia in 1617, leaving, as it did, the ambitious Duke unpunished for his insolence, had caused the deepest indignation in the proud, impatient, Spanish satraps who lorded it over Italy. Pedro Giron, Duke of Osuna, the most arrogant of them all, had during his viceroyalty of Sicily, which, thanks to the enormous bribes sent by him to Lerma and Uceda he had exchanged for that of Naples in 1616, shown extraordinary activity with his galleys from Messina in harrying the Moslem pirates, and raiding their African strongholds. When the merchant Republic of Venice, always the covert enemy of Spain and frequently the friend of the Turk, sided with Savoy, he swore to cripple the Seigniorie so as to make it harmless in the future. He had sent from Naples a strong force to aid that employed from Milan against Savoy; and during the war he had not only covered the Adriatic with his galleys, but had obliged the Venetians to abandon Istria, and to recall their land forces from aiding Charles Emmanuel. Venice and Spain were not nominally at war, but that mattered little. Philip III himself encouraged Osuna to damage Venice all he could, "without letting anyone know that you are doing it with my knowledge, and making believe that you are acting without orders." (December, 1616.)

When the peace was signed early in 1617, Osuna, who aspired to play the part of a dictator in Italy, was openly scornful of such a conclusion to a war in which Spain had been to some extent successful. Nor was the Viceroy of Milan, Pedro de Toledo, Marquis of Francavilla, who had been obliged to sign the peace for want of resources from Spain, better pleased than his colleague: and from the first day he practically repudiated the conditions to which he had been one of the contracting parties. With two such magnates, both possessing great armed forces, and both swayed by the proud traditions of universal Spanish predominance, continued tranquillity in Italy was not to be

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from the assassins in wait for him. All the world was told by indignant Venice that Osuna, Toledo, and Bedmar had engaged the French corsairs and other foreign mercenaries in Venice to sack the city and overturn the government, and the punishment of Osuna for treason was violently demanded of Philip's government. Spanish writers usually contend that the entire conspiracy was an invention of the Venetians, and Quevedo's great literary skill aids them in their contention. Ranke and Daru have imagined an explanation that still finds supporters: to the effect that Osuna had really been in league with Venice to proclaim himself independent sovereign of Naples, and that, finding the Viceroy's plot frustrated, the Seigniory, with the double object of effacing its own complicity, and finally ruining Osuna, denounced the supposed conspiracy. The theory seems untenable, for if any such plot against his own sovereign had been hatched by Osuna with the knowledge of the Seigniory, he might have been effectually destroyed at any time, by the mere denunciation of it, without the elaborate pretence of a conspiracy against Venice. Weighing the whole of the circumstances, with much additional evidence that has of late become available, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a conspiracy did exist to surprise and pillage Venice, and that Osuna was a leading spirit in the plot; but the elaborate trial of the Viceroy in Spain, when his protectors had fallen, furnished no convincing evidence that he had any intention at this time of making himself an independent sovereign.

Bedmar was withdrawn from Venice; but the complaints of the Seigniory had for the time no other effect in Madrid. The palace intrigues by which Lerma was disgraced, however, led those courtiers who had not been bribed from Naples to keep alive the irritation against Osuna. Deputations of the nobles and clergy of Naples came to complain of his harshness, his pride, and his immorality, and to whisper doubts of his loyalty. Osuna himself saw that the coming men in Spain would oust him from his place, perhaps ruin him; and there is no doubt that in 1619 he did suggest both to the Venetian agent in Naples, and to Marshal Lesdiguières in Provence, a plan by which he might rule Naples independently of the weak and wasteful overlordship of Spain. Such a secret could not long be kept; and suddenly, in 1620, the blow fell, and the great Viceroy was summoned to Madrid, soon to answer to a new sovereign and a new favourite whom he had not bribed the accusations of treason brought against him, and subsequently to die miserably in prison, with his crime unproved.

The loss of his second self, Lerma, deprived Philip of his one stay. Uceda was weak and useless in council, and the true state of affairs in the country which the fallen minister had so scrupulously hidden from the King for so many years, was now brought home to him with double poignancy by the ineptitude of his present advisers. The knowledge overwhelmed him, for he was nerveless and incapable; and his long spells

local and provincial octrois and tolls, practically confined the sale of commodities to the place of production. Ten years before the period now under review (1614–20), the Venetian ambassador in Spain had reported that, “seeing the state at which affairs have arrived, the increasing discontent of subjects caused by bad government, the servitude in which the King lives, the intolerable burden of taxes, and other reasons indicate that if this system continues it will produce the effects usual in such cases, with greater detriment to the King than either France or Italy could inflict upon him.” The national resources had somewhat increased since Contarini thus wrote; but the locusts that battened upon them had grown to a far greater extent. Every functionary, from Lerma downward, was surrounded by a swarm of parasites and hangers-on of parasites, down to the ragged mendicants who lived in loathsome plenty upon the perquisites of a procurer’s scullions.

Intrigue and envy were inevitable in such a Court as this. When Lerma had centred in himself and his relatives and dependents patronage, honours, and plunder almost beyond compute, and had even obtained formal grants of money for himself from the Cortes of Catalonia and Valencia, it is not surprising that those who were outside the circle of his bounty should have cast jealous eyes upon the wealth they could not reach. Lerma’s old friend, Rodrigo Calderon, was the first to be attacked, for he was an upstart and had no great family behind him. The friars surrounding the Queen had made the first move some years before, and this was soon seconded by the King’s confessor; but Calderon, insolent and obnoxious as he was, was not the quarry they really aimed at. He held his own for a long time, by the aid of Lerma, but at last was accused of having killed a man. It was a small thing indeed for which to bring a proud favourite low, but the churchmen made the most of it to Philip in his morbid moods; and Calderon was first dismissed, and afterwards imprisoned. The stories of his tremendous booty ran from mouth to mouth, ever increasing; and, as the conspirators intended, people began to ask: if the servant had plundered all this treasure from the King, what had the master stolen? Lerma had kept his son, the Duke of Uceda, near him at Court, believing that he, at all events, would be faithful to his father. Uceda was young, good-looking, and plausible, without either scruples or ability; but he was served by a young noble of far greater talent and boundless ambition, who had his private grudge against Philip’s present advisers. This was Gaspar de Guzman, Count of Olivares, whose father had been the trusted ambassador and councillor of Philip II. Guzman’s claim to a grandeeship had been rejected, and he had carefully laid his plans to capture for himself the supreme position in the State, whoever might have to fall. Uceda’s greed and vanity had been worked upon, and, when the blow fell on Rodrigo Calderon, Lerma recognised that his own son and heir was foremost amongst those who were whispering to the King

depth of despair he passed to ecstasies of trust in the efficacy of the Church to save him. All around his bed were relics of dead saints, and images to which he addressed his frantic appeals. Solemn religious offices went on unceasingly before his eyes, and for many days he anticipated his momentary death, notwithstanding the assurance of his physicians that it was not so near as he thought. He bade farewell to his children more than once, and distributed amongst them relics and sacred images, warning his heir to keep the rough crucifix which his father's dead hand would grasp, to serve a similar sad office when the new King's dread hour should come. In an agony of remorse he prayed continually for mercy and deplored the unhappy results of his two-and-twenty years' rule; but when he died at last, on March 31, 1621, a cry of grief went up from all his people at the loss of the saintly sovereign, who, they said, had served his faith so well, had battled against heresy throughout the world, had founded convents without number, had expelled all the Spaniards in whose veins ran Mohammadan blood, and had caused the canonisation of more Spanish saints than any King before him. The people knew that the land was desolate, that the workshops were empty, the looms idle, and a whole nation sunk into pretentious sloth; but they did not know that the qualities which they most revered in their monarch had been the main cause of their ruin. That knowledge, like the King's repentance, came too late to work a remedy. Four-fifths of his will are occupied by pious exhortations to his successor and legacies for religious purposes; but, with all this saintly parade, he followed the example of his ancestress Isabel the Catholic, and ordered that his grants from the royal domains—mostly made in return for hard payment—should be held void.

Lerma's warning to his undutiful son was fulfilled in a shorter time than even he could have expected it. Uceda's friend, Gaspar de Guzman, when once he had made his position secure in the young Prince's household, left no room for doubt as to his ambitious projects for himself. One after the other, the servile courtiers were given to understand that they must serve him if they hoped for future advancement, and the Prince, who at first found his new governor too masterly to please him, was initiated into licentious pleasures before his time in order that he might be made plastic in the hands of his initiator. When it was already too late, Uceda endeavoured to get rid of Guzman, now Count of Olivares, by offering him the great post of ambassador in Rome; but Olivares aimed at a higher mark and refused to leave young Philip's side. Uceda was with Philip III at the last, and had bethought him of summoning to his aid the Cardinal Duke of Lerma, to influence with his experience and authority the last dispositions of the King. But Philip III was dying, and Olivares held in his hand the will of the real King of Spain—the pale, tow-haired boy with the great hanging underlip, who was waiting with unconcealed impatience for his father's last breath;

and Olivares, in the Prince's name, peremptorily forbade Lerma's approach.

It was the first of many blows which fell in rapid succession upon all those who had enjoyed power and office in the last reign. Even as Philip III had done when his father had died, so did Philip IV as soon as the corpse of his father, clad in the garb of a Franciscan monk, was borne out of the Alcazar on the cliff and over the dreary plains to the Escorial. Olivares had on several occasions during the last days of Philip III feigned a desire to abandon his office and retire to Andalusia; but he knew his young master well. The Prince implored him to stay, and promised to place himself entirely in his hands. "How goes it in the Prince's apartment?" asked Uceda of Olivares, as the King lay dying. "All is mine," replied the Count. "All?" exclaimed Uceda. "Yes, everything without exception," retorted Olivares, "for the Prince overrates me in all things but my desire to serve him." It was Uceda's notice to quit, and before the expiration of the new King's nine days' retirement to San Geronimo for mourning, a clean sweep was made of the men who, under Philip III, had brought Spain to the dire pass in which she found herself. Orders were given that every minister of Spain since 1603 was to give a strict account of all his property, and how he came by it. Lerma himself was not spared; though he fought stoutly but unsuccessfully for his vast possessions. Calderon in his prison, when he heard the passing-bell for the dead King, cried, "The King is dead, and so am I"; and soon his head fell under the axe in the great square of Madrid. The Duke of Osuna, the Viceroy who had ruled Naples with so high a hand, was lodged in prison and persecuted till his stout heart broke. Uceda met with a similar fate; and all the clan of Sandoval and Rojas were trampled under the heels of Guzmans and Zuñigas.

The state of things with which the new sovereign had to deal was pitiable in the extreme; and there is no doubt that, so far as their lights extended, both the boy-King and his strong-willed minister sincerely wished to reform the abuses, the results of which were patent to every one. Young Philip himself was good-hearted, as his father had been, but far more sensual in his tastes, and less devout in his habits. As years went on and he gained experience he deliberately assumed in public the stolid gravity and marble impassivity which he thought befitted the monarchy of Spain; but in his youth, and in the society of his favourites, he was gay and witty. His ability was far greater than that of his father had been, and his delight in books, music, poetry, the drama, and, above all, pictures, made him the greatest patron of the authors and artists of Spain's golden age. But idleness marred all his talents, and the mad lust of pleasure which he was powerless to resist, kept him, as his father had been kept, nearly all his life, in the leading-strings of favourites. The man to whom on the first day of his reign he

handed his conscience, Gaspar de Guzman, Count of Olivares, and first Duke of San Lucar, was twenty years his senior. An indefatigable worker, with an ambition as voracious as his industry, Olivares was the exact opposite to the idle, courtly, and conciliatory Lerma. His greed was not personal, as Lerma's had been, though his love of power led him to absorb as many great offices as his predecessor had appropriated. He was arrogant and impatient, violent in his rage if opposed, and careless of all considerations but those which served his ends. Able as he undoubtedly was, he appraised his ability too highly and contemned all opinions but his own; and his attitude towards foreign Powers would only have been warrantable at the time when the Spanish power was irresistible. From an economic point of view Olivares was not much wiser than his Spanish predecessors; but his conception of the political unity of Spain as the thing primarily needful, was sage and statesman-like, though premature; and upon this rock he was wrecked. The portraits of him by Velasquez enable us to see the man as he lived. As he stands, dark, stern, and masterful, with his heavy shoulders bowed, seemingly by the weight of his ponderous head, with its fierce, black, sunken eyes, we know that this man would dominate or die. He was the finest horseman in Spain; and he treated men as he treated his fiery, big-boned chargers, taming them to obedience by force of will and tireless persistence. Such was the man who led Spain during the crucial struggle which decided, not only whether France or Spain should prevail politically on the Continent, but whether Spanish or French influence should in future predominate in the artistic, literary, and social development of Europe. In that great contest Spain lost not so much because Olivares was inferior to Richelieu, as by reason of the inflexible traditions that hampered Spanish action at home and abroad, and pitted a decentralised country, where productive industry had been killed and the sources of revenue destroyed, against a homogeneous nation in which active work was being fostered, and whose resources were being placed at the command of the central authority.

Olivares was clever enough to place in the nominal post of chief adviser of the Crown his uncle Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, an experienced and able diplomatist, who until his death, a year after the accession, attended to political affairs, while Olivares was fastening his hold upon all those who surrounded the King. Before Philip was out of bed, his minister was always the first to enter his room; he drew the curtains, opened the window, and then, on his knees by the bedside, rehearsed the business of the coming day. Every garment that the King put on passed first through the hands of Olivares, who stood by whilst Philip dressed; after the monarch's midday meal, Olivares entertained him with chat; and late in the evening, before the King retired his minister attended to give him an account of the despatches received, and to consult him as to the answers. Philip's natural idleness led him to

shirk as much of the work as possible; and jealous observers, who called the minister "the King's scarecrow," sneered that Olivares purposely appeared before the King with his hatband stuck full of State documents, and with great bundles of papers under his arm and hung from his waistband. After a short time the King merely glanced at the papers presented to him, and affixed the signature "*Yo el Rey*" with a hand-stamp, to save himself trouble. The imputation of Olivares' enemies, that the minister's activity was the cause of the monarch's indolence, appears unjust in view of the original papers still extant, in which Philip is implored by Olivares to attend to business and decide matters for himself. In 1626 a most emphatic appeal was made to this effect. Since the beginning of the reign, Olivares says he had never ceased to urge that patriotism, duty, the happiness of the country, and the future of Spain, all demand that the King should not evade the labours of his position. "But lately," he continues, "affairs are growing worse than ever, and his conscience will not allow him to remain silent. And, if the King will not put his shoulder to the wheel, the writer will bear the responsibility no longer, but will leave Madrid, whatever the consequences." Nothing can exceed the force, not to say the violence, of this appeal to the young King to do his duty to his subjects; and if Philip eventually disregarded it, he, and not Olivares, should be blamed. The King was well-meaning, however, and desired to do right, though his will was weak. His answer to the exhortation of his minister (here printed for the first time) may be transcribed in full. "Count. I have resolved to do as you ask me, for God's sake, my own, and yours. No action of yours towards me can be presumptuous; and knowing, as I do, your zeal and love, I will do it, Count, and I return to you the paper with this answer on it, that you may make it an heirloom, and that your descendants may know how their monarchs ought to be addressed, and what an ancestor they had. I should like to leave such a paper in my archives that my children, if God send me any, may learn, and other monarchs too, how to prevail in matters of right and justice.—I the King."

It is evident, in any case, that Philip began his reign by casting upon Olivares the whole weight of government, and that, especially after Zuñiga's death, the policy adopted was the minister's alone. The position of the country was one that might have appalled the boldest, and the best summary of it is that addressed by the King himself five years later to his Council. This striking manuscript, to which reference will again be made, and which has not hitherto been printed, sets forth in the King's own words how Spain stood in 1621. "The finances were so utterly exhausted—in addition to the terrible debts incurred by Philip II—that every resource was anticipated for several years to come. My patrimony was so distressed that in my father's time alone grants and voluntary gifts had swallowed up 96,000,000 ducats,

without calculating what had been given in four or five of the principal Spanish kingdoms, from which returns have not yet been made. The currency had been raised to three times its face value: a thing never seen in any nation before, which threatened us with utter isolation and ruin, but for God's help. Ecclesiastical affairs were in such disorder that we were told from Rome that innumerable dispensations for simony had been obtained for bishoprics and archbishoprics, besides an enormous number for prebends. As for affairs of justice, they were in such a state that on the very first day of my reign I was obliged to make the demonstration you will recall....The State itself was so degraded that the King, my father, had been forced to negotiate with the Hollanders as if they had been an independent sovereign State, over which he had no claims; which confession was made, although not a single minister was in favour of it; although the King rejected it in his answers to the Consultas sent to him on the subject, and my uncle the Archduke also repudiated it, and likewise all authorities both here and in Flanders. I found myself with only seven Ocean ships, and a maritime war on my hands; India lost to me, and America on the point of being lost. The truce in Flanders was within three months of its expiration, and in the twelve years' truce my subjects had lost their knowledge of war, and what is worse their prestige. I found German affairs in such a condition that nothing less than a miracle seemed capable of avoiding utter ruin in that direction. The marriage of the Prince of Wales with my sister was so far advanced that it looked impossible to evade it without a great war. Portugal was discontented with the Viceroy, and the rest of the monarchy was ill-ruled or not ruled at all. Roman affairs were totally ruined: we were in a state of war with Venice; and the realm of Naples was bordering upon a popular revolt, with the coinage completely debased. This was the sad condition in which I found my country on my accession, from no fault of the King my father, or of his predecessors, as all the world knows, but because God Almighty decreed that it should be so; and I myself experience this every day: for no matter how adequate may be the remedies I adopt, our sins suffice to condemn all our affairs to the most miserable state imaginable."

The sad condition thus disclosed might have been ameliorated, as some unofficial observers urged, by setting the idle people to work upon the land again and by the encouragement of lost industries; but no measure would have permanently arrested the decadence short of an entire reform of the fiscal incidence and administration, and a rigid concentration of national resources on the purposes of Spain itself. As we have seen from the King's words, however, there was no inclination to abate the old claims or to limit the old arrogance; and the measures adopted by Olivares were mainly palliative rather than remedial. The expenditure of the palace was cut down to a minimum, the corrupt officials of the past reign were forced to disgorge their plunder, and

nothing but titles and other empty honours given to those whose services called for reward. Philip afterwards boasted that in the first five years of his reign he had made fewer grants than any of his predecessors had in six months, and that he had spent hardly anything upon himself. But there was apparently no thought of economy where it was most needed: namely, by the avoidance of war abroad. In the Cortes of Castile, met by Philip a few months after his father's death, he set forth to the deputies that the very first of his obligations as Spanish sovereign was "with holy zeal befitting so Catholic a prince to attend to the defence and exaltation of our holy Catholic faith." He states, as if no doubt about it were possible, that it had been the duty of his father, and now was his, to aid the Emperor to suppress rebellion, to expel the Prince Palatine from Bohemia, to fight the Hollanders again—now that the truce was ended, as well as to defend everywhere "our sacred Catholic faith and the authority of the Holy See." With such views as these, repeated again and again to succeeding Cortes, it was inevitable that the national expenditure should continue ruinously out of proportion to the revenues of the country, at this time admitted to be not more than eight million ducats available from all sources, of which, the Cortes was told, no less than three millions had to be sent yearly to Flanders.

The folly of this persistence in traditional aims which had long ago been proved unattainable, and of which, indeed, the importance, so far as Spain's national interests were concerned, had disappeared, is the more evident when the entirely changed position of foreign politics is considered. The Queen-Mother of France, with her strong Spanish Catholic sympathies and her Italian methods, had been swept from power by a coalition of French parties; and a civil war was raging in France which might end in a Huguenot domination. The relations between Spain and the governing authority of France were still further embittered by the struggle in the Valtelline; and Philip III, seeing France drifting away from him, had for two years before his death been in close negotiation with James I of England for the marriage of his daughter with the Prince of Wales; James abasing himself to the utmost in order to weaken the already strained alliance between France and Spain. The more arrogant Philip, Gondomar, and Lerma were, the humbler grew the King of England; and though it is evident now that the Spaniards were never for a moment in earnest, their diplomacy disarmed James at a time when his active interference in favour of his son-in-law might have been disastrous to the House of Austria. From Philip IV's reference to the English match (quoted on the previous page) it is evident that he had no more intention of effecting it than his father had. But when Richelieu in 1622 sought to heal civil discord in France by urging, at the first meeting of the Council after the death of Luynes, that the primary duty of all Frenchmen was to check the renewed pretensions of the House of Austria, and when even Mary de' Medici herself joined in

the crusade against Spain, it became necessary for Philip and Olivares to smile, however falsely, upon the proffered English friendship.

But when, late in 1622, James, growing impatient, asked for definite help to be sent to his son-in-law from Spain, Olivares haughtily scoffed at the very idea, and coolly put the marriage question aside as of no present importance. Buckingham in England had been heavily bribed by Gondomar, and was all impatience to carry through the Prince's marriage. Blind to the insincerity of Spain in the negotiation, he started with young Charles on their harebrained journey to Spain. Their almost unheralded appearance in Madrid, in March, 1623, threw Bristol into a panic, which subsequent events fully justified, and placed Philip and his minister in a most difficult position. The Spanish populace and clergy were furious at the idea of such a marriage. It is clear now, and was to many observers even then, that, while still advancing her old arrogant claims, Spain could never enter into a family alliance with a Protestant House; while, even if he had wished, the Prince of Wales would not have dared to change his faith at the bidding of Spain; and the idea of Buckingham outwitting in diplomacy Olivares and the Spanish Council was ridiculous. Philip and his minister cleverly disarmed the visitors by a show of extreme cordiality. Madrid was made to look its best; the vast sums squandered in vain show ruined the town for many years; and all the sumptuary decrees enjoining sobriety in garb and living were suspended. The Infanta, who well knew that she was destined for the Emperor, and would never be the wife of Charles, was almost unapproachable, and played her part with reluctance. Buckingham's debonair manner shocked Olivares, and the English favourite was almost openly insulted by the stately Spaniard. So long as festivities, cane-tourneys, bull-fights, and balls were to the fore all went merrily; but as soon as either Buckingham or Bristol tried to come to close quarters with Olivares, he made it clear that Spain would finally consent to the marriage only on quite impossible terms. To keep up appearances a provisional treaty of betrothal was drawn up, and a pretence made that the alliance was effected; but when Charles took leave of his host in September, not all the extravagant presents and fine words on both sides could hide the fact that his voyage had been in vain, and that England had suffered the affront which her King's servility and Buckingham's foolishness had deserved.

The ambitious project of Olivares to revive the old dreams incited the Spanish people and their young King to renewed outbursts of pride, and aroused the distrust of the French. Philip, as yet but a mere lad, was given the title of Philip the Great, and flattered with the idea that in him the vast dominion of Charles V might be revived. The Valtelline was still occupied by Spanish troops in spite of treaties; Spinola held in his grip the Lower Palatinate; and Bohemia had been crushed into obedience to the Emperor. It was clearly time for France to check the

swelling power, and Richelieu prepared to do it. England was attracted to his side, while yet the irritation caused by Charles' rebuff at Madrid was fresh, and Henrietta Maria became Queen of England; the Duke of Savoy, ever ready to strike for Lombardy, joined, and the Hollanders, now at war with Spain again, hailed with delight so powerful a coalition against their enemy. The war began with the invasion of the Valtelline by Richelieu; and together with Savoy the French overran Montferrat and the Genoese territory. Italy in this war for the most part stood on the side of Spain, for the Papacy was strong and the faith was threatened. The fever of glory seized again upon the deluded Spaniards; and all thoughts of economy were thrown to the winds. Money in amounts previously unheard of was raised. Nobles, churchmen, and citizens were made to give freely of their substance, sometimes to their ruin; ladies sold their jewels, and every device was used in order to obtain funds for the war.

The result was on the whole favourable to Spanish arms, and a peace was arranged with France in January, 1626, leaving England still at war with Spain, and the German and Flemish contests still going on. England, indeed, had been again outwitted; for the Palatinate, for which she had fought, was not restored, and the only effect of Lord Wimbledon's abortive attack upon Cadiz in 1625 was to deal a further blow to her prestige. Spain was also fortunate in the Low Countries, where Spinola captured Breda; in Germany, thanks to the genius of Tilly; and in South America, where the Hollanders were handsomely defeated at Guayaquil; while the Moorish pirates were humbled in the Mediterranean. Money, and ever more money, was needed for all this military activity. The economies effected by Olivares enabled him to do much, and they, with other measures adopted, had aided Philip to rehabilitate his forces. But by 1626 these resources proved still insufficient, and Philip addressed a curious statement to his Council of Finance, of which the unpublished manuscript is still extant, giving an account of his pecuniary straits. When he comes to consider, he says, not only the amounts that his subjects have to pay, but the persecution and trouble they have to undergo from those who collect the revenue, he would rather beg from door to door, if he could, to make up the fresh funds he needs, than ask his subjects for them. The Council are harshly taken to task for their lack of invention in not finding some way for providing the means required for the wars. "Grief is in my soul to see these good subjects who suffer so bitterly through the acts of my officers. If my own life-blood would remedy it I would give it freely: and yet you can propose no remedy." In the previous year he had had in his pay no less than 300,000 men; he had raised his fleet from 7 vessels to 108; with Europe against him, he had held his own everywhere, and had forced foreigners to respect him; and yet, when he asks his Council of Finance to propose measures of relief, they only obstruct him. This outburst appears to

have been caused by the report of the Council having been unfavourable to Olivares' proposal to debase the copper coinage. The measure had subsequently been adopted, but it had been found that prices had risen in proportion.

An attempt was made in 1626 to extort more money than usual from the free Parliaments of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. Philip, in great state, with Olivares at his side, met his Valencian Cortes at Monzon, but was made to understand roughly that not an iota of the ancient privileges would be bated, however much he wanted money. Olivares stormed; but according to the constitution a unanimous vote was necessary for supply, and one member bravely held out until he was menaced with the garrotte and reluctantly yielded. Even then fresh difficulties were made, and for days Philip chafed and his minister hectored, until at last Olivares threatened to abolish by force the right of rejecting the King's demands, and the Cortes of Valencia in a panic were conquered. It was a triumph for Olivares and a first step towards his policy of unifying Spain, but it cost him dear. The Catalan Cortes were even bolder than the Valencians, and refused to vote anything until their previous loan to the King was repaid. After three days of haggling, Olivares, fearing a tumult, fled with the King to Castile, and though the Catalans in a fright then passed the vote, their breach with the King and his minister was never fully healed, and the bitterest struggle of the reign was that in which the ancient county of Catalonia fought to free herself from centralising Castile. That the contest with the Catalan Cortes was provoked by Olivares is seen in a paper he wrote to the King late in 1625, only a few months before the meeting. In it he set forth a plan for the unification of the realms for mutual action in war. This plan remained the kernel of Olivares' home policy until his fall, and it will be seen that the intrigues against him which finally triumphed were largely fomented by provincial interests.

The death of the Duke of Mantua, and the claim of Spain to interfere in the succession, led early in 1628 to an attack by her upon Casale in Montferrat, and brought her again face to face with Richelieu later in the year; and thus the great struggle which was finally to ruin Spain was commenced by Olivares. His first step, when he found himself thus pledged to a great national war, was to make peace with England, who was then aiding the Huguenots at La Rochelle. Charles I, like his father before him, was ready to make any sacrifice to win back the Palatinate for Frederick, and the breach caused by the quarrel about Charles' marriage with the Infanta was healed by a treaty of peace in January, 1629, though, as before, England failed in her main object. The ensuing campaign in northern Italy ranged the French, the Pope, Venice, and the new French Duke of Mantua (Nevers) against the House of Austria, with the assistance this time of the unhappy Charles Emmanuel. Richelieu was victorious everywhere. Savoy was occupied, and the heart of the Duke broken

(July, 1630). Spinola died during the campaign before Casale, and his successor, Santa Cruz, lacked his experience and genius. Casale, which from the first had been the Spanish objective, stood out stoutly during a long siege, until at length Olivares was obliged to consent to an agreement, followed by ignominious peace, in which all the sacrifice was on the side of Spain (April, 1631).

It was a hard lesson for Philip; but unfortunately he did not profit by it. Richelieu was as much superior to Olivares as a statesman as France was to Spain in material resources and homogeneity; but the old tradition that Spain must fight for the faith and the Imperial House throughout the world refused to die; and Spanish blood and treasure were poured out like water in a quarrel which concerned Spain hardly at all. In the meanwhile, in 1633, the old Infanta Isabel, the beloved daughter of Philip II, and independent sovereign of Flanders, died, and Spain was once again burdened with the fatal inheritance of Burgundy, that had dragged her down. Philip's representative in Flanders was his brother, the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, whom Olivares' jealousy had sent from Spain. He was able and ambitious; and his popularity with the Catholic Flemings was great; but he too must needs follow the tradition of his House and imperil the dominions he ruled to fight for the faith wherever it was assailed. In 1634 the Emperor summoned his cousin and brother-in-law from Flanders to his aid. The Infante led his army of 18,000 Spaniards to join the Imperial forces before Nördlingen, and arrived soon after the Suedo-German force sent to relieve the town. The Imperial army with the Infante's contingent outnumbered the Swedes, and the battle, which lasted two days, was a complete victory for the Catholics. In May, 1635, Richelieu met this heavy blow by declaring war against Spain itself in order that his foe might be weakened by a direct attack upon Spanish Flanders.

Thenceforward Spain was not only fighting for Catholicism and the Imperial House, but was engaged in a death-struggle with Richelieu for the preservation of Flanders and for the maintenance of her own prestige in Europe. Flemish dominion was draining what was left of her life-blood, and Germany made ceaseless demands upon desolate Castile. In France, in the Valtelline—wherever religious liberty dared to raise its head—Spain, or rather Olivares, considered it necessary to fight. The silver fleets and cargo galleons fell a prey to the Dutch rovers; the armies and fleets of Spain struggled, sometimes successfully, sometimes disastrously, upon many fields, but never for the material profit of their own country. Private property in Spain was seized now without scruple by the Government; the "millions" excise was increased until famine was rife everywhere in the realms of Castile, the Church temporalities were drained, the revenues of bishoprics confiscated, and salaries, pensions, and debts unpaid. In Madrid the penury was so great that Philip, who always lived frugally himself, begged his brother in Flanders to

save to the utmost: to compel his household to wear plain cloth, and to live sparingly, so that not a ducat might be needlessly spent.

While the Spanish forces were distributed over Europe, Richelieu made two bold attempts to gain a footing upon the soil of the Peninsula. The earlier was in the summer of 1638, when every nerve was being strained to maintain the Cardinal Infante in Flanders. A powerful French force crossed the Bidassoa, captured the frontier town of Irun, and the harbour of Pasages, and then laid siege to the picturesque stronghold of Fuenterrabia at the mouth of the river. A French fleet cooperated with the land forces under Cardinal de La Valette, and an attempt was made to storm the precipitous hill upon which the fortress stands; but an army of Basque militia gallantly put the beleaguers to flight, La Valette escaping from the wrath of Richelieu to join the banished Queen-Mother in England. In the following year, 1639, an attempt was made by the French at the other end of the Pyrenees to enter Spanish territory. The resistance of the Catalans, much more Provençal than Spanish, and always jealous of Castile, was thought likely to be slight. Olivares, moreover, being on bad terms with them, left the province to a great extent to defend itself. This it did with unexpected vigour and success. A provincial army of 10,000 men was rapidly formed; but was practically annihilated by plague as it lay besieging Salces, in Spanish Roussillon, which the French had captured. Another army of Catalans, however, flocked to the standards; and when Condé arrived with a fresh force of 20,000 Frenchmen, regiment after regiment of them broke against the Catalan trenches and earthworks, and finally fled. Salces was surrendered to its rightful owners in January, 1640, and the second French attempt to conquer Spanish soil had failed.

The maritime attacks of the French on the Mediterranean coast of the Peninsula were almost equally barren of result; and, had Philip been content, even now, to abandon the vain pretensions which a century of struggle had proved it impossible to enforce, he might not only have with ease held his own country against the world, but have made his people prosperous and happy. Flanders was, as ever, the bane. So long as it was necessary to send constant reinforcements thither, not only had Spain to be drained of men and money; but the naval force so necessary for the protection of Spanish commerce with Spain's productive and distant colonies had to be employed, and imperilled, in the narrow seas, in order that reinforcements might reach Flanders. Prodigious, and successful, efforts had been made, as has been seen, to raise the maritime strength of the country. Certain nobles and ports, and some of the Spanish Bishops, were under feudal obligations to find and maintain ships for the King's service; and these obligations had been either habitually evaded, or only partially fulfilled. By dint of pressure upon the contributories, and by great national sacrifices, a respectable fleet had been formed in 1639; when 70 ships, with a force of 10,000 men, on

the voyage from Spain to Flanders took refuge in the Downs to escape from a Dutch fleet under van Tromp. Both the Dutch and the Spaniards at once appealed to Charles I. Charles endeavoured to bargain with Spain about the restoration of the Palatinate, in return for his protection of the fleet; but van Tromp was in no mood for trifling, and regardless of England's neutrality, attacked, and practically destroyed, the Spanish fleet, the result of so much effort and sacrifice, while it lay in the Downs. The Spaniards cried that the English had rather aided than hindered the attack, though Pennington was imprisoned for not vindicating the security of English waters; but, in any case, the blow was a fatal one to Spain's naval power, and for a hundred years she remained hopelessly paralysed at sea. It was the first patent sign to the world of the material and moral decadence which was creeping through all the organs of the nation. On land Spanish troops still for a while fought bravely as of old, though no longer with the conviction of Divine favour and unconquerable right. Loyalty to the person of the monarch was engrained in their nature; and they suffered and died, if necessary, uncomplainingly at his behest, because they thought that he and they, for some inscrutable and irremediable reason, had been selected by the Almighty for special chastening, and their oriental fatalism hardly cared to search for other explanations for their ills.

The King himself constantly gives evidence in his many rescripts of the same conviction. His own and his country's misfortunes are always ascribed to an adverse providence frustrating well-meant efforts, "in punishment of our sins." This feeling was itself a sign of moral deterioration in the national fibre. In the greater times of the sixteenth century Spaniards were convinced that Heaven was on their side, and it gave them strength; now they felt as certain that it was against them; and, though it still fed their pride to know that they were selected at all, they lacked incentive to bold action and dogged persistence when assured beforehand that a supernatural power stronger than their own had doomed them to misfortune. Their waning faith had the curious effect—so strongly seen in Philip's secret correspondence—of redoubling their dependence upon inspired spiritual guides for the regulation of their conduct. Formerly, their firm conviction that God was on their side was strong enough to justify their acts, however cruel and oppressive, and they needed not to be certified at every point by nuns, hermits and anchorites, friars and confessors, that all was well with them and their actions. The religion which timorously needed constant reassurance from inspiration was not of the robust kind that had led to Spain's ephemeral greatness, but rather a superstition constantly trembling on the verge of infidelity. This was the feeling that saturated Spain during the years of her glittering decadence, which began with Philip III, progressed under his son, and ended with their race.

Spain was thus a prey to fatalistic despair, sunk into misery by unwise

taxation which crushed industry and deepened the national disinclination to labour; her coinage debased, her sons fighting abroad whilst the fields at home were left fallow, or were partially cultivated by foreigners, who took abroad after each harvest the money that Spain so direly needed. Everyone, from the King downward, deplored the evils, but agreed that they arose from nobody's fault; and though some wits added the word "taxer" to the title of "Philip the Great," impressed on the new-fashioned stamped paper, which Olivares' confessor had invented by way of adding to the national revenue, the monarch and the people in general sympathised with each other in the national suffering. Such a feeling of mutual sympathy, if wisely fostered, might have been used to bring about, temporarily at least, the solidarity which Spain always lacked. But unfortunately the exhaustion of Castile, and the need for ever-growing sums of money for foreign wars, led Olivares, in pursuance of his fixed idea of centralisation, not only to destroy the chance of a sympathetic union of the various realms, but to precipitate a civil conflict which proved the country's crowning disaster. The Count-Duke (as Olivares was called) was rash and hasty of speech, and, as the Venetian ambassador wrote in 1641, "hated the constitutions, breaking out into violent abuse whenever he spoke of the Catalans." He could not forgive them or the Valencians for their sturdiness during the Cortes of 1626, and when he accompanied the King to Barcelona in 1632.

During the abortive French invasion of Spanish Roussillon already mentioned, the Viceroy was a creature of Olivares—one Santa Coloma, who chose the time when the Catalans were fighting for their province to urge a policy of severity against them. "Do not," he wrote, "allow a single man in the province able to work to absent himself from the field, or a woman capable of carrying a bundle of fodder on her back. This is no time to beseech, but to command. The Catalans are naturally fickle, sometimes they will, and sometimes they will not. Make them understand that the welfare of the nation and the army must go before all laws and privileges....Seize their beds for the troops, even from the highest in the province, if necessary, and let them sleep on the ground. ...If pioneers be wanted and peasants refuse to go, force them to do so, and if necessary carry them bound. Do not spare force, no matter how loudly they cry out against you. I will bear all the blame." The sullen resentment aroused in the Catalans by the treatment thus enjoined came to a head when the Castilian troops sent to help Catalonia against the French were quartered in the principality, in violation of the constitution, instead of being sent home after defeating the French. The Castilians, as usual, were unpaid: to them the Catalans were almost as foreign as Frenchmen, and they plundered and ravaged as in an enemy's country. Violence was opposed by violence, and Olivares ordered that every village in Catalonia should billet a certain number of Castilian troops. The result was that

all Catalonia flamed into opposition against the King's soldiers, and Santa Coloma fanned the flame by his severity. Street riots disturbed the large towns; the Catalan nobles and clergy declaimed against the savagery of Philip's troops, and advised resistance. "Send me an army strong enough to crush this people," wrote Santa Coloma. But the King's armies were scattered over Europe, and Olivares had no troops to send and no money to raise fresh levies.

On May 12, 1640, the people of Barcelona broke open Santa Coloma's prisons, and rescued from these their leaders; and four weeks later the fire of insurrection blazed out. "Vengeance and Liberty" was the cry of the maddened populace as they rushed through Barcelona murdering every Castilian soldier they could catch. Santa Coloma tried to escape, but he was old and obese, and sank fainting by the way, only to be cut into pieces by his fierce countrymen. From Barcelona the train of resistance was fired through the province. Rebellion of Christian Spaniards against their King had been unheard of for a hundred and twenty years; and, when Philip heard the news, it must have been plain to him that the sacredness of his sovereignty was impugned and he was no longer master of his finest province. An attempt was made at conciliation. The new Viceroy, the Duke of Cardona, restrained the revengeful violence of the Castilian troops, and endeavoured to soothe the Barcelonese; but Olivares saw in the revolt a chance of crushing the free constitution which he hated, and Cardona was disgraced, to die of a broken heart. "This revolt," said Cardinal Borgia in the Council, "can only be drowned in rivers of blood"—and these Olivares was ready to let loose if he could destroy the charter of Catalonian autonomy. With great effort a new army was raised in Castile, under the Marquis de Los Velez, who was to operate from Saragossa as a base. The great object was to prevent the autonomous kingdom of Aragon from joining its allied principality of Catalonia; for Philip had always been popular with the Aragonese, and their defection would have been fatal.

In September, 1640, while Los Velez was still in Aragon, the Spanish troops in Perpignan were ordered to attack a Catalan village whose inhabitants were negotiating with the French; and the Castilians were badly beaten. This gave heart to Barcelona. The Catalan Cortes met and denounced the violation of their rights; a demand for help against Philip was sent to his enemy Richelieu; Barcelona was placed in a condition for defence; and defiance went forth from Catalonia to Castile. But the promised French contingent to aid the Catalans was delayed, and when Los Velez entered the southern end of Catalonia he met with but little resistance, and the ruthless cruelty of the Castilians wrought terrible vengeance upon the few who dared to oppose them. Tarragona was garrisoned by a French force hastily summoned for its defence, but although Los Velez' army was already weakened by Aragonese desertions, owing to Catalan raids into Aragon, and his stores

and artillery were lacking, the French commander Épernon surrendered at demand; and as Los Velez marched triumphantly northward the Catalan cause seemed to be crumbling. But Barcelona was a more difficult affair. There the citizens had formally renounced allegiance to Philip, and had acknowledged Louis XIII as their King, surrendering the dominating stronghold of Monjuich to a French commander, who, with 300 men, was in the city. Los Velez assaulted the walls on January 26, 1641, and a most sanguinary struggle ensued. The Catalan volunteers fought splendidly, as did the Castilian assailants, and especially the Irish regiment under the Earl of Tyrone, who fell in the fight. The attack upon Monjuich was led by the Neapolitan Marquis of Torrecusa, and just as victory seemed within his grasp a body of Catalan fishermen attacked the stormers from the rear, and panic seized the Castilians. The slaughter was appalling, and Los Velez, defeated and broken, was cast back to Tarragona, leaving Barcelona triumphant in its defiance. Soon French troops arrived in large numbers, and in April, 1641, the Castilians at Tarragona, reduced to 14,000 men under the Prince of Butera (Fadrique Colonna), were closely beleaguered by land and sea by French and Catalans.

Through the summer and autumn of 1641 the state of war continued; but Catalonia could with difficulty pay and support the French armies sent by Richelieu to the aid of the insurgents, and the provincials through their chief Tamarit made a personal appeal to Louis XIII to come to his faithful city of Barcelona and receive the oath of allegiance. He sent Marshal de Brézé as his proxy, and thenceforward French national resources to a great extent maintained the civil war. By the spring of 1642 the Castilian armies had been reorganised after their repeated defeats, and the struggle continued, though the great French forces that were pouring into the province, with the aid of the Catalans, seemed to make the position hopeless for Philip. One Castilian army after the other was captured or routed, and Philip in despair could only pray the minister who had dragged him into this trouble by his rashness to find him a way out.

This was the opportunity for the Count-Duke's enemies. The Queen, Isabel of Bourbon, had from the first resented his absolute dominion over her husband. She blamed Olivares for inciting the King to legitimatise Don Juan of Austria, his natural son by Maria Calderon, an actress, of whom she was bitterly jealous; and she chafed under the yoke of the favourite's wife, who was her Mistress of the Robes, and was as arrogant as he. Olivares always spoke slightly of women, and when the Queen had made some remark on State affairs had dared to say openly, that "monks must be kept for praying, and women for child-bearing." Isabel made no secret of her hate, and instilled a similar sentiment into her popular and promising only son, Prince Baltasar Carlos. Gradually all those, and there were many, who suffered from

the terrible oppression induced by Olivares' financial methods and the continuance of wasteful wars, looked towards the Queen and her son for rescue. "My goodwill and the Prince's innocence," she said, "must for once serve the King for eyes. If he continues to look through those of the Count-Duke much longer my son will be reduced to a poor King of Castile." When affairs in Catalonia were at their worst, when Roussillon was lost for ever to Spain, and French troops were successfully upholding the rebel Catalans against their King, the Queen and nearly all of the nobility, most of whom were in her favour, urged the King himself to take command of his armies in the field, and win back the province that his minister's policy had lost. Olivares opposed the plan to the utmost, for he knew that during a campaign his influence would be less powerful over Philip than in the palace of Madrid, or in the beautiful suburban pleasure of the Buen Retiro, which he had built, not at his own expense, as a toy for his master. But Philip himself was anxious now to take part in winning back his heritage. So he insisted, almost for the first time, against Olivares' opinion, and, in spite of the groans of his minister at the expense of the royal journey, set out for Aragon.

There was, indeed, good reason, beyond the disaster which Olivares' centralising idea had brought about in Catalonia, why Philip's trust in him should have declined. In another of the autonomous dominions an even worse catastrophe had been simultaneously caused by the same hasty policy. The Portuguese had never been reconciled to their union with Castile, though Philip II had carefully respected their constitution, so far as regarded their exemption from taxation for Spanish objects or by Spanish methods. Under Lerma, and later, the blight of favouritism had fallen upon the relations between the two kingdoms, and the Portuguese viceroys, bishops, and offices had been largely bestowed on Spanish adherents of the favourite in Madrid. The Portuguese had already suffered much from the connexion with Spain: Cadiz had taken away much of the commerce of Lisbon, and Portuguese shipping was not safe from Spain's enemies. The national discontent had grown gradually deeper as the evil increased; but when, in 1636, Olivares burdened Portugal with the five per cent. Castilian tax upon all property, movable and immovable, rebellion against Spain became inevitable. The first rising, premature as it was, was suppressed; but from that time all the patriotic elements drew together to plan the liberation of the country. The Regent of Portugal at the time was the widowed Duchess of Mantua, a daughter of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy and the Infanta Catharine, and consequently Philip's first cousin; and she, knowing the danger, did her best to withstand the unwise action of the favourite. The real ruler of Portugal, however, was Olivares' low-born henchman Miguel Vasconcellos, who, Portuguese by origin, was ruthless in the insolent oppression of his countrymen.

The easy suppression of the first attempt at revolt encouraged Olivares to fasten the yoke of Castile more firmly than ever on Portugal; and he imprudently chose the time when Catalonia was seething in discontent. A fresh special tax was decreed upon Portugal, in violation of its constitution, and Vasconcellos announced the minister's intention of abolishing the Portuguese Cortes altogether, and of making the country a province of Castile, with representatives in the Castilian Cortes. At once there gathered around the Duke of Braganza, the principal Portuguese candidate for the throne, a party determined to win the independence of their country. The Duke, a timid, lethargic man, had married an able, ambitious Spanish wife of the great House of Guzman, Dukes of Medina Sidonia, and a relative of Olivares, who, being aware of her character, looked upon her with distrust and suspicion. Tempting offers of foreign vicerealties were made to the Portuguese Duke, but, safe among his own people, he was not to be caught, and even refused all invitations to proceed to Madrid. Hereupon an attempt was made to kidnap him, but also without success; and Vasconcellos, becoming seriously alarmed at the growth of the conspiracy, and the importance of the conspirators, warned Olivares that he must either crush discontent by force, or disarm Braganza.

This was in 1640, when the preparations for the war in Catalonia were draining the strength of Spain, and Olivares was forced to parley with the foe at the Portuguese gate, while he tried to crush the Catalans. To gain the confidence of Braganza he gave him the control of the Portuguese ports, and sent him 40,000 ducats to raise troops to defend them. It must have been a counsel of despair, for the result which ensued seemed almost inevitable. Portuguese troops were raised, it is true, but they were all for the defence of Braganza, and soon there was no power in Portugal that could withstand him. The Duke himself remained quietly on his estate at Villa Viçosa, making no sign; but his friends were busy and bold under the Archbishop of Lisbon and Pinto Ribeiro. When the plot was nearly ripe, Braganza visited the Regent Duchess of Mantua in Lisbon with a train strong enough to protect him, and the frantic cheers of the populace announced that this was not a subject Duke but a potential King coming in state to the capital of his nation. Olivares then perceived his mistake, and peremptorily summoned Braganza to Madrid. A thousand excuses for delay were made; but still Braganza clung to Villa Viçosa. Money was sent to pay for his journey, and appeal made to his loyalty, his cupidity, his honour; but, though he feigned acquiescence and sent his household ahead on the road to Spain, he knew that if once he fell into the hands of Olivares he would never be King, and prudently kept in his own stronghold. At length, in November, 1640, the conspirators and his wife together prevailed upon Braganza to pluck up courage, throw aside the mask, and proclaim himself King; and a small body of nobles and soldiers in four divisions

surprised the palace on December 1, overpowering the few Spanish and German troops on guard. The populace were only awaiting the first blow, and hailed the conspirators and Braganza as the saviours of Portugal. The hated Vasconcellos, dumb with fright, was hacked to death with knives; and, though the Regent offered a dignified verbal protest, she had herself bitterly hated Vasconcellos and rejoiced at the vengeance that had fallen upon him. Braganza, still lingering timidly in the country, was acclaimed John IV of Portugal; but there was practically no resistance, and in three hours of revolt Portugal had shaken off the yoke of Castile, never again to bear it.

The news came to Madrid within a week, at a time when Olivares, by festivities and gaieties, was trying to divert the thoughts of the King from the disaster of Barcelona. None dared to carry the dire news to Philip for fear of Olivares' vengeance, though all the capital was astir with the tidings, and it was the favourite himself who performed the task in a characteristic way. "*Albricias! Albricias!* your Majesty, good news! good news! You have won a fresh duchy and a great estate." "How so?" asked the King. "The Duke of Braganza, sire, has gone mad and proclaimed himself King of Portugal, so that your Majesty may seize the twelve million ducats worth of property which he owns." The King said little, but he was not deceived by Olivares' mellifluousness, for he knew that a kingdom lost was not easily regained, and thenceforward was the more ready to listen to those who besought him to take matters into his own hands, and avert the dismemberment of his inheritance. High and low were urging him on. The Queen missed no opportunity of enforcing the lessons of Catalonia and Portugal; and even the people in the streets cried to Philip that he must act the King now or be for ever fallen. "Everybody deceives the King," cried one working man, placing himself in the sovereign's way as he walked in the procession of the Holy Sacrament through his capital. "Sire, this realm is perishing, and he who mends it not will burn in hell."

Before the King started for Aragon another blow threatened, which further served the turn of the enemies of Olivares. The brother of the new Queen of Portugal, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, Viceroy and Admiral of Andalusia, was the greatest territorial magnate of Spain, and head of the House of Guzman, of which Olivares was a cadet. The Duke was weakly ambitious, and listened to the suggestion of his kinsman the Marquis of Ayamonte, that he should follow the example of his brother-in-law and take advantage of the weakness of the central power to proclaim himself King of Andalusia. The plot was arranged with the new King of Portugal, and all promised well, when a treacherous intermediary divulged it to Olivares. Fortunately Medina Sidonia was feeble and foolish, and was easily terrified into complete submission, though much of his vast wealth was confiscated; but Ayamonte, a

kinsman of Olivares, lost his head, though his life had been promised to him if he confessed, and he had done so. So low had the armed power of Philip fallen at this time (1641) by the drain upon it for foreign wars and the Catalan revolt, that, had Medina Sidonia been a strong, instead of a weak conspirator, Andalusia might have successfully resisted any force that Castile could have sent against it.

In these unhappy circumstances Philip left in April, 1642, to lead his armies against the Catalans, the Queen remaining as Regent in Madrid. Having failed to prevent the journey, Olivares did his best to make it useless by turning it into a slow progress of pleasure. Hunting parties and long sojourns on the way delayed the King to July 27, when he entered Saragossa, not with the simplicity of a soldier going to a campaign, but with the splendour of a triumphant sovereign. The greater nobles usually avoided contact with Olivares, but the presence of Philip in the Aragonese capital prompted the *grandees* to visit their King there. They were not allowed even to see him, and were treated by Olivares with bare civility. * The King himself was kept closely secluded in two rooms, and not allowed to join the army or leave Saragossa, on the pretext of fear for his safety if he approached Monzon; and he had to content himself with passing his time watching tennis matches from his window. In the meanwhile the Queen was making the most of her chances in Madrid, visiting the barracks and flattering the soldiers, smiling upon the populace, and with her grace and sweetness winning all hearts. So dire was the want of money at Saragossa that the Queen sold all her jewels, and sent the money to Olivares for military purposes. Before Philip had arrived in Aragon the French had entered it; and Monzon, the ancient capital, was soon in their hands. Around the King all was defeat and humiliation. Roussillon, to the north of the Pyrenees, was lost; Catalonia was governed by a foreign viceroy for a foreign King; the Castilian armies were unpaid, starving, and in rags; and Olivares himself, now that the truth could no longer be hidden from Philip, knew that his fall was approaching. Philip, almost for the first time in his reign, acted without consulting him and appointed the Marquis of Leganes as the new commander-in-chief; but he, too, was defeated by Marshal de La Motte before Lerida almost immediately, and his army melted away, as others had done before. Heart-sick at his helplessness, the King in Saragossa heard with dismay of the entry of de La Motte into Barcelona as Viceroy for Louis XIII; and, unable to strike any fresh blow for his province, he returned to Madrid after an absence of nine months, at the very time of the death of Richelieu, whose statesmanship had so successfully met the rash pretentiousness of his would-be Spanish rival.

When the King and his favourite returned to the Court at the end of December, 1642, the Queen and her friends had everything in readiness for the blow. Count de Castrillo, Count de Paredes, the Haros, the

Carpíos—all those, indeed, whom the favourite's insolence had wounded or injured—had plucked up courage in his absence and feared him no longer. The ex-Regent of Portugal, the Duchess of Mantua, had been interned at Ocaña and forbidden by Olivares to see the King. On January 14, 1643, the Queen made her appeal to her husband. In the presence of her son Baltasar Carlos, now approaching adolescence, she solemnly exhorted the King, for the sake of his child, to dismiss before it was too late the man who was dismembering his inheritance. As the King traversed the passage leading from the Queen's apartment he was intercepted by his foster-mother, Doña Anna de Guevara, who also had been dismissed by Olivares. Casting herself at Philip's feet, she implored him in impassioned words, to listen to the voice of his best friends. Her impeachment of the favourite was bold and scathing. "You have spoken truly," replied the King to her, as he turned, dazed and perturbed, and re-entered his wife's room. That night, too, in defiance of the favourite's orders, the Duchess of Mantua fled from Ocaña, and through a winter tempest travelled rapidly to Madrid. Olivares treated her insultingly when she suddenly appeared; but she was of royal birth, and the Queen secured her an audience of the King, who heard in dismay, for the first time, how Portugal had been lost through the obstinate insolence of Olivares and his tool Vasconcellos.

The Count-Duke saw that the tide against him was too strong to be withstood, and begged the King to allow him to retire; but no decided answer was vouchsafed at the time. On January 16, 1643, he had a short public audience of the King; but watchful observers noticed that Philip's eyes never once rested upon him, and that evening Olivares found awaiting him a polite note from his master granting him the requested permission to retire. Soon the news ran through the city, and when the next day, Sunday—the day of St Anthony—the King and his wife and children, and the Duchess of Mantua, drove in one coach to worship at the royal Convent of the Barefooted Carmelites, all Madrid was there to shout "Long live the King; death to the evil favourite." "Now wilt thou be Philip the Great indeed," cried the people, "for there will be no Count-Duke to make thee little." Olivares had not quite lost hope even yet. On the Tuesday a deputation of the *grandees* met the King while he was hunting, and offered their loyal duty to him, now that the Count-Duke could no longer slight and insult them; and Philip on his return to the palace asked impatiently if Olivares had gone yet. On being told that he had not, the King cried in a rage, "Is he waiting for us to use force?" In vain the favourite, and especially his wife, prayed for another chance, for one more audience: Philip was obdurate, and Olivares with a sinking heart left Madrid the next day, to see the King no more. "I must reign, and my son must be crowned in Aragon; and this will not be easy, unless I deliver your head to my subjects, who all demand it," Philip wrote; and, although

his life was left him, the fallen favourite was stripped of his wealth, and died mad two years and a half after his disgrace.

There were few who had a good word for Olivares; for, with the exception of the Count de La Roca, those who wrote his history were his bitter foes, and his haughty irascibility made him detested personally by high and low. But he was able and laborious, and if he failed, as he did, it was not so much because his ideal in home politics was a bad one, as because it was an impracticable one at the time. His real fault was one that he shared with his countrymen at large; namely, the obstinate clinging to the old boastful tradition of Spain's right and power to interfere in the religious affairs of other countries, and to play a predominant part in European politics. The ruin which mistaken political economy had wrought in Spanish industry and national resources rendered it impossible for Castile to pay for such a policy as was favoured, not by Olivares alone, but by most Spaniards; and the desire of Olivares to obtain as free a hand over the other autonomous parliaments as had been obtained over that of Castile, was a statesman-like consequence of this unstatesmanlike policy.

To obtain funds for this disastrous system of widely-diffused activity in foreign affairs on the part of a nation economically and socially decadent, not only was Spain itself exposed to the danger of disintegration, but the vast American colonies were driven to desperation. The exactions of the greedy courtiers, who alone were eligible for posts in the Spanish possessions, the exclusion of foreigners from trade with the colonies, and the stoppage of all commercial relations between the mother-country and the countries at war with it, which provided most of the goods for American consumption that Spaniards had ceased to produce, resulted in a systematic evasion by the colonists of their obligations towards Spain. Contraband, on a scale so extensive as in some directions to exceed legitimate trade, deprived the mother-country of the revenue to be derived from its possessions. The mines, it is true, continued to send the precious metals to Spain, and the King's fifth share of the value added on paper to the revenue accruing to him. But even this wealth, diminished as it was by plunder and capture, hardly gained any currency in the Peninsula, since it was forestalled in most cases by loans contracted abroad for the payment and supply of troops, and added nothing to the national riches; whereas the supply of commodities to the colonies from Spanish industry would have provided a means of productive wealth to the people and taxable resources to the government. The policy of bombastic inflation favoured by all Spaniards at the time thus worked in a vicious circle. The pressing need for money to carry it out caused provincial discontent and the increase of expenditure for provincial wars, and at the same time the stoppage of provincial revenue; the exactions and restrictions burdening colonial trade drove the colonies to wholesale contraband, whereby the national revenue from trade with

them was lost; and in Castile itself the need for quickly realisable taxation led, as we have seen, to the burdening of transactions in food and manufactures, which strangled both rural and urban industries.

Holland, Catalonia, and Portugal had all been alienated by the attempts to weaken or destroy their autonomous liberties and fiscal independence; and the Italian possessions of Spain were as tenacious of their rights as the rest. Again and again, under one pretext or another, the Neapolitans had rebelled against their masters; usually with the countenance of the French, whose old claims to the country had never been forgotten. Sometimes the cause of discontent had been the Spanish Inquisition, sometimes the unpopularity of Viceroy, sometimes the oppression of the poorer classes by the native nobles; but a more frequent excitant than any had been the exactions of the Spanish officers, and the tampering with the value of the coinage, a favourite device both of Lerma and Olivares. The Neapolitan Parliament of nobles and burgesses had, like the Cortes of Castile, lost its vigour under the corruption of the Spanish Viceroy, and the classes had been systematically alienated from each other. The poorer part of the population were helpless against injustice and extortion, since the Parliament and aristocracy were either powerless or antagonistic, and the only possible remedy for intolerable oppression was violence. The constant exactions both of men and money from Naples for the Spanish wars, and for the enrichment of Spanish officials, had kept the Neapolitans in simmering discontent for years; and the sight of Catalonia and Portugal in open revolt could not but act as a stimulus.

In the course of the war between France and Spain, which had never ceased, Mazarin, who had succeeded Richelieu, sent a squadron to seize some of the Spanish fortresses on the Tuscan coast, with the aid of Prince Tommaso of Savoy in May, 1646. The Duke of Arcos, the Spanish Viceroy of Naples, knowing the disaffection of the people, and recognising the danger of the vicinity of a French force, applied to the city of Naples for a forced loan to enable him to resist invasion, which the French now threatened from Elba, where they had captured a position. The only thing remaining to be taxed in Naples was fruit, the principal food of the poorest; and the new impost upon it caused widespread distress. The people were well-nigh starving; Arcos was appealed to in vain. When, however, on the other side of the Straits the Sicilians broke into revolt against a similar tax in the spring of 1647 the Neapolitan Viceroy in a panic abolished the objectionable excise. Arcos was short of troops in the city, and the weakness of his action following upon his tyranny gave heart to the Neapolitans. The populace, unaided by the better classes, broke into insurrection on July 7, 1647. The cry was suddenly raised in the market-place that the tax upon the fruit was after all to be levied; and led by a young fisherman of Amalfi,

Tommaso Aniellò, popularly known as Masaniello, the rabble swept through the streets, burning the excise stands, and swarmed into the palace of the Viceroy in uncontrollable numbers. Arcos lost courage and promised all he was asked, but incontinently fled, first to the monastery of San Francesco, and afterwards to the Castel Nuovo, leaving the mob the rulers of Naples. There was no general massacre at first; and, although the gaols were broken open, the armouries sacked, and a few specially oppressive Spaniards hanged, there was no anger expressed against the King of Spain's rule, but only against the abuses of his officers.

Arcos was weak as well as powerless, and for his personal safety fraternised with the leaders of the revolt. The lack of restraining influences and the collapse of the Spaniards soon had their effect, and the people got out of hand. First petty robbery, then pillage, arson, rapine, and murder, became rife. The thirst for blood seized the excited people, and massacre for cruelty's sake alone wrought them to increasing fury. Masaniello's head was turned, and mad with vanity and drink he gave himself the airs of a sovereign. His excesses turned many of his adherents against him, and the Viceroy contrived by bribery to divide the populace; the result being that, in order to escape a faction opposed to him—Neapolitan plebeians in Spanish pay—Masaniello took refuge in a church, throwing himself upon the protection of the authorities. While the leader of the revolt rested in a cell of the adjoining monastery, a band of his persecutors called him by name. Stepping forth from the cell to the cloisters, Masaniello, believing that those who called were friends, answered, "You seek me? Here am I, my people." In a moment four bullets pierced his breast, and, with a cry of "Ingrates," the insurgent chief sank dead. From the cloister his dead body was dragged through the streets with contumely, only to be almost worshipped the next day: and the leader of one week became the martyr and the saint of the next. At length a patrician, Prince Massa, won the adherence of the mob, and some sort of revolutionary order was established. On October 1, 1647, the watchers on Santelmo saw a fine Spanish fleet sail into the Bay. Philip had chosen his brilliant and beloved legitimised son Don Juan of Austria for the suppression of the revolt, and his advent gave new hopes to the Spaniards.

While Don Juan, in cooperation with the garrison and a party of the Neapolitan nobles, was endeavouring to win back the populace, another faction invited to Naples Henry Duke of Guise, whose House, through their Anjou ancestors, had ancient claims upon the Neapolitan monarchy. The Duke of Guise suddenly appeared in the city at the end of November, and at first took the hearts of the populace by storm. All the power of the French nation, thought the leaders, would now be on their side, and the belief was confirmed when a strong French fleet appeared in the offing. Guise was offered, and accepted, the position of Doge of an independent Naples, and for a few weeks all looked hopeful.

But the Duke was unwise, and offended his supporters by his hauteur; and the French fleet did nothing effective to help him. It was evident that Guise alone could never maintain his independence. Mazarin, indeed, had no wish to employ national resources in aggrandising a subject House, and the French fleet had other work to do. The revolt had been dwindling by division since the death of Masaniello, and after drawing away Guise and his followers by a feint to Posilipo, Don Juan captured the city by a *coup de main* in February, 1648, the popular government of Naples being thus brought to an end, amidst cheers of "*Viva il Ré*" from the mob, who yearned again for a real master.

Personal and national troubles fell thick and fast upon Philip. The loss of Olivares, upon whom he had leaned so long, was terrible to him. Conquering his desire for idleness, he resolved for once to act the King, "without human means," as he wrote, "but depending solely upon the Divine help, resolved to fulfil my duty as King, regardless of weariness": and in pursuit of this resolve he travelled again, in 1643, to Aragon to animate a new attack against Catalonia. On his way he was induced to visit, in her convent at Agreda, the famous saintly nun Maria, upon whose wise and patient counsel he was thenceforward to depend in all things, and to whom alone in the world he bared his seared and suffering heart. While Philip was with his army in 1643, his new-born activity and assumption of responsibility had resulted in his gaining considerable advantages over the French and Catalans; and his forces had, under his personal command, recaptured Lerida from La Motte.

In 1644, when still in Saragossa, he was suddenly recalled to Madrid by the fatal illness of his wife, who died, to his great grief, before his arrival, September 28. She had been beloved by his people, and perhaps by himself, for, notwithstanding his unfaithfulness, she had borne him many children, of whom only two lived, Baltasar and Maria Teresa; and nearly two months after her death he wrote: "I am in the greatest state of trouble that can be, for I have lost in one person all I can lose in this life: and if I did not feel that God disposes for the best I know not what would become of me." His principal solace now was Prince Baltasar, the sturdy youngster with whose appearance Velasquez' brush has made us so familiar. Anxious to indoctrinate him early in the science of government Philip carried the lad with him to Saragossa to receive the oath of allegiance from the Aragonese and Valencian Cortes in the autumn of 1645. Once again the independent Cortes were stiff in their demands, but this time Philip had no obstinate Olivares by his side, and, though with grief and hesitation, he was obliged to give way with regard to the power of the Inquisition in Aragon. Whilst the King was at Saragossa in October, 1646, his son fell ill. The grief-stricken father almost rebelled against Heaven at the prospect of losing him,

but prayer consoled him, and when the boy died (October 9) Philip wrote: "I have lost my only son, whose presence alone comforted me in my sorrows. My consolation is that I feel God wishes to save me through these tribulations..... All I could do was to offer up this last blow as a sacrifice to Him, though it has broken my heart, and I know not yet whether it is not a dream."

Spain, like her King, was drinking the cup of sorrow to the dregs. The war in Germany went on without intermission, while Catalonia still drained the national resources to the utmost. The war with France on the Flemish frontier never ceased, and Spain had now really reached the end of her resources. At length, to the relief of the world, the Treaty was signed at Münster in January, 1648, which secured the recognition of Dutch independence by Spain, after an eighty years' struggle against the inevitable. The bitter truth was now confessed, but too late to save Spain; the dream of dominating Holland for the sake of the Catholic faith was dead. Spain thenceforward would not be needed to fight for the Emperor against his Protestant subjects, and, now that she was useless to him, she found herself without allies face to face with France.

With a little further sacrifice of pride on the part of Spain peace might, perhaps, have been made after the deaths of Louis XIII and Richelieu had placed Anne of Austria in power as Regent for her son Louis XIV; but the lesson was hard to learn, and Melo, who had succeeded as Viceroy of Flanders, on the death of the Infante Ferdinand, had won some successes against the French. In May, 1643, however, young Condé gained over him the victory of Rocroi, which broke the spell surrounding that indomitable Spanish infantry whose valour and skill had made the Spanish empire. Thenceforward Spain was as decadent in land warfare as at sea. But still the war with France dragged on. Some attempts to patch up a peace were made in 1649; but the Spanish claims that France should surrender all her conquests doomed them to failure. Mazarin's political troubles at home, however, were paralysing him also, and the bewildering changes of side of the great French generals, Turenne and Condé in particular, caused them temporarily to take the Spanish side against their own countrymen. The divisions in France were busily fomented by Spain, the aid of Condé brought some success to the Spanish arms in Flanders; and in the battle of Valenciennes he and Don Juan of Austria defeated Turenne (July, 1656). Moreover, friendly relations had sprung up between the English Commonwealth and Philip. The French, notwithstanding the relationship of the royal family with the Stewarts, had bid high for Cromwell's friendship; but for several years after the execution of Charles the Spanish connexion had been preferred by the English Protector. Cromwell's demands upon Spain in return for an alliance had included the right to trade in the Spanish American colonies, the limitation of

the power of the Inquisition over English subjects, and the equalisation of customs dues in Spain upon English and Spanish merchandise. Philip needed the alliance, but the old pride still stood in the way, and the demands of Cromwell were rejected. The sudden and treacherous attack upon Santo Domingo (April, 1655), the seizure of Jamaica (May), and the capture and destruction of the Spanish silver fleet by Admiral Stayner (September, 1656), opened the eyes of the overburdened King of Spain to the danger that, while fighting the French on land he would have to face the English at sea; and in November, 1656, Cromwell actually concluded an alliance with France. In April, 1657, Blake destroyed a large Spanish fleet off Vera Cruz. Whatever terms the French might impose upon him, it was at last clear to Philip that peace would have to be made; but the negotiations, which had begun before the battle of Valenciennes and had been broken off in consequence of that victory, were resumed. While they were slowly dragging on the war in Flanders proceeded vigorously. The battle of Dunkirk or the Dunes (1658) in which Condé, Don Juan, and James Duke of York stood on the side of Spain, proved finally the terrible deterioration of the Spanish infantry, first demonstrated at Rocroi; rapidly Oudenarde, Gravelines, Bergues, Dixmuyden, and other Spanish-Flemish towns fell into the hands of the French, and at last exhausted Spain had to humble herself, and make peace on terms dictated by her foe. The terms of the Peace of the Pyrenees (November, 1659) were hard; yet they might have been still harder, but for the anxiety of Anne of Austria to marry her son Louis XIV to her niece, Philip's only daughter, Maria Teresa. Roussillon was to remain French, while Catalonia was, so far as the French were concerned, to be abandoned to Philip. Artois was surrendered to Louis XIV. The battle had been fought to the bitter end, and Spain's impotence was patent to the world.

Philip's natural indolence had soon overcome his resolve to be his own minister. Don Luis de Haro, his new favourite, was less corrupt and greedy than his predecessors, for there was now little or nothing left to seize, and he was not without ability as a diplomatist; but he had proved himself no match for Mazarin in negotiation, as at Elvas he had been no match for Meneses in the field. The principal honours of the peace were Haro's, however, and the joy of Spaniards at the treaty passed all bounds. Sacrifices were forgotten, for now for the first time for over forty years Spain was free from foreign war. Haro was made Duke of Carpio and Prince of the Peace; the betrothal of the Infanta in Madrid to Marshal de Grammont as his King's proxy in the presence of sixty peers of France, surpassed all previous records of stateliness, and when in the following spring of 1660 the King and all his family and Court slowly travelled through desolated Castile to the French frontier, to give his daughter to the young King whose sun rose as that of Philip sank, the stiff magnificence of the ceremonial was the last great

manifestation of a defeated and dying system. Two thousand mules were needed to carry the baggage, with seventy caparisoned horses and nine hundred saddle mules; seventy state coaches carried the nobles, and eighteen horse litters were devoted to the ladies who followed the Infanta. Velvets, brocades, cloth of bullion, and cunning goldsmiths' work, gloves, perfumes and laces, such as only Spain could produce, burdened seventy-five sumpter mules, for the use of the future Queen of France; but when the Infanta had been surrendered on the historic islet of Pheasants, in the Bidassoa, and Philip and his host of courtiers wended their way homeward, their dark doublets and stiff *golillas* had grown old-fashioned in their eyes, and the lank hair clear of their projecting collars seemed antiquated and uncouth, by the side of the frizzled curls and piled periwigs of the French nobles and the elegance of their wide-skirted coats of embroidered brocade and their dainty lace cravats.

The war in Catalonia had continued; but, with the capture of Tortosa by Philip's troops in 1650, and the capitulation of Barcelona, after a terrible siege of fifteen months, in October, 1652, the revolt so far as the Catalans themselves were concerned was practically at an end. The French, however, had fought on in the north of the province against Don Juan and Mortara, Philip's best general; but with the Peace of the Pyrenees this war also ended, to the content even of the Catalans, who were heartily tired of war and of their French masters. In the attempts to recover Portugal Philip had been more unfortunate. In 1658 the Spanish frontier stronghold of Badajoz was closely beleaguered by the Portuguese, and a desperate effort was made to relieve it by the favourite, Haro. His approach caused the Portuguese to abandon the siege and recross the frontier, whither Haro followed them, only to be routed ignominiously at Elvas in January, 1659, and himself to join in the panic-stricken *saute qui peut* which ensued. But with the pacification of Catalonia and the Peace of the Pyrenees Philip was able to make a serious attempt to reconquer his lost kingdom. Early in 1661 Don Juan, with 20,000 men, crossed the border from Estremadura, while another Spanish force somewhat smaller invaded Portugal from the north. The Portuguese troops, with an English auxiliary force under Schomberg, though fewer than the Spanish, succeeded in holding Don Juan at bay; and in Madrid Haro, as Don Juan said through jealousy, refused or neglected to send the reinforcements which the Prince demanded. The civil dissensions in Portugal enabled Don Juan in 1662-3 to overrun the Alemtejo; but in June, 1663, Schomberg met the Spaniards near Evora, which they had captured, and utterly routed them with terrible loss, in spite of Don Juan's gallantry. But still the surrender of Portugal was too bitter a humiliation for Philip to accept, and the war dragged on. Don Juan was recalled, for there were new currents against him in Madrid now, though Haro was dead; and Count Caracena with a fresh

army attacked Villa Viçosa. Marialva and Schomberg, with superior strength, came to the rescue, and were met by Caracena in June, 1665. After eight hours of hand-to-hand struggle the Spaniards suffered a crushing disaster, losing all their guns and two-thirds of their men. It was the last effort. Philip could do no more; and, though he never formally recognised the independence of Portugal, even this humiliation was inevitable for his successor.

Spain had in Philip's reign not lost so much in actual territory—for with the exception of Portugal, Roussillon, and Artois, her possessions had remained practically intact after forty years of war—as in prestige, in initiative, and, above all, in her belief in herself. The disillusionment that had crept over the King had equally paralysed his people, and from similar causes. Pride alone was now the sustaining power, not, as it had been, a fervent faith in personal and national selection. This pride, which upheld inflated pretensions without the power to enforce them, fostered the love of sulky magnificence which was the note of the reign, together with the scorn of labour. Of this tendency idle display without gaiety, which in Philip's time had become a perfect craze, was a natural consequence; and the social decadence and decline of morality, side by side with abject devotion, which characterised both the monarch and his people, were the inevitable outcome of a conviction that Spain was now selected for special suffering. Religion had little to do with the conduct of daily life. Sins constantly repeated were constantly repented in sackcloth and ashes. The agonising remorse of the King for the frivolities and immoralities into which his weakness betrayed him, did not deter him from again falling at the next temptation; and there is ample reason for believing that the majority of his people viewed their moral and social transgressions as he viewed his own.

Like some other stages of the history of Spain, this period of rapid declension in sincerity and endeavour coincided with one of great brilliancy in literature and art. Philip's new pleasure palace of Buen Retiro in Madrid, built for him by Olivares as a place where royal state might be somewhat relaxed from the grim austerity of the Alcazar, was a centre of culture, wit, and poesy, where, in a dilettante society round a dilettante King, every courtier who could spin a verse or coin an epigram was sure of a hearing. The Spanish stage was never so brilliant or so fashionable as it was when Philip reigned. It was a time when Lope de Vega, Calderon, Tirso de Molina, Montalban, and Moreto, were bewitching Spain and providing plots which were later, in French garb, to pervade the theatres of the world. Philip and his first wife were constant patrons of the two theatres of the capital—the inner courtyards of houses, in which the rooms looking upon the enclosed space served as private boxes, whilst the ground accommodated the mass of spectators. Philip's love for comedies extended to comedians. His infidelities with

actresses were public, and set the fashion for his courtiers, with the consequence that brawls and assassinations in and after stage performances were common. In the Buen Retiro itself play-acting and literary contests constantly went on, in which the royal family took part; and it was said the King himself wrote plays under the pseudonym of *Un ingenio de esta Corte* for representation upon his own stage. Nor was the drama the only form of literature fashionable. Quevedo was a privileged genius who could, and did, write scathing and witty satires, but was for many years in high favour with Philip. Velez de Guevara and a dozen smaller men were penning stories filled with malicious humour reflecting the foibles of the decadent society, portrayed for us to the life in *El Gran Tacano*, and *El Diablo Cojuelo*; and, at second hand, in *Gil Blas de Santillana* and *The Bachelor of Salamanca*. With such a King and such a Court, alike saturated with literary preciosity, it is not surprising that idlers and adventurers of all sorts should have aimed at advancement by the writing of eccentric satires in prose and verse; and that failing of success in their efforts, many lived by their wits as best they might, cheating, swindling, and cozening.

That such was the case in Madrid is recorded by every visitor at the time. The main amusement of the people was the dull, aimless parading in carriages up and down the Calle Mayor in the winter and the river-bed in summer. Where the rich crowded the birds of prey gathered. In vain laws were passed forbidding the ostentatious riding in coaches, except with strict limitations; in vain decrees were published prohibiting women from dressing outrageously, and covering their faces in the streets; the parade, where nobles and thieves jostled with masked women, continued unchecked to the scandal of all. Spanish women, from being retiring and modest, as in a semi-oriental country, became shamefully free; and at the end of the reign of Philip IV, in spite of all regulations and penalties, there were said to be 30,000 professional prostitutes in Madrid; and no woman took offence at being accosted by strangers in the street. The two playhouses were constantly crowded in the daytime with artisans; and even working people wore swords and imitated the dress and demeanour of gentlemen. Snuff-taking and the wearing of large black-rimmed goggles were the fashion, as savouring of literature; and everywhere was pretence, affectation, sloth, and debauchery. The streets of the capitals were filthy beyond belief. There was no attempt at drainage of any sort, the garbage and refuse being simply cast into the roadways to rot and fester.

Amidst this unpromising environment wit, fancy, and art flourished with an over-florid luxuriance which portended decay. Not only was Philip the great patron of poetry and the drama, but also a discriminating lover of pictorial art. Madrid in his day was the acknowledged emporium of rare and beautiful objects in all the arts. Philip's nobles vied with himself in the collections of art treasures from Italy, Germany,

France, and Flanders; and, thanks to the patronage of the King, Spain developed in his day two schools of painting which have retained the despairing admiration of art-lovers to the present day. When the Prince of Wales visited Madrid, "he collected with remarkable zeal all the paintings that could be had, valuing and paying for them at excessive prices," and he and Philip in their presents to each other included some precious gems of art. When the Commonwealth sold King Charles' pictures, Philip, through his agents in London, hastened to buy some of the best of them, which may still be seen at Madrid. But it was not only as a collector of paintings that Philip shone. His friendship and patronage throughout his life to one of the great artists of the world, Velasquez, encouraged the development of the master's genius from the severe early paintings inspired by Pacheco and Greco, through the opulent freedom of Rubens' influence and that of the great Italians, to the full perfection of the School of Madrid, of which Velasquez was the supreme exponent. A sovereign who fostered the art of Velasquez and Zurbaran, of Murillo and Ribera, and who by his liberal patronage and admiration led to the creation of the finest works of the Schools of Madrid and Seville, has some claim to the gratitude of mankind.

So long as his son Baltasar had lived Philip had resisted all suggestions that he should marry a second wife, but the death of his heir left no Spanish male successor to the throne; and, at the suggestion of the Emperor, Philip in 1649 married his niece Mariana of Austria. She was a girl hardly over fifteen, eager for pleasure and overflowing with life, but scheming and self-seeking from the first. To the heavy, lethargic, disillusioned man whom she married she could bring neither solace nor counsel; but she bore a son to him seven years after the marriage, who promised at least to secure the succession. The child, however, died at the age of four in 1661, and again the bereaved father was plunged in despair, convinced, "that it is because I have grievously offended God that He sends me these punishments for my sins." But soon another son, Charles, came to console him. The astrologers and saintly seers predicted for the child a happy, glorious life; for the omens combined in his favour. Alas! they were all wrong; for he was well-nigh a monstrosity in his degeneracy, and consummated the ruin of his country before he died of senile decay at the age of forty. With this poor weakling as his heir Philip's prospects in his last days were darkened. His stolid pride of place forborne, as it had done all his life, an open demonstration of his grief. But the dull earthy face grew ever more despairing, and his melancholy more profound. The rumour ran that the King was bewitched, and the Inquisition was busy persecuting the poor wretches who were supposed to have cast the spell upon him. The witchery that was killing him was bodily decay and spiritual depression. "I want no more health, or anything else, than shall be for God's service," he wrote in the last year of his life, "only

that His holy will be executed upon me." In September, 1665, six months after this was written, he fell gravely ill. The first step taken to aid him was a curious one. The Inquisitor-General and the King's confessor approached his bed and asked to be shown a small bag of sacred relics he wore. After the contents had been inspected the bag was restored, and the ecclesiastics then went to the church of Atocha and burnt "an old black-letter book of witchcraft, some printed portraits of his Majesty stuck through with pins, and other things." This having been done, medical remedies were resorted to, but with as little effect. Already the Court was divided into two jarring factions, that of the Queen and that of Don Juan of Austria; and of Philip "the Great" on his death-bed small heed was taken; for each faction was looking for its rising sun. So little decency, indeed, was observed that the rival ecclesiastics wrangled noisily over the death-bed, until they were expelled from the chamber. On September*17, 1665, just before dawn, Philip breathed his last; and for the man who had been flattered as a demi-god all his life few tears were shed by the courtiers whom he had loaded with honours. The corpse of Philip, theatrical to the last, with painted hands and face, and in the rich garments he wore in life, lay under a canopy of state, "in the great room in his palace at Madrid where they used to act plays"; whilst Mariana, mistress of Spain in right of the semi-imbecile now called King, triumphed over Don Juan, whom his father had angrily refused to see on his death-bed. The evils that had ruined Spain had originated long before Philip IV was born, and only a hero and a genius could have averted the catastrophe of the country. Philip was neither. He was only an overburdened, indolent man, with vicious tastes, a weak will, and a tender conscience. To this combination was due the descent of Spain like an avalanche, bearing with it to despairing extinction the last degenerate scion of the Spanish Habsburgs and the splendid inheritance of the Emperor Charles V.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PAPAL POLICY, 1590-1648.

SIXTUS V had died in August, 1590, filled with hatred against Spain; his energy, which nothing else had been able to destroy, paralysed by the fear of that nation. He was followed to the grave, in the space of a year and a half, by three Popes, who bade farewell to life immediately after their election; and in January, 1592, a fourth was chosen—Cardinal Ippolito Aldobrandini, who took the name of Clement VIII. He was a son of the Silvestro Aldobrandini who had fled from Florence in 1531, when the Medici were restored through the arms of Spain, and who had ingratiated himself with Paul IV, when that Pope was venturing to make war upon the House of Habsburg. But Spain had since established her supremacy in Italy so firmly that the newly-elected Pope was forced to renounce the tradition of his exiled Florentine House, and to accept unreservedly the position which the Cabinet of Madrid had gained in the Apennine Peninsula. He did this at first with uncompromising firmness, but in the later years of his pontificate with a circumspection so subtle that he contrived to satisfy even the enemies of Spain. This effect he was perfectly able to create, because he had only to look on while the Government of Madrid drifted little by little towards the complete disablement of its own power.

But what was the actual position of this power when Philip II was overtaken by death in September, 1598? In Italy it could scarcely have been more favourable: Sicily, Naples, and Milan were in the undisputed possession of Spain, the Grand Duke of Tuscany not ill-disposed towards her, the Dukes of Parma and Savoy her vassals, the Duke of Urbino a pensioner of the Court of Madrid; the College of Cardinals contained other Spanish pensioners in considerable numbers; obedience, either purchased or compelled, was to be found everywhere, and nowhere an independent State, unless it were Venice, who kept guard over her own sovereignty, leaving the rest of Italy to its fate. But a glance at the countries of Europe north of the Alps makes it clear that Philip II had obtained the reverse of what he wanted. The Armada sent by him against England was annihilated, and Elizabeth's position newly

strengthened; the Peace of Vervins had dissipated the vision which he had persistently followed of winning for his House the crown of France; and the war which he had waged for many years with the Netherlands—a war in which he had sacrificed well-nigh 200 million ducats and 300,000 men—was handed on, still unfinished, to his successor, with lamentable results for Spain. The Netherlands had by means of that war acquired commerce and wealth, virtual independence and maritime power; Spain had brought home nothing but poverty and bankruptcy. All these things implied a lesson for the Italians themselves, and, above all, for the Popes—that they too might venture to relax somewhat in their obedience to Spanish rule: and Clement VIII well knew how to effect such a transition.

In this he succeeded by means of a policy of consistent moderation, favoured by the general condition of European affairs. In spite of the peace which prevailed between France and Spain, the opposition between their respective interests had not ceased to smoulder; and, without actually fanning it into flame, Clement contrived to turn it to his advantage. This is most distinctly apparent from the signal success which he achieved with respect to Ferrara. His predecessors, Sixtus IV, Julius II, and Clement VII, had cast covetous eyes upon that duchy; he succeeded in winning what they had merely desired. As a matter of fact, the occasion was not one which demanded any particular skill or effort. Both the purely platonic attachment of Spain for the Duke and the eagerly-promised assistance of France against him were turned to advantage by Clement, to help him in carrying through without bloodshed his design of conquering Ferrara. Even the long-blunted weapon of excommunication proved still effectual, and frightened the Duke, who was not remarkably brave, into consenting to the addition of Ferrara to the States of the Church.

Pope Clement VIII lighted upon a choice which was in every respect an excellent one, when he committed the management of State affairs to his nephew, Cardinal Pietro Aldobrandini. This Cardinal had already, in the matter of the conquest of Ferrara, proved his value as a negotiator of peace, and incidentally as a legacy-hunter on his own behalf. He showed himself, moreover, adroit enough to steer his own vessel safely to harbour, avoiding the conflicting currents which flowed headlong from France and Spain, and to take care at the same time that the cargo consigned to her by the House of Aldobrandini should come to no harm. Though this nephew of the Pope was delighted to see Henry IV providing himself with a French party in Rome by the distribution of pensions, he soon allowed dispassionate reflexion to take the place of delight. Both he and other kinsmen of Pope Clement obeyed his orders in spurning Spanish and French pensions alike, they did so only in theory, and in practice hit upon the compromise that the pensions were not to be paid to them, but to be placed to their credit—what was

due to them to be got in—after the death of the Pope. Pietro Aldobrandini really cherished a friendship with France on the one hand while displaying a genuine confidence in Spain on the other, and trying to invest his money in Neapolitan funds, which he regarded as safe under the Spanish *régime*. The Pope himself behaved in much the same way; for, when he felt the domination of the Court of Madrid burdensome, he procured a lightening of the load by coming to terms with that Court, and thus rivalry—at that time a friendly rivalry—between the two great continental Powers proved useful to him and to his nephew, who were seldom at a loss for expedients: they surveyed the two rivals in turn “with an auspicious and a dropping eye,” in order that neither might feel aggrieved. Even the adherents of Spain among the Italian dynasties were inspired by Clement with a remarkably favourable disposition towards the Papacy: as in the case of the Duke of Parma, who married a lady of the House of Aldobrandini, with an enormous dowry paid out of Church funds. Unlike the policy of Urban VIII at a later date, that of Clement was, in the main, inclined to passivity, and on pursuing its ends during the prevalence of peace.

The year 1600, proclaimed by Clement as a year of Jubilee, brought to Rome an influx of pilgrims not quite so numerous as the crowds attracted on similar occasions in medieval times. These pilgrims had an opportunity of witnessing, on February 17 in that year, one of the most infamous deeds of the Roman Inquisition—when, by the decree of that tribunal, Giordano Bruno, the most profound thinker of whom Italy can boast, perished at the stake. He suffered, as a martyr in the cause of speculative and astronomical truth, on the very spot on which free Rome has at last raised a monument to his memory. But on the proceedings of the Inquisition a final judgment has been passed; and it would be carrying owls to Athens to give reiterated expression to the contemptuous indignation which it calls forth on all sides. Such is not the case with the administration of justice in Rome at that time, when not concerned with matters of religion. Upon this a fierce light is thrown by the execution, in September, 1599, of Beatrice Cenci and her mother, for the murder of father and husband. They were suspected, rather than proved guilty, of the crime laid to their charge; and, if there can be extenuating circumstances for the murder of a father or a husband, such surely pleaded in this case for mother and daughter alike; since it is unquestionably true that old Cenci whom they murdered was the horror-inspiring monster portrayed by Shelley in his tragedy. Moreover, the financial interests of the Apostolic Chamber were mixed up with the trial: it had settled on terms of cash with Cenci for all his atrocious doings, and turned to a profitable account the condemnation of the accused.

After the death of Clement (March, 1605), it is alleged that Henry IV spent 300,000 ducats in procuring the election of Cardinal Alessandro

de' Medici as his successor. There is no documentary evidence for this statement; but it is nevertheless very credible, for this member of the Medici family had become Pope in spite of the prohibition of King Philip III, and his accession as Leo XI was celebrated in France with the firing of cannon and every manifestation of joy. But the newly-chosen Pontiff survived his election by only twenty-five days. The conclave was unduly prolonged, and a violent contest raged between the electors, until, on May 16, Cardinal Camillo Borghese was elected Pope, taking the name of Paul V. He was, in common with many of his contemporaries, influenced by astrological prejudices, as well as by the firm conviction that it was his duty, as one called by the Holy Ghost, to direct the Church, and to repel what seemed to him the encroachments of secular Powers.

In the endeavour to wrest rights out of the hands of these Powers, the new Pope met, in the beginning of his career, with pronounced success. He insisted that Spain should no longer levy tithe upon the Jesuits—and he gained his point; furthermore, that a layman who had been condemned in the secular Court at Naples should be given over to the Inquisition—and the man was given up; he demanded of the Knights of Malta that they should confer certain benefices upon his nephew—and what he wished was done; he insisted that the Duke of Savoy should revoke the nomination to an abbacy which he had already made, and appoint a papal nephew to be abbot instead—and the Duke complied; and, in the same way, he urged that the Republics of Lucca and Genoa must recall certain ordinances whereby they had done injury to the freedom of the Church—and the requisition was fulfilled. All this encouraged the Pope to risk a further struggle—this time with the Grand Council of Venice.

Here, however, he knocked at the wrong door. The Republic of Venice, with her territory on the mainland, was at that time the only part of Italy which could not be described as priest-ridden. Her clergy were subject to the law of the State, and neither the making nor the execution of this law was affected by clerical opposition. Such opposition was now raised by Paul V. He imposed upon the Seigniorship a series of demands: they were to deliver up to him two priests who had been imprisoned for heinous offences; they must annul a law, issued by themselves in January, 1604, which forbade the erection of churches, the institution of new Orders, and the establishment of new monasteries or lay-brotherhoods without the previous permission of the Senate; and they must revoke the decisions renewed in March, 1605, which forbade the alienation of property in mortmain. When compliance with these demands was refused, the Pope, by virtue of his own supreme authority, declared the two offending laws to be null and void—exactly as Innocent III, in the thirteenth century, had declared Magna Charta to be invalid—insisted, besides, on the restoration of the two imprisoned priests, and, in

a monitory letter, gave the Seigniorie 27 days' grace, after the expiration of which, if his injunction had not been obeyed, he would put Doge and Senate under his ban, and lay his interdict on all the territory of the Republic. When the Seigniorie, disregarding the papal threats, persisted in their obstinacy, Paul pronounced his ban and ordained the interdict. From May, 1606, until April 21, 1607, the Seigniorie did all that lay in their power to defeat the Pope's endeavour to intimidate them by the severest means which the Church had at her command. The ban was treated as non-existent, as being illegal, and the interdict was disregarded as equally subversive of the law. The Government was powerful enough to curb its clergy, and to bind them down, with more or less forcible compulsion, to the performance of all their sacred functions, as though there were no interdict in existence. A decree of banishment was issued and summarily executed against the Jesuits, who refused to obey the orders of the Seigniorie. In Venice they set themselves to keep the management of the affairs of the State, in spite of ban and interdict, and in spite of an otherwise feeble opposition, in the ranks of the nobles; in Rome it behoved the Pope and his supporters to take serious counsel with themselves, whether and by what means the resistance of the Republic could be overcome.

It became every day more obvious that, since spiritual weapons were of no avail, the subjection of the Seigniorie to the papal authority could only be obtained by means of a war. But it was a difficult problem where to find means even to open hostilities. Both sides began to look round for allies. The Spaniards, who felt the independence of Venice to be a thorn in their own flesh, came first into consideration, and Count Fuentes, the Spanish governor of Milan, actually made preparations for an attack upon the Venetian territory, keeping back certain troops at his disposal instead of despatching them to the Netherlands, much to the dissatisfaction of the Spaniards there and to the contentment of the Dutch. But at Madrid the question whether the Venetian ambassador, being under an interdict, ought to attend mass, was inflated into a matter of State; and the King, whose thoughts ran more upon the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin than on any problem of politics, lost no time about declaring that he sided with the Pope. But his partisanship went no further than words, and did not extend to the furnishing of auxiliary troops against Venice. Philip III, influenced by his peace-loving minister Lerma, took the side of the Pope precisely as James I of England took that of Venice; neither King hesitated to declare himself thus far, while both were chary of confirming the assurance by action.

The behaviour of Henry IV of France was entirely different. He deceived neither the Pope nor the Seigniorie with promises, and allowed no one to fathom his opinion on the question as to which of the two was in the right. He thus contrived to be accepted as a mediator in

both Roman and Venetian circles, and to bring about, by his intervention, the adjustment of the quarrel. Cardinal Joyeuse, sent by him to Italy, concluded the agreement in Venice, although de Castro, the Spanish ambassador there, did not always support and frequently hindered him. As must inevitably happen in such cases, the parties who agreed upon a reconciliation were obliged to depart a little from their original standpoint: the two priests whose restoration the Pope had required were handed over by the Seignior to Cardinal Joyeuse, with the reservation that the Republic in no way prejudiced, by this act of surrender, her right of citing ecclesiastics before a secular tribunal, and Joyeuse thereupon delivered up the pair to the papal commissary. The laws of which Paul V had demanded the repeal remained in full force, and Venice only promised that in the execution of these laws she would conduct herself with her accustomed piety. Absolution from the interdict, the binding force of which was categorically denied by the Seignior, was either not pronounced at all or pronounced in a quite illusory manner: it is said that Cardinal Joyeuse, appearing before the Seignior, kept his hand concealed under his biretta, making the sign of the cross unperceived, and that this was to be taken as the revocation of the ban. The Seignior would not at any price, in spite of the most urgent solicitations, agree to the readmission of the Jesuits, who had been banished from Venice, and Venetian territory remained forbidden ground to that Order for the succeeding half-century.

In the history of the struggle which came thus to an end, the towering figure of the Servite monk, Fra Paolo Sarpi, stands out conspicuously to the eyes of later generations. It was he who inspired, and by his vigorous polemic writings repeatedly upheld, the resolutions formed in the matter by the Venetian Government. The hatred of the Roman Church was concentrated on him; and not later than in the autumn of the same year which brought the struggle to a close there were sent forth, not by the Pope, but by his nephew, Cardinal Scipio Borghese, assassins at whose stealthy hand Sarpi nearly lost his life. They then took refuge in the house of the papal Nuncio, who doubtless facilitated their escape into the States of the Church. The fugitives found in the papal territory shelter and even financial assistance; and it was not until a year had elapsed after their attempted crime that the Pope ordered them to be arrested.

It was, however, undeniable that the experience which Paul V had gained in his quarrel with Venice served him as a lesson. His attitude from that time forth was one of more moderation, and was notably characterised by a subtle caution—in fact, by mistrust, in the direction of Spain. It may be regarded as highly probable that on the occasion of the great plot to destroy Venice, which was made and stifled in 1618, the Duke of Osuna, Spanish Viceroy of Naples, and Bedmar, the Spanish ambassador accredited to the Seignior, had a hand in the game; but no sane judge of these transactions could assert or imagine that Paul V and

his Court favoured these outrageous doings on the part of the two Spaniards and their accomplices, or that they were even aware of them. When the Spaniards, shortly after the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, were planning the wholesale massacre of the Valtelline Protestants, and applied to the Pope for his blessing on the undertaking, Paul met their demands with a flat refusal; withheld from the Duke of Feria, Spanish governor of Milan, all the help for which he asked; and would not so much as reveal his own view of the affair. Later, when the massacre had been carried out—between five and six hundred Protestants having perished as its victims—and when Feria had caused the slaughter to be celebrated as a glorious victory by the singing of a *Te Deum* in Milan, Paul was most zealous in avoiding any expression which might have been construed into approval of the horrible transaction. He refused on this occasion to abandon his position of absolute neutrality, in spite of strong attempts on the part of the Venetians to stir him to action against Spain; and in the same way he refused to give any financial aid to the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, which were desirous of closing the passes of the Alps against Protestant reinforcements making for the Valtelline. Again and again he and his nephew, who was his right-hand man, lamented the fact that while they condemned they could in no way oppose the proceedings of Spain, because it would otherwise appear as though the Holy See were taking heretics under its protection—a consideration set at nought, as we shall see, by the next Pope. Even till the day of his death in January, 1621, Paul V refused to side either with Spain or with the Grisons, from whom she had wrested the Valtelline; and to requests for money put forward on the part of Spain he invariably replied with cold refusal or with expressions of regret. He may have suspected—it is not improbable that he knew—that the so-called Holy War was being carried on rather in the private interests of the House of Habsburg than in those of the Faith. It was a bold request that the Pope, whose State was already hemmed in by the Italian possessions of the Spanish Crown, should loosen his purse-strings to increase the facilities for the common action at which the two branches of the House of Habsburg were manifestly aiming. Paul V evaded this request: he preferred to heap up his wealth for his own family, the Borghese.

His successor was Gregory XV, whose reign, extending from February, 1621, to July, 1623, coincides with a more marked progress of the Catholic reaction in Germany and elsewhere. Gregory, an old man and a feeble, was ruled by his nephew, Cardinal Lodovico Lodovisio. The latter was perfectly competent for the two tasks which he saw before him: first, the enrichment of the Lodovisi family in Rome—an end which he pursued in a truly commercial spirit and achieved with brilliant success—and secondly, the promotion of the Catholic Reaction throughout the world, undertaken by him with great, and even excessive, zeal.

The suppression of Protestantism in the hereditary dominions of Austria, which was begun immediately after the battle of the White Hill and relentlessly carried on; the conquest of the Lower Palatinate by Spinola and of the Upper by Bavarian troops; the transference of the electoral dignity of the Palatinate to Maximilian of Bavaria; the resumption by Spain, after a twelve years' truce, of hostilities against the Netherlands: the oppression of the Huguenots in France; the diplomatic game of hide-and-seek by which James I and his minion Buckingham and the Prince of Wales were fooled in Madrid, and induced to grant far-reaching concessions to the Catholics in England—in all these causes Cardinal Lodovisio, in the name of Gregory XV, jubilantly took part, most effectually furthering them all by stirring up, at the right moment, a violent agitation in the Catholic Courts, by calling out the body militant of the Jesuits and even by giving assistance from the papal coffers. Catholicism, now avowedly on the offensive, had everywhere favourable results to record; and it seemed, now that Protestantism had been successfully restricted, as if time might bring about its complete annihilation.

But those who looked below the surface could discern, even in these first events of the Thirty Years' War, the point where the closely-drawn net that enclosed and united the States which had remained Catholic threatened to break asunder. In the Valtelline, the Spaniards had turned to the best possible advantage the massacre which had been brought about by their help; they had occupied the district and erected fortresses there, and had pushed forward as far as Bormio. From another side the Austrians under Archduke Leopold invaded the Grisons, and, having seized Chur and levied contributions upon it, wasted the Engadine with fire and sword. Spaniards and Imperialists could now bring help to each other over the passes of the Leagues, in order to fall upon their opponents in one body. Protestantism in the Valtelline was rooted out, in the Grisons it was exposed to the utmost danger; but precisely for this reason did it threaten the unity of the Catholic Powers, more than one of which had its interests at stake. Venice had to rely, in defence of her possessions on the mainland, upon the recruits enrolled in the Grisons and in Switzerland; but how could these make their way across the mountains, if the Austro-Spanish alliance blocked up the passes against them? The Duke of Savoy, who had shortly before joined the cause of the Catholic Reaction, and had taken up anew certain old schemes of his House against the heretics of Geneva, grew suspicious, recognising in the fact that the Spaniards in Milan could, whenever they felt so inclined, bring Austrian troops over the mountains, an addition to the dangers which threatened his independence. Finally, France, her war with the Huguenots being successfully ended, had now to fear that the Spaniards, once more in close alliance with Austria, would make an end once for all of her influence in Italy. These three

Powers combined to induce—in case of necessity to compel—the House of Habsburg to surrender the Grisons passes.

There was thus imminent upon Italian soil a war between Catholic Powers, which could not be welcome to the Protestants. At first it was deferred by negotiations, which led to a Franco-Spanish agreement: the two Cabinets again took up the scheme by the help of which they had tried, as early as the time of Paul V, and now tried again, to arrive at an understanding. They resolved to await the adjustment of the controversy by the Pope, and to request that he would nominally take into his own keeping the fortresses of the Valtelline and the Grisons then occupied by Spaniards and Austrians, by putting into them garrisons of his own papal troops. Gregory XV and the Cardinal-nephew acceded to the request. The necessary soldiery were recruited in the Roman territory and their command entrusted to the Pope's brother; he led his force to the point where the Spaniards—and, after some reluctance on the part of the Archduke Leopold, the Austrians also—actually yielded to them the strongholds which they had evacuated. The dissension in the Catholic camp seemed to be happily ended; but it was soon to break out afresh, and to lead to sixteen years of deadly struggle for the possession of the Valtelline. Gregory XV lived long enough to see the papal standards waving in the High Alps. Upon his death, which followed shortly afterwards, Cardinal Maffeo Barberini was elected Pope, in August, 1623, and took the name of Urban VIII.

Eight months after this election an event happened which was epoch-making for the whole of Europe. On April 26, 1624, the *Conseil du Roi* admitted among its members Richelieu—that instrument of fate who in France overthrew the Huguenots, who in Germany helped to raise up the Protestants, and by indirect and secret ways or even by open force hastened the downfall of Spain, and lowered the domineering position of the House of Habsburg. Within the comparatively short space of time which had elapsed since the death of Gregory XV, the compromise which had been made and acted upon with regard to the Valtelline had proved itself to be fraudulent. The papal garrisons quartered in the fortresses of the Valtelline had steadily dwindled away, and the consequent gaps in their ranks had been gradually filled by Spaniards. The new Pope grudged the money which went to the troops which he had allowed to be despatched on this errand; he would have liked Spain to furnish their pay, and he actually made proposals for replacing the unsatisfactory compromise by a permanent arrangement. These proposals, however, suited neither France nor the Venetians, and Richelieu resolved on a fresh move. He concerted with Venice an armed rising, with the object of wresting the Valtelline from Spanish influence. He despatched the Marquis de Coeuvres to Switzerland, where, supplied with funds by France and Venice, he induced the Protestant cantons to furnish some 1000 men: these first prevailed on the Austrians under Archduke

Leopold to quit the Grisons, and then de Coeuvres, reinforced by French troops, marched over the mountains to the Valtelline, where he was supplied by the Venetians with heavy artillery for a siege. No sooner were the first shots fired than the papal troops and the Spaniards who were with them abandoned all the fortified places of the valley, which before the end of the year (1624) was placed under the protection of the King of France, in conformity with the agreement made between France, Venice, Savoy and the Grisons; the Valtelline and the passes of the Alps were thus secured against occupation by Spain.

Pope Urban, who showed himself later to be above any suspicion of a partiality towards Spain, was on this occasion sorely displeased with the French for having driven his troops out of the Valtelline as though they were Turks or heretics. And according to the latest researches it is scarcely to be doubted that he had his revenge upon them. For the notorious Treaty of Monzon, concluded in March, 1626, whereby France basely turned her back on her allies, Venice, Savoy, and the Grisons, was a piece of work—carried through by an overstepping of authority on the part of the French envoy du Fargis—which was contrived by Urban; and in fact he expressly designated it as his own work to one of his nuncios. Richelieu was compelled by the Catholic party at Court to acquiesce in the agreement made at Monzon, and to abandon the allies of France. It was an act of treachery, dictated to him on that occasion by the Pope.

The events arising out of the Treaty of Monzon followed one another in constant succession. The Treaty pronounced a decision nearly affecting the Valtelline—that the right of crossing the passes belonged to Spain equally with France; a purely nominal prerogative of the Grisons over the Valtelline (where only Catholics were to be tolerated) was to continue, and the fortresses of the Valtelline were to be given up again to the Pope. The people of the Grisons, however, scorned to make use of the formal prerogative adjudged to them; the Venetians and the French commanded by de Coeuvres vacated the Valtelline territory; the Spaniards might at any moment occupy it; and the Pope hesitated as to the vindication of his right to garrison it. Before this treaty, an open war between France and Spain had been in sight, but by means of this agreement the enmity was replaced by mutual advances fraught with far-reaching consequences. The secondary and small States of the Italian peninsula were now given over, without hope of recovery, to the hegemony of Spain, which was strengthened by the understanding with France; in the latter country Richelieu was proceeding to strengthen the royal authority, for he meant to force the Huguenots to bow beneath it and to strip them of all political power. For the United Provinces the treaty which they had concluded with France at Compiègne in June, 1624, had become worthless, and they were obliged to carry on the struggle for their existence under disheartening circumstances, since

Spain was secured by the Treaty of Monzon from any thwarting of her plans. Finally, in Germany the Catholic Reaction took a loftier flight than ever before, when the King of Denmark, whom at precisely the critical moment the subsidies promised by France had failed, suffered a defeat, and the Imperial troops forced their way irresistibly to the shores of the Baltic and the North Sea. This turn of events in Germany opened to Urban VIII the prospect not only of the ultimate defeat of Protestantism but also of material advantage.

And both these prospects seemed to draw nearer and nearer, as the German Catholics hastened to make capital out of their victories. Step by step they succeeded in ousting the Protestants in the Empire from the just and legally recognised position which they had held since 1555, in accordance with the Religious Peace of Augsburg. Rome had been obliged to submit to this Peace, but had never consented to it: one Pope, Paul IV, had even requested the Emperor Charles V and his brother King Ferdinand to declare the Religious Peace null and void, and had at the same time released them from their oath to keep it. Now, it had become an established principle that there was no need to observe towards heretics promises assured to them by a fundamental law of the Empire. In 1627 the Emperor Ferdinand II issued a formal edict, in which he proclaimed that Protestants were no longer to be tolerated in his kingdom of Bohemia, and in the following year he extended the force of this edict to the rest of the hereditary dominions of Austria. And in the rest of Germany the Catholic Reaction, which called itself the New Reformation and is more appropriately known as the Counter-reformation, was carried on with cold ruthlessness. These proceedings, carried on in defiance of all equity and all hitherto acknowledged rights, culminated in the Edict of Restitution published in 1629, which constrained the Protestant States to give back to the Catholic Church all the ecclesiastical property that had come into their possession during the last seventy-four years. A new source of enrichment was thus opened to this Church; and there was no doubt that Rome meant to have her share in the wealth of the national Churches subordinated to herself. From this it is easy to understand the action of Urban in addressing briefs to the Emperor, in which he expressed approval of the Edict of Restitution and could not say enough in its praise; it is less comprehensible how upon a subsequent occasion, when Gustavus Adolphus had entered upon his triumphal march through Germany and became associated with the very obvious hostility on the part of the Pope towards the House of Habsburg, the same Urban could deny that he had ever given his consent to the Edict of Restitution, stating how he had informed the Consistory of Cardinals that this edict did not correspond to his conception of affairs.

Even before the publication of the edict, which had for its aim the despoiling of the Protestants, another resplendent hope had arisen for

Catholicism. Richelieu, desirous of subduing the Huguenots of La Rochelle and thus baffling the plans of Charles I and Buckingham, who were making overtures to them, succeeded in concluding, on April 20, 1627, a Franco-Hispano-papal treaty, planning the invasion and in fact the dismemberment of England. This idea appears to have been originally suggested by Urban, and Richelieu merely acted upon the suggestion, while Olivares, the minister of King Philip IV, declared his assent. In any case, the treaty was concluded, and, had it been crowned with success, would have resulted in the restoration of the Catholic religion in England. Besides this, as we are told on no uncertain authority, Ireland was, in case the undertaking prospered, to have been made over to the Pope, as his sovereign property, which he could give in fief to whomsoever he would. The scheme was not ill-devised and shaped, although it came to nothing—an indication from which we may judge to what extent the united Powers of Catholicism trusted in their strength.

It was not only Protestantism which was threatened with the utmost danger from the overthrow which these Powers had prepared, or were about to prepare, for the followers of the Gospel: the whole of modern civilisation and the continuous development of learning would have been forcibly stopped, and that for no short time, had the Catholic Reaction been finally victorious. The clearest possible proof of this is found in the cruel treatment to which Rome, by order of Urban VIII, subjected one of the greatest of speculative thinkers, Galileo Galilei. The wider the field which would have been won for the Inquisition on the Continent, the more effectively would it have set itself to oppose—not only astronomical truth.

But the artificial edifice of the coalition of Catholic Powers began to totter, just when it seemed most securely placed. In Germany, shortly after the Edict of Restitution had been issued, many Catholic States revolted from the Emperor, whose heightened authority, together with the extortions of Wallenstein's soldiers, led even Catholic Princes to look round for deliverance from the danger which threatened their independence, while Maximilian of Bavaria himself joined the aggrieved party and began to compare his own ill fortune with the good fortune of the House of Habsburg. In France Richelieu, engaged in the siege of La Rochelle, nevertheless kept in mind the main task of his political life—the purpose of making war upon Spain and the Emperor; and scarcely had La Rochelle fallen before he determined to oppose the Spanish policy in Italy. Pope Urban met him half-way, or rather was beforehand with him. He stirred up France against Spain, and urged King Louis XIII to despatch an army over the Alps without delay: he, the Pope, would himself reinforce it with his troops and take his part in the struggle for the freedom of Italy. The camp of the Catholic States, which had forced heresy to yield one position after another, had itself

become the scene of unconcealed discord, for which no remedy was found during the remainder of the Thirty Years' War.

The motive that prompted the Pope to range himself on the side of France was the struggle for the Mantuan succession, which was assuming a more and more threatening aspect. The elder line of the House of Gonzaga had died out at the close of the year 1627 with Vincent II, Duke of Mantua, who had acknowledged as his successor in the dukedom Charles di Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers and Rethel, then resident in France. This Duke of Nevers, actually the nearest agnate to the succession, was a peer of France, a favourite of Louis XIII and personally devoted to the French cause: his father had fought at St Quentin against Philip II and Charles V. There was enough reason in this to make him undesirable in the eyes of the Courts of Madrid and Vienna. The Emperor, however, when it was made known to him that Nevers had taken possession of Mantua, maintained an attitude of extreme reserve. Spain took the opposite course, and did not long hesitate to conclude an alliance with the Duke of Savoy, who was raising a claim to Montferrat, a dependency of Mantua. Spanish troops were sent out from the Milanese and the siege of Casale, the stronghold of Montferrat, followed. No onlooker in his senses could have doubted for a moment that the Emperor would support the warlike action of Spain. As overlord of the Imperial fiefs, Mantua and Montferrat, Ferdinand II, in the first instance, tried legal action, by placing both duchies under sequestration. Nevers, in the hope of bringing about an arrangement, sent his son to Vienna, where he hoped to gain the favour of the Empress, herself a Gonzaga. But, almost simultaneously with the arrival of young Nevers in Vienna, there arrived a protest from the Spanish Governor of Milan, objecting to the reception by Ferdinand of an enemy of King Philip IV. The protest took effect; the Prince was only once received, and that in secret, by the Empress, while the Emperor only granted him an audience of leave after his recall had been notified from Mantua. Ferdinand II had on this occasion allowed his attitude to be dictated to him by Don Gonzalez de Cordoba, the Spanish Governor in the Milanese. At about the same time the Pope, through his nuncio, made offers of mediation in Vienna, but found his efforts futile, as Spain naturally wished them to be.

In the meantime an event had occurred which gave an entirely different turn to the whole situation. La Rochelle had surrendered, on October 30, 1628, and Richelieu had his hands free. During the winter months he contented himself indeed with negotiations; but directly afterwards he set the King on the march, at the head of the flower of the French army, from Grenoble over Mont G n vre to Italy. At Susa, which the French took after a short resistance, the Prince of Piedmont was compelled to subscribe to a treaty, the terms of which bound his father, the Duke of Savoy, to break with Spain. The Spaniards in consequence raised the siege of Casale; and Richelieu made an alliance

with Venice and Nevers, but not with the Pope, who had promised to join their league, but deferred his final decision. The dilatoriness of Urban VIII was on this occasion dictated by prudence; for no sooner had Richelieu gone back with his French troops over the Alps to complete the subjugation of the Huguenots in Languedoc, than Spain and the Emperor gathered themselves together for a more energetic attack. Spinola was made Governor of Milan, and the Emperor sent a considerable body of troops from Germany over the passes of the Grisons into Italy, where they immediately opened hostilities against Venice and Mantua. The Pope would have been powerless to withstand them, if his treaty of alliance with France had already been ratified.

In the next year (1630) the French, led by Richelieu, appeared again in Italy, and took from the Duke of Savoy, who had fallen away to the side of Spain, the stronghold of Pinerolo, the sally-port which permanently secured to them the way to Piedmont. But they could not prevent the defeat of their allies at Valeggio, nor the seizure by the Imperial troops of Mantua, which for full three days was pillaged without mercy. Closely considered, the whole bloody business in Upper Italy amounted to an episode of which the final decision was found north of the Alps and rested with the House of Habsburg.

The net from which the Emperor Ferdinand II was unable to extricate himself was woven by Richelieu and the Venetian Government, Maximilian of Bavaria, and the Pope. It has now been exposed to the light of day, and we can distinguish the various threads which made its meshes. So early as the autumn of 1629 the mediation of France had brought about a truce, which suspended hostilities between Poland and Sweden for the next six years; and the way was thus opened for Gustavus Adolphus to make war upon the Emperor. In July, 1630, the Venetian ambassador, Alvise Contarini, in the French camp at St Jean de Maurienne in Savoy, signed the treaty whereby France and the Republic pledged themselves to pay to the King of Sweden, so long as the war he was planning against Ferdinand II should last, a yearly subsidy of 1,200,000 *livres*. But to stir up a powerful enemy against the Emperor was only a part of the precautions suggested by diplomacy; it was also necessary to take thought how to force him to adopt measures in Germany which impaired his power of resistance and made him weak almost beyond recuperation. And this both Richelieu and the Pope understood to bring about with masterly skill. In the same year, 1630, a meeting of Electors was held at Ratisbon, and the Emperor wished to prevail on them to elect his son Ferdinand King of the Romans, and to express a virtual approval of the Mantuan war. Now the Pope had already, in the two previous years, advised Maximilian of Bavaria to prevent the election of the Emperor's son as King of the Romans—advice which he afterwards disowned, precisely as he denied having approved of the Edict of Restitution. On this occasion he sent the Nuncio Rocci to Ratisbon,

while Father Joseph, subtlest of Capuchins, appeared there as Richelieu's emissary. The two succeeded in arriving at a complete understanding with Maximilian of Bavaria, so that no election of a Roman King was held, while the Emperor resolved on a very far-reaching compliance with the wishes of the Princes. He abandoned his victorious commander-in-chief Wallenstein, with whose removal the Imperial army, which he had held together, practically fell to pieces. That such a concession was extorted from the Emperor is probably traceable to the influence of the Elector of Bavaria, who employed spies among Wallenstein's closest associates, and who certainly made no secret of their reports, which accused the general of the most infamous designs against the Emperor and his son. For the rest Ferdinand II submitted to the conclusion of the war in Upper Italy on terms favourable to the French, while the sovereignty of Mantua and Montferrat was adjudged to the Duke of Nevers. Such were the consequences of the Ratisbon meeting, and it is clear enough that a chief share in the accomplishment of results most disadvantageous to the Emperor belongs to the Nuncio Rocci and to Father Joseph.

Urban VIII, Gustavus Adolphus, and Richelieu lost no time in turning to most effectual account a conjuncture so admirably adapted to their purpose. Even before the end of January, 1631, the ruler of France and Gustavus Adolphus concluded their treaty of alliance, against which Maximilian of Bavaria conscientiously addressed a protest to the Pope. Yet the same Maximilian, not later than in the ensuing May, concluded an alliance with France—it is true for defensive purposes only—but mainly directed against the Imperial House, and arranged by the Nuncio Bagni in Paris. From Munich it was signified to Crivelli, the Bavarian diplomatic agent residing in Rome, that this alliance was the fruit of the fatherly foresight of his Holiness, who had always advised the re-establishment of a good understanding between Bavaria and the Crown of France.

Spain and the Emperor were filled with indignation by the action of the Pope. The Spanish ambassador, Cardinal Borgia, in the name and by command of his King, Philip IV, raised a protest which stated that all the harm and detriment which would befall the Catholic religion must be imputed not to him, the most pious and obedient of Kings, but to his Holiness. The only result of the protest was to exasperate Urban still more, and the citizens of Rome waited upon him on the Capitoline Hill with a declaration to the effect that God in His mercy had summoned out of the furthest north the King of Sweden, who, by thwarting the designs of Austria and Spain, was rendering to Christian Rome services like those of Camillus to the pagan city.

In vain, too, the Emperor Ferdinand exerted himself to arouse in the Pope the conviction that the struggle against Gustavus Adolphus was a religious war. He sent an ambassador to ask him for a substantial subsidy, which Urban must grant if it were his earnest desire to repel

the attack of the heretics upon the Catholics. But the answer he received to this request was always the same—that the papal coffers were exhausted, and that the Emperor had only himself to blame for this exhaustion, since by the war with Mantua he had imposed upon the Papal States heavy charges for purposes of defence; that the treasure in the Castle of St Angelo, which had come down from Sixtus V, was considerably diminished, and the rest of this treasure must remain in reserve for the defence of the Church, and neither could nor might be applied to purposes of war, involving purely secular interests and not those of religion. All that Ferdinand II could obtain from the Pope was the monthly sum of 12,000 *scudi*, promised after the victory of Gustavus Adolphus at Breitenfeld; but this sum was to be divided in equal shares between the Princes of the Catholic League and the Emperor. And scarcely a year had passed before Urban managed adroitly to evade his promise; he then granted the Emperor 200,000 *scudi*, which he was to raise from ecclesiastical revenues in the hereditary dominions of Austria and employ for his need; after which grant the Pope's promised payment of the 12,000 *scudi* was to be discontinued. We cannot mistake in thinking that these concessions were only made by Urban by way of lulling the world to sleep in the belief that he had yielded, so far as lay in his power, to the demands of Spain and Austria. But, however persuasively he may have demonstrated this theory, the Cabinets of Madrid and Vienna were no readier than before to believe in his goodwill.

As in the sixteenth century a condition of the utmost tension between Pope Paul III and the Emperor Charles V had all but led to an open breach, and caused the Pope to appear in league with the Protestant party, so now matters seemed about to come to an exactly similar pass between Urban VIII and the ultra-Catholic Ferdinand II. Nor indeed, according to the evidence of the best authorities, can any doubt be said to remain that the successes of Gustavus Adolphus, the far-famed champion of the Protestant faith, were hailed with joy by Urban. This Pope reserved his Catholic feelings for home use; his foreign policy bore, for a considerable time, the stamp of Protestantism.

Shortly before the close of 1632 a whole series of announcements reached Rome, where they were received by Urban as Job received his messages. First came the news of the death of Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen, and of the consequent overthrow of the Swedes. The news of the King's death proved to be true, but the Swedes had really gained a victory over the Imperial troops, who had been compelled to abandon the places they had occupied in Saxony. Next came the report concerning the election to the Polish Crown, which had resulted in favour of a candidate intimately connected with the Emperor; and, last not least, the announcement that Richelieu, whose opponents in France were bestirring themselves more vigorously, had fallen ill. The Spaniards

in Rome rejoiced, while the Pope mourned. But he would not let his courage fail him because of these misfortunes, for he put his firm trust in France. "The Pope"—so the envoy of the Duke of Modena wrote of him at the time—"better affects the French side than any citizen of Paris." Was he driven to this by a kind of instinct, to turn his face to the rising sun and his back upon that which had begun to set? Or did he perhaps hope, in spite of everything, that with the help of France and the Protestants he might wrest the kingdom of Naples from the Spaniards, who, being also masters of Milan, and most intimately connected with the Imperial Government, had it in their power to make the Church a dependency of the House of Habsburg? These questions admit of no answer capable of proof; for no sounding-line of historical enquiry can reach the motives of his actions and the ultimate foundation of his character.

After the death of Gustavus Adolphus, some hesitation and uncertainty may for a time be observed in Urban's bearing. When the Swedish Chancellor Oxenstierna had, at Heilbronn in April, 1633, concluded the compact binding the Protestant Princes of the Empire to leave the chief management of war and politics in the hands of Sweden, which in the agreement had secured for itself a support against Emperor and Catholics extending even beyond any peace that might be concluded—it was the Pope who expressed his disapproval of this arrangement, and who wished to induce the French to supersede their treaty of alliance with Sweden by a similar agreement with himself for the defence of Italy. It seems more probable that by this action he only wished in some measure to soothe Spain and the Imperial party, than that he could have supposed Richelieu likely to consent to the abandonment by France of an ally so powerful in the field, in order to chain herself to the helpless forces of the Papacy. In the same year (1633) an ambassador extraordinary from Ferdinand II besieged the Pope with demands which once more aimed at the grant of a subsidy against the heretics. For a considerable time he met with peremptory refusals, scarcely even couched in diplomatic language, especially as Urban felt himself strengthened in his obstinacy by the news of the capture of Ratisbon by the Swedes under Bernard of Weimar. The ambassador was obliged to press his demands for a full year before he at last obtained, not indeed a promise of subsidies from the papal treasury, but a decree issued by Urban, whereby six-tenths of all ecclesiastical revenues in Italy were put at the service of the Emperor (March, 1634). In September of the same year was fought the battle of Nördlingen, in which the Imperial troops, under the command of King Ferdinand, were victorious over the Swedes. Pope Urban could not quite conceal his dejection at this reverse, and during the *Te Deum*, sung to celebrate the triumph over the heretics, it was obvious enough that his joy as Head of the Catholic Church was sadly damped, and his disappointment

as a temporal prince was a very bitter one. He had flattered himself, even until 1630 or thereabouts, with the illusory hope of being able to place the Imperial Crown of the House of Habsburg upon the head of Maximilian of Bavaria, and what a spectacle now met his eyes! The understanding which had been re-established between Ferdinand and Maximilian developed after the murder of Wallenstein into a relation of the greatest intimacy; the House of Habsburg, lately vanquished, was now victorious, and, worst of all, victorious over Protestants, so that Urban was still obliged to put a good face on a bad business.

But at this juncture Richelieu mustered his forces for the ambitious scheme of attack upon Spain and the Emperor, which was to raise France to the position of the foremost Power in Europe. In the year following the battle of Nördlingen the French assumed the offensive at every point in the scene of war; the Duke of Rohan, now reconciled with Richelieu, seized and held the Grisons and the Valtelline, while, to give the Spaniards no breathing-space, more than 25,000 French advanced towards Flanders; other French regiments kept watch and ward over the frontiers of Lorraine and Upper Burgundy; Dutch and Swedes and the Duke of Savoy followed the example of the French; and France sustained the martial ardour of her allies by subsidies which were lavishly promised, even if not always punctually paid.

Had Urban VIII been made of the stuff of a Julius II or a Paul IV, he would not have hesitated for a moment, in the face of such events, to side openly with France. That his joining in Richelieu's enterprises must have been to the advantage of the Protestants as well as to his own, would not have startled him in the least. In spite of his rigorous Catholic orthodoxy, Paul IV had summoned Lutherans to defend Rome when he was waging his war against Philip II, and had allowed them to make their mock at Catholic uses or abuses. But Urban VIII was not, like Julius, more of a pagan Emperor than a Christian Pontifex, nor yet, like Paul, filled with fiery passion and ungovernable hate: he adroitly avoided daring enterprises, or caused others to engage in them to his advantage—he had not the courage to devote himself with might and main to their successful accomplishment. To judge by all that has come down to us with the warrant of unimpeachable evidence, concerning his anti-Spanish and anti-Imperial policy—he would have liked nothing better than that Richelieu and his confederates should have wrested from the grasp of Spain the possession of Milan, Flanders, and, if possible, Naples as well. Nevertheless, he refused to join the great alliance formed by France, just as he also declined to grant a hearing to the wish of the Imperialists that he would approve their endeavours, or at least express disapproval of those of the French. He persisted in observing, to the end of his life, a scrupulous formal neutrality, an attitude which, owing to the posture of affairs, certainly proved useful to France. For Richelieu in particular, who was obliged

to consider the Catholic party in the country and the Court, it was of incalculable value that the Pope silently allowed the support of Protestantism against its adversaries in Germany and elsewhere. Spain and the Emperor appreciated this toleration at its real worth, perceiving it to be a masked goodwill.

As to the internal condition of the States of the Church in the time of Urban VIII, it presents the picture of a specious augmentation of strength produced by violent means, side by side with an insuperable hidden weakness. Already in the third year of his pontificate the Pope had succeeded, without much difficulty, in bringing to pass the escheat of one of the larger fiefs of the Church, the duchy of Urbino. The duchy became a province of the Papal States, and its population at first rejoiced that their turn too had now come to take advantage of the inexhaustible fount of benefices at the Pope's disposal. Disillusionment soon followed in the shape of increased pressure of taxes, which Urban hastened to impose upon them. For his system of government led him to walk, with never a stumble, in two paths, both of which made it necessary for him to use to the utmost the people's capacity for the bearing of burdens.

One of these paths was the precipitous one of nepotism, which led to the most hazardous aberrations. It has been maintained by contemporaries of this Pope, otherwise well-informed, though their statement on this head is not removed beyond all doubt, that he thought of reviving that form of nepotism which was usual towards the end of the fifteenth, and during the sixteenth, century, by making his family a sovereign one. However this may be, it is unquestionable that Urban, either voluntarily or perforce, finally restricted himself to another form, within the range of which he displayed the most eager solicitude for the enrichment of his nephews, the Barberini. They for their part were not backward in helping themselves where anything was to be gained. The charge which was brought against them, of having purloined six, or indeed fourteen, million *scudi* of the State funds, may be an exaggeration; but it is a fact that during the twenty-one years of their uncle's pontificate they managed to increase the yearly income of their House from the original figure of 20,000 *scudi* to at least 400,000, and this entirely from landed property and the revenues of benefices heaped upon them. What they called their own in gold, and jewels besides, defies all valuation. There was no question in their case of any rendering of accounts; nor was it till after the death of Urban that they were threatened with a rigid scrutiny of their conduct, which they avoided in the first place by flight, and later by making an arrangement with the all-powerful sister-in-law of the new Pope.

The second path, which Urban pursued with unyielding obstinacy, had for its goal the transformation of the States of the Church into a military State. Nothing was too costly for this Pope if it implied an

increase of his power of resistance, in order to bring the prevailing hierarchy into a condition of perfect security within and power of action without. His efforts resulted in producing an army whose strength looked magnificent on paper, but could not meet any real test. He augmented the number of his troops, built new galleys, and laid out imposing fortresses, displaying with regard to such matters all that unbridled eagerness which leaves the devotees of militarism unsatisfied when they have done all they can. The result was that a prodigious amount of money was spent, the screw of taxation tightened to the utmost, and the debts with which the State was loaded made heavier, while it became more and more evident that the people were sinking deeper and deeper into poverty. Urban lived to discover, when his day of power was almost over, how vain had been his unresting efforts, and how impossible was the task of producing out of a people who obeyed the priestly government like a flock of sheep, soldiers who would fight for that government like wolves.

For the Pope was at the very last involved in an Italian war through his Barberini kinsmen. It was a war which began with a scandal, was carried on ignominiously for the papal arms, and ended by no means favourably for the States of the Church. The Barberini had fallen out with the Duke of Parma on questions of etiquette, and they revenged themselves on him in precisely the way in which a smart member of the Stock Exchange might retaliate on his commercial antagonist. The Duke had given certain *monti* (bonds), the interest on which was to be paid out of the revenues of his possessions in the Papal States, Castro and Ronciglione. The Barberini now contrived that their uncle should issue an inhibition, forbidding the exportation of grain from Castro into Roman territory; the property thereupon ceased to yield rents, and the Duke, who was already in financial straits, was unable to pay interest to his creditors. They, in a panic, threw their *monti* at very low prices on the market; these were hereupon bought by the Barberini, without any risk on their part, because they knew that the Pope would either compel the Duke to resume the payment of interest or seize Castro and Ronciglione, and thereupon completely satisfy the creditors out of the rents of both places. The plan seemed to be answering admirably. Papal troops marched to Castro, and took possession of it after a futile resistance. The Pope did not rest contented with this, being encouraged by the position of affairs at the moment to take further steps. Spain was for the time being completely crippled, Portugal in course of defection from her, Naples on the verge of revolt, the Dutch victorious everywhere as far as the sea. France, on the other hand, to whom Urban had rendered incontestable services, was in all respects at an advantage; for, being in possession of Pinerolo and allied with Savoy, she could at any moment attack the Milanese, while on the theatre of war in Germany the Swedes and Bernard of

Weimar had gained new victories on her behalf. But the Pope could safely hope that the French would leave him at least a free hand against Parma. In January, 1642, the Duke was excommunicated, all his fiefs were declared forfeited, and his freehold estates in the Roman territory (which had already been sequestered) were ordered to be sold: out of the proceeds of the sale the Apostolic Chamber had to satisfy the Duke's creditors, including the Barberini, who had obtained his bonds at a discount, by paying nominal prices for them, before it confiscated the remainder as lapsing to the Treasury.

By these events, and by the threatening preparations for war which were set on foot by the Pope, the middle States of Italy—Tuscany, Modena, and Venice—were roused to rebellion. If the Papacy, which had in the time of Clement VIII seized the duchy of Ferrara, and latterly, under Urban, that of Urbino, had now incorporated Parma with the States of the Church, all possibility of maintaining an equilibrium in the peninsula would have been at an end; and it was to prevent such a displacement of power in Central Italy that the three Dukes in question concluded, in August, an alliance which aimed at repelling the hostile intentions of the Pope towards Parma. The whole country between the Po and the Tiber now resounded with the alarm of war, and the Duke of Parma was the first to make up his mind to try his fortune. Breaking forth with not more than 3000 cavalry, he crossed the frontier, drove before him the papal troops wherever he encountered them, and took Forlì and Faenza; he then made towards Rome over the Apennines, and, with none to check or even to molest him, took up a position, in the end of September, near Lake Trasimene, spreading terror far and wide. The way to Rome, which was filled with anxiety and fear, lay open to him; had he appeared before the city walls there is not a doubt but that the Pope and Cardinals would have been obliged to grant him all that he might have asked. What induced the Duke to remain stationary, instead of pressing on, cannot be determined. He thus gave the enemy time, which they employed both in military preparations and in diplomatic negotiation. Near Orvieto a meeting took place of delegates from the three Dukes allied with Parma, and Cardinal Spada, as plenipotentiary of the Pope. Spada, it may be remarked, by the way, is described in the famous *Mémoires* of Cardinal de Retz as "*rompu et corrompu dans les affaires*"; and the mediation was undertaken by Hugues de Lionne, French ambassador at the Court of Rome. They agreed upon a treaty, which was not observed by the Pope; so that not only the three allied Dukes, but France as well, entered a protest against the breach of it. The spring of 1643 saw the renewal of hostilities, which were actually prolonged, together with a dreadful devastation of the States of the Church, until March 31, 1644—upon which day peace was at last declared at Venice, immediately after a defeat of the papal party at Ponte Lagoscuro on the Po. It was a peace which amounted to the restoration of the *status quo ante*: the conquests made on either

side were to be given back, and the Pope was obliged to free the Duke of Parma from his ban, to restore Castro to him within 60 days, and in like manner the freehold property confiscated in the territory of Rome. Urban VIII saw his pride humbled, the army on which he had lavished unsparing trouble and expense brought into ill-repute, the finances of his State undermined, and the vassal whom he had excommunicated reinstated, with undiminished honours, if not with actual gain, in his rule over all the property of which the Pope had dispossessed him. Urban was a broken man: it is reported that upon the signing of the treaty of peace he fell into a swoon, and died shortly afterwards on July 29, 1644.

The war which Urban had last waged was called by his contemporaries, not without reason, the War of the Barberini. What were its consequences we may gather from the report of a Venetian ambassador accredited to Urban's immediate successor. "All the communes of the Papal States"—so it runs—"have fallen, since the war of the Barberini, into a condition of such decay and exhaustion that it is impossible for them ever to rise or recover themselves." The suffering entailed by the war upon the Italian States which opposed the Pope—Tuscany, Modena, and the Republic of Venice—was disproportionately less. They emerged from the struggle without having either lost or gained in political importance, and their importance in this respect remained what it already was—quite secondary in degree. For between France, which was closely allied with Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, and Spain, who held sway over Milan and Naples, and the Republic of Genoa as a bank for the placing out of her loans, all these Italian States, not excepting even Venice, were powerless to adopt or carry out any independent policy. If, in spite of this, men still talked of the freedom of Italy, the princes and politicians who made use of the phrase understood and could understand nothing else by it than a security, granted to them by the power and influence of France, against being overpowered by Spain—a contingency which at that time was not regarded as impossible, and was at all times dreaded.

After the death of Urban followed some turbulent weeks, during which the See was vacant: and on September 16 Cardinal Giambattista Pamfili left the conclave as Pope Innocent X. Of this Pope it must be said that instead of ruling he was ruled, and that by his sister-in-law, Donna Olimpia Maldachini. A bust of this lady stands in the villa Pamfili in the same room with that of the Pope, and on comparing them one becomes conscious, as Ranke observes, that it was not merely possible, but inevitable, that he should have been governed by her. The personality and the moral weakness of Innocent speak far more clearly from the portrait of him in the Doria-Pamfili Gallery painted by the Spanish master, Diego Velasquez. This picture may be read like a written record: while fascinating the eye through the unsurpassable skill of the master, it repels through the mingled vulgarity and cunning of the original; it tells us in so many words that it is feeble and faint-hearted,

and became Pope by three things alone—as was said of him in derision by the Curia—through saying little, dissembling profoundly, and doing nothing at all: and it is easy to guess that he needed a man—or a woman—to rule him, while any effort made by him to emancipate himself could have had no other result than a final relapse into dependence.

It was during his pontificate that the great problem of peace was solved; and the Pope for his part, in dealing with it, deviated very little from the line for which a precedent from the time of Urban VIII had given the direction. For in 1636, when the attempt was made in the Conferences at Cologne to obtain a universal peace, Urban had sent a nuncio with the following instructions: he must oppose the revocation or even any weakening of the Edict of Restitution, and the establishment in the Palatinate of a Protestant Prince; and, above all, he must seek to prevent all treaties of peace between Catholic and heretical Powers. Innocent X, imitating this action on the part of his predecessor, sent his nuncio, Monsignor Chigi, to Münster and Osnabrück, where he was nevertheless unable to prevent the settlement of the Peace of Westphalia, in a spirit against which the Papacy had always striven. It is said, moreover, to have been the fault of Chigi (as was in 1654 laid to his charge in an instruction of Louis XIV directed to Hugues de Lionne), that peace was not brought about between France and Spain also, and that the Spaniards, in order to be able to continue their war with France more successfully, even made concessions to the United Provinces at the expense of the Catholic religion—concessions for which no one pledged himself more energetically than did Chigi in his own person. Whether this be correct is not to be ascertained; moreover, the attitude adopted by the Nuncio before the peace is of less consequence than that of the Pope after the peace had become an accomplished fact.

On November 20, 1648, Innocent X published the memorable Bull *Zelo domus Dei*, in which he declared the Peace of Westphalia to be “null and void, accursed and without any influence or result for the past, the present, or the future”; and he expressly added that no one, even if he had promised on oath to observe this peace, was bound to keep the oath. The Pope was filled with the deepest grief—“*cum intimo doloris sensu*,” says the Bull—because in the treaty of peace the free exercise of religion and right of admission to offices was granted to the Protestants.

By means of this Bull Rome maintained her standpoint of holding herself empowered to release men from oaths, especially of such as had been sworn to heretics. The Powers which at Münster and Osnabrück brought the Thirty Years' War to an end, when confronted with this pretended privilege, or rather this highly illegal pretension of the Roman Curia, simply disregarded it, and it was treated in just the same way by the nations, as subsequent history unfolded itself. The epilogue of Innocent X's protest against the peace, after the close of the war, was never anything more than a dead letter, and even the most zealous of Catholics will scarcely number it among the creditable documents of papal history.

CHAPTER XXIV.

FREDERICK HENRY, PRINCE OF ORANGE.

ON the death of Maurice (April 23, 1625), his younger brother, Frederick Henry, was hailed by men of all parties and opinions in the United Provinces as his natural successor, and the reins of power were unreservedly placed in his hands. He was now in the prime of life, having been born at Delft in 1584, and he possessed every qualification both by training and inherited gifts for the position of high authority and influence to which he was called. From his earliest youth he had lived in camps, and had shown himself a keen student of military science under the careful tuition of his brother. Already distinguished by many gallant feats of arms, handsome in face, chivalrous in bearing, with genial manners, the first of his House who could speak Dutch without a foreign accent, the son of William the Silent and Louise de Coligny had endeared himself alike to the army and the people, and this personal popularity was increased by the known tolerance and moderation of his religious and political opinions. Without a dissentient voice he was at once elected by the five Provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Overijssel, and Gelders as Stadholder in the place of Maurice, and was appointed by the States General Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union, and head of the Council of State.

Frederick Henry thus found himself, without a rival in the field, at the head of a country weary of domestic strife. He was invested with vast, though undefined, powers, and he used them with a statesmanlike sagacity and masterly tact which gave him henceforth undisputed predominance in the State. It was an authority which grew with the passing of the years. A contemporary writer, van der Capellen, a little later states that "the Prince in truth disposed of everything as he liked. All things gave way to his word." Nor was the increasing deference paid to his advice in matters political the only difference between the position of Frederick Henry and that of his predecessors. Frederick Henry was married to a clever and ambitious wife; and both he and Amalia von Solms delighted in society and were fond of ceremonial display. The somewhat burgher-like simplicity of the bachelor household of the surly Maurice was exchanged for the luxurious splendours of a Court. The

Prince was during the whole period of his stadholdership compelled to spend a large part of every year with the army in the field. To his wife at the Hague was entrusted the delicate task of keeping herself in touch with the cabals and intrigues of politicians and diplomatists, and holding him fully informed of all that was going on. Such duties were eminently congenial to the tastes of the Princess, who in thus acting as the eyes and ears of her husband at the seat of government was able to exercise no small influence over him, and upon the conduct of affairs.

Frederick Henry was an indefatigable worker. Active campaigning at the head of the armies of the Republic naturally had the first claim upon his attention, and every detail of military and naval administration passed through his hands. But, unlike Maurice, he was a politician and statesman, as well as a soldier. Frederick Henry kept a continuous and vigilant outlook over the entire field of administrative activity; and one department of State, with the help of certain trusted councillors, he entirely controlled—the important department of foreign affairs. Chief among these was Francis Aerssens, lord of Sommelsdijk, included by Richelieu among the three greatest statesmen he had met in his life. The new Stadholder had to overcome a natural prejudice against the arch-enemy of Oldenbarneveltdt. But the proved skill and capacity of the diplomatist speedily won for him the entire trust and lasting friendship of Frederick Henry. It is from the voluminous confidential correspondence which passed between these two men, between 1625 and 1641, that we are able to form a true estimate of the foreign policy pursued by the Prince, and to learn how great a part during his long career Frederick Henry “*par sa prudence et dextérité à manier les esprits*” played in deciding the issue of the great drama known as the Thirty Years’ War. His triumphs as a general were perhaps less instrumental than his gifts as a diplomatist in turning the scale against the preponderance of the House of Habsburg.

The first difficulty which the new Stadholder had to face was the burning question of religious persecution. The events of 1619 had left behind them bitter memories, and the Remonstrant party on the death of Maurice hoped for a reversal of the harsh policy with which his name was associated. Frederick Henry, however, was far too prudent to commit himself to any violent course. With statesmanlike instinct he was resolved, whatever his personal leanings to the principles of the Remonstrants, not to run the risk of a revival of civil strife. The Synod of Dort he looked upon as a *fait accompli*. The issues then settled must be broadly accepted. But, in the spirit of his father, he steadily advocated toleration, and, while maintaining the established “reformed” religion, he strove to mitigate the policy of repression, and to allow to all law-abiding citizens, within certain limits, freedom of worship and opinion. The enforcement of pains and penalties was discouraged, and gradually became almost a dead letter.

The conduct of the war was also attended by serious difficulties. The entrenchments which Spinola had drawn round Breda were too strong to be forced by the troops at the disposal of the Prince of Orange, and after holding out for eleven months the town was compelled by stress of famine to surrender (July 2). The loss of this frontier fortress, an ancestral possession of the Nassaus, caused much discouragement in the States, who, weary of the heavy burdens entailed by a series of ineffective campaigns, were anxious to confine the operations within the narrowest limits. Fortunately the conquerors of Breda were so exhausted by the length of the siege that for the rest of the summer of 1625 and the whole of the following year they were unable to assume a vigorous offensive. It was a critical moment for the United Provinces, and Frederick Henry by the agency of Aerssens made the strongest appeal to Richelieu for assistance against a common foe. The Cardinal offered a subsidy of a million *livres* annually on condition that a Dutch squadron helped to blockade the great Huguenot fortress of La Rochelle, then besieged by him. So strange an employment for the ships of Calvinist Holland and Zeeland was very unpopular in those provinces. But the influence of the Stadholder was strong enough to override opposition. He had his way and the treaty was ratified. What stronger proof can there be of the statesmanlike insight of Frederick Henry and his adviser, Aerssens, than their clear discernment that, as Ranke says in his admirable review of the situation, "the political power of the Huguenots in France and their antagonism to their King were opposed to the interest of the great Protestant and anti-Spanish party in Europe"?

The campaign of 1627 was marked by the brilliant capture of Groll, a town on the eastern frontier, by the forces of the States. With this exception, the characteristic of the military operations during 1627 and 1628 was cautious inactivity. Neither side felt strong enough to assume the offensive, and both were content to render the formidable barrier of frontier fortresses yet more impenetrable by additional fortifications. One of the chief of these on the side of Brabant was the town known to the Dutch as Hertogenbosch, to the French as Bois-le-Duc. This place in 1629 Frederick Henry determined to seize, as a set-off to the loss of Breda. It was a formidable task, but he made adequate preparations. He was able, on April 28, by almost incredible exertions, to assemble an army of 24,000 foot and 4000 horse, all picked men, on the heath of Mook; two days later by forced marches he arrived before Hertogenbosch and proceeded to invest it. Great was the joy at Brussels when the news came that the Prince of Orange had ventured on such an enterprise, and it was resolved that no efforts should be spared to prevent his success, as well as if possible to effect the destruction of his army. There was no fear of a speedy capture of the fortress. It was a place of extraordinary strength, garrisoned by a

force of 3000 good soldiers under a brave and tried Governor, Baron de Grobendonc. Under his orders there were likewise 5000 well-armed citizens, who had several times during the war shown their mettle by their successful defence of "Bolduc la Pucelle," as the town was proudly called.

The army of the Stadholder was of first-rate quality, strongly attached to a leader, who, though a stern disciplinarian, knew how to win the hearts of his soldiers by freely sharing their dangers and fatigues. It consisted of a medley of nationalities. Frederick Henry himself tells us, in his memoirs, that he led 18 regiments to Hertogenbosch, and of these three were Netherlanders, one Frisian, one Walloon, two German, four French, three Scottish, and four English. The English, Scottish, and French contingents formed the *élite* of the force, all of them veteran troops serving by the consent of their sovereigns, but in the pay of the Republic. Few military records indeed are more interesting than those of the English and Scottish brigades in the Dutch service, which first came into existence in 1572, and were not finally dissolved until 1782. They numbered in their ranks during the War of Independence some of the best blood and of the most adventurous spirits to be found in Britain, and were always in the forefront of danger.

The strength of Hertogenbosch lay in its position in the midst of marshes and of a number of small streams through which only one available military road passed, flanked by water on either side, and defended by two powerful detached forts, named St Isabella and St Anthony. But the Prince had had long training in the school of Maurice, and with a patience and skill that had never been surpassed he set to work to surround the town with a double line of circumvallation; all the resources of engineering were employed upon the task. The whole of the earth and fascines had been brought by boat from Holland. Across the marshes he built two immense dykes, one of these 3500 feet in length and 12 feet wide, rising 4 feet out of the water with high parapets on either side; the other was 1500 feet in length, and both were strong enough to admit of the passage of cavalry and artillery. The village of Crèvecoeur, three miles distant at the confluence of the rivers Dese and Meuse, was strongly entrenched and garrisoned as a base of supplies, and was connected with the lines of circumvallation by a double line of earth-works along the banks of the Dese. With such unremitting energy was the work carried on under the personal superintendence of the Stadholder himself, that the whole was completed in the astonishingly short period of three weeks. To the English and French contingents was entrusted the attack on forts St Anthony and St Isabella, company relieving company unceasingly, the soldiers of the two rival nationalities emulously, side by side, with resistless vigour pushed on their approaches.

The news led to prompt measures being taken at Brussels. The

Count de Berg was ordered with all available forces to march as quickly as possible to the relief of the town. Accordingly that officer set out from Turnhout, June 19, at the head of an admirably equipped army of 30,000 foot and 7000 horse for Hertogenbosch, gathering reinforcements as he went. No one imagined that the Prince would dare to stand his ground in the face of such a force. But Frederick Henry had already made his preparations. By damming two streams, the Doommel and the Aa, he was able to fill with water two broad canals that he had drawn right round his lines, and to flood a stretch of low-lying country beyond. Day and night the entire circle of the ramparts was patrolled by detachments of troops. De Berg after some unsuccessful attempts, finding access impracticable, determined on a bold counter-stroke. Crossing the Yssel he advanced into the very heart of the United Provinces, which lay almost defenceless before him. With fire and sword he ravaged the Province of Utrecht, which had long been spared the presence of an enemy, captured Amersfoort, and even threatened Amsterdam.

Everywhere terror and anxiety reigned; but the Stadholder was not to be moved from his set purpose. Sending a force under Ernest Casimir of Nassau to watch de Berg, he pushed on the siege operations with relentless determination. The forts of St Isabella and St Anthony were stormed, July 17, and the advance along the narrow causeway to the main defences of the town began. Again the English and French regiments, working turn by turn in the trenches, and having to fight their way step by step, were the assailants. Meanwhile, a success attended the arms of Frederick Henry in the capture of the important town of Wesel by a small force under the command of Colonel Dieden in a sudden night-attack. This fortunate stroke occurred at a critical moment, for an Imperialist force was advancing into the Veluwe to cooperate with the Spaniards. But, on hearing of the loss of Wesel, which had served as his storehouse for munitions and arms, de Berg, fearing for his communications, abandoned Amersfoort and retreated towards Rheinberg followed by the Imperialists. Hertogenbosch was left to its fate, and the efforts of the besiegers were redoubled. Frederick Henry set an example of reckless courage, by exposing himself freely in the front ranks; and Colonel Vere was killed at his side. The garrison, on their part, fought hard to the very last, and did not parley until their main defences, one after the other, had been carried by assault. At length, on September 14, Grobendonc capitulated on most favourable terms. This was a great triumph for the Stadholder, for the eyes of all Europe had for months been fixed upon the siege of Hertogenbosch, and his position both at home and abroad was greatly strengthened by this fine feat of arms. On his return to the Hague on November 13, after six months' absence, he was enthusiastically greeted by the people as a national hero.

Nevertheless, like his predecessors, Frederick Henry had his difficulties with the Province of Holland, and with its largest town, Amsterdam. He was perpetually hampered in the vigorous prosecution of the war by their refusal to grant supplies. Yet overtures from the Infanta for a truce came to naught chiefly through the opposition of the States of Holland, under pressure from the Calvinist preachers and the shareholders of the East and West India Companies. The old questions as to freedom of religion and freedom of trade once more blocked the way. But, though rejecting the proposals for a truce, the stiffnecked Hollander Regents would not open their purse-strings, although the Stadholder plainly told them that if they were resolved upon war it should be offensive war, and that in his opinion defensive operations could only end in the ruin of the country. But he spoke to deaf ears, and the year 1630 passed without any serious military undertaking. In spite, however, of this divergence of views, the influence of Frederick Henry and the confidence inspired by him were continually on the increase. This was conspicuously shown by the readiness with which the Hollanders took the lead of the other provinces in the passing of the *Acte de Survivance* (April 19, 1631), by which the States General declared the only son of the Prince of Orange, a five years' old child, heir to his father's offices of Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union, while Holland, Zeeland, and Gelders severally declared him heir to the stadholdership in those Provinces. The passing of this Act rendered the position and powers of Frederick Henry little different from those of a sovereign prince.

In the year 1631 self-interest prompted the Hollanders to vote supplies for an expedition against Dunkirk. The bold sea-rovers of the Flemish port had long been the pest of Dutch traders in the narrow seas. The Stadholder actually entered Flanders at the head of a considerable army; but through the timidity of the deputies of the States General, who accompanied the expedition, it proved abortive. The deputies dreaded lest Frederick Henry and his army should be cut off from their base in a hostile country, as Maurice had been in 1600, and the Prince was unwilling to take the responsibility upon himself of a hazardous advance against their wishes. The course of events proved that he had acted judiciously. After his return to Holland news was brought that a considerable Spanish armada, consisting of thirty-five large vessels and a number of smaller boats laden with stores and munitions, had set sail from Antwerp, under the command of Count John of Nassau. The Infanta herself was present at the start. The fact that besides the crews 6000 soldiers had been embarked made it clear that a serious attack was projected upon some place in the province of Zeeland. Hurried measures had to be taken. Some twelve or thirteen vessels, hastily collected, were ordered to keep in close touch with the Spaniards, while detachments of troops were despatched to

different points to resist any attempt at disembarkation. The difficulty was that the destination of the Spanish force was unknown. Their first attempt was upon the island of Tertolen, but they were too late, for Colonel Morgan, at the head of 2000 English troops, just forestalled them by boldly wading across a channel with the water up to their armpits. The Dutch ships meanwhile, though they kept their adversaries in sight, could not for some days come up to them, owing to contrary winds and tides. At last, on September 12, on the Slaak, near Tholen, they arrived within shot, and, despite their great inferiority both in the number and size of their ships, did not hesitate to attack. A desperate encounter took place, which ended in the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet. Count John, with a few followers, escaped in a swift-sailing sloop; hundreds were drowned in their efforts to escape from their ships; and those who reached the shore fell into the hands of the States troops. All the ships were taken or sunk, and 5000 prisoners were the prize of this astonishing victory.

Frederick Henry made the year 1632 notable by another great feat of arms. In 1629 he had secured the southern frontier of the United Provinces by the taking of Hertogenbosch; he now resolved to strengthen their eastern frontier and their hold upon the Meuse by the capture of Maestricht. With this design the Prince of Orange advanced in the spring from Nymegen at the head of a force of 17,000 foot and 4000 horse, the choicest part of which consisted of the seasoned English, Scottish, and French regiments. To clear his way he invested and took Venloo and Roermonde. Before Roermonde Ernest Casimir of Nassau was killed. He was succeeded in the stadholderships of Friesland and Groningen by his son, Henry Casimir. On June 10 the army arrived before Maestricht. The task which confronted the Stadholder was not so difficult as in 1629. The river Meuse, on both sides of which lay the populous town, afforded easy facilities for supplies. Maestricht was, however, strongly fortified and garrisoned, and, in case of the advance of a relieving force, the besiegers would be weakened by the division of their army into two separate bodies by a broad, deep river. But Frederick Henry, using all the resources of engineering science for which he was renowned, surrounded the place with entrenched lines of circumvallation, connected above and below the town by bridges, and protected at all critical points by powerful redoubts and outlying forts. The English and French troops again, as at Hertogenbosch, shared the honour of being entrusted with the approaches. The Prince was not, however, to carry on his siege operations undisturbed. A strong Spanish army of 18,000 foot and 6000 horse under Don Gonzalez de Cordoba was ordered to advance to the relief of the fortress, and on July 2 encamped not far from the Dutch lines on the southern side of the river. By unremitting vigilance, however, and by personally visiting the outposts by day and

night, Frederick Henry was able to prevent the Spaniards from finding any vulnerable spot in his extended works which they could pierce by surprise or by sudden attack. Nevertheless, the position of the Stadholder became very critical when, at the beginning of August, an Imperialist army of 12,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry under Pappenheim arrived before Maestricht and pitched their camp near the Spaniards.

That fiery leader, despite the strength of the Stadholder's lines, determined at all hazards to force them, and so compel the besiegers to retire at the imminent risk of being crushed in their retreat. Accordingly, while the Spaniards made a strong demonstration on one side of the Meuse, he flung himself with all the forces at his command against what he believed to be a weak point in the Dutch entrenchments. But Frederick Henry, though taken by surprise, being at the moment laid up by an attack of gout, at once rose from his bed and hurried in person with strong reinforcements to the post of danger. A fierce and protracted struggle took place; but, as night fell, the Imperialists were finally beaten off, leaving 1500 killed and wounded on the field. An attempt was next made to cut the Stadholder's communications. He had, however, laid up within his lines ample supplies for two months, and without paying any attention to the proceedings of the armies outside pressed on with the utmost vigour his approaches against the town. In vain the brave garrison made sortie after sortie. The English bore the brunt of the fighting; and the Earl of Oxford and Colonel Harwood were killed and Colonel Morgan dangerously wounded. At last two tunnels sixty feet deep were driven under the great moat before the ramparts, a mine was sprung, and a forlorn hope succeeded in making good their footing within the main walls. Night put an end to the strife, and when morning came overtures were made for surrender. It was feared that further resistance might lead to the sack of the town. Favourable terms were granted and the garrison marched out with all the honours of war (August 23). The Spanish and Imperial armies were still encamped close by; but as their supplies were running short, and the position of the States troops was too strong to be successfully assailed, they withdrew, the Spaniards in the direction of Liège, Pappenheim across the Rhine. The taking of Orsoy ended a triumphant campaign.

One of its results was the reopening of negotiations by the Archduchess Isabel for a peace or a long truce. The terms at first offered were sufficiently favourable to win the support of Frederick Henry. But the usual differences as to the questions of freedom of trade and of religion led to long months of diplomatic discussion, and finally the negotiations were broken off, the southern envoys suddenly stiffening in their demands. The reason for this change of attitude is to be found in changed circumstances. A few months after the taking of Maestricht Gustavus Adolphus had fallen at Lützen (November 16, 1632), and his

death at the very height of his career of victory filled the Catholic party throughout Europe with fresh hopes. A year later the Infanta Isabel died (November 29, 1633) childless, and after thirty-six years of quasi-independence, the southern Netherlands again became directly subject to the rule of the King of Spain. The irreducible demands of the Dutch traders were once more confronted by the *non possumus* of the traditional Spanish policy with regard to commerce and conquests in the Indies, which barred all efforts at accommodation. Frederick Henry's comment upon the draft articles submitted to him in 1633 explains the whole situation tersely but clearly:—"In our judgment the whole treaty consists in two points: the one touching the affairs of Europe, the other that of the Indies.....and first, to begin with, that of the Indies, whereon once being agreed, we are of opinion that we should also quickly come to an understanding with one another on the affairs of Europe." But the question of the Indies, which had proved so formidable an obstacle in the negotiations of 1608-9, had acquired a far greater weight and importance in 1632-3. It will be shown later that much had occurred in the interval to make "the point touching the affairs of the Indies" one of vital moment to a large and influential section of the Dutch people.

The failure of these negotiations rendered an alliance with France a necessity. There were many difficulties in the way. The majority in the States of Holland, headed by the Pensionary Adrian Pauw, was opposed to a continuance of the war; and for a while the Princess of Orange used all her influence on the same side. Richelieu also, though ready to help the Dutch with subsidies, was at first averse from committing the King of France to a step which meant nothing less than taking sides openly with the cause of Protestantism against Catholicism in the great struggle now devastating Germany. The firmness of purpose of the Stadholder, aided by the diplomatic adroitness of Aerssens, was however at length completely triumphant. Adrian Pauw was replaced by Jacob Cats, and Amalia von Solms changed sides. The declaration of Oxenstierna, that he would not continue the war if Holland withdrew, decided Richelieu. At the beginning of 1635 an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between France and the United Provinces. By this neither Power was to make peace nor conclude a truce without the consent of the other; their conquests in the southern Netherlands were to be divided between them; and each undertook to maintain in the field an army of 25,000 foot and 5000 horse.

In the spring of the year a strong French army under Marshals Châtillon and de Brézé, accordingly, after defeating a Spanish force under Prince Thomas of Savoy near Namur, marched across the enemy's country and joined the Dutch troops at Maestricht, where in conformity with the orders of Louis XIII the Marshals placed themselves under the command of Frederick Henry. The Stadholder found himself at the

head of 32,000 foot and 9000 horse, and assuming the offensive, made an attempt to besiege Louvain. But provisions ran short, dissensions arose between the commanders, and a retreat was attended by disaster. The Cardinal Infante Ferdinand had been despatched by his brother Philip IV with considerable reinforcements to Brussels, as Governor of the Netherlands. The victor of Nördlingen did not let slip so favourable an opportunity for the display of his military talents. Diest, Goch, Gennep, Limburg, and finally the fort of Schenk, commanding the junction of the Rhine and Waal, fell rapidly into his hands. The loss of this post was serious, and the Stadholder, in his turn, lost no time in laying siege to it. All through the winter the blockade was continued; but so determined was the defence that not till April 26, 1636, was the fort retaken. The fatigue and privations endured by the Dutch army, and their losses through disease during the operations, had been such that nothing further was attempted during the summer of 1636. Meanwhile the Cardinal Infante, by a bold march southwards almost to the gates of Paris, had effectually alarmed the French, and prevented them from sending an army into the Netherlands.

Under pressure from Richelieu, the States General in 1637 gave their consent to the despatch of a large force to attempt, with French aid, the capture of Dunkirk. Frederick Henry, on May 7, ordered the troops destined for the expedition, consisting of 14,000 foot and 32 companies of cavalry, to assemble at Rammekens. But week after week contrary winds prevented embarkation, and as his troops, wearied out with inaction, were already suffering from disease, the Stadholder abandoned an enterprise which the enemy had made full preparations to repel, and suddenly, July 20, gave orders to set out for Breda. Vexation at not being able to effect the relief of this town, had, it will be remembered, hastened the death of Maurice. It had fallen to Spinola, in the beginning of Frederick Henry's stadholderate, after a blockade of eleven months. The fortifications had then been regarded as quite prohibitive of direct attack. They had since been strengthened, were held by a garrison of 4000 men, and were looked upon as impregnable. But to so consummate a master of the art of besieging as Frederick Henry the word impregnability had no terrors. It was the story of Hertogenbosch over again. Lines of circumvallation were drawn round the town, the river was dammed to flood the flat country around, and the task of pushing the approaches was again entrusted to the English and French regiments. The Cardinal Infante marched to raise the leaguer at the head of a powerful force; but, finding no single spot where he could assault the Stadholder's lines with hopes of success, he was obliged to move on, and try to entice the Prince away from Breda by attacking Venloo and Roermonde. All in vain. A French invasion from the south compelled the Cardinal Infante to leave the place to its fate. After a desperate resistance extending over eleven weeks, the town capitulated on